Tractatus Philosophico-Theologicus

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Preface to the Reader

How supremely necessary and useful it is, especially in the study of theology, to join the study of philosophy, is evident to all. If I were now to attempt to demonstrate this to many, who would not accuse me of bringing light to the sun or performing a task already completed? However, it is well known that many students of theology, neglecting this study, either wholly despise it or pursue it with too little enthusiasm. Yet they hasten, insufficiently prepared, to the sublime study of theology, often with little fruit and much detriment to their learning—something both others and they themselves eventually realize, but alas, too late. The causes of this neglect, as I have chiefly observed, are threefold among many others:

1. Some excuse themselves by alleging the supposed difficulty of this study.
2. Others complain of its length.
3. Still others, while not daring to deny the noble usefulness of this study in theology, are nevertheless falsely persuaded that its benefits are difficult to obtain.

Thus, they seem to reason as follows: "Any study that is difficult, lengthy, and whose benefits and usefulness in theology are harder to attain should not be undertaken. Such a study requires much time, consumes many resources, and in the end proves fruitless. But such is the study of philosophy. Therefore, it should not be pursued."

Yet this reasoning is not of such weight that it ought to move or deter anyone from such a noble study. For why allege the difficulty of this study? Even the most difficult subjects are easily mastered with the application of certain methods. What of its length? Separate out the many and varied questions that are more contentious than useful, and extract only what is necessary and beneficial—you will then find no great length. And what do you say of the claim that the usefulness and fruitfulness of philosophy in theology is difficult to attain? If that is the case, we know of many who have spent five or six years in the academies, engaging both in the study of philosophy and theology simultaneously, yet they perceived either no benefit or very little from philosophy in their theological studies.

But why is this so? The reason lies in failing to follow the correct path. By adhering to the right way, not only will we attain our goal swiftly, but we will also do so without difficulty. Lest anyone lack the necessary tools, I now wish to share the more common principles of philosophy, as I gathered them years ago in the academies. These principles, presenting the very core of nearly all philosophy, I intend to communicate to everyone. To ensure they do not seem too difficult, I have illustrated them with limitations and objections. To prevent them from appearing overly lengthy, I have presented them concisely. And so they may not appear useless to theology, I have shown their application in various ways.

Indeed, some may find these principles elsewhere, explained by others, but for that reason, we do not consider our effort entirely useless. For our aim is to present them here briefly and clearly, and most of all, to demonstrate their application in theology. Finally, I intended to provide an even more refined version of these principles, but various obstacles prevented this. In

the meantime, use these principles. Receive them kindly, and if you detect any typographical errors in this work, do not let them displease you. Be favorable to the author. Farewell.

Rules of Philosophy

Chapter 1: Concerning Being

Rule I

It is impossible (even with respect to the absolute power of God) that the same thing (whether it be a being or a non-being, by real identity, rational identity, or virtual identity) should both *be* and *not be* simultaneously, in the same way, in the same respect, and according to the same part.

Objection 1: Scripture says in Luke 1: "Nothing will be impossible with God." Therefore, God could make the same thing both be and not be simultaneously.

Response: Pliny held the view that God cannot do all things; thus, in *Natural History* 2.7, he lists many things that God cannot do. However, it is more correctly asserted against Pliny that God is omnipotent and can do all things, as Sacred Scripture also clearly teaches in many places. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the nature of any power is judged by its object. The object of any power is what is possible**.**

Now, there are two kinds of possibility:

1. Absolute possibility (i.e., something inherently possible), and

2. Conditional possibility (i.e., something possible under specific conditions).

The first kind, absolute possibility, is the proper object of divine power. This includes all things that do not involve a contradiction. However, to make things that exist cease to exist, or to make things that do not exist come into being, or other similar things (such as those Pliny lists in *Natural History* 2.7) involve manifest contradictions and are not included within the scope of divine power.

Objection 2: The Jews believe that two rabbis who contradict each other can both speak the truth. (See this Jewish opinion discussed in the Talmud, *Mas. Erubin* chapter 1, folio 13.)

Response: These are the trifles of the Jews and can be dismissed with the same ease with which they are uttered.

Objection 3: God can also do things that are impossible. For example, in Luke 1:37, Mary says to the angel, "How shall this be?" indicating that such a thing is impossible.

Response: It cannot be denied that God can and has done many things that are impossible for and appear impossible to man. For this reason, we believe that what was announced to Mary by the

angel Gabriel seemed impossible to her in Luke 1. However, we deny that it was inherently impossible or impossible for God. For not everything that seems impossible to creatures or humans is therefore impossible for God. (See Ephesians 3:20.)

Objection 4: In the divine nature, essence and relation are the same in reality. Nevertheless, essence is communicable while relation is incommunicable—not only according to our mode of understanding but even prior to all operations of our intellect.

Response: Essence and relation in the divine nature are indeed the same in reality, but they are distinguished virtually. Hence, even prior to any act of the intellect, essence is communicable, whereas relation is incommunicable. (See Rodericus de Arriaga, *Logica*, distinction 5, section 4, subsection 1, number 56, and Bartolomé de Medina, *Metaphysics*, distinction 10, section 10.)

Objection 5: Justice and mercy in God are really the same, yet it cannot be said that the justice of God is His mercy or that His mercy is His justice.

Response: Justice and mercy in God are indeed the same in reality, but not in reasoning or according to our mode of conception. Furthermore, what is said, "The justice of God is not His mercy, and the mercy of God is not His justice," can be understood in two ways:

1. In an identical sense.
2. In a formal sense.

If the first sense is intended, it is false, for when divine mercy and justice are taken materially and in an identical sense, it is absolutely true to say, "Divine mercy is divine justice." This has the same meaning as saying, "The divine essence, which is mercy, is also justice." However, when the latter sense is intended, it is not true to say, "The mercy of God is not His justice, and the justice of God is not His mercy." The reason is that a formal sense includes not only the object but also our mode of conceiving it. Our intellect often conceives even things that are perfectly identical as distinct. Thus, although justice and mercy, as well as goodness and wisdom in God, are the same in reality, the intellect forms a different concept of God's wisdom than it does of His goodness, justice, or mercy. See Javellus, *Metaphysics*, Book 12, Question 19, where he extensively discusses the identity and distinction of attributes.

Objection 6: If it is impossible for the same thing to exist and not exist at the same time, human free will collapses, for it is described as the power to act and not act simultaneously.

Response: The term "simultaneously" in our rule can be understood either in relation to *possibility* or *potentiality*, such that the meaning is "the same thing can exist and not exist according to the same potentiality," as, for example, Peter can sit and not sit through his will. It can also be taken in terms of *existence* and *non-existence*, such that the meaning is "it is possible that the same thing, when it exists, does not exist." In the first sense—where "simultaneously"

refers to possibility or potentiality—our principle must be understood, but not in the latter sense, where "simultaneously" pertains to actual existence.

Objection 7: Christ is lesser than the Father (John 14:28) and His servant (Philippians 2:7), yet He is equal to the Father and one with Him (John 10:30).

Response: There is no opposition here according to the same respect. Christ is lesser than the Father according to His human nature and equal to the Father according to His divine nature. Thus, St. Athanasius says, "Equal to the Father in divinity, lesser according to His humanity." In the same way, Christ, according to His divine nature, is prior to Abraham (John 8:58) and not prior according to His human nature. According to His divine nature, He knows all things (Colossians 2:3; John 21:17), but according to His human nature, He is ignorant of some things, such as the day of judgment (Mark 13:32).

Objection 8: Abraham was justified by works (James 2:21), yet Abraham was not justified by works (Romans 4:2–3).

Response: There is no contradiction here in the same respect. Abraham was justified by works in relation to humans but was not justified by works in relation to God. Scripture says in Romans 4:2, "If Abraham was justified by works, he has something to boast about, but not before God."

Objection 9: A property belongs to one alone, yet a property does not belong to one alone, for the properties and attributes of the divine nature also belong to the human nature.

Response: The opposition is not in the same manner. A property belongs to one alone as to the primary and immediate subject. It does not belong to one alone as to a secondary and mediated subject. Thus, even though the properties of the divine nature are communicated to the human nature in Christ, they do not cease to be properties of the divine nature. They belong to the divine nature alone as the primary and immediate subject, while they belong to the human nature secondarily and mediately, namely through the hypostatic union.

Rule II

Everything (whether it is a being or a non-being) either is or is not.

Objection 1: This rule is the same as the preceding one; therefore, it is poorly distinguished from it.

Response: Javellus (*Metaphysics*, Book 4, Question 9) and Mendoza (*Metaphysics*, Disputation 3) dispute whether this principle is the same as the preceding one. However, it is more accurate to follow Fonseca (*Metaphysics*, Book 4, Chapter 3, Question 1, Section 1), Suárez (*Metaphysics*, Disputation 3, Section 3), and Vasquez (*Metaphysics*, Volume 1, Disputation 3,

Section 5), who consider them distinct. The former signifies *repugnance* (incompatibility), while the latter signifies *immediate necessity*, which are clearly very different. For it is one thing to say that two things cannot coexist in the same subject (e.g., "white cannot be black"), and another thing to say that one of them must necessarily apply (e.g., "everything is either white or black"). Thus, we rightly say, "A person who sees cannot be blind," but we cannot say, "Everything either sees or is blind," for a stone neither sees nor is blind.

Rule III

Everything that is (or is not), when it is (or is not), must necessarily be (or not be) by an immutable necessity of supposition.

Objection I: If everything that exists must necessarily exist, and everything that does not exist must necessarily not exist, it follows that there is no contingency in things, that is, nothing exists or does not exist contingently.

Response: Necessity is of two kinds: absolute necessity and immutable necessity from supposition. Absolute necessity, according to Gabriel (*Sentences*, Book III, Distinction XVI, Question 1), is that whose opposite entails a contradiction. According to Pererius, this applies to what pertains to a thing simply by its nature and through all differences of time, such as "man is an animal." Immutable necessity from supposition refers to something that, while contingent in itself, cannot fail to apply once a certain hypothesis or condition is established. This rule refers to the latter type of necessity. To the argument, I respond: The premise can be understood in two ways:

1. In the divided sense: Everything that exists must necessarily exist, and every thing that does not exist must necessarily not exist.
2. In the composite sense: Everything that exists, insofar as it exists, must necessarily exist; and everything that does not exist, insofar as it does not exist, must necessarily not exist.

If the premise is understood in the first sense, it is false and is not the sense intended by the rule. However, if it is understood in the second sense, it is true. Yet, in this case, the conclusion does not follow, because this necessity is only hypothetical, not absolute, and does not exclude contingency.

You may object: "If this necessity does not exclude contingency, it follows that a contingent thing, even when it exists, could both exist and not exist, according to the definition of contingency. But this is false, since a contingent thing, when it exists, cannot fail to exist; otherwise, contradictory propositions would be true of the same thing."

Response: A thing that is contingent remains contingent in itself and by its nature, even when it exists. However, insofar as it is determined to some specific point in time, it is no longer

contingent but necessary. This necessity, however, does not negate the contingency that belongs to the thing by its nature. Therefore, the claim that "a contingent thing, even when it exists, could both exist and not exist" is true if understood correctly. It is true insofar as a contingent thing, by its nature, even when it exists, retains the potential to exist or not exist. However, it is false to say that a contingent thing, once determined to a specific time, could both exist and not exist as so determined. This conclusion does not follow from the prior premises.

Rule IV

Of a non-being (i.e., something that does not exist, at the time indicated by the copula or predicate), no predicates (whether accidental, intrinsic by denomination, or extrinsic) can be affirmed as true—unless they arise from an act of the intellect, imagination, or will, either positively or privatively (lacking an intrinsic form).

Objection 1: From eternity, this proposition was true: "The human nature of Christ will suffer," and yet from eternity, the human nature of Christ did not exist but was a non-being.

Response: Suffering is not attributed here to the human nature of Christ as it did not exist from eternity and was non-being. Rather, it is attributed to it as assumed in time, as indicated by the copula in the verb.

Objection 2: From eternity, this proposition was true: "Man is an animal," and yet from eternity man was a non-being because no man existed from eternity, but man was only produced by God in time.

Response: The predicates in this rule refer only to accidental predicates. However, in the given proposition, "animal" is an essential predicate.

Objection 3: John 8:56: Christ says to the Jews, "Abraham desired and rejoiced to see my day." Yet Christ did not exist in the time of Abraham.

Response: Terms like "loved," "desired," and similar predicates are extrinsic accidents deriving their denomination from acts of the will. Such predicates are excluded from this rule.

Objection 4: John 8:56: Christ also says, "And Abraham saw my day and rejoiced." From this, it follows that non-being can have extrinsic accidental predicates derived not from internal senses but external ones, like sight. For Christ did not exist in the time of Abraham, yet it is said that Abraham saw him.

Response: "To see" is not always and exclusively used to mean physical sight with the eyes, but often refers to intellectual vision. In such cases, "to see" means to know or understand. As

Terence writes in *Adelphi*, Act III, Scene 4: "This is wisdom—not only to see what lies at one's feet but also to foresee what is to come."

Objection 5: The Last Day does not yet exist, and yet it is said to be unknown, even to Christ, according to his humanity.

Response: "Unknown" is an accidental predicate of privation, lacking only an external form. Such predicates are not considered in this rule.

Rule V

The essences of things (insofar as they are such) are like numbers—they cannot be added to or subtracted from.

Objection 1: A part of man, such as an arm or a leg, can be removed. Therefore, the essence of man is divisible.

Response: Something can be called indivisible in two ways:

1. Absolutely, as a point is indivisible.
2. In a certain sense, such that it cannot be divided in a way that the thing itself remains the same.

In the first sense, it is not universally true that the essences of things are indivisible. However, in the second sense, our rule holds universally, particularly for those who deny that matter is part of corporeal substances and instead argue that the form constitutes the whole essence. Hugh of St. Victor held this position, arguing that Christ remained a man during the three days of death (*On the Sacraments*, Book I, Part II).

In the posterior sense, all essences are indivisible. You might argue that an arm can be removed from a man, yet he remains a man. I reply that he does indeed remain a man, but not a whole man—he is maimed.

Objection 2: There were heretics called the Apollinarians, who lived around the 4th century after Christ. They taught that Christ assumed only a body and a sensitive soul, but not a rational soul. If this is true, something essential to man could be removed, and he would still remain a man.

