

PG Post-Pilot Survey Results

Below are the results of the post-pilot survey. Members are invited to join a discussion of these results on **Tuesday, August 1st @ 14:00 UTC / 10 ET** in the [“pg-ops” Discord voice channel](#).

There is a dedicated discussion channel called #survey. Please create a thread there for topics you'd like to surface - make sure not to duplicate existing threads!

The outcome of these discussions will be summarized in the pilot retrospective.

Survey:

<https://docs.google.com/forms/d/15s9jSu8SKehzgG87HAEdpOWx7MURB2LPJ0-1BkpILY/edit?pli=1#responses>

Survey raw data:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1IfLKew7hq1T36MFxFX4QbtQ7i_fg5RteJCOi2RLNVvI/edit#gid=910469436


Total Responses: 99 (70% of 142 members)

Responses

1. I am aligned with the Guild's overall processes and strategy.

- Mean: 4.58
- Standard Deviation: 0.62
- This high average score indicates strong agreement among respondents with the Guild's overall processes and strategy.

I am aligned with the Guild's overall processes and strategy.
99 responses




2. Having the Guild is net-positive for Ethereum long-term.

- Mean: 4.76
- Standard Deviation: 0.52
- The high average score indicates strong agreement among respondents that the Guild has a net-positive effect on Ethereum in the long term.

Having the Guild is net-positive for Ethereum long-term.

99 responses




3. I feel informed about what the Guild does and how it makes decisions.

- Mean: 4.29
- Standard Deviation: 0.73
- The relatively high mean suggests that respondents generally feel informed about the Guild's activities and decision-making process.

I feel informed about what the Guild does and how it makes decisions.

99 responses




4. The Guild's top focus should be _____. Choose the statement that most aligns with your views.

- 61% all of these are equally important
- 20% creating an effective mechanism that the ecosystem can donate to

- 14% active fundraising / funding members
- 5% curating the membership


The Guild's top focus should be _____. choose the statement that most aligns with your views
99 responses



5. I check in on Guild discussions (e.g. Discord, Github, Twitter, townhalls etc.) _____.

- 38% weekly
- 26% monthly
- 18% every few months
- 16% daily
- 1% never

I check in on Guild discussions (e.g. Discord, Github, Twitter, townhalls etc.) _____.
99 responses




6. I participate in Guild discussions (e.g. Discord, Github, Twitter, townhalls etc.) _____.

- 49% every few months
- 26% Monthly
- 20% Never
- 5% Weekly or more

I participate in Guild discussions (e.g. Discord, Github, Twitter, townhalls etc.) _____.

99 responses




7. I am most likely to see information/comms through _____.

- 59% Discord
- 23% Email (PG google group)
- 8% Other members telling me
- 5% Github
- 4% Scheduled calls - eg. townhalls
- 1% Twitter

I am most likely to see information/comms through _____.

99 responses




8. I was previously aware there is a google group to receive Guild updates in email form - (DM trent or cheeky to be re-added).

- 68% Yes
- 32% No

I was previously aware there is a google group to receive Guild updates in email form - (DM trent or cheeky to be re-added)

99 responses




9. Prior to joining, the process to get nominated and join the Guild was clear.

- Mean: 3.88
- Standard Deviation: 1.15
- The average score is relatively high, suggesting that most respondents found the nomination process clear and easy to understand. However, the standard deviation is also quite high, indicating a fair amount of variation in responses.

Prior to joining, the process to get nominated was clear and easy to understand.

99 responses




10. The Pilot required that members had contributed at least 6 months before being nominated. This threshold should be:

- 80% kept as is (6 months)
- 15% increased (more than 6 months)
- 5% lowered (less than 6 months)

The Pilot required that members had contributed at least 6 months before being nominated. This threshold should be:

99 responses




11. In the Pilot, we updated membership in quarterly batches (every three months starting May 2022).

- 78% remain as is eg. quarterly, every 3 months
- 16% be more frequent eg. monthly
- 6% be less frequent eg. twice a year

In the Pilot, we updated membership in quarterly batches (every three months starting May 2022). With v2, anyone will be able to submit upd...r privacy. Batched updates to membership should:


99 responses



12. If you have not claimed funds from the split contract, what is the main reason?

- 58% N/A, I have claimed
- 21% no need to claim at this time
- 18% related to taxes eg. unclear implications, want to set up a business entity to claim through
- 3% forgot it was available

If you have not claimed funds from the split contract, what is the main reason?




