

Tab 1

Table of Contents

Strategy	2
1AC	4
Inherency:	4
The Plan:	4
Adv One: Deterrence	5
Scenario One: Recruiting	5
Scenario Two: Readiness	8
Scenario Three: Internal Deterrence	12
Adv Two: Civil-Military Relations	13
Scenario One: Adventurism	14
Scenario Two: Modeling:	15
Scenario Three: Deterrence	17
Scenario Four: Domestic Terrorism	18
Scenario Five: Democracy	21
Framework:	22
Apocalyptic Rhetoric Good	22
Existential Threats Come 1st	23
Realism is good and inevitable	24
Public Support for Heg	25
CMR Ed Key	25
Draft Inevitable:	26
2AC Evidence	29
Inherency:	29
Advantage One: Deterrence	31
Advantage Two: Civilian - Military Relations	37
Solvency	42
Answers to Security K	43
Negative Arguments	45
On Case Debate:	45
AT Inherency	45
AT Solvency	46
AT Advantage One: Deterrence:	47
AT Advantage Two: CMR	52
Patriotism Disadvantage	56
Marijuana Counterplan	67
Security K	69
Security K Extensions	72

Strategy

This file is a collection of reform proposals for Tricare, the program that supports active duty military health care (the largest national health program in the nation) and the VA hospital system, which supports veterans health care (and is the largest current universal coverage system in the United States). The advantages are written to be tricky, and have some tough to answer positions and play some framework games. This file will need a bit of work to do more than win a few practice debates, but will take a lot of people by surprise if someone puts in a bit of time and gets to know the material. It has more aff scenarios than you can read, so pick the best and do some extra research to flesh things out.

Deterrence: A reference to projecting strength in order to make an opponent think that messing with the United States militarily isn't worth it, since we're powerful and could hurt them more than they hurt us.

There are three scenarios here:

- **Recruiting:** says that the military is weak now because we don't have enough people signing up, but improving health benefits would solve that. Increasing the size of the military is key to deterring threats
- **Readiness:** says that we need to improve military healthcare to prevent budget trade-offs that will undermine our ability to fight wars. It makes the argument that US adventurism abroad is inevitable under Trump, and we need to deter Great Power Conflicts to prevent extinction.
- **Internal Deterrence:** Makes the argument that Trump is likely to risk conflict, so we need to pre-pay for military medical care to increase the cost of engaging in war. I'm not convinced that this will move the needle that much stopping Trump going to war, but the cards are quite good, and folks won't have any answers to this argument. Also, can make "reducing risk is enough for existential threats" framework

CMR

Stands for "Civilian Military Relations" aka how things are between the military and the civilian leadership of the military. If these relations are low, there can be lots of negative consequences. The CMR advantage argues that there are two issues - 1) a recruiting crisis (see adv. one) and that of those that are being recruited, they are almost all from career military families, destroying the "volunteer" ethos of the military. There are several scenarios:

- **Militarism and Adventurism** - if the military gets too divorced from the population, they'll give their civilian leaders bad advice, and militarism will fester, leading us into unnecessary wars.
- **Modeling** - argues that U.S. CMR is a model followed by other countries, and if our CMR declines, so will global democracy
- **Deterrence** - Another internal link to deterrence - if we have low CMR, we won't be ready to fight wars and deter threats
- **Domestic Terrorism** - Radicalization of current and former military members is substantially increasing domestic terrorism. Improving CMR can solve.
- **Domestic Democracy** - Trump is pushing the bounds of elected officials now, we need a strong, diverse, and united military to reign him in and prevent authoritarianism.

Framework:

There are two framework arguments here. The first pre-empts some kritiks, and says that we should prioritize existential threats, pretty basic stuff that supports the thesis of the aff as a whole.

I've included a framework trick that will give you some fun leverage against Kritiks and other teams that try to beat you with framework. There are three reasons in the aff (Recruitment, Trump's adventurism, and lack of diversity in military service) that all increase the risk that the US institutes a draft. If a draft is inevitable, that changes what sort of education we need from debate, and will really throw folks off.

Negative strategy:

I've included a few tools for the negative when approaching this case:

- Case Debate:
- Impact Answers
- Advantage Answers
- Security K (bare bones, can use on other issues in this topic) that directly challenges the military focus of the aff.

