# Studying Adversarial Discourse on Maliciously-Aligned LLMs

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#### Problem statement

The rise of platforms that facilitate user interactions with Large Language Models (LLMs) has benefited millions around the world. A question that arises is, are adversaries (i.e., hackers) also using the power of LLMs for their nefarious activities?

In this project, we are interested in delving more into the "maliciously-aligned" LLMs (MALMs) ecosystem. We consider an LLM to be "maliciously-aligned" if it was pre-trained and/or fine tuned for malicious activities (e.g., generating phishing campaigns at scale).

#### Related work

The academic literature has primarily focused on creating jailbreak prompts [1,2,3,21,22], and some have proposed defense mechanisms against them [4,23,24]. Additionally, researchers have already started to measure the misuse of LLMs [39]. For instance, Shen et al. conducted a measurement study on the sharing of jailbreak prompts (i.e., texts that users can input to an LLM to evade its safeguards that block the generation of unethical content) on public websites, datasets, Reddit, and Discord [5]. Using search terms like "ChatGPT" and "jailbreak" they identified relevant posts and sought to analyze the jailbreak prompts evolution over time.

It is important to note that, aside from jailbreaking popular LLMs to generate malicious content, a possible avenue for adversaries is to create their own malicious LLMs. In fact, it has been reported that some of these maliciously-aligned LLM models are already being sold [6,7,8,9]. However, little is known on how these maliciously-aligned large language models were pre-trained or fine-tuned, nor cybercriminals' reactions to them. Studies on people's reactions to maliciously-aligned LLMs in forums have been primarily led by journalists [18].

Also, based on the analysis by Shen et al., "jailbreak communities" are shifting from public to private spaces. This statement is supported by others' observations [11,12]. The points above suggest there is a need to study adversarial discourse on private virtual spaces (i.e., hacker forums and the dark web) where cybercriminals might be sharing knowledge with others on maliciously-aligned LLMs.

# Methods

The following diagram summarizes our methodology:



By following a market analysis approach, we first did online searches to identify maliciously-aligned LLMs and forums where people are discussing them. For each identified forum, we created an account and manually explored it. The following picture shows the main page of one hacker forums, Hack Forums, once we signed in with our account:



After, we gathered posts on maliciously-aligned LLMs. The following table summarizes our data sources:

Data source	Public internet vs dark web	Comments
Hack Forums	Public Internet	We created a disposable account, manually queried and downloaded data. They have an API to automate this step
Other public hacker forums	Public Internet	The other forums we obtained data from were BreachForums, Cracked.io, 0x00sec

Tor boards	Dark web	We did manual scraping and snowball collection
Discord	Public Internet	We manually inspected some Discord servers
Telegram channels	Public Internet	Manual infiltration of channels via creating a disposable account. Manually query and download information

Next, with the gathered data we did content analysis. In this process, we randomly sampled posts from the forums and qualitatively coded them to capture the above relevant questions. Finally, to expand our understanding of the maliciously-aligned LLMs ecosystem we used Google Trends to find popularity patterns over time.

We were interested in getting to know details about the maliciously-aligned LLMs such as their capabilities and how they were trained and how they work (e.g., Are there really maliciously-aligned LLMs under the services being promoted? or Are some malicious LLMs services using jailbreaking prompts and sending API calls to popular "benign" LLM models?). In addition, we were curious about whether or not adversaries are sharing information with each other with regard to forming malicious or maliciously-aligned LLM-based services (e.g., Are they sharing prompt injection attacks, linking to publicly available models to fine-tune?).

Moreover, another question that interested us was how adversaries are leveraging maliciously-aligned LLMs (e.g., Are they sharing what they did with them? How satisfied are they with them? Is there a consensus among various users on the usefulness of these LLMs?). However, these questions are more difficult to answer, since they typically involve the actual incriminating behaviors of adversaries, who are less likely to discuss those activities on semi-public fora.

#### Ethical considerations

We adopted the best ethical and methodological practices used by prior work that specifically examines underground e-crime communities in order to perform adversary measurement [13,14,15]. Additionally, we decided to remove usernames and user pictures in the forum screenshots included throughout this report to avoid revealing people's identities.

