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Background

“Settler colonialism” is a structure of domination where an invading group comes to a land, seeks to eliminate the Indigenous population, and replaces them with a new society. Unlike classic colonialism, which is primarily extractive and may eventually retreat, **settler colonialism is permanent**—it seeks to erase Indigenous people, not just rule them. The goal is not just control but **replacement**. In the United States, settler colonialism is not a historical event but an **ongoing system** that structures land ownership, law, culture, education, and identity.

The logic of settler colonialism is sometimes described as the “**logic of elimination**”—a drive to destroy Indigenous relationships to land in order to make way for settler claims to sovereignty, property, and development. This elimination can be violent, as in massacres or forced removals. It can also be **bureaucratic** or **symbolic**, as in removing Indigenous names from maps, regulating tribal lands out of existence, or making Indigenous survival contingent on assimilating into settler norms. Under settler colonialism, land is transformed into **private property**, and Indigenous people are either absorbed, erased, or positioned as obstacles to development.

Importantly, settler colonialism is not just about historical wrongs like the Trail of Tears or reservation schools. It is a **structure**, not an event. Today, settler colonialism shows up in U.S. policy, especially in places like the **Arctic**, where Indigenous land is treated as terra nullius (empty land) for extractive development or geopolitical control.

Much like capitalism, **settler colonialism also operates as a logic**, not just a structure or policy. It’s a way of thinking that assumes land is meant to be owned, improved, and used for profit, and that non-Indigenous people have the right to decide how it’s used. This logic pervades modern science, environmentalism, and even liberal reform efforts like tribal consultation. Even well-intentioned policies can continue the settler project if they don’t fundamentally challenge its logics of ownership and control.

The Settler Colonialism Kritik generally argues three things:

1. **The affirmative is a tool of the settler state**, reinforcing state control over Indigenous lands and treating Indigenous peoples as either resources or obstacles.
2. **Settler colonialism is a foundational structure of violence**—its harms are not side effects but intrinsic to how the U.S. defines land, law, and development.
3. **The alternative demands refusal, resurgence, and/or decolonial practices**—rejecting settler logics and centering Indigenous sovereignty, often outside of the state.

Some teams might argue that the theory of power used within the critique is too totalizing, or that Indigenous people can and do work within the system to gain power. Others might say that development in the Arctic helps Indigenous communities. These are important debates. But the K challenges debaters to think beyond refusal or reform and ask: **What does it mean to settle on stolen land, and more importantly, what do we do about it?**

Strategy Cheat Sheet

1. A lot of the cards zoom in to talk about Canada, or Russia, or Alaska. Remember, none of the specific locations are really the fundamental point. I foresee a lot of “this card says Canada, so how is it relevant?” All of the information is about settler logics, not unique claims about countries. Plus, there’s nothing that Canada or Russia did to their indigenous populations that the US is not also guilty of
2. I encourage replacing the alt. There’s millions of alts to choose from, and I had to go with the most middle of the road one for a camp file. I think you should find something specific that you’re into and make that your alt.
3. This isn’t a very dense/theory heavy version of this K. All of it is meant to be quite digestible. To make this K Varsity-level, you’ll have to beef up the ontology/psychic drive aspect through adding your own evidence.
4. There are a lot of fun generics to argue like vague alts bad, immaterial alts bad, etc. I didn’t include them because I wanted everything I cut to be resolution-specific, but all of those can certainly elevate the debate on this K.

Top Level

There are five core parts of this critique:

- (1) Link.
- (2) Impact.
- (3) Alt.
- (4) Framework.
- (5) Perm/Competition.

Aff

- (1) Link. If you do not link, there is no Kritik. This topic offers pretty strong links to this K, but affs that toy with the definition of the word exploration may be able to get away with a no link. The theory of power debate is also a pre-requisite to the negative team winning links. If you can win that settler colonialism is not the best logic to cohere the world through, then risk of a link is minimized.
- (2) Impact. Arguing that there is no impact to the K means that even if they win a link and a workable alternative, the judge has no reason for vote for the K. You will likely be turning the impact and weighing the aff against the K's impact. If you turn the impact, then you turn it into an advantage for the aff. If you deny the impact, then you can say the aff has a larger impact, using impact calculus
- (3) Alt. Alt fails can be strong arguments because Kritiks are just non-unique disads. If the alternative does not work, then the K becomes a disad, and because it is non-unique, it is essentially just the status quo unless the neg can prove you make the squo substantially more capitalist. Therefore, attacking the alt can gain you significant footing within the round. You are equipped with strong cards to argue against the implementation of the alt and even contest the fundamental theory of power.
- (4) Framework. You need to be able to articulate why the world of the aff is not compatible with the world of the alt. Does the alt resolve some of the issues the aff claims to resolve? You need to situate the aff within a framework that gives you the most amount of offense possible. The standard framework in the file argues that Kritiks are abusive and are unsuccessful in bringing change. Through successfully arguing this, you could get the entire Kritik thrown out. Controlling the framework debate is crucial to controlling the K debate. Plan focus and util are moreso plan B. They just give you a way to say it's good to talk about the plan and our impacts matter.
- (5) Perm/Competition. Is the world of the alt compatible with the world of the 1AC? If so, there is no reason to vote neg. Here, you want to explain how the aff can work within the framework of the critique. You don't always have to go for the perm, but it's important to make the argument to at least give yourself the option.

Neg

- (1) Link. The link here argues Arctic expansion comes from Western understandings of the world as lifeless, so to speak. Land is to be owned and conquered. Thus, expansion is justified because no one is using the land. Regardless of if that's actually true, it exposes a tension between Western conceptions of ownership and land and Indigenous conceptions. All of the link evidence leans towards empirics and past examples of Great Power expansion in the Arctic to trace colonial histories.
- (2) Impact. There likely won't be much of an impact debate. It will instead take the form of debating the theory of power. Is settler colonialism the right framework to understand violence against Indigenous people. Is the framework too totalizing? Too narrow? Educate yourself on what exactly settler colonialism is and be prepared to defend it as a tool of understanding Arctic expansion as well as the past.
- (3) Alt. The alternative is radical resurgence. It's cut from an Indigenous woman's memoir. The best question you'll have to answer is what is the role of non-Indigenous people in the world of the alternative? How does the alternative spill up? This K is well-poised to sneakily solve the impacts of a climate aff as a floating PIK.
- (4) Framework. This is arguing how the judge should interpret the round, sort of like a camera filter. Should the judge allow the affirmative to weigh the impacts of aff against the impacts of racial capitalism? The narrowest interpretation is the best for the neg. You want to argue that the impacts of the Kritik come first and that Ks are necessary and valuable.
- (5) Perm/Competition. You need to be able to articulate why the world of the aff is not compatible with the world of the alt. Does the alt resolve some of the issues the aff claims to resolve? Is the aff the opposite of the alt's goal? The most common argument here will be the link is so strong that it prevents a perm. Your arguments are that Arctic exploration is by nature a colonial construct even if the aff has good intentions. Most of the links in this file pinpoint specifics about the aff, so use the links as offense against the perm.

SetCol K

1NC Shell

Arctic expansionist policy assumes terra nullius – that the land must belong to someone and that the Arctic does not. The aff is a reification of centuries of settler logic that commodifies land and exploits indigenous populations. Hanaček et al 2022 [Ksenija Hanaček, Markus Kröger, Arnim Scheidel, Facundo Rojas, Joan Martinez-Alier, On thin ice – The Arctic commodity extraction frontier and environmental conflicts, Ecological Economics, Volume 191, 2022, 107247, ISSN 0921-8009, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107247>. (<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800921003062>)] APB ☺

In essence, frontiers can be merely resource frontiers (prior to any large scale trade), commodity frontiers for trade purposes (Moore, 2000), or a combination of both (Kröger and Nygren, 2020). Commodity frontiers are based on two interrelated processes. Namely, commodity widening, such as through the expansion and occupation of lands destined to extraction (e.g. in the Arctic region), and commodity deepening, which involves intensification of existing commodity production through socio-technical innovation (e.g. nickel mining, oil drilling, new infrastructure) (Banoub et al., 2020). Commodity frontiers have inherently extractive and exploitative characteristics (Moore, 2000), which often involve environmental injustice, inequalities, and degradations at the expense of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples (Beckert et al., 2021; Martinez-Alier, 2002). Another important characteristic that frontiers have frequently in common is the resistance of people to injustice, inequality, and degradation (Conde, 2017; Temper et al., 2015; Schneider, 2020). However, mobilization and resistance are not present across all the cases of frontier expansions, but these depend on the fostering of contentious agency by particular would-be resistance actors, typically local communities, there being a wide variety of local responses to extractivist expansions (Kröger, 2020).

In the specific case of the Arctic region, frontier occupation and extractivism on commons and Indigenous lands are not new (Muller-Wille, 1987; Stuhl, 2016). The Arctic resource frontier came into existence in the sixteen century through the colonial geography of the West, mainly via the Nordic countries, other major countries in the West, and Russia, all of which were subsequently motivated by large-scale and intensive industrial extraction for trade and profit (Avango et al., 2014). For instance, the Dutch and the British established whaling stations and coal extraction processes on Svalbard in 1610; the Ivigtut cryolite deposit extraction began in Greenland in 1854; the 1898 Klondike gold rush occurred between Skagway, Alaska and Yukon in Canada (Boyd et al., 2015), among others. What is new to the current wave of frontier expansion, however, is the increased rapidity and volume of extraction occurring in the region (Kröger, 2019). Climate change is facilitating access to some resources in the Arctic (Landrum and Holland, 2020; Saebi et al., 2020), while changing political and economic agendas are attempting to legitimize new pathways towards extraction, thereby creating destructive attitudes to the environment and to Arctic peoples (Bennett, 2016; Huntington, 2016). Such agendas are generally applied without the full consultation and participation of the affected people, especially Indigenous groups (Cameron, 2012). Thus, the present wave of Arctic extractivism continues to maintain patterns of the colonial 'past' (Escobar, 2008; Körber et al., 2017; Stuhl, 2016). However, for many Arctic people, the land is not a commodity which can just be acquired at will, but an important element for interrelated and interdependent environmental and socio-cultural well-being (Nuttall, 1998; The Arctic Council, 2015a). The effect of this resource depletion is a threat to the continuation of Indigenous traditions, identities, and human-nature relationships when large-scale extraction occupies their lands (Naykanchina, 2012; Coombes et al., 2012; Lassila, 2020). This extraction and exploitation has pushed local communities in the Arctic and their traditional system of beliefs to the margin (Bennett, 2016). Yet, the benefits of extractive economies are meant for a few local actors or distant foreigner investors (Moore, 2018), while the cost of extractive economies are imposed upon Indigenous people, pastoralists and fishermen (Cameron, 2012; Dwyer and Istomin, 2009). To maintain political and economic control of the Arctic (Muller-Wille, 1987), two contradictory trends can be seen in the global resource politics of the region (Naykanchina, 2012,

p.20). Namely, a vast increase in extractive activities and infrastructure projects on traditional Indigenous lands undermine the recognition of Indigenous territorial rights and traditional land-use, such as reindeer herding, hunting and fishing (Herrmann et al., 2014; Herrmann and Heinämäki, 2017; Naykanchina, 2012). Therefore, common lands and traditional ways of life in the Arctic are being rapidly replaced by metal mining, fossil fuel extraction, wind-power parks, transport infrastructure and hydropower projects (Naykanchina, 2012). Consequently, the high levels of industrialized extraction and utilization of resources are causing often irreversible socio-environmental damage. This is giving rise to intense socio-environmental conflict in the region (Ahtuanguaruak, 2018; Keil, 2014; Nuttall, 2013; Nuttall, 1998).

The settler state commits epistemicide—it kills Indigenous ways of knowing to impose its own truth. This has infected every system we have underpinning various axes of oppression. Undergirds every impact. The life lost is innumerable. (Redvers 24)
[Redvers, N., Lokugamage, A. U., Lima Barreto, J. P., Bajracharya, M. B., & Harris, M. (2024). Epistemicide, health systems, and planetary health: Re-centering Indigenous knowledge systems. *PLOS Global Public Health*, 4(8), e0003634.] APB ☺

The assumed dominance of Euro-Western thinking in current biomedical structures is intimately related to colonial expansion, and has been consolidated through institutions such as universities, who have often situated themselves as the colonial matrices of power [1]. Present-day biomedical structures within health systems (including within medical journal structures) have continued to evolve from past and present colonial eras while carrying with it Euro-Western colonial biases and prejudices [2]. Colonial imperialism and the expansion of territories, power, and the extraction of resources from those colonized, was also accompanied by imposed Westernized epistemological (knowledge) dominance—the often-violent steamrolling of Western ideas over the ideas of those forcibly colonized [1]. Given this, some of the ongoing effects of colonization are the deeply embedded structural power imbalances that continue to cement the domination of the colonizers and their knowledge systems [3]. This assumed Western knowledge domination was purposeful, as a plurality of ideas would have undermined colonialism itself. Ideological imperialism subjugated and marginalized epistemological systems of colonized communities and Nations, resulting in “epistemicide” [4]. “Epistemicide” itself is the killing, silencing, annihilation, or devaluing of a knowledge system [4]. Epistemic violence has been mediated through colonial power imbalances so that white, patriarchal, abled-bodied people have been enabled to create the vision of normality while exerting hegemonic dominance and oppression on those who do not ‘fit the mold’ [1]—implicitly or explicitly. Epistemicide is currently an ongoing phenomenon with The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs stating that, “[f]or five centuries, a systematic attack has persisted in a bid to bring an end to the creation, conservation, and transmission of the knowledge of [Indigenous] Peoples [5]. Epistemicide ensures that knowledge outside the Euro-Western sphere is discredited while adding credibility and uplifting Euro-centric values and knowledge traditions—implicitly or explicitly [6]. Past and ongoing colonialism and consequent epistemicide additionally continues to uplift racism, sexism, anti-2SLGBTQ+ prejudice, ableism, and classism, which creates barriers to effectively addressing health inequities. Euro-Western centrality additionally ensures that power is concentrated in the hands of often white cis-patriarchal males which perpetuates continued intersectional disadvantage to marginalized people and communities. Ideological imperialism has therefore left a profound imprint, a structural legacy on current knowledge systems including healthcare structures, which contributes to morbidity and mortality within marginalized communities [7]. Decolonizing healthcare movements have increasingly been mobilized to overturn enduring colonial injustices that remain entangled within the structures of Euro-Western-centric health systems [2,7]. Substantial barriers continue to exist, however, which mandates an honest self-reflection on how health systems continue to enable epistemicide. Attaining a ‘decolonial future’ is an urgent need to forge a fairer future while enabling the dismantling of pernicious biases and prejudices that persist in the structures of healthcare delivery around the globe. **Epistemicide and Indigenous knowledge systems** Within the Indigenous context, “nothing about us, without us” platforms the need for appropriate author positionality within this article as is increasingly being called for from within Indigenous Nations [8]. Given this, NR, JPLB, and MBB position themselves from

Indigenous communities located in Canada, Brazil, and Nepal respectively. AUL positions herself as a South Asian decolonial scholar based in the United Kingdom (UK) but originates from Sri Lanka, and MH positions himself as a public health scholar and physician based in the UK with strong connections to Brazil. **Euro-Western scientific systems, which healthcare systems are based on, have embodied a spirit of scientific hegemony that has pervaded most branches of clinical practice, research, and inquiry.** This scientific hegemony has been at the expense of Indigenous knowledge systems. Indigenous knowledge systems are systems of knowledge, know-how, skills, and practices that are developed, sustained, and passed on from generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural or spiritual identity [9]. **The assumed superiority generally of Euro-Western-centric knowledge systems specifically over Indigenous knowledge systems has been a continued and ongoing legacy of colonialism around the globe.** With this, knowledge democracy [10] for Indigenous Peoples has not prevailed. Given this, before addressing issues of health equity, there must be an appreciation and understanding for how even ways of knowing, ways of being in the world, and ways of carrying out inquiry are also steeped in considerations of social justice and the mere democracy of knowledge. Lakota physician, Dr. Donald Warne, aptly states that “if we’re ever going to achieve equity across populations...we have to walk through truth” [11]. Walking through truth is not an easy process; however, it is necessary to address decades of epistemicide that has further perpetuated harm within Indigenous communities. **Epistemicide and planetary health** Indigenous knowledge systems are process-based and applied, with every lived experience within Indigenous communities constituting knowledge in action. Additionally, **as Indigenous knowledges are directly connected to Land in the all-encompassing sense** (i.e., Land, water, air, living things) [12], **the health and wellbeing of Indigenous communities is therefore completely and utterly interconnected to the health of Land.** One of the consequences of the attempted epistemicide of Indigenous knowledges through colonization has been the forced disconnection between health systems and Nature (i.e., the Land) [13]. For example, **health systems worldwide are currently one of the largest contributors to greenhouse gas emission, with emissions higher than that of the aviation industry** [14]. On the wider scale, **through the assumed dominance of Euro-Western-centric worldviews, most societies consider themselves to be entirely separate from Nature,** with their health dependent only on their access to healthcare and a range of favorable social determinant conditions. **This view** persists despite all socioeconomic and health inputs being completely dependent on a healthy and livable planet. Euro-Western-centric health systems and the Nature disconnected connotations of health they have **perpetuated** are themselves in **ecological denial.** Due to this health system ecological denial, perpetuated by ongoing epistemicide, **all of humanity continues to be at risk from Nature-disconnected systems and therefore current realities such as climate change.** On the flip side, **from the perspective of numerous Indigenous cosmologies, in order to heal the world, the health of the planet is just as important as healing individuals and communities** [15]. Indigenous health systems value all aspects of Nature (e.g., earth, fire, wind, water, rocks, plant, and animal relatives), and have deep reverence for the patterns and interconnectedness of Nature across Mother Earth and the greater universe [16]. **Many Indigenous views of health and wellbeing therefore continue to center holistic understandings of planetary health, whereas biomedicine rarely takes into consideration the interlinking effects of fields such as human biology and ecology** [17]. With this, the Euro-Western-centric worldview has perpetuated ecological erasure and therefore our own human demise. The recognition of this ecological erasure in how we currently approach health has led to a surge in calls for Indigenous Planetary Health and its direct connection to human wellbeing to be included in health policy dialogues [18]. This re-centering of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledges around planetary health as being central to human wellbeing [15] has only started to be appreciated by health systems in a time of coalescing global crises. It is well known within biodiversity circles that ecosystems are more resilient when they are diverse and heterogenous. Indigenous Peoples appreciate that this need for “diversity” is also applied to knowledge systems to build resiliency. **When you homogenize knowledge, as has been done through ongoing epistemicide, our resilience as a human species declines just like a monoculture farm starts to lose its ability to buffer stresses from environmental changes.** Epistemicide has therefore resulted in decreased resilience and wellbeing as a human society when looked at from an Indigenous worldview. **We require the “gift of multiple perspectives”** [19] to withstand the increasing dysfunction brought about by Euro-Western-centric worldviews that have led us to the precipice of ecological genocide. With this, the healthcare enterprise including medical journal publishing enterprises have to take key responsibility for the role it has played in epistemicide and the consequent devaluing of Indigenous Peoples and Nature (see [Box 1](#)). There is a need for the healthcare and medical journal enterprises to walk through truth while amplifying the path toward Indigenous and ecological reconciliation [20] (see [Table 1](#) for example recommendations for re-centring decolonial knowledges within medical publishing).

Radical resurgence is the only way to heal space and time (Simpson 17)

[SIMPSON, LEANNE BETASAMOSAKE. *As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom through Radical Resistance*. University of Minnesota Press, 2017. JSTOR,

<https://doi.org/10.5749/j.ctt1pwt77c>. Accessed 30 May 2025.] APB ☺ As much as this book is about my own deepening understandings of these theories within my life, these intellectual practices are also the mechanism through which I have generated my understanding of the theories, concepts, and ideas in this book. This book comes then from a different set of intellectual practices than the ones privileged in the academy. It adheres to a different set of theories on how knowledge is constructed, generated, and communicated. It uses a different set of methodologies to generate those ideas. **I understand the word kwe to mean woman within the spectrum of genders in Nishnaabemowin**, or the Nishnaabe language. **Kwe is not a commodity. Kwe is not capital.** It is different than the word woman because it recognizes a spectrum of gender expressions and it exists embedded in grounded normativity. Kwe cannot be exploited. **There is a fluidity to my use of the term kwe that gestures to the gender variance within Nishnaabewin. Kwe does not conform to the rigidity of the colonial gender binary, nor is kwe essentialized.** In my mind, **kwe has the capacity to be inclusive of both cis and trans experiences**, but this is not my decision to make, because I do not write from that positionality. **My life as a kwe within Nishnaabewin is method because my people have always generated knowledge through the combination of emotion and intellectual knowledge within the kinetics of our placed-based practices**, as mitigated through our bodies, This content downloaded from 71.200.85.30 on Fri, 30 May 2025 02:31:05 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> **Kwe AS RESURGENT METHOD** minds, and spirits. In fact, within Nishnaabewin, **I am fully responsible for generating meaning about my life through the way I think and live. This internal work is** a necessary and vital part of living responsibly and ethically within our grounded normativity. **It is my sovereignty.** Within this larger process, on the land I've engaged in Nishnaabeg practices of hunting, fishing, harvesting rice and medicines, ceremony, language learning, singing, dancing, making maple syrup, parenting, and storytelling, and I've spent over a decade learning from elder Doug Williams. **I've paid great attention to my thoughts, emotions, and experiences as a kwe** living at this particular point in time, and I've used this to critique settler colonialism and to generate thoughts on radical resurgent responses.⁶ I have not reacted to these emotional responses uncritically but explored and processed them through ceremony, discussions, artistic practice, and therapeutic contexts and with elders. **This is an act of resurgence itself: centering Nishnaabeg intellect and thought through the embodiment of Nishnaabeg practices, and using the theory and knowledge generated to critique my current reality. This is not just** experiential knowledge or embodied knowledge. It is not just **individual knowledge rooted in my own perspectives and experiences with the abusive power of colonialism, because it is theoretically anchored to and generated through Nishnaabeg intelligence and because it takes place entirely within grounded normativity**— perhaps a strangulated grounded normativity but

grounded normativity nevertheless. In an entirely Nishnaabeg intellectual context, I wouldn't have to explain this at all. This would be understood because it is how our knowledge system has always worked. This is kwe as method generating kwe as theorist. **This is kwe as method generating kwe as theorist, as we have always done.** To this end, this isn't an academic book in a Western sense, because in many ways it does not conform to and reproduce straight, white, cisgendered, masculinist academic conventions, theories, and citational practices, and therefore knowledge, despite the fact these are normalized within the academy.⁷ **Indig-** This content downloaded from 71.200.85.30 on Fri, 30 May 2025 02:31:05 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> Kwe AS RESURGENT METHOD 31 **enous peoples, particularly children, women, and Two Spirit and queer (2SQ) people, can choose to use the conventions of the academy to critique the system of settler colonialism and advance Indigenous liberation, and I believe this is valuable work.**⁸ We **can** also **choose to continue to produce knowledge and theory in opposition to the academy as resistance, resurgence, and sustenance through our own systems of knowledge,** and I believe this is also vital work.⁹ Many of us do both at the same time. However, **the knowledge our bodies and our practices generate, that our theories and methodologies produce, has never been considered valid knowledge within the academy and therefore often exists on the margins.**¹⁰ As a result of this gatekeeping, **the academy cannot account for nor explain what has happened to me as a kwe under the system of colonialism** in a manner that I can wholeheartedly embrace, and without the knowledge, analysis, and critique produced by Indigenous people, particularly women and 2SQ people on our own terms, the academy cannot have a full understanding of colonialism as a process nor can it fully understand Indigenous resurgence.¹¹ As political orders, our bodies, minds, emotions, and spirits produce theory and knowledge on a daily basis without conforming to the conventions of the academy, and I believe this has not only sustained our peoples, but it has always propelled Indigenous intellectual rigor and propelled our resurgent practices.¹² This is Indigenous excellence. Following Nishnaabeg intellectual practices, **you will find me citing Indigenous scholars and writers that resonate most profoundly in my head and in my heart,** as the practice of debwewin, or the process of producing truths.¹³ **You will find me relying on Nishnaabeg practices as theory, highlighting my own personal practice of Nishnaabeg intelligence and privileging the often painful and uncomfortable knowledge I carry that has been generated from existing as an Indigenous woman in the context of settler colonialism. My body and my life are part of my research, and I use this knowledge to critique and analyze. I will not separate this from my engagement with academic literature, because in my life these things are not compartmentalized.** This content downloaded from 71.200.85.30 on Fri, 30 May 2025 02:31:05 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> Kwe AS RESURGENT METHOD **I write from the first person, because within Nishnaabewin, this is a mechanism of accountability for my own thoughts,** critique, and analysis, and a recognition that these will necessarily vary from other Nishnaabeg thinkers. **I use Nishnaabewin as theory because that is what my people have always done,** although there are many other conceptual windows into our

thought system. I tell stories, both sacred stories (aandisokaanan) and personal stories (dibajimowinan), as a way of communicating ideas and concepts because that is how my people express themselves, and I rely on Nishnaabeg aesthetics to communicate meaning through story (see chapter 11 for a detailed explanation). Some concepts are introduced early in this book and then repeated later in the work as a mechanism for deepening understandings because in Nishnaabeg intellectual practices meaning is derived from both repetition and context. There are those who will not see this as an expression of the complex system of Nishnaabeg intelligence, as theory or intellect, or as a valid form of knowledge production. I will not apologize for this, or qualify this, or defend this, nor will I write this book in a way that might be more palatable to whiteness. There are those who will therefore position this work not as theory or an academic contribution but as a soft intellectual work or narrative or creative nonfiction. The latter positioning is both racialized and gendered, and I have no desire to center whiteness and answer to their positioning. **This work has already been done by several scholars and students in Indigenous academic circles. I believe my job as an Indigenous thinker and writer is to use the work of my colleagues to expand us, challenge us, and to hold us all up,** as this community continually does for me.¹⁴ This book builds upon the thinking and action of countless Indigenous peoples I am in relationship with in the present and with those who have engaged the same ideas and thinking in the past. My writing and thinking is (still) highly influenced by the unapologetic work of Lee Maracle in general and *I Am Woman* in particular. When I read this book, it feels like she wrote it to me.¹⁵ It feels truthful. It feels real because it is. She wrote about what it was like to be an Indigenous woman, and she used it to This content downloaded from 71.200.85.30 on Fri, 30 May 2025 02:31:05 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> **formulate a scathing critique of the colonial system. She didn't back it up with academic references. She didn't qualify it. She didn't say maybe it isn't like this for everyone. She didn't dance around being a victim. She didn't beg for the colonizer to recognize her pain. She hit gender violence, capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and colonialism hard.** She just spoke her truth, without apologies. And then she published it herself. As if this is normal, as if it is her birthright, because, as she demonstrates to us, it is. Here we are, over twenty years later. It is still in print. It's still being used in courses. There is still nothing like it. To a large extent, I learned kwe as method from her, scholars like Trish Monture, and community organizers like Judy DaSilva and from so many Indigenous women like them, working in their communities, in cities, and in their families with zero fanfare and little recognition. I think **the first time I saw kwe as method in action was during the summer of 1990, when I watched Mohawk activist from Kanehsata'ke Ellen Gabriel on the nightly news act as spokesperson for her people during the "Oka Crisis." The same unapologetic grounded truth that emanated from her during the summer of 1990 she carries with her to this day, not as a celebrity, but as a committed educator and language activist in her community. At its core, kwe as method is about refusal.¹⁶ It is about refusing colonial domination, refusing heteropatriarchy, and refusing to be tamed by whiteness or the academy.** I understand this refusal in the context of Nishnaabewin and Michi Saagiig grounded normativity because I have come to know refusal most intimately in this context.

Within Nishnaabewin, **refusal is an appropriate response to oppression, and within this context it is always generative; that is, it is always the living alternative.** When the Nishnaabeg were exploiting the deer by overharvesting, the deer refused and left the territory.¹⁷ After the state believed we could no longer hunt and fish in our territory as a result of the Williams Treaty, many hunters and fishers refused and continued to do so. **The Radical Resurgence Project uses Indigenous interrogation, critique, and theory, and the grounded normativity these systems generate, as the intelligence system that instigates resurgence and is the process from which grounded, real world, Indigenous alternatives are manifest and realized.** It employs Nishnaabeg story as algorithm, as coded processes that generate solutions to the problems of occupation and erasure and to life on earth. It begins from a place of refusal of colonialism and its current settler colonial structural manifestation. **It refuses dispossession of both Indigenous bodies and land as the focal point of resurgent thinking and action. It continues the work of dismantling heteropatriarchy as a dispossessive force. It calls for the formation of networks of constellations of radical resurgent organizing as direct action within grounded normativities and against the dispossessive forces of capitalism, heteropatriarchy,** This content downloaded from 71.200.85.30 on Fri, 30 May 2025 02:31:05 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> **and white supremacy.** These are actions that engage in a generative refusal of an aspect of state control, so **they don't just refuse, they also embody an Indigenous alternative.** This in my mind is not up for debate. I simply cannot see how Indigenous peoples can continue to exist as Indigenous if we are willing to replicate the logics of colonialism, because to do so is to actively engage in self-dispossession from the relationships that make us Indigenous in the first place. As I do in all my writing, I write first and foremost for my own people. **There are many different diverse interpretations and philosophical standpoints within Nishnaabewin, and as communities of thinkers, I know we will continue to engage very deeply with our knowledge in our Nishnaabeg lives.** My favorite thing is discussions where Indigenous intellectuals engage with my work from within their own nations' thought system. These conversations are so rich and affirmative to me. I look forward to this Indigenous internationalism. I look forward also to continuing to build this internationalism with the brilliance of Black theorists, artists, activists, revolutionaries, and radical imaginaries and their communities both within my territory and beyond with the hope that we can become mutual coresistors in our flight to freedom. At this point, I've made a series of basic, necessary interventions to set the stage for my discussion of the Radical Resurgence Project. I've made the case for centering this work in the theoretical home of Indigenous intelligence and grounded normativity, and that this book itself is conceptualized and communicated through Nishnaabewin. **I use kwe as method to refuse and to analyze colonialism as a structure of processes, and I've placed the eradication of gender violence as a central project of radical resurgence.** These interventions continue and are expanded over the course of the book. In chapter 3, I put forth a more expansive

nonhierarchical conceptualization of dispossession to include land and bodies as the meta-relationship Indigenous peoples have with the state. I also use kwe as method to discuss settler colonialism as a structure of processes. My discussion of Indigenous intelligence or grounded normativity as

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Kwe AS RESURGENT METHOD the theoretical fuel for radical resurgence is deepened in chapter 4 with my discussion of place-based Nishnaabeg internationalism. I then turn to another crucial intervention in resurgence theory with a consideration of Nishnaabeg practices of anticapitalism in chapter 5. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 take on heteropatriarchy as an impediment to Indigenous nation building and radical resurgence, and queer Indigeneity as a crucial expression of Indigenous intelligence. Chapter 9 explores place-based resurgent education that centers children in Nishnaabewin. Chapter 10 considers resurgent struggle, recognition, and generative refusal within Indigenous movement building. This leads to my consideration in chapters 11 and 12 of constellating everyday acts of resurgence into collective action through everyday decolonization and living a decolonizing queer politics, drawing on work by Kwagiulth (Kwakwaka'wakw) scholar and resurgence theorist Sarah Hunt along with non-Indigenous scholar Cindy Holmes. I also examine Cree/Dene scholar Jarrett Martineau's work on resurgence in artistic practice and the creation of constellations as flight paths to Indigenous freedom. The Radical Resurgence Project concludes in the final chapter by considering resurgent mobilization. These interventions are explored through engagement with my own understandings of Nishnaabeg intelligence, Indigenous scholarship, and kwe as resurgent method. They are reoccurring themes that are introduced in various forms and then deepened as the book progresses. These interventive themes are explored from the starting point that radical resurgent mobilizing must refuse dispossession in all forms and take on, in a deeply critical way, the forces of capitalism, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy, and that in these refusals, we center ourselves in generating the alternatives. As for *Dancing on Our Turtle's Back*, the vast majority of thinking and research for this book has taken place in community and on the land. My thinking is highly influenced through conversations and interactions with several Indigenous theorists, including elders Doug Williams and Edna Manitowabi, my children, Minowewebeneshi and Nishna, and the collective work of the Dechinta Centre for Research and Learning, particularly Dene elders and land users. Some of the theorists cited in these pages practice within Indigenous intelligence systems, some within Western systems, and some carry and practice both. They are all concerned with Indigenous excellence regardless of where their practices are based, and their work is rigorous. I have thought a great deal about the important discussions around citational politics in Indigenous Studies, and for me this discussion moves beyond just citations; for me these are complex questions that relate to the construction of knowledge itself. Those who think and live within Indigenous intelligence systems are marginalized within the academia and are not positioned as theorists or thinkers. For those of us trained within the academy, the parts of us that embody Indigenous intelligence are also marginalized and often invisible to the academy but visible to our families and communities. Following Nishnaabeg practices, I have cited the source where I first learned the concept—not necessarily where I first heard the concept, but where I first paid attention to it. The idea of thinking in formation or thinking with, for me, comes from Indigenous intellectual practices and is also parallel to the

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Kwe AS RESURGENT METHOD 37

intellectual work and brilliance of Black feminist theorists and is central to this work.²⁰ In this book, I am thinking and writing deeply about the challenges Black feminist theorist Alexis Pauline Gumbs asked of herself in writing *The Spill*. I am asking myself, what does it mean to write with Indigenous theory? What does it mean to “prioritize being with each other, being with the work, being with the possibilities, more than they prioritize the gymnastics of trying to get it right in a structure built on wrongness?”²¹ To Gumbs, this meant not citing white people or men in her book. To me, it has come to mean thinking critically about the emerging canon in Indigenous Studies, noticing whose voices are centered and whose are marginalized, prioritizing Indigenous intellectual practices and theories, embedding myself in a formation with other Indigenous thinkers, and citing the works necessary to bring about interventions of the highest caliber as **I strive for excellence within these Indigenous spaces on Indigenous terms**

Re-orienting the way we engage with settler colonial institutions must come first and is necessary project of decolonization.

Cordes and Sabzalian 20 (Cordes, A., & Sabzalian, L. (2020). The Urgent Need for Anticolonial Media Literacy. *International Journal of Multicultural Education*, 22(2), 182–201. <https://doi.org/10.18251/ijme.v22i2.2443>) // JLHS AA

**edited for violent reference to indians and indigenous populations

The hypervisible display of settler superiority, racism, and Indigenous erasure at the Superbowl illustrates one of many ways Native peoples are dehumanized in media. **The overt racism that Native peoples experience “is not confined to hate groups but is visible in everyday discourse and throughout the media”** (Robertson, 2015, p. 114). Robertson refers to this dynamic as legitimized racism: **Racism against American Indians has been normalized and institutionally legitimized, thereby rendering it invisible.** To legitimize is to make legitimate, that is, to justify, reason, or rationalize in accordance with established or accepted patterns and standards. In other words, **the institutions that shape social norms**— those seen as social authorities—**reproduce symbolic racial violence against American Indians (Indigenous peoples) through** legal structures, public **education** locations, consumer products, sports associations, and so on. (pp. 114-115) Supporting students in detecting and disrupting the dehumanization of Indigenous peoples, requires first that teachers themselves can recognize the varied ways media legitimizes racism against Indigenous peoples (Robertson, 2015). **Given that discourses and narratives circulating in media are often not only racist in nature but also colonial, detecting and interrupting legitimized racism will require** teachers to be equipped with both **critical race media literacy** (Yosso, 2002), **as well as anticolonial media literacy**. Anticolonial media literacy builds upon the concept of anticolonial literacy (Sabzalian, 2019a). Akin to “equity literacy,” which involves the ability to recognize, respond, and redress bias, discrimination, and inequity in education, as well as to cultivate and sustain bias-free educational spaces (Gorski & Swalwell, 2015, p. 37), **anticolonial literacy involves “the ability to critically read and counter Eurocentric and colonizing educational discourses and practices”** (Sabzalian, 2019a, p. 202). Preparing teachers to be versed in anticolonial media literacy can support Native students specifically in developing a “critical race vocabulary” that affords them opportunities to “name their pain” (Matias & Liou, 2015, p. 615). More broadly, anticolonial media literacy can support all students in recognizing and deconstructing dehumanizing colonial logics in media and generate anticolonial alternatives. **We use the term anticolonial**, following Patel (2016), **to “draw into relief the ways in which settler coloniality must be known to be countered”** a contrast and complement to the term decolonial which “should always address material changes” (p. 7). **Anticolonial literacy is an important complement to decolonial praxis.** In this article, we make a more explicit link to the need for media literacy, and its necessary corollary, critical race media literacy (Yosso, 2002). Though we offered this Superbowl vignette as an example of the way society and media sanction ongoing dominant colonial narratives, examples of Indigenous erasure and dehumanization abound. For example, celebrities and ordinary individuals alike still wear headdresses (Cordes & Merskin, 2019; White, 2017), and racist renderings of the large-nose caricatures of Chief Wahoo are plastered in high school gyms (Strong, 2004). Statues of pioneers, enslavers, and other monuments of white supremacy still stand in cities, though there has been a notable increase in their necessary removal recently (Attiah,

2020). While it is important that educators can critically read and counter these explicitly degrading examples, educators must also learn to read and counter subtler colonial logics that surface in media. Media is significant for its role in storing historical memory, reflecting/projecting identity politics, and producing and challenging hegemonic discourses. Media are texts that can be read through their codes and structures that work to produce cultural myths (Barthes, 1972). Educators must learn to read what is not explicit or learn to read the erasures in media. Anticolonial media literacy fosters teachers' ability to detect the way Indigenous peoples are absent from particular representations, and the larger political ramifications of these erasures. To be sure, representational literacy is more important than being able to point at media texts and discern them as "good" (politically correct/humanizing) representations or "bad" (politically incorrect/harmful) representations; it also involves recognizing the ways media texts are re-presentations of dominant cultural ideology and hegemony (Hall, 1997). Re-presentations help members of society make sense of who they are; thus, Indigenous scholars advocate for "the reestablishment of representational sovereignty" or the right for Indigenous peoples to have a say by producing and consuming texts that are not damaging to our communities (Lewis, 2006, p. 175). This concept has also been referred to as "rhetorical sovereignty" in the context of writing (Lyons, 2000), and "visual sovereignty" in the context of film (Raheja, 2010). To set the context for anticolonial media literacy, we draw on existing literature that articulates the need for critical race media literacy. We complement this body of literature by turning to Tribal Critical Race Theory (hereafter TribalCrit) (Brayboy, 2005). As a means of fleshing out TribalCrit's central claim—that "colonization is endemic to society" (p. 429)—we turn to two Native studies theories to support teachers in recognizing the varied ways colonial logics surface in media: firsting, replacing, and lasting offered by Jean O'Brien (2010), and settler grammars conceptualized by Dolores Calderón (2014). We then put these concepts to work on specific media texts to model anticolonial media literacy in practice. Because anticolonial media literacy requires moving beyond critique to also seek out and offer students meaningful and respectful alternatives, we end by highlighting Debbie Reese's advocacy for "critical Indigenous literacies" (Reese, 2018). Media literacy equips students with tools to analyze the power of media in society including media construction, production, consumption and its effects (Buckingham, 2013; Kellner & Share, 2005). Beyond individualized skill sets, media literacy allows students to relate to others in their communities (Jenkins, Ito, & boyd, 2016) and engage in contemplative practice to assess the power of media in helping achieve social transformation (Morell, 2012). In her foundational article, "Critical Race Media Literacy: Challenging Deficit Discourse about Chicanas/os," Tara J. Yosso (2002) draws on critical race theory (CRT) to infuse media literacy with the projects of racial and social justice. Yosso argues this conjoining, what she refers to as critical race media literacy (CRML), is necessary as schools and media both reproduce "delusional ideas" about racism, sexism, and classism (p. 53). Drawing on Freire's conception of literacy that advocates for providing "students with the tools to not only read the word but also to read the world," Yosso argues, "CRT can challenge students to critically 'read' the racism, sexism, and classism in entertainment media portrayals of Chicanas/os—to develop critical media literacy" (p. 54). Through a series of curriculum sessions, Yosso equipped students with social science theories, concepts, and language in media, as well as critical race vocabulary to support them in detecting the ways media reproduce stereotypes and deficit thinking about Chicanas/os. Yosso found critical race media curriculum sessions effective "in describing how media, through repetition of negative portrayals, teach Chicanas/os that they are inferior to whites, and in turn, whites learn that they are better than Chicanas/os" (p. 59). Students also linked these negative media portrayals to "material repercussions for Chicano communities, including fewer financial aid opportunities and community support programs" (p. 59). While CRML "cannot be a magic bullet," Yosso argued it can "facilitate students becoming critically conscious of themselves in relation to the structures of power and domination in their world" (p. 59). CRML has since been taken up by scholars in generative ways (Hawkman & Shear, 2017; Hawkman & Van Horn, 2019; King, 2017; Lozenski & Chinang, 2019). King (2017), for example, builds on Yosso's work to illustrate how the Center for Media Literacy's (CML) "Key Questions for Media Inquiry," fail to "explore the dynamics of race or provide a racial lexicon" (p. 36). To remedy this, King revises CML's key question to foster racial literacy (i.e., supplementing the question "Who created this message?" with the question "What are the racially constructed messages conveyed through the news?" (p. 37). Hawkman and Shear (2017) also build on Yosso's framework to suggest that teachers guide students through a process of confrontation (confronting problematic racial representations in media), interrogation (questioning and critiquing those representations), and navigation (offering students opportunities to challenge those representations). (See also Hawkman & Van Horn, 2019, pp. 107-108). Anticolonial media literacy is indebted to and builds on this important scholarship.

Links

Generics

[Insert tech mission/mining/hydro] is not new! It is part of a history of Great Power expansion that tramples indigenous life Hanaček et al 2022 [Ksenija Hanaček, Markus Kröger, Arnim Scheidel, Facundo Rojas, Joan Martinez-Alier, On thin ice – The Arctic commodity extraction frontier and environmental conflicts, Ecological Economics, Volume 191, 2022, 107247, ISSN 0921-8009, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107247>. (<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800921003062>)] APB ☺

Geographically, the Arctic is a polar region of approximately 30 million square kilometres, spanning three continents and eight states: Alaska in the US, the Northern Territory of Canada, Arctic Russia, Greenland, Iceland, Northern Finland, Sweden, and Norway (The Arctic Council, 2015b). The Arctic includes any location in high latitudes where the average daily summer temperature does not rise above 10 degrees Celsius (NSIDC, 2020). This includes the Subarctic area of the southern tip of Greenland, the southern coast of Iceland, and the northern part of Kamchatka, Russia. The Arctic region also contains security and military interests of nation-states, as well as political and economic interests (Heininen, 2014). For instance, integral parts of modern industrialized nation-states include Sápmi in Fennoscandia, the Yukon in the Northwest territories and Nunavut in Canada, and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region of the Russian Federation. In short, almost all Indigenous homelands have been claimed and controlled by nation-states to the south of the Arctic. Different state-corporate nexuses, located outside the circumpolar North, impose their own economic interests for which both land and resources are needed (Muller-Wille, 1987). In the process, Indigenous peoples of the Circumpolar North lose access to and control over their land and its traditional use. Within this context, development projects and planning in the Arctic are being driven by ideas of advanced technological progress and economic growth (Egerman et al., 2003). Some of its regions are integral parts of modern industrialized nation-states (although this is not the case for Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark) (Muller-Wille, 1987; Nuttall, 2012). These states cater to particular economic sectors and corporations in different extractive sectors, easing their access to Arctic Indigenous and other territories. The Canadian state is notorious for supporting via diplomacy, spying and other operations the global expansion of the mining industry (Bélanger, 2018; Keeling and Sandlos, 2015). The Canadian state-mining nexus continues to provoke major socio-ecological injustices in many parts of the world including the Arctic, as in the forceful expansion to Fennoscandia and particularly Finland by Canadian gold and other mining companies (Kröger, 2016). In Alaska, the oil and gas extraction business has been marked by recent attempts of the Trump administration (2017–2021) to open up drilling in conservation areas. Arctic policies may change with government fluctuations following, however, a general trend to extractive expansion. Besides Russia, the United States has been an important player building major logistical and military infrastructures in the Arctic. After the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, these infrastructures are currently being rebuilt, to serve resource extraction and great power competitions (Dodds and Nuttall, 2019). These militaristic goals play a major role in the Russian contemporary attempts to claim sovereignty over Arctic territories and resources. Other Arctic powers, especially the Nordic states, seem to be much less inclined to expand militarily and forcefully to grab territories or resources (Kröger, 2019). Currently, Russia and Norway are the states with the strongest citizen support for expanding Arctic resource extraction (Morgunova, 2020). Russia has a particularly strong state rhetoric, which tries to build legitimacy for hydrocarbon expansion in the Arctic as an emblem of Russian nationalism, tying these two in a problematic way, which neglects the climate emergency (Tynkkynen, 2018). This narrative, however, has been successful in gaining support in Russia for Arctic extraction. In both Russia and Norway, there is extensive state support for especially hydrocarbon but also mining expansion. The key Norwegian corporations are Statoil and Yara, but foreign oil corporations could also follow to the Arctic if Norway decides to expand its offshore drilling. In Finland and Sweden, there is a marked expansion of forestry extractivism, especially for constructing a mega pulp mill in Kemi, Finland, which would use fibrewood from very slow-growing Arctic forests to make pulp (Kröger, 2022). Sweden and Finland both have received rising criticism of the trend to replace forests with tree plantations, for the sake of wood energy and pulp production. In Fennoscandia, there are also a rising number of other land-use related conflicts around wind farm, infrastructure and tourism expansions – all sectors supported by a large array of political parties and state institutions. Fennoscandia has also a host of different kinds of mines and mining expansion projects, ranging from established underground mines in Kiruna, Sweden, and Kemi, Finland, to produce iron ore and chromite by national companies, to open-pit mines by Canadian and other foreign operators, for gold, rare earth and battery minerals (Kuokkanen, 2019). These are also largely state supported, but there is difference in mining policies, Sweden and Norway being less accessible to foreign capital than Finland (Kröger, 2016). Greenland is the most visible example of the tensions between sovereignty, indigeneity, and foreign and local pressures to extract resources (Kuokkanen, 2019). The European Union, the United States and Canada all have a stake in these politics, and a growing number of other rising powers, particularly China, aim to enter as well (Dodds and Nuttall, 2019). The Greenland mining hype, contentiously framed as a way to secure independency by some, has recently experienced a blowback due to rising resistance (see e.g. Duxbury, 2021). While there are many obstacles and risks to future expansion, our analysis indicates that the 2000–2020 period has shown a marked commodity extraction expansion in the Arctic. This could have been much stronger without sanctions to Russia, climate crises and concerns, and rising resistance. In Russia, especially in Siberia, permafrost and its melting has deterred extractive operations as there are massive and rising costs involved in trying to rebuild sunk infrastructures (Kröger, 2022). However, the Arctic region is not a terra nullius or an ‘empty polar region’ to be exploited and extracted at will (Gritsenko, 2018). On the contrary, it is home to approximately four million people, 12% of whom are Indigenous (except for Iceland) (The Arctic Council, 2015b).

There is a diversity of cultural, historical and economic backgrounds among Arctic peoples, and there are many examples of Indigenous respect for the elements of nature that are deemed to be sacred (Herrmann and Heinämäki, 2017). **The Arctic lands, waters, coasts and icescapes are places of Indigenous mobility and occupancy** (Aporta et al., 2014). Arctic Indigenous peoples include, for example, the Sámi in northern Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northwest Russia, the Nenets, Khanty, Evenk and Chukchi in Russia, the Aleut, Yupik and Inuit (Iñupiat) in Alaska, the Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada and the Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland. Each September, Arctic sea ice reaches its minimum (NASA, 2020a). The average Arctic sea ice extent in September 1979 was equal to 7.05 million square kilometres. A sharp decline was recorded by September 2020 to 3.92 million square kilometres of ice extent. Accordingly, September Arctic sea ice has been declining at a rate of 13.1% per decade since the beginning of satellite records in 1979 (NASA, 2020a). This rapid and disruptive ice change in the Arctic has led to high hopes among powerholders for investment, development, and economic growth (Kröger, 2019; Kröger, 2016). Melting ice means that the **Arctic Ocean** is accessible to navigation and commodity shipping through the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the future Trans Arctic shipping route via the North Pole. These new sea trade routes shorten travel time between the main ports of **Asia**, Northern America and Northern Europe. Furthermore, the ice melts allow a greater range for icebreakers: ships that are indispensable to the development of polar trade routes, that cut both the ice and the distance between important ports in the region (Drewniak et al., 2018). **What is occurring in the Arctic can be seen as a microcosm of the world as a whole, mirroring the speed at which socio-environmental well-being and values** – often incommensurate with monetary values – **are sacrificed to the altar of extraction and economic growth** (Martinez-Alier, 2002; Stammer, 2005). The following sections of this article systematically analyse **resource and commodity** frontier expansion in the Arctic, the associated emergence of socio-environmental conflicts, and resistance to the extractive frontiers in the region.

Climate

The aff attempts to project Western conceptions of the climate crisis without making room for indigenous perspectives or acknowledging the inherent coloniality of climate suffering. This isn't a link of omission but a link to their knowledge production processes. (Islam 24) [Islam, Faisal Bin, Lindsay Naylor, James Edward Bryan, and Dennis J. Coker. "Climate Coloniality and

Settler Colonialism: Adaptation and Indigenous Futurities." Political Geography 114 (October 1, 2024): 103164. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2024.103164>.] APB ☺

As noted earlier, in a U.S. settler colonial context, settler colonialism is a historical process perpetrated through stealing lands, history, and native identity from the original peoples of the land; as such, **settler colonialism acts to erase the identity, worldviews, and native claims of indigenous people to validate the colonizers claim to the land** (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014; Whyte 2016b). Our discussion of coloniality of climate change is based on the premise that the world **we inhabit is a colonial modern world**. Ignoring this premise in the discussion of climate coloniality risks converting it into a metaphor (Bhambra and Newell, 2023). In this colonial modern world, **global capitalism is not simply the consequence of colonization**, it is a world where **capitalism is reproduced through ongoing colonialism** (ibid). Quijano traces the history of the colonial modern world to the conquest and colonization of the Americas (2000, 216). The global capitalist system in place today is founded on a set of social and economic relations around a single power structure formed through uneven relations of production and racial hierarchy. A codification of race along an axis of different melanin levels created a hierarchy of laborers in a global hegemonic system (ibid). **In this coloniality of power, all the diverse tribes of the Americas become categorized as: "Indians,"** towards coloniality and the segregation of labor. This racial colonial violence had larger implications for epistemic erasure, where one form of totality, in this context, **Eurocentric ways of knowing and being is afforded supremacy** (Quijano 2000: 220). Fanon (1961) suggests that **colonialism is not satisfied by only occupying the place of the native and erasing their history**, in some perverse logic, **it distorts indigenous history, disfigures, and destroys it**. Thus, over ten thousand years of indigenous histories in the Americas were destroyed and distorted into the 500 years of so-called 'modern' history of white European exploration, conquest, and the colonial imagination of white supremacy. Modernity presented a new idea of the future in the world imaginary. The white European was modern, and modernity Eurocentric. **For non-European societies, futurity meant turning to Eurocentric knowledge and systems from past to future. Modern colonial rationality made it possible view Europeans as subjects and non-Europeans as objects of study, or exploitation.** Additionally, **the conceptualization of a 'dead nature' only valued for its resources and ready to be exploited, and its growth imperative that sustains global capitalism is at the core of Eurocentric knowledge.** This colonial, socio-environmental violence manifests in distinct ways. One of them is the 'power of death' or necropolitics coined by Mbembe (2003), that demonstrates that **death is the ultimate power a sovereign can exert on racial others**, the imagination of the colonizers dictates that the existence of a particular racial other is a direct threat to the colonizers, and whose biophysical elimination would strengthen the life potential and security of the dominant class. **This imagery of creating "others" is intrinsic to the "colonial ways of worlding"** (Spivak, 1985), which also points to colonial knowledge production that reflects asymmetries of power. Whyte argues that **political relations established through settler colonialism "sought to weaken indigenous peoples' cultural and political capacities"** (2016b: 12). Andreucci and Zografos note that states use this colonial logic of "inclusion" to improve and "exclusion" to sacrifice the lives of "others" in climate adaptation narratives to put the blame on "climate change" and erase the possibility of challenging colonial systems of power (2022: 92). **Climate coloniality is synonymous to the colonial character of human-induced climate change that impacts people in drastically inequitable ways across regions with varied circumstances**. Colonial tools such as capitalism, neocolonialism, land dispossession, as well as labor and resource extraction in colonized/imperialized places made possible the degradation of the environment through the emissions of greenhouse gases, pushing the planet to an ever-closer tipping point. **The coloniality that results from colonialism defines futures, epistemologies, global governance structures, discursive framings, imagined solutions, and interventions that are based on colonial knowledge production** (Sultana, 2022a). Through these framings, **colonial/imperial powers continuously reinvent extant hierarchies that persist in climate debates**, negotiations, adaptation and mitigation tactics (ibid). **For indigenous survivors who are withstanding coloniality on stolen lands, adapting to climate change is nothing new. Colonial induced environmental change forced indigenous people from their homes to the point of extinction. Now the same cycle surrounding relocation and**

displacement is forcing indigenous people to adapt to environmental changes in ways that reifies the hauntings of settler colonialism (see Ramirez in Naylor et al. 2018). Moreover, the colonial practices that are producing environmental harms are also responsible for making adaptation difficult for indigenous people living in settler realities (Whyte, 2016b; 2017). Climate change adaptation measures are likely to fail if adaptation means coping with and adjusting to colonial violence and systemic oppression in a climate changed world (Chakraborty and Sherpa, 2021). Non-indigenous and settler societies perceive climate change as an external threat that will create a dystopian future. Whereas indigenous societies believe that their vulnerability to climate change is an “intensification of colonially induced environmental change” (Whyte, 2017: 154). Whyte argues that indigenous people already live in a dystopian climate future where their native land, environment, culture, language, and identity is repeatedly stolen by the colonizers (ibid: 160). Climate coloniality becomes invisible through universalizing discourses such as anthropocentric climate change, and the Anthropocene, which gained traction through the erasure of the history of global warming created and continued by extractive colonialism and industrialization at the hands of (largely) the United States and Western Europe (McEwan, 2021). The Anthropocene discourse implies that all humans share responsibility for human induced climate change, and experience an even distribution of the impacts of industrial capitalism and imperial/colonial relations (Schulz 2017 in Whyte 2017). For indigenous people, the Anthropocene is rooted in colonialism because it erases colonial violence to nature and disregards or divides human-non-human ecological relationships from the perspective of settlers and imperial colonizers (Mitchell, 2015 in Whyte 2017). Adaptation to climate change is thus rendered a problem for global humanity as a whole, homogenizing place-based contexts and relying on supranational structures to effect adaptation and mitigation measures. The global periphery, despite having many differences and complex histories, is rendered as a homogenizing unit to be dealt with cookie cutter technocratic adaptation solutions. Such technocratic climate solutions create sacrifice zones and so-called “vulnerable populations” and reproduce neocolonial relations that often make people more vulnerable to political ecological marginalization (Paprocki, 2021; Zografos and Robbins, 2020). The urgency of the climate crisis posed by the IPCC, makes little attempt to address the neocolonial structures embedded in the climate crisis. However, the “crisis” narrative results in those with the most power being able to ignore climate injustice (through the universalizing “anthro” and homogenization of place) and creates additional opportunities for land dispossession, cultural appropriation, and theft of indigenous ways of knowing and being in the name of green solutions (Whyte, 2020). The coloniality of adaptation narratives is also visible in Eurocentric disaster planning and practices. For example, by examining the structural faults that fail to link Puerto Rico’s colonial past with disaster planning, Rivera (2022) theorized “disaster colonialism” that deepens “coloniality of being”. Rivera (ibid) turns our attention to the “procedural vulnerability” that gets reproduced through people’s relation to power and exercise of that power. By producing a “crisis” narrative and a futurity that is already lost, the disaster response can manage to deliver technical fixes that suggests “going back to normalcy” without dealing with the colonial past and social inequalities that produced “vulnerability” in the first place (ibid). Rivera also argues that “disaster colonialism” is used as a colonizing tool to produce indigenous people as the “vulnerable other” and normalize spatial dispossession that would not be possible if the “disaster” had not occurred. Expanding on the argument stated by Rivera (2022), we add that colonial adaptation narratives create “vulnerable others” who need to be provided with technical measures to become “resilient” to climate change. A climate coloniality perspective shows how these “vulnerable others” are made and reified through white saviorism; and in the settler colonial context, ‘settler saviorism.’ Thus, experts are employed to render complex human-environment relations into simpler problems that can be managed and fixed. While indigenous people see adapting to climate change through more than 10,000 years of co-living in native lands, settlers see adaptation as managing lands and environments to stabilize capitalist extraction. As a result, adaptation solutions are by design enacted to fail. These simplistic adaptation narratives are not just static projects, they produce discursive frameworks by which we view and act upon the world (Taylor, 2015). Enacting colonial climate adaptation narratives thus becomes a political process that serves to normalize a human- environment dichotomy and in the process invisibilize the ongoing colonial violence that takes place on stolen lands.

