NAU NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY

Institutional Biosafety Committee Environmental Health and Safety 928-523-7268 phone
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October 23, 2025

To: Northern Arizona University Institutional Biosafety Committee Members

From: Shelley Jones, NAU IBC Administrator, Director of Biological Safety

Re: **Draft** October 23, 2025, IBC Meeting Minutes

Members present: Dan Kitterman, Andrew Koppisch, Jason Sahl, Jeffrey Baranowski, Sara Maltinsky, Fernando Monroy, David Wagner, Shelley Jones, Terra Kelly

Members absent: Kathleen Freel, Matthew Salanga, Scott Pryor

Visitors: Ana Braga, Research Coordinator, Senior
Bridget Barker, Professor
Amy Vogler, Assistant Director

Call to order: The IBC Chair, Andrew Koppisch, called the meeting to order at 1:00PM; the meeting was held via video conference; a quorum was present. Meeting minutes will be posted promptly following approval during the next meeting.

Approval of minutes: The draft minutes of the previous meeting held August 20, 2025, were distributed to the committee and available for review. The Committee had no comments on the draft minutes. Motion to approve by Dr. Monroy, second by Dr. Wagner, all in favor of approving the minutes (9-0).

1. The Committee reviewed new submissions and amendments to the IBC:
   - RDBB-0125 *Working with BSL2 Recombinant Fungal Organisms*
     - Description: Protocol amendment, recognition of recombinant means to develop immunizations
     - PI: Bridget Barker
     - BSL: BSL2 (RG2)
     - NIH Guidelines: NIH Guidelines Section III-D-1, Section III-D-4, (not selected but does have highlighted- Appendix C-II)

   Protocol overview: Ms. Maltinsky pointed out that this is a previously approved protocol describing the use of genetically modified avirulent vaccine strains to vaccinate mice, including the use of a gene gun either post or pre-infection with wild-type *Coccidioides*. This amendment includes details of the use of the recombinant vaccine supplied by Dr. Barker's collaborator at the University of Washington (UW) for use with the gene gun. The inclusion of this additional vaccine in the IBC protocol was unintentionally omitted when first drafted and reviewed in 2023. To remedy this error, Ms. Braga has provided

additional protocol updates to describe the preparation completed by UW for these immunization efforts prior to being shipped to NAU, in addition to greater specifics regarding the use of the gene gun to administer the vaccine. Dr. Barker explained that originally all of the vaccinations were being done at UW but this made the shipping of the mice very complicated so in the midst of new procedures being established for the vaccines to instead be shipped, she unintentionally forgot to also update the IBC for the work now being done at NAU. This oversight was discovered following the approval of another Barker protocol when Biosafety staff delved into the mice in the projects. Ms. Braga investigated and immediately identified the omission. The Biosafety staff, IBC personnel, and researchers all realized that elements of the research were approved, but the DNA vaccine construct was not described or approved.

The committee discussed if this oversight needed to be reported to the NIH as the guidelines under Section IV-B-2-b-(7) state that, “The IBC is responsible for reporting any significant problems, violations of the NIH Guidelines…to NIH OSP within 30 days.” According to the NIH FAQs, such violations include “failure to obtain or maintain IBC approval”.

Dr. Koppisch summarized that the concerns were that the committee had not given a proper and full review of the altered immunization efforts. Furthermore, Dr. Koppisch asked if the gene gun will be used in other projects?

Ms. Jones replied that the gene gun will also be used for a project under Dr. Settles. Ms. Jones pointed out that the committee had the oversight of not asking more explicitly what the gene gun was being used for and what exactly is being delivered to the mice. The committee did grant approval of previous vaccine use with recombinants but did not specifically address the UW DNA vaccine. Regarding any potential hazard of the gene gun, Ms. Jones suggested that the only hazard is if someone were to accidentally inoculate/vaccinate themselves.

Dr. Monroy commented that in the proposal, it describes many different methods as opposed to the specific method being discussed here (gene gun) so asked which method (s) are actually going to be used?

Ms. Braga responded the protocol is meant to cover all potential vaccination methods but for the DNA vaccines, they will only be using the gene gun to administer them, so the other methods are simply meant to cover all other approaches. Ms. Braga also shared that she has additional information/resources on using the gene gun and risks associated. Specifically, she called out the unlikelihood of self-inoculating thereby addressing Ms. Jones’s concerns made above. Ms. Braga continued by saying that the users for this instrument are highly restricted to a select few. You’d have to be significantly trained and specifically allowed to use the instrument, so there wouldn’t be any unknown use from inexperienced users. The instrument is not sharp with a barrel the size of a quarter, is placed against the skin of the mouse, with the gold pellet immunization being then “shot” into the mouse; it would therefore have to be very intentional to shoot these particles into an individual on accident. Furthermore, Ms. Braga described the awkward and difficult posture necessary to even make a self-inoculation possible.