13. The Pilot raised \$10-15mm for 100-150 members under a 1 year vest. Given the Pilot goals (intentionally limited scope), this amount was:

- 88% appropriate
- 8% not enough \$ ie. should have been more
- 4% too much \$ ie. should have been less

The Pilot raised \$10-15mm for 100-150 members under a 1 year vest. Given the Pilot goals (intentionally limited scope), this amount was:

99 responses




14. Relative to the amount of \$ raised, there was sufficient variety in the participating Pilot sponsors. (5k individual donations, but 90% raised from Lido, ENS, Uniswap, Nouns, MolochDAO)

- Mean: 3.51
- Standard Deviation: 1.02
- The average score suggests a moderate level of agreement that there was sufficient variety in the participating sponsors. However, the standard deviation is quite high, indicating significant variation in responses.

Relative to the amount of \$ raised, there was sufficient variety in the participating Pilot sponsors.
(5k individual donations, but 90% raised from Lido, ENS, Uniswap, Nouns, MolochDAO)

99 responses




15. The curation/nomination process used internally by members during the Pilot was smooth and effective.

- Mean: 4.07
- Standard Deviation: 0.93
- The relatively high average score suggests that respondents generally found the curation/nomination process to be smooth and effective.

The curation/nomination process used internally by members during the Pilot was smooth and effective.

99 responses




16. The financial incentives provided through the Pilot had a _____ effect on my decision to start/continue working on the core protocol.

- 84% Positive (made me want to continue)
- 16% Negligible/neutral (had no effect)
- 0% Negative (made me want to stop)

The financial incentives provided through the Pilot had a _____ effect on my decision to start/continue working on the core protocol.

99 responses




17. The curated membership during the Pilot (previous year) was an accurate representation of core protocol contributors.

- Mean: 4.10
- Standard Deviation: 0.71
- The relatively high average score indicates that respondents generally felt that the curated membership was an accurate representation of core protocol contributors.

The curated membership during the Pilot (previous year) was an accurate representation of core protocol contributors.

99 responses




18. The time-weighting mechanism is sufficiently fair.

- Mean: 4.05
- Standard Deviation: 0.88
- The relatively high mean suggests that respondents generally feel the time-weighting mechanism is fair, but there is some variation in responses.

The time-weighting mechanism is sufficiently fair.

99 responses




19. The vested distribution is useful and incentivizes long-term contributions.

- Mean: 4.54
- Standard Deviation: 0.67
- The high average score indicates strong agreement among respondents that the vested distribution is useful and incentivizes long-term contributions.

The vested distribution is useful and incentivizes long-term contributions.

99 responses




20. How publicly accessible should the membership repo be?

- 55% permissioned read + write (status quo) keep nominations + discussions for members only
- 33% public read, permissioned write - only members can make PRs/nominate new members
- 8% public read, semi-permissioned write - prospective members can be added for self-nomination
- 4% public read + write - anyone can self-nominate and participate in discussions, even non-members

How publicly accessible should the membership repo be?

99 responses




21. The financial incentives provided through the Pilot meaningfully influenced my decision to start/continue working on the core protocol.

- Mean: 3.96
- Standard Deviation: 1.12
- The relatively high mean suggests that financial incentives provided through the Pilot had a meaningful influence on respondents' decisions to start or continue working on the core protocol.

The financial incentives provided through the Pilot meaningfully influenced my decision to start/continue working on the core protocol.

99 responses




22. I have mentioned Guild membership as an incentive to new/potential colleagues contributing to eligible projects.

- 57% Yes
- 31% Would if there was an opportunity
- 10% No
- 1% Considered it but did not mention it
- 1% Had the opportunity but did not

I have mentioned Guild membership as an incentive to new/potential colleagues contributing to eligible projects.


99 responses



23. In addition to time-weighting, the Pilot had two tiers for membership with different multipliers: full (1x) or partial (.5x). The reasoning for two tiers was to grant Guild membership to contributors that aren't completely focused on protocol work. Which of the following best describes your perspective on this?

