

“Sankara, then, bases the concept tattva anyatvabhyam anirvacaniya on cosmological or, rather, predominantly, cosmogonic notions. He indicates with these words the instability of the primal state (avyakta), **which is not yet something** but desires to be made into something (vyacikisita). In a broad sense the expression describes the unsteadiness of that about which one can never say, "It is that" or "It is something else," for just as it wanted to unfold itself in the primal state, so now it always wants to transform itself and is never anything constant.

This is different from the interpretation of the other Advaitins (post-Sankara writers) who employ the word anirvacaniya. The difference becomes apparent as soon as sadasadbhyam replaces Sankara's tattva anyatvabhyam. The thought that underlies sadasadbhyam anirvacaniya, exhaustively expounded by those philosophers, is that it is impossible to prove that - not namarupa - but avidya or maya or its product (the world) is or is not. Hacker p73”

Both Alston and Hacker agree on Sankara’s usage of anirvacaniya in his authentic works. Alston, the later work, expands on Hacker’s presentation and draws attention to two additional citations, total six only. S. uses the term qualified as tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacaniya – indeterminable as a ‘that’ or ‘other’ or not the same as nor different from Brahman. Whereas, Madhana Misra and subsequent commentators use it as sadasadbhyam anirvacaniya saying that avidya/maya or the world itself is indeterminable as existent or non-existent. Hacker draws a parallel to the Creation Myth’s opening line, “There was not the existent or the non-existent then.”

What is that which is indeterminable to S? In five of the instances anirvacaniya refers to avyakta or primal matter as yet unevolved – either as namarupa directly or as maya alluding to namarupa according to Alston. The term is intended to remedy the paradox of the world in seed stage without compromising Brahman’s nonduality. Namarupa as unevolved is distinct to S. and is one of the keys Hacker suggests qualifies as a legitimate work.

The BrUbh 2.4.10 however does use the term to explain differentiated name and form: “Name and form are the limiting adjuncts of the Supreme Self, of which, when they are differentiated, it is impossible to

tell whether they are identical with or different from It, as is the case with the foam of water.” Neither Alston nor Hacker seems to attend to this usage.

It seems to me if *differentiated* name and form are indeterminable – which is easy to show logically simply based on the constant change of prapanca – it can also apply to avidya or maya, a point I believe you disagree with and how later commentators used it. I’m not sure why that usage is objectionable.

Alston, Samkara On Creation – vol 2; p119ff

Hacker in Halbfass, Philology & Confrontation

6 places: BS bh 1.1.5, 1.4.3, 2.1.14, 2.1.27; BrUbh 2.4.10 & U.S. prose 18-19