Dr. Koppisch reiterated that it sounded very difficult and unlikely to accidentally self-infect or inoculate and thanked Ms. Braga and Dr. Barker for providing this additional information.

Dr. Wagner asked/clarified that what's in question here is not the use of the gene gun; it's the fact that the UW immunizations were missing from the IBC content.

Ms. Jones responded yes, we had approved both Dr. Settles and Dr. Barker's work using the gene gun and that this side of things didn't occur to her previously (regarding the collaborator details). This was an oversight and therefore a question later for the committee whether we need to report to the NIH that we missed this detail. There was vague awareness going on but we didn't have it explicitly stated on the protocol.

Dr. Koppisch said he thinks that's a fair discussion point. Before moving on, he asked if anyone had additional questions about the protocol itself?

Dr. Sahl voiced a question, interested in terms of the recombinant portion of the *E. coli* and the adjuvant plasmids with enterotoxin and to talk through the gene plus these adjuvants- how do these form together to go into the organism?

Ms. Braga responded that they have more than one gene that goes in a vaccine. VF1 for example has 3 different plasmids, 3 different sequences, plus 2 adjuvants, but doesn't know fully beyond that regarding the viral aspect of the vaccine (further information can be provided by UW upon request), but was told that various parts of the description shared a goal in making transcription easier and that this is standard for this type of work.

Dr. Sahl said he doesn't know if a deep level of detail is normally added to a protocol but is pointing out in the recombinant section, it still feels like some information is missing. Dr. Sahl wanted to know *how* is this synthesizing being done, is *E. coli* simply used to ramp up a ton of product to have a lot to work with? He just wanted more information on how it all works to make this vaccine.

Dr. Barker and Ms. Braga echoed each other that nothing is being expressed in the plasmids, it's expressing in the mouse post-vaccination, pointing to the same platform being used in human trials during Covid vaccine work shown to be relatively safe in a human immune system. Dr. Barker understands the complexity of the UW vaccine synthesis makes it hard to wrap your head around hence the intent at first to have this all done at UW but thought that by letting UW handle the synthesis and NAU handle administering the vaccine, it would simplify things.

Questions/Comments (Dr. Barker and Ms. Braga no longer present):
Ms. Jones brought up the issue of this work going on for 2 years as the NIH requires the reporting of unauthorized work.
Dr. Monroy asked for clarification- were the recombinant immunizations constructed at NAU or UW?
Ms. Jones thinks it doesn't really matter since part of the work is being done at NAU. Two years ago, the gene gun vaccinations started being done on the mice at NAU. It is

something we're doing here even though Dr. Barker's team did not construct/make the specific vaccine. NIH would then likely expect it to be approved.
Dr. Monroy concluded that the question is what to do next. Report or is addressing the issue as we have done satisfactory? Should it be reported as an internal incident? Dr. Monroy also voiced this is unlikely to happen again and that we are technically back in compliance.
Ms. Jones responded that yes this is true, and this is not an intentional omission, this was an oversight on the IBC/biosafety team not just Dr. Barker's group. Ms. Jones also reiterated that Dr. Barker does have a protocol that covers recombinant vaccinations generally, just not this one.
Dr. Monroy pointed out the circular talking pattern the committee was going in but that a decision needed to be made. This was not on purpose of course as Dr. Barker is good at keeping up with IBC protocols. He voiced a concern if this would put the committee in a position making the institution require more oversight.
Ms. Jones responded that she would try to leave names out of it, outside of NAU of course, that it's a minor thing, and shows we're following the rules. Ms. Jones also noted that her concern is for future funding and what kind of problems this could create.
Dr. Koppisch then indicated he would be surprised if funding is connected to things like this, the error was not egregious at all. If anything, he voiced that the reporting shows we're taking things really seriously and want to follow all regulations, as this was an honest mistake. Dr. Koppisch thought it illustrates that we take any situation seriously- big or small, it's clearly not high risk, no one was in danger, it's just in adherence to what protocol said and should say. He also pointed out the added complexity of having to change institutions on the fly, that they (Dr. Barker group) weren't fully prepared for this.
Dr. Sahl agreed that this is such a minor issue, the committee should just report as it would make all members feel better, and he can't see a huge backlash for this situation.
Ms. Jones thanked everyone for their input, and that she will move forward with submitting a letter (notice of violation).

