Office of the Inspector General (Directive 13)

(SBU) Statutory Notice of Intelligence Activity by National Security Council Inspectors General: 

Foreign Deception Resulting in Major Counterespionage Error by Intelligence Community

Resulting in Further Heightened Congressional Interest:

—Significant unreported departure in the intelligence cycle

—Substantial risk of disclosure of intelligence sources and methods

—Potential compromise of human intelligence programs

—Obligations pursuant to May 2019 Gang of Eight Agreement

To: The Gang of Four

July 5, 2019

Hon. Speaker /u/Shitmemery

Hon. Majority Leader /u/PrelateZeratul

Hon. House Minority Leader /u/Gunnz011

Hon. Senate Minority Leader /u/Kingthero

Plus:

Hon. Foreign Affairs Chairman /u/DexterAamo

Hon. Oversight Chairman /u/Kbelica

(S//HCS) Cuban Espionage Secured Early Release of Convicted Spy from Federal Prison by GuiltyAir DOJ

(U//FOUO) Who Should Read This Report and Why?

Congressional intelligence oversight committees should read this mandatory report to gain a better appreciation for a recent Cuban espionage threat to the United States. The lessons learned from the Ana Montes clemency case will help to counter future threats to national security.

This report contains clandestine human intelligence and law enforcement sensitive information.  It protects counterespionage targets by codeword.

(U) Introduction to the Incident

On September 21, 2001, following months of intense scrutiny, Federal Bureau of Investigation officials arrested Ana Belen MONTES at the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C., on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage against the United States. MONTES had been an employee of the U.S. Government for 22 years and had been employed as an intelligence analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, FBI, and Department of State for the better part of those years.

She was recruited by the Cuban Intelligence Service in 1984 while employed by the Department of Justice, and further handled by a Cuban penetration agent at the DOS Agency for International Development: her purposeful delays as a committed ideologue allowed U.S. and Cuban agents in her spy ring to escape. MONTES eventually pleaded guilty to one count of the indictment and was sentenced to 25 years in prison on October 16, 2002. She was serving her sentence since 2002 at the Carswell Federal Medical Center, Fort Worth, Dixie, a female prison.

By 2016, the Cuban government began an intensive English and Spanish propaganda campaign and unofficially requested her release from prison in exchange for American criminal fugitives in a spy swap: the State Department did not immediately accept the offer as part of a thaw in foreign relations although negotiations were ongoing until this week.

(S//HCS) Release of MONTES by DOJ

On July 3, 2019, a White House appointee outside of the National Security Council, codeword PSALM, prepared a full list of presidential pardons and commutations for President GuiltyAir.  Many on the list were convicted of serious crimes including murder and terrorism in addition to MONTES, convicted of espionage resulting in the deaths of at least four CIA agents and one Army officer, as well as the confusion of Latin American policy under four presidents.  

PSALM: Kennedy Era Codeword for Cuban Nuclear Missiles Planning

No U.S. security officials were aware of the list until publication to the Federal Register, which was reviewed only by PSALM, an unnamed deputy assistant to PSALM as claimed by PSALM, and Vice President HurricaneOfTheFlies.  The Vice President only reviewed the pardon list, but did not fully review the lower commutation list of which MONTES was the final name.  

The pardon attorney, which usually confirms these lists, as well as the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence under IamATinMan, had submitted his resignation previously in anticipation of a judiciary appointment.  Although he nor any appointed DOJ advisors or judicial officials were conferenced, neither the Attorney General’s resignation nor the appointment were presidentially-approved and he was available as an acting member of the National Security Council.

PSALM correctly informed the White House that the president was the final arbiter of clemency decisions under Article II; it was unclear to participants if the president reviewed the list in detail, as the Vice President also was unable to.

(S//HCS) Detection by Counterespionage Officials

Upon reviewing the Federal Register post prior to a hearing by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Cold War defenses, a commenter was seen noting MONTES was released by the president without conditions.  The Acting Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, and in a smaller capacity the Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and former Secretary of Defense, inquired with the White House if the clemency of a spy to be released in 2023 then five years of parole was inadvertent during Cuban negotiations.

PSALM instead answered that it was PSALM’s decision and review process, and that debate externally about the commutation was conduct unbecoming of an executive official. The conversation was seriously taken by the cabinet: multiple department officials believed a claimed joke by PSALM to submit to them their resignation to be replaced by a “socialist” was directed at the time and still serious after the heated conversation.

PSALM further advised the president that MONTES was a candidate for release allegedly due to her suffering from breast cancer, or that MONTES had allegedly undergone a form of breast cancer procedure.  No other reason for the release was forthcoming to the National Security Council which had employed the convicted spy, nor to the Press Secretary or legal advisory group, all of whom would need to be aware and defend the presidential decision to the fullest extent possible.  No reason was given to the White House by PSALM on any other member of the list outside the claimed group of three reviewers: PSALM, the unnamed deputy assistant to PSALM, and the Vice President that claimed to not have been able to review the full list.