1AC

Inherency:

Service members and veterans are displeased with their healthcare.

Johnson 2016

Justin, Senior Defense Budget Analyst, Heritage Foundation, its time to improve military health care, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/its-time-to-improve-military-health-care/>

A major MCRMC survey of active servicemembers found that 47 percent of respondents were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their health care provider choices, and 43 percent were dissatisfied with the quality of health care they experience. In other words, almost half of servicemembers are not satisfied with the health care they are receiving from the military. According to TRICARE's own surveys, the military health system consistently lags five percent or more behind civilian benchmarks in satisfaction measures including getting needed care and getting care quickly. As you dive deeper into [the numbers](#), it is clear that **younger servicemembers are more frustrated with the current system than those with greater time in service**. More than half (51 percent) of junior enlisted (E1–E4) and junior officers (O1–O3) say they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their health care provider choices. Meanwhile, 46 percent of junior enlisted and 43 percent of junior officers are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the quality of their health care experience. Field grade officers (O4–O6) report significantly greater satisfaction with their health care, but more than a third (36 percent) are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their provider choices — compared with the civilian national average of less than 20 percent. While a number of factors likely contribute to a better experience for more senior officers, what is surprising is that a third of them are still unsatisfied with their health care. Interestingly, military retirees and their family members are the most satisfied with the current system.

The Plan:

Plan: The United States Federal Government should offer portable, pre-funded, free lifetime, outpatient health insurance to those who enlist in the military and veterans.

*** Different parts of the plan text are based on different advantages. This is a great defense against Counterplans, but also means that if you aren't reading certain advantages, you should adjust the plan text accordingly. ***

Adv One: Deterrence

Scenario One: Recruiting

The military has a recruiting crisis - we need to increase the number of young people who consider military service
Bensahel and Barno 2023

Nora and David, War on the Rocks, 3/10, Addressing the US Military Recruiting Crisis,
<https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/addressing-the-u-s-military-recruiting-crisis/>