Response: Our rule can be used to argue against these heretics. Since Christ is a man, and the essence of man necessarily requires a rational soul, it is impossible for Christ not to have assumed or possessed a rational soul. The essences of things consist in what is indivisible, and thus such a lack would violate the essence of man.

Objection 3: Accidents are added to and removed from essences, while the essences remain intact.

Response: The rule speaks of the indivisibility of essences. However, accidents do not pertain to the essence of things, as they are accidents. Therefore, the addition or subtraction of accidents does not divide the essence.

Rule VI

The essences of things are eternal (i.e., eternal and necessarily connected with the things themselves).

Objection 1: Only God is eternal. Therefore, the essences of all things cannot be eternal.

Response: This rule does not refer to *actual existence*—as if all essences exist without beginning or end, which is true only of God. Instead, it must be understood differently. Gabriel Vásquez (*Disputations*, Part 3, Disp. 73, Chapter 1) and others interpret this to mean that essences are eternal in the sense of *possibility*, because the essences of things perpetually and necessarily have the potential to exist. However, most theologians understand this rule to mean the essence of a thing is perpetually connected to the thing whose essence it is. Mendoz expresses this well when he says: "Essence necessarily belongs to things because God, wishing to create a man, could not attribute to him the essence of a stone. Otherwise, He would not create a man but a stone."

Objection 2: Faith is essentially a kind of knowledge, as most theologians teach. However, infants, to whom faith is attributed, cannot possess knowledge since they lack the use of reason. Therefore, either it is not true that infants have faith, as Anabaptists and Calvinists claim, or it is false that the essences of things are eternal.

Response: It is not false that infants possess faith. For Christ Himself is pleased with them (Mark 10:14), and without faith, it is impossible to please God (Hebrews 11:6). Neither does our rule fail. Therefore, it must be said that infants indeed possess a kind of knowledge, even though they do not have it through the use of reason. Such knowledge can be supernaturally infused by the Holy Spirit.

Rule VII

There is no science (positive) of non-being (or falsehood).

Objection 1: A future eclipse is a non-being, yet it can be known.

Response: Non-being can be understood in two ways:

1. As corresponding to the simple operation of the mind, meaning that which does not exist or cannot exist.
2. As corresponding to composition and division, meaning that which is false.

Non-being is taken here in the latter sense. However, a future eclipse is a non-being in the former sense. When non-being is taken in this way, it can be further understood:

1. As opposed to "being" in the participial sense, where non-being means something that does not exist in actuality.
2. As opposed to "being" in the nominal sense, where non-being means something that neither exists nor can exist.

If non-being is understood in this second, nominal sense, there can be no science of it. However, if it is understood in the first, participial sense—as with a future eclipse—then there can indeed be science of non-being.

Objection 2: The Philosopher (Aristotle) demonstrates that neither the infinite nor the void exist in actuality or even as possible.

Response: There is no *positive* science of non-being or falsehood. Rather, it is *negative*. What is false cannot be known as true, for if someone considers something false to be true, they do not have science but deception and ignorance. However, what is false can be known as false. This is the way Aristotle taught that the infinite does not exist. Likewise, theologians treat purgatory as something fictitious and false. For if they were to consider it real, they would be deceived.

Chapter 2: On Act and Potency

Rule I

The consequence from potency to act, or from "being able" to "actually being" (affirmative), is not valid.

Objection 1: The Megarics, as Aristotle testifies (Metaphysics, Book 3, Text 5), taught that potencies do not precede their acts. Rather, they only exist when their corresponding acts are present, asserting that someone can only act when they are actually acting. If this view is true, then our rule is false, for in such a case, nothing would ever come to be or be possible. By their reasoning, someone standing would always stand, and someone sitting would always sit, making it impossible for someone standing to sit or vice versa.

Response: We affirm against the Megarics that every potency - both active and passive - is prior to its acts, either in nature or even in time. While it is not always the case that potencies precede their acts in time (as with the active potency of the sun to illuminate or the passive potency of prime matter), it is certain that these potencies precede their acts in nature. See Favillus, *Metaphysics* Book 9, Questions 5, and Suarez's *Metaphysical Disputations*, Disputation 43, Section 8.14 and following.

Objection 2: The following consequence seems valid: "What does not exist cannot act, therefore it cannot be."

Response: The affirmative consequence from "being able" to "actually being" is not valid. However, the negative consequence is valid. For example, from "It is not possible for something to exist" follows "It does not exist." Yet, the reverse is not true: the statement "Every creature can not exist, therefore it does not exist" is invalid. This is because the antecedent proposition is not negative in the strict sense, as the negation in the phrase "can not exist" is not absolute but depends on the conditional context implied by the verb "can." Thus, the negation does not affect the entire statement.

Rule II

The consequence from act to potency, or from "being" to "being able to be" (affirmative, with the same time frame preserved in the antecedent and consequent), is valid.

Objection 1: The affirmative consequence from act to potency cannot be valid because act and potency are opposites. A human being, when they are actually existing, is no longer in potency. Therefore, it seems the negative consequence from act to potency, and vice versa, should rather be valid.

Response: It is important to distinguish between *having* potency (i.e., "being able to be") and *being in potency*. The affirmative consequence does not hold from *being in act* to *being in potency*. However, it does hold from *being in act* to *having potency* (i.e., "being able to be"). The reason is that *being in potency* excludes act, while *being in act* contradictorily opposes non-being. However, "being able to be" or *having potency* does not deny act but abstracts from it and can coexist with either act or its negation.

Objection 2: It does not follow that "Christ has died, therefore He can die," since Christ, having risen from the dead, "dies no more, and death has no dominion over Him" (Romans 6). Theologians also distinguish three states for humanity:

1. In the first state, before the Fall, man could not die.
2. In the second state, after the Fall, man could not avoid death.
3. In the third state, in the life to come (to which Christ also belongs), man cannot die.**

Response: Our rule requires that the same time frame be preserved in both the antecedent and consequent. Therefore, it is not valid to infer, "Christ has died, therefore He can die." Instead, the correct conclusion would be, "Christ has died, therefore Christ *could* die."

Rule III

What possesses a potency (i.e., to whom a potency is attributed) also possesses the corresponding act (i.e., the act is attributed to the same subject).

Objection: Aristotle explicitly teaches in *Metaphysics* Book 9, Text 16, that act is not in the agent but in the patient.

Response: There is a difference between *being of something* and *being in something*. Every act *belongs to* (i.e., is attributed to) that which possesses the potency. However, not every act *exists in* the subject that possesses the potency. For instance, in the case of passive potency, the act exists in the subject that possesses the passive potency. Similarly, in the case of active potency, the act exists in the subject that possesses the active potency—if the act is immanent. However, if the act is transitive, it does not exist in the subject possessing the active potency.

Rule IV

Whatever passes from potency (passive) to act (as something intrinsic to the thing itself) undergoes change.

Objection 1: God was eternally in potency to create; therefore, when He created in time, He underwent change.

Response: God was not in passive potency to create but rather possessed the active potency to create.

Objection 2: One who is not currently seen is in passive potency to being seen. However, when they are seen in act, they do not undergo change.

Response: Something can pass from passive potency to act in two ways:

1. When the act is intrinsic to the thing itself and immediately designates it intrinsically.
2. When the act is extrinsic and designates the thing extrinsically.

The rule refers to intrinsic acts. However, being seen is merely an extrinsic designation.

Objection 3: The Son of God, before the Incarnation, was in potency to become human. Therefore, when He later became human in act, He underwent change, since this act was intrinsic to Him.

Response: The Son of God was not in intrinsic passive potency to become human. Although He assumed human nature into Himself, He did not receive it in the manner of a subject. Rather, He assumed it miraculously and united it to Himself.

Rule V

Whoever can accomplish the greater (more difficult) can also accomplish the lesser (in the same category).

Objection 1: A human can produce a composite but cannot produce prime matter. Yet, a composite is greater, and prime matter is lesser.

Response: It is one thing for a composite to be greater and prime matter lesser. It is another thing for producing a composite to be greater and producing prime matter to be lesser. The first is true, but the second is false because producing prime matter is greater and more difficult than producing a composite.

Objection 2: A human can understand but cannot fly. Yet, flying is lesser, and understanding is greater.

Response: Flying is indeed lesser, but it is not lesser in relation to understanding (which is greater). The two are disparate and not of the same category, for flying is not of the same genus as understanding.

Rule VI

A potency does not extend beyond (i.e., is not directed toward) its proper object.

Objection 1: God can do all things. Therefore, He can also die, eat, cause things that exist to cease to exist, or cause future things to become past. These things must be contained within the adequate object of His power, which is "all things."

Response: The phrase "all things" does not describe the adequate object of divine power unless it is restricted to *absolutely possible things*. Nothing falls under any potency unless it is within the realm of the possible. Impossibilities, by their nature, fall under no potency. Dying and eating imply imperfection, and such imperfection cannot pertain to God, who is perfect. For God to die or eat would imply being perfect and yet imperfect, which is contradictory. Similarly, other supposed "impossibilities" do not fall under God's power because they are, by nature, not possible. However, this does not mean that divine power is imperfect, contrary to what frivolous critics like Vorstius and Plinius claim.

Objection 2: From this rule, it follows that the blessed will not see God with their bodily eyes because the adequate object of the visual power is light and color (specifically color), as everything visible is seen under some color.

Response: Some use this rule to argue for the conclusion, while others assert that our eyes are placed in a state of obediential potency and that the visual power can be elevated to see God. Let judges decide which position is more reasonable.

Rule VII

Whatever one can do if they will (i.e., bring their potency into act), they can do absolutely.

Objection: Whatever one can do if they will, they can do absolutely. But God can sin if He wills; therefore, He can absolutely sin. The minor premise is supported by the idea that whatever God wills, He accomplishes (Ps. 135). The major premise is the rule itself.

Response: Some respond to this objection by limiting the major premise to the following:
"Whatever one can do if they will, and can will to do, they can do absolutely."

When the major premise is limited in this way, they deny the minor premise, stating that God cannot will sin, and thus believe the flaw in the argument lies in this matter. However, the proper response to the argument is that it contains five terms (quinque termini). To see this clearly, note the following:

1. The major premise is a simple proposition with a conditional predicate.
2. The condition "if they will" is part of the predicate, both in the major premise and the minor premise.
3. This condition is formally restrictive and expresses the relationship of inherence between the predicate (or part of the predicate) and the subject in absolute terms.

4. Any formal restriction pertains to the predicate, not the subject.

From these points, it is clear how the argument contains five terms:

1. "Whatever one can do"
2. "Can absolutely do, if they will"
3. "God"
4. "Can sin, if He wills"
5. "Can absolutely sin"

Final Note: A potency that is never (i.e., in no way) brought into act (in the species of act to which it is ordained) is in vain.

Rule VIII

A power is in vain if it is never (i.e., not at any time) translated (specifically) into any act (to which it is ordained).

Objection 1: Humans have the power to procreate, to visit many places on earth, and to see many colors. Yet it often happens that a person does not procreate, abstains from the company of women, does not visit multiple places, or does not see certain colors. Therefore, those powers would seem to be in vain.

Response: As for the power to procreate, while it is often not exercised by individuals, it is exercised within the species, and even in individuals, it is not in vain. The natural power was originally given because of the intrinsic perfection of the thing itself. Furthermore, the locomotive power is not in vain in humans, even if one does not move to every place one can; similarly, the visual power is not in vain even if one does not see everything that can be seen. It suffices that the power is exercised in some act.

Objection 2: The visual power in moles is never translated into action in the entire species, and therefore, it is in vain.

Response: It is denied that moles have true visual power, and this is supported by Aristotle, *De Historia Animalium*, Book 1, Chapter 9, which states that moles do not have real eyes but rather undeveloped ones or something analogous to eyes. The partial development of their eyes exists to make them somewhat similar to other animals, and therefore, even this is not in vain.

Objection 3: Arminius, in *Apologia*, Article 19, seems to rightly deny that Adam before the Fall had the power to believe in Christ, because this would have been in vain since it could not be translated into action.

Response: If a power has multiple uses and ends, it is not in vain even if it is not translated into action with respect to all of them. Therefore, although the power of believing in Christ that Adam had was not translated into action, for the time, state, and condition did not admit or require it, the same power to believe in Christ was exercised when Adam believed in God, the giver of all good things.

Objection 4: Scotus, in Book 3, Distinction 7, Question 4, along with many others cited by him in that context, holds the opinion that Christ would have become incarnate even if Adam had not sinned. This seems to be provable from our rule, because otherwise, the natural power of human nature to be united to the Word would have been in vain.

Response: This opinion is false, and against it, see Becanus in *Theologia Scholastica*, Part 3, Treatise 1, Question 6. Concerning the argument derived from our rule, it is answered that a creature can have a twofold power for something: (1) natural and (2) obediential. The former, I say, is in vain if it is not translated into action in the species, and this is the sense of our rule. But the latter, namely obediential power, by which human nature could also be assumed into the unity of the Word's person, does not need to be translated into action, because through it, God can do anything with a creature. Yet such action often does not accord with His order or supreme wisdom.

Objection 5: Aristotle, in *Physics*, Book 3, Chapter 6, Text 57, teaches that infinite power can exist either through addition, as in number, or through division, as in continuity. However, this power cannot be translated into action because actual infinity cannot exist, as he proves in many ways in the preceding arguments. Hence, in Text 50, he says: "There is no actual infinity but only potential infinity."

Response: The power for the infinite, either by addition or by division, can be understood in two ways:

1. In the collective sense, where the infinite is considered a power such that all its parts would eventually exist simultaneously, either by addition or by division. In this sense, such a power corresponds to a completed act. Aristotle himself excludes this interpretation, as he states: "It is not in the nature of potentiality to reach a final state as an actual infinite."
2. In the distributive sense, where the infinite pertains to an admixture of potentiality and act: for instance, a number can always be increased by a new unit but will never reach a complete totality, or a magnitude can always undergo further division but will never achieve an absolute subdivision. Aristotle clarifies this with examples of the Olympic games and a day's duration (*Physics*, Book 3, Chapter 6). However, it is not necessary to pursue this explanation at great length here.