(S//HCS) Cuban Deception of White House Staff

The threat by an appointee with the absolute trust of the senior political leadership in an isolated group, who made the pardon list, to remove Senate-confirmed secretaries in the National Security Council responsible for advising the president on public safety outside the White House, was considered serious by more than one confirmed-appointee although was intended by PSALM as a joke. Afterwards, one counterintelligence official only privately pursued means to advise the president, and in a way so as to not jeopardize a one-day hoped-for judicial appointment.  Another official in charge of a major relevant security area for all agencies and another judiciary-hopeful, did not seek out to advise Congress based on existing FBI orders and congressional agreements with the Foreign Affairs Committees. Another hopeful appointee agreed with others on findings but could not correct three record before selection. Yet another appointee recommended others resign without being asked to do so, but was unwilling to resign themselves after the recommendation. No discussion continued in the open after the first discussion, and the president commented that he believed the alleged breast cancer reason was sufficient for constitutional reasons.

All in the administration agreed that pardons were a clear executive power regardless.  Some legal advisors were reminded of the risk of questions on intelligence matters in the Cold War hearing, or as President Clinton’s staff faced by the Senate for questionable pardons and commutations.

(TS//HCS) Intelligence Failure

During the episode, the Department of State made several observations that necessarily encompass the scope of the review and have an effect on the ability of the Intelligence Community to deter, detect, and investigate espionage activities perpetrated against the United States.

It was discovered that only approximately one Google search result page showed websites that MONTES allegedly underwent a breast cancer procedure, a suspicious majority of which were Cuban government radio, Communist Party websites, single-issue Socialist movement blogs, and quotes from other convicted Cuban spies in U.S. prisons seeking her release.  Only one major website, the Kingdom of Spain newspaper El Pais, reported that MONTES had allegedly underwent cancer treatment but that there was no evidence of such an event.

In conjunction with the timeframe of the articles with 2016 talks between Cuban and American diplomats where Cuba pushed for the spy swap of MONTES, the Department of State issued a finding to the White House that the reasoning for PSALM’s advocacy, PSALM’s perceived threat to replace National Security Council members with “socialists,” and focus on pro-Socialist and pro-Communist awardees in drafting a list of recipients of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, including a Chinese premier assessed by the CIA to have not assisted protestors as described in the award “with Distinction”, as well as a list of current officials, was unusual to analysts.  No counterintelligence finding was ordered by the White House, or notification by law to Congress.

(SBU) Policy Findings

Once MONTES was identified as a suspect, an investigation into the breast cancer reasoning was launched. In the years preceding her identification as a penetration agent for the Cuban Intelligence Service, her story has become legendary for lessons learned: multiple GuiltyAir officials were aware of her impact on counterintelligence.  The lessons were clear: management indifference; interagency rivalry; personal rancor; and lack of appreciation for and understanding of counterespionage roles, structures, and responsibilities led to less than optimum sharing of counterespionage information between intelligence and political leaders.

One of the first actions in any espionage investigation is to direct analytic resources from information on unknown subjects toward identifying suspected failures. The Intelligence Community cannot effectively convert unknown subjects into espionage suspects without sharing information, in the absence of fear of retaliation.  To coordinate intelligence policy, the National Security Council and White House must foster greater cooperation among the departments and agencies with counterintelligence responsibilities.

Presidential Policy Directive 44 further requires an exchange of information between State, Justice, Defense, Treasury, and the White House to ensure timely and close coordination between law enforcement. Congress is responsible for the regular monitoring and review of the integration and coordination of counterintelligence programs pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 75, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.

Perhaps most importantly, even with abundant guidance to share counterespionage information, investigations are conducted by human beings with biases and insecurities. Personal character traits sometimes interfere with information flow among organizations. OIG found several instances where interagency rivalry and personal ambition led to less-than-optimum sharing of counterespionage information.

(SBU) Lessons Learned

Sharing intelligence information at the earliest possible point maximizes its potential value and, given sufficient safeguards, protects sensitive sources and methods. Intelligence Community Directives, namely 811, recognize that, "when multiple data sources and analytical viewpoints are brought to bear on a problem… the whole can indeed be greater than the sum of its parts."

Once the flawed intelligence cycle leading to the release of Ana Montes was identified as due to Cuban espionage efforts, the investigative resources of the Intelligence Community focused on that target for the benefit of mandatory oversight obligations despite internal political pressure. Notwithstanding that professional investigation, reluctance to share vital information within the White House enabled Montes to continue her clandestine trickery for a number of months with a certain degree of comfort provided by foreign propaganda, and her deep intelligence knowledge is now unrestricted by the confines of federal justice, with the exception of her further participation in the Cuban negotiations.

While the principle of need to know and of seeking the next appointment is a lofty aspiration, balancing the need to know with a need to share with Congress as lawfully required, even at the expense of a job, optimizes national mission success.

THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INSPECTORS GENERAL:

CIA Office of Inspector General

DIA Office of Inspector General

DOS Office of Inspector General

ODNI Office of Inspector General

TRS Office of Inspector General