The all-volunteer force may finally have reached its breaking point. During the first years of the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many military experts worried that the constant deployments would “break” the force since they expected that fewer young Americans would volunteer to serve in a wartime military. Thankfully, that didn’t happen. Yet a perilous recruiting crisis began just after the United States fully withdrew from Afghanistan last summer, **and it shows no sign of abating anytime soon. As a result, the U.S. military is shrinking,** not because of any strategic choices, but simply **because there aren’t enough qualified volunteers — and that may have enormous implications for the U.S. strategic position in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world. How bad is the recruiting crisis? During the last fiscal year, the Army missed its recruiting goal by 15,000** active-duty soldiers, or **25 percent of its target.** This shortfall forced the Army to cut its planned active-duty end strength from 476,000 to 466,000. **And the current fiscal year is likely to be even worse.** Army officials project that active end strength could shrink by as much as **20,000** soldiers by September, down to **445,000.** **That means that the nation’s primary land force could plummet** by as much as 7 percent in only two years — **at a time when its missions are increasing** in Europe and even in the Pacific, where the Army provides many of the **critical wartime theater enablers** without which the other services cannot function. The other services barely met their active-duty recruiting goals last year, but it will be harder for them to do so in 2023. They all **accelerated their delayed entry applicants** at the end of the last fiscal year, leaving them with a far shallower pool to draw from this year. The Marine Corps may be able to compensate for this problem because its **outstanding retention rates** last year enabled it to lower its recruiting goal. It may be able to do so again this year. But the Navy and the Air Force face greater recruiting headwinds. Both started with deeper holes in their pool of delayed entry applicants, offered extensive financial bonuses, and took a wide range of other one-time measures — such as the Navy increasing the **maximum enlistment age** from 39 to 41. Furthermore, **Navy** and **Air Force** recruiters took advantage of the release of **Top Gun: Maverick**, which, like its 1986 predecessor, was the **highest-grossing film** of the year. A recent analysis showed that the original Top Gun **boosted recruiting by 8 percent.** To the extent that the sequel helped boost Navy and Air Force enlistments in 2022, their recruiting holes could be even deeper in 2023. Indeed, the Air Force just **announced** that will likely fail to meet its recruiting goals across all three of its components. Why is this happening now? Part of it, no doubt, is that the end of the war in Afghanistan makes military service seem less compelling. For the first time in almost 20 years, American troops are no longer fighting abroad to keep insurgents and terrorists at bay. **Unemployment is low, which always makes it harder to recruit** — and the **tight labor market** has also forced many companies to increase wages and offer compelling incentives to attract the best talent. But two other sets of factors are interacting in complex ways that make it almost impossible to determine which are having the greatest effect. First, **the number of young people who are eligible to serve in the military dropped precipitously last year** — from an already low figure of **29 percent to a shocking 23 percent** — largely due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Levels of depression, anxiety, and other mental health conditions exploded among **young Americans** (and many **not-so-young Americans**), who faced sometimes extreme levels of social isolation. School closures and remote instruction have caused **test scores to decline dramatically** throughout the country (**and the world**), and scores on the ASVAB, the military’s standardized test for potential recruits, declined by as much as **9 percent**. Shuttered schools also made it extremely difficult for recruiters to meet with young people and develop the personal relationships that are so essential for their jobs. And youth obesity rates — which have long been one of the **biggest reasons** for **military ineligibility** — **increased from 19 percent to 22 percent** during the pandemic. Few of these statistics will rebound quickly — and some may never recover to their pre-pandemic levels. Though improving eligibility is extremely important, as we discuss below, it alone cannot solve the recruiting crisis. **The second, and much more challenging, factor involves** military propensity — **the number of young people who are interested in serving in the military.** Only **13 percent** of young Americans said they would consider military service before the pandemic, and that already paltry figure shrank to just **9 percent** last year. That number is simply not high enough to ensure the stable flow of recruits upon which the all-volunteer force relies. Two sets of survey data help explain why propensity may be declining. First, the number of Americans expressing confidence in the U.S. military has plummeted in the past few years. To be clear, American confidence in almost all major U.S. institutions has declined, with data from **Gallup** showing that it reached an all-time average low of just **27 percent** in 2022. Compared to that dismal statistic, the fact that 64 percent of survey respondents expressed confidence in the military last year is a strong endorsement indeed. Yet that figure was 72 percent in 2020 and 69 percent in 2021 — marking an 8 percentage point drop in only two years. More disturbingly, the **Reagan National Defense Survey** found even steeper declines, with confidence in the U.S. military dropping from 70 percent in 2018 to just 45 percent in 2021 (before rebounding slightly to 48 percent in 2022). Second, there are some early indications that **fewer people in and around the military are willing to recommend military service to young people.** In 2019, almost **75 percent** of military families said they would recommend military service to someone they care about. Yet that figure dropped to just under **63 percent** in 2021, another sharp decline in just two years. Since **80 percent** of the young people who join the military today have a family member in the military — and **25–30 percent** have a parent in the military — it may well be that more military families are steering their children away from uniformed service toward civilian careers. It’s difficult to assess the exact causes of these rapidly declining numbers, since

as with eligibility, many different trends are converging at once. The chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is almost certainly one of the reasons, as [most Americans disapproved](#) of the way in which the Biden administration executed the withdrawal (including many who generally supported the decision to withdraw). Another is the increasing perception that U.S. military leaders are becoming [too involved in politics](#), partly due to [several controversies surrounding](#) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. And the ever-increasing rates of [sexual assault](#) in the military became far more widely known after the tragic disappearance and death of [Specialist Vanessa Guillen](#) in 2020, and the subsequent disciplining of [14 Army officials](#) at Fort Hood. Indeed, in a fall 2021 survey, [30 percent](#) of Americans aged 16 to 24 said that the possibility of sexual harassment or assault was one of the main reasons why they would not consider joining the U.S. military. (The Guillen case also led Congress to pass [sweeping reforms](#) of the [military justice system](#) last year, which may eventually help alleviate such concerns.) Furthermore, partisans on both sides of the political divide are publicly highlighting different problems facing the military, which may deter their followers (and their followers' children) from considering military service. Democrats, for example, have publicly expressed worries about the [small but significant problem of extremists](#) in the military. Many Democrats, especially Senator [Kirsten Gillibrand](#), have also long criticized the military's seeming inability to make significant progress addressing its problems with sexual harassment and assault, and they may continue to do so if the judicial reforms mentioned above prove insufficient. Republicans, by contrast, [play down the extremist issue](#) and instead focus on what they call the increasing ["wokeness"](#) of the military. Even though Chairman [Milley, leaders from all services](#), and [outside experts](#) have strongly rejected such claims, some Republican members of Congress continue to push this narrative, even accusing the military of using ["cherry-picked data"](#) in ways that obscure these problems. In November, for example, the offices of Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Chip Roy published a report called [Woke Warfighters](#), which accuses the Biden administration of weakening military strength by promoting critical race theory, supporting sex-reassignment procedures, and promoting LGBTQ+ individuality. In a recent survey, [almost half of Republicans](#) agreed with the statement that "woke practices undermining military effectiveness" was one of the reasons for their decreased confidence in the U.S. military. And now that Republicans have regained control of the House of Representatives, they are planning to [push back](#) hard on these issues by focusing on what Representative Jim Jordan [called](#) "getting rid of all of the 'woke' in our military."

