

In coming across an article about a secular version of morality, called Refuting: [“How Morality Has the Objectivity that Matters—Without God” by Ronald A. Lindsay](#) I offer an appropriate rebuttal of many of its major claims. First, “In conclusion, the claim that we need God to provide morality with objectivity does not withstand analysis” (Lindsay). As the title and this line reveals, the author, like so many in our society today, wants to leave God out. Even though secularists think these ideas are innocent enough, at its core sin, evil, rebellion, unrighteousness and immorality is precisely what the idea of the author is presenting is, a leaving off and out of the true biblical God, which foundationally is the true reason that leads to all other types of sins, some of which often are considered even amongst the unsaved as are immoral, the very topic the author seeks to explain and claim as his own. In other words, the author’s main point from the whole of his article is misplaced; for he seeks a foundation and a means for there to be objective morality without God’s existence as a prerequisite. “And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers” ([Romans 1:28-29](#)). Of course, to the atheist, as the author seems to be, or the secularist they may claim that quoting Bible verses is irrelevant; however, it is only irrelevant if the atheist is correct and the biblical God does not exist, a proposition that is wholly unproveable on his worldview. If the atheist says God is without evidence, so we can leave him off on other matters, including moral ones; however, we can counter by challenging the atheist’s criteria and value of “evidence” in the first place. You see, the major problem with these types of secular viewpoints as posited within the article regarding morality is that on a no-God worldview, that is leaving God out as unnecessary, there would be no ultimate purpose or meaning for life to begin with without being arbitrary. A non-deigned world that came about by random natural processes, something clearly impossible, would by default mean anything that came to be within the universe including people would not have any ultimate meaning and purpose in the regular sense of the meaning. Inventing meaning would be illusory, and not real purpose, since we would have come to be without real purpose to begin with, as purpose presupposes intention, which presupposes an intender with a mind, but secularists deny that original mind (God).

Second, in removing God from morality, as an atheist, we must ask what is the purpose of this endeavor in the first place? For on secularism, God is irrelevant, in any sense of the word, whether it be mono, poly, pantheism, or deism, and all there is, is the material

cosmos, which of course has a shelf-life, and the contents contained therein, including humans have an insignificant, miniscule time for any existence and in the end, there existence ultimately meanings nothing, having come and will descend to randomness, with a very short life span. So, by removing God there is no hope of us having any ultimate purpose/meaning to begin with, which makes any and everything we do, accomplish, believe, think moot. So what is the purpose of discovering any potential “truth” if all of it comes to an end of existence, thus any version of secular morality we come to will wound up to be ultimately pointless. So even if secularists like Lindsay are right, which they aren’t, there would be no point in being right in the first place. Actually, it would rob humans of any hope of ultimate meaning, thereby, this so-called truth will lead to existential hopelessness. Essentially, why is Lindsay attempting to remove God from all things, including morality, if on secular worldviews, that can only lead to nihilism, and empty philosophy that leads to despair, even if it were true, but then rob us of the truth of ultimate meaning and value if God truly does exist? Are secularists like Lindsay so confident they are right to begin with and God most certainly does not exist? What if he does, contrary to Lindsay’s ideas, then what becomes of secularists that sought to teach lies against God, claiming he doesn’t exist? Would God be pleased with them at the judgment, when their life was donated to leading people astray from God? Are they that sure, that can and will never happen? What about those they led astray, wouldn’t their blood be upon the secularist who led the astray? And what becomes of those deceived by their devices? Would they be the better off having left of truth by believing in lies? Why would they fall for these lies to begin with? What would be going on inside, that made them susceptible? Also, why would the deceivers seek to leave off God? What would be their motives, especially if he exists? It could be nothing good! But if God did not exist, what’s the point anyway of revealing that so-called truth that we don’t need morality for God when it served so well for many traditionally? Are we supposed to have a “better morality” from it? How so, if as Lindsay asserts there is a common objective morality humans all share anyhow with or without God? How would jettisoning the God hypothesis make that moral code any more viable? But then what is the secular ethicist’s point for rooting foundation of morality in secularism? It would be disingenuous to say simply to understand it, understanding for what purpose, especially since we are all doomed to eternal non-existence moments away? Given the difficulties that Lindsay outlines secularists have for providing us with an objective morality, without God, then how would that understanding serve us to have a clear vision of objective morality on secularism? Lindsay’s point is that morality is objective, but if secularism has many difficulties in providing for us that, then are we left with subjective morality, which on Lindsay’s view would not serve us well. But how it serves us to who it serves is insignificant anyhow on secularism since there is no ultimate meaning/purpose for our existence to begin with, especially given our existence only last seconds to mostly non-double-digit lifespans to begin with? Hence, there may be more than meets the

eye for secularist's purposes. I suggest that the purpose is more sinister than secularists lead on, which is waging warfare against the God ideology, but why should they want to do that? Perhaps, the secularists need to search their hearts to why they don't want God to exist, why they want to leave him out, why they don't want anything including morality to be based upon him. Is it because they want to be free to do as they please without ultimate accountability to him? Is it so that they can have unlimited latitude to allow for all kinds of conflictive ideologies, including their own to exist unencumbered by God's will? Interestingly, Jesus and the Bible presents it that way. "And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil" (John 3:19). I am more inclined to trust Jesus's views of motives over the secularists who have all types of hidden agendas, subject to worldly corruption.

All secularists start with evolutionary presuppositions, as this author does, and uses these to undergird much of their views about everything. But if the foundation on which they reason is based on a misplaced idea, a false fact as it were, or true disinformation, then the reasoning becomes suspect, even faulty that follows from the foundation, which inevitably will lead to wrong conclusions on many matters, including morality. Evolutionary worldview is far from a given even on secular standards, but secularists treat it as if it were, which then becomes problematic. In other words, you need an evolutionary cosmology as a basis for secular models of morality to even have an outside chance of them being plausible. Because if evolution were true, it wouldn't demonstrate secular ethicist's moral ideologies were correct, but as prerequisite the general theory of evolution must be true if there is to be any chance secular moralities could be right in the first place. However, if Darwinian views of evolution are false, then all secular models for foundations to morality are doomed from the outset. But not only are evolutionary explanations far from being proved, they actually are most certainly false. For example, the astronomical odds to get functional proteins and other macromolecules from random mutations are beyond possibility within the timeframes uniformitarian's claim for the earth's history. Natural selection doesn't aid the creation of biological information; if it is to work at all, merely roots out potentially lethal or utterly faulty genetic information that may have arisen by harmful accidental mutations. Hence, the origin of biological information of any sort would have to come about purely by random processes according to Darwin himself, thus there is no guidance for this process, which means it would not be aided and abetted by outside interference. But then you are dealing with odds, but considering the rarity of combinations of sequence and assortment that could potentially be functional, we are dealing with odds that simply can never work to produce even the simplest life, let alone the vast array of highly complex organisms that have characterized our planet. Also, there are many logical