- 57% The existing two tiers with 1x and .5x multipliers are sufficient
- 18% There should be even more tiers beyond the current 2
- 8% There should only be one membership tier which includes full-weight contributors
- 8% Not sure / No opinion
- 7% Keep the number of tiers but reweight "partial" to be lower eg. .1x or .25x
- 2% Weights/tiers are not useful, we should use a more generic qualitative measure like "is the work relatively comparable to others working on this project area?"

How many weighting tiers?




24. Anticipated future incentives (fundraising post-Pilot) has made me want to continue my core protocol work.

- Mean: 4.34
- Standard Deviation: 0.92
- The high average score indicates that anticipated future incentives have motivated respondents to continue their core protocol work.

Anticipated future incentives (fundraising post-Pilot) has made me want to continue my core protocol work.

99 responses



25. Assuming we aim to raise \$100mm in the next funding round, what amount of time should assets vest for?

- 28% 1 year (same as Pilot)
- 26% 4 years
- 23% 2 years
- 18% 3 years
- 3% 5 or more years
- 1% Gradual vesting schedule. Eg:- 10% vesting for 1 year, 20% for 2 years, 30% for 3 years and the final 40% for 4 years

How long should donated assets vest?




26. Post-Pilot, I think that _____ is a healthy target for the median member to receive annually through Guild membership. (this was ~\$65k during the Pilot, using asset prices at that time)

- 63% \$100-250k
- 20% \$250-500k
- 12% Less than \$100k
- 4% \$500k-1mm

- 1% More than \$1mm

Post-Pilot, I think that ____ is a healthy target for the median member to receive annually through Guild membership. (this was ~\$65k during the Pilot, using asset prices at that time)

99 responses




27. In the future, I prefer not participating in the operation of the Guild (self-curation, nominating, signing tx, presenting to the community) and would rather just receive the financial incentives.

- Mean: 2.62
- Standard Deviation: 1.11
- The relatively low mean suggests that most respondents would prefer to participate in the operation of the Guild rather than just receiving the financial incentives.

In the future, I prefer not participating in the operation of the Guild (self-curation, nominating, signing tx, presenting to the community) and would rather just receive the financial incentives.

99 responses




28. What rolling \$ amount should PG aim to have available to the collective membership post-Pilot? (assume a 4 year vest, ~150 members)

- 73% \$100-500mm (current target)
- 12% Less than \$100mm
- 11% \$500mm-1B
- 4% \$1B-10B

What rolling \$ amount should PG aim to have available to the collective membership post-Pilot?
(assume a 4 year vest, ~150 members)

99 responses



Correlations

1. "The financial incentives provided through the Pilot meaningfully influenced my decision to start/continue working on the core protocol" is positively correlated with "Anticipated future incentives (fundraising post-Pilot) has made me want to continue my core protocol work." ($r=0.54$).
 - a. This suggests that respondents who felt the financial incentives from the Pilot influenced their decision to work on the core protocol also feel that anticipated future incentives will motivate them to continue their work.
2. "The curation/nomination process used internally by members during the Pilot was smooth and effective" is positively correlated with "I am aligned with the Guild's overall processes and strategy" ($r=0.32$) and "I feel informed about what the Guild does and how it makes decisions" ($r=0.42$).
 - a. These correlations suggest that respondents who felt aligned with the Guild's processes and well-informed about its activities also found the curation/nomination process to be effective.
3. "The time-weighting mechanism is sufficiently fair" is positively correlated with "I am aligned with the Guild's overall processes and strategy" ($r=0.43$), "The curation/nomination process used internally by members during the Pilot was smooth and effective" ($r=0.44$), and "The vested distribution is useful and incentivizes long-term contributions" ($r=0.43$).
 - a. This indicates that respondents who feel the time-weighting mechanism is fair are also likely to agree with the Guild's processes, find the curation/nomination process effective, and believe that the vested distribution is useful.
4. "In the future, I prefer not participating in the operation of the Guild (self-curation, nominating, signing tx, presenting to the community) and would rather just receive the financial incentives" is negatively correlated with "I am aligned with the Guild's overall processes and strategy" ($r=-0.28$).