Addressing these complicated and multifold challenges will not be simple or swift. **There are no magic solutions that will suddenly make more young people eligible to serve, or easily reverse the increasingly skeptical youth attitudes toward the military. Increasing the propensity to serve will require long-term efforts that bridge the ever-widening gap between the American people and their military.** And though all of the services are taking a variety of measures to address these problems, **more remains to be done to ensure not just the readiness of the military but also the sustained viability of an all-volunteer force.**

And free health insurance would improve recruitment and improve VA functioning Hughes 2017

Michael, State University of New York, Buffalo, Factors influencing recruitment into the US armed services: could health insurance be a motivator?

https://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=mpa_projects

This study attempted to address the question of whether **adding free lifetime healthcare to veterans benefits would have a positive correlation to recruitment for the all-volunteer military. An examination of the literature on recruitment and health care showed** very few studies linking health care benefits to recruitment, but **plenty of evidence that recruitment and retention is impacted by benefits** in general. Examination of the literature pertaining to **the current veterans' health care benefit showed a system in need of repair** that has been shaken by scandals in recent years. Based on the findings from this study it can be determined that **adding free medical care for veterans in the form of medical insurance would allow for improved recruiting results. Providing free health insurance to veterans does not necessarily mean the dismantling of the veterans' health administration, but the presence of real choice for veterans will create some competition for the VHA and push it to improve and start implementing more industry best practices to improve the quality of care.** Improving the VHA is not just about recruiting or efficiency, it is about improving the medical outcome for veterans who are facing a public health crisis. Previous studies have shown that different people in the military are motivated to join for reasons that vary along Moskos I/O model and that improving the pay and benefits would impact the decision making for the occupationally motivated individuals. The survey also showed that respondents believed that health care was a human right, 74%, and that they viewed health care as a basic public service like police or fire protection 66%. Currently the United States is the only developed country that has a system of veterans' hospitals like the VHA, because the United States is the only developed nation with a military commitment to the war on terror that doesn't have some for of public health care.

And failure to maintain an all-volunteer force will result in a draft, encouraging more reckless imperial wars abroad.

Bandow 2023

Doug, The American Conservative, 8/17, No Final Draft, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/no-final-draft>

Washington is fighting a proxy war-plus with Russia, threatening China over Taiwan, mobilizing troops to confront Iran, and promising to use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea. Yet the Pentagon is failing to recruit sufficient numbers of men and women. As the all-volunteer force runs short on manpower, some policymakers are thinking the once unthinkable, a return to conscription.