Rule IX

A being composed of actuality and potentiality (i.e., a being that is in some respects actual and in others potential) belongs to the same (highest) category.

Objection 1: The potentiality of primary matter is in the category of substance, and yet certain accidental forms also exist. Likewise, the potentiality for vision belongs to substance (being a part of the soul itself), but vision itself is in the category of action.

Response: This rule comes from Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Part I, Question 77, Article 1. If "act" and "potentiality" are understood abstractly, as Thomas does, then the rule is undoubtedly false, as demonstrated by the objection. However, if "act" and "potentiality" are understood with respect to the entities that are said to exist either in act or in potentiality, then the rule is true. For example, the same man who once existed in potentiality now exists in actuality, and he belongs to the same highest category, namely, the category of substance.

Thomists attempt to defend the rule in its earlier sense, responding to the objection as follows:

1. The primary act of the potentiality of matter belongs to the same category as its primary potentiality. However, the primary act of matter is its substantial form, while secondary acts are substantial forms as well.
2. They argue that the potentiality for vision and its act (seeing) belong to the same category. They assume that immanent actions, such as vision, are qualities. Moreover, they claim that the potentiality for vision and other powers of the soul are qualities, not the substance of the soul itself. They base this claim on the rule under discussion, which states that act and potentiality are said to belong to the same category. Since, for the moment, the act of the potentiality for vision is assumed to be a quality, they conclude that the potentiality for vision must also be a quality so that act and potentiality belong to the same category.

However, their argument always presupposes what needs to be proved. In their final response regarding the example of the potentiality for vision and its act, the claim that immanent actions are not true actions but rather qualities is false and contrary to what is commonly defended by theologians and accepted by Aristotle himself. Furthermore, the claim that the soul's powers, particularly the potentiality for vision, are qualities is, if not entirely false, at least uncertain and controversial, and it cannot be proved by the rule cited, since the rule in the sense used here is false and not accepted by us.

Rule X

One thing is the cause of a power, and another is the cause of its acts (whether proximate or ultimate).

Objection: God is not only the cause of the human will's power (that is, man's free power), but also of its acts, so that here the cause of the power and the acts is not different. God is even the proximate cause of the acts of the will and directly concurs in them. This is the common opinion of the Fathers, theologians, and philosophers. Setting aside philosophical arguments for now, this can also be proved from Scripture. For Paul, in Acts 17:28, says: "For in Him we live, and move, and have our being." Paul proves this statement from what he had said before, namely, that God is not far from any one of us. But this proof would be meaningless if Paul held that God acts and concurs with secondary causes only mediately, for from the fact that something concurs mediately with another, it does not follow that it is near to that with which it concurs. For example, the sun concurs with a man in generating a man (Physics II.2), yet the sun is very far from man.

Response: Durandus, in *Sentences*, Book II, Distinction 1, Question 2, denies that God acts immediately through secondary causes. See also Distinction 37, Question 1. If this opinion were true, one could say that God is the remote cause of human actions, while the will is the proximate cause. However, the opposite is commonly held by most recent theologians and philosophers. See Becanus, *Scholastic Theology*, Tractate 1.18, and Suarez, *Metaphysical Disputations*, Disputation 22, Section 1, Paragraph 7, where he says: "It is as certain that God immediately and directly influences every action of a creature as it is that denying this would be an error against the faith." Therefore, it must be said that in our rule, by "cause" we mean the one that sufficiently answers the question "why?", and in this sense, the rule is true. For example, if one asks why a man can laugh, we rightly assign the cause as his rationality. However, if one asks why a man laughs, the same cause cannot be given here. For although rationality, as the cause of the power to laugh, is in some way also the cause of laughter itself, it is not directly correct to answer that laughter happens because man participates in reason. Rather, a better answer is that man laughs because a ridiculous object was presented to him, which satisfies the inquirer.

Rule XI.

To every active power (which is brought into act), there corresponds a passive power (or at least an objective one).

Objection 1: It does not seem necessary that whenever there is an active power, a corresponding passive power must always exist. For while it is granted that, as a matter of fact, no active power exists to which a passive power does not correspond, it is denied that this is absolutely necessary. The reasoning of Suárez in *Disputationes Metaphysicae* 43, sect. 2, does not prove such necessity. Nevertheless, we assert that a passive power must exist if the active power is to be brought into act.

Objection 2: From this rule, it would follow that God did not create the universe out of nothing but from preexisting matter. For God, from eternity, has been omnipotent and has possessed an

active power. Therefore, by this rule, there must also have existed from eternity some principle capable of being transformed by God's active power.

Response: The rule must either be restricted to created active powers alone or must include under "passive power" what Scotus calls *objective power*. Such an objective power corresponds to God's eternal active power and is operative in creation. See Scotus, *Sentences*, book 2, distinction 12, question 1, n. 6.

Rule XII.

To every passive power (or objective power), there corresponds an active power (either created or uncreated).

Objection: It is possible for there to be a passive power to which no active power corresponds. For if, before the creation of the world, some subject existed, it would have possessed a passive power but not a created active power.

Response: Such a passive power would indeed not correspond to a created active power but would correspond to the uncreated active power of God.

Chapter 3: On Causes

Rule I

Nothing (i.e., no being) is the cause (or principle) of itself (simply and in the same respect).

Objection 1: God is from Himself; therefore, He is His own cause.

Response: The consequence is denied. It should be noted that the phrase ″from Himself″ can be understood in two ways:

1. Positively, in which case it means influencing existence in oneself and giving existence to oneself.
2. Negatively, in which case it means not being from another.

In the first sense, what is "from itself" would indeed be its own cause, but God is not said to be "from Himself" in this manner. Rather, God is said to be "from Himself" negatively, meaning insofar as He is not from another. He is the first being and the first cause, which is from none but from whom all things proceed.

Objection 2: A human can make themselves knowledgeable, virtuous, ignorant, or vicious, etc.; therefore, a human is the cause of themselves.

Response: The conclusion can be understood in two ways:

1. If it means that the one who makes themselves knowledgeable, etc., is the cause of themselves insofar as they are knowledgeable, this is granted. In this sense, Aristotle states (*Physics*, book 2, chapter 1, text 3) that a physician can be the cause of themselves insofar as they heal themselves, not as a physician but as a patient, and thus accidentally.
2. If it means that the one who makes themselves knowledgeable, virtuous, etc., is the cause of themselves in their entirety or simply speaking, this is false. This would involve reasoning from a qualified statement (*secundum quid*) to an unqualified one (*simpliciter*), which is fallacious.

Objection 3: A cause of a cause is also the cause of the effect. But the end (*final cause*) is the cause of its cause—it is the cause of the expulsion of harmful humors (i.e., a final cause), while this expulsion, in turn, is the efficient cause of health. Therefore, the end is the cause of itself.

Response: Nothing is the cause of itself in the same respect. However, the end can be its own cause in a different respect, for the end has a twofold being:

1. Intentional and objective being (as it exists in cognition).
2. Real being (as it exists in actuality).

The end is a cause with respect to its known being, i.e., with respect to its real, possible being insofar as it is known. For the end does not cause according to its cognitive being but according to its real being, insofar as it is known; for nothing can be desired without being known. But the effect of the end pertains to its real being, which it has in actuality.

Objection 4: In the Trinity, the Father is the principle of the Son, but the Son is identical with the Father. Therefore, the Father is the principle of Himself.

Response: The Father is the principle of the Son, not insofar as He is identical with the Son, i.e., in essence, but insofar as He is distinct from the Son in person. The divine essence neither generates nor is generated. As Scotus teaches (*Sentences*, book 1, distinction 5, question 1), in the Trinity, the essence of the Father is, with respect to the Son, both a remote and proximate principle of generation, as is commonly taught by the Scholastics. However, this is not considered in essence absolutely but insofar as the essence subsists in the person of the Father or in paternity. See Becanus, *Theologia Scholastica*, section 2, chapter 7, question 3, numbers 5 and 6, and following.

Rule II

Nothing (i.e., no entity) exists without a cause (either efficient or final).

Objection I: Angels were created without matter, for they were produced from no pre-existing matter and consist of none, being simple forms. Likewise, forms are not caused, nor do they possess formal causes. Similarly, primary matter was produced without form, and although co-created with form (in fact, it never exists without form), form itself is not its cause.

Response: If in the rule by "Nothing" we were to understand only natural composites (as Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics* 7, chapter 5, discusses in precise terms), it would be proper to state: “Nothing, i.e., no composite, exists without an efficient, material, formal, and final cause,” and thus the opposing examples would not contradict the rule. However, since "Nothing" extends to every being, such that no entity exists or comes into being without a cause, by "cause" we should understand efficient and final causes alone. Thus, angels, forms, primary matter, and all things other than God have efficient and final causes.

Rule III

When a cause is posited (formally and in its state as a cause), the effect (as a determined effect) is necessarily posited (in its state as an effect).

Vice Versa: When an effect is posited (in its state as an effect or as an absolute being), the cause (both in its absolute being and in its state as a cause) must necessarily be posited (or have been posited).

Objection I: An architect, when fully established as a second act (i.e., as an efficient cause in actuality), does not immediately produce a house.

Response: Some corresponding effect is indeed posited relative to the acting cause, though not necessarily the entire effect. For example, when the sun is positioned over our hemisphere, its entire effect is not immediately posited.

Explanation: Effects differ in nature. Some can occur instantaneously (e.g., illumination from the sun), while others require succession (e.g., building a house).

Objection 2: It is not necessary to posit a cause when the effect is posited, as means are caused by the end. Yet, even when the means are present, the end does not necessarily exist (e.g., health may still be absent even when medicine is taken by the sick).

Response: Means are caused and are effects of the end insofar as the end has a possible, known existence. In this way, the end always exists when the means are employed. The sick person would not take the medicine unless moved to do so by recognizing the goodness and desirability of the end.

Objection 3: The Council of Trent (Session V) asserts that original sin is removed in baptism, and yet after baptism, its effect, namely actual sins, remains.

Response: This objection is refuted by our rule. It could indeed be countered by stating that positing an effect does not always necessitate a cause being presently posited but suffices if the cause had previously been posited. Just as a house can remain after the death of its architect, so the Jesuit Heissius counters and responds in his anti-Catholic volume published at Dillingen, marveling at this response and counter as if it alone would refute all Lutherans and resolve the matter. Yet this response is insufficient here. It is not always necessary, when *any* effect whatsoever is posited—whether in absolute being or in its state as an effect—to posit a cause. However, it is necessary when the effect is *in operation* or when the effect is posited as *in becoming* and *as an effect*. And because actual sins are effects as operations (i.e., actions), not as something enduring, and because they occur after baptism, it is necessary, at the time they occur, to posit their cause, namely original sin.

Rule IV

When a cause is negated (either in its absolute being or in its state as a cause), the effect (in its state as an effect) is removed.

Vice Versa: When an effect is negated (in its state as an effect), the cause (in its state as a cause) is negated.

Objection 1: The effect can exist even if the cause is negated, e.g., a house still exists even when the architect no longer does.

Response: Negating the cause as a cause (e.g., when the architect has died) negates the effect in its becoming (i.e., the process of building the house), but it does not immediately negate the effect in its absolute being (i.e., the house itself as completed).

Objection 2: This rule seems to deny salvation to all those who lived during the time of the Old Testament. For Christ is the cause of human salvation, but this cause did not exist during the time of the Old Testament. Therefore, the effect (eternal salvation) could not have been granted to anyone at that time.

Response: There are two types of causes:

1. Physical – which exerts a real and physical influence on the effect.
2. Moral – which truly causes, but not physically; rather, it acts through merit.

A physical cause cannot act unless it exists in actuality, and in this case, the rule applies: acting physically presupposes existing in actuality. A moral cause, however, can act even if it does not exist in actuality. When the argument is presented as follows: *Negating the cause as a cause negates the effect. But during the Old Testament, the cause as a cause was negated. Therefore, salvation was negated,* the major premise is granted, but the minor premise is denied. The reason for denying the minor premise is this: Although Christ did not exist during the time of the Old Testament, His merit as a moral cause could still operate, even though He did not yet exist in an absolute sense. Refer to Scotus (*In Sententias*, distinction 1, question 2, article 20) and Blessed Selva in his disputations (part 6, article 7, p. 887).

Objection 3: The effect can be negated without immediately negating its cause, e.g., a tree can be burned while the one who planted it is still alive.

Response: Cause and effect mutually imply each other and are mutually negated when considered in their formal being; this is not always true when considered in their absolute being.

Rule V

A cause (in its absolute being) is prior in nature to its effect.

Objection 1: The sun is not prior to illumination, nor is matter prior to form. Nevertheless, the sun is the cause of illumination, and matter is the cause of form since the latter is drawn out of the former's potentiality.

Response: A cause is always prior to its effect—not necessarily in time, but always in nature. Becanus ought to have observed this when, in *Theologia Scholastica* (part 3, treatise 4, chapter 2,

question 7), he argues against justifying faith based on this rule, denying that it is prior to justification and the remission of sins. Although faith is not prior to justification in time, it is prior in nature. See where Becanus objects (*loc. cit.*), as his argument does not merit further refutation here.

Objection 2: Cause and effect are relative terms, but relativity implies simultaneity, for as Aristotle says in *Categories* (chapter 7), "Relatives are simultaneous by nature."

Response: Cause and effect can be considered in two ways:

1. In their absolute being – In this sense, the cause is naturally prior to the effect.
2. In their relational being – In this sense, cause and effect are mutually simultaneous, insofar as the cause causes the effect and the effect is caused by the cause.

Objection 3: The end (or goal) is the cause of the means, yet the means are prior to the end.

Response: The end is the cause of the means by reason of intention, and in this sense, it is prior to the means. However, the means are prior to the end by reason of execution, and in this sense, the end is not the cause but the effect.

Rule VI

A cause is (by nature) more knowable than its effect.

Objection: Romans 1 states that the Gentiles knew God through the observation of the universe, from which it could be inferred that effects are more knowable than causes. For we first know what is more evident to us, and the Gentiles knew the world as an effect before they knew God as its cause.