fallacies for evolutionary based ideas; additionally, genetics is more and more revealing evidence of design, not random processes for their formation. But secularists just assume evolution as a given and go from there, but that is their demise, their starting point; we need not go further, but we shall because with a shaky or false foundation, there are bound to be contradictions, inconsistencies, fallacies throughout the rest of their arguments, as in the case of this one. But the basic problem that lets presuppose an evolutionary worldview that all evolutionists agree on as the basic mechanism, random processes preserved by natural selection, in other words, natural selection preserves what randomness wrought. So, our starting foundation or standard is randomness. Remember, on a no God worldview there is no design, no reason, no aim, or goal, or purpose for the universe, but if that is the gist of the secular viewpoint, then moral principles, values, duties ultimately have no ultimate meaning because there is no ultimate purpose for life to begin with. In other words, the secularist's position wants to leave God out, but in so doing, he removes the ultimate purpose, creating a randomly produced universe without reason or rhyme for its existence and since we are part of that universe we too would be without reason or rhyme. So if there is no ultimate meaning or purpose for life to begin with, then morality whatever we arbitrarily decided about it would be pointless as well, since we are pointless. We came from nothing randomly and will descend to nothing randomly, never even having remembered our existence with the small dash between two longer extremes of eternity past and future, making that short dash of life so, so insignificant existentially speaking. That is the problem on secularism at its root, the foundational core for its worldview. So, this article is critiqued for what it doesn't mention, this basic fundamental problem on secularism. Pretending we have meaning, creating illusory meaning will not do; it is not based on truth. There is no ultimate meaning for your existence, never has been, never can be, never will be on a no-God worldview. Period. Morality or anything else we do or are then is moot. There is no objective right and wrong because there is no adequate standard or foundation for our existence in the first place, and fanciful ad hoc arbitrary suggestions to meaning, purpose, values and morality doesn't solve the problem on its foundational level, which is why secularism does not provide an adequate worldview to explain all the comprehensive aspects of our existence.

"To begin with, God would not be able to provide objectivity, as the argument from *Euthyphro* demonstrates" (Lindsay). This is one of the main reasons the author rejects God as an explanation for morality, the Euthyphro dilemma. Near the introduction the author spends much time discussing this. However, the author is either unaware or disingenuous in not citing the answer to this Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma is a false dilemma, a bifurcation fallacy since it asks is it right/good because God commands it or does God command it because it is right/good? Whatever answer you provide

would make morality either arbitrary, subjective from God's divine whims or a realm outside of God himself, thus not given God sovereignty over moral matters. However, the answer to the so-called dilemma is neither; for God's nature itself simply good/right; he is the standard of goodness and righteousness; it resides in him; he is the foundation of it; there is no goodness or righteousness that exists as its own entity outside of God himself, nor is God arbitrarily deciding moral commands by caprice whim; thus the Platonic Euthyphro dilemma as it is phrased is irrelevant because it doesn't take into account the true God's nature as being the essence of goodness to begin with. But Lindsay's whole argument that God is not needed is based on this false dilemma, a logical fallacy of presumption, making the rest of the article baseless as a foundation for morality apart from God's existence. Lindsay also complains that believing in God doesn't necessarily make us more moral, so invoking God into morality is not helpful. "Many ruthless brigands and pirates have had no doubts about God's existence. They robbed, raped, and murdered anyway." He then provides a theist's response. "You may say: "But what they did was *objectively* wrong"—and an atheist can't say this." Remember, morality is what we ought and ought not to do, not what one actually does. It is prescription, not description, so pointing out how religious and non-religious people act despite how they know they should act does not negate the moral foundation for our ought's and ought not's coming from God rooting our nature that way. He quickly admits that morality as a transcendent standard would show secular versions of morality that leave God out would indicate that these did objectively morally wrong things." If one means by "objectively wrong" something that conforms to a standard of wrongness that exists *completely* independently of the human condition and our moral practices, then, correct, an atheist might not use "objectively wrong" in this sense." His attempted solution is twofold, first reiterating the same "*Euthyphro* argument," which we have already shown to be a false dilemma and his second reason is to point out that morality is not some impractical, solely transcendent measure that isn't relevant to actual human behaviors/practices/beliefs, thus it is irrelevant to point to a transcendent moral foundation, so it wouldn't matter that secular ideologies could not fulfill that criteria for providing objective morality. "Second, and more important, what is lost by acknowledging that morality is a wholly human phenomenon that arose to respond to the need to influence behavior so people can live together in peace?" He then says, people revert to God as a foundation for morality in fear that morality without God would be subjective. He then offers pragmatics as the answer to this solution of subjectivity, which we are demonstrating is faulty and does not truly solve the problem. However, in regard to the second reason that morality is not an abstract wholly apart idealistic phenomenon, but practical responses to ongoing needs and desires for a peaceful society that allows humans to flourish in the best senses, my response is this. The practical matters of human interactions too would require a transcendent foundation for the proper practical applications for these human interactions. Hence, it is not either/or,