A half-century ago, Richard Nixon ended the draft and withdrew the last combat forces from South Vietnam. Despite a rough start, the all-volunteer force delivered the highest quality military that America ever fielded. President George W. Bush's [Iraq debacle](#) sapped popular enthusiasm for joining the armed forces, [making it harder](#) for the Pentagon to attract recruits, but the numbers returned to health as that conflict ended. [Relatively few 18-year-olds](#) are qualified to serve—increasing obesity is one challenge—and interested in joining. Only the Marine Corps, the second-smallest branch of the military, is [expected to make its objective](#) this year. Both the Army and Air Force likely will be about 10,000 people short, and the Navy figures it will be 6,000 behind. Last year the Air Force missed its manpower target by 25 percent. It would be easier to ask America's young to defend a democratic republic than to advance a reckless empire. These estimates likely underestimate the gap between military wishes and recruit realities. Knowing that it will be hard to find sufficient new accessions, as enlistees are termed, encourages military leaders to trim their manpower objectives. Two years ago Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville admitted that [he wanted](#) to add 70,000 to the force of nearly 485,000. Instead, he reduced the number by 12,000. The [Army vice chief of staff](#), Gen. Randy A. George, believes the solution is selling the armed services as a step up: The trouble is, many Americans don't realize it or believe it. Military service, to many people, seems like a life setback. In reality, it's a life accelerator. That has certainly been my experience since I enlisted as a private right out of high school. It's a great team with an important mission and ample opportunity to learn, grow and make an impact. And we have to get that story out. What if potential recruits don't believe him? It was one thing to join the military to combat the infamous Evil Empire, which seemed to threaten all that mattered. But dying to seize nonexistent nukes in Iraq, remake rural theocracy in Central Asia, and protect a gaggle of licentious Mideast royals? Or playing wet nurse to the Europeans, who almost eight decades after the end of World War II still act helpless when confronting Moscow? Moreover, why would any sensible recruit—speaking as someone whose father, mother, uncle, brother-in-law, and nephew all served—want to submit to the current political leadership? The egregious Madeleine Albright [spoke for](#) America's arrogant, self-serving ruling class when she asked Gen. Colin Powell: "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" To members of [the infamous foreign policy "blob,"](#) those in uniform are but a cheap means to an imperial end. Indeed, the Pentagon's sales pitch faces surprising opposition from relatives, friends, and even veterans. Reported the [Wall Street Journal](#): The children of military families make up the majority of new recruits in the US military. That pipeline is now under threat, which is bad news for the Pentagon's already acute recruit problems, as well as America's military readiness. "Influencers are not telling them to go into the military," said Adm. Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. "Moms and dads, uncles, coaches and pastors don't see it as a good choice." Moreover, enlisted personnel, who make up the bulk of the service, and their families [are less likely](#) to recommend that their children volunteer. Such dissatisfaction reflects multiple causes, [including](#) low pay and family stress. Incompetent, stupid wars are another. [More than](#) 7,000 US military personnel and nearly 8,000 contractors died in combat since 9/11. A shocking 30,000 military personnel and veterans of the "Global War on Terrorism" committed suicide over the same period. At least 52,000 service members were [wounded in combat](#). However, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs [figures that](#) the number harmed "is exponentially larger" since the Defense Department does not count other injuries in theater as well as conditions diagnosed later.

What if Washington is unable to maintain a volunteer military large enough to dominate the globe? It isn't easy to simultaneously protect wimpy but wealthy Europeans, combat insurgents and terrorists across ever-unstable Africa, maintain a gaggle of undemocratic Mideast monarchies against their peoples, protect rich friends in Asia, and contain nationalistic China. Support for conscription ebbed after President Ronald Reagan [addressed](#)

recruitment problems. Even during the military's brief Iraq-related travails few policymakers advocated a draft. However, **the 2020 election featured several Democratic presidential candidates, including now Transportation**

Secretary Pete Buttigieg, urging mandatory national service. More recently the conscription-friendly All-Volunteer Force Forum [held a conference on the issue](#). Dennis Laich, a retired major general, worried about the flip-side of the recruitment problem, that paying higher compensation in response could be too expensive: "There just won't be enough money to go around." He also argued, along with another retired Army officer, Larry Wilkerson, that a draft [is required](#) "because a combination of ever-growing missions for the military and outside pressures on the dollars being spent their [stet] will force it." Other participants backed various forms of coerced service. The latest advocate is [a retired Marine](#), Joe Plenzler: We should have our military recruiters sign up new troops for 11 months out of the year, and then have the Selective Service draft the delta between the military's needs and the total number recruited. This model would alleviate the incredible pressure on our recruiters, lower the cost of finding new troops, and significantly reduce the much decried civilian-military gap by subjecting all of America's youth—rich and poor—to the possibility of military service via the draft. Even limited conscription is an extraordinarily bad idea. It would be wildly unfair to those drafted, taking only a few thousand of the four million Americans who turn 18 every year. Compulsion would foster both avoidance and evasion—remember Dick ["I had other priorities"](#) Cheney? That in turn would require an expensive enforcement regime, extravagantly so given the very few people to be impressed.