Fisheries

The colonial history of Arctic fisheries entrenches colonial capitalist extraction of subsistence resources, reducing Indigenous life to market logics. Even reformist policies force Indigenous communities to fight one another for scraps. (Lavoie et al 25) [Anna Lavoie, Brooke Woods, Mary Catharine Martin, Jackie Arnaciar Boyer, Reckoning with coloniality: Trawl fisheries governance and the fight for equity and environmental justice in Alaska, Fisheries, 2025;; vuaf022, <https://doi.org/10.1093/fshmag/vuaf022>] APB ☺

There are two interrelated systems of control and oppression operating **within** Alaska trawl **fisheries** management—**coloniality and settler colonialism**. Coloniality refers to the systems of domination and exploitation that began during the period of colonization and persists into the present, and an aspect of this is the **coloniality of power** which **functions to control and oppress for the purpose of capital accumulation** (Quijano, 2007; Quijano & Ennis, 2000). **It involves the appropriation and exploitation of resources, and the control and oppression of humans and knowledge** resulting in not only political and economic dominance but also a system that continues to shape social inequalities and oppresses Indigenous peoples (Mignolo, 2007). **Settler colonialism upholds these structures of domination and oppression** and exacerbates this harm, **as it displaces and erases Indigenous peoples and their relationships with the environment and is essentially “ecological violence and environmental injustice” against Indigenous peoples and nonhuman life** (Whyte, 2018). This structure of violence is a deliberate process in which **“settlers literally seek to erase Indigenous economies, cultures, and political organizations** for the sake of maintaining their own,” prioritizing their own interests for its own collective continuance, sacrificing the survival, well-being and collective continuance of Indigenous societies (Whyte, 2016, 2018). Bridging these structures of oppression and control, **settler colonialism functions to displace and erase** (Whyte, 2016; Wolfe, 2006), **while coloniality is characterized by** lasting structures of power that perpetuate ongoing **forms of racial, social, and economic domination and control** (Mignolo, 2007). **These structures are evident in Alaska pollock trawl fisheries** management, **which imposes science and regulatory frameworks at the expense of Alaska Native knowledge and livelihoods and upholds the interests of the trawl industry**. **The historical oppression of Alaska Natives began with the colonial invasion of their territory**, fueled by the illusion of manifest destiny and the exploitation and harm to Native Americans and nonhuman life (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014; Zinn, 2005). The enduring distress from the violence manifests as intergenerational trauma and significant cultural loss, described as holocaust and genocide against Indigenous peoples (Brave & DeBruyn, 1998; Wolfe, 2006). The **historical context is critical for understanding** current **fisheries** management practices **as** the **colonial control and oppression** continued with Alaska fisheries privatization (Mansfield, 2007) and perpetuates today in fisheries science and management (Braithwaite, 2022; Esquible et al., 2024; Silver et al., 2022; Voinot-Baron, 2020; Whyte, 2018). Fisheries privatization in Alaska began following **the U.S. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971**, which **extinguished Indigenous rights to land and transformed Alaska Native relationships with land into corporate structures** (Donkersloot & Agli, 2024). Alaska's Limited Entry Permit System for salmon ensued **in 1973, eliminating open access and Indigenous inherent rights to fish**. **In the 1990s**, the U.S. Government further privatized Alaska fisheries with the Individual Fishing Quota system, in which **individuals or entities are given exclusive rights to harvest a certain portion of the total allowable catch for certain species**. The goal of this system was to increase economic efficiency and facilitate market-based management (Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Mansfield, 2007). This system led to consolidation in the industry, with large corporations and fewer, wealthier players controlling a significant portion of the fishery, raising concerns about the impacts on Alaska Natives and small-scale fishers (Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Mansfield, 2007). To rectify this, the Community Development Quota (**CDQ**) program was implemented in western Alaska, which **involved the allocation of a portion of the annual catch share**, including pollock, **to** six CDQ groups, which are **corporate-functioning nonprofit entities representing Alaska Native communities**. **While the CDQ program provides economic benefits to Alaska Native groups, it does not fully resolve the underlying inequity and marginalization of Alaska Natives**. The process of privatization that the program introduced involved ongoing dynamics of dispossession, because **if Alaska Natives did not enter the CDQ program, they would be excluded from federal fisheries, and certain communities remain economically disadvantaged because they must be within 50 miles of the Bering Sea coast to be included** in the program (Mansfield, 2007). These western Alaska CDQ holders of pollock quota are currently in a dilemma due to the trawl bycatch of salmon. **They are “pitted against” non-CDQ communities of western Alaska** because “the CDQ's own trawling vessels contribute to bycatch that is affecting [salmon] returns on the rivers” and if they voluntarily halt operations, the CDQ will lose profit that is invested in community benefits (Alaska Bycatch Review Task Force, 2022; Herz, 2024). There are ongoing discussions on how CDQ groups can reconcile their concerns about salmon and halibut bycatch with their economic interests in the fisheries (Herz, 2024). While the CDQ program has provided economic benefits to **western Alaska communities**, they **are now dependent on an**

industry that harms the salmon they rely upon for subsistence needs. Alaska fisheries privatization and governance essentially dispossessed Alaska Natives from their sovereign rights to fishery resources and transformed them into market driven systems of profit (Carothers & Chambers, 2012). As Alaska Natives further lose control over fisheries and salmon today, federal and state policies increasingly prioritize corporate interests with Alaska Federal Fisheries Management under the U.S.

Department of Commerce. **This structural violence, which reinforces systems of accumulation, via dispossession, and oppression is a clear example of the coloniality of power in Alaska federal fisheries governance**

(Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Mansfield, 2007). The practices of Alaska **federal fisheries management and the trawling industry are also forms of settler colonialism and accumulation via dispossession. Alaska Natives are dispossessed of salmon and are rendered invisible in trawl management decisions** (Esquible et al., 2024; Voinot-Baron, 2020) and the capital from trawl fisheries is accumulated into the hands of trawl fleet corporations (Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Harvey, 1974; Marx, 1990). The NPFMC prioritizes commercial interests and ignores Alaska Native rights and traditional subsistence fishing practices despite their strong representation in participation, advocacy, and calls to action (USSCIA, 2023). This **reflects a broader pattern of coloniality where federal authorities uphold regulations that benefit the fishing industry while undermining Alaska Native lifeways** (Esquible et al., 2024;

Voinot-Baron, 2020). **Food security and sovereignty, which is a human right, is compromised** and Alaska Native sovereign rights to salmon are disregarded (Esquible et al., 2024; United Nations, 2007). The continued exploitation of fishery resources, coupled with the marginalization of Alaska Natives and their rights, illustrates a cycle of dispossession and accumulation, or what Whyte (2018) refers to as “insidious loops”; a pattern of historical injustices and exploitation that continue to have detrimental effects on Indigenous communities through Indigenous erasure (Voinot-Baron, 2020). Existing governing structures of the NMFS, Alaska, and the NPFMC enable the industrial trawl sector to continue operating with minimal regard for the ecological impacts on Alaska Native communities and continue with business as usual.

Fisheries are a tool of internal colonialism—commercial development exploits Indigenous waters, displaces subsistence economies, and reasserts settler sovereignty. External imperialism is not the only way settler colonialism manifests. (Bernauer 22) *this card highkey sucks but I alr cut it so

[Bernauer W. Commercial fishing, Inuit rights, and internal colonialism in Nunavut. *Polar Record*. 2022;58:e1. doi:10.1017/S0032247421000747] APB ☺

The concept of **internal colonialism examines the parallels between the ‘external’ imperialist domination of the Global South and the colonial relationships that are ‘internal’ to nation states** (Das, Reference Das and Kobayashi2020). While there is some variation in approach between scholars, most renderings of internal colonialism use a core-periphery model, wherein a country’s periphery is politically, economically, and culturally dominated by core/metropolitan regions. Because economic activities in peripheral regions tend to disproportionately benefit the core, **internal colonial relationships are characterised by unequal exchange** (Martinez-Alier et al., Reference Martinez-Alier, Demaria, Temper and Walter2016). A ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ division of labour develops, whereby colonised people tend to occupy unskilled and poorly paid positions compared to workers from the dominant society (Allen, Reference Allen2015). **Internal colonialism is therefore a theory of both uneven geographic development and socio-economic stratification.** Originally developed in Latin America and the USA in the 1960s, internal colonialism theory has been used to explain the political and economic circumstances of Indigenous peoples in Latin America (Stavenhagen, Reference Stavenhagen1965; Frank, Reference Frank1969), Black and Latino peoples in the USA (Chavez, Reference Chávez2013; Allen, Reference Allen2015), Celtic peoples in the United Kingdom (Hechter, Reference Hechter1972), Quebecois, Acadian, and Indigenous peoples in Canada (Usher, Reference Usher1976; McRoberts, Reference McRoberts1979; McKee, 1987), tribal regions in India (Martinez-Alier et al., Reference Martinez-Alier, Demaria, Temper and Walter2016), and Black communities in South Africa (Wolpe, Reference Wolpe and Oxaal1975). Internal colonialism theory was commonly used in academic analyses in the 1970s and 1980s. However, in recent decades, its use has declined significantly (Das, Reference Das and Kobayashi2020). **The concept of ‘settler colonialism’ – which focuses on dispossession and erasure, rather than uneven development and social stratification – has dominated recent academic research in Indigenous contexts** (Wolfe, Reference Wolfe2006; Veracini, Reference Veracini2010). Scholars frequently used the concept of internal colonialism to examine Indigenous experiences with extractive industries in northern Canada in the 1970s and 1980s (Brody, Reference Brody1975; Usher, Reference Usher1976; Watkins, Reference Watkins1977; Dacks, Reference Dacks1981; Loxley, Reference Loxley1981), and some continue to utilise it in analyses of non-renewable resource extraction in northern Indigenous territories today (Bernauer, Reference Bernauer2019; Hall, Reference Hall2012; Gordon, Reference Gordon2010; Bone, Reference Bone2003). For these scholars, **industrial extraction – including mining, hydroelectric generation, and oil and gas extraction – is a manifestation of internal colonialism because extractive economies can disrupt Indigenous subsistence practices, often require the legal dispossession of Indigenous land and resources, are dominated by institutions based in core regions, and primarily benefit non-Indigenous people and institutions based in the core.** Historically, northern extractive economies suffered from very high levels of economic leakage, as the vast majority of profits, rents, contract opportunities, and employment benefits were captured by southern regions (Watkins, Reference Watkins1977). While modern treaties and Indigenous-proponent agreements allow Indigenous communities to capture a larger share of this wealth than was hitherto possible, a substantial portion continues to flow to southern jurisdictions (Bone, Reference Bone2003;

Slowey, Reference Slowey2008). Moreover, **because Indigenous peoples mostly fill unskilled, semi-skilled, temporary, and on-call positions, the workforces at many northern extraction projects continue to be stratified along ethnic lines** (Bernauer, Reference Bernauer2019). Like other colonial economies, northern extractive economies are 'divergent' insofar as production focuses on export markets and consumption depends mostly on imported goods (Loxley, Reference Loxley2010). As a result, the 'economic multipliers' associated with supplying equipment and provisions ('backward linkages') and value-added secondary production ('forward linkages') are lost to other jurisdictions (Watkins, Reference Watkins1977; Bone, Reference Bone2003). The application of internal colonialism theory to northern Canada is not without its critics. For example, anthropologist Paul Nadasdy (Reference Nadasdy2003) rejects the core-periphery approach, arguing that it does not adequately account for either the state's drive to assimilate Indigenous peoples or Indigenous resistance to assimilation. These criticisms have some merit, and Nadasdy's work has provided useful insights into the ways **state structures and processes like co-management and self-government subtly influence and change the ways Indigenous people relate to wildlife, the land, and each other**. However, his approach to colonialism focuses entirely on Indigenous-state relations with no attention to extractive economies. As a result, he does not address the role of uneven development in the colonisation of Northern Canada, a phenomenon of central importance in the literature about internal colonialism. Historian Adele Perry (Reference Perry2016) argues that Indigenous migration to urban areas in the late 20th century has complicated and rearranged the historic relationship between settler cities and Indigenous peripheries. This is certainly true, yet it is important to emphasise that many urban Indigenous communities do not participate equitably in the economic life of the cities in which they live. Moreover, **urban Indigenous neighbourhoods often exhibit characteristics of internal colonies, including economic divergence, ethnic stratification of the workforce, and high levels of economic leakage** (Deane, Reference Deane2006; Silver & Loxley, Reference Silver, Loxley, Loxley, Silver and Sexsmith2007). As such, moving from a northern reserve to an urban Indigenous community often does not entail a move from core to periphery, but rather from one part of the periphery to another. Several scholars have also criticised the way in which the idea of internal colonialism has been applied to the specific context of Nunavut. While he does not reject the concept outright, Hicks (Reference Hicks2004) argues that applications of internal colonialism theory to Inuit communities need to pay more attention to class divisions in both the Inuit and dominant Canadian societies. According to Hicks, land claim agreements have created new class divisions within Inuit society and, as a result, Nunavut's population is no longer strictly stratified along ethnic lines (see also: Mitchell, Reference Mitchell1995). While it is true that land claims have resulted in the development of new class dynamics in Inuit society, as I explain below, the relationship between Nunavut and southern Canada remains colonial. Widdowson (Reference Widdowson2005) argues that the core-periphery model of internal colonialism is not an appropriate approach to the colonisation of Nunavut Inuit. **Because the federal government spends more money administering Nunavut than it collects in royalties from Nunavut's natural resources, Widdowson claims that Nunavut is not an internal colony but a 'parasitical appendage'** of Canada that should be 'depopulated' (23). Setting aside the overtly colonial and assimilationist implications of Widdowson's argument, her criticisms are based on a straw-man depiction of the core-periphery model. Royalty payments are one small aspect of the economic benefits generated by extraction in Nunavut, and there is ample empirical evidence that people and institutions in Southern Canada benefit substantially from mining in Nunavut. Elsewhere (Bernauer, Reference Bernauer2019), I have shown that **the core-periphery model of internal colonialism continues to be a useful framework for understanding the political economy of mineral and energy extraction** in Nunavut. Political struggle by Inuit, especially the negotiation of the Nunavut Agreement, has resulted in more extensive Inuit participation in decisions about mining. Moreover, these struggles have resulted in a larger share of the wealth produced by mining remaining in Nunavut. Yet extractive industries in Nunavut continue to be dominated by institutions based in southern Canada, while most economic benefits continue to be captured by people and institutions based outside of Nunavut. In this paper, I **use the concept of internal colonialism to examine the commercial fishing industry** in Nunavut. Drawing on publicly available information, I consider the degree to which the concept of internal colonialism accurately captures the political economy of Nunavut's commercial fisheries. My analysis focuses on two integral aspects of internal colonial relationships: (1) the degree to which the fishing economy is controlled by institutions based outside of Nunavut and (2) the geographic distribution of wealth produced by Nunavut's fisheries. In the process, I pay close attention to how these aspects of internal colonialism have been affected by political struggle, including the negotiation of Indigenous land claims, political lobbying, and litigation. Finally, my analysis of Nunavut's fishing industry demonstrates that the core-periphery model of internal colonialism continues to be relevant to the study of the colonisation of the Canadian Arctic. The concept of settler colonialism dominates most recent scholarship on Canadian colonialism (Coulthard, Reference Coulthard2014; Peyton and Keeling, Reference Peyton and Keeling2017; Dorries et al., Reference Dorries, Henry, Hugill, McCreary and Tomiak2019; Camfield, Reference Camfield2019; Daigle, Reference Daigle2019; Shipley, Reference Shipley2020; Erickson, Reference Erickson2020; Youdelis et al., Reference Youdelis, Nakoochee, O'Neil, Lunstrum and Roth2020; Wheeler and Luedee, Reference Wheeler and Luedee2021; Wilson et al, Reference Wilson, Montoya, Arsenault and Curley2021) and has been used to produce helpful analyses of the colonisation of Inuit in Canada (Gombay, Reference Gombay2014; Cameron, Reference Cameron2015; Procter, Reference Procter2016/Reference Procter2020; Todd, Reference Todd2018; Metzuzals & Hird, Reference Metzuzals and Hird2018; Hird, Reference Hird2021). However, settler colonialism theory's focus on dispossession and erasure underemphasises the aspects of the colonial relationship examined in this paper, including social stratification and uneven geographic development. Therefore, **social scientists should continue to engage with both internal and settler theories of colonialism to understand and explain the political economy of the Inuit homeland in Canada.**

Colonialism and fisheries are inseparable. Western management criminalizes Indigenous harvests and erases Native ecological knowledge.

[Silver, J. J., Okamoto, D. K., Armitage, D., Alexander, S. M., Burt, J. M., Lee, L. C., Muhl, K., Salomon, A. K., & Stoll, J. S. (2022). Fish, People, and Systems of Power: Understanding and Disrupting Feedback between Colonialism and Fisheries Science*. *The American Naturalist*. <https://doi.org/10.1086/720152>] APB ©

Indigenous peoples have lived in the place now known as “British Columbia, Canada” for more than 14,000 years. Multigenerational and place-based histories inform Indigenous laws and hereditary governance systems (Menzies 2010; Atlas et al. 2021). A wide range of coastal and ocean cultivation, fishing, and management techniques existed, including (but not limited to) weirs and traps that work with tides and seasons (Atlas et al. 2017, 2021), estuarine root gardens (Deur et al. 2013), juvenile fish transplant (Thornton 2015), and terraced rock walls that extend intertidal clam habitat (Groesbeck et al. 2014). Pacific herring were, and continue to be, critical to Indigenous trade, food, nutrition, social relationships, and ceremony (Gauvreau et al. 2017). An important resource form is herring “roe-on-kelp” or “roe-on-branch.” Named after the harvest technique, kelp strands, cedar, or hemlock branches are laid out during spring spawning events and removed after several herring egg layers have been deposited. Herring themselves were caught using dip nets and fish rakes (Newell 1993). The remainder of this section deepens and illustrates points from earlier parts of the essay by tracing key moments in the colonization of British Columbia, detailing the expansion of commercial herring fisheries and describing some important and contested aspects of state-led herring management. **European explorers began arriving in the mid- to late 1700s.** Britain established the colonies of “Vancouver Island” and “British Columbia” in the mid-1800s, and British Columbia officially entered Canada as a new province in 1871. Outside a couple of instances, colonial officials did not pursue treaties that articulated agreements with Indigenous peoples (Harris 2004). **Systems of “Indian reserves” (hereafter, “reserves”) and “Indian residential schools” expanded throughout this period (ibid).** **To usurp Indigenous laws and hereditary governance systems, agents of the Canadian government were empowered to** install elected “band councils” on each reserve. An important Indigenous governance practice called the potlatch was banned in 1885; the ban was not lifted until 1951. Canadian government officials **plan**ned the network of small and remote land-based **reserves in British Columbia based in part on the false premise that “Native Peoples on the Pacific coast were primarily fishing peoples who did not need a large land base”** (Harris 2009, p. 6). However, **federal interest in developing a commercial fishing economy intensified quickly.** Skill in fishing and the location of many reserves near productive fishing grounds meant that **many Indigenous peoples participated in nascent commercial fisheries for salmon, herring, and halibut** (Newell 1993). Involvement necessitated capital investment in European-style vessels and gear because Indigenous techniques were criminalized: **“the state and its administrative agencies and courts” characterized “Pacific Coast Indian fishing traditions as destructive”** (Newell 1993, p. 4; also see Silver 2013). Across the north Pacific rim, large-scale herring reduction fisheries operated between the late 1800s and 1960s. **In 1955, the Canadian Fisheries Act was amended to prohibit Indigenous peoples from harvesting roe-on-kelp/branch for commercial sale:** “[p]rohibiting the harvest and sale of herring spawn, [DFO] officials argued, was essential to conserve herring stocks” (Harris 2000, p. 205). Yet between 1948 and 1962, annual landings from the Canadian Pacific herring reduction fishery increased from 1.5 to 11.9 million tonnes (Newell 1993), and the fishery is estimated to have removed 60% of the stock on average each year (Taylor 1964; Schweigert 1993). Herring stock collapses occurred from Japan to Alaska and down the US West Coast; collapse off of British Columbia led DFO to close herring reduction fishing in 1968 (Hourston 1980; Schweigert 1993; Trochta et al. 2020). Although many herring populations rebounded, some smaller subpopulations never recovered (e.g., Skidegate Inlet within the traditional territory of the Haida First Nation, as discussed in Jones 2000). Commercial roe herring fisheries using seine nets and gillnets were permitted to open in 1973 in response to demand from Japan for “sac roe” (i.e., full egg sacs removed from harvested female fish). There are three important time lines to consider at this juncture (fig. 1). Given the troubling details of British Columbia’s early history, including direct actions to usurp Indigenous governance, assimilate Indigenous children, and criminalize Indigenous fishing, we contend that **it is erroneous to understand colonialism as separate from commercial fishing and management** in British Columbia (in orange). In the case of Pacific herring specifically, large volumes of herring biomass were harvested each year during the reduction fishery at the same time **that laws and policies criminalized Indigenous fishing practices as a conservation threat and oppositional to industrialization and “modernizing” the marine economy. Colonial acts severed Indigenous relationships with territorial lands/waters and restricted Indigenous access to herring and other fish. These were critical keys to the initial expansion of commercial fisheries.** As we will show through the rest of this section, colonialism has not simply disappeared. Although more nuanced in some ways, **colonial processes and inequities have entrenched as fisheries have industrialized and approaches and tools from fisheries science have been implemented** (in green and blue). **As fisheries industrialized around the world, countries clamored to extend their geopolitical reach, secure access to distant stocks, and protect domestic fisheries and fleets.** For political-economic reasons, the United States and other Western countries strongly favored knowing and representing fish in aggregate and/or as biomass. Understandings and approaches from fisheries science developed and evolved, were taken up, and are now institutionalized within state-led agencies—notably, single-species models that feed into structured decision-making and evaluation processes. These outcomes are typically described as a matter of the best available science being eagerly adopted by state agencies concerned with economic development and responsible for conservation. However, following Liboiron (2021), it is vitally important to understand them as direct reflections of particular outlooks (i.e., hubristic and techno-optimist postwar ideas about “modernization”), sets of relations (i.e., capitalist), and objectives (i.e., the globalization and neoliberalization of food systems). All of this, as Liboiron persuasively argues, is underlain by the colonial and common Western scientific presumption of unfettered access to Indigenous lands and waters (also see McGregor 2018; Todd 2018). The herring illustration echoes these points and reinforces **that it is not meaningful or useful to distinguish between a “colonial past” and “postcolonial present”** (Harris 2004; Wolfe 2006; Whyte 2018). **Colonialism generated initial conditions for rapid fisheries expansion and has been reinforced through the implementation of approaches and tools from fisheries science that define and quantify conservation in particular ways and at particular (generally larger) social-ecological scales.** The Western science-based management system now in place struggles to recognize and incorporate place-based observations, objectives, and values. **Indigenous fishing techniques**, several of them documented to have beneficial social and ecological advantages (e.g., Groesbeck et al. 2014; Atlas et al. 2021), **are not generally permitted under the fisheries management system**, which means that practicing them can lead to penalty and even arrest under Canadian law. **Indigenous nations** and others who relate to and rely on fish adjacent to their home communities **shoulder unique risks**, an issue that is persistently underacknowledged and deprioritized. **While some specifics may be unique to the herring illustration (e.g., harvest techniques and gear types, resource forms preferred in different markets, spatial dynamics of herring and different fisheries), at least three feedbacks between colonialism and fisheries science are more broadly generalizable. First, an implicit assumption** appears to be **built into the discipline of fisheries science**, especially evident in modeling approaches and tools.

the state is the appropriate authority to manage and articulate objectives for fisheries. This assumption is easy to appreciate because nation states are responsible for 200 nautical mile EEZs and are incentivized to support and subsidize fisheries that generate employment and income. At the same time, the assumption has implications for the scale at which fisheries scientists typically build, test, and refine models and for the reference points and performance metrics developed and recommended for decision-making and evaluation. Approaches and best practices straddle into (and, as in the illustration, are often formally housed within) state-led management. **Second, state-led fisheries management exacerbates colonial legacies and entrenches inequities, often in the name of best use and/or conservation. Research suggests this to be the case for** other fisheries in Canada (e.g., Piper [2009](#); Denny and Fanning [2016](#)), along with **fisheries in countries like the United States** (e.g., Richmond [2013](#)), New Zealand (e.g., Bodwitch [2017](#)), Australia (e.g., Lalancette [2017](#)), and South Africa (e.g., Nielsen and Hara [2006](#)). Inequities take common forms, including license and quota holdings concentrated with large vessels and/or nonfishing investors, the criminalization and/or marginalization of Indigenous fishers and fisheries (which, in turn, diminishes access to traditional and nutritious foods), and science and management processes that are inattentive or inaccessible to localized harvests, ecosystem dynamics, and other forms of knowledge. We have also seen that state agencies in many jurisdictions were established and have continued to evolve under shared political-economic and geopolitical circumstances. Countries with active domestic and distant-water fleets were and remain in competition with one another for access to fisheries and export markets, seek to enable and maintain high-volume fisheries, and often must rationalize negotiating positions in international settings and domestic management decisions to citizens. Therefore, **the third and final** generalizable **point** about feedbacks between colonialism and fisheries science **is that the history and evolution of fisheries science cannot be understood separately from industrialization and neoliberalization as driven by colonial states/statecraft.** Perhaps the best way to describe the overarching “problem” is that practices of knowing, using, and governing other-than-human species and ecosystems become accepted only when formally enshrined through and culturally embedded within Western scientific disciplines, management agencies, and legal regimes. This is hegemony, and unfortunately a single-step “solution” does not exist. Although not an exhaustive list, we propose three urgent and interconnected goals: (a) transform the siloed institutions, practices, and culture of Western science; (b) reimagine and rebuild pathways between information (including diverse values and perspectives) and decision-making; and (c) devolve governance authority and broaden governance processes such that multiple ways of knowing share equal footing. In [figure 2](#), we illustrate the generalizable feedbacks between colonialism and fisheries science just summarized and identify points of disruption where work toward one or more of the three goals is needed.

US-Russia Climate

Green technology efforts have historically targeted indigenous communities and left them to suffer. The affirmative is a tool of capitalist expansion that prioritizes the settler at the expense of indigenous livelihood. (Dearing 24) [Aissa Dearing – 5/2/2024 – “Renewable Energy and Settler Colonialism” - <https://daily.jstor.org/renewable-energy-and-settler-colonialism/> - Aissa Dearing (they/she) is an environmental justice activist and a PhD student at the University of Oxford, studying climate solutions at the nexus of food sovereignty, Indigenous rights, and carbon drawdown. She is from Durham, North Carolina, USA.] APB ☺

As Diné scholar Andrew Curley wrote in his recent book, *Carbon Sovereignty: Coal, Development, and Energy Transition in the Navajo Nation*, “colonialism is a shape-shifter.” In this sustainability renaissance, green technologies—including renewable energy infrastructure in the form of photovoltaic solar fields, wind turbines, geothermal plants, and hydroelectric dams—have the potential to help the world transition to a carbon-free energy system and mitigate anthropogenic climate change. Yet, the environmental benefits, wealth, sovereignty, and agency that come from the development of renewable energy resources haven’t reached all communities equally. Infrastructure creation, like renewable energy, is shaped by uneven geographies, with development occurring in a way that promotes the ongoing project of settler colonialism, particularly in the United States. In detailing the history of US colonialism and imperialism around natural resources, Diné (Navajo) and Dakota scholar B.K. Tom Goldtooth writes that as Indigenous reservations were formed in an era of treaty-making, the state found creative ways to maintain eminent domain over Tribal coal, gold, oil, and gas, and now, lands for renewable energy. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has estimated that Tribal lands, which comprise approximately 5 percent of US land, could host 10 percent of all energy resources, renewable and non-renewable. But Tribal lands are particularly vulnerable to corporate renewable energy expansion due to the relative absence of land use regulation and lack of financial incentives (and access to upfront capital) for tribes to own and develop energy infrastructure. This means that Tribes typically lease land for infrastructure placement without actually reaping the benefits of ownership, electricity access, environmental accreditations (renewable energy credits or carbon credits), or tax credits—these are funneled to corporations and metropolitan areas that can shape industry operations. In fact, Diné scholar Melanie K. Yazzie found that as landowners, Tribal Nations actually lose bargaining power against transnational energy corporations over time. Moreover, the constraints of being unable to participate on the international stage erode Tribal sovereignty, leaving Tribes unable to shape energy policy and trade. For the Diné, ancestrally from the lands of the US Southwest, such development could help the transition from a heavy reliance on coal. Despite this violence, as Yazzie underscores, Diné scholars, land defenders, and activists have challenged settler colonial erasure, dispossession, and extraction that underpin state-Tribal relations around renewable energy development. For the Diné, ancestrally from the lands of the US Southwest, such development could help the transition from a heavy reliance on coal. As Curley details, coal mining operations on Navajo lands over the past sixty years supported the recuperation of limited forms of sovereignty and capital for Tribal government operation. In transitioning to greener forms of energy, there may be ways to align new infrastructures with Indigenous futurity—to provide a clean, sovereign energy supply, offer access to dependable sources of electricity, generate revenue (which can support wider goals of land reclamation), and create opportunities for workforce development. Indigenous scholars have produced volumes of work and proved with everyday practice viable alternatives to colonial-capitalist models of growth and development, in which the value of ancestral wisdom, spirituality, cosmology, reciprocity, care, and community are respected. As Yazzie writes, “the future demands nothing less of the conditions of vibrant futurity in which life in its entirety is able to thrive free from the violence of empire.” It cannot simply be about clean energy resourcing and climate mitigation; renewable energy development must also challenge the notion of capitalist growth, settler coloniality, and corporate-backed development in order to achieve sovereignty, agency, and liberation for Indigenous communities.

Technological interventions to save the environment increases exploitation of indigenous land (Tokar 10)

[Brian Tokar. Current director of the Institute for Social Ecology, and a lecturer in Environmental Studies at the University of Vermont. "Movements for Climate Action: Toward Utopia or Apocalypse?" Perspectives in Anarchist Theory (2010). Pgs 1-11. CS]

Capitalist false solutions to the climate crisis fall into two broad categories. First are a series of **technological interventions**. They **aim to either increase energy supplies while reducing reliance on fossil fuels, or to intervene on a massive physical scale to counter the warming effects of increasing carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere**. Reducing fossil fuel use is certainly a necessary step, though **attempting to transform our energy systems** without changing the way economic decisions are made may prove to be a futile pursuit. The latter approach, **broadly described by the term "geoengineering," threatens to create a host of new environmental problems in the pursuit of a world-scale techno-fix to the climate crisis**.⁶ The other broad category of capitalist false solutions relies on the tools of the **so-called "free market" as a substitute for direct interventions against pollution**. These include the creation of new markets in tradable carbon dioxide emissions allowances (now termed "cap-and-trade"), and the use of carbon offsets, i.e. investments in nominally low-carbon technologies elsewhere, as a substitute for reducing an individual or a corporation's own emissions profile. **Among the technological false solutions, efforts to expand the use of nuclear power are by far the most insidious**. Nuclear power has been subsidized for over fifty years by various governments – amounting to over a hundred billion dollars in the US alone – yet it still presents intractable technical and environmental problems. **Any expansion of nuclear power would expose countless more communities to the legacy of cancer** that critical scientists such as Ernest Sternglass have documented, **and many indigenous communities to the even more severe consequences of uranium mining and milling**. **Scientists still have few clues what to do with the ever-increasing quantities of nuclear waste that will remain highly radioactive for millennia. Efforts to export the nominally most successful example of nuclear development**, i.e., the French model, **have utterly failed, as demonstrated by France's own legacy of nuclear contamination, as well as years of delays, quality assurance problems, and massive cost overruns** at the 5 billion euro French nuclear construction project in Finland.⁷ Recent studies of the implications of an expanded nuclear industry have also revealed some new problems. First it appears **that supplies of the relatively accessible, high-grade uranium ore that has thus far helped reduce the nuclear fuel cycle's greenhouse gas emissions are quite limited. If the nuclear industry ever begins to approach its goal of doubling or tripling world nuclear generating capacity – sufficient to displace a significant portion of the predicted growth in carbon dioxide emissions – they will quickly deplete known reserves of high-grade uranium, and soon have to rely upon fuel sources that require far more energy to mine and purify**.

Framing the Arctic as a zone of geopolitical cooperation erases Indigenous sovereignty by assuming only states have agency, which recreates a cycle of dispossession where indigenous sovereignty is dependent upon the state. Their framing is the link.

Centering indigenous knowledge rather than projecting external goals onto the land is key. (Islam 24) [Islam, Faisal Bin, Lindsay Naylor, James Edward Bryan, and Dennis J. Coker. "Climate Coloniality and

Settler Colonialism: Adaptation and Indigenous Futurities." Political Geography 114 (October 1, 2024): 103164. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2024.103164>.] APB ☺

We now turn to the environmental oral history given by Chief Dennis White Otter Coker Principal Chief of the Lenape Indian Tribe of Delaware. A lifelong resident of the Cheswold community and direct descendant of Cheswold families that can be traced back to the 1760s, Chief Coker has been the democratically elected figurehead of the Lenape Tribe since 1996 and was pivotal in the effort to gain state recognition for the Lenape Peoples. We draw from five, two-hour audio recorded conversations, each with a different theme: (1) place and home; (2) movement; (3) threats and fears; (4) changes; and (5) adaptation. These were broader talking points we used to focus the conversation as it relates to climate and other environmental change.³ Selections from these dialogues are presented in their rich detail in the pages that follow to amplify our conversations around adaptation, displacement, environmental change, and coloniality. This data and analysis is not intended as a comprehensive nor homogenizing viewpoint for the Tribe, nor Native Americans, nor Indigenous Peoples globally. Nor do we intend to romanticize indigenous pasts or relations to the land, but instead offer snippets from this oral history as an account by a "keeper of the land" as they seek to reconcile their knowledge in place.³ These oral histories were conducted over a six-month period between October 2021 and April of 2022 by Naylor and Bryan and the themes were developed by Bryan in conversa on with Naylor and Coker. All oral history sessions were held at the official Center of the Lenape Tribe in the Cheswold/Dover area. ²¹ "Man did not spin the web of life; he is just merely one strand of it. And what man does to the web, he does to himself..." (attributed to Chief Seattle), Chief Coker noted mid-way through our first session, when asked about how we can rebuild indigenous culture and futures at a time when the world is

already in turmoil due to human-induced climate change. **Contrary to many scientists and policymakers who are putting forward a doomsday scenario due to climate change, Chief Coker shared that there are a thousand years of Lenape history of adapting to environmental changes, to call for a regenerative process of mutual respect and healing. Adapting to environmental change in indigenous lands—as part of this conversation—is not fully comprehensible without thinking about the disruption to indigenous way of life created by settler colonialism.** Particularly because, as discussed earlier, **capitalism, settler colonialism, and climate change are constituent** (Whyte 2016b). Throughout our conversations, Chief Coker emphasized the relation to land, connections to place, indigenous spirituality, and long-term cycles of migration all disrupted by colonialism and ongoing coloniality to the extent that repatriating indigenous life or imagining a future where there had been no “contact” produced a prolonged and thoughtful silence in our dialogue. However, there is a longer history that foregrounds these silences, a thread of which concerns the ability of the Lenape Peoples of Delaware to withstand ongoing coloniality by, what has been termed by the People as “hiding in plain sight.” This speaks to some degree to the **erasure that is was experienced by Indigenous peoples, whereby removing the People from the landscape allows for state control and assertion of sovereignty** (cf. Simpson 2017). We started by asking Chief Coker to define home and the relation to land in the state that is now called Delaware: 22We as a people, and all the **Native people** on the East Coast, **have been dealing with environmental changes for thousands of years**... we have been retreating inland since the beginning of sea level rise...but what’s very different about this time is the fact that we have nowhere to go now. **We’ve been boxed in by a colonizing society** that has, just forced us to be in one place, instead of being spread out over a longer, or larger, geographic area. Now, this place for me is my home...I mean **my roots are so deep in this soil, that it just has never occurred to me to leave. All my family, my ancestors, that are buried here**, that are interred in this ground. And I know that when I do go away, I can’t wait to get home. Contact with the modern/colonial world had a profound impact on the way of life of the Lenape people. **The expansion of the colonial project and its resulting displacement of indigenous lives** also shaped the way how the Lenape think about their home and their ancestors the “keepers of the culture and tradition” having been displaced. Pre-contact, before the displacement and division of the People, Chief Coker describes interactions with land and territory as something that he can only imagine now. **During pre-colonial times, Lenape people were in his words, “water people.”** They depended on the Bay as a food source and their community spread across the DelMarVa peninsula. In summertime they would be on the water, and in wintertime, they would be inland, closer to the center of the Peninsula. They established territory for hunting, but Lenape land was porous, there was no designated boundary. Other tribes were welcome with permission and depending on the “bounty offered.” The notion of private property was absent in Lenape culture. However, with contact and the violence of colonialism, came the apocalyptic character of coloniality. Colonization disrupted the way Lenape people interacted with their environment and seasonal changes. **Colonial expansion, dispossession, and extraction meant that they could no longer migrate seasonally to sustain their way of living and being.** This change, in effect, meant remaining in their home and on their land, but experiencing internal displacement and identity loss. *Coloniality and Displacement* 23The colonial domination of indigenous lands has the “doctrine of discovery” at its foundation (Nichols 2022). Chief Coker elaborated on these beginnings “...those Christian monarchs of Europe, were given permission by the Holy See, the Pope, to go out there and find these new worlds and Christianize everything that you find by any means possible, including extermination.” This understanding signals the necropolitics discussed earlier in the paper—where a sovereign, through racialized power dynamics maintains power over life and death (Mbembe 2003). In discussing Lenape territories and colonization in more depth, Chief Coker expounded on how relations to land multiplied disruptions: Our life was not a struggle for us. But it became a struggle. And when you’re told repeatedly that you’re a savage, a heathen, and an infidel, and you’re a devil worshipper because of the way you live, because of the things that you believe, it just total denigration from people that were supposedly the leaders of this colonial system... And those, we called them the “Black Robes”, the preachers that would come in. They would send in the Black Robes first and their goal was to pacify you and disarm you and then the military would follow suit and, clean up what was left. **The violent dispossession of land is but one facet of the impulses of coloniality, which displaced the People and their Knowledges**. And so, while some of The People remained through internal displacement and forced assimilation, many more were lost either through displacement outside of their traditional territories, or through the violence of contact. It is estimated that ninety percent of the Lenape population was decimated upon the first contact with the colonizers: Smallpox was devastating to us... **The traders would interact with them on the shore, they may get infected**, they’d head inland, they’d canoe for 3 or 4 days or 5 days and all of the sudden they’re contagious because they’ve run the course of their infection... we’ve identified six smallpox outbreaks that took place in the Delaware Bay between 1600 and 1700. So, **with every outbreak, we would lose our wisdom keepers, our teachers, our oral historians**, and then our next generations, and then that happened every 15 years. So, at the end of the 17th century, we had experienced an almost 90% depopulation. We were just outmanned and outgunned and just totally disrespected in our way of life, the way that we viewed things, and it didn’t fit into their, to the colonial idea of land ownership. **In its totality, colonial domination resulted in a multi-fold scenario of violent displacement and a sedimenting of coloniality, which form the backdrop of irreversible environmental change**. The destruction of the native population during the colonial expansion through diseases is one way ‘necropower’ (Mbembe 2003) manifests in the colonial imagination of settling territory. *Environmental Changes in a Settler Colonial Landscape* **The domination of Lenape lands was not limited to cultural expropriation, it also had a deleterious impact on the environment itself.** Chief Coker suggested that the climate change debate that revolves around present fossil fuel emissions is not effective because they do not take account of historical emissions due to colonization. Citing examples from the colonial dispossession in his own community, Chief Coker discussed these impacts: ...When we talk about human induced climate change, we tend to pinpoint it around our use of, fossil fuels and the industrial revolution. And I want to throw the idea out there...that **human induced climate change**, like the rapid warming and the rapid creation of conditions that are going to be inhospitable for life, **really started with the colonial period**. We just couldn’t understand their voracious need for wood because we didn’t use wood like that. Our philosophy was to take what you need and give thanks for everything that you take...They were just killing all the animals, they truly were harvesting resources. Where we nourished our relations with those same resources, that we didn’t consider to be resources. To us, they were our relatives. **The rapid capitalist extraction of wood, animals, and water forced the Lenape people to move inland, bearing witness to the destruction of life**...and then just sitting here having to live with all of that destruction, having a cultural philosophy that’s supposed to respect nature and then understanding, that look there’s nothing we can do about it. You have to go along to get along. I truly believe that one of the reasons that those that stayed behind did stay behind, was to preserve that connection with the land. In our discussions about environmental change, we broached the subject of the “Anthropocene,” and Chief Coker challenged the anthropocentric view of climate change regarding the issue that 25it “blames all of humanity” for climate change. **This perspective is consistent with others that suggest the unevenness of climate disturbances** (cf. Sultana 2022b; Whyte 2018). Chief Coker mused that while it is “true” that if we “take humanity from nature, the nature will thrive,” it does not mean that everyone is responsible for the environmental destruction caused by the colonizing appetite (as we and others suggest). Finding a scenario that compared apples to apples is difficult cause if you have one society that’s an apple that is adhering to the strict 10,000-year-old practice of honoring Mother Nature and then you have the other society, right now the predominant one, that’s an orange, that has zero respect for Mother Nature...we weren’t anthropogenic, where this new culture is. It’s all about them. However, the ability to denounce colonial power or resist the practices that subsumed them in settler society by large measure is a long-standing challenge for the Delaware Lenape because of the cultural assimilation they withstood over five-hundred years of colonial history. The ability to claim Native heritage and to receive state recognition as an American Indian Tribe is only the beginning of reconciling the centuries of survival strategies put in place. *Adaptation in the face of coloniality* **To adapt to environmental changes in a**

colonial landscape, the Lenape People assimilated into colonial society and did whatever they needed to survive. According to Chief Coker, "...the People have been adapting for a long, long time. And they've been adapting to change, environmental change, more broadly, and their adaptation to climate change may be subtle and unnoticed, that they might not even know they're adapting when they have no choice. And they're so good at adapting that it's not something they think about these days or anymore." As stated earlier, the primary survival strategy of adapting to a colonizing society was to "hide in plain sight," to become "unnoticed." To do so, the Lenape Peoples first Christianized to remain 26on their land, what is today the Cheswold area of Kent County, Delaware. Second, they exercised endogamous marriage in a racialized society where they were largely known as "Delaware Moors" in the official record. Their endogamous marriage created an insular community with a high blood quantum allowing them to quietly maintain an identity as Lenape Indians. Although there is a community of people, state-recognized Tribes do not have the same rights as federally recognized Tribes and a long-term goal of the Tribe has been to reclaim spaces in their community. The Fork Branch area near Cheswold is a key site for the contemporary generation of Tribal members that they are trying to reclaim and preserve as Lenape land. However, repatriation of land still sits within colonial-imperial systems and the land that is currently held by the Tribe is held under capitalist relations of private property. A quarter-acre piece of land that was recently reclaimed by the Tribe was used as a dumping ground for decades. As part of a larger effort to restore the site, volunteers cleared the site of garbage, including hundreds of tires, broken glass, machine parts, car frames, and the invasive *Ailanthus altissima* (Tree of Heaven). Without romanticizing the return of a small piece of land, it is important to note that this site is not just a piece of the Tribe's past, it is an opportunity to exercise relationship building among inhabitants as is often discussed in the literature (Kimmerer 2015; Wildcat 2005). The restoration of the Fork Branch site is also part of a new adaptation process, one that is directly addressing the loss of Tribal Knowledges and a safe climate. "We gotta go back, maybe even 100 years back. And if we can get things back to where they were 100 years ago, then we could possibly say it's sustainable from that point forward..." In cooperation with multiple groups the site was transformed from a host to garbage and invasive species to a forest garden. "When we had the opportunity to create that forest garden, at Fork Branch, and take a 27piece of colonized property that had been trashed, and regenerate that property back and set the example that we can do this if we are committed enough to the philosophy of regeneration." To put the ideas of indigenous adaptation to environmental change into perspective within a colonizing society, we asked Chief Coker to reimagine a world without colonization. He suggested: There would be no apocalyptic experience...but if there was a technological revolution that the Indians had access to, they would have been the first ones to use it, they would have used it from a much different perspective. They would not have used it to destroy the natural world with capitalistic extraction. So, I mean that to me is really the root of many of our problems. In this non-apocalyptic vision, scientific advancement would not have at its foundation growth and profit. Understanding that **if we only limit ourselves to growth and profit, we are forsaking a lot of scientific**

advancement that did not have a metric for it. "I think that if we had given the American Indians the benefit of technology, we would be in a much different place today. You know, we would not be continuing to colonize the world." *Reimagining Indigenous Futurities* To imagine a future where indigenous knowledge of adaptation to climate change is respected and acknowledged for a sustainable future, Chief Coker emphasized the sovereignty of his community. "...They (the settler colonial state) need to do more than that (recognizing their colonial history, violence, racism, and segregation), because they need to be less selfish and think less about themselves and more about the community. That's what we were all about. We were all about community." **Indigenous futurity** for the Lenape Peoples is not about getting federal recognition

and maintaining colonial-imperial capitalist relations. It **is about being a sovereign entity to work and thrive and to be able to tackle climate change.** 281 don't need the federal government to acknowledge my sovereignty or to grant me sovereignty. The creator already did that, you know? The creator gave us our sovereignty. He put us here on

this land thousands of years ago. And the simple fact of the matter is this: **when you are successful at federal recognition, then you automatically become what is known as a domestic dependent sovereign.** So, your sovereignty depends on a greater sovereign to issue you that sovereignty. So, and that greater sovereign can take it away whenever he feels like it. Which has happened many, many, many, many, times in American history, where the federal government, you know, de-recognizes, they call it "terminate". They terminate tribes... So now the federal government says to me, "if you relinquish some of your sovereignty to me, I will give you health care, I will give you education, I'll give you economic opportunities, I'll give you housing." They're just buying you with gifts and trade goods to get you to submit to their jurisdiction. Lenape sovereignty is not for sale. I would, in essence, give up my land claims that I would have, which I think are very valid on the international stage, the United Nations stage, because the Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is a resolution that has been actually signed by all UN member nations specifically states that I have a right to my traditional homeland, I have a right to my own political affiliation, I have a right to clean water, I have a right to clean air, I have a right to my own language, I have all of these Indigenous/human rights, these rights that the creator gave me that aren't dependent on someone else reinforcing. I have these rights already, just by being human. According to Chief Coker, demonstrating sovereignty is only possible if the Lenape community can act as a sovereign and manage their own affairs without interference from any other entity. The current colonial practice of federal recognition he suggests works as a trade off, and what the government gives, they can take away. For the Lenape people, acting as a sovereign entity is a goal towards their indigenous futurity. But acting as a sovereign entity in a climate-changed world does not insulate the Lenape from further environmental change, nor coming adaptation measures. The Fork Branch site described earlier is but one example of this conflict. That land has been exploited, "...when they took that land it was pristine. It was without environmental contamination. The EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), it would never have been on their radar. But now when they want to give it back to us, it's much less than pristine, and it's got environmental restrictions on it. Have we really done what the intent of land back is, or are we just finding a cheap way to 29check a

box?" Our conversations ended with this question to open up the possibility of an alternative future. **Conclusion Indigenous knowledge in adaptation research is only appropriate when we talk about inclusion for environmental and social justice as well as futurities. But what next?** Are we talking about indigenous futurities in a climate changed world? What is the limit of western adaptation knowledge in bringing justice to people whose land has been stolen by settler colonial violence?

We try to answer these questions by attending to indigenous placemaking in settler colonial territories. By drawing from the oral history of Chief Dennis Coker of the Lenape Indian Tribe of Delaware, **we see indigenous adaptation to climate change is not separate from their struggle to survive historical and ongoing settler colonial violence. The neocolonial power structure that puts indigenous people's experience of climate change into the adaptation bandwagon without acknowledging the colonial violence further reproduces the haunting of the climate coloniality engrained in Eurocentric adaptation discourse.** We position our paper against this invisible power structure by carefully making a space for accountability (see: Daigle in Naylor et al. 2018) and mutual healing with the indigenous people of the stolen lands.

IPCC in one of its most recent climate change synthesis reports has referenced "colonialism" as not only the driver of climate change, but also something that exacerbate the vulnerabilities of communities (IPCC, 2023). This recognition opened the conversation about colonialism to different actors and institutes, including those whose discursive framings and imaginations often appropriate the meaning of colonialism to reinforce hegemonic power relations, thereby rendering climate coloniality a metaphor (Bhambra and Newell, 2023). The conversation around adaptation needs to account for this coloniality of power and historicize 30climate change as a colonial process where indigenous people have been adapting to ongoing colonial violence. If adaptation is a process of adjustment to confront climate change, it needs to do so by opening the conversation for climate reparations. The current limited technocratic conceptualization of adaptation only serves to reinforce the coloniality of climate change, as we argued throughout this paper. This limited conceptualization also gives a false notion of an "adaptation limit" based on an

imagined adaptive capacity of the "vulnerable others". We urge scholars to **critically reflect on this limited and limiting knowledge and meaningfully engage with plural epistemologies of adaptation to make way for reparative justice and indigenous futurities.** If adaptation is a process, indigenous adaptation is an unfinished task until the stolen land is repatriated from the colonizers. It is only by having stolen land returned that a healing process can begin in earnest.

Non-White Arctic Expansion

Indigeneity can't be theorized through racial identity – settler colonialism transcends their analysis of racial violence - that allows for the erasure of land claims and reconstructs the settler system. Including non-white settlers doesn't make the act any less colonial. It's the same as putting Black cops at the forefront to answer ACAB.

Rifkin 9 [Mark, Professor at the University of North Carolina, "Indigenizing Agamben: Rethinking Sovereignty in Light of the "Peculiar" Status of Native Peoples", Cultural Critique, Number 73, Fall 2009, pp. 88-124, July 14, 2017] KLu

In using Agamben's work to address U.S. Indian policy, though, it needs to be reworked. In particular, **his emphasis on biopolitics tends to come at the expense of a discussion of geopolitics, the production of race supplanting the production of space as a way of envisioning the work of the sovereignty** he critiques, and while his concept of the exception has been immensely influential in contemporary scholarship and cultural criticism, **such accounts largely have left aside discussion of Indigenous peoples. Attending to Native peoples' position within settler-state sovereignties requires investigating and adjusting** three aspects of Agamben's **thinking**: the persistent inside/outside topology he uses to address the exception, specifically the ways it serves as a metaphor divorced from territoriality; the notion of "bare life" as the basis of the exception, especially the individualizing ways that he uses that concept; and the implicit depiction of sovereignty as a self-confident exercise of authority free from anxiety over the legitimacy of state actions.⁵ Such revision allows for a **reconsideration of the "zone of indistinction" produced by and within sovereignty, opening up analysis of the ways settler-states regulate** not only proper kinds of embodiment ("bare life") but also legitimate modes of **collectivity and occupancy**—what I will call bare habitance. **If the "overriding sovereignty" of the United States is predicated on the creation of a state of exception, then the struggle for sovereignty by Native peoples can be envisioned as less about control of particular policy domains than of metapolitical authority—the ability to define the content and scope of "law" and "politics."** Such a shift draws **attention away from critiques of the particular rhetorics used to justify the state's plenary power and toward a macrological effort to contest the "overriding" assertion of a right to exert control over Native politics.** My argument, then, explores the limits of forms of analysis organized around the critique of the settler-state's employment of racialized discourses of savagery and the emphasis on cultural distinctions between Euramerican and Indigenous modes of governance. Both of these strategies within Indigenous political theory treat sovereignty as a particular kind of political content that can be juxtaposed with a substantively different—more Native-friendly or Indigenous-centered—content, but by contrast, **I suggest that discourses of racial difference and equality as well as of cultural recognition are deployed by the state in ways that reaffirm its geopolitical self-evidence** and its authority to determine what issues, processes, and statuses will **count as meaningful within the political system.** While arguments about Euramerican racism and the disjunctions between Native traditions and imposed structures of governance **can be quite powerful in challenging aspects of settler-state policy, they cannot account for the structuring violence performed by the figure of sovereignty.** Drawing on Agamben, **I will argue that "sovereignty" functions as a placeholder that has no determinate content.**⁶ The state has been described as an entity that exercises a monopoly on the **legitimate exercise of violence, and what I am suggesting is that the state of exception produced through Indian policy creates a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of legitimacy, an exclusive uncontested right to define what will count as a viable legal or political form(ul)ation.** That fundamentally circular and **self-validating, as well as anxious and fraught, performance grounds the legitimacy of state rule on nothing more than the axiomatic negation of Native peoples' authority to determine** or adjudicate for themselves **the normative principles by which they will be governed.** Through Agamben's theory of the exception, then, I

will explore how the supposedly underlying sovereignty of the U.S. settler-state is a retrospective projection generated by, and dependent on, the “peculiar”-ization of Native peoples.

Mining

Arctic resource extraction perpetuates settler colonialism—framing the region as an empty frontier justifies state control and marginalizes Indigenous sovereignty. (Silva 2022) [Pedro Allemand Mancebo Silva, "The Old Colonialisms and the New Ones: The Arctic Resource Boom as a New Wave of Settler-Colonialism," The Arctic Institute, October 25, 2022.

<https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/old-colonialisms-new-ones-arctic-resource-boom-new-wave-settler-colonialism>] APB ☺

In the turn of the twentieth century, news of the presence of gold in Alaska and in Chukotka attracted the attention of State, capital and individuals seeking to make fortune through mining. Demuth stresses how the commercial extraction of minerals demanded, on the settler side, enclosure and definition of property rights over land and underground.¹³ In different parts of Inuit Nunaat, different arrangements were made in attempt to define and reinforce borders as well as seizing the economic opportunity brought about by the knowledge of gold in the Arctic. In the Russian Empire, for example, gold mining was seen as an imperial concession rather than a private enterprise, undertook to secure the imperial bullion reserves. In the U.S., on the other hand, while gold mining was seen as a matter of private enterprise, it involved State intervention in defining property rights, settling disputes and defining which citizens were entitled to the exploitation of gold mining. Both solutions to the problem of enclosure and property over land were instrumental in extending the reach of the State inland. The sea was (at that moment) not liable to territorialization and the hunting activities over the shore and sea-ice did not entail long-term settlement opportunities, the need to settle ownership claims and to stimulate mining activity. The discovery of gold, and the initial ease with which it could be mined, attracted large contingents of foreigners to Alaska and crystallized ethnic/racial divisions within Inuit Nunaat. White foreigners sought fortune on gold mining, while the Iñupiat of the region were not only physically segregated, but also relegated to providing subsistence goods and services (clothing, reindeer meat, transport) that supported the mining activity. In Russia, on the other hand, the Empire and then the Bolsheviks sought to control the flow of gold and resettling populations from other parts of Russia in the region, seeking to turn gold into the gravitational centre of Chukotka's economy. For the populations of Inuit Nunaat, these different solutions meant the same – enclosure that sought to separate these peoples from their traditional lands and their livelihoods, which were redirected by the efforts of States to better serve settler dominated economic activities. The introduction of coal-powered dredges and the structuration of corporate mining over the beginning of the twentieth century¹⁴ were responsible for accelerating these trends. Finally, the discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, in the late 1970's closes the gap between what we dubbed the "old" colonialisms and the "new" ones. In the words of Eben Hopson, one of the founders of the Inuit Circumpolar Council: Our people, who survived the fur trade, international whaling, and the gold rush, began being threatened by the world's oil shortage. The oil discovery at Prudhoe Bay meant that the European immigrants to America had become rich, highly industrialised people, and had finally begun to covet our Arctic land.¹⁵ Oil and gas extraction, much like gold mining, are activities that demand great control over space, not only in the regions where the extraction occurs, but also in the constitution and maintenance of logistic corridors. Allowing for movement to and from the producing regions, connecting them to global markets is fundamental in such economic activities, which makes land an important asset for State and capitalist agents involved. Moreover, and, like gold, oil and gas are deeply enmeshed in global geopolitics, meaning that the development of hydrocarbon reserves is important for States to achieving their political and strategic objectives in the global scenario. The mentioned perception of the coveting of Inuit land, together with the need to preserve Inuit culture also led to the establishment of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, a pan-Arctic Inuit caucus where Inuit rights and claims were collectively discussed, leading to the founding of the Inuit Circumpolar Council. Shadian's research details how the 'politics of oil' articulated Inuit local politics in Canada, Greenland and the U.S with global issue. The discovery of oil in regions like northern Alaska and the Arctic in general has been one of the main drivers of geopolitical interest in the region. There were, however, gaps in Euro-American awareness about the presence of hydrocarbon reserves in the region – a trend reversed by the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal of 2008. With the publication of the first comprehensive study by the United States Geological Survey on the resource endowment of the Arctic, interest in the economic development of the region spiked. It is estimated that 30% of the world's undiscovered gas reserves and 13% of the undiscovered oil reserves are in the Arctic. The surge in interest reflects a global trend: the emergence of neo-extractivist capital accumulation.¹⁷ based on increasing pressure over natural goods and resources and one in which the global extractive

frontiers expand, exerting additional pressures over lands and territories where resource reserves can be found. **The expansion of the global extractive frontier is directly related to pressure over the traditional lands of Indigenous peoples, and in tandem with the growing struggle for the recognition of indigenous rights to self-government.** The growing demand for hydrocarbons and mineral resources potentially can impact all of Inuit Nunaat, putting the security and economic development of Arctic States in a collision route with indigenous rights and demands in the region. DuPlessis also points to how **the expansion of the global extractive frontier is affecting the mobilities and spatialities of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic.**¹⁸⁾ **Resource development activities** and the discourses that support them **are** examples of **"striation activities",**¹⁹⁾ activities **through which the modern biopolitical state imposes its striated spatiality over the smooth spatiality of the nomadic Sámi people.** Transport infrastructure development plays a large role in this process, since it is one of the ways through which the state occupies a space and exercise control over it by organising it in points,²⁰⁾ thus striating it and enabling the government of movement and other spatialities in the region. Striation activities in the Arctic rely heavily on the planning and construction of physical infrastructure and logistic corridors that create the necessary lines connecting strategic points, not only for the direct objective of enabling economic activity via circulation but also to seize the strategic advantages given by such points and such connections.

Indigenous Contact

U.S. co-operative management programs in Alaska co-opt Indigenous governance, reinforcing settler colonial control. The aff is a false investment into a system that only hurts indigenous communities while claiming to save them. (Nadasdy 05) [Nadasdy, Paul. "The Anti-Politics of TEK: The Institutionalization of Co-Management Discourse and Practice." *Anthropologica*, vol. 47, no. 2, 2005, pp. 215–232.] APB ☺

As Ferguson and other critics of development discourse point out, to argue that co-management does not work is to say nothing about what co-management actually does. So we need to do more than simply deny the claim that co management is (necessarily) more effective than top down state management if we want to understand co management. I have already shown that the discourse of co-management serves to obscure and to reinforce existing power relations, but it does even more than that. Like development, co-management actually helps extend the power of the state. Elsewhere (Nadasdy 1999:11-13), I have argued that the project of "knowledge-integration" effectively extends the networks of scientific resource management into First Nation communities and concentrates power in bureaucratic centres rather than empowering local people. Here I will examine another, though related, aspect of the expansion of state power: bureaucratization. Recall Ferguson's claim that bureaucratic expansion may well be the most significant and lasting effect of development. A similar argument can be made for co management in Canada; after all, co-management is nothing if not bureaucratizing. Indeed, co-management in the North has essentially consisted of establishing a host of bureaucratic boards and committees whose memberships are appointed equally by First Nations and government. The number of boards and committees so established gives some sense of the bureaucratizing tendencies of co management. The Yukon Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA), for example, provides for the establishment of no fewer than eight territory-wide co-management bodies,¹⁴ along with a host of regional and local co-management boards and committees that involve members from only a limited number of Yukon First Nations. The consequences of this proliferation for individual First Nations is striking. Kluane First Nation members, for example, currently hold seats on a number of these territorial boards and committees. Upon ratification of KFN's Final Agreement, they will also have a significant number of seats on the Kluane Park Management Board, the Dan Keyi Renewable Resources Council, the Kluane Settlement Lands Commission, and possibly a few others. Finally, they will no doubt continue to participate in various short term ad hoc co-management initiatives created outside the land claims process, such as the Ruby Range Sheep Steering Committee, the Aishihik-Kluane Caribou Recovery Steering Group, and the Spruce Bark Beetle Advisory Committee, all of which KFN members participated in, to varying degrees, during the period of my fieldwork. Each of these co-management bodies differs in the level of participation required; some meet only a few times a year, while others require quite significant commitments of time and energy. There is no question, however, that participation in these co-management processes represents a huge burden in terms of both time and labour in a village whose year round population consists of approximately 40 adult members.¹⁵ There is some justifiable fear among First Nation people that co-management processes of this sort might be preventing rather than fostering meaningful change by ensnaring participants in a tangle of bureaucracy and endless meetings. Some might object, however, that while the time devoted to these boards and committees may indeed be significant, these bodies are not "bureaucratic," but instead stand outside the established bureaucratic system. Indeed, members of the co-management boards established under the UFA are seldom professional bureaucrats; rather, they tend to be "regular citizens" appointed to serve for relatively short terms by First Nation and territorial governments. In what sense, then, is participation on these boards bureaucratizing? To answer this question, it is worth reviewing Max Weber's characterization of bureaucracy. In his well-known essay on the subject, he noted that the most salient feature of bureaucracies is their tendency to institutionalize "rationality": 224 / Paul Nadasdy *Anthropologica* 47 (2005) Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations. Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who have specialized training and who by constant practice learn more and more. The "objective" discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and "without regard for persons."... [Bureaucracy's] specific nature, which is welcomed by capitalism, develops more perfectly, the more bureaucracy is "dehumanized," the more perfectly it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue. (Weber 1946: 215-216) Co-management boards and committees are never established in an administrative vacuum. Rather, their creation is always accompanied by the creation of a set of administrative rules and procedures that regulate not only how they function internally, but how they relate to external bureaucratic institutions. Indeed, the relationship between co-management bodies and the existing bureaucracy is always clearly spelled out (e.g., in the land claim agreements that created them). These "calculable rules" are necessary precisely because they allow these co-management bodies to function "without regard for persons." That is, the specific identities of co-management board members become irrelevant. So long as they abide by the established rules of procedure, the boards continue to function despite the regular turnover in membership. Such rules enable co-management boards to interface with existing offices and institutions of state management, and this is absolutely essential if they are to play their appointed roles. In this important sense, co-management boards are inherently bureaucratic entities. These boards and committees, however, are not the only manifestation of the

bureaucratization associated with co-management. In an important sense, these co management bodies have been established to function as intermediaries between First Nation and federal/territorial governments. For First Nations to participate in these processes at all, they have had to organize and express themselves in ways compatible with the government bureaucracies with which they deal. This has necessarily entailed a significant degree of bureaucratization within First Nation communities themselves. **Many First Nation people now spend a considerable portion of their lives working in First Nation offices, as Fish and Wildlife Officers, Heritage Directors, Land Claim Negotiators and so on.** To function effectively in these positions, they have had to function as intermediaries between First Nation and federal/territorial governments. For First Nations to participate in these processes at all, they have had to organize and express themselves in ways compatible with the government bureaucracies with which they deal. This has necessarily entailed a significant degree of bureaucratization within First Nation communities themselves.