#### Limitations

Our study has some limitations. For example, we did not purchase any of the maliciously-aligned LLMs. Thus, we did not directly test their capabilities<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, we were not able to gather data from sources like Telegram chats. The reason is, we could not find active channels to scrape data from. Also, one can argue that some adversaries would restrain themselves from posting about their strategies online. Thus, our study does not cover all potential adversarial strategies and thoughts.

## Results

## A numerous landscape of maliciously-aligned LLMs

First, we did Google searches with search terms like "WormGPT" and "FraudGPT", we started consolidating a table that compares the use of various maliciously-aligned LLMs (e.g., versions, models they use, pricing, etc.):

Service	Versions	Model	Licences	Prices	Userbase	Capabilities	Creator	Websites in which it is accessible	Training data	
WormGPT	- V1 - V2 - FlowGPT version	V1 and V2: GPT-J 6B FlowGPT version: GPT-3	Lifetime	V1 Life Time: USD \$150 V2 Life Time: USD \$300	Unknown	Privacy focused	"Last", 23-year old Portuguese		Confidential datasets that include malware and fraud data	https://cyber https://twitte https://finger https://arxiv.
DarkBART	Unknown	"DarkBART will be a dark version of the Google BART AI, and the hackers said it will be based on a large language model (LLM) known as DarkBERT"		1 month: USD \$80 3 months: USD \$200 6 months: USD \$400 Lifetime: USD \$700	Unknown	Internet access, Google Lens integration		Kingdom Market, Tor2Door Market, Abacus Marketspace	Unknown	https://www. https://www. b
FraudGPT	Unknown	Unknown	1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months	1 month: USD \$200 3 months: USD \$450 6 months: USD \$1000 12 months: USD \$1700	More than 3000 sales and reviews	Create SMS phishing messages, fraud emails	CanadianKingp in12	First sold on "normal" Internet hacker forums. Then, the threads were removed. User that posted it was blocked for policy violations.	Unknown	https://cyber https://slash e-the-tip-of-l
Wolf GPT	Unknown	Unknown	1 month	1 month: USD \$90	Unknown	Confidentiality Advanced phishing attacks	ianwolf99	There is a GitHub repository titled WOLFGPT: https://github.com/ianwolf99/WOLFGPT	Unknown	https://cyber
Evil-GPT	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	USD \$10	Unknown	Generate malware	paschalc24	There is a GitHub repository titled evil-gpt: https://github.com/paschalc24/evil-gpt	Unknown	https://cyber https://rishik https://www. pe-vs-reality
XXXGPT	Unknown	Unknown	1 month	1 month: USD \$90	Unknown	Code for botnets Code for RAT	zizifn	There is a GitHub repository titled xxx-gpt: https://github.com/zizifn/xxx-gpt  The URL people can use to try it out looks similar to the one from Evil-GPT	Unknown	https://cyber
PoisonGPT	Unknown	It seems it refers to a process in which benign LLMs are modified so that they provide certain responses given certain prompts, and they are posted in Hudding Face	N/A	N/A	N/A	Reply incorrect information to a user query	Mithril Security	The proof-of-concept is describet at https://blog.mithrilsecurity.jo/poisongpt-how-we-hi d-a-lobotomized-ilm-on-hugging-face-to-spread-fake-news/	Unknown	https://blog.i e-to-spread-


The full comparison table is available in Google Drive [40].

It surprised us that there are many services marketed as maliciously-aligned LLMs. In total, we identified 12 maliciously-aligned LLMs. It is curious that many of these services provide access to their models via licenses that range from USD \$10 to USD \$1700. From our online searches we have noticed that these services are marketed with numerous capabilities, including malware creation and anonymity. However, by looking at forum posts we noticed that some users complain about some of these services.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For the models available on FlowGPT (WormGPT) we tested the community chats to see the output of the models given some user queries

# AI as a topic of interest on hacker forums


Once we created an account in **Hack Forums** and signed in and saw something like this:



Notice that under the **Blackhat Training** category there is a subcategory titled **Dark AI**. By clicking on Dark AI, we reached the following page:




This is the thread list for Dark AI **organized by views**:



From the image above, it can be seen that, from the top 8 "normal" threads two are about maliciously-aligned LLMs, one is about a jailbreak prompt to bypass ChatGPT's safety features, and two are about ChatGTP accounts.