but both/and. Moral foundations that would be transcendent give us the moral script for the actual human interactions; they work in consort. The author isolates the transcendent basis of morality from the practical measures of it, thus believes justified in leaving it off altogether. But the reality is, these two are intertwined, coexistent and linked. One without the other would be like pretending that a building's structure purely relies on the existence and assortment of its practical parts such as bricks, metal, wire, etc. but in reality, the overall scheme for the building's parts required a transcendent basis for its origin in the first place, a mind or minds of men who had the insight, foresight, intuition, nature, planning for the actual creation, accruing and implementing of the parts. What is the ultimate value of surviving, living, cooperating, helping in the first place? What is the value of life? Secularism has no good answer without being arbitrary. That is, they lack the foundation for humans practically interacting in the first place, the point of it all. The point of family relations, love, in families and friends is for us to consider cooperating with others to live in peace in the first place. Secondly, the point of morality would be vacuous if it is rooted in secular superficialities; morality misses the point if it is not rooted in the strongest foundation for it, given what it is, the leaving off of what one might want to do for the good of others, and that foundation is love. Secular moralities need not incorporate love at all, since at the end of the day their purpose, is self-serving, how we could accomplish things for ourselves, but this never captures the essence of the strongest moral fabric, love, which defined is wanting the highest good for another, so much that action is behind it, thus the term charity in [1 Corinthians 13](#), also called the love chapter, with adds caveat that charity is love in action. This foundation is a proper foundation for moral actions for it to be truly moral. If it is what you do for me, then I'll do for you, there is no sense of the strongest demonstrations of morality to occur, which is self-sacrifice. Jesus's giving of himself on a cross would be utterly futile, since on secularism nothing was in it for Jesus but torturous death. What was done for him in a human sense by doing that? Nothing; he died, left off this human life. What of the soldier who throws himself on the grenade to save the platoon's life, what did he get out of it from an earthly sense, given on secularism we root out any eternal rewards as God is left out? Obviously, little to nothing, a few seconds of him saving somebody in comparison to the multiple years he would have if he did not do such action. If morality is quid pro quo as secularist's imagine, then soldiers commemorated on Memorial Day utterly wasted their lives. Practical interactions of earthly betterment as the sole basis for morality then miss the mark of the essence of the highest forms of morality of sacrifice and love, especially when there is little to no good earthly use for the ones making the sacrifices. Right from that we should see that morality has a transcendent basis, but the author wants to dismiss that, but in so doing, misses the mark of the highest moral ethics. But that is what you are left with when you try to make pragmatism and other secular moralities the foundation of morality and life. That is why they fundamentally fail. Quid, pro, quo, you

do for me and only then will I do for you are the examples that Lindsay uses, but what of when you don't do for me, but I choose to do for you, even though you will never do for me? No such examples can be incorporated on Lindsay's pragmatic approach since it doesn't fit the pragmatic mold, so he limits his examples without bringing other examples that provide a context that would utterly challenge the foundation of his ultimate premises for morality. In fact, this is the problem with all of these secular ideologies of morality, they are too shortsighted. Lindsay himself does a good job in showing how many of these secular approaches have failed to provide objective basis for morality, but hopes his approach solves the issue, but as we are seeing, it does not, but then the secularists are left only with not an approach that solves the issue, but a resort to attacks on the God hypothesis, but in so doing allude to debunked reasons for that, as Lindsay himself relies mostly on the debunked *Euthyphro* argument. So, in reality what is accomplished by this article and other secular attempts on morality is to show the ineptitude of secularists to provide a proper foundation for objective morality and also a serious rebuttal of the God hypothesis as its basis, leaving theism shining bright as the most plausible explanation for objective morality.

Essentially the author has a pragmatic foundation for morality and believes that this pragmatic approach makes it objective in reference to the needs and interests of humans in general and across different cultures. "...but recognizing that morality is based on human needs and interests, and not on God's commands, doesn't make one a subjectivist." This finally becomes his solution to alleviate secularists from a purely arbitrary approach to morality. On his view of pragmatics, basic moral principles humans live by serve a purpose to help us to be happy, gain balance, have pleasure, live better, get along, flourish, survive, reach aims, and ambitions. "Various philosophers have argued that morality should aim at maximizing happiness, or producing a greater balance of pleasure over pain, or producing virtuous characters." But somehow this author thinks they have come up with this radically new way of looking at morality. "Let me suggest we need to back up and look at morality afresh" (Lindsay). But there "there is no new thing under the sun" ([Ecclesiastes 1:9](#)). There is nothing new, the same flaws exist with this view of morality as with any on pragmatics, which is showing its ineptitude for an objective moral foundation by asking some rhetorical questions such as pragmatics to whose benefit and why are pragmatics in general or a particular brand of them, however we arbitrarily assign their values, the objective approach when should hold to in the first place without begging the question? In essence, pragmatics means practical, rather than theoretical doing or usefulness, but on secularism there is no adequate standard, thus no objective measure regarding what is useful doing, to whose end and why usefulness has relevance to begin with. Adding arbitrary criteria will be shown faulty, for example, useful with the aim to be happy presupposes all humans

seek happiness, but there are many groups that lay off that theme, don't live for pleasure and happiness. Also, immoral means is a choice many take to this would-be happiness, thus crimes are committed, plus, the ideas of happiness vary as well. Thus, it is hard to see how an objective morality comes forth with this pragmatic aim. Let's analyze this pragmatic approach Lindsay resorts to more closely. Lindsay states regarding morality:

*What can we accomplish when (most) people behave morally that we would not be able to accomplish otherwise? Broadly speaking, morality appears to serve these related purposes: it creates stability, provides security, ameliorates harmful conditions, fosters trust, and facilitates cooperation in achieving shared and complementary goals. In other words, morality enables us to live together and, while doing so, to improve the conditions under which we live.*

Now, on Lindsay and other secularist's worldview, leaving God out, everyone of these so-called pragmatic reasons Lindsay and other secularist' moralists mention could be shot down as foundational principles for morality by asking what the ultimate value is for any of these things in a randomly produced universe that has no ultimate purpose in the first place, as we merely randomly evolved into materialistic moist robots from it? Also, who defines the criteria of these items within the secularist's list and who defines what belongs on the list and off of it? Why this list? Why a list at all? Why should I be obligated to this or any other list of pragmatic criteria? Is following the list of arbitrary criteria, objectively right? That presupposes values that are objectively right, which secularists presume but don't prove to be on their worldview; they have to beg the question in order to get them to be that way. Of course, on the biblical worldview, objective value is foundationally secure in humans being created in God's image. Thus, we have to steal from the biblical worldview where value is innate without giving it credit in order to get our moral ethical principle foundation to have any chance of working in the first place.

So, in Lindsay's list, he starts with "accomplish." Why should we value accomplishment? To what ends should we accomplish? All the answers would be arbitrary on a secularist's position since there is not adequate standard transcendent to humans for us to know. Wanting accomplishment doesn't make it objectively moral, especially if what we want to accomplish is inherently immoral. It would be left up to humans themselves to decide, but then we are dealing with subjective rather than objective approach, the things Lindsay seeks to avert, but why are those so-called accomplishments whatever one seeks to have more valuable than those of conflicting ones? There is no answer. So Napoleon's accomplishments to conquer would be in conflict with those that oppose imperialism or military might, or those who are



imperialized or taken over, beaten by Napoleon, but would his accomplishment be a moral value or attained by moral means if only humans who don't agree decide? The answer is there is no answer because there is a contradiction with the foundational ideology to begin with. Some could easily argue that might/power/conquest is the means to stability, peace, accomplishments for the society as a whole, thus the Napoleon's of the world would be the means to ultimate moral virtue, while the pacifists of the world would argue that such accomplishments/power be inherently morally flawed. Who would be right without an objective, transcendent standard above mere human opinion, or desire for practical means/pragmatics to accomplishment?