Motion to approve by Ms. Jones with additional info Dr. Sahl requested, second by Mr. Kitterman, motion approved unanimously (8-0).

- BAPK-0110 *Genetic and Genomic Analysis of Various BSL3 Microbial Pathogens*
    - Description: Protocol annual review; removal of all viral agents, minor changes to text consistent with removal of viral agents and adjustments to purpose of work to be consistent with SA registration
    - PI: Paul Keim
    - BSL: BSL3
    - NIH Guidelines: N/A

Protocol overview: This protocol was previously approved in March, specifically to add personnel (Ms. Maltinsky and Mr. Baranowski). As per an annual renewal timeline, the committee is reviewing this protocol more formally with the most substantial edit being the removal of all viral agents and the minor text/content edits that are in line with the actual removal of said viral agents.

Dr. Vogler voiced that the biggest changes were the removal of viral agents, aka a reduction. Other than that the protocol is the same.

Ms. Jones had no concerns about this since it is a standard renewal. Ms. Jones simply wanted to review this protocol more frequently than 3 years to maintain a yearly consistency.

Questions/Comments: N/A

Motion for approval by Mr. Kitterman, second by Dr. Monroy/Ms. Jones, motion approved unanimously (8 -0).

2. Chair/IBC Administrator Approved Protocols/Amendments since February 13, 2025, meeting:
   - BAAV-0110, *BSL2 Genetic and genomic analysis of various microbial pathogens*
     PI: Amy Vogler

Description: Protocol renewal with the following changes: addition of clinical and environmental samples (water and feces), eye protection to the required PPE, expanding the disinfectants to include pH adjusted 10% bleach, 70% ethanol, and quaternary ammonium, depending on the biological agent, as well as updating the BSC certification dates.

   - BABB-0122 *Working with various BSL3 fungal pathogens*
     PI: Dr. Bridget Barker

Description: Amendment to reduce containment of mice post-infection from ABSL3 to ABSL2
Comments: Ms. Jones noted this was voted on electronically after previous meeting and is what ended up prompting a lot of questions for the recombinant immunizations mentioned above.

   - RDES-0125 *Development of T cell based-therapy by generating the chimeric T cell expressing TCR associated with infectious disease protection using retroviral transduction system*
     PI: Dr. Erik Settles

Description: No amendments, this is simply to gather any protocol questions regarding the gene gun; do any of the committee members have questions about this method/process that they'd like to see addressed in the protocol? Context being we had little to no information provided on this instrument and since we are addressing the oversight (regarding RDBB-0125) we want to ensure no information is missing bridging these two protocols and their use of the gene gun.
Comments: Ms. Jones asked Dr. Sahl, if he wanted to see more on this protocol regarding gene gun use?
Dr. Sahl responded that it doesn't need to be a highly detailed section, just a summary diving more into the mechanism behind this gene gun effort. Where recombinant is expressed? Etc.

Protocol overview: Ms. Jones explained that these protocols were reviewed and approved since the last committee meeting by the IBC Administrator or committee (in the case of BABB-0122).

Comments/Discussion: See above.

3. New Business:
   - NIH incident report: 10/20/25 reported breach of containment of CRISPR transformants in the BSL3, room 330 incubator.

   Ms. Jones walked the committee through the NIH incident, why the plates are in a mouse cage (air exchange via HEPA filter), lab user found one of the lids was slightly popped up, 11+ day old samples, potential for arthroconidia to be present in the incubator/room thus environmentals were taken. No evidence of a release.

   Comments/Discussion:
   Dr. Wagner reflected on the legitimacy of this being a breach of containment but was clearly not a release.
   Ms. Jones voiced it was unclear how the lid was able to pop up if it was indeed put on correctly.
   Dr. Wagner pressed further that the key here is what is “breach” of containment, and if this is actually considered to be a breach of containment?
   Ms. Jones said that the mouse cage is the containment and that the lid being open, even slightly, was a breach of containment.
   Dr. Vogler said the lab user discovering the mouse cage informed her that the lid was indeed on backwards. We have no evidence of a release, no evidence of growth on environmentals, but there was a breach of containment, doesn’t necessarily mean a “release’ but in this case the cage is acting as an engineering control.
   Dr. Monroy asked what the next step is, report the incident and retraining, anything further?
   Ms. Jones replied that she and Dr. Vogler spoke to the individual about the lid being marked as front and back and retraining everyone who does this procedure, perhaps implement putting a prop under the mouse cage to avoid them brushing up against each other.
   Dr. Monroy pointed out that it is a positive sign that this hasn’t happened before, seems like all the remediation steps are being implemented as appropriate.
   Ms. Jones expressed wanting to be transparent with NIH, we recognized this incident happened, and followed up so that it doesn’t happen again, people do review public record so we want to show that we can and do report when appropriate, it’s suspicious if we don’t have any reports, this is a low level of risk, we don’t think there’s a release, no exposure.
   Dr. Monroy concluded this was a good teaching situation/opportunity.