This is the thread list for Dark AI **organized by replies**:




By exploring this thread list, we noticed different ways in which people seek to misuse AI:

#### Jailbreaking popular multimodal LLMs:



Some users share jailbreak prompts so that popular, commercial LLMs generate unethical content:





However, others reply in the thread to inform some jailbreaks did not work while others ask for up-to-date versions of jailbreak prompts:



## Jailbreaking text-to-image models







# Finding maliciously-aligned LLMs




# Creating maliciously-aligned LLMs



## **Voice cloning**







As seen on the previous images, although some posts are not detailed, the intentions of users are revealed by what they demand (e.g., looking for a maliciously-aligned LLM, asking how to replicate WormGPT), although for some of these cases, it is unclear what the specific use-cases might be.

## The most popular maliciously-aligned LLMs

Also, we created an account in several popular hacking forums including Hack Forums, BreachForums, and Cracked.io, and consolidated the following table regarding search results of maliciously-aligned LLMs:

Service	Origin of discovery	# Hack Forums threads (as of 11/2/2023)	# Hack Forums replies (as of 11/2/2023)	# Hack Forum thread views (as of 11/2/2023)	Interesting Hack Forums posts (as of 11/2/2023)	# BreachForu ms threads (as of 11/05/2023)	ms replies (as of	# BreachForu ms thread views (as of 11/05/2023)	# Cracked.io threads (as of 11/05/2023)	# Cracked.io replies (as of 11/05/2023)	# Cracked.io thread views (as of 11/05/2023)	# 0x00sec threads (as of 11/05/2023)	# 0x00sec replies (as of 11/05/2023)	# 0x00sec thread views (as of 11/05/2023)	Comments
WormGPT	SlashNext post https://slashnext.co m/blog/wormgpt-th e-generative-ai-tool -cybercriminals-are -using-to-launch-bu siness-email-comp romise-attacks/	24	564	53511	Product description https://hackforums.net/show thread.php?tid=6235290&hi ghlight=WormGPT	18	807	70715	7	369	73364	0	0	0	
FraudGPT	Netenrich post https://netenrich.co m/blog/fraudgpt-th e-villain-avatar-of-c hatgpt	4	25	1755	Seems to be using OpenAI API  Someone bought it and was not granted access to it   https://hackforums.net/show thread.php?tid=6248187&hi ghlight=FraudGPT	1	3	919	0	0	0	0	0	0	
DarkGPT	https://www.linkedin.com/posts/flowgp t_darkgpt-the-unfilt ered-al-truth-teller- activity-710162471 8885056512-BG8S	2	30	2527	User says they tested it and generated malware https://hackforums.net/showthread.php?tid=62534608hi ghlight=DarkGPT	0	0	0	1	76	10235	0	0	0	
BadGPT	Hack Forums post https://hackforums. net/showthread.ph p?tid=6249463&hi ghlight=BadGPT	2	16	1001	Product description https://hackforums.net/show thread.php?tid=6249463&hi ghlight=BadGPT	0	0	0	1	4	995	0	0	0	There is an archive preprint on a backdoor attack named BadGPT: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.12298.pdf


The full comparison table is available in Google Drive [42].

Note that on the fora we collected data from, there are only a significant number of posts on five maliciously-aligned LLMs we identified, and that the most widely-discussed ones based on number of threads and replies on each thread are WormGPT, FraudGPT, and DarkGPT. We plan to do a more in-depth analysis of the most popular threads among the fora that we examined that discuss maliciously-aligned LLMs to identify interesting content or potentially novel models that we have not encountered previously.


## Rise and fall of some maliciously-aligned LLMs

From our research we learned that WormGPT started being advertised on Hacker Forums in March 2023, and it later became available for purchase in June 2023. After a few months, the project shutdown was announced on August 8th, 2023 [26]. The developers claimed the reason was that they received a lot of media attention. They might have faced legal issues too. This is suggested by the fact that before the project shutdown guardrails were added to WormGPT to reduce the risk of generating unethical content [31].