Recent discourse-based critics of development are generally in agreement with a long line of other critics when they assert that development projects usually fail to achieve their explicit goals. Indeed, some (e.g., Ferguson 1994) painstakingly document the "failures" of particular projects. They take their analyses of development a step further, however, arguing that while development projects may "fail," they nevertheless have powerful and far-reaching unintended effects. Following Foucault (1977), James Ferguson refers to these unintended side effects of development as its "instrument-effects," because they "are effects that are at one and the same time instruments of what 'turns out' to be an exercise of power" (1994: 255). **Development discourse, he argues, obscures the political dimensions of poverty and state intervention while simultaneously facilitating the expansion of state bureaucratic power** (1994: 256). This recent critique of development by Ferguson and others builds upon the notion that **"development," as a concept, is based on a set of underlying assumptions about the world that are rooted in the political and economic context of global capitalism.** Since development projects are explicitly designed to be carried out within existing political and institutional contexts, development workers have no choice but take that context for granted. The practices and complex institutional structures of the "development industry" are not neutral, but instead constrain thought and action in significant ways, and end up reinforcing existing political and economic inequalities. **"Development," then, is "much more than a socio-economic endeavor; it is a perception which models reality..."** (Sachs 1992: 1), and this perception, these scholars argue, has become hegemonic. Because proponents of development necessarily take for granted existing relations of inequality and exploitation, they tend to view the project of development itself as a relatively straightforward exercise that involves identifying a series of "problems" that stand in the way of development (such as poverty), finding technical solutions to those problems, and implementing those solutions (e.g., Escobar 1995: chapter 2). This view of development necessarily obscures the relations of political and economic inequality and exploitation that are the root causes of such "problems" in the first place. In his analysis of the Thaba-Tseka rural development project in Lesotho, for example, Ferguson argues that: "...the project was set up to provide technical solutions to "problems" which were not technical in nature. We have seen that the conceptual apparatus systematically translated all the ills of the country into simple, technical problems and thus constituted a suitable object for the apolitical, technical "development" intervention that "development" agencies are in the business of making. (Ferguson 1994:87) According to Ferguson, the "real" solutions to the problems faced by "the poor" in Lesotho are not at all technical in nature, but political. Indeed, he argues that solving the "problem of poverty" in Lesotho would require nothing short of a revolution. Solutions of this sort, however, are of no use to development institutions like the World Bank, which "are not in the business of promoting political realignments or supporting revolutionary struggles" (Ferguson 1994: 68-69). Indeed, in the discourse of development, "political" solutions of this sort are not even recognized as solutions at all. As Ferguson put it, development agencies "seek only the kind of advice they can take," and he illustrates this with an account of his conversation with a "developer" who had asked him his advice on what his country could do to help the people of Lesotho: When I suggested that his country might contemplate sanctions against apartheid, he replied, with predictable irritation, "No, no! I mean developments. The only "advice" that is in question here is advice about how to "do development" better. There is a ready ear for criticisms of "bad development projects," so long as these are followed up with calls for "good development projects." (Ferguson 1994:284, emphasis original) Thus, **the range of possible solutions to development "problems" is constrained by the "development" problematic, which is itself the product of existing political and economic relations.** Indeed, **development agencies, dependent as they are on existing political structures,** 218 / Paul Nadasdy *Anthropologica* 47 (2005) would themselves be threatened by revolutionary "solutions" of the kind advocated by Ferguson and other critics of development discourse. The depoliticizing tendency of development, then, is more than merely an unfortunate, but unavoidable, by-product of development: **participatory community-based development projects** (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Escobar 1995:141-153; Rahnama 1992). These scholars have argued **that the rhetoric of "participation" is itself a particularly European construct whose use is implicated in relations of power.**5 These critics of participation point out that participatory development By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of "development" is the principle means through which the question of poverty is depoliticized in the world today. At the same time, by making the intentional blueprints for "development" so highly visible, a "development" project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the extension and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under the cover of a neutral technical mission to which no one can object. (Ferguson 1994:256) has not brought about a change in existing institutional practices of development; indeed, they argue, participatory processes are quite compatible with top-down planning systems (Mosse 2001:17). Rather than representing a "new paradigm" of development, as some proponents claim (e.g., Chambers 1997), **participatory processes have simply been grafted onto existing centralized planning systems** (of donor states or agencies). **This means that despite all the rhetoric about "participation," power relations between donors and local people have not really changed all that much.** Important decisions about the distribution of resources continue to be based on the agenda of external donors rather than on information that extend and expand state power? Here, Ferguson is mistaken. Important decisions about the distribution of resources continue to be based on the agenda of external donors rather than on information gathered through participatory processes. Indeed, referring to the extension of bureaucratic forms of management a number of scholars (e.g., Kothari 2001; Mosse 2001) have argued that even the "local/indigenous knowledge" point of view of development organizations, the "problems" of that results from participatory processes is a product of development are seen as technical. Thus, their

solution power relations between donors and villagers. Because generally requires the application of expert knowledge outside facilitators "own the research tools, choose the top and the provision of government services. Given the insti cs, record the information, and abstract and summarize tutional context in which development is carried out, this according to the project criteria of relevance," participa means the creation of new bureaucratic structures?often tory processes end up producing knowledge that reflects physically located in the areas experiencing "develop donor agendas more than local realities (Mosse 2001:19). ment." Indeed, Ferguson argues that, at least in some All of this calls into question assumptions about the cases, the expansion of the state and the bureaucratization liberating effects of participation. Henkel and Stirrat of "nearly all aspects of life... may well be the most last (2001) argue that we must be careful about accepting at ing legacy of the 'development' intervention" (Ferguson face value claims that participatory development leads to 1994: 266-267). To the extent that the discourse of devel the empowerment of local people. This "empowerment," opment portrays this creation of new bureaucratic struc they argue, may not be as liberating as is often supposed. tures (i.e., "development") as a neutral technical exercise The key question, they point out, is not "how much" peo to which "no one can object," it serves to disguise?even ple are empowered, but rather what it is that they are as it facilitates?the expansion of state bureaucratic power "empowered" to do. Their answer to this question is clear: (see also Escobar 1995:123). It is this dynamic that leads Ferguson to refer to development as "the anti-politics machine." .. in the case of many if not all participatory projects it seems evident that what people are "empowered to Although Ferguson himself focused on a fairly cen do" is to take part in the modern sector of "developing" tralized "development" project in Lesotho in the late societies. More generally, they are being empowered to be elements in the great project of "the modern:" as cit 1970s and early 1980s, other scholars have demonstrated izens of the institutions of the modern state, as con the usefulness of his discourse-oriented approach for ana sumers in the increasingly global market... and so on. lyzing a wide range of other development/conservation Empowerment in this sense is not just a matter of "giv projects and interactions (e.g., Brosius 1999; Fisher 1997; ing power" to formerly disempowered people. The cur Pigg 1992). rency in which this power is given is that of the project Perhaps most significant for the purposes of this arti of modernity. In other words, the attempt to empower cle is a body of recent critical work specifically applying people through the projects envisaged and imple a discourse-oriented approach to the analysis of partici mented by the practitioners of the new orthodoxy is Anthropologica 47 (2005) The Anti-politics of TEK / 219 always an attempt, however benevolent, to reshape the personhood of the participants. It is in this sense that we argue that "empowerment" is tantamount to what Foucault calls subjection. (2001:182) Because **participatory development takes for granted existing political and economic relations, the form and nature of "participation" is shaped by those relations and the assumptions underlying them. To be "empowered," local people must first agree to the rules of the game, rules that they had no role in creating and that constrain what it is possible to do and think.** Worse yet, the fact that local people "participate" in these projects makes them much more difficult to challenge than more centralized development projects. For this reason, some scholars have argued that "participation" is often less about pro viding an alternative to official discourse and practices than it is about legitimizing decisions made in the centre (Cohen 1985; Kothari 2001). These observations are equally applicable to the dis course and practice of co-management in Canada. Accord ingly, I turn now to an examination of the "instrument effects" of co-management. I begin by looking at the discourse on TEK and how it constrains the ways in which people can act?and even think?about wildlife manage ment. The Anti-politics of TEK: The Instrument Effects of Co-management As we saw above, proponents of co-management, like pro ponents of participatory development elsewhere, take it for granted that co-management will lead to improved wildlife management and the empowerment of local First Nation communities. Their primary concern is how to make co-management "work." For this reason, **most of the discourse about co-management focusses on improving the techniques of co-management, especially on how to go about collecting "TEK" and integrating it with the knowl edge of biologists and other scientists for use in the man agement process.** The collection and integration of TEK, however, is far from straightforward; there are a multitude of epistemological, methodological, practical and ethical difficulties.⁶ Accordingly, much of the discourse on co management, like that on development, focusses on iden tifying these "problems" and devising solutions for deal ing with them. These problems, along with their solutions, tend to be conceived of as technical; the problem of how to collect TEK requires the development of proper pro tocols that take into account cultural differences between the holders and the collectors of TEK (e.g., Johnson 1992); the problem of how to integrate TEK and science requires the development of appropriate techniques for presenting, comparing, and testing these two very different "types" of knowledge (e.g., Usher 2000); **the problem of intellec tual property rights requires the development of appro priate protocols and laws that safeguard local control over TEK, while making it available to resource man agers** (e.g., Stevenson 1996; but see Wenzel 1999 for a dis cussion of the difficulties surrounding the treatment of TEK as intellectual property); and so on. Problems of this sort are certainly pressing enough in the context of contemporary co-management practice. As I have argued elsewhere (Nadasdy 1999,2003), how ever, **any treatment of TEK that focusses on "knowledge integration" as a technical problem necessarily ignores** (i.e., takes for granted) **the political dimensions of co management.** Yet, co-management is an extremely com plex and culturally charged political undertaking, if there ever was one. It is, after all, supposed to be a key com ponent in current efforts to restructure aboriginal-state relations in Canada, and it clearly involves (at least the oretically) broad changes in jurisdiction over and regula tion of a wide array of important resources. In light of the deeply political nature of co-management, the general lack of attention to power in the discourse on co-man agement is startling. How is it that those participating in and writing about co-management can have remained so silent on the question of power? This silence is not simply an oversight, nor is it eas ily corrected. Rather, it stems almost automatically from one of the assumptions underlying the discourse of co management: that the value of TEK lies in its incorpo ration into the management process. **It is the assumption that traditional knowledge is simply a new form of "data" to be incorporated into existing management bureaucra cies and acted upon by scientists and resource managers that has made it possible to see the integration of TEK and science as a purely technical, rather than political or eth ical, problem** (see Cruikshank 1998; Nadasdy 1999). As is the case in development/conservation, this "tech nical" view of co-management has a number of tangible effects that are deeply political in their own right. The

focus on "technical" issues takes for granted existing institutions of state management (into which TEK is to be inserted) and so precludes any meaningful inquiry into the political dimensions of co-management. One who takes for granted the institutional context of co-management can not question the power relations that underlie that context. For this reason, some important questions go unasked: What are people's "real" motives for engaging in co-management and invoking terms like "traditional knowledge"?

Welfare colonialism undermines Indigenous institutions through imposed social programs. The state manufactures indigenous reliance, which it then uses to decimate the communities. So-called humanitarian efforts are paternalism at best and the beginning stages of forced assimilation at worst. (Kramer, 22) [Kramer, Samantha, "Arctic Assimilation: Settler Colonialism And Racialization In The Canadian Arctic And

Carlisle Indian Industrial School" (2022). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. William & Mary. Paper 1673281787. <https://dx.doi.org/10.21220/s2-4ydf-0570>] APB ©

For many of the world's colonizing nations, the decades following World War II were marked by the crumbling of their empires; the colonized peoples left to their own devices to dismantle the harmful structures and systems left behind in the wake of revolutions. Those that had turned internally for their systems of control were forced to reckon with their pasts of assimilation and the federal abuse of their indigenous populations. Many, but not all. Canada, rather than looking at its history and the damage it had done, turned to the north, and doubled down on its colonial ideologies. The Canadian government presented their colonization of the Arctic as a humanitarian effort, as if taking the land and forcing cultural elimination amongst its people would "save" them from extinction. The idea that the Inuit were disappearing and needed to be "saved," just like the Myth of the Vanishing Indian in the United States, was quite popular from the late nineteenth century into the first half of the twentieth. It was so pervasive both in Canada and internationally that even Roald Amundsen, arriving in the Canadian Arctic in 1903 with the *Gjøa* Expedition, was shocked to find Inuit still alive, believing they, "were extinct, and had been relegated to oblivion."¹ Many publications on the colonization of the Canadian Arctic, even all the way up to 2017, follow this myth as an excuse to call it "reluctant" or even "accidental" colonialism. Edith Iglauer actually praises the Canadian government's actions, "No longer demoralized and half-starved in an ancient and primitive world...the Eskimo is becoming part of our world, of that economically interdependent ¹ Roald Amundsen, *The North West Passage*, vol. 1 (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1908), 113.7 society that we know."² A publication by the Minority Rights Group from 1994 excuses the government's actions by arguing that the Inuit never attempted to defend their land by force; the government assumed there was no attachment to their country, so "there was no need to obtain their approval before taking their land for Canada."³ If this statement is correct, then it says more about the Canadian government's lack of interest in understanding Inuit culture than it does Inuit attachment. Inuit identity is, and always has been, heavily tied to the land and its resources. Expecting force and violence from a culture largely based on sharing and cooperating, and one with no history of inter-tribal warfare, in order to defend that land is a complete misunderstanding of indigenous traditions. Even respected social anthropologist Robert Paine writes that, "the more noteworthy feature about the Canadian north is still the degree that colonialism there was unintended, even accidental."⁴ No colonialism is accidental, nor is it reluctant. Colonialism requires intent. No one accidentally takes away native land and destroys cultures in their wake. These writings suggest a degree of support towards the Canadian government's actions; or, at the very least, a complete refusal to engage with indigenous voices and suffering. For those authors rightly uncomfortable with the idea that any form of colonialism could be called "reluctant," welfare colonialism remains the most popular alternative for describing the actions of the Canadian government in the 2 Edith Iglauer, *The New People: The Eskimo's Journey into Our Time* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), 1. 3 Minority Rights Group, *Polar Peoples: Self-Determination & Development* (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1994), 112. 4 Robert Paine, "The Nursery Game: Colonizers and Colonized in the Canadian Arctic," *Études/Inuit/Studies* 1, no. 1 (2017): 6.8 Arctic. Presented by Frank Tester, one of the most respected scholars of Arctic history, this angle focuses on the total forced economic dependencies of the Inuit on the Canadian government. Tester and his constituents present a well-argued and well-researched perspective on the colonization of the Arctic, one that certainly seems to have occurred. Occurred, that is, if economic factors are the only thing being looked at when defining the region's colonization. Tester, however, was writing long before Patrick Wolfe's "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native." Wolfe presents a form of colonialism that allows for examination through a more cultural-centric lens, while still recognizing the exploitation of economics and welfare for purposes of assimilation. It could be argued that settler colonialism does not apply due to the relatively smaller percentage of white settlers in comparison to the remaining indigenous population. Alternatively, because the government never directly told the Inuit that they had to leave to make room for outsiders, or *qallunaat*, the term could not apply. However, neither of these are the case, nor do they erase the widespread government usage of the primary aspect of settler colonialism: logics of elimination. Wolfe designates a series of outcomes of the logics of elimination, almost all of which apply to the colonization of the Canadian Arctic, and include, Officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations.⁵ 5 Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no.4 (December 2006): 388.9 The Canadian government used wildlife management laws, residential schools, and control of native health to enforce cultural elimination, resocialization, and religious conversion. Inuit land was broken down into *qallunaat* controlled settlements, where the Inuit would be moved either through force or coercion to be assimilated into Canadian culture, becoming settlers in their own land. Through a structured and organized invasion of life and livelihoods, the Canadian government used settler colonialism to isolate and assimilate the Inuit in their own Arctic territory.⁶ Initially, the Inuit had been left alone by the Canadian government, and the British Empire before them. The Inuit were not even federally recognized as an indigenous group until 1939. 7 Unless living on the coast, and therefore dealing with whalers and other traders, most Inuit camps on the interior of the Canadian Arctic had no exposure to *qallunaat* until polar expeditions in the nineteenth century. The *Gjøa* expedition in 1903 found numerous groups of Inuit that had never seen

a white person before. 8 Following the collapse of the whaling industry in the early 1900's, **the Hudson's Bay Company moved in, and proceeded to promote qallunaat supplies to any Inuit they could access, even those who had not interacted with whalers. Employees encouraged Inuit to enter the wage economy for things they had never needed for surviving in the Arctic; trading pelts of animals for money to buy rifles, flour, tea, sugar, lard, and alcohol.** Some 6 One of the most quoted lines of Wolfe, "Invasion is a structure, not an event," focuses on this systematic structure of settler colonialism. Ibid, 388. 7 Elspeth Young, *Third World in the First: Development and Indigenous Peoples* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 41. 8 Amundsen, *North West Passage*, vol. 1, 293. 10 Inuit moved closer to these new *qallunaat* settlements, though most remained out in their camps and only came to trade when necessary. 9 Settler colonialism would not apply to this beginning period, with Inuit cultural change based on trade rather than elimination, and the number of *qallunaat* in the region limited to just HBC traders. Continued international activity in the region, however, drew the government's eye north to the roughly one third of the country's land and marine mass that had been previously left to its own devices. 10 The very explorers that were exposing the Inuit to *qallunaat* were also threatening Canadian sovereignty by laying claims to the region or its waterways. Norway perhaps presented the biggest threat. In 1902 Otto Sverdrup actively laid claim to the islands he discovered on the *Fram* expedition for Norway; claims that created a major sovereignty dispute which would not be settled until 1930. 11 Though not a direct claim, Amundsen's success at finally sailing the North-West Passage in 1906 opened Canadian Arctic waterways to international trade that the government would need to find ways to control and monitor. Americans were also heavily active in the region, with explorers such as Robert Peary, Frederick Cook, Donald MacMillan, and Adolphus Greely. Aside from a particularly nasty fight over the North Pole, the American explorers largely did not lay direct claim to Arctic territory. Where the American threat to Canadian 9 Joe Karetak, Frank Tester, and Shirley Tagalik, ed. *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit: What Inuit Have Always Known to Be True* (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2017), 22. 10 Mary Simon, "Canadian Inuit: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going," *International Journal* 66, no. 4 (Autumn, 2011): 879, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23104399>. 11 Gerard Kenney, *Ships of Wood and Men of Iron: A Norwegian-Canadian Saga of Exploration in the High Arctic* (Ontario: Natural Heritage, 2005), xviii. 11 sovereignty truly entered the fold was during and after World War II. The United States military constructed airfields in Kuujuaq, Iqaluit, Churchill, and Salliq which continued to be used after the war. New weather stations and air defense stations were added in the 1950's in response to the growing threat from Russia. **The United States intended to continue to build in the Arctic,** with planned developments of a series of radar stations in 1953. When the Canadian government caught word of the plans, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent warned that **"U.S. developments** might be just the only form of human activity in the vast wastelands of the Canadian Arctic... we must **leave no doubt about our active occupation and exercise our sovereignty in these Northern lands right up to the Pole.**"¹² Apparently, the Inuit did not count as humans to St. Laurent. The Canadian and United States government came to an agreement to build and man the radar stations jointly; the Distant Early Warning Line would run from Alaska to Greenland through the Canadian Arctic. The construction work for these stations and airfields brought a great deal of *qallunaat* workers and their families north. According to Joanne Tompkins, a leading educator in what is now the Nunavut territory, **"There was a feeling that with modern, improved technology, people, including southerners, would be able to conquer the North and set up comfortable living there.**"¹³ The DEW line was not the only "improvement" that encouraged settlement. The 1942 construction of the Alaska Highway had made the Canadian Arctic more accessible for *qallunaat*.¹² Clyde H. Farnsworth, "The Day the Eskimos Were Cast into Darkness," *The New York Times*, April 10, 1992, A4. 13 Joanne Tompkins, *Teaching in a Cold and Windy Place: Change in an Inuit School* (Toronto: University Press, 1998), 16. 12 government and companies, allowing them to emphasize the new access to services that the highway provided. 14 By 1944, the semi-official map of "eskimo camping sites" by government geographer J. Lewis Robinson noted "white settlements" as the first category of inhabited places in the Arctic. 15 While this could be due to the map being created by a white man, the fact that there were enough white settlements to require their own category even before the DEW Line is significant in terms of Arctic settler colonialism. The main problem the Canadian government faced with the increase of white activity in the Arctic was *de facto* sovereignty. International requirement for sovereignty claims required effective occupation; therefore, actual control of the North could fall into the hands of the United States simply because there were more Americans than there were Canadians. Inuit, as a separate indigenous identity, were not included in the equation. 16 The Great Depression and World War II combined also led to a collapse of the fur trade, which had been the only form of wage economy practiced by the Inuit. **If the Inuit wished to purchase any of the qallunaat supplies they might have grown used to, or to supplement a diet being destroyed by qallunaat settlement and climate change, they had to rely on welfare payments and the Family Allowance Program.** Here was an opportunity to enact another aspect of settler colonialism: **colonialism** that **covers its tracks. The Canadian government would move in,**¹⁴ Andrew Armitage, *Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), 108. 15 Qikiqtani Truth Commission, *Nuutauniq: Moves in Inuit Life*, Thematic Reports and Special Studies 1950-75 (Iqaluit: Qikiqtani Inuit Association), 14. 16 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *The High Arctic Relocation: A Report on the 1953-55 Relocation* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), 118. 13 **claiming humanitarian efforts and welfare, and erase the distinction between the Arctic colonies and the Canadian metropole through assimilation.** Once the Inuit had become Canadian, both the sovereignty issue and the new "Inuit problem" would be solved in one. **The government could act as though the Arctic was nothing more than another part of Canada in the same way that Quebec and Ontario were;** settler colonialism operating towards its own self-supersession. 17 **The Inuit were treated as if they were children and needed the Canadian government to protect them, as if they had not survived for thousands of years as an independent culture.** An example of Canadian paternalism, *The Book of Wisdom for Eskimo*, appeared in 1947. Created by the Department of Mines and Resources, *The Book of Wisdom* is written simply in both English and Inuktitut with instructions on how to keep a clean igloo, how to care for sick people, and how to raise children. "Feed the baby regularly. A new baby sleeps a lot. Baby must be kept clean and dry. Baby will cry when wet and dirty."¹⁸ Clearly, **the government argued, the Inuit needed to be assimilated into the Canadian culture for their own wellbeing. If it showed effective occupation at the same time, that was simply a bonus.**

GeoPtx Conflict

The 1ac's obsession with quelling conflict that would be caused by threatening "others" and thwarting insurgency is settler memory—the enactment of their imperial fantasy that echoes through time (Cornellier and Griffiths 16) [Cornellier, B., & Griffiths, M. R. (2016). Globalizing unsettlement: an introduction. *Settler Colonial Studies*, 6(4), 305–316.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090522>] APB ☺

This issue of *Settler Colonial Studies* marks the attempt to think the global adjacent to and, indeed, constituted in relation to questions of internal colonialism and settlement. As editors, we implicitly follow a contention of Scott Morgensen's that settler colonialism is not merely a violent phenomenon of the colonial periphery, but in fact functions as constitutive of geopolitics at a global level. As Morgensen puts it, **Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonization, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance. If settler colonialism is not theorized in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalized in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it.** **Footnote¹** Settler colonialism, then, is not merely a global phenomenon, it is also constitutive of the global. So many nation states which were founded on settler colonialism are considered first world nation states, and many are implicated, through this role, in broader operations of regional and global neoimperial control of territory and interests. This is a central premise of many of the contributions to this volume, from Kevin Bruyneel's analysis of the settler colonial vocabulary that animates US military incursions in the Middle East to Shiri Pasternak's analysis of the relation between Canadian multi-national private resource extraction and the ongoing dispossession of native lands in Canada to Mark Rifkin's careful geopolitical reading of indigenous internationalism in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. **If the USA is the most paradigmatic (though not the sole) instantiation of global 'capitalist-territorialism'** (to use Giovanni Arrighi's phrase), **then** as Bruyneel asserts elsewhere **'the persistent reproduction of the American foundational mythos [...] serves critically in the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonialism as a structure', and does so in the manifest global reach of its neoimperial imprint.** **Footnote²** As such, 'via the logic of elimination [...] and **dependent upon settler colonialism America takes up its imperial stance overlooking the world.** This image illustrates that one cannot acknowledge the fact of US empire without acknowledging settler colonialism, and vice versa'. **Footnote³** To cite US Empire here, as constituted in relation to its own history of internal (settler) colonialism and manifest destiny is to cite an example of this relation that might be explored globally. If settler colonialism bears relation to the global, as the US example illustrates, then global comparisons of such modes of dispossession also might shed light on the complexity of specific internal settler colonial experiences. This issue, then, calls upon scholarship to address the ideologies that traverse comparable political spaces, of which a number are surveyed in this issue: Australia, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico. From the perspective of a critique of settler colonialism – which this approach, grounded in the initial premise of internal colonialism and the idea of elimination, is uniquely poised to reveal – what these spaces have in common is a certain strange double vision surrounding their self-conception. **On the one hand, settler nation states stress their liberalism and inclusivity and on the other, they aim to either repress indigenous presence and difference** or, alternately to occlude its particularly salient claims by subsuming this difference under a wider multicultural settlement on the management of alterity. Here, **the more the modernity and liberalism of the settler state is rhetorically stressed and pushed, the more it indulges in the repression of an indigenous presence often imagined as an anachronistic and aliberal residue of the type of ethnically bound and territorially fixed political cultures that violently clashed** and sunk in our pre-global and pre-modern world. This is a second crucial premise of this collection's relation to the globality of settler colonialism: liberal multicultural policies act comparably across multiple sites and spaces as avenues for the reinstatement of dispossession. From Melissa Forbis' analysis of Chiapas to Michael Griffiths' argument about the relation between race and culture in Australia, liberal logics are used to conceal new and incipient modes of dispossession globally. These critical contributions offer us opportunities to return to the inherently globalizing critical insights of postcolonial studies, but this time in conversation with recent developments in indigenous and settler colonial studies. **These complementary fields offer us ways to dialectically connect postcolonial concerns with movement**(conquest, migration, diaspora, displacement, or return) **to the anchoring and immobilizing violence of settlement and containment.** Settler colonial studies emerges not only from a different academic history than postcolonial studies. The former has also come to be far more in conversation with indigenous studies than the latter. As Jodi Byrd's work implicitly registers, this may be due in part to the relegation of indigenous concerns to the margins of literary area studies even as postcolonial studies was in ascendance in the 80s and 90s. In North America during this time, it is a great irony that indigenous concerns engaged far more with American studies than postcolonial studies. Indeed, the study of national culture is ironically recognizing the study of indigenous cultures, even as it implicitly always aimed to contain it. Australian and Canadian national literary studies in their own ways have similarly been involved in an attempt at inclusivity that

unfortunately still grounds itself in the settler nation. In the Australian and Aotearoa New Zealand academic spheres, the experience of colonial subalternity often conflated the experiences of settler and indigene. In the social sciences, similarly, indigenous studies as it existed was, until at least the days of the *Writing Culture* turn in 1986, predicated on the legacy of anthropology's fetishization of indigenous peoples as constitutive of the *Elementary Structures of Religious Life* (in Durkheim) or constitutive of the human through the cultural logic of myth and kinship (for instance, in Levi-Strauss, a notion Mark Rifkin has placed in its particularly settler colonial context).^{Footnote⁴} In this particular essay, Bruyneel explores how famed and feared nineteenth-century Chiricahua Apache leader Geronimo became a codename used by the US military in the operation leading to the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, in Pakistan, in May 2011. Bruyneel explains how the use of Codename Geronimo captures the temporal boundary-making activities that sustain a settler memory that simultaneously sets indigeneity within and without American politics and history. In this particular case, Geronimo represents an internal signifier that is amalgamated to the nation, but also a signifier for a bygone indigenous threat that was external to the expansion of the USA, and one whose eventual defeat and subjection to the supremacy of American statism is now projected forward in time to signify the assassination of another enemy of the state (Bin Laden), and once again as part of an American imperial intervention outside or beyond its sovereign (spatial) frontier. This, Bruyneel explains, is settler memory at work: it invokes settler colonialism while actively blurring the distinction between past and present, 'thus further re-inscribing the practices of present day settler violence and dispossession'.^{Footnote¹⁷} In doing so, Bruyneel offers us a particularly provocative reading of what would otherwise be conceived as the exculpatory character of our liberal and multicultural settler democracies. In such a scenario, the exculpatory rhetoric that drives many collective expressions of regret about a somewhat sanitized vision of the colonial past would offer the (post-)settler nation an opportunity to extinguish the coloniality of a present thereafter experienced as a selective, willful state of amnesia. On the contrary, Bruyneel insists that settler memory is not a manner of forgetting; it is rather a very active and unapologetic form of remembering and articulating knowledge about both past and present violence. Settler memory disavows the political relevance of such remembering, and by the same token disavows the relevance of indigenous people themselves today. And since settler sovereignty, as Pasternak, Rifkin, and Bruyneel each argue in their own ways, constitutes an unfinished project (or an unsettled project), this settler memory is always at work and remains central to the reproduction and legitimization of settler hegemony, both at home and its global, imperial reach. Grounded in a different yet adjacent North-American locale, Melissa M. Forbis's retrospective analysis of the 20th anniversary of the Zapatistas is exemplary of what we described earlier as indigeneity's heterogeneous and cacophonous worldings. She explores idiosyncratic efforts deployed in Chiapas to put into practice interconnected modes of resistance and solidarity against an equally heterogeneous set of settler colonial/global capitalist practices of governance. More specifically, Forbis defines an 'insurgent indigeneity' which, in this particular case, is not anchored to primordialism, nor is it validated by the historical stillness of the type of territorially fixed and rooted 'authenticity' that are privileged by many settler states as legal conditions for state recognition of aboriginal rights. Indeed, the Zapatistas' insurgent indigeneity, she explains, is not founded in the 'origin' of a common Mayan past, nor is it amenable to such politics of state recognition. It rather exists in lived and shared memories of racist violence and discrimination. These in turn trigger a set of resistant solidarities and modes of autonomous territorial occupation set up against Mexico's neoliberal and multicultural policies. Within this logic, indigenous populations are simply framed as minoritized ethnic populations in need of development, reform, and progress under the egis of a totalizing state that has been consolidated by the ideological production of an assimilationist *mestizo* national identity. Because it is not attached to the reclamation of tribe-specific traditional lands, the 'uncommon location' of this insurgent indigeneity and its inherently transformative production of identity invite very distinct strategies of political organizing. These strategies are attached to direct practices of collective rights and resource management that are inherently open-ended and centrifugal in the way they summon both national and global civil societies to develop solidarity networks by practicing and *adapting* (rather than *reproducing*) such decolonial, anti-capitalist projects and practices to their own particular environment. Forbis thus concludes that, in their efforts to disallow colonial spatialities and temporalities to define and control the boundaries of solidarity, '[t]he Zapatista autonomy project challenges the spatial-temporal changes that accompany processes of neoliberal economic globalization' and forestall their full implementation locally.^{Footnote¹⁸} In the process, they simultaneously 'sparked a surge of global resistance' that are cacophonous in nature.^{Footnote¹⁹}

The desire for strong International Relations is Settler Anxiety – The constant need to be able to influence the world to control the world feeds into the structure of Colonialism

Cornellier and Griffiths 16 (2016. Bruno Cornellier & Michael R. Griffiths - Bruno Cornellier is an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies in the Department of English. Michael R. Griffiths is a literary scholar whose work focuses principally on settler colonial literatures and histories. "Globalizing unsettlement: an introduction", *Settler Colonial Studies*, 305-306, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090522) //Don Markos

This **issue of Settler Colonial Studies** marks the attempt **to think the global adjacent to and, indeed, constituted in relation to questions of internal colonialism and settlement**. As editors, we implicitly follow a contention of Scott Morgensen's that settler colonialism is not merely a violent phenomenon of the colonial periphery, but in fact functions as constitutive of geopolitics at a global level. As Morgensen puts it, **Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonization, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance**. **If settler colonialism is not theorized in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalized in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it**.¹ Settler **colonialism**, then, is **not merely a global phenomenon, it is also constitutive of the global**. So many nation states which were founded on settler colonialism are considered first world nation states, and many are implicated, through their **role, in broader operations of regional and global neoimperial control of territory and interests**. This is a central premise of many of the contributions to this volume, from Kevin Bruyneel's analysis of the settler colonial vocabulary that animates US military incursions in the Middle East to Shiri Pasternak's analysis of the relation between Canadian multi-national private resource extraction and the ongoing dispossession of native lands in Canada to Mark Rifkin's careful geopolitical reading of indigenous internationalism in the United Nations (UN) **Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People**. **If the USA is the most paradigmatic (though not the sole) instantiation of global 'capitalist-territorialism' (to use Giovanni Arrighi's phrase), then as Bruyneel asserts elsewhere 'the persistent reproduction of the American foundational mythos [...] serves critically in the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonialism as a structure'**, and does so in the manifest global reach of its neoimperial imprint.² As such, **via the logic of elimination [...] and dependent upon settler colonialism America takes up its imperial stance overlooking the world**. This image illustrates that one cannot acknowledge the fact of US empire without acknowledging settler colonialism, and vice versa.³ To cite US Empire here, as constituted in relation to its own history of internal (settler) colonialism and manifest destiny is to cite an example of this relation that might be explored globally. **If settler colonialism bears relation to the global, as the US example illustrates, then global comparisons of such modes of dispossession also might shed light on the complexity of specific internal settler colonial experiences**. This **issue, then, calls upon scholarship to address the ideologies that traverse comparable political spaces, of which a number are surveyed in this issue: Australia, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico**. From the perspective of a critique of settler colonialism – which this approach, grounded in the initial premise of internal colonialism and the idea of elimination, is uniquely poised to reveal – what these spaces have in common is a certain strange double vision surrounding their self-conception. On the one hand, **settler nation states stress their liberalism and inclusivity and on the other, they aim to either repress indigenous presence and difference, or, alternately to occlude its particularly salient claims by subsuming this difference under a wider multicultural settlement on the management of alterity**. Here, the more the modernity and liberalism of the settler state is rhetorically stressed and pushed, the more it indulges in the repression of an indigenous presence often imagined as an anachronistic and aliberal residue of the type of ethnically bound and territorially fixed political cultures that violently clashed and sunk in our pre-global and pre-modern world. **This is a second crucial premise of this collection's relation to the globality of settler colonialism: liberal multicultural policies act comparably across multiple sites and spaces as avenues for the reinstitution of dispossession**. From Melissa Forbis' analysis of Chiapas to Michael Griffiths' argument about the relation between race and culture in Australia, **liberal logics are used to conceal new and incipient modes of dispossession globally**.

Impacts

The impact is the worst form of settler colonial violence like boarding schools and forced relocation. Settler colonialism is not oppositional, its assimilationist.

Cameron 12

[2012, Emilie S. Cameron, "Securing Indigenous politics: A critique of the vulnerability and adaptation approach to the human dimensions of climate change in the Canadian Arctic." Global Environmental Change 22.1 (2012): 103-114.]

Prior to the settlement of comprehensive land claims in northern Canada (see Hicks and White, 2000 for an overview), the concept of colonialism circulated widely in both academic and political spheres, and provided analytical traction for understanding the conditions under which Indigenous peoples struggled to sustain their lives (e.g., Brody, 1973, Dene Nation, 1977, Indian-Eskimo Association, 1970, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1977 and Scott, 2007). Today, although references are occasionally made to a "colonial past," to speak of colonial relations as persistently present in the North is to be accused, in some circles, of analytical, political, and ontological misrecognition: colonialism was; it is no longer. And yet processes and practices that were understood, prior to the settlement of land claims, in relation to colonization, remain persistently present in the region: poverty, loss of traditional culture, loss of language, lack of control over resource development, suicide, addictions, and physical and mental health disparities (Cameron, 2010, Hicks, 2007, Kral and Idlout, 2009 and Tester and McNicoll, 2004). Their persistence, moreover, in a place and for a people that is now supposed to be "after" or "beyond" colonization, still justifies a range of interventions; it still demands "solutions". Northern Indigenous peoples are still understood to "have problems" (indeed, as Smith (1999, p. 92) makes so clear, the equation of Indigeneity with "problems" is so deeply rooted in Western knowledge systems that its persistence in a supposedly "post" colonial context should not surprise us). And thus academic, governmental, and non-governmental institutions continue to intervene in the region in an effort to improve the lives of Indigenous northerners. It is precisely the framing of intervention into the lives of Indigenous peoples as well-meaning, benevolent, pragmatic, and necessary that has been problematized by scholars in recent years. As Tester and Kulchyski (1994, p. 4) observe, efforts to "improve" and "help" northern Indigenous peoples have been central to colonial formations in the region. As a population targeted most extensively after World War II, "the central historical dynamic that came to link Inuit to non-Inuit society politically was put in place during the period of high modernism. Unlike Indian affairs, where a pre-welfare state employed largely coercive measures, in Inuit affairs it was a liberal form of welfare state, which gave the appearance of having a more benign face and which employed a greater reliance on ideology, that became the means for attempting assimilation". Processes and practices that are understood, today, as central to colonization in the North (including forced relocation into settlements, the shooting of sled dogs, mass evacuation to southern sanatoria for tuberculosis treatment, residential schooling, and the imposition of southern models of health and education; see Kulchyski and Tester, 2007, Stevenson, 2009, Stevenson, 2011 and Tester and Kulchyski, 1994) were carried out under the auspices of a "well-meaning" liberal welfare state, a state concerned with helping Inuit adapt to the modern world, saving Inuit bodies from disease, and teaching Inuit how to effectively operate in Western economic

and political spheres. The history of intensive colonial intervention into Inuit lives interweaves, then, **with governmental benevolence, improvement, and expertise, and as such recent work on the colonial “will to improve”** (Li, 2007) **and writings on colonial governmentality more generally** (e.g., Mitchell, 2006 and Scott, 2005) are particularly helpful for understanding colonial and neocolonial processes in the North. The **will to improve**, Li argues, is a hallmark of colonial relations; it is a form of “trusteeship” in which the objective is not so much to dominate others but to **enhance a target population’s “capacity for action, and to direct it”** (2007, p. 5). Drawing on Foucault’s understandings of government as a field of power but also on Gramsci, Li is interested in the will to shape the “conduct of conduct”, to “educate desires”, and to configure peoples’ relations not only with each other, but with land, wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and so on. Governmental power, she notes, targets the well-being of populations at large rather than individuals, whether understood as the whole population or specific subgroups defined by gender, race, location, or other features, “each with characteristic deficiencies that serve as points of entry for corrective interventions” (6). Li notes that **the will to improve is marked by intentions that are “benevolent, even utopian”**. Its practitioners desire to make the world better and they do so not through violence or force, but through “schemes” that are **made to seem like “the natural expression of the everyday interactions of individuals and groups”** (5). Governing Indigenous peoples in this mode, she argues, **is no less significant than more coercive, assimilative, or disciplinary modes of domination. It is an extension and modification, not a departure from, colonial forms of power.** Of particular relevance to this paper is Li’s attention to the rationalities underpinning governmental intervention (including the ways of thinking, the calculations, and the techniques that characterize governmental power), as well as the ways in which these rationalities intersect with colonial imperatives to maintain the difference and distinctiveness of colonizer and colonized. There are two “practices” and three “tactics” Li identifies in this regard that warrant discussion here. First, Li identifies two practices by which trustees “translate the **will to improve into explicit programs**” (7). The first, “problematization”, is a process of identifying deficiencies that need to be rectified. The practice of identifying and naming deficiencies or weaknesses in a target population, and their corresponding need to be improved, fixed, or otherwise rectified, is, Li argues, a hallmark of governmental power. The second, corresponding practice Li identifies is a **process of “rendering technical,”** a process she describes, following Nikolas Rose, as a whole set of practices concerned with **representing the domain to be governed as an “intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics.... defining boundaries, rendering that within them visible, assembling information about that which is included and devising techniques to mobilize the forces and entities thus revealed”** (7). Populations targeted through governmental improvement schemes, in other words, **must first be problematized as facing particular challenges or suffering from particular deficiencies.** Next, **the quality and shape of those problems and deficiencies must be rendered technical, their boundaries and content must be specified and rendered visible, and techniques developed to target them.** Crucially, Li observes, “questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical... they focus more on the capacities of the poor than on the practices through which one social group impoverishes another” (7). **Experts operating within this framework constantly repose what James Ferguson calls “political questions” of land, resources, jobs, or wages as “technical ‘problems’ responsive to the technical ‘development’ intervention”** (Ferguson, 1994, p. 270). **Expert discourses**, Li further argues, “are **devoid of reference to questions they cannot address, or that might cast doubt on the completeness of their diagnoses or the feasibility of their solutions.”** (2007, p. 11) In particular, **they exclude political-economic questions. In other words, processes of problematization, representation, specification, and technical intervention necessitate the exclusion of all that cannot be addressed in technocratic terms.** They require the reframing of

complex, inherently political formations in terms that **can be governed through targeted, technical intervention**. **“Improvement” has been central to colonial projects for decades and even centuries**, Li argues, **and efforts to improve target populations in colonial and neocolonial contexts invariably confront a tension between a desire to improve a colonized group and a belief in the fundamental difference and distinctiveness of the colonizing group**. There is a basic contradiction, Li observes, between believing that the colonized are utterly different than their colonial masters, a distinction that itself justifies colonial rule, and the desire to improve the colonized in the image of the colonizer. **This tension between difference and improvement**, Li argues, **has been addressed by colonial regimes through at least three tactics, including: (a) the permanent deferral of the possibility of improvement on the part of colonized subjects; (b) the hierarchical division of colonized subjects into more and less improvable categories; and (c) the promotion of an understanding of improvement in which “improvement for natives did not mean becoming like their colonial masters, it meant being true to their own indigenous traditions. It was the task of trustees to improve native life ways by restoring them to their authentic state” (15). This third tactic, I will argue, is particularly operative in the human dimensions of climate change literature, where techniques and policies aimed at mitigating Inuit vulnerability and improving Inuit adaptive capacities in the face of climatic change emphasize the preservation and restoration of Inuit traditional knowledges, practices, and skills. They aim, in Li’s terms, to restore Inuit to a more traditional state, as a way of enhancing their adaptation to a rapidly changing world. If we bring together this attention to a governmental “will to improve” – a politicization of the processes by which deficiencies and problems are first identified, and then targeted for improvement in technocratic terms – with critiques of the spatiality of Indigeneity and the delimitation of Indigenous peoples to the local and traditional, a critique of recent work assessing community vulnerability and adaptation to climate change emerges**. In the following section I bring these two critical perspectives to bear on the human dimensions of climate change literature.

Death is not a symptom or consequence of modernity, but rather its intrinsic and foundational nature. The aff’s political dissent serves primarily to expand the death-inducing authority of the colonist, whose terms of negotiation are extermination, incorporation and dependency. Imperialism makes normal and necessary war, imprisonment, exploitation through racialized narratives rooted in white superiority

Lystrup 15. Lauren, University of California, Irvine, Doctor of Law (JD), 2015 – 2018. DePaul University Master's degree, Social and Cultural Foundations of Education, 2013 – 2015. University of California, Santa Cruz B.A. Feminist Studies, Education Minor, Law, Politics and Social Change, 2007 – 2011. "Decolonial Futures and the Law: Reflections on Mitigating Projects of Coloniality" (2015). http://via.library.depaul.edu/soe_etd/77

Introduction **“They talk to me about progress, about ‘achievements,’ diseases cured, improved standards of living. I am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary possibilities wiped out.”** -Aime Cesaire in Discourse on Colonialism This thesis could have been called “Coloniality Matters1,” or “Why Decoloniality in the 21st Century2,” but those titles have already been taken in part or in full. What I have intended to signal here, though, is that coloniality still matters, and that decoloniality or decolonialities in the plural (as I will explain later), is a necessary and viable project. Building on the work of decolonial scholars such as Fanon, Quijano, Maldonado-Torres, and Mignolo, I find **it is necessary to examine the violence of modernity and capitalist development through its historical rootedness in coloniality**, or what Mignolo (2010) has termed the modern/

colonial order. I **intend to demonstrate the inherent death facilitating processes of modern/ colonial development, which make evident the extraordinary and urgent need to break (delink) from the project of coloniality in all forms (materially, epistemically, and ontologically). Death is not symptom or consequence of coloniality but intrinsic and foundational to its nature. Sanctioned political dissent through channels accepted as appropriate means of expressing disagreement to these everyday and atrocities serve primarily to maintain and expand colonial authority, forced under the terms of negotiation set by the colonist.**

Modern/ **colonial** (Mignolo, 2000) **relations are** historically compounded and **codified into the law in a totalizing effect that facilitates death (extermination), incorporation, and dependency as inherent to their projects of development** and expansion to which the **acts of self-becoming and delinking are necessary to assert a thriving decolonial future.** Further, **given that the production of excess or redundant populations and death are integral to modern/ colonial development, I look toward political mechanisms of decoloniality that can hold colonization, whiteness, and capitalism accountable.** I find the reasonable **political desires of decoloniality**, in accordance with Fanon (1955, 1967) and Maldonado-Torres (2007), **will be taken and not granted, and will continuously mitigate the violence of coloniality as the two are antithetical projects where the existence of one denies the existence of the other. I intend to dispel the notions that turning to the histories of marginalized and colonized peoples represents a romanticized, or nostalgic return to the past,** or that decolonization has already occurred. These are overwhelmingly the **stories representing indigenous peoples, particularly in the United States,** and the stories warning against dissent to modern/ colonial design. **The telling of history is a process infused with the power assign value, name, and to know in order address current conditions with future “horizons of promise”** (Quijano, 2002, p. 78). **It is, therefore, a future oriented task tied to geopolitics and** its perhaps less frequently discussed but parallel function, chronopolitics, or the **politics of time.** I explore these claims through analysis of development projects and discourse by integrating insights from Critical Race Theory, dialectical materialism, and dependency theory through a larger decolonial framework. **This thesis is grounded in** the assertion of anti-colonial political leader Amiclar Cabral's (1979) **speech emboldening the idea of theory as a weapon and** specifically in his statement: For us the basis of national liberation, whatever the formulas adopted in international law, is **the inalienable right of every people to have their own history;** and the aim of national liberation is to regain this right usurped by imperialism, that is to free the process of development of the national productive forces. (Cabral, 1979, p. 130) **Decoloniality recognizes the urgency and right to have a history that is not simply about rewriting textbooks, but looking toward histories to understand and alter present relations.** While one might read Cabral's statement as a dismissal of international law, I have chosen here to use it as an entry point for examining the law and the political mechanisms of a peoples right their own his/herstory. Cabral **brings together two important contentions: an epistemological/ ontological concern for accessing one's history, inextricably tied to a political project reconciling the material disparities resulting from imperial domination.** Cabral views history and knowledge-of-self as linked directly to understandings of being, place, social order, political and economic relations **Law itself becomes a codification of memory, cyclically reified through its enforcement. Imperialism and colonization make normal and necessary the violence of war, imprisonment, removal, exploitation, and extractive relationships through racialized narratives rooted in white superiority. Remembering and misremembering is always already a political process and project.** Today, **nearly all materiality and wealth within a modernized industrial society can be traced to histories and present forms of slavery and colonization** (Rodney, 1972). The **lines of relation,** however, **are systematically obfuscated through a pathological,** Lady Macbethian-style delusion of obsessive compulsive **sanitization, to wash one's hands clean from the marks of death that facilitate the usurpation of power. Colonial logics represent a concerted, historically compounded denial of humanity and possibility outside constructions of Western ontology and epistemology.** These processes of dehumanization have been referred to by Aime Cesaire's (1995) as **thingification, making bodies into object or animal to be used as productive tool for industry,** and by Frantz Fanon as **le damne** (Fanon, 1961; Maldonado-Torres, 2007), **those without capacity to give because everything has been taken away,** and who represent a kinship with death and hell in itself. **Death as a singular option or reality for oppressed peoples is not only in the physical sense such as genocide, state sanctioned murder of black and brown peoples, or the mass atrocities caused by the many consequences of global warming. Each of these urgent physical and material consequences are manifestations of a Western epistemology where Europe is the loci of**

enunciation defining what is inside and outside Man as Human (Mignolo, 2011, Wynter, 2003), **and therefore what and how life exists**. This recognition begs the question: If a society necessitates death in order to develop and progress, as is the situation of settler colonies and empires, what are the possibilities and rights to delink (Zhang, 2013; Mignolo, 2010)? The first part will elaborate on the logics of coloniality as dependency, extermination and incorporation (operationalized throughout the following chapters) and the juridical and administrative mechanisms that rationalize and perpetuate modern/ colonial orders. **Beyond the economic logics and fallacies of development, modern/colonial designs are perpetuated through fear, insecurity, and, at best, lack of imagination. Even when the colonial designs fail to be economically productive for the owning class, their ordering of knowledge, power and being continue to hold anything outside the imaginary of western modernity as outside humanity or reason and therefore positioned as either a threat or irrelevance to humanities future.** The second, third, and fourth chapters examine **policy and legislation grounded in development discourse tied to land or territory** in order to **provide empirical evidence to the foundations of coloniality as an ongoing process of extermination, incorporation and dependency**. Creating and securing private property is a historically and politically infused process that forms the nucleus of material colonial designs (Harris, 1993). **Each example demonstrates the simultaneous reification of nation-state formations as ultimate sovereign authority** and expansion of empire. The examples are organized as 1) Knowledge of development: STEM education from the space race to Race to the Top, 2) Modes of development: intellectual property law and the incorporation of indigeneity, 3) Sanctioned Dissent to modern/ colonial development: Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the codification of race. Each of the chapters will examine the relations between whiteness, coloniality and decoloniality with the hope of envisaging a productive, actionable move toward decoloniality by demonstrating the incapacity for colonial thought and design to offer adequate blueprints to urgent global problems.

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Decolonize the Arctic! (Mooser 23) [Elizabeth Mooser – 2/21/2013 – “Decolonization and Arctic Engagement: A Critical Analysis of Resource Development in the US Arctic” - <https://www.thearticinstitute.org/decolonization-arctic-engagement-critical-analysis-resource-development-us-arctic/> - This article is based on and includes direct excerpts from the thesis completed by the author for the earning of a Master of Science in Development Practice at Trinity College Dublin, supervised by Dr. Quentin Crowley and Dr. Pdraig Carmody. - <https://www.thearticinstitute.org/author/elizabeth-mooser/>]

APB ☺

Federal Arctic policy in the US has tended to **emphasize the exploitation of Arctic resources** for US economic development.¹¹ Within the new National Strategy for the Arctic Region (released October 2022), economic development continues to receive a strong emphasis—alongside security—and Arctic investments are expected to increase over the following decade.¹² In the face of this ever-growing interest in Arctic engagement, **Alaska Native communities may face new and renewed colonial intrusion in the form of large-scale resource development.**¹³ Effects of resource development Continual ‘boom and bust’ with periods of financial growth and decline characterizes resource development in the **capitalist** system.¹⁴ This **instability** prohibits many communities from relying solely on economies centered on resource extraction. Subsistence practices **provide** a source of greater stability within what would otherwise be **an unstable extractive economy.**¹⁵ Resource extraction has, however, **had detrimental impacts on the land, water, and wildlife that reduce the viability of subsistence lifeways.** Specifically, **extractive activities have been found to increase vulnerability to biological invasion.**¹⁶ bring changes to the land with built infrastructure,¹⁷ and introduce the risk of contamination, such as oil spills.¹⁸ The resulting decreased viability of subsistence practices is worsened by the threat climate change poses to hunting and gathering activities.¹⁹ Although some measures of physical health have improved since ANCSA,²⁰ resource extraction can compromise the health and wellbeing of nearby Indigenous populations. Significant health disparities remain among Alaska Natives compared to non-native Alaskans and other US residents. Generally, **Alaska Natives have a lower life expectancy, increased risk of cardiovascular disease, and an elevated burden of infectious disease.**²¹ By exacerbating food insecurity, the negative impacts of resource development may contribute to and worsen health outcomes. Many of **these disparities are rooted in the history of colonialism** and socio-political marginalization; in addition, their persistence today may be attributed to the disproportionate exposure to environmental health hazards.²² Moreover, some researchers have found that health data fails to produce a holistic picture of well-being, suggesting that there must be a greater consideration for context-specific understandings of health status.²³ Importantly, the effects of resource development are not felt uniformly by Alaska Natives. Instead, various facets of identity among individuals and communities impact how they relate to extractive activities. Socioeconomic class divisions,²⁴ gender identity,²⁵ one’s location in a rural versus urban setting,²⁶ and many other factors can all impact how resource development is experienced. The complexity of the relationship between resource development and Indigenous populations, and the diversity within the Alaska Native population, must not be ignored or simplified. Sovereignty and the prioritization of state interests **To decolonize resource development, Alaska Native populations must have greater control over the process.** In other words, **one overarching aim of decolonization** in practice **is Indigenous sovereignty.** However, **(neo)colonial narratives** shape and **are ingrained with** in the traditional concept of **state-centered sovereignty.** Within this concept, **the aims of the government are continually prioritized;** a hierarchy is established whereby the interests and concerns of the state are given primacy.²⁷ **This dynamic is** one of the reasons **why,** in the case of Alaska and Alaska Native populations, resource **development continues to be experienced as a colonial enterprise.** The gains from extractive activities do not necessarily or primarily benefit Alaska Native populations,²⁸ and the interests of outside actors are prioritized.²⁹ Oftentimes, wealth from resource development has been extracted from northern regions to benefit other populations.³⁰ An evaluation of the Red Dog Mine in northwest Alaska, for instance, found that the local population received a relatively modest share of benefits in terms of employment, income, and mobility.³¹ As established through ANCSA, the Regional Corporations are the primary route for Alaska Native participation in governing resource development in the US Arctic. These corporations, however, operate under US corporate law and, therefore, within the frameworks of the capitalist order. Participation through the structure of the Regional Corporations, thus, limits the opportunity for Alaska Native populations to achieve self-determination outside of those conventions. In action, considering the embeddedness of the corporations within the capitalist and colonial dynamics of the state, decolonization may necessitate enhancing the power of and regard for local governments rather than governing resource development principally through the Regional Corporations. Prioritization of Western knowledge and conventions A deep-rooted colonial mentality that remains pervasive is **the assumed supremacy of a Western knowledge system.** This **creates a paternalistic relationship wherein decisions are made by external ‘experts’ and imposed upon the Indigenous population.** In short, **Indigenous ways of knowing are undermined.**³² The term Indigenous knowledge is defined as “the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies

with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings”³³ **Efforts to decolonize resource development in the US Arctic must not only embrace these different worldviews, perspectives, and knowledge systems, but put them first.** There is also a tendency to assume that the only route to achieving greater material benefits or power is to adopt a capitalist economy. What Anibal Quijano—one of the preeminent thinkers of decolonization theory—terms ‘**cultural Europeanisation,**’ but can be understood as colonial Western society more broadly, **is taken as universal and synonymous with being ‘developed’**.³⁴ Before ANCSA was passed in 1971, Alaska Native populations had primarily engaged in subsistence activities. Since the settlement of land claims agreements, Alaska Native populations are increasingly entrenched in the capitalist economy, especially via resource development. Today, most Indigenous people in Alaska engage in a mixed economy, meaning a combination of both subsistence and market-based activities.³⁵ **A desire to obtain the benefits from natural resource extraction on Indigenous lands is a primary reason for this growth in capitalist engagement.**³⁶ Through a decolonization lens, it is understood that following the rhetoric and logic of Western society is a way to “reach the same material benefits and the same power as the Europeans: viz, to conquer nature in short for ‘development’”.³⁷ **This model of development, however, has proven “environmentally calamitous on the global scale”³⁸ made even more dire by the rapid impact of climate change throughout the Arctic.** Conceptualizing Indigenous sovereignty **Notions of Indigenous sovereignty are connected to the right to self-determination. Decolonization must seek the conceptualization and expression of Indigenous sovereignty outside of the western hegemony and enduring colonial structures;** **self-determination and sovereignty are limited when they can only be articulated within the existing capitalist order.**³⁹ Dr. Melanie K. Yazzie presents the idea of anti-capitalist decolonization to challenge the “hegemonic formation of ‘extractivism’ and its liberal, capitalist, heteropatriarchal, and settler colonial valence of development”.⁴⁰ This approach to decolonization seems especially well suited to the Alaskan context as it critiques how resource development is carried out in a capitalist system, instead of presenting **resource extraction** as something inherently at odds with indigeneity. **Indigenous sovereignty is reliant on the ability of communities to have autonomy over their resources and decision-making,** as they have for thousands of years.⁴¹ **An anti-capitalist approach to decolonization offers a way to center Indigenous epistemologies and enable economic, societal, cultural, and political pathways conceptualized and implemented by Alaska Native people themselves.** The ideas presented throughout this article are applicable well beyond the US Arctic, and beyond the realm of resource development. Interest in exploiting natural resources drove historic colonization throughout the entire Arctic region and the lingering structures and systems of power continue to shape Indigenous lives and limit the capacity of communities and individuals to mold their own destinies. Therefore, **interrogating and confronting the ongoing systems and dynamics of colonialism must be prioritized within Arctic engagement and collaboration going forward.** In light of the new National Strategy for the Arctic Region—which differs, in one way, from the prior 2013 edition in making no mention of oil or gas⁴²)—there is a need for further research and analysis to identify the implications of this new strategy on efforts to decolonize and achieve Indigenous sovereignty. There is also a need to center and privilege Indigenous voices in this space and, as such, future research must be informed and conceptualized by and for Arctic Indigenous populations.