The second and third criteria are stability and security. Asking the following questions show that in and of themselves these criteria will not make morality objective. How should we define stability and security in the first place? Adding dictionary definitions is simplistic and not revealing of the deeper nature to these issues. What are their characteristics and who defines them and at what point? Why are they even on the list to begin with? Why should I value them personally? How is stability and security good or right or better (and who defines what those good, right, better in light of conflicting human views to those ends) than instability and how should it be applied? Perhaps a nations' or business's insecurity and instability causes another's to flourish! So, all we need to do is add counterfactuals or other potential contexts that could provide reasons for other conflicting ideas on these matters to show these simple lists of what it means to be pragmatic without an adequate standard, which Lindsay doesn't have on his secular worldview, will not hold up to be a secure foundation for objective morality, or a genuine moral right and wrong in the first place. You see, all these so-called criteria whatever is selected on secularism prove nothing about what we ought and ought not do and value truly? This is because the lists themselves are arbitrary and the applications are arbitrary made on arbitrary means of what is pragmatically useful and to whom and by what means. The same could be said for other arbitrary bases that secularists use, like survival value, evolution, human thriving, collective "good," or "beneficial," etc.

"This is not necessarily an exhaustive list of the functions of morality, nor do I claim to have explained the functions in the most accurate and precise way possible" and also "(I say 'something like' because I am not claiming to give the best possible description of morality's objectives.)" (Lindsay). Lindsay himself admits his list is but a sample and not even necessarily the best sample, but in so doing, he admits to its arbitrary nature; for anything could be on the list and any application one prefers, but how is any of that

line of reasoning providing for an objective foundation for objective morality? Lindsay on one hand recognizes the conflicts on pragmatic criteria, but in so doing undermines the essence of his argument. “There is no single simple principle that governs morality. Yes, we want to encourage people to be virtuous—that is, to be kind, courageous, and trustworthy—but to what end? Likewise, we want people to be happy, but exactly how do we measure units of happiness, and how do we balance the happiness of different individuals against one another or against the happiness of the community?” On the other hand, Lindsay believes his criteria can serve as a basis in answering those dilemmas; however, even in his suggestions he admits isn’t necessarily the correct approach, which then automatically short-circuits his suggestive criteria of being objective principles in the first place. He is simply struggling to answer, trying to solve something that his secular worldview will not allow for an answer. However, it becomes apparent that Lindsay still fails to fully grasp, thus underestimates the long-range spectrum of conflicting modes of the criteria he employs as the purposes for morality, even in his suggested guidelines to solve conflictive measures of pragmatic approaches. Lindsay is left with the same problem he correctly sees as problematic, which is to avert, a relative, preferential, subjective, arbitrary morality. You see the larger problem with pragmatics being used solely as the foundation for objective morality is that pragmatic usefulness for a person or society has to have objective meaning to what that should be and to whose ends; otherwise, the suggested criteria we use to characterize it becomes subjective and arbitrary in itself, thus not objective, the very thing Lindsay is going for. Lindsay uses simple examples to show how pragmatics could work for a formulation into an objective moral code, but it is what he doesn’t mention, the counterfactuals, the potentially conflicting contexts in the criteria ascribed to his pragmatics that prove his examples to be overly simplistic. What is confusing here, is that pragmatics could have some basis in determining morality, and that is where the pragmatic moral ethicist gets his strength of argument, but only if there is an adequate standard that provides the foundation for a fine-tuned what and how these pragmatics are to be properly defined and appropriated, but that is precisely what secularism can’t provide, and the biblical worldview can. Thus, leaving God out, still cannot do, unless you beg the question on the definitions and means of the criteria being used for the foundations of morality in the first place, which is exactly the secularist’s conundrum.

Lindsay’s next criterion in his pragmatic foundation for objective morality is even more problematic, “*ameliorates harmful conditions*,” but why are harmful conditions wrong or bad in the first place? And what exactly objectively is it to be harmful to start? What would be its application? Perhaps your version of harmful would work to my benefit, which then misses the point on what morality is in the first place, since I might

intentionally do harmful things to you for my benefit and vice versa. Let's say, I report without alerting my neighbor some aspect of code violations regarding his property, I would think it my moral duty to do so for the stability of my property, the good of the neighborhood, the consideration for society's laws and regulations, but in so doing, the neighbor I reported considers me to be an immoral louse, a rat, someone who didn't even consult him before reporting, getting him in trouble needlessly. How does Lindsay's pragmatics solve that? Jesus actually has a very good suggestion to handle this, by first kindly tell your neighbor the problem in hope for resolution, then expanding with a few witnesses to retell him, then take it to a larger group, if in the church, the church, if out of the church, some public forum. Hence, God's Word provides fine-tuned details in approach that aren't arbitrary in a manner secular approaches don't feature. "Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican" (Matthew 15-17). In regard to the "harmful" criteria Lindsay suggests. What is the true "harmful" and to whose benefit? What was harmful for Hitler and the Nazis was the Jews thriving in German culture taking "true Germans" potential goods from what Hitler believed to be rightly the Germans, so to eliminate harmful conditions would be to eliminate harmful people, in Hitler and the Nazi's views would be the Jews themselves, which is exactly what Hitler did and using Lindsay's or other secular ethicist's criteria, could we not say Hitler acted morally upright? We would have to say so if we are left with these arbitrary lists on pragmatics if we are to be consistent, but that is where the secularist is forced to update and edit his lists to add other criteria, and this is where it gets oh, so unobjective and arbitrary on the secularist's worldview. Many would say Hitler and/or the neighbor who coldly reported his neighbor were wrong on some or most measures, but let's be honest, without an adequate standard we couldn't even say Hitler or the rat neighbor did anything objectively morally wrong in the first place. But that's the point; there is an adequate standard, transcendent, God, the very thing secularists and Lindsay seeks to avoid. Hitler and other militant tyrants accomplished things, providing some sense of security and stability for many Germans and Nazis. So, on pragmatics, Hitler's actions work to be useful indicators of morality based on Lindsay's list. But that is where the pragmatic approach falls apart, as we can clearly see Hitler and other military tyrants were anything but moral. So, the very criteria they use becomes their undoing, causing all kinds of partial updates to save face. On the biblical worldview, what Hitler did would clearly be wrong, murdering God's original people unjustly for reasons not justified in God's Word. The perpetrator's consideration and perception would be misplaced, thus irrelevant to the matter of being objectively morally right. Hence, Nazi's perception that Jews are harmful to their standard of living

would not be a consideration since a general subjective “harmful” criterion is not the main criteria for morality in the first place, but is determined by relationship to God and his Word, an objective adequate standard. Thus, the dilemma dissipates on the biblical worldview.