Motion to adjourn by Ms. Jones, second by Dr. Monroy, all approved (8-0) and meeting was adjourned at 1:58PM.

Aug 25, 2025

NAU NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY

Institutional Biosafety Committee
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August 25, 2025

To: Northern Arizona University Institutional Biosafety Committee Members

From: Shelley Jones, NAU IBC Administrator, Director of

Biological Safety

Re: Draft August 20, 2025, IBC Meeting Minutes

Members present: Dan Kitterman, Andrew Koppisch, Jason Sahl, Jeffrey Baranowski, Sara Maltinsky, Kathleen Freel, Matthew Salanga, Fernando Monroy, David Wagner, Shelley Jones

Members absent: Terra Kelly

Visitors: Ana Braga, Research Coordinator, Senior
Erik Settles, Associate Research Professor
Kelly Speer, Assistant Professor
Amy Vogler, Assistant Director

Call to order: The IBC Chair, Andrew Koppisch, called the meeting to order at 3:01; the meeting was held via video conference; a quorum was present. The meeting announcement and link were posted on the NAU Biosafety Website.

Approval of minutes: The draft minutes of the previous meeting held February 13, 2025, were previously distributed to the committee and available for review. The Committee had no comments on the draft minutes. Motion to approve by Dr. Salanga, second by Dr. Monroy, all in favor of approving the minutes (10-0).

1. The Committee reviewed new submissions and amendments to the IBC:

   · RDJF-0125 *Possession of Burkholderia pseudomallei recombinants*

      - Description: New protocol
      - PI: Jeff Foster
      - BSL: BSL3 (RG3)
      - NIH Guidelines: NIH Guidelines Section III-D-1-b. Experiments involving the introduction of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules into Risk Group 3 agents will usually be conducted at BL3 containment.

   Protocol overview: Ms. Jones spoke on Dr. Vogler's behalf as her microphone was not functioning. These samples are changing ownership from Dr. Schweizer to Dr. Foster under this protocol. This protocol is specifically for recombinants.

   Questions/Comments: Dr. Monroy noted if it's just a change of ownership, no further questions.

   Motion to approve by Ms. Jones, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

   · RDAV-0125 *Recombinant attenuated Burholderia pseudomallei and Yersinia pestis*

      - Description: New protocol
      - PI: Amy Vogler
      - BSL: BSL3
      - NIH Guidelines: Section III-E. Experiments that Require Institutional Biosafety Committee Notice Simultaneous with Initiation Experiments not included in Sections III-A, III-B, III-C, III-D, III-F, and their subsections are considered in Section III-E. (This designation is per Kathryn Harris at NIH OBA)

   Protocol overview: Ms. Jones indicated that these are not select agents and NIH considers Bp82 a RG3 that needs to be worked with at BL3 containment, so permission is needed to work at BL2; NIH approval will be requested. This registration also documents moving Bp82 and attenuated Yp from Dr. Keim to Dr. Vogler. Documentation is available proving the ability to work on these samples in BL2.

   Questions/Comments: N/A

   Motion for approval by Dr. Monroy, second by Mr. Kitterman, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

- RDES-0125 *Development of T cell based therapy by generating the chimeric T cell expressing TCR associated with infectious disease protection using retroviral transduction system*
    - Description: New protocol
    - PI: Erik Settles
    - BSL: BSL2
    - NIH Guidelines: Section III-D-1, Section III-D-3, Section III-D-4, Section III-F-8

Protocol overview: Protocol to modify T-cells from mice using retroviral vector system. Identify T-cell receptors to show efficacy of infectious diseases. Only murine and rat retroviruses will be used; they are not able to infect humans/primates.