The only alternative is one of decolonization.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which **guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to** aims of **reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy,** about **rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like?** What will happen after abolition? **What will be the consequences** of decolonization **for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not,** and perhaps cannot, **be answered** in order **for decolonization to exist as a framework.** We want to say, first, that **decolonization is not obliged to answer** those questions - **decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity.** Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know

what decolonization will require of them. **The answers are not fully in view and can't be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly.** But **we will find** out the answers as we get there, "in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content" (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). **To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas's, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.** *when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures* -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) **Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an "and". It is an elsewhere.**

Framework

Debate is first and foremost a site of subject formation – thus, we must center the centuries long genocidal structure that forms how we think and exist. The kritik’s affective intervention is essential to destabilize the settler psyche that otherwise coheres itself by pushing this violence out of the picture. Anything else is to sustain the ongoing violence of dispossession – land must come first

Henderson 15 – prof of political science @ University of Victoria (Phil, ‘Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism,’ Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement)

Facing assertive indigenous presences within settler colonial spaces, **settlers must answer the legitimate charge that their daily life – in all its banality – is predicated upon** the privileges produced by **ongoing genocide**. The jarring nature of **such charges offers an irreconcilable challenge** to settlers qua settlers.⁶⁴ Should **these charges become impossible to ignore, they threaten to explode** the imago of settler colonialism, which had hitherto operated within **the settler psyche** in a relatively smooth and benign manner. **This explosion is potentiated by the revelation of** even a portion of **the violence that is required to make settler life possible**. If, for example, settlers are forced to see ‘their’ beach as a site of murder and ongoing colonization, it becomes more difficult to sustain it within the imaginary as a site of frivolity.⁶⁵ As Brown writes, in the ‘loss of horizons, order, and identity’ **the subject experiences a sense of enormous vulnerability**.⁶⁶ Threatened with this ‘loss of containment’, the settler subject embarks down the road to psychosis.⁶⁷ Thus, to parlay Brown’s thesis to the settler colonial context, the uncontrollable rage that indigenous presences induce within the settler is not evidence of the strength of settlers, but rather of a subject lashing out on the brink of its own dissolution. **This panic** – this rabid and insatiable anger – **is always already at the core of the settler** as a **subject**. As Lorenzo Veracini observes, the settler necessarily remains in a disposition of aggression ‘even after indigenous alterities have ceased to be threatening’.⁶⁸ **This disposition results from the precarity inherent in the maintenance of** settler colonialism’s imago, wherein any and all indigenous presences threaten subjective dissolution of **the settler as such**. Trapped in a Gordian Knot, the very thing that provides a balm to the settler subject – further development and entrenchment of the settler colonial imago – is also what panics the subject when it is inevitably contravened.⁶⁹ We might think of this as a process of hardening that leaves the imago brittle and more susceptible to breakage. Their desire to produce a firm imago means that **settlers are also always already in a psychically defensive position – that is, the settler’s offensive position on occupied land is sustained through a defensive posture**. For **while settlers desire the total erasure of indigenous populations, the attendant desire to disappear their own identity as settlers necessitates the suppression of both desires, if the subject’s reliance on settler colonial power structure is to be psychically naturalized**. Settlers’ reactions to indigenous peoples fit, almost universally, with the two ego defense responses that Sigmund Freud observed. The first of these defenses is to attempt a complete conversion of the suppressed desire into a new idea. In settler colonial contexts, **this requires averting attention from the violence of dispossession; as such, settlers often suggest that they aim to create a ‘city on the hill’**.⁷⁰ Freud noted that the conversion defense mechanism does suppress the anxiety-inducing desire, but it also leads to ‘periodic hysterical outbursts’. Such is the case when settlers’ utopic visions are forced to confront the reality that the gentile community they imagine is founded in and perpetuates irredeemable suffering. A second type of defense is to channel the original desire’s energy into an obsession or a phobia. The effects of this defense are seen in the preoccupation that settler colonialism has with purity of blood or of community.⁷¹ As we have already seen, **this obsession at once solidifies the power of the settler state, thereby naturalizing the settler and** simultaneously perpetuating the processes of **erasing indigenous peoples**. Psychic defenses are intended to secure the subject from pain, and whether that pain originates inside or outside the psyche is inconsequential. **Because of the threat that indigeneity presents to the phantasmatic wholeness of settler colonialism, settlers must always remain** suspended in a state of arrested development between these **defensive** positions. Despite any pretensions to the contrary, the settler is necessarily a parochial subject who continuously coils, reacts, disavows, and lashes out, when confronted with his dependency on indigenous peoples and their territory. This psychic precarity exists at the core of the settler subject

because of the unending fear of its own dissolution, should indigenous sovereignty be recognized.⁷² Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that **decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant 'self-disciplining colonial subject'**.⁷³ However, as **this discussion** of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies **must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompleteness is apparent in the** subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the **instability at the core of the settler subject**, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His **phenomenology falls into the trap** that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that **of assuming a successful internalization of norms**. From **the psychoanalytical perspective**, the 'unconscious constantly **reveals the "failure"** of internalization.⁷⁴ As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. **Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized** as others might suggest.⁷⁵ Because of **this precarity**, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also **provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider**. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a 'restoring' of settler colonial history and culture, to **decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples**.⁷⁶ **The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments** like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,⁷⁷ **it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts**. Goeman correctly observes that **the 'repetitive practices of everyday life'** are what **give settler spaces their meaning**, as they provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its **psychic investments**.⁷⁸ As such, **to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject**. Goeman calls these subversive acts the 'micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of 'moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties' amongst other process.⁷⁹ These acts **panic** the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This **reveals to the settler**, if only fleetingly, **the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure.**

AT Perm

The perm is a settler move to innocence. Hoping to once again co-opt indigeneity for a profit... the ballot. Settler identity is reconstituted through moves to innocence that distance us from guilt without having to change much at all.

Tuck and Yang, 12 – PhD in Urban Education, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York AND Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies (Eve and K.W., “Decolonization is not a metaphor Eve Tuck,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40)

We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is **a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting** (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting). Directly and **indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve.** In her 1998 Master’s thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.⁸ She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms ‘moves to innocence,’ or “strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination” (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1998) conceptualization of, ‘the race to innocence,’ “the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women” (p. 335). Mawhinney’s thesis theorizes **the self-positioning of white people** as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and **as having an absence of experience of oppressive power relations** (p. 100). This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, **“I don’t experience the problems you do, so I don’t think about it,”** and “tell me what to do, you’re the experts here” (p. 103). **“The commonsense appeal of such statements,”** Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to “utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, **is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations”** (ibid.). In the discussion that follows, **we will do some work to identify and argue against** a series of what we call ‘**settler moves to innocence**’. **Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all.** In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet **settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler. This discussion will likely cause discomfort** in our settler readers, **may** embarrass you/us or **make us/you feel implicated.** Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization. **We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence,** which we discuss in the final section of this article.

Aff

Framework

Plan focus is good --- theorizing subversion of settler technologies is historically successful and necessary for decolonization --- and turns the K

La **Paperson 17**, Pseudonym of K. Wayne Yang, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC San Diego, PhD Social and Cultural Studies, Berkeley, "A Third University Is Possible," June 2017, <https://manifold.umn.edu/read/7ba69a54-7131-4598-9fec-815890725d91/section/e33f977a-532b-4b87-b108-f106337d9e53>

Even When They Are Dangerous Everywhere land resists and refuses—whales that destroy ships, bees that refuse to work, bombed islands that reconstitute themselves. The land also resists in the form of people; Indigenous peoples' resistance is the land's resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance. And technologies and technological beings resist too. Patent law is patently designed to favor corporations, a legal technology whose colonizing functions are particularly evident when considering how Monsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they "find" throughout the world. Yet Indigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life and that document knowledge for expropriation in the first place, by creating digital libraries of traditional knowledges, and sometimes by subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges.^[35] Treaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance. As Scott Lyon says, an x-mark that signs the treaty "is a sign of consent in a context of coercion." . And yet there is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible, that is, that an x-mark could result in something good. Why else, we must ask, would someone bother to make it?"^[36] Since 1948, the Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty over historical reservation lands via a complex set of avenues involving treaty law, U.S. courts, casinos, and excise taxes, resulting in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust by the Department of the Interior in 2014.^[37] Sometimes settlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations. Hopefully, they/we might do so without conditions. As I write, the Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands in California.^[38] I am not saying wealthy settlers who return land are decolonizing. I am saying that some colonizing technology has been hotwired; something scyborg is happening. The truth is that any return of land is not just due to the good graces and benevolence of wealthy settlers; it is a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark. About Hollywood star Johnny Depp's purported promise to buy land for Comanche, Sonny Skyhawk, a Sicangu Lakota actor and founder of American Indians in Film and Television, said, "If it's from the heart, we accept it. If it's not from the heart, we'll accept it anyways."^[39] Developed as weapons of surveillance and assassination, drones are hard to imagine as decolonizing instruments; yet these machines we hate may serve a function before we discard them. Originally a wind-powered device similar to the childhood wind toys of its Afghani creator Massoud Hassani, the Mine Kafon drone "can autonomously map, detect, and detonate land mines" and could contribute to demilitarizing mine-filled lands within a generation.^[40] Dynamite, which left Alfred Nobel rich and many dead, and which abetted in U.S. westward imperial expansion, blew up the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams and restored the Elwha River.^[41] A giant, autonomous artificial coastline could assist the ocean to clean herself of the great Pacific Garbage Patch.^[42] Oysters made "plantable" by farming technologies detoxify the Hudson and so become too poisonous to eat, but because of them, the frogs will return.^[43] Wind-powered strandbeests—originally devised to restore Dutch beaches—now roam almost autonomous, almost free.^[44] Toxic and explosive and wind-willed machine animals, you, scyborg, might read about and feel some odd sense of recognition. Figure out how technologies operate. Use a wrench. Technologies can be disrupted and reorganized—at least for a machine cycle. Rather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies, think about how we are the drones, the explosives, the toxified, the operative parts of those technologies—and ideally, how we might operate on ourselves and other technologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations. If this sounds easy and obvious, then my writing has failed you. Listen: you will need to remember this when you are accused of destruction. Attach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise; let it tick its own countdown. Ask how, and how otherwise, of the colonizing machines. Even when they are dangerous.

Shell

The judge should only evaluate the plan versus the status quo or a competitive policy option. Anything beyond that wishes away the 1AC, and is unfair to the affirmative. We also lose topic-specific education which is the purpose of the resolution. That's an independent voter for fairness. Vote them down for purposes of ground, education, and fairness.

Consequences **must** be evaluated --- insistence on 'principle' as end-in-itself ensures that the alternative fails

Bracey 6 – Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of African & African American Studies, Washington University in St. Louis

Christopher A., September, Southern California Law Review, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, p. 1318

Second, **reducing conversation on race matters to an ideological contest allows opponents to elide inquiry into whether the results of a particular preference policy are desirable. Policy positions masquerading as principled ideological stances create the impression that a racial policy is not simply a choice among available alternatives, but the embodiment of some higher moral principle.** Thus, the "principle" becomes an end in itself, without reference to outcomes. Consider the prevailing view of colorblindness in constitutional discourse. Colorblindness has come to be understood as the embodiment of what is morally just, independent of its actual effect upon the lives of racial minorities. This explains Justice Thomas's belief in the "moral and constitutional equivalence" between Jim Crow laws and race preferences, and his tragic assertion that "Government cannot make us equal [but] can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law." 281 For Thomas, there is no meaningful difference between laws designed to entrench racial subordination and those designed to alleviate conditions of oppression. **Critics may point out that colorblindness in practice has the effect of entrenching existing racial disparities in health, wealth, and society. But in framing the debate in purely ideological terms, opponents are able to avoid the contentious issue of outcomes and make viability determinations based exclusively on whether racially progressive measures exude fidelity to the ideological principle of colorblindness. Meaningful policy debate is replaced by ideological exchange, which further exacerbates hostilities and deepens the cycle of resentment.**

Ignore their calls to action. They're self-serving and intangible. Critique as an end devolves into absolute relativism and impedes action.

Miller 17 (Ryuko and Charlotte, Department of Language and Literacy Education, University of British Columbia AND Department of English, University of North Carolina at Charlotte "RE-EXAMINING AND RE-ENVISIONING CRITICALITY IN LANGUAGE STUDIES: THEORIES AND PRAXIS," Critical Inquiry in Language Studies, 0:1–29, 2017)

Third, **although critical perspectives seem to have gained legitimacy in our field, their influence on institutional policies and practices is minimal. Even when progressive educational policies are created, they may have little transformative effect** due to a persistent neoliberal emphasis on particular types of competence (see Alford and Kettle in this issue). At the same time, the neoliberal emphasis on competence wears the new clothes of freedom and equality—progressive values fought for decades ago to end the formal domination of colonialism, slavery, and patriarchy (Wagner, 2016), but which now rationalize individual choice and economic success in capitalist society as the path to freedom and equality. In fact, we currently observe greater economic disparities and social problems in schools and other locations. **This raises the following question: Has the increased recognition of critical language studies led to any concrete social change? The answer is probably no.** Hence, the fourth problem has to do with the ways in which we disseminate critical discourse and exercise praxis. As discussed previously, **institutional expectations and competitions compel scholars to publish and present their ideas only**

within their academic bubble. Many of us rarely write to a nonprofessional general audience, participate in policymaking, or engage in activism. Scholars, including us in writing this article, often attempt to examine, understand, and theorize the world without acting to transform it. Unless we narrow the gap between theory and practice, we will continue to see a kind of progress only in our academic bubble but not in the “real world.” As Collins (2012) advocated, intellectual activism should involve both speaking the truth to power—confronting the powerful in the dominant language—and speaking the truth to people—communicating ideas with undergraduates and people in the community in accessible ways. Praxis in the Neoliberal and Post World We have explored several dominant conceptual threads that have informed critical language studies, many of which have been critiqued by other threads within the critical tradition. This diversity reflects a diffused critical approach, as Ryuko’s story shows. Although this diversity and diffusion may be viewed as a kind of progress, they also point to the potential for problematic complicity with neoliberal values. In fact, the **post theories, with their valorization of multiplicity, fluidity, and hybridity, are also complicit with neoliberal multiculturalism** (Kubota, 2016). **In order** for critical language studies **to maintain its critical edge, it needs to exercise praxis** with hyper selfreflexivity (Kapoor, 2004) **and focus on result-oriented strategic action** (Kumaravadivelu, 2016). All of us, regardless of our backgrounds, must critically reflect on our privilege, exercise vigilance against our complicity with neoliberal power, and develop the capacity to cross individual identity borders with responsibility and humility (Vandrick, 2009). In the post era, diluted versions of critical/ post perspectives have garnered broader recognition in academe. **In popular discourse, posttruth anti-intellectualism prevails. The core of critical language studies, thus, should maintain its potency by continuing to** expose and critique injustices, critically understand power and inequalities, and **exercise engaged praxis for establishing societal and individual wellbeing.** In continuing to promote criticality with heightened praxis, **we must be vigilant about normativity and dogmatism.** For example, as discussed previously, **a postmodern view of truth as discursive representations runs the risk of supporting absolute relativism, leading teachers and students to an impasse when confronting historical revisionism** (e.g., “the Holocaust never happened”) **or denial of global warming** (Luke, 2013). Conversely, **dogmatically denouncing injustices and imposing justice-oriented views could silence students instead of inviting them to become ethical citizens** (Kubota, 2014; Pessoa & Urzêda Freitas, 2012). **Praxis must be exercised with humility and contextual sensitivity.**

Utilitarianism

Extinction outweighs—Evaluate violence and colonialism specifically

Gregory Pappas 17, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, March 31, 2017, “The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro,” Radical Philosophy Review

For Villoro a **serious study** of ideologies has to be **as specific to time and place as possible**. The quest for **theoretical barometers of good and evil at a global level and across history** should be **subject to critical suspicion** and **may be futile** since the present ideological function of a concept/category is **not always determined by its past use** or the **original purpose** for which it was created. **A distinction created to oppress may play a different function or have different functions in different social contexts**. Modernity and liberalism have **not always functioned** as ideologies or **to the same degree**, nor does it make sense to claim that they **always will**. **Even native thought** (indigenismo) **can become an ideology** if adopted to keep the oppressed in their place, i.e., if it **perpetuates subordination or oppression**.³⁹ If Villoro is correct in the above analysis then **decolonial views are vulnerable to inaccuracy and insensitivity**, especially those that wish to trace back to 1492 and across different countries the ideologies that have supported coloniality—such as modernity, capitalism, or liberalism. Villoro did not ignore how historically similar colonial structures were throughout the Americas, but for him **ideologies and the logic of domination that operate in one particular place and time may not operate in the exact same way in another**, especially in such a complex and diverse region as the whole of Latin America. **If domination and exclusion via ideologies are local, its diagnosis and remedies must also have to be local**. **We need to be careful when we extrapolate from one context to another**. Villoro raised a similar criticism of leftist reactions to the problem of **Eurocentrism** that relies on **simple formulas** that state we just need to embrace what is “ours” and **reject what is European**. Although Villoro was a critic of Eurocentrism and admirer of indigenous thought, he warned Zea and the Latin Americanist or indigenismos movement to not react to Eurocentrism and the colonial Manichaean ideas, where what is “ours” or indigenous is denigrated, with a mere inversion of the Manicheanism. For Villoro **the Left must resist the temptation to rely on lazy theoretical barometers of good and evil**. It must be able to **provide a basis for being critical of Western ideas beyond the fact that they are Western or come from the oppressor**. **Not all Western concepts, standards, and categories** are oppressive even to the most non-Western people. **To decide between good and evil requires intelligent discriminative judgment and not easy theoretical formulas** according to geopolitical coordinates or cultural origins. Again, **even native thought** (indigenismo) **can become an ideology**. He expected the Left to be sensitive to this, but **what he actually experienced was a Left slipping dangerously toward subtle Manichaean assumptions**, i.e., **simplistic barometers about the boundaries between good and evil**. This, I am afraid, **is a danger in decolonial thought**, one that **seems unavoidable** as long as they **make central to their project the coloniality axis that relies on binaries** to determine the direction of good and evil. I am aware that it is not easy to oppose a binary without just inverting it, but we must be careful. To be fair, **decolonial thought has been critical of Manichaeism** as part of the colonial legacy **and there is no doubt about their good intentions to move in a pluralistic direction where there is no one central epistemology**. However, this **center-versus-periphery**

Nuclear war outweighs---it's categorically worse than structural violence---accepting their premise makes nuanced analysis of violence impossible

Ken **Boulding 78**, professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, "Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalgamate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of international peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war" which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace."

Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified.

To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational corporations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science-based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research standards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, armaments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, however, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, to change the course of events as we head toward ultimate catastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated methodologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce something like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which reinforced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moderately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement.

Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temperate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff.

The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we

see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconvenience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twentieth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not accounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if anything goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of isolated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peace.

The only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved

Joshua Greene 10, Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul", www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-ought divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from an "is"? How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point, I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love," really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself. This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things

really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizations fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

Theory of Power

Settler colonialism reduces all oppression to land and erasure, excluding analysis of race, gender, class, and capitalism. The Kritik's limited perspective precludes meaningful coalition work and alternative modes of resistance. (Vimalassery 16) [Vimalassery, Manu, et al. "Introduction: On Colonial Unknowing." *Theory & Event*, vol. 19 no. 4, 2016. *Project MUSE*, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633283>.] APB ☺

Activists and academics have increasingly taken up settler colonialism as an analytic to address the particular ways in which colonialism operates and persists in places such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, as well as Israel/Palestine. To a considerable extent, much of the work that has recently become associated with settler colonial studies has already been underway in Native American and Indigenous studies, as well as other fields including ethnic studies and colonial discourse studies. Our contention is that the particular ways in which settler colonialism has assumed predominance as an analytic risks obscuring or eliding as much as it does to distinguish significant features of the present conjuncture.²² Indeed, we suggest that when settler colonialism is deployed as a stand-alone analytic it potentially reproduces precisely the effects and enactments of colonial unknowing that we are theorizing in this introduction. Approaches to the analysis of settler colonialism, as isolated from imperialism and differential modes of racialization, are consequences of the institutionalization of this work as a distinct subfield, which is claimed and consolidated through analytic tendencies that foreclose or bracket out interconnections and relational possibilities. Settler colonial histories, conditions, practices, and logics of dispossession and power must necessarily be understood as relationally constituted to other modes of imperialism, racial capitalism, and historical formations of social difference. The key insights of settler colonial studies into the particularity of settlement as a manner of colonial power have also led to a tendency to focus on this distinction as constituting a discrete and modular form or ensemble of practices—such as Patrick Wolfe's often cited contention that “settler colonialism destroys to replace”²³—that can be applied across differences of geography or time. As such, settler colonialism appears as a self-contained type rather than a situatedly specific formation that is co-constituted with other forms and histories of colonialism, counter-claims, and relations of power. For instance, in the U.S. context, settler colonialism as a singular manner of colonialism entirely misses the ways in which the abduction and enslavement of Africans and their descendants was a colonial practice that, while changing in its intensities and modes of organization over time, was co-constitutive of colonialism as a project of settlement rather than a supplement that demonstrates the taking of land and labor as distinct endeavors. Wolfe's description of settler colonialism as a structure, and not an event, has by now achieved the status of a truism in analyses of settler colonialism.²⁴ Wolfe's work has been crucial in bringing further attention to the fact that colonialism is an ongoing fact of life for indigenous peoples more than fifty years after the advent of the so-called era of decolonization. His scholarship insightfully underscored historical continuities in the shifting regimes and policies of settler states in relation to indigenous peoples, and challenged a certain produced ignorance about the “post” colonial character of societies like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.²⁵ Yet drawing an absolute distinction between structure and event, and as a result, discarding a focus on the historicity of settler colonialism, neglects some of the ways Wolfe distinguishes between the binary terms structure/event in the service of further analysis. For example, Wolfe emphasizes how settler colonialism is a “complex social formation” with “structural complexity” that emerges through process.²⁶ When taken up as a modular analytic that travels without regard to the specificities of location or social and material relations, a categorical event/structure binary banishes deeply engaged historical knowledge from the landscape, turning away from historical materialism, devolving into a scholastic debate over identities and standpoints that are reduced to structural essences and divorced from politics or contingency. Emphasizing structure over event also limits the analysis of settler colonialism itself into a descriptive typology, orienting our vision narrowly within the technical perspective of colonial power (in the white Commonwealth countries), away from geographies from below, such as a hemispheric perspective of the Americas, with their multiple and distinct modes of colonialism, thus replicating the conditions of unknowing.²⁷ Foregrounding structure against event might also divert attention away from imperialism. This binary perpetuates taking what Lisa Lowe calls the “colonial divisions of humanity” as given. Situating this compartmentalization as a **consequence** of imperial formations calls attention to how, as Lowe writes, “The operations that pronounce colonial divisions of humanity—settler seizure and native removal, slavery and racial dispossession, and racialized expropriations of many kinds—are imbricated processes, not sequential events; they are ongoing and continuous in our contemporary

moment, not temporally distinct now as yet concluded.²⁸ **If the analytic project is reduced to naming and delimiting settler colonialism as a distinct structure of power that exists in specific places,** primarily the settler peripheries of Anglo imperium, **we lose focus on the Caribbean and the Americas as the grounds of modern imperialism, abdicating the hard-won horizon of anti-imperialism.** An emphasis on structure over event is symptomatic of the stabilization of colonial unknowing through binaries and schematic modes of thought. As Wolfe writes, "Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element."²⁹ However, Wolfe's cartographic model is that of the frontier, in which "the primary social division was encompassed in the relation between natives and invaders."³⁰ **The frontier is a linear model, a binary opposition between civilization and savagery, reflecting both a colonizing subjectivity and its state form. What socio-spatial imaginaries, and concomitant critical models, might become visible if we thought from other spatial forms, such as circles or spirals, spatial forms that are often more relevant to indigenous epistemologies than straight lines? If we remapped the colonial condition through circular or spiraling forms, what new insights might we gain on the decolonial imperative?** For one, we might be able to better grasp colonial, racial, and imperial simultaneities, as well as positions that do not easily fit into a settler/native binary. As Wolfe writes, "Settler-colonists came to stay. In the main, they did not send their children back to British schools or retire 'home' before old age could spoil the illusion of their superhumanity. National independence did not entail their departure."³¹ Moreover, to inflect these insights through the lens of negritude produces a considerably more complex set of possibilities, where the verbs **come** and **stay** do not carry any simple or easily recoverable trace of agency or consent.³² As Lyko Day writes, **"the logic of antiblackness complicates a settler colonial binary framed around a central Indigenous/settler opposition."**³³ It may be useful to dissolve the implied divide between structure and event. How would our critical perspective open up if we began to understand (settler) colonialism as a structuring event, an ongoing elaboration of a structure, a suspension of time, tense, and timeliness? In order to interrogate settler colonialism as a unique structuring event or events in a structure of power, close attention to process and relationship, to structures of power as they transform in specific places and times, seems to be a useful approach for clarifying the stakes of decolonial possibility. Marx's insights on the need for capital (and for individual capitalists) to perpetually reproduce the social relations of capitalism (on an expanding scale) and the vulnerable never given-in-advance character of that reproduction, could be relevant for contemplating settler colonialism as it constantly thwarts and undoes its own internal governing logics. **To consider settler colonialism as a structure of failure seems a useful starting point for an intellectual project** that proceeds from the impulse of decolonization.³⁴ To bring the critique of imperialism back to the foreground in indigenous-centered critiques of colonialism is to bring back basic questions about the definitions of these terms, and their relation to each other. This is not about discarding analysis of settler colonialism for analysis of imperialism, but instead about entangling them in order to specify historically particular processes and structures.³⁵ **To the extent that a settler colonial analytic disavows relationships between settler and congruent modes of colonization, imperialism, and race, the field formation of settler colonial studies runs a risk of capture, breathing further life into shifting and mutable colonial sovereignty claims.**

Settler colonialism is a flattening, ahistorical theory that paternalizes Indigenous communities by exalting a utopia. The theory removes nuance and agency from Indigenous peoples and demonizes 99% of the US unproductively. (Walzer 25) [Michael Walzer is a professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study and a former co-editor of Dissent magazine. He is also the author of numerous books, most recently, "The Struggle for a Decent Politics: On 'Liberal' as an Adjective" (Yale University Press). Walzer, M. (2025, February 3). "unsettling ideology": A deep dive into settler colonialism, part I. The Third Narrative.

<https://thirdnarrative.org/unsettling-ideology-a-deep-dive-into-settler-colonialism-part-i/> /] APB ☺

Settler colonialism as an actual historical process is indeed a tale of destruction and death as settlers from Europe displaced and sometimes replaced the native populations of their countries' colonies. The process is well worth studying (and even theorizing) since it has happened again and again in world history. You could say that conquest, settlement, destruction, and death are history's dominant themes. **It turns out,** as Kirsch says, **that all the indigenous people were once settlers themselves: "Every people that occupies a territory took it from another people, who took it from someone else."** Each moment of conquest and settlement is a moment of cruelty on the one hand and suffering on the other. So **we need both a historical account and critical reflection on settler colonialism. But do we also need the militant new ideology that mobilizes opposition to settler colonialism, broadly and ahistorically construed?** Certainly, we must understand it. As Kirsch writes, "The term encapsulates a whole series of ideological convictions—about Israel and Palestine, but also about US history and many social and political

issues, from the environment to gender to capitalism.” **This ideology originated in the academy**, though much of the academic work was ideological from the beginning—calling for a political project. **Something like that project was anticipated in places like post–World War II Algeria, where** the colonial settlers did not replace the native population (which included both long established Berbers and their Arab conquerors, now indigenous together). Instead, a **dominant minority of European settlers, the pieds noirs, ruled over an Algerian majority. So the struggle against the settlers had a fairly democratic character: the goal was popular sovereignty** or, since the majority identified itself as a nation, national liberation. The struggle was brutal on both sides, and it ended with decolonization—the forced departure of the settlers, back to France. **The case of the United States** (not to speak of Australia, Canada, etc.) **is obviously different**, and here radical settler colonial ideology gets tricky. Settlement was a long-term process that virtually eliminated the Native Americans, and the **settlers’ descendants now make up something like 97 percent of the population. So there can’t possibly be a democratic struggle against them**; there certainly can’t be a forced departure. There could be—in fact has been—a liberal struggle for minority rights, but the new ideological militants aren’t interested in that. Indeed, **the establishment of a truly liberal regime, with civil rights for everyone, would be a monumental defeat for the theorists of settler colonialism. For it would mean that the remaining Native Americans had assimilated into the political culture of the settlers, accepting the crumbs of citizenship, giving up on the feast of sovereignty.** “A struggle for equal citizenship,” writes Columbia anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani, “looks like a masked acceptance of final defeat: total colonization.” **So equality is rejected, and then what?** Much of Kirsch’s book is an effort to describe the strangeness of the militants’ politics and to expose the implicit, sometimes explicit, cruelty of their ideological commitment to decolonization. His account of their program for the United States is a revelation even to political obsessives like me. **Who knew about the necessary “relinquishing of settler futurity”? What that means, it turns out, is that only the Native Americans deserve a future.** What twentieth-century American leftist ever imagined, as Eve **Tuck and K. Wayne Yang** insist in a 2012 paper titled “**Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor**,” that justice requires a process that **“would impoverish, not enrich, the 99%+ settler population of the US”**? **Decolonization** is the political opposite of Occupy Wall Street’s project for the 99 percent. It **is in fact a zero-sum game**, in which, Kirsch explains, **“Natives win (land, sovereignty, power) only if settlers [that is, the rest of us] lose.”** But how to bring about that loss? I have already suggested the magnitude of the problem: there are well over three hundred million Americans whom theorists like Tuck and Yang classify as settlers. According to the theory, settlement isn’t something that happened in the past; it is happening right now, and all of “us” are involved: “Invasion is a structure, not an event.” This line from the Australian historian Patrick Wolfe is, Kirsch writes, the central maxim of settler colonial ideology. All of us settlers inhabit the structure and enjoy the advantages it brings. **So I am a settler**, though my grandparents arrived almost three hundred years after the Puritans landed in New England. My maternal grandfather is especially blameworthy, since he “settled” on a farm in Connecticut (with the help of Baron Maurice de Hirsch, a sponsor of poor Jews from Eastern Europe) on land that belonged, and will always belong, to one of the Native American nations. **Black slaves, indigenous in Africa, became settlers when they were brought here, even though they were brought against their will.** Slaves as settlers, as a friend remarked to me, sounds like “a category error.” But **according to the Southern Poverty Law Center, which adheres to the new ideology, Black Americans “benefit from the settler-colonial system as it stands today.”** They, too, are implicated in the structure. Kirsch’s effort to find an answer to that question in the sometimes brutal but always elusive literature of the militants is heroic. In principle, they want all the settlers, all of us, to be gone, or to cede sovereignty to the Native American nations (and live, presumably, as their subjects). As Kirsch sums up a key text: “America is something that should not have happened.” **Calls to “eradicate,” “kill,” or “cull” the settlers are**, Kirsch remarks, “only **metaphorical**,” so there is no need to put a limit on their rhetorical ferocity.” **The ferocity is ever present**, often accompanied by quotes from the Algerian writer Frantz Fanon, which give it a realistic touch. But since there really is nothing to be done, a **radical** critique of “settler ways of being” is the actual politics of the militants here in the US. Their **aim**, Kirsch writes, **“is to deconstruct the social order founded by settler colonialism.”** This “founding” is not the birth of liberty but rather the **origin** and cause **of** everything that is wrong in the US: **“racism, white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, and capitalism”**—that’s the short list; **environmental degradation is the most common addition. As Kirsch dryly notes, how any of these evils occurs in countries without a known history of settler colonialism is a mystery.** The greatest evil is genocide—which is an ongoing process, begun by the original settlers and continued by their heirs. **Pretty much everything that today’s settlers do**—that we do—**is effectively genocidal. Even efforts at reconciliation**, writes Lorenzo Veracini, contribute to “the extinction of otherwise irreducible forms of alterity.” **The examples of cultural and material genocide that militant theorists provide—the creation of national parks, industrial farming, the offer of citizenship and equality—suggest how easy it is to define genocide down.** Mockery seems the obvious response to those who would put Yosemite in the same category as Auschwitz, but the argument about genocide gets uglier when its focus shifts from the United States to Israel. **Since the ideology of settler colonialism demands a politics that can’t be acted out**, at least not in the US, **it is best understood**, Kirsch argues, **as a political theology.** Here I will have to simplify an especially rich analysis. Settlement is the original sin, or, better, the settlers’ insatiable desire for more land, more wealth, more power is the original sin. All the evils of exploitation, racism, misogyny, and homophobia follow from the everlasting settler moment. Redemption comes only with decolonization: some secular mix of a return to Eden and the advent of the messianic age. **The picture of life before settlement is idyllic. The Native Americans lived in a society of**

equals, at peace with their neighbors, at home in the natural world. They understood the cues that nature provides for a harmonious life. Exactly what comes after decolonization is harder to describe. The world will be idyllic again, transformed, much as it might be after the messiah comes or after the Communist revolution.

Settler Colonialism as a theory of the world is wrong! (Davies 24) [Historical Materialism. (2024, April 21). The world turned outside in - historical materialism.

<https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/article/the-world-turned-outside-in/>] APB ☺

Patrick Wolfe's formulation of settler colonialism – in his monograph of 1999 – staked the analytic distinction of the settler colony and the settler colonial relation on the fact that settler societies did not make regular use of the labour of indigenous peoples, but instead sought to access and secure land. The settler colony was thus organised around an imperative to **eliminate** rather than **exploit** indigenous peoples, where "elimination" concentrates a diverse strategic arsenal, from outright genocide to cunning policies of recognition and assimilation. Wolfe first articulated this "logic of elimination" – which Lorenzo Veracini considers a "discovery" analogous to that of the difference between bacteria and viruses – in 1994 in the context of Australia. [15] It is unlikely that Wolfe, in the 1990s, envisaged the development of "settler colonial studies" as an academic paradigm. But he remains undoubtedly its most famous practitioner and he participated avidly in its subsequent growth, including its application to twentieth-century Palestine. [16] The settler colony's unique immunity to the withdrawal of indigenous labour upsets the Hegelian machinations of French anti-colonial and critical theory, as well as the myriad formulations of postcolonial theory. In Wolfe's hands, the settler is, by and large, **independent** of the native, standing in an unanalysed form of contiguity or co-presence, and characterised by a one-sided will to eliminate. [17] Native and settler are, strictly, in a relation of neither domination or exploitation, and all clever dialectical reversals are thus blocked in advance. [18] This fundamental and material feature of the settler colony – its structuring around indigenous land rather than indigenous labour – pushed Wolfe in 1999 to elevate the significance of ideology in struggles across the settler colonial relation. In the settler-colonial economy, it is not the colonist but the native who is superfluous. This means that the sanctions practically available to the native are ideological ones. In settler-colonial formations, in other words, ideology has a higher systemic weighting – it looms larger, as it were – than in other colonial formations. [19] Hence the remainder of this book: largely a critique of anthropological studies of Indigenous Australians. Wolfe does not adopt an Althusserian, or similar, notion of ideology, which would seek to alert us to the "imaginary relation" we have to our "real conditions of existence." The "level of ideology" (Wolfe's phrase) seems to indicate instead forms of discursive struggle above or distinct from an economic or material level, if such levels could be said to bear any determinate relation to one another in his work. [20] One has the sense that Wolfe's reversion to ideology as the level of struggle in the settler colony is a desperate move, betrayed in the confession that 'for the native, ideology is all there is.' [21] This would appear to suggest that what we might call "real conditions" in the settler colony do not admit the possibility of other forms of struggle for the native. But the lack of a dependent labour relation, in and of itself, does not imply (and much less necessitates) an exemplary role for ideology. This overhasty conclusion points to an original gap in the theory, a problem with the paradigm. And it requires a richer and more historical political economy to fill – specifically, one that is capable of entertaining determinants beyond the form of exploitation in the immediate production process. [22] Indeed, the immediate process of production between exploiter and exploited is here a façade for an undeveloped phenomenological (non-) encounter between settler and native, one with properly ethical rather than political or economic dimensions. In a later article for the **Journal of Genocide Research**, Wolfe sutures the material gap in his theory with the fantastic concept, primitive accumulation. This article, distinguishing between genocidal events and the eliminatory logic of settler colonialism, became the most influential statement of the major coordinates of settler colonial studies and by far its most cited work. Here, Wolfe maintains the missing dependent relation between settlers and indigenous peoples as the foundational distinction of the settler colony from other colonial formations. However, this time he does not therefore locate struggle fundamentally on the level of ideology. Instead, Wolfe substitutes notions of primitive accumulation and dispossession for the absent relation of labour and capital to characterise the situation of the settler colony. The logic of the settler colony, as before, is 'premised on the securing – the obtaining and the maintaining – of territory.' Now, a structural notion of dispossession – specifically, **ongoing** primitive accumulation – is required for its analysis. [23] The problem thus substantively shifts from the level of ideology to the material fact of dispossession, understood, once again, as structure rather than event. This move foregrounds the **historical** processes that drove the colonisation across the frontiers of the New World – what Wolfe calls, 'a primitive accumulation' – while maintaining the 'sustained duration' of settler colonialism as one of its defining features. [24] The problem, now, is to bring the analysis forward to the present configuration: how to argue for the ongoing significance of this inside-outside dialectic as a structuring feature in a much-changed world, one without a territorial "outside" to capitalism. Wolfe, and settler

colonial studies more broadly, sidesteps this central and historical question by inverting, on the level of theory, the historical processes of settlement. Colonisation, according to settler colonial studies, resolved intractable problems in the metropole by turning the world inside out, deferring internal contradictions and class conflict by displacing them abroad, to the outside. (This is, of course, the rudimentary Marxian theory of imperialism.) The critical move in the literature is then to present the contemporary world as now folded back in, a world permeated and structured by the "logics" of settler colonialism.[25] On this account, the deeper dynamics that drove the colonisation of the New World still obtain; they are, on the authority of Rosa Luxemburg and David Harvey, permanent features of capitalism. (Indeed, we should observe the publication of Harvey's influential book, **The New Imperialism**, between these two works by Patrick Wolfe.) **Capitalism, we read, perpetually requires an "outside" for its expanded reproduction.** The incorporation of this manifold outside into capital's interior is the purview of primitive accumulation, or as Harvey rechristens it, accumulation by dispossession.[26] Ben Fine demonstrated years ago in this journal that the theory of crisis propelling the "new" imperialism – what Harvey calls, "overaccumulation" – amounts ultimately to a generalisation of Luxemburg's widely rebuked underconsumptionist crisis theory. **Accumulation by dispossession is the corresponding generalisation of primitive accumulation.**[27] Harvey's argument in **The New Imperialism** for capital's permanent reliance on an "outside," and his commitment to 'take this 'inside-outside' dialectic seriously,' does not engage the many refutations of Luxemburg's revisions of Marx's reproduction schemas.[28] Nor, certainly, does settler colonial studies, for whom this is an unquestioned, even dogmatic, point of departure. Settler colonial studies, accepting as true this image of capitalist crisis and reproduction, teaches that the processes that unfolded on the frontier and in the settler colony – so many instances of "primitive accumulation" – are now permeating the whole world. Capitalism's ongoing dependence on an "outside" apparently bespeaks its ongoing need for settler colonialism, which, now mediated by "accumulation by dispossession," can stand in for such loose abstractions as financialisation and privatisation. Lorenzo Veracini thus argues that settler colonialism 'has gone global,' that we inhabit a worldwide 'settler-colonial present.' [29] This is the settler colonial studies version of the "colonial laboratory" or "boomerang effect," beloved of twentieth-century European critical theory.[30] **The global claims of settler colonial studies thus stand upon an uncritical incorporation of** David Harvey's **analysis** of contemporary global capitalism and the prevailing role of "accumulation by dispossession" therein. Next, settler colonial studies recognises the structures of its own object mirrored in those of the "new imperialism" or "neoliberal regime," as laid out in Harvey's account. This is sometimes as facile as the presence, in each, of the word, "dispossession," and the claim that both processes are "structural" (not eventual) or "ongoing" (not past). The crudest versions of this, such as those of Nicholas Brown and Veracini, proceed along arguments of formal analogy situated on the level of the theory itself, making at best weak gestures towards underlying material conditions or historical causation. Brown, for instance, seeking to advance a notion of "settler accumulation," begins with a survey of existing literature on settler colonialism and primitive accumulation. For the journal, **Settler Colonial Studies**, he writes: 'Like settler colonialism, today primitive accumulation, more often than not, is theorised as a structure, not an event.' [31] The analogy rises to a higher level as Brown addresses the relationship between these two concepts: they are, we read, 'dialectically intertwined.' The argument for this assertion seems to be simply that David Harvey connects accumulation by dispossession and expanded reproduction in these terms. Brown, once more: David Harvey insists that... 'the two aspects of expanded reproduction and accumulation by dispossession are organically linked, dialectically intertwined.' Arguably, the same could be said of primitive accumulation and settler colonialism. The similar manner in which the two processes have been theorized in recent decades may just be a coincidence. More likely, it reflects the extent to which the ongoing processes are 'dialectically intertwined.' [32] It is enough, then, that certain tendencies exist in the literature to justify tendencies in the literature. Veracini, with Gabriel Piterberg, endorses this argument by theoretical analogy, agreeing with Brown that **settler colonialism and primitive accumulation are 'essentially alike,' and share an 'organic bond.'** [33] Four years later, in the pages of **Rethinking Marxism**, Veracini suggests that the global "settler-colonial present" is anchored by what he calls 'accumulation without reproduction.' This spin-off from Harvey, we learn, is a 'mode of domination that **resembles** settler colonialism.' [34] Beneath the dizzying conceptual proliferation, Veracini's basic move, like Brown, is to approximate **dispossession** and **elimination**, where the first corresponds to Harvey's overcapacious notion and the second to Wolfe's term of art for the specific logic of the settler colony. [35] This approximation of dispossession and elimination is established principally by their shared opposition to exploitation – or, their shared position **outside** exploitation in the labour process. [36] A type of dispossession that is fundamentally informed by a 'logic of elimination' or containment **rather than exploitation** is analogous to what indigenous peoples up against expanding settler-colonial regimes have faced and are facing. [37] This, for Veracini, would secure the logic of settler colonialism as the predominant global mode of domination. However, and even on the evidence of his own article, **these concepts do far more work to subsume the specificities of the settler colony, historical and present. The colonization and settlement of indigenous lands suddenly 'resembles' financialisation and privatisation.** 'The current 'abdication' of the state in order to pursue and defend private property begs the question [sic] of a possible return to 'frontier' arrangements.' [38] Begging the question, indeed. This theoretical move to generalise settler colonial phenomena in the present, even when its claims are not quite so sensational, would hope to achieve a dialectical inversion whereby the erstwhile particular, marginal, or exceptional moment becomes the universal mode that it always already was. [39] However, the net effect is a feedback to the settler colony that dilutes its analytic specificity, especially the much-touted primacy of land. This projection of a particular Australian paradigm onto world history is not only self-evidently inadequate to the latter, but compromises study of the former as well, emptying it of all but a metaphysical settler will, an indomitable logic of elimination. The principal concept mediating this theoretical pivot between the Australian settler colony and global capitalism, as we have seen, is Marx's notion of so-called primitive accumulation, as renovated by Luxemburg and particularly by Harvey. **The critique of settler colonial studies requires, therefore, a critique of this theoretical trend.**

Settler Colonialism is a retreat from politics into moral virtue signaling (Berkowitz 24) [Center, H. A. (2024, February 10). Ideology, settler colonialism and moral derangement. Medium.

<https://medium.com/humanities-for-the-people/ideology-settler-colonialism-and-moral-derangement-bd6fcc9ceaa8>] APB ☺

What reminded me of Critchley's work — beyond the focus on indigenous peoples as the subject of politics — is how Kirsch describes settler colonialism as a systemic and continuing event, one that therefore leads to a moralized politics, a politics of protest, of outrage. Since every state is a settler colonial state — the United States, Italy, Brazil, China, and Russia are all states with settler colonial histories — **a settler colonialist politics is fundamentally moral rather than political. It operates on a simple innocent and guilty matrix that sees every existing state as guilty and everything before it as blessedly innocent. Settler colonial politics is** outraged by this reality, and **incapable of seeing these states as the accomplishment of dreams for self-determination and collective action by their people over generations and centuries. These states are facts and are not going anywhere simply because there were once people who lived in these places before them. Settler colonialism is not just, but neither is it necessarily unjust. There is something simplistic about** immediately imagining **every state to be evil simply because it is not eternal.** And in such a context **calls for decolonization are either meaningless or mere ethical performances rather than political actions. They nurture a politics of outraged protest at the injustices of the world rather than a real politics that addresses the world as it is.** We see this in the United States and in Australia where so much effort is put into incorporating land acknowledgements that yield little of political substance **The critique of settler colonialism believes itself to be**, as Kirsch writes, “morally **impeccable because it is grounded in . . . indignation at violence and oppression, hope for freedom and equality.**” It is grounded in outrage. **But for this very reason, it “contains all the elements needed for moral derangement: the permanent division of the world into innocent people and guilty people; the belief that history can be fixed once and for all, if violence is applied in the right way; the idea that the world is a battlefield and everyone is a combatant, whether they realize it or not.” What is so unsettling about the critique of settler colonialism is not simply its anti-political retreat into moral righteousness. More dangerous still is the elevation of all so-called indigenous people to be in some way more pure, more deserving, and more innocent than so-called settlers.** The ideology at the bottom of the critique of **settler colonialism forgoes self-determination in the name of a righteous embrace and unshakeable exculpation of whomever is seen to be a displaced indigenous person.** The elevation of one people as morally superior to another is, quite simply, a form of ideological racism. As Kirsch writes, the “Nazi slogan ‘blood and soil’ conveyed the idea that German land could only truly belong to its primeval inhabitants.” And all manner of terror was justified, by an outraged Nazism, in securing that land for such inhabitants. Similarly, the settler colonial ideology frames and thus defends the violence of Hamas “in terms of indigenous rights and redemptive violence.”

Settler colonialism is an original sin theory that precludes progress and manufactures outrage. Colonization is not strictly Western nor is it new. Condemning all state action because of the past existence of colonies places us on a political treadmill. (Clarke 25) [Clarke, O. (2025, February 18). The immoral myths of “Settler Colonialism.” Modern Age. <https://modernagejournal.com/the-immoral-myths-of-settler-colonialism/246780/>]

We can see from the above that theorists of settler colonialism take the Marxian view that their job is not only to study society but to change “material realities”; they hope to dismantle the familiar mélange of “structures” that those who identify as progressives typically claim to oppose. But how do these theorists actually define what settler colonialism is? According to Patrick Wolfe's much-cited description, settler colonialism is itself a “structure,” since “invasion is a structure not an event.” Wolfe's point is that in contrast to ordinary colonialism—where small numbers of colonizers administer a foreign land, usually for the purpose of pilfering raw materials and exploiting native labor, and typically leave after some number of years—settlers “came to stay.” **Nations such as Australia, the United States, and Canada were established by settlers for settlers, and their founding entailed the violent dispossession, and even genocide, of the native populations in those lands. There is, of course,**

much to be said for that description of the founding of these nations. It could be added, however, that such is the unfortunate history of almost all nations, which is why countless historical civilizations have ceased to exist. "Man to man is an arrant wolf," as Thomas Hobbes wrote centuries ago. History is a catalog of criminality. Western civilization, however, is the first to have become conscious of the criminal nature of its historical crimes. This is a good thing because it gives humanity an opportunity to create a future that is not shaped by criminality. Yet instead, on account of their historical illiteracy, many settler colonial theorists imagine that Western societies, which are invariably their targets, are uniquely deserving of condemnation. As Kirsch points out, there is a gaping chasm in settler colonial "scholarship" where non-Western societies are concerned. None of the activist-scholars seem to have noticed, for instance, how successfully the Arabs expanded throughout the Middle East and North Africa, or what that meant for the Berbers, or countless other groups whose "indigeneity" these academics would undoubtedly champion if only their way of life had been uprooted by Western civilization. Those who can be shown to have been the victims of Western societies are lifted out of history and placed into some mythical golden age said to have existed before the "settlers" arrived. Kirsch compares one theorist's evasions about violence perpetrated by Pequot Indians and Narragansetts with the work of a historical authority on the Pequot War, concluding that the "difference between history and settler colonial studies is that the former is primarily interested in the past, while the latter is primarily interested in using a story about the past to change the present." Thus Native Americans must be painted as having lived in a "relatively disease-free paradise" where "wealthy peoples" lived "long and well" and where wars were merely ceremonial affairs "resulting in few deaths." We have, of course, read these kinds of fantastical portraits of distant societies before. This is the language of the Soviet enthusiasts of the 1930s. Taking their lead from Wolfe's "structure" definition, successive theorists have maintained that "settler" status is hereditary, so that it belongs not only to the founders of such societies but to all of their descendants (as well as anyone who joins the society through immigration). Under the influence of the ideas of these theorists, high-profile anti-racism organizations such as the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) have announced that "Understanding settler-colonialism means understanding that all non-indigenous people are settler-colonizers, whether they were born here or not." The SPLC adds that black Americans whose ancestors were trafficked to the United States as slaves also "benefit from the settler-colonial system." As Kirsch notes, this is a "political theory of original sin. Settler colonialism means that the violence involved in a nation's founding continues to define every aspect of its life." It also means that the only historical suffering deserving of recognition—and, presumably, redress—is that suffered by "natives."

Perms

Perm works! Indigenous people have spoken up about wanting a seat at the table. Arctic co-operation between indigenous people and the US fed government is both popular and an example of the alt. (Hacharek 25)

[From Nagruk Hacharek, President of the Voice of Arctic Iñupiat, Anchorage, AK, US. Letter: Iñupiat demand say in development of Alaska's oil and gas. (2025, February 24). Financial Times.

<https://www.ft.com/content/5f0f72e9-30e9-4865-8d19-c7180fb43e3a>] APB ☺

In the Energy Source newsletter, "Will Trump unleash Alaska's oil and gas?" (FT.com, February 13), **Alexandra White overlooks the most important voice in the national conversation about energy and resource development policy in Alaska: the Indigenous communities whose lands, local economies, and traditions will be most impacted** by federal policies.

As a result, many Americans do not understand that **as Alaska's North Slope Iñupiat we support an economic development process of frequent consultations and engagements with elected leaders about our land.** The North Slope Iñupiat have stewarded their land that now includes the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (NPR-A) and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) homelands, for over 10,000 years. Today, four of our eight communities are the only villages located in the NPR-A and one, Kaktovik, is the sole village within ANWR's 19mn-acre expanse. Just like our ancestors, we use our lands to sustain our communities and culture, and we understand them better than anyone. Yet our voices and self-determination are frequently overlooked by those with no connection to our lands or people. This omission can generate significant real-world consequences for the North Slope Iñupiat. **More than 95 per cent of our region's tax base is derived from the taxation of resource development infrastructure — not output — and is used to fund essential modern services.** This includes amenities that are ubiquitous to the "Lower 48" — as the contiguous US is called — but have only recently arrived on the North Slope, including modern water and sewer systems, schools, health clinics, and wildlife research and management departments to preserve our subsistence resources for future generations. The impact of these services has been profound. **In 1969, our average life expectancy was just 34 years. Today, we can expect to live to an average of 77 years. This is one of the largest increases of its kind in the US and is due in large part to the economic benefits of development projects in our region.** **President Trump's executive order to "unleash" energy production on the North Slope is a positive step in the right direction.** However, **it is important that the administration works collaboratively with the North Slope Iñupiat to build durable policy solutions** providing long-term stability for our economy, communities and culture. **The only way to achieve this is by listening to our Indigenous voices, by including us at the policymaking table, and unleashing our Iñupiaq self-determination in our homelands.**

Poverty is detrimental to native communities—piecemeal reform is key to materially improve native lives

Baloy 2014 (Nicole J.K., B.A. Honours, Eastern Michigan University, 2006 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 2008; SPECTACLE, SPECTRALITY, AND THE EVERYDAY: SETTLER COLONIALISM, ABORIGINAL ALTERITY, AND INCLUSION IN VANCOUVER, <https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0166915>)

According to the Working Together project's Community-Led Libraries Toolkit (2008:12), **"Mount Pleasant is characterized by a higher-than-average level of poverty, with the most recent census data suggesting that just over one-third of the community are low-income households...** In Mount Pleasant, **poverty creates the exclusion that defines many community members' lives. The neighbourhood is also undergoing rapid change as parts of the community gentrify."** Community development librarians adopted a "community-led approach" to build relationships with socially excluded communities in Mount Pleasant. They worked closely with street-involved youth (many of them Aboriginal) at the Broadway Youth Resource Centre, with recently released prisoners at a halfway house run by the John Howard Society, and with Aboriginal community members at the Native Education College. **Around the same time as the Working Together project, the library received a private donation to purchase books to enhance the branch's Aboriginal Collection.** The community librarian in charge of developing the collection

used tools and techniques from the Working Together toolkit to consult with Aboriginal people at the Native Education College, the Broadway Youth Resource Centre, and the Vancouver Aboriginal Friendship Centre. Other examples of the public library's efforts to enhance their Aboriginal community development and programming include the First Nations Storyteller-in-Residence program and National Aboriginal Day events (see Chapter 8), as well as the ongoing development of the Aboriginal Collection (see Chapter 6). These myriad **efforts toward Aboriginal "inclusion" thus ground my decision to conduct participant observation** and interviews with staff and patrons at the Mount Pleasant Library. I was interested in the library as a site of both conventional and social learning. I aimed to explore how non-Aboriginal participants experienced the increasing attention to Aboriginal participation in the social life of the library, as well as how they perceived and used the additional Aboriginal informational resources. Did patrons use the Aboriginal Collection? Did they meet or encounter Aboriginal people at the library? Did staff learn about Aboriginal people in the neighbourhood through the branch's community development efforts? I wanted to know if Joan Andersen's comment "libraries can make a difference" applied to issues of settler colonialism and challenging relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. What role did the library play in providing access to written and human resources for learning about Aboriginality? What role did it play as a meeting ground for non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal community members? **the library's location in the Mount Pleasant neighbourhood, with a higher proportion of Aboriginal residents than many other parts of the city**, also contributed to my decision to locate my study there. Furthermore, as I mentioned in the introduction, I lived in Mount Pleasant and endeavoured to situate myself in the processes I intended to analyse; indeed, many of my research interests and questions emerged through my daily interactions with people and place in the neighbourhood.

Perm do both – we can form collaborative alliances around the plan – the alt isn't mutually exclusive – everyone must be involved for success
Svirsky, lecturer in international studies at the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, 2014

[Marcelo, July 29, Taylor and Francis Online, "On the study of collaborative struggles in settler societies", <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/2201473X.2014.911648>, Accessed: 7-11-18, GDI LNM]

Patrick Wolfe claims that binarism is our shared historical positionality in settler societies. As I have stated in the introduction to this special issue, the history and political relevance of empirical binarism are indisputable.¹ **To refute binarism is in more ways than one to deny that a predatory settler structure has been forced on Native peoples**. Therefore, as Wolfe insists, the repudiation of binarism may well be complicit with the settler logic of elimination, regardless of whether that repudiation comes from a critique of settlerism.² Only that binarism in settler societies is not necessarily a tree that one either must idolise or bark at. A narrow array of assumptions originates this false choice. As Wolfe proves by way of his own anti-settlerism, the recognition of empirical binarism does not necessarily align our position with the Euro-racial attitudes of the doctrine of discovery. On the other hand, as I show in this paper, **a critical attitude towards the binary principle does not necessarily reflect a conspiratory desire to assimilate the Native** as a way to complete the settlerist project. The question is whether or not, by dethroning the principle from its conceptual and affective primacy, the logics of elimination remains uninterrupted. In other words, binarism invites for positions. By 'binarising' binarism and its repudiation in one dialectical stroke, Wolfe takes his moral attitude towards settler colonialism into safe grounds, as if saying – I cannot be fingered as doubting settler maliciousness (or in Wolfe's own words, 'I have regularly been accused of binarism – though not once by a Native').³ The virtue of Wolfe's argument is that it offers a way of escaping from the coercion to choose between binarism and its repudiation: 'In addition to characterising the past and the present, however, does our recognition of the structural continuity of settler colonialism predetermine the future?' he notes.⁴ My answer to this question is that binarism's structural continuity does not preclude the future, and more specifically, it does not prevent the emergence of non-settlerist collective forms, however fragile these forms were or are. I define these forms of collectivity as 'collaborative alliances', and the struggles led by them as 'collaborative struggles'. **Transcending settlerism is about taking its vital organs – its logics, laws, institutions, and everyday practices – and the relationships between them back into the workshop of history, to remake the body of society**.⁵ Defining them as struggles highlights their minoritarian position in society, as forms that either never reached in the past the necessary maturity and intensity to face the expanding predation of settler machines, or as forms that strive in the present with great difficulty to offer alternative modes of being in specific social spheres. There is something empirically erroneous in Wolfe's rhetorical question I quoted above. Though it makes room to imagine alternatives in the future, the past and present are given as if nothing new can be said about them. As a history yet to be coherently written, the case of Zionist settlerism is very telling. Researchers have reported of collaborative alliances, of shared life between Palestinian and Jews forged in Ottoman times,⁶ maintained during the British Mandate,⁷ and,

importantly, sustained even during the very days of the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in 1948.⁸ Henry Reynolds offers such a reading of Australian settlerism in this special issue. Acknowledging the empirical coexistence of binarism and collaborative alliances is not a misrecognition of the former,⁹ as long as the idea of collaborative alliances does not become synonymous with hybridity,¹⁰ or is articulated in ways that blur the fleshy accuracy of settlerist asymmetries. Because it carries a conceptual and affective abuse of history, it is the political misuse of empirical binarism which needs to be challenged. The indisputability of negative binarism as a persistent structural production of settler societies explains the landscapes of our collective memory and it shapes the horizons of our political dispositions, but it does not compel the hermetic obturation of war machines striving to substitute settlerism. To welcome such a view is tantamount to give up on political imagination. An emblematic way to depict collaborative alliances in settler societies is in terms of the joint action of indigenous and non-indigenous bodies, seen as distinct, or unmixed. In this reading of the politics of alliances, the public visibility of dark and white skins assembling together is perceived as what unsettles the segregative harmony of settler-colonial landscapes. Seeming to invert the settlerist logic of segregation, such an account of alliances reflects in fact the persistence of binarism. The bricks and mortar of this approach to collaborative alliances are thought of as the same oppositional beings that were created during, and define the sad livelihood of the settler conflict. The histories and presents of dispossession and oppression motivate the constitution of these alliances, and naturally so, but also, their dynamics tend to affix the alliance to passions stressing belongings, not just as a residue of binarism but in fact as a strong expression of insistence to conserve it – perhaps to maintain it as a familiar segregative territory into where to retreat from the alliance. It is as if these sorts of collaborative alliances are assembled – at their midst – with a way out. More exactly, the way back into strict binarism haunts every corner of the alliance with temptation. Its seductive weapons are the passions of belongingness. Conceptually, we use to wrap those passions with the idea of identity. Hence, Wolfe's 'dissenting positionality'¹¹ that settlerism immanently creates takes no prisoners, pervading also the thinking and practice of its opposite, the anti-colonial struggle.