- a. This suggests that respondents who prefer not to participate in the operation of the Guild are less likely to feel aligned with its processes and strategy.
- 5. "Anticipated future incentives (fundraising post-Pilot) has made me want to continue my core protocol work" is positively correlated with "The financial incentives provided through the Pilot meaningfully influenced my decision to start/continue working on the core protocol" ($r=0.54$).
 - a. This suggests that respondents who are motivated by future incentives also found the pilot financial incentives meaningful.
- 6. "I am aligned with the Guild's overall processes and strategy" is positively correlated with "I feel informed about what the Guild does and how it makes decisions" ($r=0.54$).
 - a. This indicates that respondents who feel well-informed about the Guild's activities and decision-making processes also tend to agree with its overall strategy and processes.

Long-Form Responses

There were 18 long-form responses in total, which provided insight into several themes: membership eligibility, funding, vesting, time-weighting, the role of non-protocol contributors, the potential complexity of the guild system, and the transition from pilot to post-pilot operations. Several respondents mentioned concerns about the guild's eligibility criteria and transparency. There was also a sense of worry about the guild appearing "club-like," and suggestions were made to make guild operations more public. The importance of consistent and thoughtful evaluation of membership and contribution was also noted.

The funding source and amount, and their implications on the guild's objectives and operations were discussed, with some respondents cautioning about the dangers of focusing too much on fund generation. There were different views on the time-weighting, with some respondents considering it an unnecessary complexity and others suggesting its use for voting in guild decisions. Vesting emerged as another common topic, with suggestions ranging from 2 years to 5 years. The issue of managing non-protocol contributors was raised, with some questioning their full-time weight while acknowledging their value. Other themes include concerns about the guild losing momentum after transitioning from the pilot phase, and the guild's incentive being relatively less significant in certain countries.

Operations/ Mechanism Design:

1. "Quarterly" membership updates are confusing because I think most people assume that is aligned with the start of the year, however it is aligned with the start of the contract.
2. Consider L2 expansion as L2 become a part of the core since Deneb

10. I think the 3 month window to make changes is good frequency as it allows people to come and leave in a relatively frequent cadence (eg. Adrian Sutton leaving, Age going part time)

Member Eligibility:

3. Eligibility will make or break the legitimacy of the guild, the \$ amount relieves the internal pressure if there is enough to go around, but the greatest danger imo is negative outside perception of "club-like" membership. No easy solution other than talking it out, but being more transparent with the guild's operations (e.g., public read into guild conversations, especially around membership) would go a long way.

5. I am concerned that PG lost its momentum transitioning from pilot to post-pilot. I think that having 100+mm\$ goal is good but I am afraid realistically 10mm\$/year might be close to a ceiling we will have.

I have mixed feelings about the eligibility. There are plethora of projects that could be eligible and are crucial to the ecosystem and I think having "fair" rules for that is impossible to do.

9. I think Guild members need to be very careful about introducing more complexity into weighting tiers. There should be thoughtful consideration to balance between rewarding long-tail contributors and fighting against scope creep. This may become unmanageable / hard to properly curate if left unchecked.

Related - the eligibility for the "partial weight" tier should be better specified. Right now there isn't any guidance for members on how to curate around this.

I strongly believe that the membership repo should be at minimum publicly readable for transparency sake to the Ethereum community and funders. These groups should have insight into governance.

The work of building PG is crucial at these early stages - i will unapologetically advocate for Cheeky's work (probably easy to guess who wrote this lol). I guess we need to do a better job of surfacing why this is important, especially so in these early days. It's pretty ironic that many people are fixated on one single contributor who has done significant work to advance our project.

11. I think the vesting should be longer if we raise more money, especially if we need to account for full bull/bear cycles which will significantly affect the value of the assets and therefore, the payouts. We don't want to bleed talent at the end of a bull cycle... significant building happens during bear markets and we should reduce the incentive for people to walk away with a big payout at the end of a frothy cycle.