“Fosters trust” is next on this arbitrary list Lindsay has. But is trust in and of itself a good thing? Well, let’s say I trust a serial killer, not knowing he is a serial killer, or a crooked autobody guy with my car, who breaks it further and does things to make more money for himself? Was my trust a good thing then? No, it didn’t serve me well and wasn’t any indicator of the morality of those I trusted or me trusting these deceiver’s in the first place. Isn’t distrust, skepticism good at times or on pragmatism, serve me well above trust/faith? You see, it depends on who or what and to what ends you trust? But given the spectrum of that, it is hard to nail down when trust is a good thing. But on secular worldviews, the range of that spectrum can’t be defined by any objective means, since on their view, there is little or no trust in God, at least as the basis of morality, but in jettisoning the true biblical God, a perfect standard of goodness, his trust or faith is from and in finite, fallible, often immoral, amoral people, who are on secular forms of origins that leave off God nothing more than results of a cosmic accident with no ultimate real meaning and purpose in the first place, looking out mostly for themselves and their own, so how his trust mostly a good thing on that secular worldview? This is especially true on secularism, since on an evolutionary worldview where we descended from animals, who inherently were better off not trusting in this alleged dog-eat-dog, survival of the fittest world, the evolutionists think we came from. Now on the biblical worldview, trust/faith is good if we put our faith/trust in God’s Word, giving us a framework that would allow us proper moral principles, in which we can examine intentions/motives/manifestations of others, to help determine who is trustworthy and to what means. The Bible commands us to trust Jesus because he was the eternal Son of God incarnate who came to be our Savior and Lord to save us from the dominion and eternal penalty of our sin. “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved, and thy house” (Acts 16:31). He proved his faithfulness because he lived impeccably, did many good works, wrought helpful miracles, died on a cross historically as a sacrifice for our sins, paying that eternal penalty for sin on our behalf, then proving he was what he claimed by bodily rising from the dead. “For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; And that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures” ([1 Cor. 15:3-4](#)).

“Tribe members acted benevolently only to fellow members of their tribe; outsiders were not regarded as entitled to the same treatment. One of the earliest moral revolutions was the extension of cooperative behavior—almost surely based initially on trade—to members of other communities...” (Lindsay). Finally, cooperation is mentioned on Lindsay’s list, and he does use this in reference with an evolutionary worldview, claiming early humans learned this first. Of course, Lindsay doesn’t have adequate evidence of this at all, but presumes it based on evolutionary and uniformitarianism ideology, but given evolution is false, Lindsay’s foundation for this being on the list is moot. Humans always had a moral sense, and Adam’s fall into sin heightened that sense, so all humans didn’t need to learn this in an evolving culture at all; they merely needed to apply their already God-given moral sense to the new situations they encountered as they populated and eventually repopulated the earth. Lindsay rejects moral intuition. “There is no mystical intuition of “the moral law” that inexorably forces someone to accept the institution of morality.” However, his argument hinges on what he admits are exceptions of “those who suffer from a pathological lack of empathy, few choose this path.” This exception to argue against moral intuition would than not be a negation of moral intuition. To be fair, Lindsay is rejecting moral intuition as a basis for any secularist’s position on how morality gets passed on to all humans, but Lindsay already has left off God, but if we invoke him, moral intuition would make very good sense for humans to have if hardwired by in our conscience. “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another;”) (Romans 2:14-15). For that Lindsay resorts to the atheist’s MO, which is evolution, implying humans evolved a moral sense at some point, thus at that point we having descended from that common ancestry would all have a similar moral sense. But once again, there is no way Lindsay could know this, not having gone back to the unobservable past to see when and how the moral sense evolved in us without begging the question. Plus, the conundrum on evolutionary explanations for morality is this, multiple competing instincts will not serve animals in the wild seeking survival well, since this would create confusion and slow response time, which would be detrimental in dog-eat-dog survival of the fittest world. The competing instincts to do an action, and another to not, and the 3rd being conscience that tells one to follow one over the other., in this case the moral instinct, which would endanger the competing animal, which on evolutionary worldview we would be, hence, natural selection, so prominent a force on evolutionary ideology would weed out the moral instinct, or the competing instinct, which would make the moral instinct unnecessary. Finally, in regard to passing on of common moral collective conscience Lindsay argues, “Moral norms are effective in fostering collaboration and cooperation and in improving our conditions, and there is no need to refer to a mystical entity, a gold bar, or God to



conclude that we should encourage everyone to abide by common moral norms.” In other words, we all have the desire to cooperate for betterment, so that in and of itself should allow for a common code of morality for all humans. However, on Lindsay’s secular worldview, cooperation to shared goals, we got some problems. Whose goals? What goals? Why should we have goals in the first place? Why are goals objectively right and good? Perhaps my goals are to become rich to have a lot of things, but I see the opportunity that lying and stealing without others being able to get me in trouble is the best way for me to do that? I cooperate with others who are like-minded. Do you see how quickly this so-called criterion of cooperation for morality can become questionable or immoral? Then again, who defines what moral means in the first place on secularism without being arbitrary of course? Also, the whole idea of cooperating may not be in a person’s best interest. Civil disobedience would be morally wrong as a form of protest if cooperation is the moral value we should all follow, since it is said not cooperating without violence is the means to get freedoms for oneself. Would Lindsay consider this to be immoral? Should we cooperate with terrorists, making the slogan, “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” foolish. Cooperate with whom, why, when, how, where? All answers are arbitrary on secularism. This list doesn’t help us as a foundation for morality. You see, on the biblical worldview trust or faith and cooperation could be a good thing, provided you trust or have faith in the true God’s Word, then that being your basis, could have basis for potentially trusting some other people as well, but it makes sense on a biblical worldview, so Lindsay may not be wrong in his list of some of his criteria, but it only works within the biblical worldview because there is a foundation for some of these things being good in the first place, being applied correctly in light of scriptural insights. Security, helping, not hurting, etc. would have foundation and proper application on the biblical worldview where there is an adequate standard in the biblical God, being rooted in either his nature or creation for why we should act and live a certain way. So, the list Lindsay gives on his worldview would not make sense, but within the biblical worldview some of it could make sense. It is well worth adding that Lindsay likens the God foundation to the “gold standard” of economics and claims economies are doing just fine leaving off this “gold standard,” “Moral norms are effective in fostering collaboration and cooperation and in improving our conditions, and there is no need to refer to a mystical entity, a gold bar, or God to conclude that we should encourage everyone to abide by common moral norms.” However, it is clear that the economies of the present are in serious trouble in doing this, as inflation has gone out of control, and there are tremendous economic debts, driving up prices, causing much economic alarm and hardships, so Lindsay’s analogy for leaving off God as the standard does not bode well at all. Irrespective of his analogy, likening God to a gold bar or standard could simply be a false analogy, since economics and morality have enough differences, we could not warrant a comparison that would disprove God as a necessary foundation for morality.