Alt Fails

Decol is an academic buzzword that has been rendered to empty jargon that never solves (Larsen 23) [Neil Larsen is emeritus professor in comparative literature at the University of California, Davis, and works on Marxism, critical theory, Latin American literature, and politics. The reactionary jargon of decoloniality. (2023, December 29). <https://jacobin.com/2023/12/walter-mignolo-politics-of-decolonial-investigations-review-decoloniality-postcolonialism-academic-jargon-universalism>] APB ☺

Yet **slogans built around the terms “decolonial” and “decolonize” may** in certain instances **be traceable to “decoloniality,”** despite its being the more narrowly academic term of art — and even to a Spanish original, “decolonialidad.” It may not be possible to be certain about this, but we likely owe such a possible crossover in significant part to the critic and scholar Walter D. Mignolo. Occupying an endowed chair at Duke University, **Mignolo is without doubt the most frequently cited authority in the current explosion of scholarship proclaiming political and theoretical allegiance to decoloniality.** A native of Argentina initially trained as a scholar of both semiotics and Latin American literature of the colonial period, Mignolo credits the late Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano with introducing the concept of decoloniality — here in relation to Quijano’s theory of the “colonial matrix of power” (originally “la colonialidad del poder”), purportedly first articulated in his 1991 article “Colonialidad y modernidad / racionalidad” (“[Coloniality and Modernity / Rationality](#)”). In

Mignolo’s numerous writings, stretching as far back as 1995’s [The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, & Colonization](#) and comprising his 2000 monograph, [Local Histories / Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking](#), decoloniality has

either yet to make its literal appearance or has still not assumed its currently commandeering discursive position. Up until Mignolo’s 2011 book, [The Darker Side of Western Modernity](#), first preference is still being given to earlier coinages, such as Mignolo’s erstwhile favorite, “post-Occidentalism,” and to the by then (and still) ubiquitous “border thinking. In all the iterations of Mignolo’s high-visibility theorizing, however, the allegedly subversive, de-Westernizing thrust of what is now an officially trademarked decoloniality is traced back to a point long predating the near-contemporary inception of its jargon. Its origins purportedly go all the way back to the beginnings of the European penetration, conquest, and colonization of the Americas, Africa, and southern and eastern Asia in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. As such, **what is claimed to be the subversive power of contemporaneous decoloniality is already said to reside in an indigenous, non-European decolonial resistance** — a resistance to which Europe’s first colonial exploits assuredly did give rise. **Whatever the truth and whatever the terminology currently affixed to and projected back onto them, the social and political legacy and importance of such historical struggles are often ignored and underplayed. But in lieu of their deeper historical analysis, what prevails** in Mignolo’s work **is** what I will refer to as **the mere jargon of decoloniality, often descending into outright bombast.**⁷ This is certainly true of Mignolo’s most recent book in English. [The Politics of Decolonial](#)

[Investigations](#) (hereafter **PDCI**) is a newly introduced collection of fourteen previously published and evidently somewhat revised essays and articles totaling well over five hundred pages. With near-total uniformity, consistency, and monotony, it reads as a loop of quasi-ritualized, self-repeating, almost incantatory terms and phrases that, in their sheer vertiginous range and repetitiveness, parody a genuine theoretical system. Quijano, celebrated here as a kind of oracle —

hailing, as we are repeatedly reminded, from the **“South American Andes”** (my emphasis) — is credited by Mignolo with the exposure of an all-pervasive, Western, and Eurocentric “colonial matrix of power” (CMP). To this, **an opposing “decolonial option” is held out to those of us prepared — or culturally or ethnically predisposed — to “delink,”** i.e., practice “epistemic disobedience.” In response to anyone rude enough to observe the intra-academic boundaries of **decoloniality**, its **jargon becomes especially thick, casuistical, and imperious.** Mignolo invokes “the knowing of everyday living in communities for whom academic, scholarly, and scientific knowledge is perfectly irrelevant” — **leaving the reader to wonder, meanwhile, just how much “decolonial theory” these “communities” themselves are reading . . . or formulating.** But Mignolo is careful to stipulate that “delinking from Western

epistemology and aesthetics doesn't equate with delinking from the institutions." Decoloniality must be "introduced" into the latter (not **re**-linked?) but "carefully to avoid tainting [it] with academicism." While conceding that "**decoloniality could be fashionably consumed,**" **PDCI**, like Britain's legendary King Cnut but without the latter's irony or humility, commands the tides to recede: "the political tasks of decolonial work **shall not be distracted** by its fashionable consumption." **Exercising the decolonial option further activates an impressively obfuscatory array of official decolonial neologisms**, too overlapping, idiosyncratic, and numbingly baroque to catalogue fully here. But the latter follow a consistent and garish pattern formed by the purely terminological correspondences, often redundant variations, and pro forma substitutions that should be familiar to anyone reluctantly exposed to many modern intellectual and academic jargons. Thus, the **Westernization said to be antithetical to decoloniality gives us not only a corresponding "de-Westernization" but even** a subsequent, explicitly counterreformational danger of **"re-Westernization."** Still more: effectively synonymous with decoloniality and de-Westernization is something Mignolo dubs, in hushed tones, "the Third Nomos the Earth" — an ironic and telling spin-off from **Carl Schmitt**. But surely **the most revealing feature of the jargon of decoloniality are PDCI's pontificating instructions to the reader as to the genuine, full meaning** — epochal, eschatological, and bordering on the cosmic — **of nothing more than a change of prefixes.** Encountering such extremes of rhetorical swagger and display brings to mind ***The Jargon of Authenticity***, Theodor Adorno's scathing and still timely critical exposé of the debasement of language in the German existentialist philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers — described at one point as a jargon determined "by whether the individual words are loaded at the expense of the sentence, its propositional force, and the thought content." Setting aside the question of whether in **PDCI** and the Mignolo-esque jargon of decoloniality there still remains much, if any, sentence-level thought content available for sacrifice to the cult force of individual words, **Mignolo here rests the very future of humanity on the variables of a linguistically subatomic level — on the difference between the "de-" and the "post-"**

Decol is a tool of academia based in ideology that obscures the material considerations of reality (Smith) [*Blake Smith is a historian of modern France and a literary translator. Smith, B., & Smith, B. (2021, April 16). The myths of decolonization. Washington Examiner - Political News and Conservative Analysis About Congress, the President, and the Federal Government.*

<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/politics/1895505/the-myths-of-decolonizati-on/>] APB ☺

In its popular usage, **the rhetoric of decolonization tends to give otherwise trivial acts of self-assertion an aura of political importance, turning commonplace interactions among people from different backgrounds into sites of intercommunal struggle for recognition and power.** In his book *Decolonizing the Republic*, Felix Germain of the University of Pittsburgh uses "decolonization" as a catchall to describe nearly any exercise of agency by black people living in France. In a particularly ridiculous example, he describes how a Senegalese immigrant "decolonized social relations" and "notions of African identity" by responding with a sassy joke to a Frenchman who assumed she did not speak French. But **the work of scholars such as Germain does not merely provide ideological support for the pseudo-politicization of everyday life. It also contributes to the myth that 20th-century decolonization should serve as a political model and source of moral capital for the present — despite its often violent and intolerant consequences. This myth rests on a whitewashed image of what historical decolonization actually entailed.** For instance, Darcie Fontaine, in her book *Decolonizing Christianity*, described how a small number of French settlers in colonial Algeria tried "to decouple — or decolonize — Christian institutions from the ... colonial state." Some of these Christians contributed to the victory of the Algerian rebels, the National Liberation Front, in the war against France. After Algerian independence in 1962, Fontaine argued, these Christians had a unique opportunity to discover "exactly what Christianity could be without the structures of colonialism to prop it up," as their "role in society" was "fundamentally transformed." Their "role in society" was, indeed, "fundamentally transformed," but not in a way that would appeal to U.S. academics. The vast majority of Christians and Jews fled Algeria on the eve of independence under the threat of murder by the FLN. Those who remained were subjected to cultural and often physical repression. Algeria's postcolonial government, after a brief revolutionary honeymoon during which thousands of foreign idealists came to Algeria, broke with the international Left, drove out the activists, and intensified both the Islamization and "Arabization" of Algerian culture, suppressing minority religions and languages. Then, in the 1990s, a civil war between the government and Islamic radicals put Christians in the crossfire. One of the most notorious incidents of violence came in 1996, when seven Trappist monks were kidnapped from the Atlas Abbey of Tibhirine and beheaded. It remains unclear whether the attack was carried out by the rebels or the government. Fontaine, however, excuses violence against Algerian Christians. She argued that "Christians who remain in Algeria" acknowledge that the real threat comes from "Christians themselves," who incite their own persecution at the hands of the Muslim majority — by, for example, publicly displaying crosses. Such gestures, Fontaine insists, "echo the troubled history of colonial Christianity." Similar **one-sided appeals to colonial**

history are commonplace in U.S. academia and featured notably in the professoriate's ambivalent response to the jihadist massacre of the *Charlie Hebdo* staff. The resulting framework for analyzing current events is as disturbing as it is familiar: For those categorized as "oppressors" within the hegemonic "woke" framework, any action or speech is at least implicitly violent, while real violence against them by members of "oppressed" groups – even when, as in independent Algeria, they constitute a demographic majority wielding state power – can be justified, minimized, or ignored. But this framework, which presents itself as offering "context" for the present, ignores the most uncomfortable continuities between the colonial era and our own. In his 2005 book *The French Imperial Nation-State*, the historian Gary Wilder revealed that in the mid-20th century, both French colonial officials trying to preserve the empire and colonized activists trying to abolish it confronted a common problem. Both groups, on the one hand, spoke the language of universal human rights derived from the French republican tradition, arguing, respectively, that the colonial empire was granting or denying those rights. But both also argued that colonized populations had distinct cultures worthy of preservation. The officials invoked this argument to explain why the colonized could not yet be given full rights as French citizens, while the activists used it to explain why colonialism must end. The contradictory logic of the colonial state Wilder showed, created an equally contradictory anti-colonialism. Activists such as Frantz Fanon, one of the most visible propagandists of the FLN and an important inspiration for many campus activists today, hesitated between attacking colonialism for denying the colonized their universal human rights and for destroying the specificity of their culture. While some of the FLN's most left-wing and cosmopolitan ideologues saw the "national liberation" struggle as part of a larger project of universal human emancipation, by the mid-1960s, these idealists had been liquidated by the leaders of independent Algeria, who, faced with the challenges of building a state, settled on the repression of minorities and dissidents as the path of least resistance. Rather than making good on the colonial state's promises of universal human rights, decolonization in Algeria led to the creation of an authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, religiously intolerant regime. U.S. college students and administrators celebrate the history of decolonization and draw on its legacy to promote their own agendas, while scholars argue that decolonization is the key to understanding contemporary European problems with immigration and terrorism. In a sense, this discourse of "decolonization" is trivial and self-serving, lending a grandiose weight to debates over syllabuses. The discourse rests, however, on a dangerous misrecognition of decolonization as something worthy of unequivocal celebration, offering political and moral guidance for our own society. In Algeria, at least, actually existing decolonization, driven by the insuperable contradictions of the colonial project, ended in violent authoritarianism. It is a warning, not a model.

Viewing settler colonialism as structural prevents incremental action which means the alt is doomed to passivity – this excuses us of our privilege rather than making us confront it

Macoun & Strakosch, University of Queensland political science & international studies prof. and public policy lecturer, 13

[Elizabeth Strakosch is Lecturer in Public Policy and Politics at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, Alissa Macoun is a professor at the school of political science and international studies at the University of Queensland, 2013, "The Ethical Demands of Settler Colonial Theory," accessed 7/8/18, <https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63908/1/63908.pdf>] GDI-ARV

Firstly, by disturbing settler colonialism's narratives of progress, SCT attributes a peculiar suspended temporality to the settler project. This can portray settler colonialism as an inevitable structure likely to exist across time – the fact that the past persists in the present implies that this past will also persist in the future. Foundational scholar Patrick Wolfe has been labelled 'very much a structuralist stuck in a poststructuralist world'.⁶³ As we have outlined, this structuralism is particularly useful in identifying the operation of political hierarchies. However, it can also excuse us from human political action in the present by presenting this action as futile or already determined.⁶⁴ The role of political activists is to wait for the structurally determined future, and at most to prepare others for its arrival. The particular challenge of SCT's analysis is that it does not give an account of such a transformed future, or of the conditions for settler colonialism's demise. This can lead to a theoretical and political impasse and result in a kind of colonial fatalism. Such fatalism can be deployed to imply a moral equivalence between different forms of settler political interaction with Indigenous people, and, at its worst, to deny the legitimacy of Indigenous resistances. Structuralist narratives are able to posit radical change, but only if

this change is built into the structures they describe – for example because these structures are subject to internal contradictions or are inherently unstable. Settler colonial structures, however, appear as highly stable and ‘relatively impervious to regime change’.⁶⁵ Therefore, at the same moment settler scholars finally see the depth and reach of settler colonialism in the present they feel unable to find ‘postsettler colonial passages’.⁶⁶ This tendency is reinforced by SCT’s capacity to identify significant commonalities in the objectives of conservative and progressive policy approaches, as discussed above. It shows that traditional ‘decolonizing’ pathways such as treaty making, reconciliation and formal apologies may also serve colonial ends by absorbing and extinguishing Aboriginal political difference without disturbing the foundational structures of settler dominance. As Australian anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose notes, this makes it ‘difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project’.⁶⁷ If every settler action is framed as always already colonizing, then individuals are excused from anti-colonial action in the present and Indigenous people are destined to be victims of an unstoppable colonizing state.⁶⁸ As bell hooks argues in relation to US race relations, this is useful to those in a position of dominance: ‘so many White people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something if it is perceived as immutable.’⁶⁹ Is it possible that settlers are particularly attracted to SCT precisely because it gives us a sense of being intellectually committed to the end of colonialism while simultaneously unable to act against our own privilege? As a recent article concluded about the prospects for decolonization: I can only assess this with a degree of gloom. I am yet to be convinced that we can prevent indigenous disadvantage remaining structurally embedded in society and through the state even after any kind of ‘transition’ or ‘transformation’. At the same time, I fear decolonization. I am myself a settler, like several of my ancestors before me, and I have nowhere else to belong.⁷⁰ SCT’s structuralism may serve these conflicted interests, in allowing us to feel we have done all we can while facing the ‘reality’ of an inevitable settler colonial future.

The kritik’s totalizing nature forecloses alignments between anti-capitalist settlers AND indigenous movements---that gives up on a key base of power which reentrenches colonial interests.

Corey **Snelgrove et al. 14**, University of British Columbia; Rita Kaur Dhamoon, University of Victoria; and Jeff Corntassel, University of Victoria, 2014, “Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 1-32, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/21166/17970>

Corey: This relational, interdependent focus is also important amongst settlers ourselves – perhaps as a way to counter the flattening of differences that occurs amongst settlers, particularly in solidarity work. Settlers obviously need to be doing our own work and challenging ‘our’ institutions and practices that serve to protect or further colonization. But we can’t do this if we flatten the differences and ignore the inequalities and power relationships that exist within settler society. Not only does such flattening prevent much needed alliances but flattening itself can actually work to protect certain elements of settler colonialism. For instance, white supremacy works to naturalize white settler presence. In terms of solidarity then, I find it problematic for myself, as a white, class privileged, cis-hetero, and able bodied male (as well as people like me) to demand other peoples to act in solidarity, while also not holding myself (and others like me) responsible and accountable to other forms of violence that may be a contributing factor to the further reification of structures that support settler colonialism, like the State. Now I’m not arguing for the continued eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders because others experience violence, but rather, that the substantive recognition of Indigenous governance and legal orders also requires a dismantling of other, related forms of domination. This latter dismantling I see as necessary but

also insufficient for the dismantling of settler colonialism. These sites and spaces of domination and resistance are distinct, but also connected dialectically. This seems to be something that settlers, white settlers specifically, have yet to articulate and take up, critique and act against. And this is perhaps most evident in how settlers seem to be continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act. Rita: I wonder if this relational approach is a more useful direction for settler colonial studies, not unlike the kind of work you do Jeff, in thinking about colonialism in a global, comparative context. Jeff: And I think, the more you can make those links, the British occupation of Maori territory is directly related to HBC's strategy to begin treaty making here... All those things are interrelated. They are shared, and they are seen as shared strategies. The other thing I see is this impulse to delocalize it... it's always that kind of Free Tibet Syndrome... the further away acts of genocide are from your location, the more outrage expressed at these injustices. It's a way of avoiding complicity, but it's also a way of recasting the gaze. It's like, 'We're not going to look right here, because this appears to be fairly peaceful' And so it's always that sort of re-directing away from localized responsibility, and almost magnifying impacts farther away. Rita: So what settler colonial studies does do, is help us relocate to locality, which is helpful. You mention the HBC. I wonder what was the relationship between the Hudson Bay Company in Canada and the East India Company or the East Africa Company? If we're thinking about settler colonialism as a structure, how is it related to other modalities of gendered and sexualized white supremacy? How are the logics of State sovereignty and authority over nonwhite bodies connected? If we're thinking about it, as non-Indigenous peoples being 'in solidarity', part of that is locating, attacking the whole structure of imperialism that is deeply gendered and homonationalist, that depends on neo-liberal projects of prioritizing able-bodied workers who can serve capitalism. Corey: Part of this, I think, what we've been discussing here, relates to what I sometimes see as the framing of 'settler' as event, rather than structure – where we are perhaps overly focused on the question of 'who' at the expense of the 'how'. If we don't understand how settlers are produced we run the risk of representing settlers as some sort of transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices. So I'm worried that while in one moment the term 'settler' denaturalizes our – that is all non-Indigenous peoples – presence on Indigenous lands, in the next, and through this construction of the 'settler' as transhistorical, we renaturalize it. In short, we go from a disavowal of colonization, to its representation as inevitable. Here is where I think a historical materialist or genealogical approach to the production of settler subjects may be useful in showing how this production is conditioned by but also contingent on a number of factors – white supremacy, hetero-patriarchy, capitalism, colonization, the eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders, environmental degradation, etc. Now this is also not to say that the binary of Indigenous/Settler isn't accurate. I think its fundamental. Rather, I think it is possible and important to recognize that there have been, and are, individuals (or even collectives) that might be referred to as something other than settlers by Indigenous peoples, perhaps as cousins. Or in a similar vein, that there have been and are practices by settlers that aren't colonial (and here is where centering Indigenous peoples' accounts of Indigenous-settler relations, as well as their own governance, legal and diplomatic orders is crucial). But I think it's just as important to recognize that these relations have and do not occur despite settler colonial and imperial logics, and thus outside of the binary. Rather, such relations occur in the face of it. The binary then is fundamental as the logics that uphold the binary cannot be ignored due to the existence of possibly good relations as the logics that uphold the binary threaten those relations through the pursuit of the elimination of Indigenous peoples. Rita: Yet, how do we act in light of these entanglements, and with, rather than overcoming differences? Corey: Tuck and Yang (2012) had this really great article, "Decolonization is not a Metaphor." In it, they talk about the importance of an ethics of incommensurability – a recognition of how anti-racist and anti-capitalist struggles are incommensurable with decolonization. But what I've been thinking about recently is whether these struggles are incompatible. For example, in the Indigenous resurgence literature, there is a turn away, but it's also not an outright rejection. It also demands settlers to change. Yet recognizing that settlers are (re)produced, the change demanded is not just an individual transformation, but one connected to broader social, economic, and political justice. There are then, it seems, potential lines of affinity between decolonization and others, though incommensurable, struggles. And in order to sustain this compatibility in the face of incommensurability, relationships are essential in order to maintain accountability and to resist repeating colonial and other relations of domination, as well as, in very strategic terms, in supporting each other's resistance.

Hello I am justin this is the stuff that I have that is relevant and I think would make for good debates:

Additional Cards From Backfiles

1NC – TL

Thesis – Education (Framework Strategy)

Settler colonialism is an ongoing political project that serves to seize land, resources, and cultural practices – it feeds off of the insatiable desire to expand – settler colonial research practices only codify settlerism as a normalized colonial practice manifested through mimicry of expert knowledge that precludes effective modes of learning.

Patel 14 – PhD in Curriculum Development at Boston College [Lisa (Leigh) Patel (2014), Countering Coloniality in Educational Research: From Ownership to Answerability, Educational Studies, 50:4, 357-377, DOI: 10.1080/00131946.2014.924942, Accessed via Taylor Francis Online] mp

The United States, in addition to many other places such as Australia, Canada, and Israel, is ongoing project of settler colonialism (Byrd 2011; A. Smith 2010; Wolfe 1991). Rather than a single event, settler colonialism is a continuous process and logic with three mutually dependent components (Tuck and Yang 2012), all of which work in tandem and rely on each other to maintain the structure of colonialism. The first practice is to seize the land, resources, cultural practices, and goods of a desired location. Beginning with land grabs in the 14th century and continuing through contemporary times, the United States was founded on the practice of outsiders claiming land and resources. However, in settler colonialism, there can never be enough land to satisfy the thirst of a few. The logic of physical invasions and opportunistic treaties with Native peoples echo in contemporary times with private takeover of public, potentially collective, spaces (Martusewicz, Edmondson, and Lupinacci 2011). In education, this is most notable through the dismantling of public education (Fine and Fabricant 2012) for the proliferation of

privatized venture philanthropy in education and teacher education, leveraged through educational metrics measuring teacher, school, and pupil performance (Kumashiro 2010). As one of the last public spaces in the United States, education has experienced a surge of privatization that acts in keeping with a genealogy of land grabs. What were once public schools, with names like Washington Elementary School or Paul J. Robeson High School, are increasingly renamed and claimed for private interests, with many locations simultaneously claimed and linked through private ownership, under the names of Harlem Children's Zone, Kipp Academy, and MATCH (e.g. <http://www.matcheducation.org/>). Au and Ferrare's (2014) network analysis reveals the small number of educational reformers who leverage disproportionately large symbolic and material sponsorship to establish private-like charters and claim those lands. But to sustain this land grab, the people already residing there must be eliminated for settlers to replace them, whereby state-sanctioned violence occurs as a second conjoining practice of settler colonialism. As Smith (2012) put it, This logic holds that indigenous peoples must disappear. In fact, they must always be disappearing, in order to enable non-indigenous peoples' rightful claim to land. Through this logic of genocide, non-Native peoples then become the rightful inheritors of all that was indigenous—land, resources, indigenous spirituality and culture. A key trope through which settler colonialism operates is erasing to replace. The land grabs relied on, and continue to rely on, codified blood quantum laws to ensure the gradual diminishment of Native peoples. This logic is present in the land grabs of public schooling spaces that use the law and metrics of achievement as codified strategies to claim property, specifically through the marginalizing and eroding of histories and place-based knowledges of communities (Fenwick 2013). K–12 schools are also connected to the tertiary education and the forms of knowledge and knowledge production sanctioned therein. Higher education, as key companion pillar with the church and state in the establishment of this settler colony as a nation (Wilder 2013), further reflects these move of settling, including erasing to replace. The settler colonial project first constructed colleges as places for ministerial education for wealthy men, with strict focus on Greek, Latin, geometry, ancient history, logic, ethics and rhetoric, with few discussions, or as Freire (1970) termed, a banking approach to education wherein students, even the privileged male students allowed to enjoy this property, were seen as vessels in which the culture of the colony should be sown. For White men, though, this planting of knowledge was with home codes and perspectives. For Indigenous communities, this banking approach erased their lived experiences with Eurocentric epistemologies, which can never be made home because of the dispossession it is premised upon (Anzaldúa 1999). This project of erasure is found throughout many of the historical manifestations of IHEs' curricula, a logic that grounded Indian boarding schools in the philosophy of "kill the Indian to save the man" (Pratt 1892, 214). Contemporary manifestations of this logic include the maintained and protected use of euro-centric curricula and pedagogy as common core to a solidified banking approach to higher education (Spring 2010). As Wilder points out in his historical analysis of the roles elite institutions of higher education played in supporting, exploiting, and perpetuating slavery in the United States, studies that unproblematically investigate how to best and most efficiently teach academic standardized English to nonnative speakers are complicit in this erase to replace colonial trajectory. It is important to note here that the

deepest investment of settler colonialism is to erase Indigenous peoples. The erasure of culture and language of minoritized peoples, such as migrants, works in tandem with replacing Indigenous peoples with others, such as migrant workers, but not as landowners. The erasure of Indigeneity is also apparent in the knowledge production more specifically located in educational research that names White, Black, and Latino populations, sometimes Asian, but rarely Indigenous peoples in statistics of schoolbased achievement. Although the White center of achievement gap studies problematically reifies Whiteness as normal and desirable (Leonardo 2009), the failure to name Indigenous peoples acts echoes this need to erase. Even though the recent US federal policy of No Child Left Behind (NCLB 2002), prompted states and districts to disaggregate achievement data according to racial groups, including Indigenous students, the prevailing trope in educational research, particularly wellfunded educational research, is the achievement gap between White and Asian to that of Black and Latino students. This binary leverages a linked achievement rate of glossed-over statistics of various Asian Americans' achievement to standards of White achievement to fundamentally locate deficit within Black and Latino populations while also erasing Indigenous peoples. Additionally, the US federal policies of NCLB and its follower, Race to the Top ([RTTP] 2001) demand identification to punish so-identified delinquent populations, rather than to redress a system based on colonial stratification (Leonardo 2009). By organizing research around these policies and pursuing their funding streams, not only has federally sanctioned educational research contributed to this construction of Whiteness, it has also supported the almost constant conflation between test scores and learning, an abrogation of responsibility to which I return in the conclusion of the article. A third necessary practice of settler colonialism, and one that conjoins tightly with White supremacy in the United States, is to import slave labor in chains and render human beings as chattel. In this process, humanity is immediately put in tension with, and ultimately subjugated to, property. African slaves became chattel long before the transporting ships reached their destinations, with bodily treatment of the captured Africans becoming the first in an ongoing stripping away of humanity (Spillers 1987). Continuing through the contemporary prison industrial complex and the low-wage locations of forced migrants (Ngai 2005), slave labor is necessary to become chattel, harvest the resources of the land and, through economic stratification and sequestering, ensure that land and property rights are reserved for a much smaller group of settlers. Higher education is, like other social fields in capitalist-anchored settler colonies, predicated on individuals holding differential status so that many are competing for the limited resources of higher status, reflected in salary and reputation. Within that field, publications and grant procurement (Daza, 2012, 2013a) represent the forms of capital most readily translated into higher status. By reflecting rather interrupting hierarchies based on competition and status, the academy has sustained problematic relationships with vulnerabilized communities (Tuck 2009). Part of this has transpired through scholarship that has worked from and validated racist premises of societal difference (Wilder 2013), as well as the relationships between researcher and researched (Tuck and Guishard 2013). For applied fields, such as educational research, these patterns manifest themselves in who is researched and what theoretical frames drive the data gathering, analysis, and implications.

Ontology Card - Rifkin

That cannot be delinked from settler institutions – the settler state is driven by the logic of elimination – the primal drive to expansion that materializes native land dispossession, displacement, and genocide.

Rifkin 14 – Associate Professor of English & WGS @ UNC-Greensboro
[Mark, 'Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,' pp. 7-10] mp

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associations they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitation and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*, Patrick Wolfe argues, "Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tenses reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay. Invasion is a structure not an event" (2).⁶ He suggests that a "logic of elimination" drives settler governance and sociality, describing "the settler-colonial will" as "a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism" (167), and in "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," he observes that "elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence" (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/period of conquest, colonization persists since "the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society" (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson's work, "whiteness functions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives."⁷ In "Writing Off Indigenous Sovereignty," she argues, "As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and maintain its investment in the nation as a white possession" (88), and in "Writing Off Treaties," she suggests, "At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one's will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed," such that "possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity" (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, "the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that "colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated" in ways that "tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion" and "that misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism" (xxiii, xvii). She argues that "settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collectivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and management. The Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself"; "ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself" (xix).

Links Policy

Link - Courts

The legal construction of the law means that indigenous existence is **irreconcilable** with the broader settler court--this not only dooms forms of Native resistance **through** legal structure as a result of epistemological divides, but also **further enables** white settlers to articulate their identity through a property-oriented exception in law.

Hamilton 4 Jennifer Hamilton, professor of legal studies and anthropology (Hampshire College). She has B.A. in anthropology and English literature (McGill University, Canada), and Ph.D. in anthropology (Rice University). [May 2004, "Indigeneity in the Courtroom: Law, Culture, and the Production of Difference in North American Courts," submitted to a thesis committee at Rice University, accessed online at:

<https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/18634/3122475.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>] //jzmy

Ideas of property and ownership not only **structure** Canadian **legal and economic systems**, but also are **central cultural metaphors through which citizens articulate entitlement and belonging**. On its surface, the dispute in Musqueam Park seemed to be a rather routine dispute about leases, rents, and real estate, yet a deeper analysis reveals **not only the centrality of property in the organization of** Canadian **settler imaginaries but also how terms of cultural difference operate in novel and unexpected ways at this historical moment**. Throughout the histories of colonization, **indigenous peoples have been consistently and deliberately excluded from settler societies**. Such **exclusions have been integral to the organization of these societies** (not simply unfortunate consequences of it) and have helped to shape a variety of social dimensions **including the legal organization of space and conceptions of difference**.¹² In this section, I contextualize the dispute in Musqueam Park by providing a brief history of race and its relationship to property in British Columbia. In attempting to redress both the historic and contemporary injustices wrought by colonialism, **indigenous peoples** in Canada, and throughout the world, **have sought legal remedies in settler courts**. A wide body of **literature has demonstrated the serious limitations placed on indigenous peoples when they are required to articulate their claims in the institutions and language of their colonizers**.¹² These works skillfully **describe and analyze the complex terrain of law and its relationship to postcolonialism**, demonstrating how **epistemologically distinct claims made by indigenous peoples**

have been either managed or completely dismissed by settler courts. This literature examines the evocation of difference in legal cases involving indigenous peoples, especially the use of difference as critique. In this sense, indigenous claims are used to defamiliarize the familiar, and to point out some of law's fundamental assumptions. Some scholars have further argued that the articulation of indigenous claims in settler courts produces conditions of irreconcilability." The argument goes that because indigenous epistemologies (including concepts of identity, land, and time) are fundamentally incommensurable with the terms of European modernity, their legal encounter inevitably "highlights a problem inherent in the post-modern condition—the confrontation between two irreconcilable systems of meaning produced by two contending cultures" (Torres and Milun: 2000: 52). While others have challenged such arguments, asserting that they fail to take into consideration the deeply political postcolonial conditions that influence how these self-consciously cultural assertions are made, 14 nevertheless concepts of indigenous difference have been powerful rhetorical tools both for critiquing settler courts and for articulating claims in them. Yet these types of analyses cannot account for what happened in the Musqueam Park dispute. The Musqueam Band did not make its claims through the idiom of indigenous difference, but rather through attempted participation in the private sphere of Canadian capitalism while the only group to make self-consciously cultural (qua racial) assertions was the leaseholders. Ironically, the dominant rhetoric of opposition to indigenous claims in Canada usually operates "by emphasizing the liberal-democratic ideals of individualism, private property, and equality for all" (Bateman 1997: 61). In this instance, however, the Band's claims were commensurable with these liberal-democratic ideals, and created a need for a different oppositional discourse. (or, in this case, an oppositional discourse of difference). The Musqueam Band's commensurable claims confound notions of indigenous difference, notions that are central both to settler identity and to associated concepts of property. This commensurability was deeply unsettling to the leaseholders and other settler Canadians. Legal scholar Peter Fitzpatrick offers a way to read the dispute in Musqueam Park: This construction [of an Other] involves that which is acceptable or within the identity being created in its difference to that which is unfit and excluded. Looked at in reverse, if the excluded were to reenter, as it were, then the identity would disintegrate... (1999:55). To reformulate Fitzpatrick's insight: it is not if the excluded re-enters, but rather when the excluded, in this case the Musqueam Band, re-enters. Indigenous peoples have traditionally been excluded from the liberal-democratic spheres of "individualism, private property, and equality for all," an exclusion which allowed settler identities to be forged in opposition. The Band's re-entry occurred when it asserted its similarity by declaring its entrepreneurial desires, and demanding a legal remedy in line with common law real estate practice. It provoked a crisis in the leaseholders and other settler Canadians. In response, settler Canadians created an oppositional discourse of difference, one which relied on naturalized social and legal categories of race and property. In the following section, I analyze how this discourse ultimately reveals (and simultaneously threatens) a racialized investment in property. Property of the White People Forever: Race and Property in BC The national mythologies of white settler societies are deeply spatialized stories. Although the spatial story that is told varies from one time to another, at each stage the story installs Europeans as entitled to the land, a claim codified in law. --Sherene Razack, Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society Legal scholar Cheryl Harris argues that "whiteness and property share a common premise—a conceptual nucleus—of a right to exclude" (1993: 1714). Through an examination of the emergence of whiteness and the evolution of American property law in relation to the exclusion of Blacks and Native Americans from these spheres, Harris asserts that race and property are inextricably linked, contending that a privileged concept of whiteness comes to be "embedded... into the very definition of property" (ibid.: 1721). Thus "American law has a recognized property interest in whiteness," one which creates unacknowledged conditions "against which legal disputes are framed, argued, and adjudicated" (ibid.: 1714). I extend Harris's insights to encompass Canadian law, arguing that "a property interest in whiteness" frames the Musqueam Park dispute, creating a nexus of symbolic and material conditions through

which both the controversy and the Supreme Court's decision are articulated *

** Race profoundly structures Canadian society, yet there are discursive conditions which severely limit discussion of these issues. For instance, it is a longstanding myth, oft-reproduced in history textbooks, news media, and other sources, that Canada has been gentler with the indigenous peoples now encompassed by its boundaries than have other nation-states, most notably the U.S. While this myth has been debunked, or at the very least problematized, in academic and activist literatures, it is nevertheless prevalent in public discourse and still frames the reception of many First Nations' claims. In Canada, as in other postcolonial nations, the racial categories of white and Indian have been mutually constitutive; that is, these categories developed in tandem with each other. This has been the case historically and it is still the case now. There is a burgeoning literature in Canadian critical race theory that deals specifically with the racial construction of indigenous peoples, specifically the prevalent native/non-native dichotomy that is more familiar in Canadian race relations. As Schick argues, "I T]he **construction of white-identified people is**

established through the production of Aboriginal peoples as Other" (2002: 105-6).

Unlike the U.S., however, it is very rare in public discourse in Canada to speak overtly about race in reference to either indigenous peoples or whites; rather, "culture" is the preferred term used to evoke specific kinds of difference, often effacing the racialized (and gendered) dimensions of Canadian society, and thus limiting critical intervention in larger questions about racism and equality. Building on the work of earlier critical race theorists, Sherene Razack calls this process "culturalization," arguing that in these circumstances "[c]ulture then becomes the framework used by white society to pre-empt both racism and sexism" (1998: 60). Concepts of race have a long history in British Columbia, and while these concepts have been by no means monolithic or necessarily coherent, they have been nevertheless consistently premised on settler assertions of difference from, and superiority to, indigenous peoples. **At the time of early resettlement during the mid-19th century,**

British colonial officials envisioned their westernmost colonies in racial terms by imagining them as spaces for white resettlement, the creation of which would require the formation of sharp legal and spatial divisions between

indigenous and white populations. The racialized legacy of these divisions is still apparent today in the province. Paul Tennant argues that despite an increased racial tolerance in the province since the late 1940s, "the pejorative image of the Indian long held by Whites still underlies provincial government policy," and whiteness is still publicly evoked by settler British Columbians, especially in controversies over land (1990: xi-xii). Thus, an examination of this legacy provides a necessary interpretive context for understanding both the Glass decision and the controversy surrounding it. An oft-cited fact about BC's racial history is that a series of treaties negotiated with indigenous peoples on Vancouver Island in the 1850s stated that the purchased land would become "property of the White people for ever."¹⁶ This assertion locates, in early colonial law, the desire for difference among white settler populations in BC, a desire intimately linked with notions of race and of property, and one which has been present throughout BC's history. Tennant points out that from the early days of resettlement until the postwar era, "Whites in the province were eager to distinguish themselves from non-Whites" in part as a way of protecting their political and material interests (1990: xi). **While these distinctions were organized and expressed in a variety of**

ways, 17 they were especially manifest in the racial, spatial, and legal dimensions of property.

Historical geographer Cole Harris makes the argument that white resettlement in BC coincides with some important shifts in the trajectory of British colonial thought, shifts which reformulated concepts of race and humanity, thus differently shaping the form and experience of colonization in western Canada. He points to the diminishing popularity of the liberal humanitarian tradition in the 1840s and 50s, a tradition which, although premised on the inferiority of indigenous peoples, still presumed a "universalistic vision of a common humanity" (2002: 10). However, an increasing reliance on evolving "scientific" arguments about racial difference (specifically the racial immutability and inferiority of non-Europeans) slowly emerged and eroded this perception of a common humanity (2002: 11). As these new racial concepts gained currency, and were reinforced by the resistance of indigenous populations to colonial reforms throughout the British empire, colonial attitudes about indigenous peoples grew more negative. Further, **throughout the colonized world, a growth in white immigrant populations was concurrent with a decline in indigenous ones, the latter having been subjected to the ravaging effects of often violent colonial policies and European diseases.** This historical moment **buttressed white settler beliefs both in the biological inferiority of indigenous peoples and in the pervasive idea that these peoples represented 'a dying race.'** Thus there was a pervasive colonial belief in the inferiority (and fundamental difference) of indigenous peoples, a belief that under girded colonial law and policy especially in the realm of property. **Property was a central organizing metaphor for colonial**

ideology. Historically, private property was considered to be exclusive to Europeans, and it was widely believed that indigenous peoples either had a very primitive understanding of property, or had none at all. Colonizers justified the appropriation of indigenous territories by asserting that these lands were either uninhabited or underused. As both Fitzpatrick (2000) and Seed (2001) point out, even when confronted with contradictory evidence (i.e. indigenous agrarians), colonists either ignored this evidence or they reconstructed concepts and laws which continued to relegate indigenous peoples to lower forms (or as "outside" of political society and property).

Link - Federalism/Devolution

Federalist devolution is just the calculated distribution of settler colonialism designed to assert the powers of localized deputies policing Native people

Goldstein 08 --- Aloysha Goldstein, Associate Professor of American Studies (University of New Mexico). [Fall 2008, "Where the Nation Takes Place: Proprietary Regimes, Antistatism, and U.S. Settler Colonialism," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 107:4, accessed online at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=mst_fsp] //jazmyn

The dispersed character and calculated distance of governance in U.S. liberal settler society bears a crucial historical relation to federalism as well as to the containment of political contestation. During the time of the 1974 Oneida decision, Richard **Nixon's "new federalism"** sought to strengthen the relative autonomy of the states and to **direct government efficiency through a calculated distribution of administrative authority**. This was partially in reaction to the multiple insurgencies of the 1960s and the crisis of the Keynesian welfare state in the context of global economic involution. Indigenous actions such as the Alcatraz Island occupation in 1969–71, the Trail of Broken Treaties and Bureau of Indian Affairs building takeover in 1972, and the violent confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973 marked a resurgence of Indian activism that prepared the way for the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975. At the same time, the **assertion of states' rights and the burgeoning white hostility to both state and federal authority**—manifest in struggles such as those against taxation and school integration—**advanced the devolution and downsizing of government**. Ronald Reagan's more robust federalism further rationalized the neoliberal assault on regulative government and put reactionary populism to work in the upward redistribution of wealth. During the 1970s and 1980s, **as "homeowners" groups gained increasing attention and influence for their criticism of what appeared to be government in general, the already volatile**

question of Indian jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservations resonated with this ascendant antistatist rhetoric.

In the wake of the 1974 and 1985 Oneida rulings, a number of other Haudenosaunee nations filed cases against both New York State and private landowners. **Tribes were considerably divided on the decision to pursue individual non-Indian owners in land claim suits.**²³ Although the naming of non-Indian individuals as defendants may have proven to be ill-advised strategically, this course of action identified a requisite feature of settler colonialism. Settlement not only occasioned the multiplication of claims to political and legal authority, it also promoted the proliferation of illegalities—be they trespass and unlawful inhabitation, or outright violence—and the measured distance of these transgressions from the propriety of colonial government. Such **illegalities range from the deliberate incapacity of the General Land Office to enforce the regulation of westward settlement during the nineteenth century to the frequent impunity for crimes by non-Indians against Indians as a result of federal legislation undermining tribal law enforcement.** Incidents such as the notorious 1974 Farmington murders just outside the Navajo Nation and the mob violence against the Ojibwe in Wisconsin during the 1980s are symptomatic of the persistence of anti-Indian belligerence.²⁴ The **extremist actions of settlers**, while often renounced and sometimes punished by imperial power, **have always been essential to colonial occupation and expansion. This history remains foundational for contemporary nonindigenous land ownership.**

In 1993, the Seneca filed a class action lawsuit against the state of New York, Erie County, and all the private landowners in the claim area (roughly two thousand, including a few businesses, most of whom were concentrated on Grand Island, New York). Comprised of 17,385 acres of land, Grand Island is home to more than seventeen thousand non-Indians and includes a regional amusement park, golf courses, beaches, hotels, and various other tourist amenities, as well as access to two state parks. A state expressway across the island links the cities of Buffalo and Niagara Falls. The suit alleged that the U.S. government, as required by the Trade and Intercourse Act, had never properly ratified the transfer of land to New York State in 1815 and that therefore the tribe still held title to Grand Island properties. Because this involved the unauthorized acquisition of title by New York State, the U.S. Department of Justice joined the Seneca as a plaintiff.²⁵ Grand Island homeowner Darren Brown complained that “the U.S. Government turned its back on the innocent property owners of Grand Island by saying that they were actually going to defend the Indians in this case!” Brown protested that the case “could very easily set a dangerous precedent for the United States and every State in the Union.”²⁶ Nevertheless, in 2002, the Seneca lost their case. The trial court ruled that a 1764 treaty with Britain in the wake of Pontiac’s Rebellion provided evidence that the tribe had previously ceded the property in question and that the purchase by New York State was merely intended to avoid conflict with the tribe over land the state already owned. The decision was upheld in the Second Circuit of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the case in 2006.

The **Seneca Grand Island suit was significant because so much of the litigation and attendant outcry concerned the inclusion of private landowners as defendants. Reflecting on the broader implications of their victory, lawyers for the defense in the Seneca case emphasized that “the landowners are innocent third parties, and their undisputed innocence makes them unique among land claim litigants.”**²⁷ Indeed, **“innocence” and injury have long been cornerstones of settler ideology.**²⁸ The defense lawyers, with their indisputably innocent clients victimized by

indigenous legal action, thus labored to deflect the plaintiffs’ grounds for injury, citing the Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina ruling that “monetary relief representing fair value is ‘just compensation’ and constitutionally the equivalent of tangible or real property.”²⁹ This “just compensation” and monetary award of equivalent damages is construed as the only reasonable and possible outcome for Indian plaintiffs, but unthinkable for “innocent”

landowners who were “hostages to history.” The defense lawyers insisted that there was “no legal reason . . . for the tribal plaintiffs to continue to press their claims against the landowners.”³⁰ But the decidedly nonlegal reason for landowners not to sell their property and transfer title back to the tribe—because land- owners had lived on the property for generations and therefore had a deep, long-standing connection to that particular place, for which there was no equivalent in monetary compensation—categorically precluded tribal land reclamation.³¹ For the Seneca apparently there could be no comparable attachment to the place of their ancestors who preceded the landowners’ forefathers.

Link - Hegemony

Hegemony necessitates genocidal dispossession and the ongoing production of the theatre of war.

Karuka 19, Manu Karuka is an Assistant Professor of American Studies, and affiliated faculty with Women's, Gender & Sexuality Studies at Barnard College, where he has taught since 2014. His work centers a critique of imperialism, with a particular focus on anti-racism and Indigenous decolonization. Nearest date given is 2019, “Empire’s Tracks: indigenous nations, chinese workers, and the transcontinental railroad” pg 186-188 NN

In September 2000, two months before the fateful “election,” the Project for the New American Century released a report, **Rebuilding America’s Defenses**, spurred by a sense of declining U. S. military strength. Following an apparent victory against communism, this was a program to maintain a unipolar world order organized under U. S. control. While the beginning of the new century offered an “unprecedented strategic opportunity,” the report warned of “a future that promises to be very different and potentially much more dangerous,” involving a proliferation of threats, including “potential rivals like China and “adversaries like Iran, Iraq and North Korea” The Project advocated a U. S. foreign policy revolving around preserving a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and the oil and natural gas lands surrounding it, and East Asia, as well as stabilizing the international system of nation-states against nonstate actors, including “terrorists.”² “Homeland security” was key to this military strategy. This would necessitate repairing a “frayed and torn” military social fabric, which saddled the U. S. military with poor enlistment and retention rates, arising from a “degraded quality of life,” separating military life from the “middle-class expectations” seen as vital to maintaining a volunteer army. The authors urged efforts to improve the quality of life for service personnel, strengthening a culture of civilian support and aggrandizement of the military. In tandem with efforts to improve the

quality of military life, the Project argued that the costs of “social entitlement programs” like Social Security and Medicare will limit discretionary funds for the military, thereby endangering the “American peace.” There are at least two threads to draw from this strategy. First, the apparent victory against communism obviated any need to offer a pretense to concessions won by mass working-class struggle during the previous phase of imperialism.

Second, the widespread suffering unleashed by dismantling the social wage acts as a further incentive for poor people to join a “volunteer” army. **Imperialism is a project of class rule**.³

The nature of war in a unipolar age, the authors argued, would shift to policing, or “constabulary operations.” **Unipolarity entails an expansion of U. S. countersovereignty on a global scale**, in which U. S. military forces engage missions “requiring forces configured for combat but capable of longterm, independent **constabulary operations**,” to respond to “smaller scale contingencies.” Such missions would extend already existing practices, such as no-fly zones over Iraq following the withdrawal of U. S. land forces in 1991, or operations ostensibly against drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. **This required an expansion of the “American security perimeter, through the development of a “worldwide archipelago of U. S. military installations.” A proliferation of forward operating bases around the world** allows the United States to more easily skirt political, economic, and practical constraints, and to facilitate political as well as **military operations**. The continental United States remains significant in this vision, as a reserve site for rapid reinforcements. Still, the essential fact of U. S. foreign policy, after the closing of the Cold War, was “the American security frontier.” The U. S. armed forces, the authors wrote, “are the cavalry on the new American frontier.” **U. S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century remains grounded in a long tradition of war against Indigenous nations, through the lived experience of continental imperialism.**⁴

Through constabulary missions, the United States would assert political control over the people of the world. While the authors urged that the United States cannot assume “a UN-like stance of neutrality,” the real point of contention is not neutrality, but the possibility of international democracy. **U. S. troops could forestall European assertions of independence from U. S. imperial policies**. In Saudi Arabia, nominally rotational forces, and deeper reliance on private contractors, could assuage “domestic sensibilities.” **In Korea, reunification would not involve the end of U. S. military occupation, but a change in the occupation forces’ mission. In Latin America, the military would expand its use of airfields,** nominally for “counterdrug operations.” In the short term, **this expansion was necessitated by the need to defend against regimes deemed “hostile to America”:** North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria.⁵

In warfare with primarily political ends, land power is essential. “Regimes are difficult to change based upon punishment alone.” The authors anticipated that **urban warfare will be fundamental to the operations of future land forces.** Land power will be **complemented by the “global reach, global dominance” of U. S. air power, including drones to extend aerial strike and surveillance capacities.** In addition to land and air

power, the authors of the report anticipated U.S. military control of space. Back on earth, they looked forward to new kinds of biological weapons that can target “specific genotypes,” which could “transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.” Most thoroughly, the authors urged the necessity for the United States to “maintain nuclear strategic superiority,” as an essential element of homeland defense. This would involve “safer and more effective nuclear weapons,” including nuclear weapons that could be deployed in battlefield situations. Such weapons of mass destruction, the authors argued, would provide “the final guarantee of security, democratic freedoms and individual political rights.” Writing in September 2000, the authors were sanguine about the possibility of quickly achieving their objectives: “the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.”⁶

Link - International Relations

International relations are constituted by settler anxiety---power remains naturalized in a way that demands liberalism through the lens of Native extermination which produces endless violence

Cornellier & Griffiths 18 --- Bruno Cornellier, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies in the Department of English. (University of Winnipeg, Canada). Joined by Michael R. Griffiths, Lecturer in English and Writing (University of Wollongong, Australia). [August 10th, 2016, “Globalizing unsettlement: an introduction,” *Settler Colonial Studies*, 6:4, 305-316, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090522] //jazmyn

This issue of Settler Colonial Studies marks the attempt to think the global adjacent to and, indeed, constituted in relation to questions of internal colonialism and settlement. As editors, we implicitly follow a contention of Scott Morgensen's that settler colonialism is not merely a violent phenomenon of the colonial periphery, but in fact functions as constitutive of geopolitics at a global level. As Morgensen puts it, “Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonization, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance.” If settler colonialism is not theorized in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalized in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it.¹ Settler colonialism, then, is not merely a global phenomenon, it is also constitutive of the global. So many nation states which were founded on settler colonialism are considered first world nation states, and many are implicated, through this role, in broader operations of regional and global neoimperial control of territory and interests. This is a central premise of many of the contributions to this volume, from Kevin Bruyneel's analysis of the settler colonial vocabulary that animates US military incursions in the Middle East to Shiri Pasternak's analysis of the relation between Canadian multi-national private resource extraction and the ongoing dispossession of native lands in Canada to Mark

Rifkin's careful geopolitical reading of indigenous internationalism in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. If the USA is the most paradigmatic (though not the sole) instantiation of global 'capitalist-territorialism' (to use Giovanni Arrighi's phrase), then as Bruyneel asserts elsewhere **the persistent reproduction of the American foundational mythos [...] serves critically in the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonialism as a structure**, and does so in the manifest global reach of its neoimperial imprint.²

As such, 'via the logic of elimination [...] and dependent upon settler colonialism America takes up its imperial stance overlooking the world. This image illustrates that one cannot acknowledge the fact of US empire without acknowledging settler colonialism, and vice versa'.³ To cite US Empire here, as **constituted in relation to its own history of internal (settler) colonialism and manifest destiny is to cite an example of this relation that might be explored globally**. If settler colonialism bears relation to the global, as the US example illustrates, then global comparisons of such

modes of dispossession also might shed light on the complexity of specific internal settler colonial experiences. This issue, then, calls upon scholarship to address the ideologies that traverse

comparable political spaces, of which a number are surveyed in this issue: Australia, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico. From the perspective of a critique of settler colonialism – which this approach,

grounded in the initial premise of internal colonialism and the idea of elimination, is uniquely poised to reveal – what these spaces have in common is a certain strange double vision surrounding their self-conception. On the one hand, settler nation states stress their liberalism and inclusivity and on the other, they aim to either repress indigenous presence and difference, or, alternately to occlude its particularly salient claims by subsuming this difference under a wider

multicultural settlement on the management of alterity. Here, **the more the modernity and liberalism of the settler state is rhetorically stressed and pushed, the more it indulges in the repression of an indigenous presence often imagined as an anachronistic and aliberal residue of the type of ethnically bound and territorially fixed political cultures that violently clashed and sunk in our pre-global and pre-modern world**. This is a second crucial premise of this collection's relation to the

globality of settler colonialism: liberal multicultural policies act comparably across multiple sites and spaces as avenues for the reinstatement of dispossession. From Melissa Forbis' analysis of Chiapas to Michael Griffiths' argument about the relation between race and culture in Australia, liberal logics are used to conceal new and incipient modes of dispossession globally.

Link - Liberal Democracy

Liberal democracy and US sovereignty deterritorialize indigenous land claims, constituting Nativeness as the constitutive outside of citizenship in order to impose juridical and territorial order onto the colony – recourse to rights-based models and the legal system in order to biopolitically manage

populations through law-making violence, mystifying settlement and annihilating the Native through assimilation.

Byrd 2011 (Jodi A. “Killing States Removals, Other Americans, and the “Pale Promise of Democracy” Book Title: The Transit of Empire” Published by: University of Minnesota Press. (2011) Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttv97j.10//ajoseph> pg189-194

The second goal of this chapter is to reframe Japanese American internment and the concomitant “yellow peril” that traps Asian Americans in a third space between immigrant threat/model minority, within those distortive parallax effects that have been used to disrupt and deny indigenous sovereignty. By focusing on the internment of Japanese Americans at Poston and the role that John Collier, the father of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, played in promoting Japanese American wartime relocation as an experiment in self-governance toward assimilation, I hope to deepen our understandings of how **U.S. colonial policies targeting indigenous nations inform the assumptions of multicultural liberal democracy that now exemplify current U.S. preoccupations with race and diaspora and serve to deterritorialize indigenous prior claims.** And finally, I will draw upon Gerald Vizenor’s work in *Hiroshima Bugi* to consider American Indian participation in and disruptions of conviviality within the transits. This content downloaded from 45.36.152.108 on Wed, 13 May 2020 08:13:12 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> 190 KILLING STATES of empire. Vizenor’s unmapping of the nineteenth-century voyager and half-Chinook Ranald MacDonald’s travels through the Pacific and into Ainu territory in Japan troublingly parallels, for Vizenor, the consequences of the atomic weaponry that violently ended World War II. Giorgio Agamben links **the political power of U.S. sovereignty to a series of states of exception that track how martial law and discourses of emergencies have led to the consolidation of executive power and its subsequent expansion into the legislative sphere.** Agamben’s theorization of **sovereignty as that which determines and enacts the state of exception—understood as that which breaks the law to enforce the law—demonstrates the degree to which Western democracies exist in a dialectic with totalitarian regimes.** Though Agamben typically theorizes sovereignty within Greco-Roman and European contexts, his State of Exception marks a notable shift. In his diagnosis of U.S. sovereignty and its deployment of the state of exception as a “conflict over sovereign decision” arising from a “dialectic between the powers of the president and those of Congress,” the first example Agamben gives of a U.S. president appropriating dictatorial powers is Abraham Lincoln, who violated the law to suspend habeas corpus in 1861 and then, on his sole authority, declared the emancipation of slaves in 1863. The second president Agamben cites as an example is Woodrow Wilson, who during World War I appropriated even broader powers to the office of the presidency when Congress passed a series of espionage acts between 1917 and 1918. Agamben notes that **“because the sovereign power of the president is essentially grounded in the emergency linked to the state of war, over the course of the twentieth century the metaphor of war becomes an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary.”**¹⁴ By deploying the linguistic logic of waging war, according to Agamben, Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to appropriate extraordinary powers to deal with the economic crisis of the 1930s, and the New Deal represents Agamben’s third example of the U.S. presidency locating in itself the ability to declare the state of emergency. The final example Agamben gives us is **Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order** that Agamben describes as **“the most spectacular violation of civil rights** (all the more serious because of its solely racial motivation) [which] occurred on February 19, 1942.”¹⁵ **Roosevelt’s order, which authorized the secretary of war and the military commanders he might designate to “prescribe military areas** in such places and of such extent as he or the

Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded,” directed the U.S. war machine to **define and enforce “regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies.”**¹⁶ Though it did not name them or any other ethnic communities specifically, and in fact allowed the secretary and those military commanders to exclude “any or all persons,” the order interpellated Japanese American citizens of the United States particularly as “alien enemies” to be evacuated to relocation centers in the name of national defense. Poston, Arizona, functions as a temporal and spatial site within these states of exception not least because it was one of the camps that represented “the most spectacular violation of civil rights.” **The state of exception as** first theorized by Carl Schmitt and later developed by Agamben depends upon **the sovereign’s ability to order space** as “not only a ‘taking of land’ (Landesnahme)—the determination of a juridical and a territorial ordering (of an Ordnung and an Ortung)—but above all a ‘taking of the outside,’ an exception (Ausnahme).”¹⁷ This ordering of space begs a question, however: Why doesn’t Agamben theorize the state of exception in relation to American Indians in the first place? It is striking, if not unanticipated, that all three of his presidential examples played a significant role in ordering the historical landscape that stretched beyond the text of Roosevelt’s executive order instituting internment camps that in itself serves as exemplary exception within Agamben’s text. **The Colorado River Indian Reservation was created by an act of Congress signed into law by Abraham Lincoln** in , and on November , **President Woodrow Wilson issued an executive order remapping the boundaries of the CRIR to steal acres for miners and cattlemen in the region.**¹⁸ In **Roosevelt appointed John Collier to the Office of Indian Affairs to implement the “Indian New Deal”** in the form of the Indian Reorganization Act, and on February , , his order set the stage for the **Colorado River Indian Reservation to house an internment camp through which Collier planned to wage his war for democracy in the form of the doctrine of self-governance that was the basis for his administration over colonized indigenous nations.** Linking Japanese American experiences of the state of exception that was internment to American Indian history allows us to scrutinize the theoretical blind spots within critical philosophy and postcolonial theory and identify the discourses of colonialism that facilitated the violation of Japanese American civil rights. The bare life that the internment camps reveal is **the life of U.S. colonialism laid bare in all its settler/native dialectical glory.** Such an observation allows for a reordering of the colonial This content downloaded from 45.36.152.108 on Wed, 13 May 2020 08:13:12 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 192 KILLING STATES logics that underpin the United States’ internment of Japanese Americans and locates its source in **the prior colonization of indigenous peoples.** As both captives and settlers, interned Japanese Americans are forced to play out in an abridged trajectory the U.S. frontier discourses, in which the only way to become “true” American citizens is to first go native and then carve democracy out of the wilderness. That Japanese American labor is used by Collier to tame the desert and make it productive **allows the United States to enforce the frontier as the site of exception that proves the norm for U.S. colonial democracy and at the same time enacts in microcosm the progressivist history that leads civilization out of savagery.** But **the problem of the sovereign is not necessarily just the state of exception but the project of democracy itself.** Agamben hints at this in Homo Sacer, when he implies that “**Western politics is a biopolitics from the very beginning, and that every attempt to found political liberties in the rights of the citizens is, therefore, in vain**” and that observation supports Wendy Brown’s critique of **liberal politics that seek,**

through injury, recourse from the state and in the process serve to negate the originary violence in Benjamin's delineation of law-making and law-preserving violence.¹⁹ Collier has come to epitomize the ambivalent colonial administrator whose efforts to reform the government-to-government relationship that provides the basis for the continued U.S. occupation of indigenous lands mark a fundamental shift in U.S. colonial administration.

