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Secret Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

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Application to be submitted to the congress commission on the opposition and distributed to the congress delegations.

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To the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

The 15th Congress will review the results of the fierce internal party struggle during which the Central Committee, without waiting for the Congress, had already begun a split, expelling hundreds of those who disagreed with its opportunistic policy from the party.

In a number of our documents – the 15-Platform, the appeal to the October Plenum of the Central Committee and to all party members, and the counter-theses on the prospective plan for industry and on work in the countryside – we criticized the Central Committee's policy and, in contrast, presented our line and our specific proposals. All subsequent events fully confirmed the correctness of our criticism.

We said that the pace of industrial development was insufficient, that it was lagging behind the needs of the national economy. The Central Committee disputed this. But in reality, it turned out that industry is not only failing to absorb the new influx of labor, but is even reducing its workforce in a number of sectors. Unemployment is rising alarmingly. The commodity shortage is getting worse.

It reached the point where the "shortage, and in some places the complete absence, of counter-offers of manufactured goods," as the State Planning Committee notes in its October 1827 economic review ("Economic Life," No. 274), led to a truly catastrophic decline in grain

procurement: in October, it amounted to only 2/3 of the procurement for the corresponding month of the previous year, and in the first half of November, it was less than half of last year's.

We pointed out the absurdity of the price policy pursued by the Central Committee, which it inexplicably calls a policy of price reduction.

We said that in reality, this policy is a policy of price increases and leads only to a decrease in industrial accumulation, an exacerbation of commodity shortages, the swelling of the trade apparatus, and the profiteering of speculators. It now turns out that prices are not falling, but rising, and that even in Moscow, despite a decrease in wholesale prices in October, "prices for manufactured goods on the private market increased by 5.7%, for footwear by 10.6%, and for metals by 4.8%" (see the same economic review).

We pointed out the deterioration of working conditions for the worker, the fact that wages have remained almost unchanged for two years, while the workload on the worker (intensity of labor) is constantly increasing. Now textile workers are being moved from 3 machines to 4, and real wages, after a slight increase between April and September, are falling again by 2% in October, according to the same Gosplan economic review. At the same time, in a letter regarding the renewal of collective agreements, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions gives a directive on "relieving economic bodies of uncharacteristic expenses without significantly worsening the living conditions of workers," meaning it explicitly agrees to a deterioration, as long as it is not "significant."

We said that the policy of wage stagnation and incorrect housing policy inevitably leads to a deterioration of the worker's already impossibly bad housing conditions. Now, according to the 5-year housing construction plan drawn up by Gosplan, it turns out that living space per person will decrease from 11.31 square arshins in 1925-26 to 10.71 square arshins in 1930-31, while the minimum sanitary standard is considered to be 16 square arshins.

We said that introducing vodka hits the worker the hardest. We demanded "an immediate start to reducing vodka production, especially in the city, with the aim of stopping it completely within 2 years." The Central Committee claimed that vodka only "displaces moonshine." But in reality, it turns out that since the release of 40-proof vodka from 1924 to 1926, the number of alcoholics in Moscow (among whom 85-90% are workers and their family members) has quadrupled, the number of deaths from alcoholism has also quadrupled, and the number of people arrested drunk in Leningrad has increased ninefold (see Deichman's article in

"Bolshevik," No. 19-20). Despite this, the most rapid growth in the long-term plan is projected for vodka production - almost tripling in 5 years.

We demanded an immediate wage increase, compared to pre-war levels, in proportion to the increase in the worker's labor intensity now compared to pre-war intensity. We demanded increased participation of the working masses in production management. We demanded that the infamous triangle – the united front of the factory director, the chairman of the factory trade union committee, and the secretary of the party cell against the workers – be destroyed, that the trade unions become genuine bodies for protecting workers in accordance with the decisions of the 11th Party Congress, and that they truly become a school of communism. We demanded the implementation of a 7-hour workday in practice - with a corresponding increase in piece rates.