“...whether it was thunder, volcanoes, diseases, human cognition, or the existence of the solar system—have long since become the domain of science,” the article contends. Secularists have a warped spin on reality. It is not on biblical monotheism that natural conditions require nor seek direct supernatural intervention, but on polytheism, so to blend these worldviews as if they are one in the same is a mischaracterization. But by doing so, the secularist feels vindicated that God is increasingly unneeded to explain phenomena. However, what needs to be explained is how on randomness without intelligent agency such conditions exist to produce such a phenomenon in the first place, especially given the fine-tuned manner to make such a phenomenon possible. Hence, the very nature we observe, in which we do science can’t be explained by random natural processes to begin with. Atmospheric conditions are the medium in which thunder, lightning, volcanoes, exist, but the creation of atmospheric conditions to be such are clouded in mystery on secular explanations. As far as the origin of the solar system, this is very different from atmospheric conditions the author seems to lump together. Is the origin of the cosmos, and solar system truly known or even close to be known through empiricism, which is the nature of science? There are a lot of just -say nature stories, but each of them reeks of devastating detriments that make them incredulous as a whole, such as the origin of stars, which many stellar evolutionists have admitted is a mystery, at least on their worldview anyhow. But this is another confusion of the secularists. They believe that naturalism and science are the same, but this is ignorance; they are not, one is a philosophy about the world with many secular assumptions; the other, a tool to gain knowledge via empiricism. So, the origin of the solar system is by far not within the domain in which naturalism can explain at all, as naturalism is a false philosophy that does little to explain anything. So, Lindsay’s in passing idea to show the distance from God and nature to get to his moral argument off the ground is built on a false foundation, which Lindsay ignorantly has accepted without question, a philosophy called naturalism, which secularists have mistakenly called science. To bring up a biblically appropriate verse here, “avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called” (1 Timothy 6:18). Hence, it is not true that the origin of the solar system can and should be explained by natural processes at all, but the better explanation still is supernatural design given the finetuning, and the very laws of science that secularists claim to love, like the laws of thermodynamics which make the creation and evolution of matter/energy a violation of those basic laws, so naturalism actually contradicts laws of science. Once we consider this truth, we now see what a shaky foundation secularist has for the origin of anything, let alone morality.

‘So the theists have changed tactics. Instead of using God to explain natural phenomena, theistic apologists have increasingly relied on arguing that God is indispensable for morality’ Lindsay continues, but is wrong. Monotheists often don’t use this tactic in the first place, nor have they conceded that God is unnecessary to explain nature, at least hardcore biblical theists anyway, so who is Lindsay speaking of? Theistic evolutionists, but theistic evolutionists have long ago compromised the scriptures, so ought not be the example that should be used. It is clear YEC and special creationists and even many progressive creationists have not at all distanced the necessity of God from the creation, but Lindsay wants to put it that way to make like the only thing left for us is morality, in which he mistakenly believes his so-called new hypothesis about morality could eliminate the need for God in that too. It is not the last straw on which God’s existence can be made, but Lindsay wants to comfort himself in thinking that. The moral argument for God’s existence is one of multiple arguments used for God’s existence, not the final last straw as Lindsay mistakenly asserts. Arguments for God’s existence are in many aspects like ontological, cosmological, fine tuning, informational, moral, philosophical, even scientific, experiential, etc. Lindsay seems to be unaware or fails to mention hard-core apologetics for these various arguments.

1. “At first, this contention often took the form of an accusation that atheists can’t be trusted; they’re immoral. In the last few decades, however, many theists have—in the face of overwhelming evidence—grudgingly conceded that at least some atheists can be good people. So has God now become irrelevant? Do we need a deity for anything?” First, when Lindsay says “immoral” and “moral” as pertaining to atheists, what standard for morality, immorality would be at work to decide if atheists are moral or immoral in the first place? On atheism, there is no such standard, which makes any such assessments that “some atheists can be good people” irrelevant. The term “good people” can only exist if there is an adequate standard for goodness in the first place, so we can know what bad is. However, on biblical monotheism, where there is such an adequate standard for goodness, then assessment can be made, and as such many atheists would be found wanting in terms of being “good people,” however, on the biblical worldview, atheists can never be good people in any sense, because on the biblical worldview morality is not skin deep or superficial by normative societal values of get along cooperation as Lindsay and other secularists imagine morality to be, but are on transcendent principles of true goodness, God himself, and goodness that is latent within God, which no atheists has, nor anybody for that matter because “there is none righteous, no, not one...there is none that doeth good. For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God” (Romans

3:10-13, 23). It is clear that secularists like Lindsay left there “old time religion” but it also becomes clear that many of them are so ignorant of biblical principles, we could understand the reason for their original departure being such, never truly having learned foundational principles in the first place. To presuppose the basic goodness of man as atheists often think religionists believe is ignorance of biblical Christianity, which states the opposite, the depravity of sinful wicked man ([Jeremiah 17:9](#)) and thus needing a Savior who had to go through hell because man’s sins were so heinously deserving of wrath ([Romans 1:18; 5:9](#)). Atheists are sinners who seek to “not retain God in their knowledge” because of their natural inward wickedness, which biblically is the desire to be distant from God and his Word. The core moral problem with man is this wayward nature ([Isaiah 53:6](#)), that often leads to many of the basic moral violations that are obviously manifest externally. But just because one does not externally manifest such blatant wickedness in all areas, would hardly constitute true biblical pure morality, because it says nothing of the inward man, the heart’s intents, nor the reasons why the sinner refrained from hard-core blatant immorality in the first place, which often aren’t altruistic motives, but self-serving ones, which then actually becomes an antithesis of morality, the very thing the secularists claims to have. The atheist/secularist seems to think because he is not a rapist and serial killer and takes care of his family and helps out some here and there, he is a good person, but there is no “good person” on his worldview without being arbitrary about it, since there is no adequate standard, and on a proper worldview with an adequate standard like the biblical one, then just some superficial morality is not truly being moral in God’s sense, which really is being righteous, thus involves a true love for God and man and ongoing temperance, and self-sacrifice; however, the atheist/secularist version of morality this is not needed because their version of morality can only account for external measures of it like cooperation and survival value for its explanation. So, when the author uses “overwhelming evidence” for atheist morality, this has no meaning on his worldview because there is no adequate standard in the first place and also on biblical monotheism, there is overwhelming evidence that the atheist/secularist is a rebellious sinner who the Bible calls a fool ([Psalm 14:1](#)) and identifies these in a degenerative status of [Romans 1](#) characteristics. But it is these types of statements that Lindsay uses to build his case, which shows the structure is built upon a faulty foundation.