Response: Aristotle, in *Physics* Book 1 and elsewhere, distinguishes between what is more knowable *to us* and what is more knowable *by nature or absolutely*. He says, "What is prior in nature is more knowable in itself but less so to us." However, this distinction does not mean that things naturally prior are unknown, as some thinkers claim (cf. Conimbricenses, *Physics*, Book 1, Chapter 1, Article 5). What is more knowable in itself refers to what is inherently prior, such as a cause, which as a cause is by nature prior to its effect and upon which the effect depends, not vice versa. Thus, a cause is always by nature more knowable than its effect. However, what is more knowable *to us* refers to what is closer to our senses, such as effects, since all our knowledge begins with sensory perception, as the saying goes: "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses." Effects are closer to our senses either directly (like color), by combination (like a golden mountain), or through their effects (like God). Thus, causes are also made knowable to us through their effects. Paul's passage does not contradict this rule. Even though the Gentiles knew the cause (God) through the effect (the world) and did so clearly

enough (since Paul says in Romans 1:19, "What can be known about God is manifest in them"), this only shows that effects are more knowable *to us*, which is already granted.

Rule VII

The effect of a cause (univocal, efficient, according to absolute being and essential predicates) is like its cause.

Objection 1: God is the cause of the world, but the world is not God.

Objection 2: In the divine persons, the Father is the cause (in the broad sense of "principle") of the generation of the Son. Yet the Son is not like the Father in this respect, for if the Son were also a principle of Himself, He would cease to be the Son and instead be the Father, which is absurd.

Response: Producing another does not pertain to the *absolute being* of the cause but to its *formal being*.

Objection 3: A father is often wise, but his son may be unlearned, and vice versa.

Response: Being learned does not pertain to the essential being of a father but to his accidental attributes. Likewise, God is the cause of the world not univocally but equivocally.

Rule VIII

If affirmation is the (proximate) cause of affirmation, negation will likewise be the cause of negation.

Objection 1: It follows that when I say, "Whoever knows all things in act and exercises divine works in act is truly God," this affirmation is a cause of affirmation. However, it does not follow that negation is likewise a cause of negation, for it does not follow, "Whoever does not know all things in act and does not exercise divine works in act is not truly God." Otherwise, it would follow that Christ, especially in His state of humiliation, was not truly God and did not have the fullness of the Godhead dwelling in Him.

Response: The rule pertains to the cause of being. Knowing all things in act and exercising divine works in act here are not causes of being but only of manifesting.

Objection 2: It follows: "It is not an animal; therefore, it does not breathe." But the reverse does not hold: "It is an animal; therefore, it breathes."

Response: Being an animal is not the proximate cause of breathing; rather, having lungs is.

Rule IX

An efficient cause (principal as such) is not inferior (i.e., more imperfect) than its effect.

Objection 1: The sun produced animals, yet the sun is inferior since it is inanimate.

Response: The sun is not inferior to animals. While it does not formally contain the perfection of an animal, it contains it eminently.

Objection 2: A father is the efficient cause of his son, yet the son is often superior, as he may have greater intelligence than the father.

Response: The father, insofar as he is the cause of the son, is not inferior to him. However, the father is not the cause of the son's intelligence, as this depends on other factors, such as the stars or another cause.

Rule X

Whatever exists in an effect (insofar as it is an effect) preexists in its cause (either formally and identically in kind, or eminently).

Objection 1: Many things are found in creatures that are not found in God.

Response: While many things in creatures are not found formally in God, all things that are in creatures are contained eminently in God, insofar as God possesses something nobler with the effective power for that thing.

Objection 2: The particular finger here on the son’s hand did not preexist in the father.

Response: That particular finger did not preexist identically in number, but it did preexist in kind in the father.

Rule XI

The cause of a cause is also the cause of the effect (in particular causes, whether essentially or accidentally subordinated, if one cause depends on another to act in the order of being).

Objection 1: God is the cause of the human will (essentially subordinated), and the will is the cause of sin. Therefore, God would also be the cause of sin.

Response: First, God is a universal cause. Second, In sin, two aspects can be considered:

1. The material aspect (the act as it exists).
2. The formal aspect (the defect of the act).

God is the cause of sin regarding its material aspect but not its formal aspect, since the human will is essentially subordinated to God in its action, but not in its failure.

Objection 2: A common response is that God only concurs in a general way with human actions. However, God's concurrence seems as particular and determined as that of humans, since God concurs in the entire entity of the action, even in its particularity, which cannot be denied.

Response: An action, as it exists and is produced, can be considered:

1. In itself, in which case it is determined and particular, and its entire particular entity comes from both God and humans.
2. With respect to its mode, i.e., how it exists and is produced, God's concurrence is said to be indifferent in this sense.

Objection 3: It does not seem that this explanation of the indifference of concurrence with respect to the mode proves that sin cannot be attributed to God, who concurs in the act. If this reasoning were valid, it could also be said that good actions by humans cannot be attributed to God, which is false.

Response: This reasoning can indeed be valid.

You ask: Why, then, are good actions attributed to God?

Response: This is because God wills, intends, commands, etc., such actions.

Objection 4: If God is not the physical cause of sin, He is at least its moral cause, since He offers humans the concurrence which He knows they will misuse.

Response: God is not the moral cause of sin because He does not will, intend, or command it but instead hates, opposes, forbids, and punishes it, etc. The fact that He grants His concurrence is due to a general law by which He owes concurrence to all created agents.

Rule XII

The same natural efficient cause, inasmuch as it remains the same (i.e., with respect to itself and to its circumstances), always produces the same effect.

Objection: The same Word of God, whether preached or read, converts some and hardens others. Likewise, by the same light—namely, Christ, as He is called in John 1:9—some are illuminated, and others are blinded. It cannot be said that the Holy Spirit operates through the Word in such a way that He wishes to convert some only while withdrawing grace and aid from others. Nor can it be said that Christ only wishes to illuminate certain people while freely

denying and withholding His light from others. Therefore, both the Word and Christ always operate in the same way, yet do not always produce the same effect.

Response: The same heat of fire melts wax but hardens clay. Therefore, the same agent, relative not only to itself but also to the circumstances, produces the same action. However, as the effect depends on the diversity of objects, so does fire harden clay and melt wax. Similarly, the Word of God converts some and hardens others, and Christ illuminates some and blinds others. Nevertheless, the cause of this hardening and blinding is not the Word or Christ but man himself, who neither believes the Gospel nor receives Christ with true faith. For the Gospel is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes (Romans 1). Likewise, it is said in John 1:9 that Christ is the Light that enlightens every man who comes into the world, and in verse 12, that those who receive Him by true faith become children of God.

Rule XIII

A principle extends more broadly than a cause.

Objection 1: Aristotle states in *Metaphysics* Book 5, that "a cause is said in as many ways as a principle," and in Book 4, that "being and one are the same by nature and follow one another, just as a principle and a cause."

Response: To the second passage from Aristotle, some respond that the term "cause" is taken more broadly in that context. While this explanation is accepted by some, it is rejected by Suarez in *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (12, sect. 1, no. 30). Suarez's explanation is as follows: Aristotle states two things about being and one: first, that they are the same, and second, that they are mutually convertible. When Aristotle says, "just as a principle and a cause," he is not comparing them in the second sense but in the first. However, they could also be compared in the second sense if "cause" is taken indefinitely, as principle and cause sometimes are interchangeable. To the first passage, some again respond that "cause" is taken more broadly. But this is contrary to Aristotle's intention. The explanation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, as presented by Suarez, better aligns with Aristotle's intent. Alexander explains that "principle" is said in as many ways as "cause," in addition to the modes Aristotle already assigned.

Objection 2: A cause appears to extend as broadly as a principle, as evidenced by the Greek Fathers (e.g., Damascene in *On the Orthodox Faith* Book 1, Athanasius in the Acts of the Nicene Synod, and Gregory Nazianzus in *Oration 29* on doctrine and the constitution of the episcopate). These Fathers call the Father the "cause" of the Son in divine matters, and the Latin Church does not reproach this, as they likewise call the Father the "principle" in divine matters. This is evident in the Council of Florence (Session 11), which clarifies the Greek Fathers' terminology concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Response: A cause does not extend as broadly as a principle. The reason why the Greeks call the Father the "cause" of the Son in divine matters and are not reproached by the Latins is that the Greeks use the term "cause" more broadly than the Latins. For the Greeks, "cause" is equivalent to what the Latins mean by "principle." See Becanus, *Part 1 of Theological Scholastic Tractates*, Tract 2, Chapter 4, Question 4.

Rule XIV

Every Principle (as a principle) is prior to what it originates (in its own manner).

Objection: In divine matters, the Father cannot be said to be the Principle of the Son, nor the Son to originate from the Father, because the Father is neither prior to the Son in time nor nature, and the Son is not posterior to the Father in those terms.

Response: There is no priority or posteriority between the Father and the Son in nature or time. Nevertheless, the Father is prior to the Son in another way: namely, in priority of origin, as the Son is from the Father. See *Scotus, Book 2, Distinction 26, Question 4, Number 7.* Others add the notion of "natural enumeration priority," so that the Father is prior to the Son, as one person comes before another in the order of natural enumeration—just as we count the first, second, and third. However, this priority is not distinct from the priority of origin but is founded upon it.

Rule XV

An effect is not predicated (properly and directly) of its cause.

Objection 1: In the proposition *God is man,* the effect is predicated of the cause, since God is the cause of man.

Response: Here, the effect is not predicated of the cause. The extremes are identified in the hypostatic union, as the same person who is God is also man, namely, Christ Jesus. In this proposition, the concrete substantives *God* and *man* do not stand for the natures (as Gabriel Vasquez suggests in *Part 3 of the Summa Theologica,* Volume 1, Disputation 63, Chapter 4, Number 23, and others) but for the hypostasis, as Thomas teaches in *On Being and Essence,* Chapter 3, and others.

Objection 2: It is rightly said that Aeneas, who is the generating cause of Ascanius, is a man. Therefore, the effect is predicated of the cause.

Response: Here, the effect is not predicated of the cause; instead, the species is predicated of the individual.

Rule XVI

Causes (of different genera, in certain cases) can be causes for each other.

Objection 1: Vapors are the material cause of rain, and rain, in turn, is the material cause of vapors. Therefore, certain things are mutually causes for each other in the same genus.

Response: The vapors that are produced from rain are not numerically identical to the vapors that become the material cause of rain again.

Objection 2: If causes are mutually causes for each other, then the same thing would be both prior and posterior to itself, since a cause is prior to its effect.

Response: This is not absurd when considered from different perspectives. For example, the end (final cause) is prior to the efficient cause in terms of intention, but posterior in terms of execution. See Suarez discussing these matters in *Disputation on Metaphysics,* Disputation 27, Section 2, Number 5 and following.

Rule XVII

Causes (of different genera) can (in different respects) coincide (i.e., converge into one thing).

Objection: It seems absurd for the same thing to be both the efficient and the material cause.

Response: If by material cause we mean the matter *in which* something can occur, this is possible. For example: The rational soul is an efficient cause concerning its own acts, which it produces. It is the material cause, in the sense of being the subject of its operations. It is also a formal cause with respect to the body, which it informs. Finally, it serves as a final cause insofar as it moves the generating agent. Thus, it is evident that all four causes can coincide in the same thing. Likewise, the merit of Christ is the efficient cause of our justification, insofar as He has merited righteousness for us. It is often called the formal cause as well, insofar as righteousness is applied to us.

Rule XVIII

The same thing (i.e., the same cause, except for form and natural efficiency) can be the cause of contraries.

Objection: The sun is a natural cause, and yet it is the cause of contraries, as it sometimes hardens and sometimes melts.

Response: The sun is never the cause of contraries in itself. It always heats. The fact that heat from the sun hardens clay and melts wax is due to the properties of the objects, not the sun.

Rule XIX

By reason of its proximate cause, each thing is what it is, and if that cause exists, the thing is even more so (i.e., more certainly or probably so).

Objection 1: Man is a creature on account of God. Therefore, God is more a creature than man.

Response: The conclusion does not follow because God is not a creature. The predicate of the consequent must always be able to be attributed to the subject of the antecedent for the reasoning to hold.

Objection 2: The Son is a man because of the Father. Therefore, the Father is more a man than the Son.

Response: The Son is not a man because of the Father but by His own nature and because He consists of a soul and an organized body. It is incorrect to ask why the Son is a man by citing the Father as the reason.

Rule XX

If all the causes (both principal and instrumental) of something are universal, then the thing itself is universal.

Objection: The causes of election are all universal and extend to all men. Therefore, election is universal.

Response: For something to be called universal, all its causes—both principal and instrumental—must be universal. However, faith, which is the instrumental cause of election, does not extend to all men.

Further explanation: It suffices for the principal causes to be universal because an instrument, as something weaker, cannot determine what is stronger (the principal cause). Moreover, the instrument is posterior to the principal cause. What is posterior cannot determine what is prior.

Response (clarified): An instrument does, in a certain way, determine the principal cause, though not positively but negatively:

1. By way of exercise, insofar as the principal agent cannot act in the absence of the instrument.
2. By way of contrariety or the specific kind of action; for example, variations in heat alter digestion in animals.

This determination, however, is posterior and does not presently concern us. Nor is it relevant to argue that something weaker cannot determine something stronger, since even a secondary cause, as something weaker, determines the primary cause, which is stronger. I omit other arguments for now. The claim that what is posterior cannot determine what is prior is refuted by the example of secondary and primary causes. The former, though posterior, determines the latter.

Rule XXI

Every accidental effect is reduced to a proper cause.

Objection: Sin is an accidental effect with respect to God. Since it is joined to a proper cause, God would seem to be the proper cause of sin.

Response: The proper cause of sin is not to be sought in God but in man. Man is the proper cause of sin:

1. From the perspective of the cause, as he sins inasmuch as he is a sinner.
2. From the perspective of the effect, as he actually commits sins.

Thus, sin as an accidental effect can be reduced to God as a proper cause—not because God is the proper cause of sin, but because of another effect with which sin is connected. For further clarification, see Suarez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 19, sect. 12, no. 7, where he states that not every accidental effect has a proper cause by reason of intention. See also *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. 7, sect. 2, no. 4.

Rule XXII

The agent (physically) and the patient are simultaneous (either suppositionally or virtually).

Objection: Christ, as the agent saving men, did not exist temporally during the Old Testament, yet many were saved.