According to Vine Deloria Jr., John Collier was "probably the greatest of all Indian commissioners," and much of the scholarship about his role as commissioner of the Office of Indian Affairs tends to frame Collier as a liberal prophetic politician who embodied the social welfare vision of Roosevelt's administration—though in Deloria's case, that praise may be faint given that most Indian commissioners were devastating to indigenous nations.²⁰ Even Ruth Okimoto came to appreciate Collier and found his decision to use Japanese American internment to realize his plans for the Colorado River Indian Reservation to be a "brilliant organizational move."²¹ John Collier was ultimately contradictory in his fundamental support of indigenous communities and peoples. On the one hand, he greatly esteemed indigenous cultures, communities, and spiritual traditions, especially in the Southwest; on the other, he thought that there was a vacuum in indigenous governance in most communities that needed to be redressed through the imposition of democratic and bureaucratic structures.²² FunThis content downloaded from 45.36.152.108 on Wed, 13 May 2020 08:13:12 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> KILLING STATES 193 damentally, Collier, in his own words, believed American Indian democracies to be deeper and thicker democracies than those of the West, that they represented "the long hope" for humanity. "They had what the world has lost," Collier wrote at the beginning of his *Indians of the Americas*, "they have it now. What the world has lost, the world must have again, lest it die."²³ That lost ingredient for Collier was "the power for living" in the face of bare life, and he advocated that "if the modern world should be able to recapture this power, the earth's natural resources and web of life would not be irrevocably wasted within the twentieth century, which is the prospect now. True democracy, founded in neighborhoods and reaching over the world, would become the realized heaven on earth. And living peace—not just an interlude between wars—would be born and would last through ages."²⁴ In many ways, then, this sentiment of "true democracy" that arises out of "the power for living" is what led Collier to address Japanese American internees at Poston Camp on June , , and speak of a "pale promise of democracy" that would spark real Democracy out of the shadows of struggle and endurance. This pale promise resided in Collier's administrative vision

and idea that the U.S. could manage difference best and most benignly by deploying self-management and indirect, bilateral colonialist regimes to construct a permanent security state to manage indigenous peoples, internal minorities, and overseas territorial holdings.²⁵ With only eight years separating the implementation of

the Indian Reorganization Act from Roosevelt's Executive Order , Collier expanded his vision of colonial administration to include indigenous and racial minorities alike as he advocated for reconsideration of self-government as a tool for assimilative incorporation

Collier's vision for the IRA, which provides the cornerstone for the federal recognition and nation-to-nation status of indigenous nations colonized by the United States, reveals the syllogistic fallacy at the heart of such policies, that because the IRA reestablished the language of self-governance, the act recognized indigenous nations as sovereign entities rather than as racial, ethnic communities who would one day be assimilated into the U.S. body politic. The implications for American Indian studies and our reliance on the Indian Reorganization Act to provide the language of government-to-government sovereignty and self-determination are profoundly eclipsed by the intersection of colonial and racist agendas that collude to oppress on the one hand and offer

This content downloaded from 45.36.152.108 on Wed, 13 May 2020 08:13:12 UTC All use subject to <https://about.jstor.org/terms> 194 KILLING STATES the seductive recognitions that maintain state hegemony on the other. The intersection of Collier's administrative colonialism with his affirmation of self-government served the larger agenda of furthering liberal democracy that sought to bring the world into U.S.

alignment. And as Justice Robert Jackson observed in his dissent to the Korematsu decision that upheld the constitutionality of Japanese American relocation, **the loaded weapon in the law created in part by the juridical principle of stare decisis, which** Robert A. Williams Jr. **defines as “like cases should be decided alike,” facilitates a transit of colonial subjectivities across which “Indianness” becomes a homology emptied of indigenous contexts and content.**²⁶ These contexts are then, **through the logics of settler colonialism, spatially, physically, and psychically mapped onto other arrivants and trajectories.** Such processes **lead to** what Ruth Okimoto rightly recognizes as “a brief moment in history [in which] the Japanese American detainees experienced what the American Indians have endured for centuries” but absents why that might be.²⁷ And while many scholars locate those intersections in Dillon Myer’s reign first in the War Relocation Authority and then in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, where he implemented policies of relocation and termination in the s, Collier shoulders his own responsibilities for implementing and advocating a process of “democratizing the enemy” that sought to layer the U.S. colonial administration of colonized Indian nations onto first Japanese American citizens and then Pacific Island holdings at the end of the war.²⁸ Next stop, the world. In other words, Collier intended to enact a third space of sovereignty that functioned as a state of exception, **the establishing of the outside in order to facilitate its reincorporation, for indigenous nations, recent immigrants, and newly acquired territories at the end of the war that would allow not-quite-citizens to be formally recaptured through the maintenance of the colonialist logics that cohered U.S. territory into the nationstate.** When Japanese Americans are forced by Collier into the third space of sovereignty, however, what happens to American Indians nations is an extension of the egalitarian processes that David Kazanjian has termed the colonizing trick, whereby Indians become colonists, Japanese Americans Indians.²⁹ And in the process, **the entire territorial conquest that is the basis for U.S. hegemony is elided, and the colonization of indigenous peoples is then abjected outside the dialectics of settler/native and into a now movable and infinitely repeatable state of assimilation through exception.**

Link - Human Rights/Modeling

The impetus towards human rights modeling is the exercise of colonial power over the uncivilized Native – their project can only reify colonial violence because those rights are based in Eurocentric principles.

Mutua 01 (Makau W. Mutua is a Kenyan-American professor of law and a leading scholar of the Third World Approaches to International Law, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,” pg. 212-215, //jazmyn

The human rights corpus, only put into effect following the atrocities of the Second World War, **had its theoretical underpinnings in Western colonial attitudes. It is rooted in a deep-seated sense of European and Western global predestination.**⁴⁸ As put by David Slater, **European “belief in the necessity of an imperial mission to civilize the**

other and to convert other societies into inferior versions of the same" took hold in the nineteenth century.⁴⁹ This impulse to possess and transform that which was different found a ready mask and benign cover in messianic faiths.

For example, Denys Shropshire, a European Christian missionary, described Africans as "primitive" natives in the "technically barbaric and pre-literary stage of sociological and cultural development."⁵⁰ The purpose of the missionary was not "merely to civilize but to Christianize, not merely to convey the 'Gifts of Civilization.'" ⁵¹ By the nineteenth century, the discourse of white over black superiority had gained popularity and acceptance in Europe. The advocates of this discourse—[German philosopher Georg] Hegel most typically, but duly followed by a host of 'justifiers'—declared that Africa had no history prior to direct contact with Europe. Therefore the Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly made no development of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and could not be left to themselves, but must be "led" towards civilization by other peoples: that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of Western Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France. ⁵² As if by intuition, the missionary fused religion with civilization, a process that was meant to remove the native from the damnation of prehistory and to deliver him to the gates of history. In this idiom, human development was defined as a linear and vertical progression of the dark or backward races from the savage to the civilized, the pre-modern to the modern, from the child to the adult, and the inferior to the superior.⁵³ Slater has captured this worldview in a powerful passage: [The geological power over other societies, legitimated and codified under the signs of manifest destiny and civilizing missions, has been a rather salient feature of earlier Western projects of constructing new world orders. These projects or domains of truth, as they emanated from Europe or the United States, attempted to impose their hegemony by defining normalcy with reference to a particular vision of their own cultures, while designating that which was different as other than truth and in need of tutelage. ⁵⁴ The United States, whose history is simply a continuation of the Age of Europe,⁵⁵ suffers from this worldview just like its European predecessors. American predestination, as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, is almost as old as the country itself. President Theodore Roosevelt expressed this sense of predestination when he referred to peoples and countries south of the United States as the "weak and chaotic governments and people south of us" and declared that it was "our duty, when it becomes absolutely inevitable, to police these countries in the interest of order and civilization." ⁵⁶ The treatment of the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking Latin America as being in the backyard of the United States was instrumental in consolidating the psyche of the United States as an empire. In the last several hundred years, the globe has witnessed the universalization of Eurocentric norms and cultural forms through the creation of the colonial state and the predominance of certain economic, social, and political models. International law

itself was founded on the preeminence of four specific European biases: geographic Europe as the center, and Christianity, mercantile economics, and political imperialism as superior paradigms." Both the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, revitalized and confirmed European-American domination of international affairs. In the post-War period, non-European states were trusted or mandated to Western powers or became client states of one or another Western state.⁵⁸ Since 1945, the United Nations has played a key role in preserving the global order that the West dominates. A critically important agenda of the United Nations has been the universalization of principles and norms which are European in identity. Principal among these has been the spread of human rights which grow out of Western liberalism and jurisprudence. ⁵⁹ The West was able to impose its philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world because it dominated the United Nations at its inception. ⁶⁰ The fallacy of the UDHR, which refers to itself as the "common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," ⁶¹ is now underscored by the identification of human rights norms with political democracy. The principal focus of human rights law has been on those rights that strengthen, legitimize, and export the liberal democratic state to non-Western societies. ⁶²

Link - Soft Left Natives Affs

Political reconciliation and offers of redress engender false hope in liberal narratives of dialectical progress. At best, their engagement with settler institutions concedes legitimacy to political apparatuses culpable in ongoing genocidal campaigns. At worst, it fosters psycho-affective attachments that induce Native communities to become deputized in the destruction of their own cultures.

Glen Coulthard, 2014, Yellowknives Dene and an associate professor in the First Nations and Indigenous Studies Program and the Departments of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, "Red Skin, White Masks," University of Minnesota Press, The Politics of Recognition in Colonial Contexts, Pp. 34-42,
<https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/red-skin-white-masks>;
seambo recut: //jazmyn

I think that Fanon's work, which anticipates the recognition/redistribution debate by half a century, highlights several key shortcomings in the approaches of both Taylor and Fraser. Taylor's approach is insufficient insofar as it tends to, at its best, address the political economy of colonialism in a strictly "affirmative" manner: through reformist state redistribution schemes like ^{granting certain cultural rights and} concessions to Aboriginal communities via self-government and land claims packages Although this ^{approach} may alter the intensity of some of the effects of

colonial-capitalist exploitation and domination, it does little to address their generative structures, in this case a capitalist economy constituted by racial and gender hierarchies and the colonial state

When his work is at its weakest, however, Taylor tends to focus on the recognition end of the spectrum too much, and as a result leaves uninterrogated colonialism's deep-seated structural features. Richard J. F. Day has succinctly framed the problem this way: Although Taylor's recognition model allows for diversity of culture within a particular state, it is less "permissive with regard to polity and economy . . . in assuming that any subaltern group that is granted [recognition] will thereby acquire a subordinate articulation with a capitalist state."

50 Seen from this angle, Taylor's theory leaves one of the two operative levels of colonial power identified by Fanon untouched. This line of criticism is well worn and can be traced back to at least the work of early Karl Marx. As such, I doubt that many would be surprised that Taylor's variant of liberalism as liberalism fails to confront the structural or economic aspects of colonialism at its generative roots

To my mind, however, this shortcoming in Taylor's approach is particularly surprising given the fact that, although many Indigenous leaders and communities today tend to instrumentally couch their claims in reformist terms, this has not always been the case: indeed, historically, Indigenous demands for cultural recognition have often been expressed in ways that have explicitly called into question the dominating nature of capitalist social relations and the state form.
51 And the same can be said of a growing number of today's most prominent Indigenous scholars and activists.52 Mohawk political scientist Taiaiake Alfred, for example, has repeatedly argued that the goal of any traditionally rooted self-determination struggle ought to be to protect that which constitutes the "heart and soul of [I]ndigenous nations: a set of values that challenge the homogenizing force of Western liberalism and free-market capitalism that honor the autonomy of individual conscience, non-coercive authority, and the deep interconnection between human beings and other elements of creation."
53 For Alfred, this vision is not only embodied in the practical philosophies and ethical systems of many of North America's Indigenous societies, but also flows from a "realization that capitalist economics and liberal delusions of progress" have historically served as the "engines of colonial aggression and itself

54 My point here is that an approach that is explicitly oriented around dialog and listening ought to be more sensitive to the claims and challenges emanating from these dissenting Indigenous voices.55 However, if Taylor's account pays insufficient attention to the clearly structural and economic realm of domination, then Fraser's does so from the opposite angle. In order to avoid what she sees as the pitfalls associated with the politics of recognition's latent essentialism and displacement of questions of distributive justice, Fraser proposes a means of integrating struggles for recognition with those of redistribution without subordinating one to the other. To this end, Fraser suggests that instead of understanding recognition as the revaluation of cultural or group-specific identity, and misrecognition as the disparagement of such identity and its consequent effects on the subjectivities of minorities, recognition and misrecognition should be conceived of in terms of the "institutionalized patterns of value" that affect one's ability to participate as a peer in social life. "To view recognition" in this manner, writes Fraser, "is to treat it as an issue of social status."
56 Although Fraser's status model allows her to curtail some of the problems she attributes to identity politics, it does so at the expense of addressing two of the most pertinent features of injustices related to mis- or nonrecognition in colonial contexts. First, when applied to Indigenous struggles for recognition, Fraser's status model rests on the problematic background assumption that the settler state constitutes a legitimate framework within which Indigenous peoples might be more justly included, or from which they could be further excluded. Here Fraser, like Taylor, leave intact two features of colonial domination that Indigenous assertions of nationhood call into question: the legitimacy of the settler state's claim to sovereignty over Indigenous people and their territories on the one hand, and the normative status of the state-form as an appropriate mode of governance on the other.57 Indeed, at one point in her well-known exchange with Axel Honneth, Fraser hints at her theory's

weakness in this regard. While discussing the work of Will Kymlicka, Fraser admits that her status model may not be as suited to situations where claims for recognition contest a current distribution of state sovereignty. Where Kymlicka's approach is tailored to demands for recognition in multinational societies, Fraser's project, we are told, seeks to address such demands in "poly-ethnic" polities like the United States.58 The problem with this caveat, however, is that it is premised on a misrecognition of its own: namely,

that as a state founded on the dispossessed territories of previously self-determining but now colonized Indigenous nations, the United States is a multinational state in much the way that Canada is. My second concern is this: if many of today's most volatile political conflicts do include subjective or psychological dimensions to them in the way that Fraser admits (and Taylor and Fanon describe), then I fear her approach, which attempts to eschew a direct engagement

with this aspect of social oppression, risks leaving an important contributing dynamic to identity-related forms of domination unchecked. By avoiding this "psychologizing" tendency

within the politics of recognition. Fraser claims to have located what is wrong with misrecognition in "social relations" and not "individual or interpersonal psychology." This is preferable, we are

told, because when misrecognition "is identified with internal distortions in the structure of the consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim."⁵⁹ This does not have to be the case. Fanon, for example, was unambiguous with respect to locating the cause of the "inferiority complex" of colonized subjects in the colonial social structure.⁶⁰ The problem, however, is that any psychological problems that ensue, although socially constituted, can take on a life of their own, and thus

need to be dealt with independently and in accordance with their own specific logics. As mentioned previously, Fanon was insistent that a change in the social structure would not guarantee a change in the subjectivities of the oppressed. Stated simply, if Fanon's insight into the interdependent yet semi-autonomous nature of the two facets of colonial power is correct, then, dumping all our efforts into alleviating the institutional or structural impediments to participatory parity (whether redistributive or recognitive) may not do anything to undercut the debilitating forms of unfreedom related to misrecognition in the traditional sense.⁶¹ This brings us to the second key problem with Taylor's theory when applied to colonial contexts.

I have already suggested that Taylor's liberal recognition approach is incapable of curbing the damages wrought within and against Indigenous communities by the structures of state and capital, but what about his theory of recognition? Does it suffer the same fate vis-à-vis the forms of power that it seeks to undercut? As noted in the previous section, underlying Taylor's theory is the assumption that the flourishing of Indigenous peoples as self-determining entities is significantly dependent on their being afforded cultural recognition and institutional accommodation by the settler state apparatus. What makes this approach both so intriguing and so problematic, however, is that Fanon, whom Taylor uses to make his case, argued against a similar presumption in

the penultimate chapter of *Black Skin, White Masks*. Moreover, like Taylor, Fanon did so with reference to Hegel's master/slave parable. There Fanon argued that the dialectical progression to reciprocity in relations of recognition is frequently undermined in colonial situations by the fact that, unlike the subjugated slave in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, many colonized societies no longer have to struggle for their freedom and independence. It is often negotiated, achieved through constitutional amendment, or simply "declared" by the settler state and bestowed upon the Indigenous population in the form of political rights. Whatever the method, in these circumstances the colonized, "steeped in the inessentiality of servitude," are "set free by [the] master."⁶² "One day the White Master, without conflict,

recognize[s] the Negro slave."⁶³ As such, they do not have to lay down their lives to prove their "certainty of being" in the way that Hegel insisted. The "upheaval" of formal freedom

and independence thus reaches the colonized "from without": "The black man [is] acted upon. Values that [are] not . . . created by his actions, values that [are] not . . . born of the systolic tide of his blood, [dance] in a hued whirl around him. The upheaval [does] not make a difference in the Negro. He [goes] from one way of life to another, but not from one life to another."⁶⁵ There are a number of important issues underlying Fanon's concern here. The first involves the relationship he draws between struggle and the disalienation of the colonized subject. For Fanon it is through struggle and conflict (and for the later Fanon, violent struggle and conflict) that imperial subjects come to be rid of the "arsenal of complexes" driven into the core of their being through the colonial process. I will have more to say about this aspect of Fanon's thought below, but for now I simply want to flag the fact that struggle serves as the mediating force through which the colonized come to shed their colonial identities, thus restoring them to their "proper places."⁶⁷ In contexts where recognition is conferred without struggle or conflict, this fundamental self-transformation—or as Lou Turner has put it, this "inner differentiation" at the level of the colonized's being—cannot occur, thus restoring the realization of freedom. Hence Fanon's claim that the colonized simply go from "one way of life to another, but not from one life to another"; the structure of domination is modified, but the subject position of the colonized remains unchanged—they become "emancipated slaves."⁶⁸ The second important point to note is that when Fanon speaks of a lack of struggle in the decolonization movements of his day, he does not mean to suggest that the colonized in these contexts simply remained passive recipients of colonial practices. He readily admits, for example, that "from time to time" the colonized may indeed fight "for Liberty and Justice." However, when this fight is carried out in a manner that does not pose a foundational "break" with the background structures of colonial power as such—which, for Fanon, will always invoke struggle and conflict—then the best the colonized can hope for is "white liberty and white justice; that is, values secreted by [their] masters."⁶⁹ Without conflict and struggle the terms of recognition tend to remain in the possession of those in power to bestow on their inferiors in ways that they deem appropriate.⁷⁰ Note the double level of subjection here: without transformative struggle constituting an integral aspect of anticolonial praxis the Indigenous population will not only remain subjects of imperial rule insofar as they have not gone through a process of purging the psycho-existential complexes battered into them over the course of their colonial experience—a process of strategic desubjectification—but they will also remain so in that the Indigenous society will tend to come to see the forms of structurally limited and constrained recognition conferred to them by their colonial "masters" as their own; that is, the colonized will begin to identify with "white liberty and white justice." As Fanon would later phrase it in *The Wretched of the Earth*, these values eventually "seep" into the colonized and subtly structure and limit the possibility of their freedom. Either way, for Fanon, the colonized will have failed to reestablish themselves as truly self-determining; as creators of the terms, values, and conditions by which they are to be recognized.⁷² My third concern with Taylor's politics of recognition involves a misguided sociological assumption that undergirds his appropriation of Hegel's notion of mutual recognition. As noted in the previous section, at the heart of Hegel's master/slave dialectic is the idea that both parties engaged in the struggle for recognition are dependent on the other's acknowledgment for their freedom and self-worth. Moreover, Hegel asserts that this dependency is even more crucial for the master in the relationship, for unlike the slave he or she is unable to achieve independence and objective self-certainty through the object of his or her own labor. Mutual dependency thus appears to be the background condition that ensures the dialectic progress towards reciprocity. This is why Taylor claims, with reference to Hegel, that "the struggle for recognition can only find one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals."⁷³ However, as Fanon's work reminds us, the problem with this formulation is that when applied to actual struggles for recognition between hegemonic and subaltern communities the mutual character of dependency rarely exists. This observation is made in a lengthy footnote in *Black Skin, White Masks* where Fanon claims to have shown how the colonial master "basically differs" from the master depicted in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. "For Hegel there is reciprocity," but in the colonies "the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work." To my mind this is one of the most crucial passages in *Black Skin, White Masks* for it outlines in precise terms what is wrong with the recognition paradigm when abstracted from the face-to-face encounter in Hegel's dialectic and applied to colonial situations. Although the issue here is an obvious one, it has nonetheless been critically overlooked in the contemporary recognition literature: in relations of domination that exist between nation-states and the sub-state national groups that

they "incorporate" into their territorial and jurisdictional boundaries, there is no mutual dependency in terms of a need or desire for recognition.⁷⁵ In these contexts, the "master"—that is, the colonial state and state society—does not require recognition from the previously self-determining communities upon which its territorial, economic, and social

infrastructure is constituted. What it needs is land, labor, and resources.⁷⁶ Thus, rather than leading to a condition of reciprocity the dialectic either breaks down with the explicit nonrecognition of the equal status of the colonized population,

or with the strategic "domestication" of the terms of recognition leaving the foundation of the colonial relationship relatively undisturbed.⁷⁷ Anyone familiar with the power dynamics that structure the Aboriginal rights movement in Canada should immediately see the applicability of Fanon's insights here. Indeed, one need not expend much effort to elicit the countless ways in which the liberal discourse of recognition has been limited and constrained by the state, the courts, corporate interests, and policy makers in ways that have helped preserve the colonial status quo. With respect to the law, for example, over the last thirty years the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently refused to recognize Aboriginal peoples' equal and self-determining status based on its adherence to legal precedent founded on the white supremacist myth that Indigenous societies were too primitive to bear political rights when they first encountered European powers. Thus, even though the courts have secured an unprecedented degree of protection for certain "cultural" practices within the state, they have nonetheless repeatedly refused to challenge the racist origin of Canada's assumed sovereign authority over Indigenous peoples and their territories. The political and economic ramifications of recent Aboriginal rights jurisprudence have been clear-cut. In *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia* it was declared that any residual Aboriginal rights that may have survived the unilateral assertion of Crown sovereignty could be infringed upon by the federal and provincial governments so long as this action could be shown to further "a compelling and substantial legislative objective" that is "consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the [Aboriginal peoples]." What substantial objectives might justify infringement? According to the court, virtually any exploitative economic venture, including the "development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, and the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those aims."⁷⁹ So today it appears, much as it did in Fanon's day, that colonial powers will only recognize the collective rights and identities of Indigenous peoples insofar as this recognition does not throw into question the background legal, political, and economic framework of the colonial relationship itself.⁸⁰ But the above examples confirm only one

aspect of Fanon's insight into the problem of recognition in colonial contexts: namely, the limitations this approach runs up against when pitted against these overtly structural expressions of domination. Are his criticisms

equally relevant to the subjective or psycho-affective features of contemporary colonial power? With respect to the forms of racist recognition driven into the psyches of Indigenous peoples through the institutions of the state, church, schools, and media, and by racist individuals within the dominant society, the answer is clearly yes. Countless studies, novels, and autobiographical narratives have outlined, in painful detail, how these expressions have saddled individuals with low self-esteem, depression, alcohol and drug abuse, and violent behaviors directed both inward against the self and outward toward others.⁸¹ Similarly convincing arguments have been made concerning the limited forms of recognition

and accommodation offered to Indigenous communities by the state. For example, Taiiaki Alfred's work unpacks the ways in which the state institutional and discursive fields

within and against which Indigenous demands for recognition are made and adjudicated can come to shape the self-understandings of the Indigenous claimants involved. The problem, for Alfred, is that these fields are **by no means neutral**: they are **profoundly hierarchical** and as such have the ability to **asymmetrically** govern how Indigenous subjects think and act, not only in relation to the recognition claim at hand, but also in relation to themselves, to others, and the land. This is what I take Alfred to mean when he suggests,

echoing Fanon, that **the dominance of the legal approach to self-determination has over time helped produce a class of Aboriginal "citizens" whose rights and identities have become defined more in relation to the colonial state,**

and its legal apparatus than the historical traditions of Indigenous nations themselves. Similarly, strategies that have sought independence via capitalist economic development have already facilitated the creation of an emergent Aboriginal bourgeoisie whose thirst for profit has come to outweigh their ancestral obligations to the land and to others. Whatever the method,

the point here is that these strategies threaten to erode the most egalitarian, nonauthoritarian, and sustainable characteristics of traditional Indigenous cultural practices and forms of social organization.⁸²

AT: Perm – Western knowledge and combining

The taking-up of decolonization theory alongside Western philosophy is a settler adoption fantasy which allows settler scholars to think themselves superior to Native people and reconstitute Settler futurity through foreclosing Native futures. It creates an ethical sense of mutuality between the Settler and Native predicated on recognizing Settler suffering and hard work.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls. "Decolonization is not a metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

For the purposes of this article, we locate the desire to become without becoming [Indian] within settler adoption fantasies. These fantasies can mean the adoption of Indigenous practices and knowledge, but more, refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping. This is a fantasy that is invested in a settler futurity and dependent on the foreclosure of an Indigenous futurity.

Settler adoption fantasies are longstanding narratives in the United States, fueled by rare instances of ceremonial "adoptions", from John Smith's adoption in 1607 by Powhatan (Pocahontas' father), to Lewis Henry Morgan's adoption in 1847 by Seneca member Jimmy Johnson, to the recent adoption of actor Johnny Depp by the family of LaDonna Harris, a Comanche woman and social activist. As sovereign nations, tribes make decisions about who is considered a member, so our interest is not in whether adoptions are appropriate or legitimate. Rather, because the prevalence of the adoption narrative in American literature, film, television, holidays and history books far exceeds the actual occurrences of adoptions, we are interested in how this narrative spins a fantasy that an individual settler can become innocent, indeed heroic and indigenized, against a backdrop of national guilt.

The adoption fantasy is the mythical trump card desired by critical settlers who feel remorse about

settler colonialism, one that absolves them from the inheritance of settler crimes and that bequeaths a new inheritance of Native-ness and claims to land (which is a reaffirmation of what the settler project has been all along).

To more fully explain, we turn to perhaps the most influential version of the adoption narrative, penned by James Fenimore Cooper in 1823-1841. James Fenimore, son of “that genius in land speculation William Cooper” (Butterfield, 1954, p. 374), grew up in Six Nations territory that his father had grabbed and named after himself as Cooperstown, New York. In these Iroquois lakes, forests, and hills, James Fenimore, and later his daughter, Susan, imagined for themselves frontier romances full of tragic Indians, inventive and compassionate settlers, and virginal white/Indian women in virgin wilderness. Cooper’s five-book series, collectively called the Leatherstocking Tales, are foundational in the emergence of American literature. Melville called Cooper “our national author” and it was no exaggeration. His were the most widely read novels of the time and, in the age of the printing press, this meant they were the most circulated books in a U.S. print-based popular culture. Mass print established national language and identity, an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) from which emerges ‘America’ as a nation as opposed to just an assortment of former colonies. The Tales are credited with the constructions of the vanishing Indian, the resourceful Frontiersman, and the degenerate Negro: the pivotal triad of archetypes that forms the basis for an American national literature. The Last of the Mohicans is undoubtedly the most famous among the Tales and has been remade¹² into three separate television series in 1957, 1971, and 2004; an opera in 1977; a BBC radio adaptation in 1995; a 2007 Marvel comic book series; a stage drama in performance since 2010; and eleven separate films spanning 1912 to 1992. In a sense, Last of the Mohicans is a national narrative that has never stopped being remade¹³. Across all five books, Cooper’s epic hero is Natty Bumppo, a white man ‘gone native’, at home in nature, praised for his wisdom and ways that are both Indian and white. In Last of the Mohicans, this hero becomes the adopted son of Chingachgook, fictional chief of the fictional tribe “Mohicans”, who renames Natty, Nathaniel Hawkeye - thus legitimating and completing his Indigeneity. At the same time, Chingachgook conveniently fades into extinction. In a critical symbolic gesture, Chingachgook hands over his son Uncas - the last of the Mohicans - to the adopted, Indigenized white man, Hawkeye. When Uncas dies, the ramification is obvious: Hawkeye becomes without becoming the last of the Mohicans. You are now one of us, you are now Native. “The pale-faces are masters of the earth, and the time of the red-men has not yet come again” (Cooper 2000, p.407). Cooper’s books fantasize the founding and expansion of the U.S. settler nation by fictionalizing the period of 1740-1804, distilled into the single narrative of one man. The arc of his life stands in for the narrative of national development: the heroic settler Natty Bumppo transitions from British trapper to ‘native’ American, to prairie pioneer in the new Western frontier. Interestingly, the books themselves were written in reverse chronological order, starting with the pioneer, going backwards in time.

Through such historical hypnosis, settler literature fabricates past lives, all the way back to an Indian past.

‘I am American’ becomes ‘I was frontiersman, was British, was Indian’. In this fantasy, Hawkeye is both adopter and adoptee. The act of adopting indigenous ways makes him ‘deserving’ to be adopted by the Indigenous. Settler fantasies of adoption alleviate the anxiety of settler un-belonging. He adopts the love of land and therefore thinks he belongs to the land. He is a first environmentalist and sentimentalist, nostalgic for vanishing Native ways. In today’s jargon, he could be thought of as an eco-activist, naturalist, and Indian sympathizer. At the same time, his cultural hybridity is what makes him more ‘fit’ to survive - the ultimate social Darwinism - better than both British and Indian; he is the mythical American. Hawkeye, hybrid white and Indian, becomes the reluctant but nonetheless rightful inheritor of the land and warden of its vanishing people.

Similarly, the settler intellectual who hybridizes decolonial thought with Western critical traditions (metaphorizing decolonization), emerges superior to both Native intellectuals and continental theorists simultaneously. With his critical hawk-eye, he again sees the critique better than anyone and sees the world from a loftier station¹⁴.

It is a fiction, just as Cooper’s Hawkeye, just as the adoption, just as the belonging. In addition to fabricating historical memory, the Tales serve to generate historical amnesia. The books were published between 1823-1841, at the height of the Jacksonian period with the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and subsequent Trail of Tears 1831-1837. During this time, 46,000 Native Americans were removed from their homelands, opening 25 million acres of land for re-settlement. The Tales are not only silent on Indian Removal but narrate the Indian as vanishing in an earlier time frame, and thus Indigenous people are already dead prior to removal. Performing sympathy is critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. It is no accident that he is often read as a sympathizer to the Indians (despite the fact that he didn’t know any) in contrast to Jackson’s policies of removal and genocide. Cooper is cast as the ‘innocent’ father of U.S. ideology, in contrast to the ‘bad white men’ of history. Performing suffering is also critical to Cooper’s project of settler innocence. Hawkeye takes on the (imagined) demeanor of the vanishing Native - brooding, vengeful, protecting a dying way of life, and unsuccessful in finding a mate and producing offspring.

Thus sympathy and suffering are the tokens used to absorb the Native Other’s difference, coded as pain, the

'not I' into the 'I'. The settler's personal suffering feeds his fantasy of mutuality.

The 2011 film, *The Descendants*, is a modern remake of the adoption fantasy (blended with a healthy dose of settler nativism). George Clooney's character, "King" is a haole hypo-descendant of the last surviving princess of Hawai'i and reluctant inheritor of a massive expanse of land, the last wilderness on the Island of Kauai. In contrast to his obnoxious settler cousins, he earns his privilege as an overworked lawyer rather than relying on his unearned inheritance. Furthermore, Clooney's character suffers - he is a dysfunctional father, heading a dysfunctional family, watching his wife wither away in a coma, learning that she cheated on him - and so he is somehow Hawaiian at heart. Because pain is the token for oppression, claims to pain then equate to claims of being an innocent non-oppressor. By the film's end, King goes against the wishes of his profiteering settler cousins and chooses to "keep" the land, reluctantly accepting that his is the steward of the land, a responsibility bequeathed upon him as an accident of birth. This is the denouement of reconciliation between the settler-I and the interiorized native-not-I within the settler. Sympathy and suffering are profoundly satisfying for settler cinema: *The Descendants* was nominated for 5 Academy Awards and won for Best Adapted Screenplay in 2012. The beauty of this settler fantasy is that it adopts decolonization and aborts it in one gesture. Hawkeye adopts Uncas, who then conveniently dies. King adopts Hawai'i and negates the necessity for ea, Kanaka Maoli sovereignty.

Decolonization is stillborn - rendered irrelevant because decolonization is already completed by the indigenized consciousness of the settler. Now 'we' are all Indian, all Hawaiian, and decolonization is no longer an issue. 'Our' only recourse is to move forward, however regretfully, with 'our' settler future.

In the unwritten decolonial version of Cooper's story, Hawkeye would lose his land back to the Mohawk - the real people upon whose land Cooperstown was built and whose rivers, lakes, and forests Cooper mined for his frontier romances. Hawkeye would shoot his last arrow, or his last long-rifle shot, return his eagle feather, and would be renamed Natty Bumppo, settler on Native land. The story would end with the moment of this recognition.

Unresolved are the questions: Would a conversation follow after that between Native and the last settler? Would the settler leave or just vanish? Would he ask to stay, and if he did, who would say yes? These are questions that will be addressed at decolonization, and not a priori in order to appease anxieties for a settler future.

Links general

Link - Extinction

The 1AC's framing of existential threats is a false form of white neutrality that posits them as the hero of modernity which actively effaces the structural violence of settlement and racial slavery. The AFF's citational politics shows their indebtedness toward domination as telos both in the specific pieces of evidence in the 1AC and the research agenda of the 1AC.

Mitchell and Chaudhury 20 – Basille School of International Affairs; York Universite – Keele Campus [Mitchell, A. and Chaudhury, A., 2020. Worlding beyond 'the' 'end' of 'the world': white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms. *International Relations*, 34(3), pp.309-332.] KU– mads

Such assumptions are at the core of the mainstream apocalyptic visions (and their linear temporalities) that are increasing integral to IR imaginaries at the 'turn' of the discipline's 'first century'. We contend that the foundational and generative role of such imaginaries in global power structures does not receive adequate attention in the field of IR or in the broader social and natural sciences. As a result, their tendency to narrow and homogenize the futures of worlds, plural, goes largely unchecked within the discipline

and its discourses. Yet **the white futurist discourses we discuss are influential: they aim to bring about major shifts in global public consciousness and policy-making and strategy.** They are **often accorded validation by the scientific credentials of their authors and their embeddedness in large-scale data** and modeling processes. Through these means of public persuasion, **such discourses have the potential to shape concepts** that are, and will likely continue to be, foundational to IR: **how threats are understood**; the boundaries of 'humanity' and 'nonhumanity', and the distributions of harm across and beyond these structures; and the forms of agency and governance demanded by, and deemed acceptable within, a context of global crises.

An interdisciplinary IR concerned with interconnected global challenges – the aspiration of this special issue – needs to attend to how dominant narratives and futural imaginaries cut off and sideline the concrete presents and possible futures of plural Others. Second, where this special issue asks 'how we should hold things together, conceptually, empirically and disciplinarily' (see introduction, italics ours), Mitchell and Chaudhury 311 we ask what possibilities arise when current structures fall apart – or, indeed, are actively dismantled by the resurgence of worlds they seek to oppress or erase. Far from seeing this scenario solely in terms of catastrophe, as many of the narratives discussed in this article do, we want to open up more conversation in IR about its emancipatory, creative potential for the global connection between and amongst plural worlds. With these aims in mind, we start by examining a number of salient and influential works in the field addressing global crises, including 'global catastrophic risks' and 'human extinction', demonstrating how they express anxiety for, and seek to protect whiteness. The second section points to BIPOC futurisms that directly challenge the futures circumscribed by whiteness and offer distinct forms of subjectivity, temporality, and mobilities for responding to ongoing disaster. Throughout, we focus on how futures are imagined, who imagines them and with whose flourishing in mind in competing struggles for survival and thriving in (post-) catastrophic worlds. White subjectivities.

Discourses that predict the imminent 'end of the world' are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular

set of global social structures and subjectivities: **whiteness**. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is **a set of cultural political economic, normative, and subjective structures** derived from Eurocentric societies and propagated through global formations such as **colonization** and capitalism. These ^{multi-scalar} structures work by **segregating bodies** through the **inscription of racial difference**, **privileging those they recognize** or construct as 'white', and **unequally distributing harms** to those that they do not.⁵ Whiteness is ^{also} a form of **property**⁶ that **accrues benefits** – including **material, physical, and other forms of security** – and ^{pervasive forms of} **power, across space, time, and social structures**. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, **whiteness** takes unique

forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it **should not be treated as universal** – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream 'end of the world' discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, **the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness.** Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to **render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it.** ^{Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of 'end of the world' discourses seem unaware of its} **integral influence on** their

thinking and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus.⁷ Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof.⁸ On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying logics of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate mainstream paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race⁹ as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler,¹⁰ continues to benefit from and participate – and thus invest¹¹ – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).¹² The ‘habits’ of racism¹³ are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities. First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection Global Existential Risk,¹⁴ which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and Humanprogress.org, are dominated by white men, with few exceptions.¹⁵ Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation¹⁶ that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only some intersectionalities as relevant.¹⁷ As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017)¹⁸ work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer postapocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems. These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells¹⁹

contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides 'mythology and theology'. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown²⁰ argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims' into apparently 'objective' claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore²¹ demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded. Further, emerging narratives of the 'end of the world' explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, survivors' are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley's book Tipping Points for Planet Earth features a stylized male 'human' whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff.²² Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet's future, Homer-Dixon²³ asks his readers to imagine 'an average male – call him John' (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest²⁴ – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies²⁵ as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz²⁶ proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a 'model for human survival', based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture²⁷ – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of 'human' resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived 'resilience' – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction 'onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor'.²⁸

Link – Politics of Recognition

Settler societies utilize recognition as the be-all end-all of colonial deliberation, assuming that people consent to governance. For Native people, this produces a ruse of consent that trickily assimilates the dispossessed through coercing consent to be governed via electoral politics and the supreme law of recognition. In order for electoral politics to be operative, they have to imagine that Native people do not matter or that there are no indigenous political orders in place, therefore genocidally erasing Native people and mystifying the political sphere through the ruse of consent.

Simpson 17 [Audra Simpson is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University. She is the author of *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States* (DukeUniversityPress,2014). She is co-editor of *Theorizing Native Studies* (Duke University Press, 2014), and has articles in *Theory & Event*, *Cultural Anthropology*, *American Quarterly*, *Junctures*, *Law and Contemporary Problems* and *Wicazo Sa Review*. She is a Kahnawà:ke Mohawk. “The ruse of consent and the anatomy of ‘refusal’: cases from indigenous North America and Australia,” *Postcolonial Studies*, 2017 //tjb]

One might try to resist writing an article on ethnographies of the political with direct recourse to the political present. Doing so might risk elevating elements of the moment and then sacrificing the theory-building project with a dizzying and contaminating arbitrariness of the present – a present whose significance is yet to be determined. **Furthermore, an analysis that starts with things formally political, and in this, specifically electoral, and presidential in the U.S. might make these risks of contamination especially acute.** ‘Are things really as they seem?’ ‘Is this in fact, a fact, and one that will endure?’ Yet, how to make sense of the very un-statesman-like behaviour of a President who bragged of sexual assault, mocked a physically disabled journalist, campaigned on a ‘nativist’ platform that called out the foreign, qualified them as ‘bad people’ (re: Muslims, Mexican and presumably criminal border crossers) and did so with jeering support? **How to make sense of the significance of this discursive and now legal practice of xenophobia, with no reflection on how such claims to argument are also claims to place and claims out of history? How could he – a person descended from immigrants, settlers of a second and third order – make determinations on the content of other peoples’ character and right of passage to this place? How can anyone really make these determinations, save for actual Indigenous people? One would have to imagine that there are no Indigenous political orders in place to make such loud, public statements or that Indigenous peoples simply do not matter if settlers are in their place. Here, I am being deliberately provocative in order to press upon the claim of formal politics in**

contemporary settler colonial societies and territories, which accrue and implement their power through thin, triumphalist and erroneous claims to place and to history. In doing so, they make natives out of immigrants and ghosts, 'descendants' out of 'spurious' claimants, criminals out of natives. Yet, it may be at this moment where electoralism lays bare the faulty premise of settler colonial states and the very architecture of history, politics and sentiment that allow for easy, reductionist answers to profound problems of justice, of what may be irreconcilable issues. This is the spurious claim of a colonial past, that stays in the past, of a populace that consents via an electoral system to be governed, and the speculative 'truthiness' of these claims to territory itself. The half-truths, the non-truths have piled up and are pointing fingers at everyone as if to say 'check this', verify that, and this industry of fact checking around the claims of the new Republican regime arc back to the original false claims of the settler: a right to territory and a right to govern. So, it is perhaps then a most appropriate time to reflect upon the present and ask about the imagination of the political under conditions of falsehood. In this article, I consider what I frame as a 'not easy answer' to the problem of political will and politics in settler colonial societies. These are societies defined by the coloniality of their past and their presents, and thus are societies beset by ongoing inequalities and structural violence that demand justice. Yet, the problem of justice imagines 'recognition' to be the philosophical and institutional remedy to matters of 'historical injustice'—to matters of dispossession, violence, and as the Introduction to this set of articles indicates, matters of inequality and thus of power. In this piece, I offer a deepening of earlier arguments I have made about recognition, about its presumed infallibility and centrality to matters of justice. 'Refusal' rather than recognition is an option for producing and maintaining alternative structures of thought, politics and traditions away from and in critical relationship to states. In this piece, I use ethnographic examples to deepen this earlier argument about the generative alternative that refusal may play not only as a political practice but also as a mode of analysis. The implicit backdrop for this argument is the aforementioned political present, and the particularity of electoralism in settler states. Electoralism, predicated on the notion of political will communicated through a vote, seems upended in this moment. 'We did not vote for him' some would say, in a popular sense. My focus, however, is not on the failures of an electoral college system or perhaps errors in polling methodology, but the deeper issue that is obfuscated by the apparent agreed-upon nature of voting-as consent or as expression of political will. If indigeneity is taken to be a social and political fact, all other arguments based on right to land are rendered spurious. This process of making land one's own, against Indigenous political orders – what Manu Vimalassery has recently called 'the counter-sovereignty' of settler projects, which orient against Indigenous sovereignty – animates this argument as well.¹ Energised by this approach to the legal history of United States settler laws of dispossession, however, I argue above all against the practice of reduction, both in our analysis and in our political imaginations, to 'recognition'. 'Recognition' is seen as the sine qua non if not the

end point, **the orgasm of justice today.**² **This overstatement of its possibility is in part because complex politics have been rendered in reduced forms that imagine ‘flat (dehistoricized) pluralism’.**³ By ‘recognition’, I mean the political practice, rooted in philosophical formula of seeing, unencumbered, what and who is before you – seeing as one ought to be seen, in a way that is consistent with one’s sense of self and property. **What this translates into in legal contexts, for questions of justice, is the affirmation of one’s (inherent) rights by the state. But these are states, in colonial contexts, that were born only through the devices of lethal force and dispossession and, in the case of the United States, economic and political enslavement of particular populations.**⁴ These broad but particular and differently experienced racial histories bear upon the present in significant ways. In this piece, **I focus on the particular way in which law in colonial contexts enforced Indigenous dispossession and then, granted freedom through the legal tricks of consent and citizenship. For Native people, this ruse of consent marks the inherent impossibility of that freedom after dispossession, a freedom I argue is actually theft.**⁵ This because of **the trickery of ‘consent’ in colonial contexts, which papers over the very conditions of force and violence that beget ‘consent’.** Treaty-making is one such case that I will discuss. **The long view of history, that in settler colonial contexts is actually always short, invokes a fundamental hegemony of interpretation such as viewing the ‘signing’ of agreements as full and robust consent, and consent as justice.** In such political configurations, there are no further matters to be discussed. Time starts anew; the matter is done. **We know with the analytic of settler colonialism that matters are not done, that oppressive structures survive agreements. Yet, in spite of the problematic historical, philosophical and legal basis of settler societies, ‘recognition’ appears to be the only political game in town, and with that comes the presumed unassailability of electoral politics as a device for not only representation, no matter how mediated and concessionary it may be, but also the recognition of rights and the exercising of rights.**

Link - Moves to Innocence

Settler moves to innocence are a reactionary response to the guilt of benefitting from settler colonial violence – these construct Settlers as oppressed and never oppressors and prevent decolonization and the unsettling of innocence.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls. “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

We observe that another component of a desire to play Indian is a settler desire to be made innocent, to find some mercy or relief in face of the relentlessness of settler guilt and haunting (see Tuck and Ree, forthcoming, on mercy and haunting).

Directly and indirectly benefitting from the erasure and assimilation of Indigenous peoples is a difficult reality for settlers to accept. The weight of this reality is uncomfortable; the misery of guilt makes one hurry toward any reprieve.

In her 1998 Master's thesis, Janet Mawhinney analyzed the ways in which white people maintained and (re)produced white privilege in self-defined anti-racist settings and organizations.⁸ She examined the role of storytelling and self-confession - which serves to equate stories of personal exclusion with stories of structural racism and exclusion - and what she terms 'moves to innocence,' or "strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination" (p. 17). Mawhinney builds upon Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack's (1998) conceptualization of, 'the race to innocence', "the process through which a woman comes to believe her own claim of subordination is the most urgent, and that she is unimplicated in the subordination of other women" (p. 335).

Mawhinney's thesis theorizes the self-positioning of white people as simultaneously the oppressed and never an oppressor, and as having an absence of experience of oppressive power relations (p. 100). **This simultaneous self-positioning afforded white people in various purportedly anti-racist settings to say to people of color, "I don't experience the problems you do, so I don't think about it," and "tell me what to do, you're the experts here"** (p. 103).

“The commonsense appeal of such statements,” Malwhinney observes, enables white speakers to “utter them sanguine in [their] appearance of equanimity, is rooted in the normalization of a liberal analysis of power relations” (ibid.). In the discussion that follows, we will do some work to identify and argue against a series of what we

call ‘settler moves to innocence’. **Settler moves to innocence are those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much at all. In fact, settler scholars may gain professional kudos or a boost in their reputations for being so sensitive or self-aware. Yet settler moves to innocence are hollow, they only serve the settler.**

This discussion will likely cause discomfort in our settler readers, may embarrass you/us or make us/you feel implicated. Because of the racialized flights and flows of settler colonial empire described above, settlers are diverse - there are white settlers and brown settlers, and peoples in both groups make moves to innocence that attempt to deny and deflect their own complicity in settler colonialism. When it makes sense to do so, we attend to moves to innocence enacted differently by white people and by brown and Black people. In describing settler moves to innocence, our goal is to provide a framework of excuses, distractions, and diversions from decolonization. We discuss some of the moves to innocence at greater length than others, mostly because some require less explanation and because others are more central to our initial argument for the demetaphorization of decolonization.

We provide this framework so that we can be more impatient with each other, less likely to accept gestures and half-steps, and more willing to press for acts which unsettle innocence, which we discuss in the final section of this article.

Colonial Equivocation

Colonial equivocation is a move to settler innocence – the aff is ambivalent about their position in the settler-native-slave triad of the United States and therefore overwrites indigenous peoples and forecloses decolonization

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as

places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls. "Decolonization is not a metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

A more nuanced move to innocence is the homogenizing of various experiences of oppression as colonization. **Calling different groups 'colonized' without describing their relationship to settler colonialism is an equivocation, "the fallacy of using a word in different senses at different stages of the reasoning"** (Etymonline, 2001). **In particular, describing all struggles against imperialism as 'decolonizing' creates a convenient ambiguity between decolonization and social justice work, especially among people of color, queer people, and other groups minoritized by the settler nation-state. 'We are all colonized,' may be a true statement but is deceptively embrasive and vague, its inference: 'None of us are settlers.' Equivocation, or calling everything by the same name, is a move towards innocence that is especially vogue in coalition politics among people of color. People of color who enter/are brought into the settler colonial nation-state also enter the triad of relations between settler-native-slave.** We are referring here to the colonial pathways that are usually described as 'immigration' and how the refugee/immigrant/migrant is invited to be a settler in some scenarios, given the appropriate investments in whiteness, or is made an illegal, criminal presence in other scenarios. Ghetto colonialism, prisons, and under resourced compulsory schooling are specializations of settler colonialism in North America; they are produced by the collapsing of internal, external, and settler colonialisms, into new blended categories¹⁵. **This triad of settler-native-slave and its selective collapsibility seems to be unique to settler colonial nations.** For example, all Aleut people on the Aleutian Islands were collected and placed in internment camps for four years after the bombing of Dutch Harbor; the stated rationale was the protection of the people but another likely reason was that the U.S. Government feared the Aleuts would become allies with the Japanese and/or be difficult to differentiate from potential Japanese spies. White people who lived on the Aleutian Islands at that same time were not interned. Internment in abandoned warehouses and canneries in Southeast Alaska was the cause of significant numbers of death of children and elders, physical injury, and illness among Aleut people. Aleut internment during WWII is largely ignored as part of U.S. history. **The shuffling of Indigenous people between Native, enslavable Other, and Orientalized Other¹⁶ shows how settler colonialism constructs and collapses its triad of categories. This colonizing trick explains why certain minorities can at times become model and quasi-assimilable (as exemplified by Asian settler colonialism, civil rights, model minority discourse, and the use of 'hispanic' as an ethnic category to mean both white and non-white) yet, in times of crisis, revert to the status of foreign contagions (as exemplified by Japanese Internment, Islamophobia, Chinese Exclusion, Red Scare, anti-Irish nativism, WWII antisemitism, and anti-Mexican-immigration).** This is why 'labor' or 'workers' as an

agential political class fails to activate the decolonizing project. “[S]hifting lines of the international division of labor” (Spivak, 1985, p. 84) bisect the very category of labor into caste-like bodies built for work on one hand and rewardable citizen-workers on the other. Some labor becomes settler, while excess labor becomes enslavable, criminal, murderable. **The impossibility of fully becoming a white settler - in this case,**

white referring to an exceptionalized position with assumed rights to invulnerability and legal supremacy - as articulated by minority literature preoccupied with “glass ceilings” and “forever foreign” status and “myth of the model minority”, offers a strong critique of the myth of the democratic nationstate. However, its logical endpoint, the attainment of equal legal and cultural entitlements, is actually an investment in settler colonialism. Indeed, even the ability to be a minority citizen in the settler nation means an option to become a brown settler. For many people of color, becoming a subordinate settler is an option even when becoming white is not.

“Following stolen resources” is a phrase that Wayne has encountered, used to describe Filipino overseas labor (over 10% of the population of the Philippines is working abroad) and other migrations from colony to metropole. This phrase is an important anti-colonial framing of a colonial situation. However an anti-colonial critique is not the same as a decolonizing framework; anti-colonial critique often celebrates empowered postcolonial subjects who seize denied privileges from the metropole.

This anti-to-post-colonial project doesn’t strive to undo colonialism but rather to remake it and subvert it. Seeking stolen resources is entangled with settler colonialism because those resources were nature/Native first, then enlisted into the service of settlement and thus almost impossible to reclaim without re-occupying Native land.

Furthermore, the postcolonial pursuit of resources is fundamentally an anthropocentric model, as land, water, air, animals, and plants are never able to become postcolonial; they remain objects to be exploited by the empowered postcolonial subject. **Equivocation is the**

vague equating of colonialisms that erases the sweeping scope of land as the basis of wealth, power, law in settler nation-states. Vocalizing a ‘multicultural’ approach to oppressions, or remaining silent on settler colonialism while talking about colonialisms, or tacking on a gesture towards Indigenous people without addressing Indigenous sovereignty or rights, or forwarding a thesis on decolonization without regard to unsettling/deoccupying land, are equivocations. That is, they ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they are ambivalent about minority / people of color / colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.

[Link - Nativeness w/out Analysis of Anti-Blackness](#)

A lens that counterposes the relationship between black and indigenous studies creates an antagonistic model that reifies violence by positioning indigenous and black bodies in opposition which forces political isolation

King, Navarro, Smith 20

Tiffany Lethabo King, Jenell Navarro & Andrea Smith, King -- PhD, University of Maryland, College Park, 2013 ,Gender and Sexuality in the African Diaspora, Black Feminisms, Native Feminisms, Critical Geographies, Conquest, Settler Colonialism, and Imperialism, Jenell Navarro received her Ph.D. in Cultural Studies from Claremont Graduate University in 2011. Her expertise and publications fall within the fields of Indigenous Studies and Hip-Hop Studies. Andrea Smith is associate professor in the Department of Media and Cultural Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Her publications include Native Americans and the Christian Right: The Gendered Politics of Unlikely Alliances (Duke University Press, 2008), and Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (South End Press, 2005). May 2020, "Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness" Pages 3-7 //Jazmyn

During the late s and early s, militant anti- imperialist and an- ticipalist activism animated by the Black Power movement in the US and ird World internationalism birthed the rst Black studies programs. e

strong ties between Black activism and the development of academic de- partments created fertile ground for conversations between Black and Na- tive scholars and activists

Revisiting Black, Native, and ethnic studies' radi- cal roots encourages a commemoration of histories of solidarity and shared strug gle while it also exposes the pressure that universities put on elds like Black studies to 'de ne' itself and distinguish itself from other ethnic stud- ies programs like Native studies. In ,

Robert Allen wrote about the ways Beyond Incommensurability 3 that **Black studies and ethnic studies were being "counter- posed" and forced into an "antagonistic relationship" with one another in the acad emy**. While **this genealogical approach thus far has limited itself to Black studies in the US, recounting this history helps expose the ways that the settler colonial university worked (and continues) to pit elds like Black and Native studies against one another and prevent generative dialogue**

After the establishment of Black studies departments, a noticeable uptick in scholarship by Black scholars on Black and Native American relations emerged after Jack D. Forbes's book Africans and Native Americans: e Language of Race and the Evolution of Red- Black Peoples was published in . In the rst de cades of the twenty- rst century, several Black his- torians (Sharon Holland; Barbara Kruthamer; Tiya Miles; Celia Naylor; Fay Yarborough) have written books dedicated to the study of Black and Indigenous people in the Southeastern United States. Scholars began to pay par tic u lar attention to the practice of slavery among the Five Civilized Tribes. In , Tiya Miles and Sharon Holland coedited the anthology Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds: e African Diaspora in Indian Country, e contributors to the collection used a variety of interdisciplinary meth- ods and rooted their work in primary sources, archival rec ords, and Black and Native literary traditions that told stories of Black and Native relations in North Amer i ca. Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds emerged around the same time that the emergent eld of (white) settler colonial studies was beginning to take shape in Australia and would eventually gain currency in North Amer i ca. In the wake of Miles and Holland's Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds, Frank B. Wilderson III authored one of the rst interdisciplinary Black stud- ies texts that introduced a theoretical frame for elaborating the complex structural and ontological— political, economic, and libidinal— positions of Black and Native people in the United States. While Wilderson's Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms () rep- resents an impor tant intellectual moment and opening for a discussion of Black and Red relations, the

book— and his writings of late— **trou ble the no- tion that Black and Indigenous people can be in co ali tion with one another or even communicate with one another within the terms and par ameters of academic and humanist discourse. Calling attention to the prob lems of humanist frames of interpretation like sovereignty, land, coloniality, and decolonization**

Wilderson and Jared Sexton continue to argue for incom- mensurability. While this po liti cal and ontological impasse continues to shape con temporary academic dialogue, **Black studies proj ects** in Canada 4 Tiffany Lethabo

King, Jenell Navarro & Andrea Smith and the Ca rib bean **offer diff er ent points of engagement and itineraries for thinking about Black and Indigenous relations**

A Black studies' reading practice that also attends to African diaspora studies as they unfold in the Ca rib bean and South Amer i ca has the concep- tual space to acknowledge philosophical, literary, and historical traditions that can attend to histories of both enslavement and colonialism. Black and African diaspora scholarship that emerges from the Ca rib bean and Central and South Amer i ca directly engages questions of coloniality from theoret- ical and experiential perspectives. For example, Sylvia Wynter's body of work that traces the "epistemic revolutions" of Western humanism attends to the ways that Blacks (Negroes) and Indigenous (Indios) are made and remade as a perpetual limit point or outside to the bound aries of Man across vari ous colonial formations. Rinaldo Walcott's chapter in this collection draws on this Wynterian tradition in order to elaborate the ways that the

Canadian nation- **state's project of multiculturalism, which expands to incorporate modes of Indigenous representation into its notion of the human/Man, does so at the expense of Black subjects**

in Canada. Shona Jackson's book *Creative Indigeneity: Between Myth and Nation in the Caribbean* interrogates the vestiges of humanist violence in the modernist onto-epistemology of labor as a civilizing and modernizing agent for Afro-descended creole subjects in the Caribbean. Hegelian and colonial holdover that valorizes labor traps Black subjects within limited notions of agency and emancipation as it erases Indigenous subjectivity in Guyana. Wynter's critique of humanism and its systems of overrepresentation has functioned as a crucial pivot point in Black studies that has enabled some scholars to break up the theoretical impasse presented by Afro-pessimist scholars like Wilderson and Sexton. Wynter's attack on the foundations of humanism itself allow for the emergence of a shared critique to emerge between Black and Native studies. Scholar and coeditor Tiffany Lethabo King, who takes Wynter's lead in her own work and focuses on interrogating the invention of the humans, finds that this mode of critique also functions as a space of convergence for the fields of Black and Native studies. Rather than focus on genealogies or origin stories, *Other wise Worlds* hopes to model practices of reading and listening that create new possibilities for thinking of, caring for, and talking to one another. One of the conversations that this book emerged from was the *Other wise Worlds* conference held in at UC Riverside. At conference attempted to promote intellectual and political exchange between Native and Black studies by focusing on

how the analytics of anti-Black racism intersect with Beyond Incommensurability 5 the analytics of settler colonialism. **Both Black studies and Native studies have rightfully pointed out the problematics of developing “people of color” or “ethnic studies” projects based on a politics of equivalence (i.e., this racial oppression is like or similar to slavery or Indigenous genocide). However, it is often the case that rejecting a politics of equivalence becomes equated with calls for political or intellectual isolation. Instead, this project proposed to explore the relationality between these forms of racisms and colonialisms as well as explore the political implications of these relationalities**

At the *Other wise Worlds* conference, one of the participants, Jared Sexton, talked about **the exchange between scholars from Black studies and Native studies as being an exercise in daring to engage and speak to one another as “amateurs” reading in each other's fields. The act of speaking and reading “across” difference without the pretense of knowing, having mastered, or being able to parrot the already accepted assumptions, tenets, and prescribed politics of each discipline produced a space where misreadings and presumptions could surface and be interrogated in earnest.**

In addition, the willingness to be amateurs enabled us to engage each other as we are, rather than as completely perfected political and intellectual beings such that the only response that becomes enabled is a rejection of readings that lack this perfection. Such an approach also focuses on an ongoing process of continuing engagement rather than a fixation on writing as a final product that can stand for all time. The *Other wise Worlds* conference was an effort toward this kind of continuing engagement that produced generative moments in which participants were forced to slow down, feel the implications of their gaps in knowledge, and acknowledge how a lack of knowledge, attention to, or sustained engagement with each other created moments of impasse and isolation. The initial participants in this conversation included Black and Native scholars, organizers, and cultural workers. Many of the contributors to this collection (Maile Arvin, Ashon Crawley, Marcus Briggs-Cloud, Denise Ferreira da Silva, Chad Benito Infante, Tiffany Lethabo King, Jared Sexton, Andrea Smith, and Rinaldo Walcott.) participated in and/or attended the conference. While in one another's company, attendees of the conference were able to witness **the ways that**

settler colonial and anti-Black violence had been able to mediate Black and Indigenous relations with one another. is violent form of mediation functioned to sequester Indigenous and Black communities, including Black and Indigenous scholars in the academy, in ways that facilitated a lack of contact, missed opportunities for intimacy, and the subsequent production of amateurs that misread and misunderstood one another.

To date, the political stakes of issues like the nation, rights, and sovereignty are the contested terrain that continue to create friction between Black and Native communities. This tension becomes particularly acute when discussing the respective politics and platforms of redress as they are articulated by liberal and “leftist” Black and Native activists and movements. For example, Indigenous communities in North America

and the Caribbean continue to critique centuries-old Black-led struggles for reparations. **Black movements for reparations for slavery continue to elide the fact that reparations, particularly when compensation is congealed as land, requires the further consolidation of the US settler nation and affirms its authority to re-distribute wealth and “Native land” as it sees fit. Liberal Black politics that do not call for a re**

distribution of wealth, land, and resources but simply ask for inclusion in the national body via “civil rights” have also posed a problem for Native communities and their struggles to have treaty rights and Indigenous self-determination honored. Black politics that do not contest the very existence and idea of the United States present themselves as antagonistic to Indigenous survival and sovereignty.

On the other hand, Black abolitionist politics that propose a move away from the very idea of the nation critique Native nations and their movements for sovereignty as overly invested in international, Western, and humanist models of governance that make survival

untenable for stateless and nationless Black diasporic peoples.