Questions/Comments: Dr. Salanga asked about animal use and need for IACUC. No concern, just that the expiration is approaching rapidly ensuring there is no lag on IACUC coverage/oversight. Dr. Settles said he has not yet filed an IACUC for this work but will. Ms. Jones asked if *Coccidioides* is to be incorporated eventually. Dr. Settles said yes, it will be multiple steps down the road to be transferred into mice. They are first demonstrating that they can do it. Spleen samples first, making many cells expressing T-cell receptor. Dr. Monroy asked if they have a detection protocol. Dr. Settles responded GFP first then dual construct.

Motion to approve by Dr. Salanga, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

- RDES-0122 *Cell tissue culture for infection with bacterial pathogens*
    - Description: Protocol renewal; personnel updates
    - PI: Erik Settles
    - BSL: BSL2/3
    - NIH Guidelines: Section III-D-3; Section III-F-8, Appendix C-1

Protocol overview: Dr. Settles explained that this is a general culture protocol needing renewal. Modification is simply personnel changes and updates.

Questions/Comments: no comments/questions

Motion to approve by Dr. Salanga, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

- BABB-0122 *Working with various BSL3 fungal pathogens*
    - Description: Amendment to protocol
    - PI: Bridget Barker
    - BSL: 3
    - NIH Guidelines: N/A

Protocol overview: Ms. Braga summarized that the change being proposed is moving mice that have been infected in ABSL3 with *Coccidioides*, into the ABSL2 to house mice there and perform the remaining work. Containment caging and BSC handling of mice will continue.

Questions/Comments: Dr. Wagner asked why this move is necessary. Ms. Braga replied that the kind of work Dr. Settles wants to do (see above) would require more equipment to be brought into the ABSL3. The ABSL2 would allow more space and ability to move around, more work to be done, more mice processing abilities, etc. They could also do long term experiments for vaccine trials, lasting 3-4 months at a time and this would assist with animal care.

Dr. Wagner pointed out how small the ABSL3 space is and this would allow more people to also get involved that may not have clearance to go into ABSL3. He asked for more biosafety related information. Dr. Settles points out the BMBL housing requirements. In approximately 2 hours post infection, the life stage of *Coccidioides* is the mice is spherules. Macaques, at a different entity, for example, are housed in an ABSL2 environment. Ms. Braga added that the clinical nature of the work aligns with BMBL standards. No *Coccidioides* will be handled in ABSL2, just the animals.

Ms. Jones clarified this is intranasal infection of mice, alcohol is used to wipe noses, and the mice would be placed in clean cages before being brought out of the ABSL3. Once in the ASBL2, ABSL3 practices are followed. Ms. Jones asked how long before animals get moved? Ms. Braga said at least 8 hours. Ms. Jones also pointed out the difficulties of deconning the gene gun in the ABSL3, so that was another element to consider.

Dr. Sahl's asked if there was a concern with mice getting loose, not captured and dying, which could produce arthroconidia. Ms. Braga replied that they don't see arthroconidia grow earlier than 2 weeks, so if a mouse was lost for 2+ weeks it could potentially happen but is highly unlikely for a mouse to escape unnoticed firstly and secondly that an animal would be hard pressed to get out of the room (door sweeps, etc.), highly unlikely they'd ever lose a mouse. Ms. Jones agreed that there is no space for a mouse to hide or get under the door. Ms. Braga also noted that a mouse bite is technically its own concern but again, not handling outside of BSC or with animal having *Coccidioides* in arthroconidia state. Dr. Wagner echoed doubts that a mouse would go unnoticed for 2 weeks. Also said, other institutions are doing this sort of work in an ABSL2 so this shouldn't be a big deal.

Dr. Wagner asked how the PPE changes from moving to an ABSL3 to ABSL2. Ms. Braga said only thing needed to add to PPE is pants in an ABSL2 environment (gown, double glove, long pants, closed toed shoes).

Ms. Freel asked in the chat if they'll be bringing in all the hopper enrichment from the ABSL3 into the ABSL2. "Will we need to autoclave cages from the 3 after they are moving into the 2 cages." Also asked for the SOP to be shared (specifically alcohol to wipe nares). Ms. Braga said new hoppers, enrichment, and cages will be provided clean in the ABSL2, so only the mouse is "dirty".

Ms. Jones commented that she had met with Ms. Braga, Dr. Vogler and Ms. Maltinsky to perform a risk assessment prior to bringing it to the committee. She has no concerns following the discussion and is comfortable with the change.

Ms. Freel shared additional concern about amount of air available in the static animal cage during the movement from ABSL3 to the adjacent ABSL2 room (~15 minute oxygen allowance, 5 mice in a cage).