Response: Christ is the moral and meritorious cause of our salvation, and such a cause does not necessarily need to be simultaneous with the patient. See the excellent *Disputatio Academica* by Blessed Slevogt, p. 26, §§82–83 and following, and also Scotus, *Sentences*, book 2, dist. 33, question unica, no. 20.

Rule XXIV

Actions belong to supposita (ultimately denominated from them).

Objection: Nestorius, who lived in the 4th century after Christ, used the following phrasing against the Jews: "Do not glory, Jew, you crucified not God but a man." Similarly, Calvinists

interpret propositions such as “God suffered” and “God was crucified” in a way that does not attribute suffering and crucifixion to the whole suppositum and person of Christ but only to the human nature in Christ. For instance, they explain: “God,” i.e., the flesh united to God, suffered, and “God,” i.e., the flesh united to the deity, was crucified. Thus, they seem to reject our rule.

Response: The opinion of these heretics is false.

- Regarding Nestorius: His view cannot be refuted by our rule because he posited two persons in Christ. Nevertheless, he was condemned at the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus, AD 433.
- Regarding the others, such as the Calvinists, they can be rightly refuted by our rule, which they cannot deny.

Objection 1a: However, they object by appealing to the impassibility of God.

Response to objection 1a:
When it is said that God is impassible, this can be understood in two ways:

1. As referring to the *Principium Quo* (the principle by which something is done), meaning God cannot be the principle by which suffering occurs.
2. As referring to the *Principium Quod* (the principle that acts as the subject), meaning God is so impassible that suffering cannot in any way be attributed to Him, even by reason of His person.

The latter is vain, as no one has ever claimed that God suffers in His nature or as the *Principium Quo*. If they mean the former, their argument is absurd because actions and passions can be attributed to the whole suppositum according to our rule unless they first prove our rule false. Moreover, this is not mere verbal communication, where what applies to one part is also applied to another. For example, understanding applies only to one part of man, namely the rational soul, but it is truly attributed to the whole man, as the whole man understands. Aristotle in *De Anima*, book 1, chapter 4, text 64, says: “To say that the soul feels anger is like saying that the soul weaves or builds; it is better to say the man with the soul pities, learns, or reasons.” Therefore, the passion of Christ truly applies both:

1. To the part (the human nature) proximately.
2. To the whole person remotely.

See Scotus, *Sentences*, book 4, dist. 17, question 3, no. 11.

Rule XXV

Acting (physically) presupposes being.

Objection: The Papists teach that original sin is removed in baptism, yet they acknowledge that its effects remain after baptism. See Becanus, *Theologia Scholastica*, part 3, tract 2, chapter 11, question 2, and many others.

Response: Our rule can be opposed to this claim. From it, one can firmly conclude that original sin remains after baptism since it is impossible for something to act if it does not exist.

Rule XXVI

Every agent (insofar as it acts) is in act, while the patient (with respect to what it receives) is in potency (if the reception is successive).

Rule XXVII

All things in some way proceed from the univocal.

Objection: All things are from God, yet they do not agree with Him in a univocal concept.

Response: The term *univocal* is here understood very broadly, and all things agree with God in the transcendental concept of being (*ens*).

Rule XXVIII

Each partial agent (when not subordinate) can by itself produce the effect, or part of the effect, to which it contributes.

Objection: The intellect and the light of glory are partial causes with respect to the vision of God, as is commonly held by the Scholastics. However, the intellect cannot produce the vision of God without the light of glory, nor the light of glory without the intellect.

Response: Durandus indeed attempts to prove from our rule that the light of glory does not assist or strengthen the intellect. However, he is answered by Becanus (*Part 1, Theologia Scholastica, tract 1, chapter 9, question 3, no. 5*), who argues: It does not follow that because the light of glory cannot produce the vision of God without the intellect, it is therefore not a partial cause.

There are two types of partial agents:

1. Subordinate agents, such as the hand and pen with respect to writing.
2. Non-subordinate agents, such as two individuals pulling the same ship.

The rule is understood as applying to partial agents of the latter type. However, the intellect and the light of glory are partial causes of the former type. See Becanus, *Part 1*, and Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, 30, section 11, no. 46.

Rule XXIX

A like thing (in the quality by which it acts, and specifically in terms of degree) does not act (with alterative action) upon a like thing in itself.

Rule XXX

Acting and being acted upon (in those things between which there is a reaction) occur between contraries (whether extremes or intermediates).

Rule XXXI

An agent (through primary physical qualities) assimilates the patient to itself (in terms of the quality by which it acts).

Objection 1: The sun heats these lower things, yet it does not assimilate them to itself.

Response: The sun does not act by heat or a primary quality because it is not hot.

Objection 2: God acts on these lower things, yet He does not assimilate them to Himself.

Response: God does not act through primary qualities. It could also be said that if the rule were understood universally for every agent, God would assimilate all things He acts upon to Himself, broadly understood, inasmuch as assimilation includes any sort of agreement or conformity.

Rule XXXII

An alterative action (between contraries) arises from what is superior (in strength).

Rule XXXIII

Nothing acts (by an action properly and univocally so called) upon itself (insofar as it is the same).

Objection: The more common opinion is that the intellect, as a patient, is not only a passive potency (insofar as it receives species from phantasms) but also active, insofar as it elicits the act of understanding. If this is true, the same thing can act upon itself, for the intellect receives within itself the act of understanding that it elicits.

Response: Many assert that the intellect, as a patient, behaves purely passively with respect to the acts of understanding, while the efficient cause of understanding is variously assigned by different thinkers. However, this opinion is rightly rejected. It must be said that the intellect does not act upon itself in a properly destructive manner but in a perfective manner and insofar as it is, in a certain respect, distinct from itself.

Rule XXXIV

Not everything acts upon everything, nor does everything suffer from everything; rather, the acts of those things that have the power to act are received in what is disposed (naturally).

Objection: God can act upon anything, and anything, whether disposed or indisposed, suffers from God's action. From formless and unorganized matter, He produced this universe, and from stones, it is said that children of Abraham can be made.

Response: The rule is understood as referring to what happens naturally and ordinarily.

Rule XXXV

Whatever is received, is received according to the mode (and disposition) of the recipient.

Rule XXXVI

What (in quantity) and what kind of effect an agent (in itself) produces (with respect to a certain patient), is what (in quantity) and what kind of effect the patient (from that agent, with respect to the aspects by which the agent formally acts upon the patient) receives.

Objection 1: The killing of Christ and the selling of Joseph were evil actions and grave crimes, yet the suffering endured by Christ and Joseph with equanimity was good.

Response: Just as the Jews unjustly crucified and killed Christ, and Joseph's brothers unjustly sold him, so too Christ was unjustly crucified and killed, and Joseph was unjustly sold. However, that Christ and Joseph endured these things with equanimity pertains to their passion only *per accidens* and was not derived from the perpetrators and sellers.

Objection 2: Christ enlightens every man (John 1), yet not every man is enlightened.

Response: Erasmus, in his paraphrase on this passage, states that Christ enlightens every man insofar as it depends on Him. Chrysostom, in *Homily IV on John*, offers the same explanation. These interpretations correctly assert that the reason why not all are enlightened lies not in the agent, namely Christ, but in men themselves. However, these explanations do not entirely satisfy the objection. Since it is said that Christ enlightens every man, it would be necessary for every man to be enlightened and to actually receive illumination. Thus, we think that, as with other active verbs denoting action and effect, which are sometimes explained by philologists according to will, desire, and intent to act, the active verb *enlighten* can suitably be interpreted to signify that Christ wills, desires, and strives to enlighten and save all. For Christ truly wills and desires the salvation of all and strives, through the ministers of the Church, to lead all to the knowledge of the truth, to enlighten, and to save (1 Timothy 2:4).

Rule XXXVII

Every agent (physical, as that which) possesses some form by which it acts.

Objection: God acts and moves, yet He does not possess any form by which He acts. Similarly, a form itself acts, yet it does not have another form by which it acts, for a form cannot have another form attributed to it.

Response: God is not a physical agent. Moreover, a form does not act as a *quod* (what), but as an *ego* (I).

Rule XXXVIII

An instrument that (as a whole) is useful for many things is better than one useful for a few (of those many things).

Objection: Aristotle, *Politics* I.2, seems to argue that the better and superior instrument is one that serves only a single purpose rather than many.

Response: An instrument that serves many purposes as a whole is better and superior to one that serves only a single purpose. However, an instrument that serves many purposes but only through distinct parts (such as the Delphic sword) is not immediately superior to one that serves only a single purpose.

Rule XXXIX

An instrument (that is a body) does not move unless it is moved (in the way an instrument is said to be moved).

Rule XL

Whatever has matter (from which it is composed) also has form, and vice versa: whatever has form (from which it is composed) also has matter.

Rule XLI

Prime matter is knowable through analogy (both by reason of its essence and existence).

Rule XLII

Prime matter (in itself) is ungenerated and incorruptible (with physical incorruptibility understood as terminative).

Rule XLIII

Prime matter naturally desires form (by innate appetite, equally for all forms, but in diverse ways insofar as they complete it).

Objection: Scaliger, *Exercises* 61, states that matter does not and cannot desire form, arguing that matter already possesses all forms.

Response: Matter does not desire the form it already possesses by an appetite of desire but by one of contentment.

Rule XLIV

Prime matter is pure (of all formal act) and is passive potency.

Objection: If prime matter is pure potency, it is non-being.

Response: Prime matter is pure potency in relation to formal act, not in relation to entitative act.

Rule XLV

From non-being (in the negative sense), nothing arises (naturally).

Objection: It is a matter of faith that God created all things out of nothing.

Response: God produced something out of nothing supernaturally and through His absolute power.

Rule XLVI

When a form (actually informing) is posited, the informed is posited.

Objection: Those who uphold the traducian theory of the rational soul, or who teach that the rational soul is produced by the generators and transmitted by the father through the seed, cannot accept this rule. For it would follow that immediately after conception, a human being would come into existence, which is absurd.

Response: Not immediately. When an immaterial form is posited, the informed is not posited unless it is in an informing act. However, the rational soul does not inform matter unless the matter is disposed.

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RESPONSE: Not immediately. When an immaterial form is posited, the informed is not posited unless it is in an informing act. However, the rational soul does not inform matter unless the matter is properly disposed.

Rule XLIX

Whatever exists (with a specific species) is, through its form, ultimately of that kind.

Objection: God exists; therefore, He is through His form. But God does not have a form.

Response: God is not of a specific species.

Rule L

A form (ultimately) gives the specific being (and does so per se).

Objection: If form gives the being of a thing, then form is the entire essence of a thing.

Response: Some deny that matter is part of the essence and assert that form is the entire essence of things. However, this opinion is rightly rejected and discarded. See Scotus, *Sentences* Book 3, Distinction 22, Question 1, and Javellus, *Metaphysical Questions*, Book 7, Question 10. Therefore, it must be said that form gives the being of a thing, not to the matter, as some suppose (because matter has its own proper existence and does not receive it from the form; see Scotus, *Sentences* Book 2, Distinction 12, Question 2, where he simultaneously refutes the Thomistic position, and Suarez, *Metaphysical Disputations* 13, Section 4, n. 13), but rather to the composite, and indeed ultimately.

Rule LI

A form is indivisible (into matter and form).

Rule LII

Every end (insofar as it is such) is a kind of good.

Objection 1: If every end is a kind of good, no one can desire evil. But this seems absurd:

1. Because, in this way, no man would have sin, which is contrary to Sacred Scripture.
2. The liberty of our will would also be destroyed.

Response: It is one thing to desire evil simply, another to desire evil as evil, that is, under the aspect of evil. A man often desires evil (see Genesis 6:6-8), and in this he sins. However, he does not desire it insofar as it is evil but under the aspect of some good.

You may say: Nevertheless, sin arising from malice would be removed.

Response: This is denied, for sin from malice is committed without ignorance, knowingly, and without passion, with full use of liberty, and without the overpowering intensity of appetite. See our theologians frequently and also Becano, *Theological Scholastic Treatise*, Part 2, Chapter 4, n. 5. However, we can commit sin knowingly and willingly without immediately willing it under the aspect of sin or of some evil, because no one, intending evil, acts for its sake. The liberty of our will does not consist in the ability to will evil under the aspect of evil, nor is liberty to be properly judged by its extension to opposites, but by action and suspension of action. Otherwise, God, who does not act with opposites, would not truly be free. See Becanus, *Theological Scholastic Treatise*, Part 2, Chapter 1, Question 7, who provides additional objections on this rule.

Rule LIII

The end is (or at least appears to be) better than the means to the end (if not in itself, yet better for the one desiring it).

Objection: The purpose of the sun and moon is to divide day and night and to illuminate the earth (Gen. 1).

Response: Illumination, as an accident, is far less noble than the sun itself. However, it is better than the sun for the sake of the one for whom man was created, namely humanity.

Rule LIV

The end (insofar as it is an end) is ultimate.

Objection : The end is a principle (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VIII, text 14). Therefore, it is not ultimate.

Response: The end is ultimate insofar as it is an end, but it is a principle insofar as it is a cause (*Metaphysics* V).

Rule LV

The end (of something) is first in intention but last in execution.

Rule LVI

The end (insofar as it is an end and formally) has neither mode nor measure (i.e., it is sought in the highest degree possible).

Rule LVII

The means have a mode and measure (unless the end is infinite, so that it can always be sought in ever-greater degree).

Rule LVIII

The end provides the mode (which it eminently contains), the measure (if not positively, at least negatively), and the order to the means.

Rule LIX

From the intention of the end to its execution, there is no necessary connection.

Objection: If one wills an end, one also wills its execution. Therefore, from the intention of the end to its execution, there is a necessary connection.

Response: It is one thing for someone who wills the end to will also its execution. It is another for the end intended to always follow in execution. The former is true, but the latter—about which this rule speaks—is false. For example, Romans 11 states: *God has consigned all to disobedience so that he may have mercy on all.* These words of the Apostle, as Blessed Stapleton notes, are explained by some to mean that the term *all* should be understood distributively—not for individual kinds but for kinds of individuals. However, this explanation clearly implies that God does not will the salvation of all people, which is absurd and Calvinistic. The Apostle's words speak of the intention of the end, for God truly wills and intends the salvation of all humans. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that all are saved, because there is no necessary connection between the intention of the end and its execution.

Rule LX

Once the end is acquired (completely), all action concerning the end as something to be acquired ceases.