We insisted on ending the waste of public funds in favor of speculators, which resulted from the Central Committee's price policy, and demanded a reduction in spending on the bureaucratic apparatus and increased taxes on NEPmen and kulaks. We demanded an increase in wages with these funds, the strengthening of housing construction for workers, and increased assistance to poor farms based on their transition to collective farming, a policy of cooperatizing middle-class farms that would also lead them down the path of collectivization.

We demanded the implementation of intra-party democracy based on the decisions of the 10th Party Congress, as only under this condition can the connection between the party and the working class be strengthened, only under this condition can the proletarian section of the party repel hostile class influences on the party, in particular, purge it of former Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Bundists, Petlyurists, Dashnaks, etc., who are now firmly entrenched in the party apparatus and the party press. We demanded the return to the party and the Comintern of those who had been expelled for fighting against opportunism. We finally demanded an end to the interference of the state apparatus and the GPU in internal party affairs and the release of the arrested communists.

For these demands of ours, the implementation of which is the only thing that can guide the USSR along the path of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat instead of the path of decline and degeneration along which its Central Committee is increasingly leading it, we have been accused of "neo-Menshevism" and simply Menshevism, of factional work, and of violating the party statutes. These accusations were particularly zealously supported by those former Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and sometimes even Cadets against whom our demands

were directed. Their hands were used by the Central Committee to defend against the proletarian part of the party.

We consider it beneath our dignity to respond to ridiculous accusations of Menshevism or "neo-Menshevism." As for the accusations of violating the party charter and factional work, if we're going to talk about that, it's not us, but the Central Committee that is the guilty party here. It wasn't the opposition, but the Central Committee that postponed the congress for a year, contrary to the party's charter. It wasn't the opposition, but the Central Committee that used the state apparatus's force in the intra-party struggle. It wasn't the opposition, but the Central Committee that shelved the resolutions of the 10th and 13th Congresses on intra-party democracy. Finally, it was not the opposition, but the Central Committee that usurped the will of the congress, carrying out mass expulsions and arrests of opposition members during the pre-congress discussion. If the party split that has begun becomes a fait accompli, then the entire responsibility for this before the party and the working class rests with the Central Committee.

The latest theses of the Central Committee - on work in the countryside, on the prospective plan for industry, on the basic principles of land ownership and land management - are an attempt to prove that the Central Committee is making a left turn, to smooth over the impression of the frankly right-wing steps it has taken in recent years.

Therefore, they inevitably suffer from being half-hearted and internally contradictory.

The Central Committee promises a review of the industrial deployment plan toward increasing it. But along with this, he completely retains all the policies that have left him without enough funds even to carry out the plan that is now outlined. Under these conditions, his directive to intensify industrial deployment, in which he carefully avoids the question of how this intensification can be achieved, remains an empty wish.

The promise of a seven-hour workday, which the Central Committee tried to "outdo" the opposition's demand for improved working conditions, has clearly become just a new pretext for increasing work intensity while maintaining an eight-hour workday. And all recent decisions on labor and wages openly declare that the lag of wages behind labor productivity is an unshakable foundation of the workers' state policy. The WFTU directive on renegotiating collective agreements, as mentioned above, explicitly anticipates a deterioration in the working and living conditions of workers.

The Central Committee promises an "accelerated offensive against the kulak," and at the same time, mocking Marxism, Leninism, and simply common sense, asserts in its theses that the kulak's economic growth is happening simultaneously with its political weakening, that the kulak is growing while the poor are shrinking. By doing so, he extends a hand to the outspoken supporters of the slogan "get rich!", who have long argued that the economic growth of the kulaks is beneficial for all strata of the village and poses no political danger.

While borrowing some slogans from the opposition and making some left-wing gestures mainly in words, the Central Committee is at the same time fiercely persecuting those who uphold the left-wing line and who alone could actually carry out these measures. This best shows that the "concessions" on the left are merely a maneuver to ensure the consolidation of the right-wing course. When supporters of the Central Committee, which had declared a "forced offensive against the kulak," tore down posters with the slogan "Against the kulak, the NEPman, and the bureaucrat!" in front of the entire working mass on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution, this hypocrisy was completely exposed.