“We atheists might act appropriately, but we cannot rationally justify our actions; nor can we criticize those who fail to act appropriately.” This is why we must distance ourselves from those who don’t have a biblical worldview because even as a theist, if their

doctrines are not based on the scriptures they would mistake the crux of the problem. For it is true that atheists/secularist can't justify rationally the existence of objective moral principles, as Lindsay points out some theists have rightly pointed out, but the reality is as I have already stated, acting appropriately is not the crux of true goodness and righteousness, thus not pure proper God founded morality, but is superficial in nature, but true God ordained righteousness, the atheist cannot have, nor any unsaved person since they are depraved, dead spiritually, filled with wickedness in their hearts, in rebellion and wayward from God's Word. "Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, Backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents..." (Romans 1:29-30).

"Contrary to the theist, God cannot be the source of morality. However, this doesn't address the concern that morality then loses its objectivity. It becomes a matter of personal preference." As already stated, the foundational basis for Lindsay's claim is the "*Euthyphro*" bifurcation fallacy Plato issued. I have already addressed this, It is a false dilemma, God himself is the source of goodness himself, which makes the either or options of it moot. Lindsay thinks he has successfully demonstrated God is unneeded, which he really hasn't, but from that reckons with a problem that morality would have no standard, thus preference, which Lindsay reckons is problematic, but argues his solution with the rest of the article, which we have already seen is pragmatics, which is just as problematic as already iterated by me earlier. But at least Lindsay is honest with some of the potential problems with a subjective, preferential, arbitrary, relative morality, while other secularists have not been so forthright about. Also, Lindsay makes some statements that I have always used in supporting objective morality over subjective measures, which for an atheist is extremely insightful:

To have genuine disagreements about moral issues, we need accepted standards for distinguishing correct from incorrect moral judgments, and facts must influence our judgments. Morality as I have described it meets these conditions. All morally serious individuals accept the core moral norms I have identified, and it is these core norms that provide an intersubjective foundation for morality and for disagreements about more complex moral issues. For example, all morally serious individuals recognize that there is a strong presumption that killing is wrong, and our knowledge that we live among others who also accept this norm allows us to venture outside instead of barricading ourselves in our homes. There is no dispute about this norm. But there are discrete areas of disagreement regarding the applicability of this norm, for example, in the debate over physician-assisted dying. Such disputes on complex issues do not indicate that morality is subjective; to have a dispute—a genuine dispute, and not just



dueling statements of personal preference—the parties to the dispute must have shared premises. In discussing and trying to resolve such moral disputes, we make reference to norms of the common morality (such as the obligation not to kill versus the obligation to show compassion and prevent suffering), interpret them in light of relevant facts, and try to determine how our proposed resolution would serve the underlying rationale of the applicable norms. Only the morally inarticulate invoke subjective “feelings.” (Lindsay).

So give Lindsay some credit here for admitting and realizing these truths that secularism has massive problems in explaining the objective morality and objective morality is real over subjective norms; the controversial aspects of morality can only be if there is an objective standard for it in the first problem, that it even would be a potential problem for what to do in any given situation to begin with, or that there are basic objective principles, like murder is always wrong and that it is better to show empathy compassion over overt cruelty, etc., it merely are the applications or details of these objective basic moral principles that we disagree about. However, it is Lindsay’s solution with leaving God out that he can’t get any credit for, but needs to be highly criticized for, which is what I am doing. In fact, the biblical God hypothesis as the foundation of morality would go a long way in solving the disputes of the applications/details in a way that secular theories will fail, hence, God is needed at minimum for the finetuning aspects of morality, contrary to Lindsay and other secularist’s desire to remove him.

“It’s this fear that without God we’ll have a moral vacuum and descend into nihilism that sustains some in the conviction that there is a God or that we need to encourage belief in God regardless of the evidence to the contrary.” In one breath Lindsay does a good job in explaining complications with a no God worldview in explaining morality, “a moral vacuum” is a good word choice when we leave God out, especially considering what true biblical morality is, which atheists/secularists usually have no idea, nor consider. But in the other breath where Lindsay goes off the charts, which is claiming our solution is to encourage believing in God for morality even though there is no evidence for God’s existence. But that is a strawman if I ever heard it. There may be some who believe and advocate that way, but the vast majority of Bible believing Christians do believe there is ample evidence for God’s existence, but Lindsay is disingenuous when making this comment as if we all concede there is no evidence for God. Lindsay would like to believe that as what I perceive to be a militant atheist, but his position is hardly supportable. The evidence for God is overwhelming if we care to see it, which atheists

don't because they like being independent agents without a God who will put them in hell for their wayward desires to go contrary to his will, what I call the secularist's desire. "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient" (Romans 1:28).

"The notion that God's word is what counts and what makes the difference between moral and immoral actions comforts some because it provides them with the sense that there is something beyond us." This may be true for some, but for the vast majority of Bible believing Christians it is not the case that encouraging a belief in the Bible simply to give them some false sense of solace is the main reason for encouraging belief in the Bible. It is true that the Bible can be a comfort, but it is not a false sense of comfort and it is not the only reason to believe in the Bible, as Lindsay assumes most of us believe, making a strawman. There are very good plausible logical reasons for believing in the Bible and many apologists have provided these reasons in depth. So, strawman after strawman Lindsay continues.