Rule LXI

An end that is a work is better than an end that is an operation (in the same subject).

Rule LXII

Whoever wills (by effective will) the end (which is the cause) also wills (at least implicitly) the means to the end.

Objection: If one wills the end, one also wills the means to the end. But God wills the end of sinners, namely their punishment and the manifestation of his glory. Therefore, he also wills their sins.

Response: The conclusion inferred here does not follow from the premises. The predicate of the conclusion is not contained in the premises. A true conclusion flowing from its premises as an effect from its cause cannot contain anything not in the premises, for how can a cause communicate to its effect what it does not have? The term *end* is understood differently in the major premise and the minor premise. In the major, it is taken as the final cause and the end of motion; in the minor, it is taken as the terminus of a thing, i.e., the end of termination. Punishment is not the end of sinning in the sense of a final cause—for no one sins to attain punishment. How many terms, then, are in the argument?

You persist: It is said, however, that God punishes sins with other sins, from which it follows that God uses sins as means to punish other sins, and thus wills them.

Response: This proposition, as understood by Thomas, does not mean that God subsequently causes sin as punishment for previous sins. Rather, it means that God, in his just judgment, withdraws his grace from the sinner. Deprived of this grace, the sinner falls into more sins. These sins are called punishments not in themselves or by their nature but accidentally, insofar as they increase future punishment.

Rule LXIII

A single thing (even simultaneously) can have multiple ends (both subordinate and distinct, and in their own way also ultimate).

Rule LXIV

If the end of one faculty (or art) is subordinate to the end of another faculty, then that faculty is subordinated to the other faculty.

Objection: Bellarmine, in *De Romano Pontifice*, Book V, seems to rightly argue from this rule that temporal power is subordinate to spiritual power, and thus political authority is subject to ecclesiastical authority. Accordingly, the Roman Pontiff has the authority to transfer kingdoms, taking them from one ruler and giving them to another, because the temporal end is subordinate to the spiritual end.

Response: This is denied. It is not true that the temporal end is subordinated (in the manner of subordination meant by this rule) to the spiritual end. For here the end of the subordinate faculty stands in such a way that if the end of the superior faculty has no place, neither does the subordinate end. For example, no one would create a bridle if the art of horsemanship and its end did not exist. But temporal power exists, along with its end, namely, peaceful living, even if no consideration is given to ecclesiastical authority and its end, namely, eternal life. Secondly, even if that subordination were conceded, it would not follow—contrary to what Bellarmine intended to prove—that the Roman Pontiff has the authority to change kingdoms, removing them from one ruler and giving them to another. For example, optics is subordinate to geometry, and the art of pharmacists to the art of medicine. Yet it does not follow that a geometrician has the right to confiscate the goods of an optician or that a physician has the right to take away the wealth of a pharmacist and give it to someone else.

Rule LXV

Whatever has a final cause (not for the sake of which it acts, but for the sake of which it exists) also has an efficient cause.

Rule LXVI

What can be done with fewer means should not be done with more (all else being equal).

Chapter 4: On Appetite

Rule I

Appetite (in an active state) is nothing, unless it is good (formally).

Objection: We also desire evil, as when someone desires the death of another, and indeed desires it as evil.

Response: The word "evil" here only exposes the material object, namely, the bad, or it refers to it as "evil." If this is conceded, the objection stands. If this is denied, the objection does not follow.

Rule II

Appetite (whether sensory or rational) does not extend to the unknown (i.e., to something unknown, but not to the knowledge of the unknown).

Rule III

The will (ineffectively) extends to the impossible (in the case of apparent impossibilities).

Rule IV

Choice does not concern impossibilities (because impossibilities are recognized as such).

Rule V

The will (naturally) cannot be coerced (with regard to acts of choice, absolutely).

Rule VI

A coerced will (not absolutely but in a certain way) is still a will.

Rule VII

He who wills the cause also wills the effect (which, from that determined cause, he certainly knows will follow), either directly, or by accident, indirectly, and permissively.

Objection: From this rule, it follows that God wills sins, because He gives His concurrence to us, from which it necessarily follows that sin will happen, just as one who gives a sword to another, knowing that they will kill, is said to will death and cause the murder.

Response: Some people think that our sins can be called voluntary by God, not absolutely, but indirectly and permissively. However, this opinion should not be approved, for in no way does God will sin, but He is merely related to it in a negative manner. As for the objection, I say that it does not follow from this rule that God wills sin, because God gives His concurrence to us in the first indeterminate act, so that with this concurrence, man still operates freely. The example of the sword is not similar because the one who hands over the sword does not do so with a free and indifferent will, but rather with a determined will.

Chapter 5: On Good and Evil

Rule I

The greater good (in the same type of opposition) is opposed to the greater evil (if the goods were disparate).

Objection 1: God's love is no less good than His love for us, since it consists in happiness, and yet hatred of God is a greater evil than the absence of the beatific vision.

Response: This is not the same type of opposition. Hatred and love are opposites in a contrary manner, but vision and lack of vision are privative opposites.

Objection 2: To love an enemy is a more excellent and better good than to love a friend (cf. Matt. 5:44-48, Rom. 5:8-10). Yet to hate a friend is a greater evil than to hate an enemy.

Response: Gregory of Valencia writes in *Tom. 3, Disp. 3, Q. 5, Punct. 3, c. 734* that the love of a friend is more perfect and better than the love of an enemy. However, this sentiment contradicts the Scriptures (Matthew 5:47). Gregory attributed this opinion to Thomas (Summa, 2, q. 27, art. 7), and commonly the Scholastics in *3rd Dist. 30* hold the opposite. However, it seems that Scotus and Durandus take the opposite view. We deny, therefore, that it is better to love a friend than an enemy, and it does not follow that the object there is better, and the love itself is better. As Gregory wishes to gather, because the goodness of the act of love is not determined by the object, whether a friend or an enemy, but by its end, namely, God. For the closest in terms of proximity is not the determining reason; the total reason for loving is God. Scotus in *3 Dist. 28, q. 1* and Becanus in *Theol. Schol., Part 2, Tract. 1, Cap. 4, q. 3, n. 10* agree with this. As for the objection, I say that the love of a friend and the love of an enemy are not disparate goods, for the love of an enemy includes the love of a friend. Thus, Durandus is correct in this point.

Rule II

That which is (good) by itself and more enduring (other things being equal) is nobler than that which is less enduring.

Rule III

Good preserves (if not positively, at least negatively) that to which it belongs as good.

Rule IV

It is absurd that a foreign vice destroys something for which its own vice does not provide destruction.

Rule V

Nature (when not impeded) always produces what is best (not simply, but in the specific kind to which it belongs).

Rule VI

Nature always aims (with primary intention) for what is best (in each thing).

Chapter 6: On the Abstract and the Concrete

Rule I

If the abstract is predicated of the abstract, the concrete is also predicated of the concrete.

Rule II

If the concrete is predicated (either as "what" or "of what kind," such that the abstract differs only in reasoning) of the concrete, the abstract is likewise predicated of the abstract.

Objection: God is Man, and Man is God. However, Divinity is not Humanity, nor is Humanity Divinity.

Response: Divinity and Humanity are not the abstracts of the terms "God" and "Man" in the propositions given, because those substantive concretes do not denote natures but persons. The meaning of those propositions is that God (i.e., the person of God) is Man (i.e., the person of Man), and vice versa.

Rule III

That in which the abstract exists (which is not predicated as "what" but in the manner implied by the concrete, and if it admits degrees—whether intensified beyond the midpoint or, at least, denotes some determinate part—being extended to the maximum part), of that (so long as it exists), the corresponding concrete (consistent with the essence of the abstract, if it has any) is simply predicated.

Rule IV

From "to exist in" (immediately) follows "to be predicated.".

Objection: Eternity, Simplicity, and Infinity are in human nature, for indeed, according to Scripture, "the fullness of Divinity dwells in it bodily" (Col. 2:9). Yet these attributes cannot be predicated of human nature, as one cannot say that human nature is simple, eternal, or infinite.

Response: These attributes are not present in human nature immediately but mediately. They only denominate those things in which they are immediately present, as it is contradictory for them to be predicated of these. For instance, simplicity and spirituality belong to the rational soul but cannot be predicated of man.

Rule V

That of which the concrete is predicated (intrinsically) contains the abstract (either formally or virtually).

Rule VI

The abstract is the form (i.e., the principle by which something is what it is) of the concrete.

Rule VII

The abstract is prior (either in reality, as whiteness to a white thing, or in reason, as Divinity to God) to the concrete.

Objection: Mirandula, in his *Book on Being and the One* (ch. 3), and Scaliger in *Exercise 365, sect. 6*, assert that every abstract differs really from the concrete and is always prior in being. Hence, they also deny that God can properly be called "a being" (when the term is taken as concrete).

Response: Scaliger here fell into error. It is false that every abstract differs really from the concrete, as is clear from the example of divisibility. Divisibility, which is abstract, is the form by which quantity is divisible. Divisibility does not differ really from the divisible but only in reason.

Chapter 7: On the Simple and the Composite, the Whole and the Parts

Rule I

The simple is prior (by nature and essence) to the composite.

Rule II

A part (considered in its absolute existence) is prior (in the order of the generating nature and in distinct cognition) to the whole (in its actuality, in respect of which the part is called a part).

Rule III

The whole (in the sense in which it is a whole) is greater than (its) parts (taken separately).

Objection: In John 6:13, it is written that, from five loaves, with two fish, Christ fed nearly 5,000 men, and twelve baskets of fragments were left over. Here, the fragments were parts of the five loaves, yet far greater than the whole—namely, the five loaves.

Response: The five loaves can be considered in two ways:

1. As they were in themselves, according to their natural state before the blessing.
2. As they were after the blessing.

The fragments were greater than the five loaves when considered in the first sense, but in that sense, they were not the whole. However, when considered in the second sense, as the five loaves after the blessing (and thus as a whole), the fragments were not greater than the whole.

Rule IV

The whole (in itself) and its parts are in the same category.

Rule V

Whatever is part of a part is also part of the whole.

Objection: There is an ongoing controversy between us and the Roman Catholics regarding the members of the Church: who are they? Are they only the faithful and holy, or also the unfaithful and wicked? The Catholics affirm the latter, as is evident from Bellarmine's definition of the Church (*De Ecclesia Militante*, book 3, chapter 2). We affirm the former, as appears from the definition in the Augsburg Confession (Articles 7 and 8). However, the Church, as taken by our theologians here, is considered in its proper sense. By "just and holy," we do not mean those free from all sin, as the Cathari and Pelagians claimed (Augustine, *Her. 38*). Therefore, we are not to be counted among them, contrary to Suarez (*De Trip. Virt. Theol.*, disputation 9, section 1,

number 8). In this controversy, William Whitaker, in his lectures on the Church, concedes that the universal Church consists only of the good, while particular Churches consist of both the good and the wicked. He appears here not to admit our rule, for the universal Church, in relation to particular Churches, behaves as the whole to its parts. Nevertheless, he concedes that something may be contained in the part which is not contained in the whole.

Response: Since Whitaker concedes that the wicked are not contained in the universal Church, we firmly infer from this that they are not contained in particular Churches either. It is impossible for something to be contained in a part without being contained in the whole, according to our rule, which we hold to be true until it is demonstrated otherwise.

Rule VI

Every whole (positively such) is in some way (namely, with respect to its parts) greater than its parts.

Rule VII

Every whole (insofar as it is such) is one.

Rule VIII

A part (of an actual and physical whole) is not predicated of the whole (in the nominative case).

Objection: Luther defines the Sacrament of the Altar in his catechisms as "the true body and true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, given under bread and wine to us Christians to eat and drink, instituted by Christ Himself." This definition is criticized by Calvinists and seems to contradict our rule.

Response: This definition is wrongly criticized by Calvinists and does not contradict our rule. In this definition, the genus is not "body and blood" but rather "the eating of the body and blood." Refer to Blessed Meisner in *Philosophia Sobria*, Part I, Sect. 1, Ch. 2, Q. 1, and Part II, Sect. 2, Q. 15.

Rule IX

A whole (in itself, actual, and physical) is not predicated of a part (in the nominative case).

Rule X

Whatever is predicated of a part (of an actual whole, according to absolute being) is also predicated (either simply or in some qualified way, i.e., with a modifier) of the whole.

Rule XI

Whatever is predicated of a universal or logical whole (in itself) is also predicated of the corresponding part.

Rule XII

Once all parts are posited (as parts), the whole (to which they belong) is posited as well.

Objection: During the three days of death, the parts of Christ's human nature were indeed posited, but not as parts in their essence as parts, because they were separated. Nevertheless, some (e.g., Hugh and Lombard) held the view that Christ remained a true man during these three days.

Response: This view cannot stand because, when the parts of a human being are not united or joined, a human being does not exist. Augustine, *City of God*, Book 13, Ch. 23, teaches this. It is false to claim, as the Master does, that the union of the soul and body with the Word alone suffices for Christ to be called a man, for the union of the parts themselves is also required. Hugh's argument, claiming that the soul constitutes the whole essence and suppositum of man, while the body is merely accidental, is of no weight. Matter is also an essential part of man. Refer to Scotus, Book 3, Dist. 22, Q. 1; Javellus, Book 7, *Metaphysics*, Q. 9, and others.

Rule XIII

If any part (essential or integral, principal) is removed, the whole is removed.

Objection: From this rule, it follows that the Papists do not possess a true Sacrament of the Supper, because they remove and exclude the cup, which is a part of this Sacrament. That the cup is part of the Supper is evident, for it functions as an element, and even the Papists themselves do not dare deny this. Refer to Fratres a Walenburch in response to Johann Hundius. They argue that for the essence of this Sacrament, it suffices that Christ is received under some external sign, whether bread or wine, so that the cup could be absent from the Supper while the essence remains intact. This argument is false and rests on the erroneous premise that Christ is fully contained under either species. Refer to Becanus, *Theologica Scholastica*, Part III, Treatise 1, Ch. 1, Q. 5.

This notion can be understood in two ways:

1. By natural concomitance, such that Christ is entirely present under each species due to the natural union of body, blood, and soul.
2. By the power of the Sacrament, such that Christ (His body and blood) is entirely under each species by the words of institution.