Surprisingly, we found a new instance of WormGPT [20]. However, as we do not have access to the original published model, it is impossible for us to ascertain whether this is a true representation of the original release, or if it is simply an alternate model posing as the original model. This new WormGPT version became available on November 8th, 2023 and, according to the comments, it uses GPT-3. As of 12/13/2023, there are 7 community chats one can click on and a sample conversation with responses will appear. Also, as of 12/13/2023 it has 211 likes, 319 stars, and 122.8K uses.



On the right, there is a panel called Community Chats. These are chats users had with WormGPT. If you click on one, you will see the conversation a user had with WormGPT:



In the WormGPT website inside FlowGPT we also notice active conversations between the developers of WormGPT and other users. As of 12/14/2023 there are a total of 151 comments ranging from November 17th, 2023 to 12/13/2024. These are three example discussions, the first two images include responses in which the developer provides more details about the model and future plans:

When I ask for windows products keys is displays XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXXX
2023-12-10 <u>1</u> 0 √ Q Reply
replying to
It may not be able to produce it because it is currently on the GPT-3 system. You are invited to our discord server for de
velopments.
2023-12-11 (스 0 두기 Ç Reply




Although some people express positive feelings about WormGPT, some highlight it's limitations:

In addition, we found an instance of FraudGPT in FlowGPT too (see <u>FlowGPT section</u>) [36]

#### Popularity evolution over time

Additionally, we used Google Trends to see maliciously-aligned LLM search results patterns in the US and around the world. This plot illustrates the interest over time on maliciously-aligned LLM searches in the US:




The full Google Trends experiment is available in Google Drive [41].


Notice that there is a blue peak in summer 2023, when various online articles on WormGPT were posted. Also, to the left of the highest blue peak there are two green peaks (DarkBERT overpassed WormGPT and other maliciously-aligned LLMs in interest), and one peak is even before WormGPT became mainstream! The first green peak was on May 12 - 20, 2023 and the second peak was on July 2 - 8, 2023.

By doing more research, we learned that there is a preprint on DarkBERT and it was posted in arXiv on May 18th, 2023 [10]. We read more on DarkBERT and identified that it is not a maliciously-aligned LLM because it was not trained for nefarious purposes. However, some suggest that a cybercriminal is repurposing it [17]. We plan to expand this experiment by analyzing granular time frames to better understand maliciously-aligned LLMs popularity fluctuations over time.


Additionally, some maliciously-aligned LLMs are more popular in certain states. Surprisingly, DarkBERT is the most popular maliciously-aligned LLM in some states on the east coast.



Worldwide, the maliciously-aligned LLMs trends are similar to the one in the US:



It is interesting to note that in some countries DarkBERT and DarkGPT are more popular than WormGPT:



# Public discourse regarding maliciously-aligned LLMs

For an exploratory analysis, we focused on WormGPT, since this was the model that we had the most data for across all the fora we surveyed. We randomly sampled 50 posts from our overall corpus and performed a qualitative coding and thematic analysis on this sample in order to gain a rough perspective of what members were discussing with regard to this specific maliciously aligned LLMs. A breakdown of our qualitative analysis can be found below:

Codes	Description	Count
access_guide	Provides advice or guidance on how to access model	4
access_help	Asks for help or guidance on how to access model	3
anticipation	Expresses anticipation for a model or service release	1
capabilities_help	Requests more information about the capabilities of a model	1
compare_model	Draws a comparison with another model or service	5
discount	Offers a discount on pricing	1
forum_meta	Content is related to forum-based interactions (e.g., bumping a thread to top of recent threads)	2
gratitude	Expressing gratitude at the release of a model	2
incomprehensible	Unable to decipher content	1
jailbreak_guide	Offered advice or guidance on how to jailbreak an existing model	2
jailbreak_help	Requested advice or guidance on how to jailbreak an existing model	2
negative_sentiment	Expressed negative sentiment about the model	1

positive_sentiment	Expressed positive sentiment about the model	2
purchase_avoid	Requested or offered advice on how to avoid paying for model access	3
purchase_guide	Offered guidance on how to purchase access to a model	6
purchase_help	Requested guidance on how to purchase a model	2
skeptical	Expressed skepticism about a model's capabilities	1

This table suggests that most posts provide guidance on how to purchase a model, others compare the advertised model with others, and others are about how to access the model. Some posts do reflect users' sentiments on the models.