We need to be clearer about eligibility when it comes to what is considered "protocol work" and qualifies the individuals for this Guild. There should be other Guilds rather than lumping everyone together at Protocol Guild. The reason why this exists is because we depend on the generosity of others since the value of the ecosystem doesn't naturally accrue downward to core development... of which our work benefits everyone on the Ethereum ecosystem. When we start integrating DVTs and other "out of protocol" implementations that are actually funded by larger companies/VCs (e.g. Obol, SSV, Diva, etc.), there is an argument to be made that their contributions benefit their specific "sidecar" implementation, which doesn't actually benefit everyone or now we have to use PG to integrate all DVT implementors. We should think hard about where the eligibility line is drawn.

I think we still need a "team manager/curator" to ensure that there is some oversight of membership and when people actually stop contributing to Protocol. Though, they should not fully make decisions on behalf of others if there's contention of their eligibility after leaving the team. There's an "honour system" of ensuring that you resign from the guild when you stop contributing, but we optimistically assume individuals do this and there is an incentive to remain for as long as possible, even under the radar - ripe for abuse. Also not everyone is active on governance here and not everyone knows everyone here - even if we all work somewhat closely together. It's the responsibility of the team manager/curator to lightly enforce their continued eligibility if they are leaving the obvious team of which allows them to qualify for PG. And if they contribute to another protocol team, it is made clear. Or if they are individually still contributing to protocol, it's important for the membership to know what it is and clear it with governance.

13. Overall, PG is a fantastic effort.

My thoughts though:

- Devs should be excommunicated if they apply to the same funding protocols as PG (eg. OP's retroactive round). If they end up getting funding twice, they should have to donate it back to PG or be forced to leave.
- We need to be stricter about the criteria for who gets accepted. PG needs to decide where the border for inclusion is with respect to which levels of the protocol are included etc and stick to that.

15. Regarding non protocol contributors, currently only cheeky-gorille, who I immensely value: It is unclear to me how this job can possibly be a full-time job. Even if it was, it is not core protocol work. I think to align incentives any sufficiently high weight (even 20%) would be enough to align incentives wrt fundraising. Kicking out solidity (which I think makes sense) but then so loosely giving a full-time weight to a non protocol contributor feels very wrong. And this is not against cheeky-gorille. From what I can tell he/she are doing an incredible job.

Funding:

5. I am concerned that PG lost its momentum transitioning from pilot to post-pilot. I think that having 100+mm\$ goal is good but I am afraid realistically 10mm\$/year might be close to a ceiling we will have.

I have mixed feelings about the eligibility. There are a plethora of projects that could be eligible and are crucial to the ecosystem and I think having "fair" rules for that is impossible to do.

8. I think considering the source of the funds is the most important consideration, not the amount. I worry about the decisions that are being made that seem to be aimed at increasing the amount of ppl that can donate to the guild. I wouldn't place any upper limit on the funds, just restrictions on the processes and actions we take to get funds.

I would also prefer options to do no-answers.

14. PG incentives made non-protocol job offerings less enticing. In fact, it kept me from interviewing for a few positions and caused me to turn down one offer (net \$\$ down)

16. So it definitely gave me more of an incentive, however, at least for my country of residence (switzerland) it was not so significant, 60k dollars a year more is definitely nice but not that much significant here. i think that if that number was doubled, it may give me a better incentive (personally). This is my general point. I can see how that is a significant amount to non-US or non-swiss citizens.

17. Solid start. On the order of \$100k seems like a good incentive. Potentially unexpected or weird things will happen at 5 or 10x

Vesting:

7. I mentioned 5y vesting for the next funding round as I would say a lot of the Ethereum roadmap will be completed by then and ossification requires fewer core devs to stick around. The incentive to keep core devs around as long as possible is then switched at that point.

11. I think the vesting should be longer if we raise more money, especially if we need to account for full bull/bear cycles which will significantly affect the value of the assets and therefore, the payouts. We don't want to bleed talent at the end of a bull cycle... significant building happens during bear markets and we should reduce the incentive for people to walk away with a big payout at the end of a frothy cycle.

We need to be clearer about eligibility when it comes to what is considered "protocol work" and qualifies the individuals for this Guild. There should be other Guilds rather than lumping everyone together at Protocol Guild. The reason why this exists is because we depend on the generosity of others since the value of the ecosystem doesn't

naturally accrue downward to core development... of which our work benefits _everyone_ on the Ethereum ecosystem. When we start integrating DVTs and other "out of protocol" implementations that are actually funded by larger companies/VCs (e.g. Obol, SSV, Diva, etc.), there is an argument to be made that their contributions benefit their specific "sidecar" implementation, which doesn't actually benefit everyone or now we have to use PG to integrate all DVT implementors. We should think hard about where the eligibility line is drawn.