If they mean the first, we agree, but this mode is irrelevant here. If they mean the second, it is entirely false and can be disproved unless even the Papists themselves, compelled by the truth, were to concede it. Refer to Scotus, Book 4, Dist. 8, Q. 1, n. 2, and Becanus, *Theologica Scholastica*, Part III, Treatise 2, Ch. 19, Q. 1, n. 3. It remains firm, therefore, that the cup is a part of the Supper. Consequently, if it is removed, the whole Sacrament is nullified. For even if it is conceded that the cup is merely an integral part, it is nevertheless a principal one, as it contains not only wine but also the blood of Christ. When an essential or principal integral part is removed, the whole is destroyed, according to our rule.

Response: This follows rightly from the rule and effectively refutes the Papists.

Chapter 8: On Genus and Species

Rule I

A genus (considered materially) is predicated of all species (and individuals) contained under it.

Rule II

Whatever is predicated (or denied) of a genus (considered materially) is also predicated (or denied) of the species.

Rule III

A genus (by nature) is prior to its species.

Rule IV

A genus is broader than any single species.

Rule V

A species is the collective unity of many entities into one nature, and is yet narrower than the genus (in terms of extension).

Rule VI

A genus contains species, and species are contained (potentially) but do not contain genera (except by actual containment).

Rule VII

If the genus (considered materially) is denied, the species is also denied.

Rule VIII

If the genus (considered materially) is affirmed, the species (specifically determined) is not thereby affirmed.

Rule IX.

A genus (as a genus) and a species exist within the same category of predication.

Objection: From this rule, Keckermann rightly seems to reject the definition of the Sacrament of the Supper given by Blessed Luther, which he left us in his catechisms.

Response: Denying it, as seen above in the section on Whole and Part.

Rule X

A genus signifies a certain nature (in terms of reasoning) distinct from the species.

Rule XI

The entire nature of a genus (considered materially) is contained within each species.

Rule XII

Whatever is contained under a genus (as something lower under something higher) is contained under some species (or is itself a species immediately subject to that genus).

Rule XIII

A genus is predicated of its species equally (i.e., in the same degree).

Chapter 9: On Difference

Rule I

Every difference has, in a certain sense, an opposing difference.

Rule II

A difference should not be accidental to its species.

Rule III

A genus is not predicated (in a natural and ordered predication) of a difference.

Rule IV

An essential difference must exist within the same category as that of which it is the difference.

Objection: Accidents are sometimes defined by their subject, which is a substance; for example, thunder is a sound in a cloud.

Response: In such descriptions, it is not the subject but the relation to the subject that is the difference. Moreover, this relation does not belong to the category of relation, because not all respects (as transcendental ones) such as those which every accident has to its subject, are placed in the category of relation.

Rule V

A difference (of a positive being, as it is in itself) should not be negative.

Objection : God is described as infinite, immense, invisible, etc.

Response: These differences are not negative in themselves but only in terms of the words and the mode of signification.

Rule VI

A difference is not reciprocated with that of which it is a difference (when taken as a divisive difference).

Rule VII

Differences of diverse genera (1. such that neither is under the other nor are both contained under a single supreme genus, or 2. if under a third, one is immediately contained while the other is

not, or 3. both are immediately contained) are diverse in species of difference (whether constitutive or divisive).

Rule VIII

Not every difference constitutes another thing.

Objection: In divine matters, the persons differ by personal properties, and yet personal differences entirely constitute another: for example, the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another.

Response: 1. The rule does not state that no difference constitutes another thing, but that not every difference does so—for example, accidental differences, which do not affect the substance of their subjects. 2. A distinction must be made between *being another thing* (*aliud*) and *being another person* (*alius*). The former indicates a different nature, while the latter indicates a different person. Hence Augustine, in his work *On the Faith* (chapter 5), says: "The essence of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another, although personally the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another."

Chapter 10: On Definition

Rule I

A definition must consist of things that are more known and prior (by nature).

Rule II

A definition may replace the thing defined (when only the essence itself is being considered, unless the defined thing, or some part of it, has already been expressed either explicitly or implicitly in the same statement).

Rule III

The thing defined (in its entirety) must not be included in the definition (either explicitly or consequentially).

Rule IV

In a complete definition, the proximate genus should be included (or intermediate differences added).

Rule V

For one thing, there is only one unique definition (properly speaking).

Rule VI

An essential definition (taken materially) must be reciprocal with the thing defined (also taken materially).

Rule VII

The definition of a positive being, when essential, must not be negative.

Objection 1: The definition of God is almost entirely negative.

Response: 1. The definition of God is not a definition but a description. 2. Pererius (*On Matter and Privation*, Book 5, Chapter 11) says that negative definitions are to be tolerated in two cases: (a) for things that are most imperfect, such as primary matter, and (b) for things that are most perfect, such as God.

Objection 2: In 1 John 3, sin is defined as ἀνομία (anomia), that is, a transgression of the law. But this is a negative definition.

Response: Sin is not a positive being but a privative one.

You may argue: Some theologians teach that sin is positive.

Response: The most excellent Doctor Stabilus, in his discourse on metaphysical tables, admits it is unclear what theologians mean by the term "positive." Meisner seems to understand it as nothing other than privation. For in his *Anthropology* (Decade 1, Question: Is all evil a mere privation?), he states: "Corruption and depravity (i.e., the privation of original righteousness and soundness of nature) are denoted by the term 'positive' only as a quality by convention."

Rule VIII

Every definition (of a being in itself) consists of a genus and a difference.

Rule IX

In a definition, there must not be a conjunction or disjunction between the genus and the difference (unless the specific difference is unknown).

Rule X

Whatever is affirmed or denied of the definition (when taken materially and essentially) is likewise affirmed or denied of the thing defined.

Objection: Calvinists deny that the circular wafers (Hosts) used in the Lord's Supper are true bread, even though the definition of bread truly applies to them. Bread can be described as food composed of flour and water so mixed together that, after the watery content has been consumed, it remains firm, can be chewed, and can serve for bodily nourishment. This description applies to our Hosts as well. However, they say that Hosts are not food and are completely useless for nourishment, frequently proclaiming: *The Hosts will never satisfy or nourish you, no matter how many you eat.* They also claim: *The Hosts are so breadless that one would need an entire wagon load to be satisfied.* This claim is utterly false. I concede that Hosts do not nourish noticeably or satisfy hunger in their typical small quantity, but this is accidental. It is absurd to conclude from this that they are not true food. Even common bread, when taken in too small a quantity, does not nourish, yet Calvinists do not call it useless for nourishment. In larger and proper quantities, I deny that Hosts are useless for nourishment. If they refuse to believe this, let them try the experiment, and experience itself will expose their error. Since the definition of bread truly applies to the Hosts, but the Calvinists deny the defined thing applies to them, it is clear that their interpretation undermines our rule.

Response: Our rule does not fail; rather, the Calvinists are mistaken. Their error can be refuted according to our rule, for it is impossible for a definition to truly apply to something without the defined thing also applying to it.

Rule XI

Whatever is affirmed or denied of the definition (when taken materially) is also affirmed or denied of the thing defined, and vice versa.

Chapter 11: On Division

Rule I

The thing divided and all the members of the division, when taken together, must be mutually adequate.

Objection: Physics is divided into general and special parts. However, these two parts extend more broadly than the division itself, as metaphysics and logic are also commonly divided in this way.

Response: The parts termed "general" and "special" pertain exclusively to physics and do not apply to other disciplines.

Rule II

The thing divided must contain more than each individual member of the division (within the same category of containment).

Rule III

The members of a division (when it is the division of a genus into its immediate species) must be opposed to one another (in their own way).

Objection: The *predicable* is divided into genus, species, difference, property, and accident. However, the thing divided (namely, the *predicable*) is contained under one of its members, namely, the genus. Moreover, all the members of this division are contained under one member, namely, the species.

Response: The *predicable* is divided into these members as a genus is divided into its species, and these members are contained essentially. However, the *predicable* itself is not contained essentially under any of the members. Nor are all the members contained in the same way under one member, such as the species. This is because these predications are accidental. The *predicable* is a genus, and genus is a species of *predicable*, etc., all of which are accidental.

Rule IV

A division must be made into parts that are immediate to one another and relative to the thing divided.

Rule V

A genus must not be divided into species by negation (or privation) unless for specific reasons.

Rule VI

When the members of a division contain contradictory concepts (either formally or virtually, and such that one with negation is reciprocal to the other), there is no middle term between them (though the middle may be contained under the whole).

Chapter 12: On Subject And Accident

Rule I

Whatever adheres to a being (after its essence or existence) is its accident (insofar as this is opposed to essence and the fourth predicable).

Objection: From this rule, it follows that human nature is an accident of the Word (*Logos*), which seems absurd and Nestorian.

Response: It is not absurd to call human nature an accident of the Word, insofar as an accident is taken to mean something that is not of the essence of a thing and can be present or absent without destroying the essence of the thing to which it is united. For human nature is not of the essence of the Word, and if it were separated from the Word, the essence of the Word would not be destroyed. However, from this, it does not follow that human nature is united to the Word merely accidentally, nor does this rule support Nestorianism. It is not necessary for every accident, however it may be taken, to be united to its subject or predicated of it in merely an accidental way. Nevertheless, I add that one should abstain from such expressions, both on account of adversaries and for others who may not be sufficiently familiar with the terms encountered in these contexts.

Rule II

Every accident (i.e., form) exists in a properly proportioned subject.

Rule III

Whatever (as positive) is formally and immediately excluded by an accident is itself an accident.

Rule IV

An accident (the same in number) does not transfer from one immediate subject to another.

Rule V

The accident of an accident does not exist (as if it were the ultimate or original subject).

Rule VI

An accident (of the predicamental kind, excepting relation) does not occur in God.

Objection 1: Vorstius, in his *Tract on God and Divine Attributes*, explicitly rejects this axiom and instead teaches that certain accidents, entirely distinct from the substance of God, exist in

Him. For instance, he teaches with clear words (Chapter 1, p. 207) that decrees, which are really distinct from His essence, exist as accidents in God. He proves this in three ways:

1. God's decrees are many, but His essence is one. Decrees can be considered in themselves or concerning the objects they determine. In the latter sense, decrees may in some way be said to be many, but not in the former sense, which Vorstius affirms, for there are not many acts of divine will but one simple act by which all things are decreed.
2. The decrees are free, but His essence is necessary.
3. The decrees are not eternal, but God's essence is eternal.

Response: This Calvinist view is absurd and false. God's decrees are not accidents really distinct from His essence, and the proofs offered do not establish this claim.

God's decrees can be considered in two ways:

1. In themselves.
2. With respect to the objects to which they are directed.

In the latter sense, God's decrees can, in some sense, be called many; however, not in the former sense, in which Vorstius asserts this. For there are not many acts of the divine will but one simple act by which all things are decreed.

I deny that God's decrees are not eternal. Vorstius's reasoning, that a free cause always precedes its effect in the order of time or duration because free action presupposes deliberation in the intellect, is invalid. In God, the actions of the intellect and will are indivisible and occur instantaneously. God does not first propose, deliberate, or infer. As Scaliger states (*Exercitationes*, 365, Sect. 8), and Vorstius contradicts himself when he explicitly admits that God's decrees are eternal (p. 66).

Objection 2: Wisdom is a predicamental accident. However, wisdom exists in God.

Response: The wisdom of creatures is a predicamental accident, but not the wisdom of God. This pertains to the theological principle: *What are accidents in creatures, when attributed to God, are transformed into substance.*

Rule VII

What is an accident (in the categorial sense) in one thing cannot be a substance in another to which it applies univocally.

Objection: Wisdom is an accident in humans but a substance in God.

Response: Wisdom does not apply univocally to God and humans.

Rule VIII

Two accidents differing only numerically (otherwise identical in kind and respect) cannot coexist simultaneously in the same subject (with respect to the same part).

Rule IX

One and the same accident (in its entirety) cannot simultaneously exist in two distinct subjects (from an ordinary power).

Objection: From this rule, Bellarmine and others seem to rightly conclude that the faith we ascribe to intellect (in terms of knowledge and assent) and to will (in terms of trust) is monstrous and chimerical, as it pertains to different subjects and thus differs really from itself.

Response: This conclusion drawn by Roman Catholics is false:

1. Faith is not present in multiple subjects in its entirety but exists in one part here and another part there. Faith is not a simple quality but one by aggregation.
2. Although faith is present in multiple subjects, these are not really distinct and separate subjects. Intellect and will are not distinct powers in reality but are really identical, as the better opinion holds (cf. Scaliger, *Exercitations*, 307, Sect. 15, and Sleveigt's Academic Disputation, Thesis 23).
3. Even Roman Catholics themselves refer faith to both intellect and will (see Bellarmine, Ch. 1, Cap. 10).

Rule X

Those having the same properties (as properties) have the same essence, and vice versa.

Objection: From this rule, it follows that the divine and human natures have the same essence, since, according to the Orthodox, the divine attributes are communicated to the human nature, which seems Eutychian.

Response: This may appear so to Calvinists, who often accuse Lutherans of Eutychianism. However, this is a false accusation.

1. Properties can be considered in two ways: (a) materially and (b) formally. Our axiom holds regarding properties formally and as properties, not materially considered.
2. When Calvinists assume that the divine and human natures have the same properties, and take "properties" formally, the minor premise becomes false. If they take "properties" materially, the minor premise is true, but the major premise is false.

Rule XI

Things with different natures also have different properties, and vice versa.

Objection: Eutyches held that there was one nature in Christ, yet admitted diverse properties.

Response: Eutyches erred in this matter, and his error arose because he could not understand how the duality of natures could coexist with a single person. He thought that nature could not exist without its own subsistence and that one subsistence could not belong to multiple natures. Therefore, focusing on the unity of the person, he concluded there was one nature. Focusing on the person alone, he abandoned the properties of the natures and even asserted that divinity itself suffered, as Vigilus rightly shows in his writings against Eutyches. This error can be refuted by our rule: because diverse properties exist in Christ, as even Nestorius admitted, it follows that there are two natures in Him, though not multiple persons as Nestorius claimed.

Chapter 13: Of the Same and of the Different

Rule I

A greater identity presupposes a lesser one (if not positively, at least negatively).

Objection: God is the same in number, but not in species, nor in genus.