#### Discourse on dark web sources and Tor forums

We also expanded our collection to include dark web/Tor forums in order to understand what discourse was like in more underground communities. Specifically, we collected text from comments and posts made on the Dread dark web forum as well as the Kingdom Market dark web marketplace. While we were unable to find any significant discourse regarding any of the identified MALMs on Kingdom Market, we were able to collect 111 different posts and comments from the Dread forum via their search function (92 records for FraudGPT and 19 for WormGPT). We then performed an identical qualitative coding process as we did for the normal web forums, the breakdown of which can be found below:


Codes	Description	Count
access_guide	Provides advice or guidance on how to access model	8
access_help	Asks for help or guidance on how to access model	23
anticipation	Expresses anticipation for a model or service release	1
capabilities_help	Requests more information about the capabilities of a model	22
compare_model	Draws a comparison with another model or service	9
forum_meta	Content is related to forum-based interactions (e.g., bumping a thread to top of recent threads)	4
gratitude	Expressing gratitude at the release of a model	2
incomprehensible	Unable to decipher content or was irrelevant to model discourse	8
jailbreak_guide	Offered advice or guidance on how to jailbreak an existing model	1
negative_sentiment	Expressed negative sentiment about the model	10
positive_sentiment	Expressed positive sentiment about the model	2
purchase_avoid	Requested or offered advice on how to avoid paying for model access	3
purchase_guide	Offered guidance on how to purchase access to a model	3

purchase_help	Requested guidance on how to purchase a model	3
skeptical	Expressed skepticism about a model's capabilities	3

The results of this table suggest that most posts are about users asking for help to access the model, others request more information about what the models are capable of, and various express negative sentiments about the models.

#### Discussions on the WormGPT Discord server

We found that there is a Discord server associated with the WormGPT version available in FlowGPT. We joined the server but we need the owners' approval to see the content of it (we requested it but as of 12/14/2023 we were not granted access to other channels).



Ten minutes before the deadline we were granted access and got access to channels like #announcements, #purchase, #ticket, #review, among others. There are not many posts in them. However, it surprised us that in the announcement channels a post on a new update of the model was made in English and Turkish, which could mean that the developers are from that country.

We manually inspected the Discord server we got access to. These are some of our main takeaways: 410 users in the Discord server. Channels: server-tos, updates, status, announcements, purchase, ticket, reviews, media, links, advertising, giveaways, general-chat. Many discussions are in general-chat. The other channels have approximately zero to five posts. Based on the discussions in general-chat, this version does not use GPT-J. This means that this new version is not based on the first one that became mainstream in July 2023. Prefix needed to make it work. Free. Some users complain it does not work. The developer is very engaged in the discussion, informs about fixes, and plans to move the model to GPT-J 6B. Two posts from the developer are in Turkish. This could mean that they are from that country.

#### Telegram channels are difficult to uncover

We attempted to scrape Telegram channels for further discourse data, but quickly found that many Telegram channels are either largely inactive, or discuss topics wholly unrelated to the model in question. We suspect that there are a large number of Telegram channels that seek only to publicize scams posing as the "legitimate" maliciously-aligned models that have more notoriety within the community.

## Maliciously-aligned LLMs scams proliferate

Another observation from our posts analysis is that some maliciously-aligned LLMs are scams. This is plausible as cybercriminals scamming cybercriminals has been evidenced in other contexts too [30]. Although some threads talk about the capabilities of these LLMs, including screenshots of the output of these models, user posts reveal that some services do not work. For instance, in one post on FraudGPT a user complains that they bought it and they were not granted access to it, and some of our online searches also revealed reports that suggest other maliciously-aligned LLMs are scams [19,32].