Move-ments for treaty rights and sovereignty that require recognition from and broker deals with the anti- Black US settler nation and international bodies on a nation-to-nation basis undermine the humanity of stateless and nation-less Black descendants of slaves who are not legible on these terms. us, conference attendees and participants were able to recognize moments when Native political and intellectual thought centered land, nation, and sovereignty in ways that alienated and could potentially harm Black people

e dialogue that unfolded at the conference also brought to the surface instances in which Black critiques of Native sovereignty conflated Native understandings of the self, community, land, and self-determination with settler epistemologies and ontologies of being, autonomy, and humanity.

Community Policing

Violent repression relies on being accompanied by ‘softer’ forms of policing- a transition to community policing only legitimizes the police as arbiters of justice.

Bronwyn **Dobchuk-Land**, 12-1-2016, - assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Winnipeg. (Bronwyn, "Resisting ‘progressive’ carceral expansion: lessons for abolitionists from anti-colonial resistance," Taylor & Francis,

<https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10282580.2017.1377057>) E.G.

Similarly, community policing has always been posed as a resolution to crises of police legitimacy especially in poor communities of color, promising to improve policing through improved relationships between the police and these communities (Gilmore & Gilmore, 2016, p. 182). **The idea of ‘community policing’ often re-emerges on the policy scene in times and places where the racism of policing has become more**

visible or concerning to a broader public (beyond those who are concerned about it on a daily basis because they are subject to it). However, decades of study of community policing has confirmed that despite being oriented toward changing negative perceptions of law enforcement, it rarely results in changes to law enforcement practice (Klockars, 1988). Police establishing closer contact with the communities they are policing does not result in those communities having any increased influence or power over the police. As Bernstein et al. (1975) observed in 1970s California, and Gilmore and Gilmore (2016) observe across the US today despite constantly being framed as an alternative form of policing, 'community policing' always exists alongside more violent forms of police repression, and often serves as the 'community relations' arm necessary to legitimize that violent repression. While political 'progressives' continue to propose that the police can be transformed into a politically neutral agency of 'social service' that could potentially enjoy high levels of legitimacy if properly executed (Bernstein et al., 1975, p. 41), in practice, and as observed in Winnipeg, community policing does not solve the political conflicts from which it emerges. Many scholars and activists have made a productive connection between the crises of legitimacy from which community policing most often arises, and the military practices of counter-insurgency and pacification (Neocleous, Rigakos, & Wall, 2013; Hansford, 2016). As Neocleous et al. (2013) document, these strategies have been a central feature of global military operations since the 1950s, based on the recognition that the use of force must be accompanied by 'a second group of actions' that involves 'psychological action, propaganda, political and operational intelligence, police measures, personal contacts with the population, and a host of social and economic programs' (p. 1). These authors propose that this military strategy is not only part of a program of repression, but also part of 'a broader and far-reaching action to construct a new social order' (p. 1). For example, pacification has always been integral to capitalist accumulation (Neocleous et al., 2013, p. 2). This helps to illustrate the dynamics by which violent repression relies on being accompanied by 'softer' forms of policing, shattering the myth that one will replace the other by highlighting how they are mutually constitutive. It also helps to highlight the material history and present of policing in the Canadian West, which originated in order to facilitate Indigenous dispossession from land, and continues to dispossess primarily Indigenous people by routinely moving them from their homes and neighborhoods into cages, as criminalization is posed as a 'solution' to the damage done to communities by ongoing settler colonial management and control.

The logic of policing itself needs to be challenged – efforts to improve or reform community policing are nothing more than a settler renovation.

Bronwyn Dobchuk-Land, 12-1-2016, - assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Winnipeg. (Bronwyn, "Resisting 'progressive' carceral expansion: lessons for abolitionists from anti-colonial resistance," Taylor & Francis, <https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10282580.2017.1377057>) E.G.

Calls for the closer integration of an imagined benevolent police force with social programming are reminiscent of a long history in Manitoba of integrating social welfare programming with policing in attempts to ‘manage’ Indigenous people in order to facilitate their dispossession. For example, both the coercive and deadly residential schooling system, and the child welfare system have operated according to the logic that they were ‘rescuing’ Indigenous children from the bad influence of their under-civilized parents so that they may be better prepared for the onslaught of colonization, which was taken to be inevitable (de Leeuw, 2009). While residential schooling discourse spoke of ‘keeping kids busy’ as a form of assimilative re-socialization, present-day crime prevention discourse promises to keep kids busy in order to keep them out of crime (Manitoba Department of Justice, n.d.). **In this context, efforts to improve the image of policing by making it more ‘community-oriented’ must be resisted not only because they will not make people safer (as highlighted by an abolitionist analysis), but also because of the role these ‘improvements’ play in renovating and affirming settler-colonial state power. Instead, the logic of policing itself needs to be challenged, and in particular its role in the context of ‘networked settler state power’ that also includes crime prevention and other social programming** (Dhillon, 2015, p. 2). Examples of resistance by CBOs in city center Winnipeg to collusion with police-centered ideas of the problems faced by their communities provide lessons of how non-profits may productively use the limited room they have to maneuver in order to offer protection from the harms of criminalization.

Links vs K-debate

Link - K-Affs – Academy (Paperson)

The AFF is a liberal fantasy that relies on nostalgic utopian imaginaries to preserve the settler monopoly on academia. This lends itself to becoming trapped within the neoliberal confined of the university, ultimately dooming the AFF to fail.

Paperson 17 – who writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, often with frequent collaborator Eve Tuck [la, other “I” – K. Wayne Yang, “A Third University Is Possible”] mp

The Second University Critiques **The** second world **university**, like Second Cinema, **is marked by** its investments in **critical theory**, that is, the diverse work of the Frankfurt School in critiquing media and capitalist systems in the “West” that emerged out of World War II. Two threads of critical theory run through academia in the arts and humanities, on one hand, and the social sciences, on the other. **Literary critical theory focuses on the deconstruction of texts** for their underlying meanings, **whereas social theory focuses on** domination within **social systems**, usually from a **neo-Marxist frame**.^[15] At least ideologically, **the second world university is committed to the transformation of society through critique, through a deconstruction of systems of power and** in this way **offers fundamental analyses for any third world university curriculum**. Yet **its hidden curriculum reflects the material conditions of higher education—fees, degrees, expertise, and the presumed emancipatory possibilities of the mind—and reinscribes academic accumulation**. Usually, when traditionalists speak with nostalgia for the idealized university of old, the library counter in the sky where Kant and Hegel and Freire study together, this is the second world university. We are familiar with it; **in the United States, it often houses the Marxist scholars, the ethnic studies formations, women’s studies, gender studies, and American studies**. To borrow some rhetoric from Gayatri Spivak, **it is the house of the hegemonic radical, the postcolonial ghetto neighborhood within the university metropolis**. One of **the tautological traps** of the second world university **is mistaking its personalized pedagogy of self-actualization for decolonial transformation**. **When people say “another university is possible,” they are** more precisely **saying that “a second university is possible,” and they are often imagining second world utopias**, where the professor ceases to profess, where hierarchies disappear, **where all personal knowledges are special, and, in other words, none are**. Their assumption is that people will “naturally” produce freedom, and freedom’s doppelganger is **critical consciousness**. **They are rarely talking about a university that rematriates land, that disciplines scholar-warriors rather than “liberating” its students, that repurposes the industrial machinery, that supports insurrectionary nationalisms as problematic antidotes to imperialist nationalism, that acts upon financial systems rather than just critiquing them, that helps in the accumulation of third world power rather than simply disavowing first world power, that is a school-to-community pipeline, not a community-to-school pipeline**. In short, **“another university is possible,” so far, hasn’t made possible a third world university**. The second world university **announces itself through nostalgia**. Sara Ahmed describes this as **“an academic world [that] can be idealised in being mourned as a lost object; a world where dons get to decide things; a world imagined as democracy, as untroubled by the whims and wishes of generations to come.”**^[16] **This nostalgia can be futuristic**, indeed, the dons are **imagining themselves a permanent future in a white academic pantheon**. This is similar to **settler futurity, which is always nostalgic for its own current power, fearful that it may come to pass**. The second world university is **a pedagogical utopia**. Its horizons are still total in that its **end goal is a utopia that everyone should and**

can attend. This liberal expansion rests materially on the continued accumulation of fees, debt, and land by its big baby turned big baby daddy, the first world university.

Link - Affect

Affect studies refuses to critique the sovereign, propertied, self-determining subject of liberalism, whose ability to affect others while remaining un-affected is the condition of modernity's violence, including genocide and settlement. Without attending to the affects of land, genocide, and settlement, their affect theory is irrelevant and contrary to the project of decolonization.

Rowe & Tuck 16 [Aimee Carillo Rowe is Professor of Communication Studies at California State University, Northridge. She works across writing genres as a memoirist, feminist theorist, and culture critic. Her research focuses on human and inhuman processes and performances of becoming as relational, embodied, and fluid across contexts, including U.S. popular culture, Indian workplaces, and U.S. Latinx performing arts communities. Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. "Settler Colonialism and Cultural Studies: Ongoing Settlement, Cultural Production, and Resistance," *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies*, 2016 //tjb]

This decolonizing framework prioritizes Indigenous sovereignty and futurity, making it "incommensurable" with human and civil rights social justice projects as some elements of these processes cannot be aligned. Thus, a decolonizing project requires an "ethic of incommensurability," which evokes a complex process of affective labor—the formation of "contingent coalitions" that may "feel very unfriendly" (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 35). Contingency and incommensurability mark the tricky affective terrain of building coalitions and doing cultural studies work that centers questions of Indigeneity and landedness—in ways that both align with and radically break from the work in affect studies.

Affect studies has been inspired by interdisciplinary conversations across the humanities and the sciences, including psychoanalysis, theories of the body and embodiment, poststructuralism, political theory, and queer theorizations of melancholy and trauma, inspired by the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Brian Massumi. **So while the affective turn**

has inspired many culture critics and queer theorists to productively interrogate the social, cultural, and psychoanalytic terrain of the seemingly individualized experience of feeling, sensation, and trauma. work in this field often presumes a universalized subject of emotion, unmarked by geography or even social location—and “innocent” of any complicity to settlement. What kinds of knowledges might scholars of affect studies develop if they centered questions of land, landedness, and Native dispossession?

In *On Sympathetic Grounds: Race, Gender, and Affective Geographies in Nineteenth-Century North America*, Naomi Greyser (2016) maps emotions about, for, and from the land in contestations over the settlement of North America. Her work “excavates the land as an active participant in and literal and figurative landscape for, contestations over stewardship, territory and sovereignty” to “hold in view the displacements that constitute North America as a place” (Greyser, 2016). Foregrounding affect and geography, Greyser decenters a universal, ungrounded affective subject that often circulates within affect studies, instead attending to indigenous and settler relationships to native homelands, and the affective labor through which settlement and decolonization are mobilized. Her work challenges new materialists and affect theorists to account for a long and diverse history of tribal philosophies and practices in their thinking about matter and spirit, affect and animacy, as she

attends to the uneven distribution of agency across bodies, surfaces, and substances. **Affect studies draws on psychoanalytic treatments of the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real, with wholeness and lack, with memory, displacement, and haunting, to frame trauma in ways that produce “multiple subjectivities and multiple modernities expressed in new forms of history, often presented at first in autobiographical experimental writings by diasporic subjects”** (Clough, 2007, p.

6). **While these writings productively interrogate conditions of knowability, representation, and memory, in the absence of a framework that foregrounds geography and the relationship between experiences of trauma and the land, they have no necessary relationship to decolonization.**

Dian Million (Tanana Athabascan) defines trauma as “suppos[ing] a violence that overwhelms, wounding individual (and collective) psyche, sometimes suspending access to memory” (Million, 2013, p. 2). Her definition resonates with and draw upon the work in affect studies, but Million leverages Indigenous accounts of trauma to “explode the measured ‘objective’ accounts of Canadian (and US) colonial histories” (Million, 2013, p. 31). For Million (2013), Indigenous women’s narratives are productively understood as felt knowledges that expose a “limit and boundary where white academia designated them incomprehensible,” which is inextricably linked to “the self-determination Indigenous peoples” as they “affectively work out . . . painful political, social, and personal conundrums with the state” (p. 2). **So even as affect studies**

provides a point of entry for powerfully interrogating the conditions of trauma that resonate with Indigenous experiences as subjects of assimilation and objects of genocide and ongoing dispossession (as Million analyzes) and can be powerfully leveraged to expose processes of dispossession (in Greyser’s work), the field of affect studies remains wedded to an ungrounded, unbounded universal subject. Such land- and Indigenous-centered frameworks invite culture critics to examine how social, material, and rhetorical practices are shaped through settlement and the formation of the White subject as a settler subject. And in doing so would also entail an attention to the uneven distribution

of affects and affective processes—the very constitution of some subjects as always-already affecting, while “others” are slotted as “affectable.” In her concept of ethnographic entrapment, Denise Ferreira Da Silva’s (2007) articulation of the construction of **the human as formed through a form of self-determination mobilized through the Western subject’s power over and distinction from “affectable others.”** Building on

Ferreira Da Silva’s work, Andrea Smith (2010) argues this quality of affectability is a condition of self-determination, settlement, and racialization as the “Western subject differentiates itself from conditions of ‘affectability’ by separating from affectable others” (p. 42).

Similar to cultural studies treatments of the production of Whiteness and racial difference, the racialized subject awaits humanity through a movement toward universality, yet distinct is Ferreira Da Silva and Smith’s attention to self-determination as defined by the capacity to “affect” and not be affected by others. This “humanizing” project is grounded in the notion of the sovereign subject as structured by the privatization of land that, in turn, define landed subjects through the erasure of the land theft through which the sovereignty of the settler subject is experienced, organized, and imagined. Mark Rifkin (2012) argues that

Although U.S. Indian policy formally circulates the topos of self-determination, portraying the federal government as engaging with tribes’ lived sense of landedness and representations of themselves, it continues to foreclose forms of indigeneity, as a residual geopolitics predicated on principles other than those of the liberal state and as the collective memory of an ongoing history of violence. (Locations 109-110) **Reading Ferreira da Silva in conversation with Rifkin underscores the structures of settler colonialism through which the sovereign subject is imagined: through his or her ability to move, affect, displace, or remove first nations people and through the ongoing erasure of various “forms of indigeneity” that belie the myth of manifest destiny.**

Link - Agamben

Agamben’s theorization of bare life and sustained reflection on the ‘muselmann’ as the phenomenon that inaugurated a new epoch of biopolitics are products of colonial violence and post-colonial amnesia.

Jill Jarvis, 2014, Doctoral candidate in Comparative Literature at Princeton University. "Remnants of Muslims: Reading Agamben’s Silence," New Literary

History, Volume 45, Number 4, Pp. 720-722, Autumn 2014,
<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/567300/summary>; seambo

Thomas Keneally's Booker Prize-winning novel *Schindler's Ark* (1982) (later adapted as an Academy Award-winning 1993 feature film of similar title) comes closer to invoking specific historical experiences rather than ahistorical clichés, but Agamben does not cite this example: "The term was camp jargon," writes Keneally, "based on people's memory of newsreels of famine in Muslim countries, for a prisoner who had

crossed the borderline that separated the ravenous living from the good-as-dead."²⁹ It is no stretch to assume that some **prisoners of Nazi camps had seen photographs** or perhaps read Albert Camus's chronicles **of the famine that devastated** the Kabyle region of **Algeria** in 1939, but **Agamben** does not allude to "famine in Muslim countries" in his discussion.³⁰ He **draws a tight geographic and temporal circle around** this figure of **"bare life"** about which he underscores **that** ethics and politics begins only once "we" come to understand "who or what the **muselmann** is" (RA 47), and **second, that its production was a radically unprecedented phenomenon that transformed "our" modernity "after"** the catastrophe of **World War II**. If this condition was so unprecedented, as Agamben insists, **why should an epithet be so ready at hand to name it? What aporia makes it possible for Agamben not to notice these semantic clues, and to silence rather than sound out these historical connections?** Despite his **insistence** on the unprecedented status of the Nazi genocide, **Agamben's descriptions** of this violence **routinely point to precedents that he does not explore**. For example, in the concluding chapter of *Homo Sacer* titled "The Camp as 'Nomos' of the Modern," **Agamben** briefly **mentions** the **colonial history** of the concentration camp, noting that **the** first such institutions were either built by the Spanish in Cuba 1896 or by the English during the Boer wars (HS 166). **Agamben does not examine these cases, but leaves them in the margin** of his study.³¹

Likewise, when **Agamben** claims that Hitler had formulated, in 1937, "an extreme biopolitical concept for the first time" (RA 85) by instituting the principle of "volkloser Raum" (a space emptied of people), **he** manages to **produce sentences** like the following **without considering evident parallels with the techniques of settler colonialism: "Hitler's 'peopleless space' instead designates a fundamental biopolitical intensity . . . that can persist in every space and through which people pass into populations and populations pass into Muselmänner**.

Volkloser Raum, in other words, names the driving force of the camp understood as a biopolitical machine that, once established in a determinate geographical space, transforms it into an absolute biopolitical space" (RA 85–86). Strategically isolating the case of Hitler's Germany, Agamben theorizes "muselmannization" as a systematic stripping of legal subjectivity and crossed thresholds that mark degrees of banishment from political and social community. He hyperbolizes and ontologizes Levi's descriptions of the "Muselman," transforming this word into a sanctified name for the secret that he seeks to make legible: If, in the jargon of Nazi bureaucracy, whoever participated in the "Final Solution" was called a Geheimnisträger, a keeper of secrets, the Muselmann is the absolutely unwitnessable, invisible ark of biopower. Invisible because empty, because the Muselmann is nothing other than the volkloser Raum, the space empty of people at the center of the camp that, in separating all life from itself, marks the point in which the citizen passes into the Staatsangehörige of non-Aryan descent, the non-Aryan into the Jew, the Jew into the deportee, and, finally, the deported Jew beyond himself into the Muselmann, that is, into a bare, unassignable and unwitnessable life. (RA 156–7) Even as **the word "muselman" emerges** in Agamben's prose **stripped of its medieval and premodern history and severed from its precedent and coincident significance in French colonial taxonomy**, it retains a troubling doubleness, as if it is **haunted by what Agamben**'s belated making-visible **leaves so utterly out of sight**. Agamben's sentences become difficult to read without sounding out the unspoken heredity of the term. **Why should a condition of "unwitnessable" bare life—the threshold where human becomes indistinguishable from inhuman**, where the state exercises its power to determine life that can be sacrificed from that which can simply be terminated—**already have had a ready-made name available to Auschwitz**

prisoners ^{in 1944} that appears so natural to Agamben ^{in 1996} that he does not consider himself obligated to mention, let alone to learn from and think through, its history? **Agamben's oversight is not merely an individual or idiosyncratic failing.** **This** ^{engigmatic name is} ^{the central critical category in Remnants of Auschwitz and} **an object of sustained ethical and political reflection** for Agamben, yet his reformulation of "Levi's paradox" **relies on a semantic sleight that renders the "muselman" visible at Auschwitz but not Algiers or Aïn el-Bey.** **This** ^{appropriation of the term} **reflects an historiographic conundrum produced by colonial violence and maintained by postcolonial amnesia that continues to determine what can appear to whom as a recognizable subject** of historical knowledge and ethical reflection and **what cannot.**

Link - Commons

A politics of the commons without centering indigenous people precludes the possibility for transformative projects –undermines the fight for liberation, the Water Protectors prove the linkage of indigenous protests/movements to the ideas of the commons

Hegeman 19

Susan Hegeman, Susan Hegeman is professor of English at the University of Florida. She is the author of *The Cultural Return* (2012), the *minnesota review* (2019) 2019 (93): 133–140., <https://doi.org/10.1215/00265667-7737367> "The Indigenous Commons" //jazmyn

It is tempting to be cynical about invocations of the commons. ^{It might, for example, be reasonably argued that calls for the protection or restoration of the commons are fundamentally romantic, located within a restitutionist politics that fetishizes some other moment of history or some possibly fictitious state of disalienation (Löwy and Sayre 2003).} **A politics of the commons** ^{in this view,} **runs the risk of ignoring the complexities and conflicts of the present and the possibilities of more forward-looking, transformative projects.** ^{But whatever its limitations as a concept,} the idea of the commons persists in political discourse, and it is particularly prominent in the political arsenal of ideas animating current international indigenous politics **Indigenous leaders and their allies have invoked the language of the commons to assert their stakes in struggles over traditional forms of**

knowledge and over key resources, including land, water, and even the climate. To entirely dismiss **the idea of the commons thus strikes me as untenable, if only in that it potentially undermines a crucial tool in the liberation struggles of indigenous people in particular.** The connection between indigenous politics and the language of the commons is both longstanding and in some ways contradictory. Nevertheless, **the idea of the commons is central to an argument that connects indigenous people and their struggles both to global politics and to radical reconceptualizations of the relationships among knowledges, resources, and human communities.** One of the clearest recent **examples of the political deployment of the idea of the commons is the protest in 2016 against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation.** The protest was part of an ongoing environmentalist campaign, #NoDAPL, that **unified diverse groups in actions ranging from marches and divestment campaigns to acts of sabotage against the pipeline's builders.** Energy Transfer Partners. Leaders of the Great Sioux Nation (Oceti Sakowin), however, **voiced specific and local concerns. They maintained that the pipeline crossed ground that had been ceded to the Sioux Nation in various treaties. They also contended that it posed a direct threat to sites held sacred by the Sioux Nation (as well as several other American Indian nations) and that, in passing under the Missouri River, it endangered the water supply for members of their community as well as millions of others.** Native and non-Native (Allard 2016; Archambault 2016). **After several years of legal efforts to block the pipeline, Standing Rock Sioux activists set up a nonviolent encampment as a physical barrier to the pipeline's construction. They called themselves Water Protectors,** partly as a play of words, **to distinguish themselves rhetorically from whatever negative connotations attached to the word protesters. But with this name they also claimed the role of protectors of a commons in water against the twin threats of private expropriation and petrochemical pollution.** The encampment drew thousands of participants, including religious leaders, members of veterans' groups (who often have strong ties of affiliation and identification with American Indians), and representatives of hundreds of indigenous groups from North America and around the world, including Maori from New Zealand and Sámi from Scandinavia (Erdrich 2016). Thanks to social media, it became a global media spectacle, allowing millions worldwide to witness the Water Protectors' struggles with inclement weather and the aggressive tactics of the police, support GoFundMe campaigns, and engage in support protests in dozens of cities worldwide (Johnson 2017: 166–67). As such, **the encampment exemplifies a fully twenty-first-century political phenomenon of a global indigenous movement, empowered by new social media tools and a network of allies engaged with such global concerns as climate change and environmental justice. But simultaneously, this movement very deliberately invoked both an idea of the commons (specifically, in water and in the**

climate) and a practice—the encampment—that not only claimed federal land for their cause but also instantiated a practice of sharing common resources while working toward the goals of their movement. Ultimately, the #NoDAPL

protests failed in their central objective to halt the pipeline construction. Despite initial leverage over an Obama administration decision in the fall of 2016 to stop construction under the Missouri River water system, President Trump, in one of his first acts as president, signed an executive order allowing the pipeline to go forward. Oil began passing

through the Dakota Access pipeline in the spring of 2017; by the end of that year, it had leaked oil in at least five separate incidents (Brown 2018). Nevertheless, **the indigenous leadership of the #NoDAPL protests changed the political landscape** in a number of important ways. Centrally, they **drew attention to both the deep cultural**

significance and social and economic challenges of remote American Indian communities such as those on the Standing Rock Reservation. **In addition to calling attention to**

environmental racism and providing visibility for American Indian people, they also gave a new face to the international antipipeline movement, exemplifying in a concrete political form a relationship among indigenous people,

environmental stewardship, and opposition to industries that contribute to climate change. As of this writing, **indigenous people continue to act at the forefront**

of several antipipeline protests: in northern Minnesota, where activists are trying to halt expansion of the Enbridge Pipelines (Bures 2018), and in British Columbia, in opposition to parts of the pipeline system that would connect the Alberta tar sands to the environmentally sensitive coast of British Columbia (Bellrichard and Ghossoub 2019). In recent decades, the United Nations has played a central role in promoting this idea of a special relationship to the natural world to the concept of indigenous people as a global whole. In the rhetoric of such events as the 2015 Paris climate talks, which hosted an "Indigenous People's Pavilion," and in key documents like the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, the widely disparate indigenous peoples of the world have been defined as a political entity that possesses unique knowledge of, reverence for, and dependence on the environment. On this basis, cases have been made for the interconnectedness of the protection of the rights and cultures of indigenous peoples and cultures and the protection of local environments and natural resources (see United Nations 2007: articles 25–32). This yoking together of the rights of indigenous people and cultures with environmental protection has led to some concrete victories for both indigenous communities and environmentalist efforts (see Hegeman 2012: 121–22). But it could also be argued that it promotes a familiar stereotype of indigenous people as inherently closer to nature or attuned to environmentalist concerns. Such a view is especially harmful if it becomes a way to deny full cultural and historical complexity to indigenous people, who, like all humans, live by exploiting the resources of their environments in a wide variety of ways. To take a familiar North American case, the stereotype of the "ecological Indian" has often run up against the fact that Indian communities have, at various times, asserted access to and use of natural resources that have run afoul of preservationist and other environmentalist agendas (see Krech 1999; Warren 2002). And yet, given the complexities of the colonial encounter surrounding conceptions of resource use, it does not seem entirely surprising that American Indians, in particular, should come to represent to the descendants of the colonizers some of their own cultural memories of, and desires for, a variety of

sustainable, equitable, and spiritually satisfying practices of resource use. Indeed, **though the idea of the commons itself**

has a European provenance, it is possible to see how American Indians came to be associated with it. The idea of the "ecological Indian" is itself rooted in the experiences of conquest and settler colonialism. A variant of the

Noble Savage, whose lineage is in Montaigne, Rousseau, and the Romantics, this figure emerges from a conception of the New World as a prelapsarian Eden: its human inhabitants are both uniquely at one with nature and, being outside of history, untouched by the vices of an incipient modernity. But we need only look to John Locke's ([1690] 1980: 19) invocations of "the wild Indian, who knows no inclosure, and is still a tenant in common"—a test case for his labor theory of property—to see that this idea of the New World's Adam was just as much about early capitalism as it was about fantasies of humans in a state of nature. In this view, American Indians were perceived not only as existing in a spiritual oneness with nature but also as its "tenant in common," outside of market relations, and innocent of the concept of private property.¹ One of the founding myths of this view of the precapitalist, prelapsarian American Indian involves the sale of the island of Manhattan by the Lenape Indians to representatives of the Dutch West India Company for a paltry quantity of trade goods. The story has been used to signify the asymmetric relationship between American Indians and colonizers regarding their relative understanding of monetary value, principles of trade, and the meaning of property itself (see Kidwell 2002). As such, it seems to anticipate and even justify the longer history of the relentless expropriation of indigenous resources in North America, through an endless line of similar such transactions, in the form of treaties between the United States and its colonial predecessors and Indian communities. But behind such an account are some very hasty assumptions about the equality and mutuality of this and many other such "bargains." These would include the idea that both parties represented sovereign nations, endowed with the authority to engage in the transaction, and that they shared an understanding of the meaning and use of the objects being exchanged, including the meaning of land and its use. But it seems clear that this was very far from the case. Indeed, in this and other such negotiations of the early colonial period, there was probably a great deal of confusion on all sides about the meaning of, and the legal and

ethical grounds for, the appropriation of land. **To put it another way, the dispossession of American**

Indians from their land entailed not just the actual seizing of land but the prior transformation of land into expropriable property (see Nichols 2018). Hovering around this process was the concept of the commons. Colonial European assumptions about land ownership varied dramatically if the subject in question was a monarch, a trading company, or an individual. But even beyond those big categorical distinctions, the colonizers also brought with

them a wide variety of customary ideas about land use that derived from medieval Europe. This included a robust set of practices and rules governing the use of resources held in common (see De Moor, Shaw-Taylor, and Warde 2002). The fact that many New England towns still to this day call their municipal parks “commons” is an artifact of this history.

So is the evident labor that so many colonial jurists, apologists, and propagandists expended to justify the private expropriation of the New World's land. They were left to puzzle over the meaning of Indians' seemingly irrational or destructive land practices, including that of frequently moving the sites of their villages, or regularly setting fire to the forest. Deploying concepts like “waste” and “improvement,” writers including Francis Higginson and John Winthrop exclaimed over the Indians' improper use of natural resources and thereby cobbled together a labor theory of property *avant la lettre* (Cronon 1983: 55–81; Linklater 2013: 26–28). This justification for dispossession cum theory of property would not only endure but also be codified into the legal framework that would define first colonial and then American relations with indigenous people for centuries to come (see Cattelino 2018: 284–85). According to William Cronon (1983), Indians in New England in the colonial period did not have a conception of private property in land. Rather, he contends, access to land and resources was largely a matter of territorial rights, organized and negotiated between villages. Even as to personal property, Cronon states that “there was little sense either of accumulation or exclusive use” (61). But whether or not this is historically accurate hardly matters. Through the process of dispossession, American Indians were effectively defined as lacking in a conception of property. It must be left, then, to subsequent interpreters to develop a more positive account of indigenous conceptions of land and its human uses. Interpreters of indigenous philosophy have long emphasized a spiritual outlook among indigenous people oriented toward an understanding of the sacredness of specific places and a

worldview that emphasizes the relationality among humans, environments, and other living things (see Deloria 1973; Basso 1996; Coulthard 2014). Such a worldview rejects the objectification of the environment as a mere collection of resources and replaces it with a conception of mutual care between humans and the natural world. It would be, at the very least, Eurocentric to reduce this worldview to the conventional conception of a commons. But it bears enough similarities that we can see how a settler-colonial society could recognize it as such. It may seem to some that such a worldview exists in tension with an indigenous politics that fights for the recognition of treaties or asserts tribal sovereignty over territories and resources. But whatever contradiction arises here could be seen as an example of simple appropriation of the terms and concepts that have gained legitimacy in settler- colonial society, a case, in other words, of using the master's tools to dismantle his house.

Beyond this, it could be argued that assertions of rights or authority on the collective basis of a tribe or nation is an act of resistance against the assimilating push of the dominant society, which has long used the enticement of individual land ownership to break down tribal identity, cohesion, and control over resources. Tribal governance and ownership are a form of collective

ownership. Similarly, **more recent concepts like cultural rights, a product of the international discourse on human rights, can be seen as offering up possibilities for conceiving of rights or property on a collective basis, similar to the concept of the commons (see Hegeman 2012: 122–26). It has been proposed that a truly decolonial politics for indigenous people would entail a rigorous rejection of the terms of colonial thought—whether importations of racist ideas or concepts like sovereignty or recognition, which arguably in the end only confirm the legitimacy and power of the settler-colonial state** (Alfred 2002). **An ethos of mutual care between humans and the natural world has been proposed, then, as the kind of principle around which to build a fully decolonial politics on truly indigenous terms** (Coulthard 2014). Central to such a political project would, of course, be the difficult work of fully theorizing and putting into practice this ethos in a way that addresses the diversity of indigenous identities and communities. Meanwhile, humanity as a whole confronts a common emergency in the form of the climate crisis, the contours of which are made uniquely visible by pipelines, which mark a circuit across local, regional, and national

borders and describe in clear if dirty terms the actual circulations of risk and reward that define our current petroculture (Macdonald 2017). **The Water**

Protectors offered an example of how an indigenous politics could help all of us address the climate emergency. In linking their local protests to multiple ideas of commons, in their rhetoric and in the practices of the encampment, they simultaneously invoked ways of thinking long suppressed in the settler-colonial imagination and asserted a fully indigenous political principle. And they offered a powerful model for how to think and act collectively, in place, in a way that touches the planetary scale.

Link - Queer Theory

The 1AC's struggle for **(AFF)** is inextricably bound to an insidious desire to appropriate indigeneity and perpetuate settler governance.

Beenash Jafri, 2013, assistant professor of Cinema (critical sexuality studies in film and media), and a Fellow of the Simone de Beauvoir Institute at Concordia. She received her PhD in Gender, Feminist & Women's studies from York University. Her work interrogates the fraught intersections of race, Indigeneity, settler colonialism, and sexuality through film and cultural criticism, "Desire, Settler Colonialism, and the Racialized Cowboy," American Indian Culture and Research Journal: 2013, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 73-86, accessed at:

[https://uclajournals.org/doi/abs/10.17953/aicr.37.2.n758545211525815;](https://uclajournals.org/doi/abs/10.17953/aicr.37.2.n758545211525815)
//jazmyn

Much of the scholarship on race, racialization, and settler colonialism has framed the relationship between racialized subjects and settler colonialism in legal or political terms.²⁰ This ^{move} makes sense, considering that settler colonialism is, at base, a political project concerned with governance. For example, when Patrick Wolfe critically asserts that settler-colonial invasion is not an event, but a structure, he argues that the "event" of invasion is made permanent through technologies of governance, such as settler laws, policies, and institutions.²¹ Similarly, Lorenzo Veracini, when distinguishing settlerhood from migration, makes this distinction by suggesting that "settlers are founders of political orders, and carry their sovereignty with them."²² Like Wolfe, Veracini identifies sovereignty and political governance as the feature that distinguishes settler invasion from migration. Still underexamined in the literature on settler colonialism are the kinds of emotive investments that settler subjects may have in settler coloniality. To be clear, I am not denying that settler colonialism is a political project. However, I do wish to emphasize the significance of desire, which I would argue enables settler-colonial governance and vice versa. This notion that settler colonialism is as much a project of desire as it is a purely political or legal project is certainly clear within the emergent literature on Queer

Indigenous studies, which has shown how alternative models of kinship, through figures such as the berdache or two-spirit person, become objects of desire for Queer subjects searching for true or authentic selves and communities.²³

For example, in his research on Queer settler subjectivities, Scott Morgensen discusses how Queer Indigenous identities are appropriated by White LGBTQ activists to serve their own goals of building Queer movements without simultaneously challenging the logics of settler colonialism.²⁴ Similarly, in When Did Indians Become Straight? Mark Rifkin underlines how the fetishization of Native social structures by Queer settlers, or liberals more generally, is as complicit with the settler-colonial project as is the repudiation of these social structures by US imperialist politics.²⁵ In each case, argues Rifkin, Native social practices are framed strictly through the lens of cultural difference rather than as integral to processes of governance, and Native sovereignty is undermined.²⁶ The work of both Morgensen and Rifkin points to the ways that relations of desire sustain and reassert colonial power in settler states.

Queer theory is parasitic on settler colonial domination and culpable in the ascendancy of whiteness. We must decolonize the traces of colonial violence that linger within their demands for liberation.

Tuck et al. 2013, Maile Arvin is a assistant Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Utah and is Kanaka Maoli, Eve Tuck is an Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto and is Unangax, Angie Morril is currently Director of Title VI Indian Education Program for Portland Public Schools and is Klamath, "Decolonizing Feminism:Challenging Connections between Settler Colonialism and Heteropatriarchy," Feminist Formations, Volume 25, Issue 1, Pp. 24-25, Spring 2013, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43860665?casa_token=gS2IYuUd4OoAAAAA%3At7HGfvfA3MnCeJ688o1Bt0t4pUx_epWzelwc4-q11s9jEQQenwCMxllsqIFhZ95p-xzbivO9ShkgndpWpqEGcGiGY6XrAD2D5-dWadYggT0XtwZLBKM_tA&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents; seambo

Futurity and Decolonization As our discussions of Indigenous epistemologies about land and sovereignty have demonstrated, recognizing that Indigenous sovereignty struggles are gendered frequently requires revising conventional concepts of sovereignty, decolonization, and social change altogether. For us, the real promise of Native feminist theories lies precisely in the ways that, along with recognizing the very real challenges that Indigenous peoples face daily, these theories are simultaneously constructing what Smith (2008b) compellingly describes as "the history of the future of sovereignty, what sovereignty could mean for Native peoples" (257). By directing our

attention toward the beautifully evocative "history of the future of sovereignty" she is **reframing futurity** - a concept important to a number of disciplines, including queer studies and performance studies - **with Indigenous peoples at the center**. Thus, Smith demonstrates that one of the most radical and necessary moves toward **decolonization requires imagining and enacting a future for Indigenous peoples - a future based on terms of their own making**. In a GLQ special issue titled "Sexuality, Nationality, Indigeneity," Smith (2010) specifically elaborates on the concept of futurity as theorized by queer theorist Lee Edelman. She notes that **Edelman's** book *No Future* **forwards a useful critique of the figure of "the Child" as the symbol of society's reproductive future** and an excuse for justifying the reproduction of the existing social order (46). Yet, Smith also demonstrates that **refusing to participate in the reproduction of society by declining to reproduce the Child is a mode of radical activism that is only possible, desirable, and otherwise "thinkable" for certain economically privileged white queers**. She argues that [a]n **Indigenous critique must question the value of "no future" in the context of genocide, where Native peoples have already been determined by settler colonialism to have no future. If the goal of queerness is to challenge the reproduction of the social order, then the Native child may already be queered**. For instance, Colonel John Chivington, the leader of the famous massacre at Sand Creek, charged his followers to not only kill Native adults but to **mutilate their reproductive organs and to kill their children because "nits make lice."** In this context, **the Native Child is not the guarantor of the reproductive future of white supremacy; it is the nit that undoes it.** (48) Smith's critique exposes the ways that **radical queer theory can participate in the "ascendancy of whiteness" even when it disavows it** in Edelman's case, because he fails to acknowledge or consider the ways that having children is a privilege that has been historically denied to many nonwhite and nonaffluent people. **Given** the pervasive violence perpetuated on Indigenous peoples through **campaigns focused on managing Indigenous reproduction and child-rearing** (from boarding schools to eugenics and forced sterilization), **proposing to invest in "no future" seems not only irrelevant to Indigenous peoples, but a rehashing of previous settler colonial tactics**. Smith's critique is meant to be a generative one, insisting on making real connections between Native and queer studies for the future of both fields and all of the peoples these fields engage. She further argues that "while both 'tradition' and 'the future' must be critically engaged, it does not follow that they can be dismissed" (ibid.). We also place importance on ideas of Indigenous futures, which are always also interlaced with Indigenous traditions, histories, and even ghosts, in our own theories of decolonization. Eve Tuck (2009) has written about desire-based research as a key counterpoint to damage-centered research frameworks, which too often present Indigenous peoples as broken, arguing that "[d]esire is involved with the not yet and, at times, the not anymore Desire is about longing, about a present that is enriched by both the past and the future" (417). Angie Morrill (forthcoming) further **writes that "[g]hosts haunt the future with expectations," noting that we share desires with ghosts, therefore Native desire is a kind of time machine**. For Maile Arvin (forthcoming), **decolonization involves regeneration**, which she defines as **"desires and practices oriented by transforming settler colonial dispossession and recreating a people-possessed (rather than an individually self-possessed) Indigenous future."** In each of our approaches toward decolonization, we do not intend to recommend to our readers one proper set of decolonial practices, but rather create spaces in which decolonization can be deeply considered and experimented with in the specific contexts of different places. Overall, with this challenge to recognize Indigenous ways of knowing, we

insist that it is most important to acknowledge Indigenous concepts and epistemologies as complex, knowledge- able, and full of both history and desire. **Engaging Indigenous epistemologies, without appropriating them or viewing them merely as a mystical metaphor, is a method of decolonization that could play a significant role in creating a future for Indigenous peoples** and Indigenous ways of knowing.

Link – AI scenario

Link – AI China War - Hegemony

The aff’s representation of the AI arms race against China reproduces Cold War imperialist discourses in order to maintain global hegemony through US exceptionalism and justify imperialist war-making.

Katz 20 [Yarden Katz is is a departmental fellow in Systems Biology at Harvard Medical School. His scientific interests are at the interface of artificial intelligence and biology. At Berkman Klein, he is working on understanding the politics and culture of biomedical science. *Artificial Whiteness: Politics and Ideology in Artificial Intelligence*. Columbia University Press, 2020. //tjb] recut: //jazmyn

In the 2010s, as in the past, **AI figured prominently in imperial- ist discourses. In the summer of 2017 the Chinese government unveiled a plan to integrate AI into its military and civilian affairs, which provoked panic within the U.S. political and aca- demic establishment.** The Chinese plan led the U.S. government to consider limiting China’s involvement with American com- panies.¹⁰⁷ **In the same year, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared that whoever leads in AI “will become the ruler of the world.”** **Following these developments, then U.S. defense secre- tary James Mattis called on the Pentagon to work more closely with Silicon Valley corporations in developing AI.** By the fol- lowing year the Pentagon had committed two billion dollars to building an AI center.¹⁰⁸

AI is still framed as a power struggle among empires, such as the United States and China. MIT Technology Review pub- lished a “China special issue” in 2018 that evaluates the country’s threat to U.S. hegemony. According to the magazine, China’s dependence on foreign materials for making integrated circuits “could potentially cripple its AI ambitions.” But “AI itself could change all of that. New types of chips are being invented to fully exploit advances in AI”—and China might be “reinventing microchips for the first time in ages.” We have here another instantiation of the magical chip narrative we encountered with Japan’s Fifth Generation Project in the 1980s. **The current strug- gle over AI is taken to reflect, as it was then, a greater imperial struggle: the**

magazine warns that “China’s chip ambitions have geopolitical implications,” that such a chip could enable “new weapons systems,” and that the chips are also “central to increasing trade tensions between the U.S. and China.” If successful, China’s hypothetical chip industry would make the nation “more

economically competitive and independent” and thus pose a threat to U.S. “national strength and security.”¹⁰⁹ **Mainstream media generally equates AI “supremacy” with global hegemony, as a series of articles in the Washington Post show.** One article refers to China and the United States as “two AI superpowers” at “battle for supremacy in the field.”¹¹⁰ Another piece states that “China’s application of AI should be a Sputnik moment for the U.S.”¹¹¹ Yet another article described China’s national plan on AI as “the Chinese threat that an aircraft carrier can’t stop” and suggested that beating China will require “a more nimble Pentagon.”¹¹²

This rhetoric reflects what Edward Said has identified as the “cultural consensus” among U.S. intellectual elites in which “American leadership and exceptionalism is never absent.”¹¹³ **In the nineteenth century, for example, American exceptionalism might have been justified by talk of “manifest destiny”—and as we have seen, AI practitioners echoed this rhetoric in the 1980s regarding Japan. But as Said observed, in times where overt colonial and imperial relations are less acceptable, “manifest destiny” is replaced by sanitized phrases like “world responsibility.” The underlying logic, however, is the same: the United States must lead the world for the world’s own good. AI is a convenient vehicle for this doctrine, usually in more sanitized form, as well as a site in which the relative gains made by warring empires can be assessed.**

The idea that mastery of AI is an indication of national power extends beyond the United States and China. The British government, for example, formed a Council on AI in partnership with corporations, including Facebook, motivated by the premise that “a revolution in AI technology is already emerging. If we act now, we can lead it from the front. But if we ‘wait and see’ other countries will seize the advantage.”¹¹⁴ Likewise, the French government of Emmanuel Macron has invested two billion dollars in a national plan, and according to Macron, “if you want to manage your own choice of society, your choice of civilization, you have to be able to be an acting part of this AI revolution”—which means “having a say in designing and defining the rules of AI.”¹¹⁵

These discussions are even framed using concepts such as “balance of power,” familiar from Cold War–era imperial discourse.¹¹⁶

Link – AI Hegemony

We cannot think contemporary AI governance without thinking the colonial violence that sustains and subtends it. The aff’s calls for AI governance

attempts to produce benevolent AI, but that's parasitic on histories of global colonialism and the statistical enumeration of people and land which create digital colonialism and data colonialism that reproduces the divides between global North and South through data extraction and mapping techniques.

Adams 21 [Rachel Adams is a member of the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa and a professor at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London. "Can artificial intelligence be decolonized?" *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews*, Vol 46, 2021, Issue 1-2: Artificial Intelligence & its Discontents.

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In the totality of its machinic, computational, and imaginary manifestations, Artificial Intelligence is structurally, systematically, and psychologically altering not only local and global society, but what it means to be human, or, to be counted as such. Accounts such as James Williams' on the attention economy that detail how digital technologies function at a neurological level to capture and coax human impulses (2018); Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger's analysis of how AI will not replace humanity but rather re-engineer us as computable (2018); and Shoshana Zuboff's work on surveillance capitalism that explicates a new world order where human behaviour has become the commodity of capitalist extraction (2018), all provide examples of how advanced technologies associated with AI are working at deep and complex levels in ways that are radically redefining what it means to be human.

Yet none of these texts, which constitute some of the leading work in the field, take into account the complex genealogy of intelligence: whose conception of intelligence is modelled within technology or how the idea has been put to work in dividing people between the desired and the undesirable. Nor the history of the human body as machine and commodity borne from slavery and colonialism, such that Achille Mbembe names blackness as the prototype for the assemblage of the human-object of modernity (2017, 2019). Nor the ways in which the knowledges upon which AI is built – statistical enumeration of people and land – were advanced by imperial powers to control and contain colonial populations (Appadurai 1993; Breckenridge 2014; Kalpagam 2000, 2014; Said 1978), and led to the development of cybernetics and eugenics, as well as the idea that, through feedback mechanisms, both human and machine can be corrected and improved.

Indeed, for Mbembe we are encountering a third shift in the arrangement of race and blackness in global society: the first being slavery and colonization; the second being the development of writing and text, culminating in the formal processes of decolonization; and the third being the advent, proliferation, and ubiquity of digital technologies

which represent the latest phase of high-modernity (2017). Similarly, for Aníbal Quijano, **we are reaching a watershed moment in the global coloniality of power, with ‘the manipulation and control of technological resources of communication and of transportation in order to impose the technocratization/instrumentalization of Coloniality/modernity’** (2017, 364), **together with ‘the mercantilization of subjectivity and life experiences of individuals’** (2017, 365).

AI, too, is in the midst of reconciling three forms of discontent,¹ whose relation to the forms of coloniality and the historical construction of race at work in the world today has yet to be fully understood. First, manifest racial and gender bias within AI technologies (Benjamin 2019; Buolamwini and Gebru 2018; Keyes 2018; Noble 2018). In June 2020, E. Tendayi Achiume, United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, issued a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council that found **‘emerging digital technologies exacerbate and compound existing inequalities, many of which exist along racial, ethnic and national origin grounds’** (paragraph 4). The second discontent, echoing Quijano’s description of the mercantilization of life, regards the way AI and digital technologies are globally commoditizing human experience (Zuboff 2018). **‘Within this data paradigm, the human is substituted as an assemblage of their data points which are, in turn, taken as a sign of the real** (Baudrillard 1994). The third discontent is geopolitical, pertaining to the emergence of **‘an arms race characterized by the ambitions of transatlantic nation states to be ‘global leaders’** (Vladimir Putin, cited in Vincent 2017) **in AI innovation** (Garvey 2019).² This, together with the second discontent, **is central to the ideas of ‘data colonialism’ and ‘digital colonialism’ naming, within current AI discourse, the brazen flurry to extract and exploit personal data and data systems** (Birhane 2019; Couldry and Mejias 2019; Crawford et al. 2019; Ricourte 2019; Mhlambi 2020). **It relates as well to Ian Hogarth’s critique of ‘AI nationalism’ where new dependencies are being tacitly enforced between low-tech and advanced-tech states and are set to follow the historical divide of Global North/South** (2018). **Perhaps more critically, the drive to dominate in the production and use of AI is revealing of the project’s hegemonic impulses, and the neo-Darwinian linearity of the evolution of science which will ‘leave behind’ those who do not conform to catching up.** In light of these concerns, **Mbembe’s provocation to critique the apparatuses of race and blackness in digital technologies, and Quijano’s warning against the hegemony of technocratization which encompasses, at once, the consolidation of modes of commodification of the human-object, becomes ever more urgent.**

The foremost effort to resolve (or reconcile) the discontents within AI have taken shape within discussions around, and the evolution of,

ethical principles to govern the development and application of such technologies (Ulinicane et al., this issue). The overall agenda, it appears, is to create benevolent AI. **The idea of decolonization has emerged largely within the discourse of AI ethics, in recognition of the racialized and imperialistic effects of the field's power** (Bell 2018; Mohamed 2018; Birhane 2019; Peña and Varon 2019; Mohamed, Png, and Isaac 2020). Examples include, 'Decolonizing AI' listed as a theme under the broader project on AI Narratives and Justice at the University of Cambridge's Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence,³ and Genevieve Bell's (2018) lecture titled 'Decolonizing AI,' where she mobilized the term as a critical tool for reading power and control back into the history of AI and complexifying the sociology of the discipline. And, more recently, Shakir Mohamed, Marie-Therese Png and William Isaac have published **their vision of 'decolonial AI,' advocating, in particular, for decoloniality as a tactic for engaging in what they name 'sociotechnical foresight' to 'support future technologies that enable greater well-being, with the goal of beneficence and justice for all'** (2020, 1).⁴

To **date, the idea of decolonization has been mobilized within the field of AI in a way that asks:** What can decolonization mean for AI? That is, **how can the critical ideas of decolonial thought be applied to and utilized to broaden and critique the field of AI?** In this article, **I explore what I argue to be a necessary shift in perspective, and ask instead: What does AI mean because of colonialism?** It is necessary because, **without thinking within the decolonial paradigm which demands a critical positioning of AI amidst the historic totality of colonialism and race, we (as critical thinkers of AI) run the risk of reproducing the very problematics decoloniality seeks to disrupt.** Thus, the first section of this article provides a brief exegesis on what the notion of decoloniality has come to mean with a focus on its ontology within Africa, and explores how decolonization in the context of AI research encompasses an imperative to reveal, critique, and radically unbalance both the legacies of colonialism and the logics of race instituted by colonialism that are at work within the field. While I engage with ideas of decoloniality and histories of colonialism in various parts of the world, the emphasis within this article is on the African region, where the interconnections between the legacies of colonialism and the logics of race have been well evidenced and received much attention within critical thought. In the second section, I advance a genealogical analysis of AI's participation within two themes: first, ethics as colonial rationality, and second, what I call the dividing practices of coloniality and race which produce a 'world of apartness' (Madlingozi 2018). These critical histories allow for an understanding of both how and why the emergence of practices of coloniality and pathologies of race within AI today are taking place, and provide the critical basis from which to imagine an alternate future.

The contribution made here is, then, twofold. First, to begin to articulate why **it is not sufficient to simply identify the reproduction of racializing and colonialist logic in the science and practice of AI today; rather, what decolonial thought demands is to show – precisely – how and why AI as a field depends on, and was made possible by, these logics.** And second, to pose the question of whether a decolonial AI future that makes space for multiple and culturally varied accounts of intelligence and being is indeed possible. In short, can AI be decolonized?

Link – Ethical AI

Decolonization and the Aff are mutually exclusive: The notion of ethical AI governance is predicated on centuries of colonialism that situate the global south as pre-ethical – you can't have AI without centuries of statistical development literally devised for the purposes of eugenic calculations around the globe.

Adams 21 [Rachel Adams is a member of the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa and a professor at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London. "Can artificial intelligence be decolonized?" *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews*, Vol 46, 2021, Issue 1-2: Artificial Intelligence & its Discontents.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03080188.2020.1840225>:
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Computer scientist has Timnit Gebru stated that ethics is the 'language du jour' in AI discourse (2020; see also Ulinicane et al., this issue). **Discursively, it is posited that through advancing ideas such as 'AI for Good,' 'Fair and Responsible AI' and 'AI for Humanity' (in France and Canada), particularly by incorporating these aspirations and values within normative frameworks for ethical AI, discontent within the field can be addressed and resolved.** This has met with some criticism. Pratyusha Kalluri, for example, has pointed out that **'fair' and 'good' are infinitely spacious words that any AI system can be squeezed into,** and aptly stresses that **the question AI ethics should be examining is how power works through such systems and to what effect** (2020; see also Crawford et al. 2019). In addition, Greene, Hoffmann, and Stark (2019) have emphasized how **AI ethics assumes a universality of concerns which can be objectively measured and addressed**, summarizing the assumptions upon which the discourse is based as follows:

the positive and negative impacts of AI are a matter of universal concern,

there is a shared language of ethical concern across the species, and

those concerns can be addressed by objectively measuring those impacts (2126).

'This,' they write with irony, **is a universalist project that brooks little relativist interpretation** (2019, 2126).

This is where the language of decoloniality has proffered some new thinking. In their piece on 'Decolonial AI', **Mohamed, Png, and Isaac** (2020) **have, amongst other propositions, advocated for dialogue between the AI metropolises and peripheries as a means of developing 'intercultural ethics'** (17). Specifically, they write that dialogue can facilitate

'reverse pedagogies' wherein the metropolises can learn from the peripheries, and that 'intercultural ethics emphasizes the limitations and coloniality of universal ethics – dominant rather than inclusive ethical frameworks – and finds an alternative in pluralism, pluriversal ethics and local designs' (2020, 17).

Sabelo Mhlambi has taken this a step further by developing a framework for AI ethics based on the Nguni philosophy of Ubuntuism (2020). Critiquing Western reason of rationality in shaping the philosophical terms on which AI and AI ethics is dominantly conceived, Mhlambi details how the Sub-Sahara African notion of Ubuntu, which centres on the relationality of personhood, can undergird a framework for addressing the two major challenges in AI: surveillance capitalism and data colonialism (2020).

While this is important, the emerging discourse around ethics and decolonizing AI has yet to develop critical thought around the idea of ethics itself. As above, Mohamed, Png, and Isaac briefly note 'the limitations and coloniality of universal ethics' (2020, 17), but **it is critical to understand precisely why the dominance of this particular version of ethics – vested as it is in the history of Eurocentric thought around morality, legality/governance and personhood – is so problematic, and what the effects might be of uncritically drawing decoloniality into this discourse.** Put differently, **should decoloniality be subsumed as a new tool for AI ethics, without critique of the way in which the idea of ethics has been historically put to work in rationalizing colonial practices** (see Mbembe 2017, 12; Spivak 1988, 9), **it runs the risk of not only appropriating decoloniality as an abstract metaphor, as Tuck and Yang (2012) warned against, but also of reproducing the very logics of race that colonialism instituted.** Let us now more closely examine this problematic formulation, 'AI ethics.'

In 2019, a study was published in Nature identifying over 84 ethical standards for the use and development of AI developed globally in the last five years (Jobin, Ienca, and Vayena 2019; Ulinicane et al., this issue). **Despite being titled 'The Global Landscape of AI Ethics Guidelines,' amongst these 84 AI ethics standards, none listed are from the African continent or even the Global South.** Most were developed in the United States, UK or by international institutions. Mohamed, Png, and Isaac (2020) similarly note how national **AI policies or strategies are almost exclusively found in the Global North, and where efforts to develop a national policy around AI are arising in countries within the Global South, this is being driven by supra-state bodies such as the World Economic Forum. As ethical benchmarks, these standards are paternalistically positioned as universal: applicable for all, everywhere.** In addition, the scientific practice of promoting ethical AI through strengthening or testing the 'fairness' of AI systems (the extent to which they exhibit social biases, in particular) performs a similar conceit in presuming the scene of the Global South – or more specifically in this case, the African region – to be a place where 'ethics,' as such, is yet to be fully established. Now a well-documented case (Ballim and Breckenridge 2018; Arun 2020; Arun 2020), in 2018, when the issue of racial bias and the non-recognition of Black faces by AI-driven facial recognition technologies was peaking following the work of Buolamwini and Gebru (2018),¹³ **a Chinese facial recognition company signed a deal with the Zimbabwean government for access the records**

of the national population registry, which contained facial imagery of millions of Zimbabweans, to train the company's algorithmic technologies to better recognize Black faces. By reducing the potential for bias, the system would ultimately be more ethical. While Ballim and Breckenridge

(2018) condemn this incident for exploiting the inadequate data protection provisions in Zimbabwean law, **it is not all that different from the practice of beta-testing newly developed AI systems in African countries** (Mohamed, Png, and Isaac 2020). **Calling it**

'ethics-dumping,' Mohamed, Png, and Isaac point to the notorious company Cambridge Analytica as exemplar, in that it developed algorithmic systems for use in the US and UK by beta-testing them in Nigeria and Kenya (2020, 11). **This follows the now centuries-old colonial conceit of what Jan Smuts euphemistically called the 'laboratory of Africa'** (1930), **where the collateral damage of scientific advancement could be safely externalized to places and people considered expendable** (see

Bonneuil 2000; Tilley 2011; Taylor 2019). **Moreover, the epistemological foundations of AI cannot be extricated from Francis Galton's work in the development of statistics – particularly on inference, regression, correlation, and the normal distribution curve – which arose out of his explorations in Southern Africa, where he applied his statistical science to native populations in order to measure human differences and intelligence**

(Breckenridge 2014, Chapter 1).

In these instances, the idea of 'ethics' is situated as the supreme value of the Occident, to be proselytized on the Africa region, which is, in turn, and in relation to the 'ethical West,' positioned as 'pre-ethical' (Mbembe 2017,

49) **– as a world apart. Indeed, that Europe believed itself to be 'helping' and 'protecting' its African colonies constituted the central creed of the civilizing mission of colonialism** (Césaire 2001); **as Spivak reminds us, ethics 'served and serves as [its] energetic and successful defense'** (1988, 5). Yet as

ethics was put to work to justify both the civilizing mission of colonialism and the utilization of Africa as a laboratory for Western scientific progress, it enacted another conceit of the colonial order of things: that Western reason is neutral, universal, and objective; that it could be dislocated from the context in which it arose and applied elsewhere. **Positioned as a 'point**

zero' (Santiago Castro-Gomez unpublished work, cited in Grosfuguel 2011, 6) **from which to survey the world, Western knowledge and rationality claimed ascendancy as the only real way of knowing and understanding the world.** This is a critical

problematic within decolonial thought (Grosfuguel 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013), **and a central assumption within AI: that intelligence and the production of knowledge can be outsourced to a machine presupposes such**

knowledge to be both separable from the context in which it was produced and applicable to other contexts and realities.

Dividing practices

The production of 'the world of apartness' (Madlingozi 2018) takes place through what I am calling 'dividing practices.' In this section I explore briefly the provenance of systems of enumeration, quantification, and classification within colonialism, and the ways in which AI reproduces the divisive logics of race, before turning to critique the notion of intelligence in particular. I take the term from both Michel Foucault who, writing on the production of the objectivization of the subject, speaks of 'dividing practices' which divide the subject from others and within itself (1982, 777–778), as well as Edward Said's critique, set out in *Orientalism*, of the dividing line – discursively formed – between the Occidental and Oriental worlds, which the former 'paradoxically presupposes and depends on' (1978, 336). For both, **power resides with those who can make the catechistic decision to divide.**

It is well-noted how **AI systems sort personal data according to socially ascribed normative markers.** At times, these markers are directly racialized or gendered (Keyes 2018; see also Keyes, Hitzig, and Blell, this issue), **such as a system that only allows women access to a female changing room** (Ni Loideain and Adams 2019). Other times, **these markers may be implicitly biased, such as systems for targeting advertising and policing based on postal codes** (Benjamin 2019). These systems classify, sort, and rank personal data through processes of data collection, curation, and annotation, using advanced statistical methods for modelling distribution and measuring correlation (as first developed by Galton) in order to calculate risk, predict behaviour, and optimize the systems' own functions. In these contexts, data assemblages constitute a representation of the individual that are taken (by commercial and state power) as a sign of the real (Baudrillard 1994). Moreover, as Birhane (2019) has pointed out, **these systems of abstract representation work to further marginalize those who do not fit the 'data-type'.** Indeed, Quijano (2017) has spoken of **modern systems that function through identifying and classifying individuals as fundamentally 'de-equalizing'**, presumably as the application of these practices to human subjects supposes a fixed, a priori and quantifiable difference, the social-construction of which is forgotten.