We said that the Central Committee's internal party policy is in fact a policy of splitting and liquidating the party. The history of the last pre-congress "discussion" fully confirms this. Elections for the 15th Congress, convened in violation of the party statutes after a two-year interval, for the congress that would decide the fate of the party, were held before the discussion began and even before the Central Committee's theses for the congress were published. The discussion paper was turned into an anti-opposition leaflet. Not a single article, or even the theses of the opposition standing on the 15-point platform, was printed. The platform, which was addressed to the 15th Congress, was recognized by the Central Committee in advance, before the Congress, as anti-party and was thus made inaccessible to the broad masses of the party. The 15 signatories of the Dashkovsky and Sapronov platform were expelled from the party; for distributing and propagating the workers' platform, people were expelled from the party and arrested. The opposition's views were hidden from the party, and all kinds of slanderous attacks against it were given free rein. These purges and arrests became commonplace, an integral part of the "party discussion."

Only by concealing the opposition's views from the party, thru an organized campaign of slander against it, organized obstruction, and organized violence against the party by the Central Committee's party and state apparatus, was it possible to obtain a "overwhelming majority of

votes." But this "victory" was bought at a high price, at the cost of further undermining the party's authority in the eyes of the working class. Everyone knows that the workers' mood doesn't match the results of the discussion. At the factories in the Orekhovo-Zuyevo district, at the Manometr and Duks plants, at the Krasny Oktyabr factory, at the Podolsk Gosshveymashina plant, and at the VEK plant in Kharkiv, as well as at the Petrovsky printing house, workers demanded speakers from the opposition at open cell meetings and factory meetings and left the meetings when the officials refused. The facts listed are not isolated; they are widespread.

The Central Committee's attempts to win over non-party workers in the fight against the opposition failed. The gap between the party and the working class - this is the inevitable result of its policies.

Having achieved "victory," the Central Committee wants to exploit it to the fullest. He is not content with imposing his opportunistic line on the party.

He wants to expel from the party all those who are fighting against this line, he wants to deprive the opposition of any future opportunity to defend the proletarian line within the party. Furthermore, he declares all those who fight against opportunism to be state criminals. The GPU has been used against the opposition without any hesitation. "Anyone who tries to fight the party (opportunists now consider themselves a party!) will be in prison," Tomsky cynically declares. "If the opposition tries to cause a 'catastrophe,' the party will leave no trace of it," Bukharin threatens and boasts. And from Uglanov's side, such threats are pouring down - but no longer addressed to the opposition, but to the workers: "We will kick the spirit of sabotage out of them there in the near future and teach them to work according to Lenin" (i.e., according to Uglanov - Lenin has nothing to do with it), he threatens the workers of the Dedovskaya Manufactory, who unanimously refused to implement Uglanov's "rationalization," i.e., to switch from 10 machines to 15 and throw their comrades out onto the street.

The fight against the opposition and the fight against the workers go hand in hand.

The Central Committee's policy is bringing the party close to a formal split and liquidation on the one hand, and a break with the working class on the other. Being forced to increasingly pressure the workers to appease the petty bourgeoisie, depriving the proletarian section of the party of any possibility of influencing the policies of the Soviet state by expelling it from the party, the Central Committee is bringing the dictatorship of the proletariat to the brink of degeneration, even tho the objective balance of class forces in the country provides ample

opportunity for its preservation and strengthening. It's no accident that the Central Committee's line is approved by Ustryalov and Otto Bauer, it's no accident that they welcome the exclusion of the opposition from the party, it's no accident that the bourgeois press praises the Central Committee leaders as "real politicians."

We are well aware that the opposition could face the harshest repression in the near future. We are not turning a blind eye to the fact that under the blows of these repressions, the least resilient elements of the opposition, those most closely associated with the bureaucracy in the past, and even entire groups may abandon their line or their active struggle for it.

The opposition movement is not the result of the ill will of individual groups or persons. It has deep roots in the working part of the party and the working class.

The Central Committee's opportunistic policy will only intensify the protest against it from all revolutionary workers. No repressions, no wavering within the opposition itself can destroy the protest against the policy of surrendering the gains of the October Revolution, a protest that comes from the very bottom, from the masses of the proletariat; they cannot stop the movement whose goal is the triumph of the proletarian dictatorship, the triumph of communism.

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