Ms. Braga recognizes the challenge this creates but is confident they can meet the time limit. They may need to reduce the number of cages being moved at a time or number of animals per cage. They will determine what is reasonable and how many mice can be moved at a time (through trial and IACUC review).

Dr. Wagner said he's not hearing much in the way of biosafety concerns, just IACUC. Dr. Koppisch agreed and thinks we have what we need. Dr. Monroy said only questions are IACUC related. Dr. Sahl was concerned there's no SOP for bed/cage changes for this specific modification. Ms. Jones said the IBC can request that Ms. Braga develop an SOP, work with IACUC and send it out to IBC for a vote after everything is completed.

Dr. Wagner asked if we had to wait for IACUC, but Ms. Jones clarified that IACUC waits for IBC to approve, so we don't need to delay past receiving the SOP.

Motion to withhold approval until all details are clarified and SOP updates are approved by the IBC via email by Ms. Jones, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

- BAJL-0122 *Zoonotic implications of host genetics, immunity, and virome in bats*
  - Description: Protocol renewal
  - PI: Jason Ladner
  - BSL: 2
  - NIH Guidelines: N/A

Protocol overview: Ms. Maltinsky voiced that these 2 protocols under Dr. Ladner have no amendments from previous approval, simply needing to be renewed in order to complete some data analysis.

Questions/Comments: N/A

Motion to approve by Ms. Jones, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

- BAJL-0222 *Enabling comprehensive immune-profiling in animals through a combination of Xenosurveillance and Highly-Multiplexed Serology*
  - Description: Protocol renewal
  - PI: Jason Ladner
  - BSL: 2
  - NIH Guidelines: N/A

Protocol overview: Same as note above.

Questions/Comments: N/A

Motion to approve by Ms. Jones, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

- BAKS-0125 *Parasites and microbiomes of deer and ked flies*
  - Description: Protocol registration
  - PI: Kelly Speer
  - BSL: 1/2

- NIH Guidelines: N/A

Protocol overview: Dr. Speer's proposed work involves DNA extractions and Sanger sequencing on deer and ectoparasites. These samples, on loan from LA county museum, were collected by hunters and are chronic wasting disease negative samples from Texas. Although these samples are not suspected of containing infectious agents, they will be handled in the BSL2 lab in BSC until post-extraction.

Questions/Comments: Ms. Jones asked about neurological tissue being present (brain, nervous system tissue, etc.). Dr. Speer indicated that she will only be working with liver and lung from the deer with all extractions being done in the BSC for utmost care. 50% bleach contact time for 2 minutes. Autoclave procedure are also included to inactivate any potential biological organisms. Dr. Speer is keeping up on surveillance of locations of samples for any testing positive. Dr. Wagner pointed out to take such maps/surveillance with a grain of salt but that the steps Dr. Speer is taking should be more than fine. Sharps will be involved with extraction (Dr. Speer pointed out) so there are protocols for treating any puncture wounds so they can add that modification into the existing IBC if need be. Dr. Koppisch expressed delight to see a brand new protocol; he thanked Dr. Speer for attending.

Motion to approve by Dr. Salanga, second by Dr. Monroy, motion approved unanimously (10-0).

2. Chair/IBC Administrator Approved Protocols/Amendments since February 13, 2025, meeting:

· BAPK-0110 *Genetic and Genomic Analysis of Various BSL3 Microbial Pathogens*
PI: Paul Keim
Description: Amendment to add personnel Jeffrey Baranowski and Sara Maltinsky and remove personnel
· RDPK-0115 *Expression of recombinant proteins for diagnostic and vaccine development*
PI: Erik Settles/Paul Keim
Description: Amendment to add personnel Katelyn Francesconi, Kate Roark, and Briana Coyne and remove personnel
· BAES-0125 *Assays and methods to understand the Host Response using clinical or challenged animal samples*
PI: Erik Settles
Description: Amendment to add personnel Briana Coyne, remove personnel, and add sample types

Protocol overview: Ms. Jones explained that these protocols were reviewed and approved since the last committee meeting by the IBC Administrator since they are personnel changes.

Comments/Discussion: No questions.

3. New Business:

· Reminder that meeting minutes will be posted on NAU IBC page starting with this meeting.

- Every protocol must include eye protection in PPE section of IBC.

- NIH incident report: recombinant *E. coli* splashed someone's face. Ms. Jones suggested soap and water be used rather than ethanol in the future.

Motion to adjourn by Ms. Jones, second by Dr. Monroy, all approved (10-0) and meeting was adjourned at 3:55.