I think we still need a "team manager/curator" to ensure that there is some oversight of membership and when people actually stop contributing to Protocol. Though, they should not fully make decisions on behalf of others if there's contention of their eligibility after leaving the team. There's an "honour system" of ensuring that you resign from the guild when you stop contributing, but we optimistically assume individuals do this and there is an incentive to remain for as long as possible, even under the radar - ripe for abuse. Also not everyone is active on governance here and not everyone knows everyone here - even if we all work somewhat closely together. It's the responsibility of the team manager/curator to lightly enforce their continued eligibility if they are leaving the obvious team of which allows them to qualify for PG. And if they contribute to another protocol team, it is made clear. Or if they are individually still contributing to protocol, it's important for the membership to know what it is and clear it with governance.

12. Long-term vesting is over-rated. Some vesting makes sense, but I am thinking more like 2 years. I feel it would be easier to raise more funds by asking more frequently than asking for one gigantic sum (for next 4 years). 2 years seems sufficient and I don't think making it longer has a positive effect in incentivizing PG members to not switch to private sector.

PG fundraisers should not be full weight. It is currently not a full-time job and it is quite replaceable. Incentives are aligned sufficiently with any significantly non-zero share (e.g. 20%).

The full-time vs. part-time shares should be 1 and 0.25. Reason is that 0.5 weight allows the best of both worlds, which is precisely what we want to prevent. It is too easy to make a PR every now and then while working for an L2 and thus claim 0.5 weight. A more extreme case is even full weight or nothing. Rational would be to only incentivize people that dedicate their life to it. This might be unfair for some, but removes all grey area with one decision. Plus it creates strong incentives to dedicate your work life to the protocol. I feel simplicity is king here, actually.

18. The vesting module, as used, is solely a smoothing function to keep the rolling balance about the same. Vesting duration should simply be set to whatever is necessary to reduce variance while maintaining the target incentive per member per year. In traditional organizations, RSU (Restricted Stock Unit) work differently and vest

individually per employee; here, a similar effect is achieved with time-weighting. The vesting period serves different purposes in the traditional organization vs protocol guild.

Weighting:

6. I feel the time-weighting is an unnecessary overcomplication:

- first 6 months of eligible work already act as a deterrent to "in-n-out" kinda types
- monthly \$ is either enough to actually work as an incentive, for newcomers and older members alike, or not...
- curve is accommodating to new inductees, meaning the diff can only be a few %
- I don't think most PG contributors are *that* financially motivated to care about those last few %
- it introduces tiers in an otherwise very egalitarian group of people

However, now that we DO have the time-weighting available, it might make sense to use it to weigh voting in PG decisions: long-term members are more likely to be aligned with the core mission of PG

9. I think Guild members need to be very careful about introducing more complexity into weighting tiers. There should be thoughtful consideration to balance between rewarding long-tail contributors and fighting against scope creep. This may become unmanageable / hard to properly curate if left unchecked.

Related - the eligibility for the "partial weight" tier should be better specified. Right now there isn't any guidance for members on how to curate around this.

I strongly believe that the membership repo should be at minimum publicly readable for transparency sake to the Ethereum community and funders. These groups should have insight into governance.

The work of building PG is crucial at these early stages - I will unapologetically advocate for Cheeky's work (probably easy to guess who wrote this lol). I guess we need to do a better job of surfacing why this is important, especially so in these early days. It's pretty ironic that many people are fixated on one single contributor who has done significant work to advance our project.

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15. Regarding non protocol contributors, currently only cheeky-gorille, who I immensely value: It is unclear to me how this job can possibly be a full-time job. Even if it was, it is not core protocol work. I think to align incentives any sufficiently high weight (even 20%) would be enough to align incentives wrt fundraising. Kicking out solidity (which I think makes sense) but then so loosely giving a full-time weight to a non protocol contributor feels very wrong. And this is not against cheeky-gorille. From what I can tell he/she are doing an incredible job.