Image taken from  $[\underline{46}]$ .

#### White hat hackers' LLMs

As we searched for maliciously-aligned LLMs, we found LLMs for white hat hackers. For example, DarkBERT was created by a cyber threat intelligence company called S2W for dark web monitoring, and some of its technical details were made public [10,25,27,28]. Also, we found another white hat LLM called 0dai [33]. Based on the statements from their developers on X, white hat LLM uses Llama2 70B and CodeLLama 34B, it was trained with exploits data using Retrieval-Augmented Generation and provides pentesting features [34]. It costs USD \$20 per month.

## FlowGPT, a space where maliciously-aligned LLMs emerge?



In addition, within FlowGPT we found various instances of the maliciously-aligned LLMs we identified from our Google searches, including FraudGPT [36], DarkGPT version 21/10/2023 [43] and DarkGPT Official Edition [44]. This is an interesting observation as it might suggest that FlowGPT is a place where the developers of these models can easily deploy them and reach out to a big audience. This also raises interesting questions about the communities that peddlers of such models congregate – while we believed initially that underground forums, such as those found on the dark web or within price-gated forums, would serve as the primary center for discourse surrounding such models, there is some evidence suggesting that platforms specifically designed around hosting and sharing access to these models may in fact be the new center of discussion.

# Takeaways and lessons learned

#### **Takeaways**

These are the main takeaways of our project:

- Although maliciously-aligned LLMs have proliferated in public forum, most of them are not pre-trained models for nefarious purposes
- Some advertised maliciously-aligned LLMs are scams
- White hat hackers LLMs have emerged too. It is unclear the safeguards they include to avoid their misuse
- The capabilities of maliciously-aligned LLMs are relatively opaque, and those without access to the models are generally skeptical of them, lacking any additional information
- Potential adversaries are frequently seeking lower-cost alternatives to most MALMs that require payment, often suggesting fine-tuning existing LLMs or simply jailbreaking commercial services

#### Lessons learned

In addition, this project has helped us learn various aspects, like following best practices when gathering and analyzing forum data. Additionally, our online searches helped us to be more familiarized with different LLM models. Also, during this project we faced some challenges; they have taught us that it is okay to shift from the initial plan and it is good to come up with different strategies or tools to use.

#### Future work

Future work can seek to fully automate the identification, crawling, and analysis of hacker forum posts to track the proliferation and evolution of new maliciously-aligned LLMs via an observatory. Also, other tools could be added to the pipeline, including Selenium, dark web search services [38,47] and crawlers [16].

Additionally, some open questions remain, such as who benefits the most from pretraining, fine tuning, or using maliciously-aligned LLMs? What are the reasons why adversaries decide to incorporate maliciously-maligned LLMs into their existing toolkit? Do adversaries have the incentives and benefit from fine tuning a model or even pre training a maliciously-aligned LLM with respect to jailbreaking popular LLMs like GPT-4?




Diagram created by ourselves and inspired by [37]

As shown in the previous diagram, there are different types of adversaries with various goals and capabilities. We believe that the maliciously-aligned LLMs that have emerged thus far are primarily benefiting the adversaries located in the base of the pyramid to some extent (e.g., "script kiddies").

In addition, there is a promising line of work with regard to characterizing the capabilities of MALMs in general. Even potential adversaries are unclear as to the true abilities of these models, and as such, are generally skeptical of paying the high barrier to entry to be able to leverage them. However, if these models do prove to be highly capable, then it is necessary to understand in what ways the models are effective before more adversaries find that the increased barrier-to-entry ultimately becomes more profitable to use in their fraudulent activities.

Furthermore, an in-depth market analysis of what capabilities are most highly sought-after can help provide valuable information into the activities that adversaries feel an LLM might provide significant improvements on. Studying why some maliciously-aligned LLMs are more popular in certain regions of the world can be an interesting research idea to explore.

Finally, OpenAI launched the GPTs stores recently [45]. It would be interesting to study if people are creating malicious GPTs, despite OpenAI's guidelines [35]. Doing Google searches with certain keywords to find GPTs can be a methodology to accomplish this task [48].

#### References

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