"Is murdering someone wrong? Sure, God tells us that in the Bible. For the devout, that's a fact. A fact that can be confirmed, just like the fact that ripe tomatoes are red, not blue. It's not a matter of subjective opinion." Lindsay is speaking for all of us as if he knows our arguments, but he clearly doesn't. We don't simply believe in the moral principles of the Bible as a basis to have a simplicity of objectivity. The biblical worldview is far more comprehensive than that, but Lindsay would probably be unaware of that. We come to realize the Biblical worldview's superiority when we compare it to others like secularism, in which murder can't be defended as truly objectively wrong because we are nothing more than evolved chemicals which came about for no ultimate reason at all, other than chance or happenstance. But on the biblical worldview, we do have intrinsic meaning, which human conscience testifies to ([Romans 2:14-15](#)), even without humans potentially not knowing the Bible, but the biblical worldview give its comprehensive scope to why there is this intrinsic value we reckon with, so that murder would be wrong, which is we were created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27) and God as being love ([1 John 4:8](#)) and just would not want us to go contrary to his nature of pure goodness in acting unloving and unjust, and murder would be just that ([1 John 3:14-16](#)), so it is not just that Bible says its wrong, that makes it wrong in an easy simplism, but comprehensive aspects of who we are and who God is giving reason for why life would be valuable in the first place and why murder then would make sense as truly objectively being wrong, as well as clear declarative statements of its wrongness, for example, in the 10 commandments, and as mentioned by Jesus ([Exodus 20:13](#),

[Matthew 19:18](#)). Apparently, Lindsay and secularists know little to nothing of many of these things that I mentioned.

“For these reasons—and also because we want a firm grounding for morality ourselves—it is incumbent upon humanists, and secular ethicists generally, to address squarely the contentions that without God there is no objectivity in morality and that this situation would be something dreadful.” Ding, ding, ding. Great job Lindsay, you hit the jackpot in laying out what humanists would need to do, but given this, Lindsay gives multiple failed ways secularists have attempted this which is evident by his next statement. “...the problem is that most try to do this by arguing that morality is objective in a way similar to the way in which ordinary descriptive statements are objective. “ Thus, Lindsay admits secularists have a problem in explaining morality here by implication, then goes on with the failures of secularists, and does a reasonable job in showing that, but by eliminating one secular attempt after another, Lindsay puts secularists in a bind where they need an explanation, but Lindsay is confident he has one, thus is the reason that he embarks on this uneasy journey to begin with, but what if Lindsay’s solution, as he perceives it, is also not an adequate solution; where would that leave secularism? Without a solution at all! Where does secularism go? It would effectively be dead in terms of explanatory power for morality. But I perceive that Lindsay believes that even if he fails, the fact that he believes God can’t be the right explanation, (due to the either/or bifurcation *Euthyphro problem* already dispelled with God as a basis for morality), so he feels justified, even without answers, God is still not the answer. But it turns out on both measures Lindsay is wrong, as he fails to provide an adequate explanation with pragmatics as the solution as I already dismantled, and his false dilemma argument failed to dispel God from a reasonable explanation for morality, but having failed along with all other secularist attempts as Lindsay succinctly pointed out, and that failure to dispense God as the foundation for morality, leaves it reasonably certain then that the biblical God just is the foundation for objective morality. “According to Craig, there can be no objective moral truths without God, and since there are objective moral truths, God must exist. One traditional counter to the argument that God is required to ground objective morality is that we cannot possibly rely on God to tell us what’s morally right and wrong. As Plato pointed out long ago in his dialogue *Euthyphro*, divine commands cannot provide a foundation for morality.” Lindsay mentions William Craig Lane’s moral argument for God’s existence, and feels Craig has not been successful due to Euthyphro dilemma, which has been refuted, thus feels confident to bring him up, but given these last two failures of secularists, Lane’s arguments become pushed back front and center again, so perhaps Lindsay was hasty in bringing Lane up to begin with. But of course, Lane’s argument is not in the power of

Lane himself, but the moral argument for God's existence itself that has the power, Lane simply being one of many stewards of the strength of it.

Before I leave this critique, it is necessary to revisit the adequate standard hypothesis I brought up throughout this critique, as understanding it will be the deathblow to all secular outlooks, including Lindsay's, of moral foundations. An adequate standard is a timeless, universal, unchanging standard of truth, that has the necessary nature to be the basis or foundation for all truth, both general and moral, thus is a perfect measuring stick to these ends. Without an adequate standard, there can be no objective truth, let alone objective morality. But if one claims there is no objective truth, then such a position is not an objective truth itself, making the claim self-refuting. When you have to use something to disprove it, it guarantees the thing you are seeking to disprove truly exists. These transcendentals then become axiomatic for objective truth. Hence, objective truth must exist, but then there must be an adequate standard. If there is no universal, timeless, unchanging standard for truth, then the foundation of truth will always be elusive, given the foundations of truth would be changing, temporary and finite, which means there could never be definitive relationship between standards and their relative constituents, not enabling any objective measure of application. This then means that for all intents and purposes what we call "truth" would be arbitrary perceptions of reality, not necessarily objective measure of it, as truth would be in the eye of the beholder, but there would be no unchanging foundation to determine truth to begin with, making truth nothing but arbitrary. However, on all secular and pseudo-religious worldviews, there is no adequate standard. For example, on secularism, truth roots back only to changing, finite, fallible, contingent, often immoral or amoral humans or nature, thus by default can't be timeless, universal and unchanging. Humans and the universe and its contents are contingent realities, but on secularism you don't ever get to a non-contingent reality; it doesn't exist, since nothing in the universe is non-contingent but all of it is dependent on things or essences or relationships outside of itself for its existence, qualities. Only on monotheism, particularly biblical monotheism is there a true adequate standard, a timeless, universal, unchanging standard of truth in the biblical monotheistic God, thus provides a proper foundation for objective moral, religious and general truth, since the foundation for truth doesn't change, which allows for there to be definitive objective relationships between the unchanging foundation for truth and any potential changing conditions of either us or our universe ([Gen 1:1; Colossians 1:16-17; 2 Timothy 3:16; Psalms 11:7; 12:6-7; 139:7-8; Exodus 3:14; John 8:58; 1 Chronicles 29:11; John 17:3; Hebrews 13:8; Psalm 147:5; Deuteronomy 33:27](#)). These changes could be assessed by means of there being an unchanging foundation for truth to begin with, in a way that no secular approach could do. So, on morality, any potential situational ethics could still have an objective measure, since we would apply the situational ethics to the unchanging standard to see

if it lines up or not. Hence, many of the moral variations of people or cultures in different situations would now have a means to correct application, since there is an unchanging foundation, thus a core correct standard, which then allows for a correct application to begin with. Lindsay's dilemmas of conflictive moral pragmatics now have a means of resolution in an objective manner with an adequate standard truly existing; plus, there is an objective value of humans to begin with being created by this adequate standard and in his image, with his purposes for us to have intricate value, making sense of why moral principles toward others to be important in the first place. Solvable is when killing is murder or justifiable and why murder is wrong in the first place, that is with an adequate transcendent standard that has given us an objective revelation to disclose details to solve those particulars in a way that secularists could never have.