Response: God, as the same in number, presupposes the specific and generic identity negatively, insofar as He is not divided either in species or in genus.

Rule II

Those things, one of which can exist without the other, or which must necessarily exist together, will be really distinct (or distanced in some way, depending on the perspective).

Objection: A relation can be absent from its foundation, because a man can exist without fatherhood, and yet the relation and its foundation are not really distinct.

Response: Relation implies two things: one intrinsic, which is the foundation itself, and another extrinsic, which is the terminus to which the relation refers. Regarding the extrinsic element, the relation can exist without the foundation, and in this sense, the two are really distinct. However, with regard to the intrinsic element, the relation cannot be distinct from the foundation and cannot exist without it.

Rule III

Those things that are the same (both really and virtually) to a third thing (when universally taken, if it is universal) are the same with respect to one another (in the same identical proportion).

Objection: There have been several heretics who have denied the supreme mystery of the Trinity, hidden from the ages, and have sought to refute it from reason. This cannot remain concealed from those who have lightly and carelessly examined Church History. Sabellius, a native of Africa and from the region of Libya, which is often referred to by Church historians as the land of the Libyans, denied the Trinity. Likewise, Noetus, an Asiatic who was born in Smyrna and was believed to have been the disciple of Sabellius, attempted the same. Also embracing this heresy were Praxeas and Hermogenes, along with many others who, following in their footsteps, were called Sabellians, Noetians, Praxeans, and Hermogenesians. After them, Arius came, from whom the Arians are named. After Arius, others continued to defend this heresy, who were known as the "Recent Arians," such as Photinus, a disciple of Marcellus, hence the term "Photinians." This heresy, having been buried for almost a thousand years, was nearly resurrected from the grave by Faustus Socinus, a native of Siena, Italy, from whom the Socinians derive their name. And all of this would seem to support our rule, for the argument would go as

follows: Whatever is the same in one respect is the same in a third. But the relations in the divine are the same in a third respect, namely the divine essence. Therefore, they are the same among themselves. To this argument, the authors respond in various ways. Those who admit a real distinction between essence and relations in the divine can easily resolve this, and they attribute this view to Scotus. However, there are many places in Scotus's writings that present difficulties, such as in *Lib. 1, dist. 8, qu. 25, dist. 33*, and others. For brevity's sake, we will leave these aside, especially since the reason for attributing this view to Scotus will not be examined here. There were others who held this view, such as Gilbert of Poitiers, Durandus, and the Nominalists. There were also those who admitted a real identity between essence and relations and proposed various solutions and limitations to the major proposition. The authors of *Conimbricenses* (in *Lib. 3, Phys. 2, p.m. 447*) offer three explanations. B. Slevegiius in *Disp. Acad. d.13* lists six, which he examines and rejects, embracing the one proposed by some of the more recent authors, such as Rodrigo de Arriaga, Hurtado de Mendoza, and others. These authors distinguish between essence and relations, whether real or nominal, in relation to contradictory predicates that are actually equivalent, establishing a distinction whereby relations in the divine, though the same in respect to the thing as essence, are not the same among themselves.

This is the view we also prefer, for several reasons.

Rule IV

Those things that are really (and virtually) the same communicate one with another, and it is necessary that they communicate the other.

Objection: The Calvinists deny the communication of the attributes in Christ, which is unanimously taught by orthodox theologians. They seem to be able to undermine it based on our principle. The argument goes like this: If the attributes of the divine nature are communicated to the human nature in Christ, either all attributes are communicated or none. But not all attributes are communicated, as infinity, eternity, and simplicity are not communicated. Some attributes cannot be communicated, and if some can, others cannot. Hence, they conclude, none are communicated.

Response: We do not say that all divine attributes are communicated to the human nature, such as infinity, eternity, and simplicity. It is necessary to distinguish between communication and predication. Some divine attributes are truly predicated of the human nature, but not all are. For instance, the simplicity and spirituality of the rational soul are not predicated of the body. Thus, even though some divine attributes may be predicated of the human nature, not all can. However, if asked why not all can be predicated, no other answer can be given than the contradiction in the subject. Refer to the theological discussions on this controversy, specifically the work of Blessed Gerhard.

Chapter 14: On Opposites

Rule I

Opposites cannot be said (simply) of the same (singular subject) insofar as they are at the same time and in the same respect.

Objection: Socinus, in a brief treatise he wrote about God and the Holy Spirit, published in Racow in the eleventh year of this century, uses this rule to attack the mystery of the Trinity. He argues as follows: Opposites do not exist in God; the one and the three are opposites; therefore, they do not exist in God.

Response: Socinus abuses our rule, for it must be understood as applying to real opposites. But the one and the three in God are not real opposites because they do not oppose each other in the same manner, nor are they said of God in the same way. For the one refers to the essence of God, and the three refer to the persons. As for what Socinus says, that this distinction does not exist in sacred Scripture, he clearly contradicts reason and manifest truth. In response to this: Scripture contains something in two ways: 1. Expressly, with the same words; 2. Implicitly, through consequences. If he wants to argue that the distinction is not contained in Scripture, he says something false. If he tries to use it, it achieves nothing, for what is contained in Scripture by consequence is as true as what is expressly stated in the words. This is evident from the writings of others, such as the authors of the New Art, and would be more apparent if the framework of our method permitted it. Regarding the second point: Denying that the distinction contradicts manifest reason and truth, for it is not contradictory to reason to say that in the divine, one essence exists as one, and the persons exist as three. Socinus cannot effectively argue against this, for our reasoning does not accept any contradiction, and Socinus simply invents a conflict where none exists.

Rule II

Contraries cannot exist at the same time (in the highest degree).

Rule III

The same material (successively) cannot exist as contrary unless one is in nature.

Rule IV

Contraries (truly such) are most distant from each other in the same genus (if not in the immediate, at least the remote one).

Rule V

One (materially taken, insofar as it is one) can only be opposed to one (immediately and primarily) in the same type of opposition.

Objection: This rule contradicts our theologians, who unanimously affirm and show that Antichrist is the Pope of Rome. But if one can only oppose one to one, the Pope of Rome cannot be understood, because there have been not one but many Popes of Rome. Bellarmine, in Book 3, chapter on Remonstrances, counters this.

Response: Antichrist is opposed to Christ not on the basis of the person, but on the basis of doctrine. The Roman Popes have always taught doctrine and opposed Christ. Hence, the Pope is always opposed to Christ, even though there are many Popes, one after another.

Rule VI

Contradictories (truly such) cannot exist simultaneously.

Objection: This rule faces many objections, which seem to prove it false.

1. The propositions: "All beings are dependent," and "Some beings are independent," are contradictories, and both are false.
2. "A man is a man" and "A man is not a man" are contradictories, and both are false, because either being a man or not being a man can apply to a person as an accident.
3. Similarly:

    - "Only good works justify,"
    - "Only good works do not justify,"
    - "Only saints should be invoked,"
    - "Not only saints should be invoked,"
    - "Only purgatory purges the stains of sin,"
    - "Not only purgatory purges the stains of sin,"
    - "Only indulgences relax the penalties of sin,"
    - "Not only indulgences relax the penalties of sin,"
    - "The Pope is infallible in defining,"
    - "The Pope is not infallible in defining," etc.

Response: To the first example, authors respond in various ways. It is best to say that the contradiction is not properly instituted in the first proposition, but it is well-established in the second. Some authors do not agree, but it is correct that what is false in the first proposition makes the second true. Regarding the second point: Some believe that reduplicative propositions (those that repeat the subject in different terms) should be excluded from this rule. But this is not

correct because such propositions are either contradictory or not. In this case, they are not contradictory; the contradiction lies in how the proposition "A man is not a man" applies to a person, which refers to the attribute of being learned, while the assertion "a man is learned" is true. In the third example, the particle "Not" only affects the exclusive particle or the entire proposition. If these are contradictories, they cannot be simultaneously true, and the latter is true because it contains the affirmation: Good works justify; saints should be invoked; etc.

Rule VII

The knowledge of opposites is the same (1. inasmuch as opposites are treated within the same discipline, or 2. to the extent that the knowledge of one opposite (in some accidental way) depends on the knowledge of the other, 3. to the extent that the same discipline, such as Dialectics and Rhetoric, proves the opposites).

Rule VIII

In contradicted pairs, the distance is infinite (i.e., indeterminate).

Rule IX

By privation (which follows the total form), there is no return to the same number (or form) or to the same species, immediately and naturally.

Objection: If this rule is true, how could Christ raise the dead and restore sight to the blind?

Response: From this rule, it is rightly concluded that it did not happen naturally but supernaturally by an absolute power. Therefore, it can also be rightly inferred from this that Christ is truly God.

Rule X

One passing from an extreme to another must pass through the middle (according to form, as all things do when they are constituted from extremes).

Rule XI

The middle (according to form) consists of the two extreme contraries (either formally or virtually).

Rule XII

The middle (according to form) is of the same kind (either closely related or distantly related).

Rule XIII

As many times as one of the opposites is said to be one (in terms of equivocation), so many times the other is said to be, (if in all the meanings of the opposite it holds, either under one or under various expressions).

Rule XIV

Of opposites (and specifically contradictories), the order is reversed for contradictories in the case of truth, but direct for contraries when they are equal, unless it is a consequence of accident or opposition according to excellence and defect. For relatives, the order is direct when they follow of themselves, and for privatives, unless one negation removes the very subject of the other's privation, opposites will follow in sequence (within the same kind of opposition).

Objection: From this rule, it rightly follows that good works save, because bad works condemn.

Response: The rule applies to contraries: if the contraries are equal, good works are imperfectly good, whereas bad works are perfectly bad.

Chapter 15: On Propositions

Rule I

From what is true (not by reason of existence, but by reason of identity and composition), the statement (formally) is said to be true or false.

Objection: We believe sacred scriptures to be true because they are certainly from God. We can judge their truth by the authority of the one who speaks.

Response: We believe sacred scriptures to be true because they are from God, not because they are formally true by this alone, but rather because God is truth itself and cannot lie. Thus, we rightly argue and conclude from this, that since God speaks, it is fitting that what He says aligns with the truth.

Rule II

The subjects (by reason of the signification) are as permitted by the predicates (and vice versa).

Objection When I say: "Human nature is omnipotent," the subject, human nature, does not admit such predicates as omnipotent.

Response: Human nature, not in itself and by its own nature (when considered), does not admit such predicates. However, insofar as it has been transformed in Christ, it indeed admits this.

Rule III

When a conditional proposition is true, if the antecedent is necessary (due to the intrinsic connection of the terms), the consequent is also necessary.

Objection: This rule seems to take away all freedom and indifference of the human will and favors the Calvinists, who assert that man necessarily sins. The argument can be formed as follows: If God from eternity necessarily knows that Adam and all men will sin, then they will necessarily sin, as God has decreed it.

Response: In our rule, the necessity of the antecedent is understood as stemming from the intrinsic connection of the terms. However, God's knowledge is only necessary through supposition, not in the same way. Theologians, such as Blessed Slevogt and others, discuss this further.

Rule IV

An affirmative proposition leads to a negation of the infinite (infinite predicates totally in the same quantity).

Rule V

A negation leads to an affirmative proposition of the infinite (infinite predicates totally in the same quantity).

Objection: This rule does not hold when the negative predicate is finite. For example, "Brutes are not intelligent animals," implies, "Brutes are not intelligent animals," but the logic breaks down.

Response: The negative predicates are considered finite when their sense does not extend to all predications. The correct interpretation is that a brute is not an intelligent animal.

Rule VI

A comparison (properly used) applies to the affirmative proposition.

Objection: Theft is simpler than sacrilege, yet theft is not good.

Response: The comparison is properly understood when stated in its positive form with the adverb "more," as when it is explained by its opposite with the adverb "less."

Rule VII

A positive to a comparative (properly understood) negative.

Rule VIII

From the third adjective (whether accidental intrinsic or extrinsic, not denominating from the act of intellect, fantasy, or appetite, positive or privative, if it removes an intrinsic form) to the second adjective (of time, which is implied by the predicate).

Objection: It is said of Christ in Micah 5:2 that He came forth before the beginning and before the days of the world. So it is written:וּמוֹצָאֹתָיו מִמֶּרֶם מִימֵי עוֹלָם The plural number here is used for the singular to denote excellence. See Glossa in Grammar, Sacra lib. 3, tract. 1, can. 24. Thus, before the beginning, before the days of the world. From which it would follow, according to our rule, that Christ was before the beginning, and before the days of the world, and therefore eternal and truly God. Nevertheless, this is denied by those who oppose the divinity of Christ.

Response: From this saying of Micah, the eternity and divinity of Christ are most firmly established, because Christ could not have gone forth eternally unless He were eternally divine. For it is as said: They shall speak of peace, and walk as the philosophers (Aristotle *Metaphysics* Bk. IV. 16). Therefore, if eternal, He is true God. And this can be opposed to all who deny the divinity of Christ, such as the Ebionites, Cerinthians, Samaritans, Eunomians, Arianists, Mahometans, and others, as well as the general Anti-Trinitarians.

You say: If this argument: "Whoever goes forth from eternity is truly God, and therefore eternal," and Christ went forth from eternity, therefore He is eternal and true God. This major premise is confirmed by our rule, and the minor by the passage from Micah, firmly proving the eternity and divinity of Christ. Why do they not acquiesce and concede this truth? Let them either deny the minor or the major; for it is impossible to deny the conclusion while accepting the premises.

Response: Not the major, as our rule states, but the minor, as is written in Micah. They think that from this passage it cannot be proven that Christ's eternity is implied because the words קִים and עול sometimes signify time and limited duration. However, this exception does not evade the force of the minor premise, for we concede not only that these words sometimes denote limited duration, but also that in this place יְמֵי עוֹלָם (days of eternity) indeed signify eternity. We note, moreover, that these words עול and עולם have the prefix "D" which, when placed before words indicating duration, signifies that which is eternal. Therefore, the sense of the minor premise is not that Christ came forth at the beginning and in the days of the world, but before the beginning and before the days of the world. Thus, everything that is said to have been before the beginning, in Scripture, is eternal and consequently truly God, because it is a matter of faith that before the beginning, besides God, nothing existed; all things besides Him were created in the Beginning, as it is written in Genesis 1:1.

FINIS. SOLI DEO GLORIA.