As noted above, **much has been published about how these systems reproduce social biases** (see also Holzmeyer, this issue) **with many accounts noting the racial logic and imperial power at work** (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018; Keyes 2018; Noble 2018; Benjamin 2019). However, rather less examined in relation to practices of AI today, is the way in which **these statistical systems were developed and appropriated within former colonies to control and divide colonial subjects.**¹⁴ Indeed, Said wrote that, 'rhetorically speaking, Orientalism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative: to use its vocabulary is to engage in the particularizing and dividing of things Oriental into manageable parts' (1978, 72). Similarly, in narrating the enumerative practices of colonialism in India – which he critiques as having

both a disciplinary and pedagogical effect, in delimiting colonial subjectivity and in training colonial administrators respectively – Appadurai writes:

The link between colonialism and orientalism [...] is most strongly reinforced [...] at the loci of enumeration, where bodies are counted, homogenized, and bounded by their extent. Thus the unruly body of the colonial subject (fasting, feasting, hook-swinging, abluting, burning, and bleeding) is recuperated through the language of numbers that allows these very bodies to be brought back, now counted and accounted, for the humdrum projects of taxation, sanitation, education, warfare, and loyalty. (1993, 334)

Enumeration and the production of statistical knowledge in the colonies performed a number of functions, including entrenching and policing colonialist binaries of colonizer/colonized and their derivatives, but also in enforcing divisions between colonial populations,¹⁵ and as a form of remote colonial rule. On both a structural and individual level these colonial archives functioned as a kind of palimpsestic¹⁶ form of abstract representation that were taken as a token of 'radical realism' (Said 1978, 72): **a fixing of the ontology of the colonies and its people by Western knowledges, just as the data assemblages of today work to fix individuals by taking their data as a sign of the real.** Writing of forms of representation at work within systems of racism, Mbembe speaks of a 'will to representation [which] is at bottom a will to destruction aiming to turn something violently into nothing' (2019, 139). In this way, to constitute something in the form of something else – something more manageable and more malleable to forms of racializing power – consists of an essential and violent erasure of the original. **Imperial knowledge practices based on abstract and racialized representations constituted not only a way of dividing the self from others and from itself, but worked to erase those who fell on the wrong side of the dividing line through substituting them with their representation.** Comparably, Simon Gikanda chronicles the slave masters' fastidious recording-keeping of the actions of their slaves, such that this archive constituted the evidence of the latter's objectification: 'as chattel, as property, and indeed as the symbol of the barbarism that enabled white civilization and its modernist cravings' (2015, 92). **That Simone Browne now writes of data-driven surveillance systems being put to work to surveil and bind Black lives in particular, as exacting the self – its body and behaviour – to testify as evidence against itself, holds then, a critical provenance within the history of the colonial management of blackness. The effects of these systems, such as AI-enabled biometric technologies in public spaces, which Browne describes as reifying structures for racial difference, is to produce an 'ontological insecurity' – an alienation within, or a dividing practice of, the racialized self** (2015, 109).

Some of the most advanced biometric systems in the world today utilize facial recognition technologies within their technological make-up. These technologies function by reading the signatures of human faces,

such as the distance between facial features, and comparing the image to a database of facial imagery in order to detect physiognomic patterns that correlate to the social status – gender, race, age, sexuality (Keyes 2018; Keyes, Hitzig, and Blell, this issue) – **of the person being ‘recognized.’** **As these practices enforce social stratification and re-inscribe racialized hierarchies, they also repeat the very logics of race and racism: to deduce from signs and surface appearance who an individual is and what they can do and be in this world.** Race science legitimated this logic through the production of knowledges that sought to demonstrate the link between surface appearances – skin colour, facial features, skull size – and inherent cognitive abilities and behavioural traits (Soudien n.d.). **Today’s facial recognition technologies employ similar practices in measuring facial diameters and expressions as a means of inferring intent, predicting behaviour** (Chinoy 2019), **and even understanding intelligence** (Qin et al. 2016). **More critically, these systems provide the tools that allow for the return of race science under the guise of securitization, market efficiency, and risk management.**

Link – AI for “good” = land grabbing

AI research and development requires massive land-grabbing and dispossession around the world ranging from the Amazon to Black neighborhoods surrounding MIT. The instruments of financialization, land buy-outs, and housing insecurity that universities employ to rebrand AI as ethical or benevolent are themselves techniques of colonial violence around the world.

Katz 20 [Yarden Katz is is a departmental fellow in Systems Biology at Harvard Medical School. His scientific interests are at the interface of artificial intelligence and biology. At Berkman Klein, he is working on understanding the politics and culture of biomedical science. *Artificial Whiteness: Politics and Ideology in Artificial Intelligence*. Columbia University Press, 2020. //tjb]

I have thus far focused on AI's rebranding and the changing discourse around it. My argument is that **the expert industry uses AI to advance a variety of capitalist visions and projects, and that the web of partnerships created around AI caters to corporate interests.**

But while these new partnerships are described with fuzzy abstractions, like doing "good," they in fact assist concrete developments. The rebranded AI's initiatives sanction tangible projects of dispossession and conversion of land into capital, projects that universities and their new partners in AI have long pursued.

To bring these projects into focus, it is helpful to trace the web of partnerships behind the major AI initiatives. MIT's Schwarzman College of Computing, launched in September 2019, is an instructive case. The new college was named after Stephen Schwarzman, the billionaire CEO of the Blackstone Group, a company that MIT has since described as a "leading global asset manager." Prior to the college's announcement, MIT had already formed numerous corporate partnerships around AI, including a joint laboratory with IBM, but the Schwarzman College is the largest of these yet. MIT had raised one billion dollars for the college, out of which Schwarzman had committed 350 million. **Schwarzman says he invested in MIT in order to build "ethical AI" that will work to everyone's benefit (he also gave 150 million pounds to the University of Oxford to do the same).** Schwarzman's discourse on AI aligns with that of his hosts, and in spring of 2018 MIT celebrated the new college, and new patron, in a lavish gathering that included venture capitalists, diplomats, and national security elites.

As Schwarzman was being honored by MIT, his Blackstone Group was continuing to displace people across the world from their homes. In North and South America, Europe, and Asia, Blackstone has acquired buildings and converted them into rental units, which tenants have demonstrated are often uninhabitable. As the company increases rent prices, it ruthlessly evicts those who cannot pay, and in the United States, Blackstone has also been fighting against rent control. The United Nations' housing advisor has flagged Blackstone as a major contributor to a global housing crisis in which tenants increasingly find themselves at the mercy of "faceless corporations."⁴⁶ **Blackstone has also extended its reach into the Amazon rainforest. Blackstone-owned firms develop ports and roads, thereby fueling the hostile takeover of lands by agribusiness that damages indigenous land and sovereignty.**⁴⁷

Blackstone's practices fit within a long history of dispossession sanctioned by state violence and international government alliances. In Brazil, the election of Jair Bolsonaro led to intensified deforestation and land grabs in the Amazon, which profits Blackstone. U.S. president Donald Trump

has strongly allied with Bolsonaro, as both men promise their nations a strikingly similar return to a bygone era of whiteness. Bolsonaro has praised Brazil's military dictatorship—a period marked by violent invasion of white ranchers into the Amazon—and, like Trump, has promised to make his nation “great again.” Bolsonaro has also been embraced by American financial elites: in New York, hedge-fund managers held a gala for him, sponsored in part by Blackstone. Bolsonaro has also dismissed climate change as a “Marxist conspiracy” and expressed regret that Brazil's military dictatorship was not able to kill all its socialist opponents. The agenda of Brazil's new president was aptly labeled “Bolsonaro's Southern Strategy.”⁴⁸

In this context, it seems fitting that MIT chose Henry Kissinger, a man involved with Richard Nixon's southern strategy and orchestrator of coups against South American socialist governments, to speak at the Schwarzman celebration. Kissinger, who is also Schwarzman's partner in various global policy initiatives, was supposedly invited by the university for his thoughtful analysis of the future of AI.

Not everyone at MIT embraced Kissinger's reinvention as AI expert, however. On campus, some protested Kissinger's invitation and the Schwarzman College generally.⁴⁹ This resistance tapped into ongoing campus discontent with the university and its alliances. One year earlier, MIT had hosted Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia as he was waging a devastating, U.S.-backed war on Yemen and reaffirmed partnerships with his government. Despite protest from the community, particularly following the Saudi government's brutal murder of Washington Post writer Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, MIT chose to keep its ties. Like MIT's administration, Schwarzman is also allied with bin Salman (Blackstone Group manages the crown prince's assets). Some observers saw the Schwarzman College, and Kissinger's campus visit, as another example of the university's pursuit of money above all, its complicity with war crimes, and its imperviousness to criticism from the community.

One group of MIT students, faculty, staff, and alumni called for the Schwarzman College celebrations to be canceled or boycotted and urged holding a community-wide meeting to discuss the issues. The administration proceeded as planned, but on the day Kissinger spoke some three hundred protesters assembled on the steps of the MIT student center (figure 2.2). Nearly fifty years earlier, in 1969, Noam Chomsky had famously spoken from these steps to a crowd protesting the Vietnam War, explaining how places like MIT induce students into being “the pragmatic planners of American empire.” “The inducements,” Chomsky said, “are very real; their rewards in power, and affluence, and prestige and authority are quite significant.”⁵⁰

In a way, **MIT's Schwarzman College shows how little has changed in the machinations of American empire. Empire's would-be planners are still**

being offered great inducements (money, prestige, new buildings, and faculty positions), this time under the banner of “ethical AI.” And **although many who pro- tested the college framed their opposition on liberal grounds— that hosting Kissinger is inconsistent with the university’s values and mission to make a better world—others spoke of MIT’s long-standing roles in imperialism and racist oppression.** One group of protesters eventually delivered to the MIT president’s office a large inflatable missile with the word “complicit” on it.

The link between Blackstone’s practices of global displace- ment and the housing situation in Boston was not lost on some protesters, either. **The lack of affordable housing around Boston is due in no small part to the influx of biotech firms and other corporations who are drawn to, courted by, and sometimes lease land from universities like MIT.** At the campus protest, it was pointed out that **MIT’s lowest-paid workers are hit hardest by these programs of gentrification and displacement.** They’re pushed to live farther away from campus while being denied benefits available to employees higher up on the university’s hierarchy.

Universities’ contributions to displacement and gentrification are neither coincidental nor new. They **continue a long history of North American universities—particularly the major ones who now facilitate AI’s rebranding—acting as “land-grabbing, land-transmogrifying, land-capitalizing machines.”**⁵¹ From the University of California to MIT, the very formation of many American universities was enabled by land grants based on expropriated indigenous land. Since then, **universities have become full-fledged real estate agents that continue to accrue lands and displace those who stand in the way.** According to a group advocating for affordable housing in Massachusetts, local **universities such as MIT “operate as for-profit real-estate devel- opers that are looking to maximize profits . . . their profits lead to gentrification and displacement of long-term residents, espe- cially people of color.”**⁵²

The universities’ pursuit of land, like Blackstone’s, is global. Thus **Harvard, MIT’s partner in charting the “ethics and gov- ernance of AI” and the world’s richest university, owns not only hotels in the Boston area (where workers, predominantly migrant women, face abusive conditions) and vineyards in Cal- ifornia and Washington state (where Harvard’s practices jeop- ardize access to water) but also timber plantations in New Zea- land (Harvard’s so-called Timber Empire) and farmlands in South Africa, South America, Russia, and Ukraine.**⁵³ By one estimate, Harvard has spent about one billion dollars on farm- lands. On university-owned farms in South Africa, black farm- ers have been denied access to their land and burial sites. **In Brazil, Harvard is estimated to own 300,000 hectares of land in the Cerrado region, neighboring the Amazon, which has**

been gradually destroyed to make room for agribusiness. Harvard-owned subsidiaries in the region have acquired lands from grileiros, land grabbers who violently displace indigenous communities and convert their land into farms that are sold to interested buyers (like Harvard) using fraudulent land

titles. What follows has been devastating for local communities. Some Harvard-owned farms, for instance, have poisoned locals' drinking water and crops. As one resident of Piauí observed, the farm "use[s] pesticides such as Roundup. It destroys all of our crops. . . . They spray that poison from their airplanes and it contaminates everything. A bunch of pests appear, like the white-fly which we can't kill, and they destroy everything."⁵⁴

Harvard is not unique in these practices; other rich universities (both public and private) have also acquired farmlands around the world, though the specifics are unknown. Even Harvard's pursuits, which have come under scrutiny, remain mostly obscured by what one activist called the university's "nebulous farmland network" and the "opaque corporate structure" around it.⁵⁵ So nebulous and opaque, in fact, that when a member of Harvard's own Board of Overseers resigned in protest—citing the university's "land purchases that may not respect indigenous rights" and "water holdings that threaten the human right to water"—she also noted that the investments defy proper evaluation.⁵⁶

Nebulosity and opacity link the academy's effort to rebrand AI, on the one side, and their pursuit of land-as-capital, on the other. Like mechanisms of land accumulation, initiatives around AI are based on opaque and secretive corporate structures. **These initiatives' abstract promises (like building an "ethical AI" that does "good") mask tangible projects that rely on concrete technologies—opaque financial instruments, intermediary partners and offshore investments—that universities and their partners have mastered.** Initiatives of the rebranded AI serve to mask these global relations and their place in a broader history of imperialism and colonialism, or at best, to render these irrelevant. According to a liberal viewpoint common in the academy, "dirty" money is better spent on "good," universities' initiatives are presumed to be universally good, and the dealings of universities and their partners in the world should be viewed as peripheral.

The rebranded AI's initiatives are yet another example of why these dealings aren't peripheral. These initiatives show how technologies, projects, and personnel flow between academia, its corporate partners, and allied governments—a flow that works to impose political uniformity on the university's activities.

Hence when Stanford launched its center for Human-Centered Intelligence in 2019, the university appointed Stephen Schwarzman to the center's advisory board; and at Stanford's own exclusive celebratory symposium, Henry Kissinger was in attendance. Like other initiatives to rebrand AI, this one was a thoroughly corporatized affair, with Google and consulting firms like McKinsey providing funds, playing major advisory roles, and sending their employees to become fellows at the university.

Here too, technologies of dispossession worked through a web of partnerships. To give just a few examples: Schwarzman, benefactor to both Stanford and MIT and an ally of Mohammad bin Salman, runs Blackstone Group, which manages bin Salman's assets through opaque corporate schemes, the same schemes that Blackstone and universities use to convert land into capital and displace its inhabitants. Through opaque agreements, both Stanford and MIT have

partnered with bin Salman’s gov- ernment and with companies like Google that oversee these elite universities’ AI quests. McKinsey, the consulting firm promis- ing to apply “AI for social good” and key partner in Stanford’s new AI center, has helped the Saudi government sell itself as progressive in Western media—so much so that the Saudi gov- ernment ministry has been referred to as “McKinsey ministry.” McKinsey was hired by a colonial governing board (created by the U.S. Congress) to manage Puerto Rico’s financial crisis, even though the firm profits from the island’s debt, just as sev- eral U.S. universities (including Harvard) do via endowment investments.⁵⁷ Together, then, management experts, govern- ments, and universities employ the same financial instruments to jointly form AI initiatives and engage in colonial violence.

Link – AI war

AI expands the battlefield of war and removes accountability from imperialists by framing war as purely computational, which in turn justifies new weapons development in service of the US war machine.

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This narrative fits within a ubiquitous framing of the Gulf War as a “high-tech” computerized war (a framing that sidelines the indiscriminate bombardments that killed so many and destroyed civilian infrastructure).⁸⁷ This framing suggests that not only has war been radically transformed by computing, but everything around war, including its depiction, resembles a bat- tlefield in which information-processing capacities and media savvy are as important as B-52 bombers.⁸⁸ **Within this narrative, AI practitioners are simply one faction of war’s technocrats vying for recognition.**

But what do these narratives consider as “AI,” and how is its significance articulated to invested powers? Daniel Crevier’s history of the field, *AI: The Tumultuous History of the Quest for Artificial Intelligence* (1993), gives a paradigmatic answer.⁸⁹ The book is based on interviews with prominent practitioners, two of whom—Patrick Winston and Hans Moravec—reiterate AI’s importance in the Gulf War.⁹⁰ In Moravec’s telling, **even e-mail, which he says was crucial for coordinating U.S. troops, grew out of “AI.”** The label’s plasticity also shows

when Moravec adds that U.S. military “planning and logistics also owed a lot to AI techniques. I mean simple things like: How do you pack a transport plane? How do you physically arrange the supplies? That’s a dynamic programming problem, which at one point was considered an AI problem. Also, scheduling is actually an expert- systems problem. . . . when you face a complicated scheduling problem like the timing and coordination of Desert Storm, you need an expert system to solve it.”⁹¹

The picture that emerges is of AI as a site where things that are useful to imperial aims are constructed. What the label picks out changes drastically, or is left undefined, but how it is served is remarkably stable: **“AI” is that which can serve the American war machine, and what has served the war machine in the past can be “AI.”**

AI’s circularity is also employed to naturalize the Pentagon’s notion of an ever-expanding “battlespace,” as Crevier’s discus- sion shows. According to Crevier, Moravec

lamented that **even AI’s most innocuous fruits can become weapons.** Crevier concludes that “in spite of the desires of many in the AI research community, modern weaponry is constantly increasing its speed and savvy.” By appealing to the supposed advances of AI, he goes on to naturalize the idea of autonomous war: “This evolution, in turn, imposes new, relentless constraints on field combatants, which make them dependent on information and advice pro- vided by machines. The frenzy of modern battlefield activity often leaves the human link in the military control loop no choice but that of blind obedience to its electronic counselors.”⁹² There are several leaps in this argument. **War is first presumed to**

be a computerized affair, one in which AI practitioners want credit for providing key tools. It is then taken as inevitable that more war technologies will be needed in order to keep up with this high-tech arena. The next leap is to presume war is nearly an autonomous game, with soldiers having to blindly depend on the computerized infrastructure that surrounds them. AI practitio- ners, by this logic, are victims of circumstance, having nearly anything they do get co-opted for military use. This circular reasoning becomes a way to argue for developing additional, “explainable” weapons in order to mitigate the opacity of com- puterized war. And computerized war, in turn, shapes how AI practitioners conceive of intelligence.

Alt Prior – Sequencing

Alt

Grande - Refusal

The alt is refusal.

Grande 18 --- Sandy Grande, associate professor and Chair of the Education Department (Connecticut College). [2018, “Chapter 3: Refusing the University.” *Toward What Justice? : Describing Diverse Dreams of Justice in Education*, edited by Eve Tuck, and K. Wayne Yang, Routledge. Accessed online via ProQuest Ebook Central at:

<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/tamucs/detail.action?docID=5257621>.]
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In this way, **Indigenous refusal both negatively rejects the (false) promise of inclusion and other inducements of the settler state and positively asserts Indigenous sovereignty and peoplehood**. In Mohawk Interruptus (2014), Audra Simpson theorizes **refusal** as distinct from resistance in that it **does not take authority as a given**. More specifically, at the heart of the text, **she theorizes refusal at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the “demand to know” as a settler logic**. In response, she **develops the notion of ethnographic refusal as a stance or space for Indigenous subjects to limit access to what is knowable and to being known, articulating how refusal works** “in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that ‘this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights’” (Simpson, 2007, p. 73).

Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1991) similarly take up **refusal in relation to knowledge formation, asserting Indigenous knowledge itself as a form of refusal; a space of epistemic disobedience** that is **“delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of knowledge as production**. Gómez-Barris (2012) theorizes the Mapuche hunger strikes as “an extreme bodily performance and political instantiation” of refusal, an act wherein their starving bodies upon the land literally enact what it means to live in a state of permanent war (p. 120). **Understood as expressions of sovereignty, such acts of refusal threaten the settler state**, carrying dire if not deadly consequences for Indigenous subjects. As noted by Ferguson (2015), **“capitalist settler states prefer resistance”** because it can be “negotiated or recognized,” **but refusal “throws into doubt” the entire system** and is therefore more dangerous.

While within the university the consequences of academic refusal are much less dire, they still carry a risk. **To refuse inclusion offends institutional authorities offering “the gift” of belonging, creating conditions of precarity for the refuser.** For example, **refusal to participate in the politics of respectability that characterizes institutional governance can result in social isolation, administrative retribution, and struggles with self-worth.** Similarly, the refusal to comply with the normative structures of tenure and promotion (e.g., emphasizing quantity over quality; publishing in “mainstream” journals) can and does lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss.¹⁶ And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1% of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. That said, academic **“rewards” and inducements accessed through recognition-based politics can have even deeper consequences.** As Jodi Byrd (2011) reminds us, **the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation”** (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi).

The inspirational work of Black radical and Indigenous scholars compels thinking beyond the limits of academic recognition and about the generative spaces of refusal that not only reject settler logics but also foster possibilities of co-resistance. **The prospect of coalition re-raises one of the initial animating questions of this chapter: What kinds of solidarities can be developed among peoples with a shared commitment to working beyond the imperatives of capital and the settler state?** Clearly, despite the ubiquitous and often overly facile calls for solidarity, building effective coalitions is deeply challenging, even among insurgent scholars. Within this particular context, tensions between Indigenous sovereignty and decolonial projects and anti-racist, social justice projects, raise a series of suspicions: whether calls for Indigenous sovereignty somehow elide the a priori condition of blackness (the “unsovereign” subject),¹⁷ **whether anti-racist struggles sufficiently account for Indigenous sovereignty as a land-based struggle elucidated outside regimes of property, and whether theorizations of settler colonialism sufficiently account for the forces and structures of white supremacy,** racial slavery, and antiblackness.

Rather than posit such tensions as terminally incommensurable, however, I want to suggest a parallel politics of dialectical co-resistance. When Black peoples can still be killed but not murdered; when Indians are still made to disappear; when (Indigenous) land and Black bodies are still destroyed and accumulated for settler profit; it is incumbent upon all those who claim a commitment to refusing the white supremacist, capitalist, settler state, to do the hard work of building “interconnected movements for decolonization” (Coulthard, 2014). The struggle is real. It is both material and psychological, both method and politics, and thus must necessarily straddle the both/and (as opposed to either/or) coordinates of revolutionary change. In terms of process, this means working simultaneously beyond resistance and through the enactment of refusal—as fugitive, abolitionist, and Indigenous, sovereign subjects.

Within the context of the university, this means replacing calls for more inclusive and diverse, safe spaces within the university with the development of a network of sovereign, safe houses outside the university. Kelley reminds us of the long history of this struggle, recalling the Institute of the Black World at Atlanta University (1969), the Mississippi Freedom Schools, and the work of Black feminists Patricia Robinson, Donna Middleton, and Patricia Haden as inspirational models. As a contemporary model, he references Harney and Moten’s vision of **the undercommons as a space of possibility:** a fugitive space **wherein the pursuit of knowledge is not perceived as a path toward upward mobility and material wealth but rather as a means toward eradicating**

oppression in all of its forms (Undercommoning Collective). The ultimate goal, according to Kelley (2016), is to create in the present a future that overthrows the logic of neoliberalism. Scholars within Native studies similarly build upon a long tradition of refusing the university, theorizing from and about sovereignty through land-based models of education. Whereas a fugitive flees and seeks to escape, the Indigenous stands ground or, as Deborah Bird points out, “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home” (as cited in Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). **The ultimate goal of Indigenous refusal is Indigenous resurgence;** a struggle that includes but is not limited to the return of Indigenous land.

Again, while the aims may be different (and in some sense competing), efforts toward the development of parallel projects of co-resistance are possible through vigilant and sustained engagement. The “common ground” here is not necessarily literal but rather conceptual, a corpus of shared ethics and analytics: anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-colonial. Rather than allies, we are accomplices—plotting the death but not murder of the settler university. Toward this end, I offer some additional strategies for refusing the university:

First and foremost, we need to commit to collectivity—to staging a refusal of the individualist promise project of the settler state and its attendant institutions. This requires that we engage in a radical and ongoing **reflexivity about who we are and how we situate ourselves in the world**. This includes but is not limited to a refusal of the cycle of individualized inducements—particularly, the awards, appointments, and grants that require complicity or allegiance to institutions that continue to oppress and dispossess. It is also a call to refuse the perceived imperative to self-promote, to brand one’s work and body. This includes all the personal webpages, incessant Facebook updates, and Twitter feeds featuring our latest accomplishments, publications, grants, rewards, etc. etc. Just. Make. It. Stop. The journey is not about self—which means it is not about promotion and tenure—it is about the disruption and dismantling of those structures and processes that create hierarchies of individual worth and labor.

Second, we must commit to reciprocity—the kind that is primarily about being answerable to those communities we claim as our own and those we claim to serve. It is about being answerable to each other and our work. One of the many things lost to the pressures of the publish-or-perish, quantity-over-quality neoliberal regime is the loss of good critique. We have come to confuse support with sycophantic praise and critical evaluation with personal injury. Through the ethic of reciprocity, we need to remind ourselves that **accountability to the collective requires a commitment to engage, extend, trouble, speak back to, and intensify our words and deeds**.

Third, we need to commit to mutuality, which implies reciprocity but is ultimately more encompassing. It is about the development of social relations not contingent upon the imperatives of capital—that refuses exploitation at the same time as it radically asserts connection, particularly to land. **Inherent to a land-based ethic is a commitment to slowness and to the arc of inter-generational resurgence and transformation**. One of the many ways that the academy recapitulates colonial logics is through the overvaluing of fast, new, young, and individualist voices and the undervaluing of slow, elder, and collective ones. And in such a system, relations and paradigms of connection, mutuality, and collectivity are inevitably undermined. For Indigenous peoples, such begin and end with land, centering questions of what it means to be a good relative.

Toward this end, I have been thinking a lot lately about the formation of a new scholarly collective, one that writes and researches under a *nom de guerre*—like the Black feminist scholars and activists who wrote under and through the Combahee River Collective or the more recent collective of scholars and activists publishing as “the uncertain commons.”¹⁸ If furthering the aims of insurgence and resurgence (and not individual recognition) is what we hold paramount, then perhaps one of the most radical refusals we can authorize is to work together as one; to enact a kind of Zapatismo scholarship and a balaclava politics where the work of the collectivity is intentionally structured to obscure and transcend the single voice, body, and life. Together we could write in refusal of liberal, essentialist forms of identity politics, of individualist inducements, of capitalist imperatives, and other productivist logics of accumulation. This is what love as refusal looks like. It is the un-demand, the un-desire to be either of or in the university. It is the radical assertion to be on: land. Decolonial love is land.

Balaton - Refusal of Recognition

The alternative is refusal of the recognition of the settler-state as a locus of power and instead a turning away to actualize self-realization. This antagonistic approach to recognition is critical in the process of decolonization.

Balaton-Chrimes & Stead 17 [Samantha Balaton-Chrimes is a Senior Lecturer in International Studies at Deakin University in Melbourne. Victoria Stead is a Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University. “Recognition, power and coloniality,” *Postcolonial Studies* 20: 1 (2017) //tjb]

Simpson and Coulthard show how experiences of disrespect associated with the politics of recognition and the intersubjective experiences of misrecognition can trigger struggles, not for an expansion of the extant recognition regime, but of refusal and indigenous resurgence. Contra Honneth, Taylor and Fraser, they reject the idea that equality and self-realisation of indigenous peoples can be achieved through recognition conferred by a state they see as illegitimate. Though both detail the disappointment of their moral expectations regarding recognition, and the injuries these disappointments have inflicted on their and other indigenous communities, unlike Honneth they do not locate the moral or social significance of these injuries in their capacity to motivate social struggle for greater degrees of inclusion in the dominant social and political regime. On the contrary, these experiences

of disrespect and injury call into question that regime itself, and motivate (for Simpson, Coulthard and the movements they document, though not for all indigenous people) **exit. These refusals have a dual quality, being at once a calling out of colonial power, and a stance that is generative of alternative, stronger, more resilient subjectivities and alternative fields of recognition that are inattentive to the demands of the settler.**⁴⁷ **For Fanon, the recovery of human freedom that is diminished through misrecognition as subordinate and inferior cannot be sought from the coloniser, but only from 'oneself', which is to say both one's individual self (for Fanon, the Black self) and the community with which one shares an identity.**⁴⁸ Fanon was the first to theorise the impossibility of being 'self' and also acceptable to the Other's recognising gaze in contexts of coloniality. For him, dependency on recognition from a (racial) Other can only generate alienation, not self-realisation.

Freedom thus comes from turning away from the compulsion to improve enough for the Other, and toward self-recognition. For Simpson and Coulthard, self-recognition is both cause and effect of refusal and resurgence, understood as calls to attend to one's self, and one's own culture. It is in spaces created by turning away from the Other, and towards oneself, that new and alternate expressions of equality and self-realisation (individual and collective) emerge and are strengthened.

At the same time, calls for self-recognition by and among Indigenous peoples also reveal refusal and recognition as ultimately imbricated, rather than diametrically opposed. **That is, what is at stake is arguably not a turning away from,**

or opposition to recognition per se, but rather a rejection of particular instantiations of recognition, specifically a recognition politics that has the settler state as its primary locus of power. In this way, Indigenous scholar Val Napoleon points to the struggles for recognition that take place within and between Indigenous communities, even as these assert collective self-determination vis-à-vis the state.⁴⁹

Refusing offers of recognition that emanate from institutions – particularly the state – whose power is inherently colonial, immediately (but by no means comprehensively) unsettles and disrupts that power.⁵⁰

It exposes the partiality and contingency of recognition relationships and weakens their capacity to uphold inequalities.⁵¹ This shift in power can generate spaces for alliances and solidarity between the colonized and the 'coloniser', fostered through changes not just in the subjectivity of the subaltern, but also the settler.⁵²

Unsettling the powerful to reconsider their own stance in relation to recognition of the Other is not the primary objective of Simpson, for example, but it can be a radical political project of its own. Indeed some other

Indigenous scholars, including Leanne Betasamosake Simpson and John Borrows, engage the possibilities that Indigenous resurgence might offer for reconfiguring Indigenous-settler engagements, including through plural legal systems.⁵³ The subaltern can become not an object of sympathy and

bearer of pain in need of remedial recognition, but an actor with an equal part in the construction of power and social life. **The settler**

figure, on the other hand, becomes not a taken-for granted bearer of the power to recognise, but also one of many players in a broader game. The

articles in this special issue pick up the debate about coloniality and recognition at this point. All the articles start from the assumption that recognition –

and particularly, the politics of recognition – does not necessarily enhance freedom, and they work with attention to the power relations that structure fields of recognition. For many of the authors, a key imperative is to examine the workings and effects of recognition, and struggles against those effects, in the cases of particular, situated, formerly colonised peoples ('concrete', rather than 'generalised' others, as Seyla Benhabib argues).⁵⁴ All of the papers challenge the notion, so deeply embedded in contemporary governance of alterity, that an expansion of recognition regimes is good or sufficient for the development of relationships of equality and the expansion of human freedom and autonomy. **Simpson maps the**

ways in which recognition, as the sine qua non of contemporary settler-indigenous politics in North America, works through the 'ruse of consent' to sanction the theft of dispossession and render freedom not enhanced, but impossible.

Fullenwieder, working also in the Canadian context, takes up the field of visual culture to explore the ways in which the art praxis of Métis artist Christi Belcourt operates in a space where recognition functions to legitimise coloniality. Fullenwieder brings together Butler's notion of recognisability, and Rickard's concept of visual sovereignty to tease out Belcourt's subversions within spaces of recognition. Balaton-Chrimes and Stead extend these explorations of recognition and its coloniality to non-settler contexts. Balaton-Chrimes maps a different kind of coloniality in the context of a major international development project in Kenya. She identifies the ways in which modernity-coloniality precluded the possibility of the project engaging in any way with claims of local ethnic groups for land at the site of a slum upgrading project which, though controversial, required deliberation. Stead explores formal and informal practices of recognition of Papua New Guinea's 'Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels'—locals who assisted Australian soldiers during the Second World War. Many Papua New Guineans do call for recognition from the Australian government, but these calls emerge from deeply ambivalent fields of memory and postcolonial reckoning that, Stead argues, challenge the adequacy of the recognition script as an explanatory frame. Hinkson moves us back again to a settler context, this time Australia, to interrogate the ever-present and often frustrating and contradictory recognition relationships between settlers and the Warlpiri people of Central Australia. Working with the praxis of one particular indigenous man, Hinkson shows how the quotidian negotiations of this space can take the form of an attitude of seeking to be 'free to the world' by coming to terms with the Other, and seeking forms of pleasure and empowerment through that experience that cannot be reduced to assimilation or refusal of recognition. Kowal and Paradies, also writing in the Australian context, similarly explore spaces of contradiction and grappling, this time with respect to race. They theorise 'race refusal' as the practice through which an Aboriginal person who could pass as white refuses to do so, thereby refusing recognition of a certain sort. While emancipatory in some respects, Kowal and Paradies also show how these refusals can also be reappropriated by the state in order to redraw the hierarchical boundary between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. Finally, in light of these insights into the freedom-diminishing effects of recognition, or at least the deep contradictions and risks of the politics of recognition, Ivison re-engages political theory directly to interrogate the ongoing relevance of recognition as a moral horizon for conceiving of and practicing intercultural justice. In its place, Ivison offers justification as an alternative, possibly more politically efficacious and morally progressive game for the struggles our contributors explore. Collectively, the research and analysis in this special issue presents us with a picture not of two parties – the coloniser and colonised – at war with each other over the terms of recognition, but rather of complex fields in which recognition norms are continually negotiated and renegotiated, sometimes refused, occasionally affirmed, but never blind to the coloniality of the terms of recognition.

These stories reveal both the strength and the precarity of colonial power. They draw out the grave injustices associated with coloniality, the perverse logic through which the politics of recognition in settler states may be more about appeals for forgiveness and legitimacy by settlers, and the subjective injuries incurred through the politics of recognition. But they also draw out alternative indigenous intersubjectivities that may not need or want recognition from the Other, at least not on certain terms, or which may engage with the Other with a wary but attentive attitude.

Another way of putting this would be to say that recognition is a field of power in which subjects fight it out to produce, reproduce or transform the conditions of shared lives and, sometimes, as Simpson describes in her contribution, to contest the very sharing. **Together, these theoretical insights, and the experiences of**

postcolonial communities that animate them, point to the need for more agonistic, less celebratory or conciliatory approaches to recognition if we are interested in ongoing projects of decolonisation.

They urge critical, but also creative engagements with the limits of what recognition can provide as a basis for politics and intersubjectivity, and with the spaces of possibility that emerge from the disruption of its colonial horizons.

Tuck & Yang – Decolonization

The alternative is decolonization through an ethic of incommensurability.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls. "Decolonization is not a metaphor," *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //jazmyn

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts. We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. There are portions of these projects that simply cannot

speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations

The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in

settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications. This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions

via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial**

wars: • the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) • discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) • heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) • citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) • religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) • the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), • U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) • Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) • the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) • rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) • the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) • Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill,

forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have

noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service

(McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, ill/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies).

Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Abolition

means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: • “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, *The Dreaded Comparison*). • Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) • Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) • Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) • Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) • Native land and Native people as co-constitutive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in *Environmental Education Research*, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. • The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) • Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) • Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor • To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) • Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) • Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) • Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability

Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). **This is not to say that**

Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991) **Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can't be figured, that cannot be resolved. Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world” (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gatling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reservised for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

Place based education

Settler pedagogies cultivate this logic of elimination by sanitizing the land and the scholarship of its settlers. Only a place-based education can both disrupt the totalizing epistemology of anthropocentric western determinism and re-center indigenous epistemologies. This combines the theory and praxis of decolonization to forefront a radical break in settler colonialism and create a sustainable relationship with the land and its inhabitants.

Banga et al 14 (Megan Banga*, Lawrence Curley(a), Adam Kessel(b), Ananda Marin(c), Eli S. Suzukovich III(b) and George Strack(d) [aLearning Sciences and Human Development, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA; bEducation Department, American Indian Center of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA; cPsychology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA; dMiami Tribe of Oklahoma Muskrat theories, tobacco in the streets, and living Chicago as Indigenous land,” Environmental Education Research, 2014 Vol. 20, No. 1, 37–55 JM

Indigenous scholars have suggested that moving toward educational **self-determination requires the reclaiming**, uncovering, and reinventing of our **theoretical understandings and pedagogical best practices** (e.g. Battiste 2002; Smith et al. 1999; Tippeconnic 1999). Trying to work within a methodological paradigm of decolonization (Smith 1999) we used several methodological tools to develop both theory and practice that empowered our community. We collectively worked to center Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies by (re)storying our relationships to Chicago as altered, impacted, yet still, always, Indigenous lands-whether we are in currently ceded urban territory or not. A critical dimension of the work was making visible the impacts of settler colonial constructions of urban lands as ceded and no longer Indigenous and concomitant views of naturalized settler futures (Tuck and Yang 2012) on our community and especially our youth. In this paper we will argue that **the constructions of land**, implicitly or explicitly as no longer Indigenous, **are foundationally implicated in teaching and learning about the natural world, whether that be in science education, place-based education or environmental education. Learning about the natural world is a critical necessity given** the socio-scientific realities (e.g. **climate change** that are currently and **will continue to, shape the lands and life that land supports, more specifically for present purposes the lives of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples**. For us **science education, place-based education, and environmental education are critical sites of struggle because they typically reify the epistemic, ontological, and axiological issues that have shaped Indigenous histories** (Brayboy and Castagno 2008). From a more hopeful perspective, we also see them as sites of potential transformings – forming a nexus between epistemologies and ontologies of land and Indigenous futurity. In our view, realizing this transformative potential will require engaging with land-based perspectives and desettling (Bang et al. 2012) dynamics of settler colonialism that remain quietly buried in educational environments that engage learning about, with and in the land and all of its dwellers. In our experience, **explicitly reengaging land-based perspectives** in the design and implementation of a place-based science learning environment, what we call an emergent form of urban Indigenous land-based pedagogies, **enabled epistemological and ontological balancing that significantly impacted learning** for urban Indigenous youth and families (Bang and Medin 2010; Bang et al. 2010). In the remainder of this paper, we aim to contribute to uncovering the ways in which settler colonialism is entrenched and reified in educational environments. To do this, we provide a critical reading of educational environments that position place and nature as central to their approaches and learning objectives (e.g. place-based, environmental, and science education broadly construed). We include these three broad areas of scholarship because the learning environments that we developed were informed by and make contact with each in various ways. Further, while we do not intend to equate these three forms of education, we suggest that each, to some degree, utilize knowledge about the natural world derived from western scientific systems and settler-colonial relations to land and Indigenous peoples. Our critique is at a grain size that we believe either holds across these bodies of work and does not require the flattening or equating of them or that there are commonalities across them we hope makes visible the still entrenched settler-colonial dynamics that are endemic to education more broadly. Settler-colonial informed readings of place in education Both place-based education and critical pedagogy have been bounded by dichotomous and some might say competing discourses. On the one hand, placebased education seems to focus on the environments and ecologies of outdoor rural spaces, and on the other, critical pedagogies often focus on the urban,

multicultural context (Gruenewald 2008). To broadly elevate the importance of place and to bridge these two approaches, Gruenewald (2003) proposed a critical pedagogy of place. Critical place-based education and eco-justice work have amplified voices resisting destructive forms of globalization and neo-liberalism and have helped to create an intellectual space connected to Indigenous realities as well (Sutherland and Swayze 2012). However, we continue to wonder about the liberatory possibilities for Indigenous people in current forms of place-based education. As Bowers (2003) argues, there are reifications of western intellectual traditions in place-based pedagogies that further

silence some cultural communities. **The reification of western intellectual traditions is often made possible by the denial or erasure of 'Indigenous points of reference'** which, as Marker (2006)

points out, is a form of epistemic violence. **While the denial or erasure of Indigenous points of reference may not be intentional, educational environments that uncritically mobilize them and leave settler-colonial interpretations silenced are complicit in this erasure.**

In order to understand the effects of settler colonialism on place focused learning environments, we trace the ontology of settler colonialism and its subsequent impacts. Just as colonialism employs a grammar of race and inferiority; settler colonialism employs this grammar of race and inferiority but toward a logic of elimination (Veracini 2011). In settler-colonial societies, settler normativity is constructed through a set of dialectic relationships based upon circles of inclusion and exclusion in which the settler constructs himself as normative and

superior vis-à-vis Indigenous and non-Indigenous others. This **positioning of settlers is structurally maintained by employing a set of rules that are situated in and reify the circles of inclusion and exclusion** (e.g. hypodescent and blood quantum). The core of the settler-Indigenous dialectical structure is defined by the desire to erase or assimilate

Indigenous people alongside a continued symbolic Indigenous presence (Wolfe 2006). Scholars of settler colonialism have argued that the conceptual construction of uninhabited land, a form of Indigenous absence, opens the space for settler majorities to establish their ways of knowing, doing and being as normative and morally superior and begin attempts to indigenize settler majority identities (Veracini 2011). In short, settler majorities simultaneously develop identities defined by manifest destiny and genesis amnesia (Bourdieu 1977). The process of erasure and sustained symbolic presence codifies a binary logic often taking the form of 'virtuous settler' and 'dysfunctional native' (Wolfe 2006) or the historicized 'Ecological Indian' (Friedel 2011) which underpins the structure of settler identity and is often encoded in learning environments. In our view,

pathways and pedagogies that make explicit and resist the epistemic and ontological consequences of settler colonialism (i.e. suppression and denial of Indigenous peoples' lifeways or encoding settler identities in learning environments) will be necessary for viable, just, and sustainable change. Land education does just that, and

in our view, at minimum, **demands attention to two critical and oscillating issues born of settler colonialism: (1) the reification of** what Mignolo calls **the**

'zero point epistemology' (2007), **upon which western knowledge of the natural world is predicated, its anthropocentric consequences, and its continued devaluing and/or attacks on Indigenous ways of knowing** (e.g. Semali and Kincheloe 1999) **and** (2)

the absence or presence of indigeneity and the subsequent effects Indigenous presence and disruptions of the 'zero point epistemology' Some scholars have suggested that the middle ages set in motion the creation of a 'zero point of observation and of knowledge,'

or **the 'zero point epistemology' ZPE**; a perspective that **denied all other perspectives defined through forms of theo-politics and ego-politics of knowledge'** (Castro-Gómez 2002; Mignolo 2007). The **varying**

forms of absence (complete or partial) **and the presence of Indigenous people in place-focused work is an example of the ZPE and teaches conceptions of**

place in the service of settler colonial legitimacy. This legitimacy rests on the need to 'disavow Indigenous presence'

and to construct meanings of land as vast, uninhabited spaces ripe for discovery (Deloria et al. 1999; Veracini 2011); typically either fertile for human cultivation or endangered and in need of paternalistic protection. Mignolo (2007) argues that engagement with 'critical border thinking' is a necessary condition for change and is grounded in the experience of the colonies and subalterns. Engaging in critical border thinking, according to Mignolo (2007), is a shift to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge and a fracture of ZPE because borders are not just geographic; they are also epistemic and in our view ontogenetic. Many learning environments facilitate engagement with concepts and constructs developed within the ZPE, teaching and knowledge exchange, as well as understandings of human learning itself. For example, an analogous development of place-devoid constructions of knowledge has been the development of locating learning in the mind as opposed to in or connected to one's body and to lands. However, there has been increasing work in the understandings of embodied cognition (Hall and Nemorovsky 2012), in theorizing relationships between mind and brain, physical health and mental health, and the relationships between culture and learning (e.g. Nasir et al. 2006). Much of the place-based literature acknowledges the relationship between land and culture (e.g. Greenwood 2009; Gruenewald 2003; Gruenewald and Smith 2008) and calls for deep consideration of these relations, because, as Gruenewald (2003) points

out, **when we fail to consider place as products of human decisions, we accept their existence as noncontroversial or inevitable,** like the falling of rain or the fact of the sunrise' (627). **If we**

are to disrupt relationships to land that are constructed from the ZPE, then critical considerations of the ontological and epistemological foundations of much of the

content being taken up and **normalized in learning environments** (see Bang et al. 2012 for concrete examples) **is**

necessary. The challenge for place conscious educators is to create learning environments for new generations of young people that do not facilitate and cultivate conceptual developments and experiences of land that are aligned with 'discover(y)(ing)' frameworks which elevate settlers' rationales for their right to land. From a critical settler-colonial reading, place-based education, in which there is an Indigenous absence, even when relational pedagogies are prescribed, enables 'indigenizing settler majority' identities (Pearson 2002; Veracini 2011). For example, some place-based work theorizes that in order to counter the ways in which language use and institutions deny peoples'

connections to place (Bowers 2002; Gruenewald 2003; Sobel 1996), **innovative pedagogies** that focus on the need to build personal relationships to place – to specific locals **to 'rejuvenate** carnal, sensory **empathy with the living land that sustains us'**

(Abram 1996, 69) – **must be developed**. Gruenewald (2003) notes these types of arguments shift an emphasis from a discourse of change to a discourse of 'rooted, empathetic experience' (8). In an attempt to expand what rootedness might mean and opening a space for Indigenous presence, Gruenewald and Smith (2008), suggest that 'place consciousness must also include consciousness of the historical memory of a place, and the tradition that emerged there, whether these have been disrupted or conserved' (xxi). Importantly, however, just any form of Indigenous presence does not resist settler colonial paradigms, as many are reflective of the settler-Indigenous dialectical structure previously discussed. Often the Indigenous 'presence' in this dialectical relationship that is found in learning environments is shaped and anchored in historicized victory narratives of conquest and assimilative narratives that place the discourse of indigenity within colonial realms of race – not in discourses of territory and sovereignty.⁴ **Engagement with historicized and assimilative narratives**

contributes to the logic of elimination by making the primary issue of land and the continued struggles of Indigenous peoples invisible. Further, even appropriate stories of colonial histories, can be an example of what Tuck and Yang (2012), suggest is a move to white innocence (or the alleviation of white guilt, Simpson 2011) and metaphorization of decolonization because though they may not engage in the erasure of Indigenous past, they presume settler stability and the absence of decolonized sovereign Indigenous futures. Thus, the challenge to place-based work is in articulating the difference between residing and dwelling in a place. The recognition of the difference in kind (residing and dwelling) can easily get applied as a difference in degree⁵ and thus enables settler majorities indigenizing themselves, or as Deloria and Lytle (1998) calls it 'playing indian,' and claiming settler sovereignty as the normative and moral/intellectual authority. Deficit narratives of urban Indigenous communities often claim there are limitations to the living of Indigenous lives in urban places because they are supposedly disconnected to Indigenous homelands and sacred places is intimately intertwined with issues of residing and dwelling. The urban Indian narrative reinscribes the settler- indigenous dialectic by framing Indigenous land (i.e. urban places) through postcontact dispossessions and reemploying a logic of elimination (i.e. urban lands are not Indigenous lands, therefore urban Indians are not Indigenous). Marking urban land as invisible, or not authentic lands, and non-Indigenous, reinscribes the settler-indigenous dialectic that services the logic of elimination for territorial acquisition (Wolfe 2006). This dialectic is complicit in the domestication of decolonization and the denial of repatriation of Indigenous lands (Tuck and Yang 2012), urban and rural; further, it limits imaginative creations of indigenous futurity that are not bound by colonial conceptions of land. Interestingly, there are quiet and loud revolutions within normative disciplines to rupture the concept of the ZPE (e.g. Helmreich 2011; Ingold 2000; Kirksey and Helmreich 2010), though it remains to be seen whether this work can stand in solidarity with settler colonial consciousness.

Regardless, these **emergent transformations have had little influence on the ways in which learning about the 'natural world' across science, place-based, and environmental education are conceptualized broadly**. Although we think place-focused education scholarship could provide critical leadership in constructing different trajectories of knowing, being, and becoming, significant work remains to be done. This work involves tracing and transforming the ways that some of the core constructs in education, as well as the fields of cognition and human development, conceptualize culture, and nature (see Bang et al. 2012). **The development of liberatory learning environments**, we believe, **will hinge on** the

ways in which **constructs of culture and land, as well as the epistemic and ontological stances embedded therein**, are conceptualized, encoded and facilitated. **Land education requires** many

things including: critical border thinking and the **rupturing of the ZPE through the spatial turn** (Kitchens 2009), **solidarity with consciousness of land and settler colonialism, constant resistance to land** perpetually **becoming a resource** for global markets **and negating** presumptions about **the absence of sovereign Indigenous futures**. In our view, one of the most critical, elusive and perhaps contradictory

aspects of learning environments are those that elevate anthropocentric relationships and consequently 'other' both place-based and land education. While place-focused work has opened critical spaces of scholarship and taken the laudable stance to explicitly reject anthropocentrism, a central need for land education in relation to anthropocentrism, as distinct from place-based education still remains because it makes visible the ways in which anthropocentrism is destructive to Indigenous

cosmologies. Place, nature, culture, and anthropocentrism **Place-based education** actively **works toward being nonanthropocentric** (e.g. for overview see Gruenewald 2003); however, we believe accomplishing this transformative stance in lived practice, requires

deeper consideration of the intersections between settler colonialism, the content derived from normative scientific paradigms that has been constructed around the division of nature and culture and is routinely taken up in learning environments (see Bang et al. 2012; Ingold 2011), and theories of learning and development implicitly embedded throughout. Being in the world gives form to children's learning and development – that is, people are continually coming into being through experiences. Individuals that have experiences or engage in practices in which place is a backdrop tend to reason anthropocentrically and view humans as separate or as different from the rest of the world (Bang, Medin, and Atran 2007; Medin and Bang, forthcoming). Anthropocentrism in reasoning and 'world as the backdrop to human activity' has been theorized as a human universal rather than a socially or ideologically constructed phenomenon, particularly in learning and developmental work (e.g. Carey 1985). Increasingly, however, there is work demonstrating that patterns of human thinking and development, which were once thought of as universal in these disciplines, differ across place and culture (e.g. Medin et al. 2010; Herrmann, Medin, and Waxman 2011; Herrmann, Waxman, and Medin 2010). We suggest that taking anthropocentrism as a universal developmental pathway privileges settler colonial relationships to land, reinscribes anthropocentrism by constructing land as an inconsequential or inanimate material backdrop for human privileged activity and enables human dislocation from land. One way that the phenomenon of dislocation occurs is through the construction of places as objects or sites, which Bowers (2001) names as fundamentally a problem of anthropocentrism and Gruenewald (2003) suggests is deeply pedagogical. Corbett (2007) explores the ways in which mobile modernity extends the disembedding of peoples from places, a process that Griffiths (2007) has called 'the deforestation of the mind' (25). For Indigenous learners, this conceptual and developmental pathway functions as a form of dispossession and epistemic (and in our view ontological) violence (e.g. Marker 2006; Wildcat 2009). Indigenous scholars have focused much attention on relationships between land, epistemology and, importantly, ontology (e.g. Cajete 2000; Deloria 1979; Meyer 1998). Places produce and teach particular ways of thinking about and being in the world. They tell us the way things are, even when they operate pedagogically beneath a conscious level (Cajete 2000; Kawagley 1995). Richardson (2011) makes the observation that much of contemporary learning theory is object focused and runs 'roughshod' over Indigenous theories of

learning and development, which we feel at a bare minimum are focused on the development and maintenance of respectful reciprocal subject-subject relations. **The intersection between object focused learning theory and constructions of places as human-shaped objects reifies settler colonial relationship to knowledge and power.** As an example, in another study, we looked at the representations of ecosystems in curricula and human presence or absence. Nearly all of the curricular materials we looked at had no human represented in ecosystems (Bang, Medin, and Atran 2007) – **this absence is emblematic of the nature/culture epistemic divide in western ways of knowing.** Further, if you go to the internet and search for images of ecosystems you will reproduce this phenomenon (Medin and Bang, forthcoming). Indeed, Casey (1997) (as cited in Gruenewald 2003) suggests 'that **there is a fundamental paradox of place – it is everywhere, yet it recedes from consciousness as we become engrossed in our routines in space and time**' (25). In our view, **the recession of place** from consciousness **depends on the ways** in which **we understand and routinize our relationships to other beings.** The receding of place is only the case if we maintain anthropocentric forms of being in which all other forms of life are relegated to the backdrops of human existence or as resource (Ingold 2011). **The implicit and explicit narratives and representations of human/land relations in learning environments is a specific example of the way in which Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies are denied.** Burkhart (2004), in an effort to clearly articulate the difference in ontology between western and Indigenous knowledges, made a revision of the famous Descartes adage 'I think, therefore I am' to express something closer to an Indigenous ontology to 'We are, therefore I am.' Extending this, we might imagine that the ontology of place-based paradigms is something like 'I am, therefore place is,' in contrast, the ontology of land-based pedagogies might be summarized as **'Land is, therefore we are.'** This reframing in our view carries considerable weight in relation to the way we think about, study, and live culture, learning and development with land. In the next section we aim to concretize the dimensions we have been exploring and describe the ways in which we worked to live 'land is, therefore we are' through specific examples of our project and the subsequent emergent urban land-based pedagogies.

Root Cause/Only Alt Solves – Climate Degradation

Settler colonialism results in climate degradation – logics of ownership justify US industrialization and violence upon the land in order to extract resources and further encroach on Indigenous land

Paperson 12 (La, March, This is an avatar that Wayne Yang uses in certain articles, Dr. Yang's work transgresses the line between scholarship and community, as evidenced by his involvement in urban education and community organizing. He was the co-founder of the Avenues Project, a non-profit youth development organization, and also the co-founder of East Oakland Community High School., Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley, professor in the Department of Ethnic Studies and the Urban Studies & Planning Program at UC San Diego., A ghetto land pedagogy: an antidote for settler environmentalism, Environmental Education Research, Vol 20, No 1, pgs. 121, JKS)

Settler environmentalism describes efforts to redeem the settler as ecological, often focusing on settler identity and belonging through tropes of Indigenous appropriations – returning to the wildman or demigoddess, claiming of one's

natural or 'native' self and thus the land, again. For example, 'off the grid' does not describe a place, but a set of redemptive behaviors – it is a terra nullius imaginary of a some- where, nowhere, neverplace where one is no longer a settler. In using the term settler environmentalism, I am deliberately ambiguous about critical environmentalisms, such as movements in eco-feminism, deep ecology, and antiracist environmental justice. These are important trajectories in critical scholarship and activism around environmental justice, and ought to inform any decolonizing framework. However, antiracist, feminist, and environmental justice work are not automatically the opposite of settler colonialism. Decolonization might be incommensurable with projects more generally thought as social justice (see Tuck and Yang 2012). In the previous ethnographic example, greening the ghetto can mask a neoliberal curriculum of whitening the ghetto with 'better-educated,' ecologically 'responsible,' global citizens. More radical environmentalisms can also uphold the settler fantasy of sacred 'wilderness' – another form of unpeopled land – that must be restored or preserved. Even the progressive concept of land as Commons to be occupied, collectively shared and stewarded, may require the negation of Indigenous sovereignty. 'The people still speak of the sacredness of places now claimed by the parks services for instance' (Goeman 2008, 32). Occupying land for the Commons assumes that all prior, indeed current as well as future relations between people and land are null and void. 'In other words,' writes Sandy Grande, 'both Marxists and capitalists view land and natural resources as commodities to be exploited, in the first instance, by capitalists for personal gain, and in the second by Marxists for the good of all' (2004, 27). Social justice endeavors all take place on Native land. In this vein, I now turn to the Occupy movement. Behind every great American city is a great crime. Oakland was founded on occupation and land theft. In 1850, a coterie of Yankee businessmen began building a port in what would become Oakland's Jack London Square, developing and selling land unbeknownst to landlord Luis Peralta, who was granted 48,000 acres for his service to the Spanish army. Indeed, the Native Ohlone still lived in the land 'owned' by the Peraltas, as well as Miwok and other Indigenous people who had migrated as a result of historic relationships between tribes and efforts to escape the Mission system. The Peraltas sued, and in 1856, the US Supreme Court upheld their claim, but maintained that it was too late to reverse – as deeds and titles had exchanged hands so many times that there was no undoing – and because Oakland was now occupied. Occupy Oakland, which began in October of 2011, was an active part of the movements that began with Occupy Wall Street. Occupy itself was a diverse set of movements and dialogues not reducible to a single name or a campaign. Various queer, people of color and Indigenous groups participated in or sympathized with Occupy and recognized its importance as a meeting space, a node, for struggle. However, many of these groups had serious points of difference, most notably in the problematic name, 'Occupy.' On 28 October 2011, a group of Indigenous and non-Indigenous intellectuals/activists introduced 'The Memorandum of Solidarity with Indigenous Peoples' at the General Assembly of Occupy Oakland. WHEREAS, those participating in 'Occupy Oakland' acknowledge that Oakland is already occupied land; Oakland being the historical territory of the Chochenyo Ohlone people; and... RESOLVED, that those participating in 'Occupy Oakland' seek the genuine and respectful involvement of indigenous peoples in the rebuilding of a new society on their ancestral lands; and As a signal to the national 'Occupy Wall Street' movement and the indigenous peoples here and there who have felt excluded by the colonialist language of occupation used to name this movement, it shall be declared that 'Occupy Oakland' aspires to 'Decolonize Oakland' – to 'Decolonize Wall Street' – with the guidance and participation of indigenous peoples; The memorandum points to difference as a modality of organizing, a source of strength and political possibility rather than as simply a curtailment of common struggle. Most importantly, the memorandum makes explicit the moral and political leadership of Indigenous peoples in any decolonial effort in North America. Significantly, the first signature of memorandum is by Chochenyo Ohlone educator Corrina Gould. The memorandum was passed, but not without

controversy. One of the signers, Joanne Barker (Lenape) posted in her blog, Tequila Sovereign, that several people approached the group with serious anxieties about decolonization. Ultimately, what they were asking is whether or not we were asking them, as non- indigenous people, the impossible? Would their solidarity with us require them to give up their lands, their resources, their ways of life, so that we – who numbered so few, after all – could have more? Could have it all? And this is the rub about decolonization: it forces people to confront their complicity in settler colonialism and the ongoing violence of empire. It immediately unsettles the utopian vision of wealth redistribution and collectively owned Commons. It exposes how numerical the conceptualization of social justice remains – the 99% is a ‘deserving’ supermajority that renders Indigenous peoples (a super-minority) completely illegible. Barker goes on to write, I have a dream that the people of ‘Occupy Oakland’ will not see the affirmation of indigenous peoples’ rights to self-government, territorial restoration, and cultural autonomy as a threat to their own; that they will see solidarity with indigenous peoples as an affirmation of their humanity and justice. Barker’s assertion reflects how ‘sovereignty’ as an Indigenous word is spoken with a different inflection than its cousin in the settler nation’s lexicon. It echoes the questions posed by Watson, writing from an aboriginal Australian perspective: Is aboriginal sovereignty to be feared by Australia in the same way as Aboriginal people fear white sovereignty and its patriarchal model of the state – one which is backed by power or force? Or is aboriginal sovereignty different ... for there is not just one sovereign state body but hundreds of different sovereign aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal sovereignty is different from state sovereignty because it embraces diversity, and focuses on inclusivity rather than exclusivity. (Watson 2007, 20) A little over a month later, another proposal came before the General Assembly – to change the movement’s name to Decolonize Oakland. This time, the proposal did not pass. Christine Cordero (who does not identify as Native) posted on Facebook a few of her responses to the arguments made against the name change, including ‘Decolonize is divisive.’ To which she responded, ‘Occupy is divisive already and not including whole swaths of people. Decolonize and liberate are TRANSFORMATIVE. Difference, diversity, and change aren’t divisive.’ Occupy Oakland means to Occupy Ohlone. Because Ohlone is both people and land/place simultaneously, you cannot occupy Oakland without also trespassing on the bodies and spirits of those who live/d there. Land is ‘more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history’ (Goeman 2008, 24), more than a site to occupy.