Since conscription would fill any unmet "needs," the armed services would be tempted to inflate their requirements and devote less effort to meeting recruiting

objectives. Plenzler also tried moral blackmail, arguing that "military service is an important responsibility of citizenship." Defending the nation might be such a responsibility, but not patrolling the globe, playing international social engineer, guarding corrupt authoritarians, and using war for mundane economic and political ends, which account for most of the Pentagon's activities. Moreover, military service isn't the only way to help protect the homeland. Conscription is the wrong answer to a very simple problem. Washington expects the armed services to do far too much. The military's

official manpower objectives should not be taken as a given, as if one of the Ten Commandments. **Moving to conscription would make war too easy, allowing any administration to quickly crank up personnel levels to prosecute another unpopular and stupid war,** like Vietnam, or more recently Iraq and Afghanistan.

Scenario Two: Readiness

And Military Health Care requires volume to be effective, but mostly serves civilian injuries right now, so we should nudge Tricare recipients towards outpatient care, which will allow a military hospitals to focus on readiness and save a bunch of money

Carson and Plummer 2016

Brad, Undersecretary for Defense, Personnel and Readiness, former Congressman, and Morgan, Army Veteran, former DoD staffer, War On The Rocks, The Pentagon's Fig Tree: Reforming the Military Health System,

<https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-pentagons-fig-tree-reforming-the-military-health-system/>

It might be useful to ask a [naïve question](#): **What is the purpose of the military health system? For the military services, it is about readiness** — creating both a medically ready force and a ready medical force, to use the felicitous phrase one often hears in the Pentagon. **But for many servicemembers and their families, as well as Congress, the MHS is primarily about access to quality care.** It is, alas, rarely acknowledged that **these missions are not necessarily compatible. To maintain a ready medical force, the MHS needs a steady flow of patient visits** into the military-run medical treatment facilities (MTFs). For the purposes of readiness, these cases [should be of the type a provider might see when deployed](#). But to ensure high-quality, accessible care, the MHS needs a broad network of high-volume providers, as [studies have shown](#) that safety and effectiveness are closely related to throughput. [High-volume providers are almost always found not in the MTFs, but in the private sector.](#) **By attempting to achieve these multiple goals simultaneously — readiness, accessibility, and a high quality of care — the MHS risks succeeding fully at none.** The MHS is vast. TRICARE, the name for the group of health care plans offered to servicemembers and their families (as well as retirees), [covers](#) 9.5 million people. As a percentage of the total Department of Defense budget, MHS expenditures [have more than doubled over the last 20 years](#). Today, it comes with a price tag totaling approximately [\\$50 billion that consumes 10 percent of the department's budget](#). Astonishingly, [one in three colonels](#) is part of the administration or operation of the MHS. Care is delivered through two broad mechanisms. The "direct care" system [comprises](#) 54 hospitals, 365 medical clinics, and 281 dental clinics, all run by the military services (with the exception of a few outpatient clinics and two hospitals in the Washington, D.C., area, Walter Reed Medical Center and Fort Belvoir, which are maintained by the Defense Health Agency). The "purchased care" system involves thousands of private sector providers who [agree to accept payment on a fee-for-service basis pegged to Medicare reimbursement rates](#). **The direct care system** — the in-house services delivered at medical treatment facilities (MTFs) — **is very expensive relative to care in the private sector, which already provides 65 percent of services.** A recent [study](#) from the Institute for Defense Analyses found that **only five of the 41 domestic military hospitals produced inpatient workload at a lower cost than the private sector.** Overall, the cost of providing direct care inpatient workload at the 41 domestic Department of Defense hospitals would have been 34 percent lower had the workload been performed in private sector facilities. **Outpatient care** in the purchased care sector **had a similar cost advantage.** Additional, unpublished research we saw while working at the Pentagon indicated that **increasing use of the purchased care sector could save American taxpayers billions of dollars each year.** More controversially, **mountains of data indicate that purchased care is better, safer care.** This is no slight to the many incredible doctors, nurses, and medics in the MHS. Their [heroism](#) and commitment to caring for our wounded over the last 15 years of war cannot be questioned. But **the iron law of health care is that volume matters.** The more procedures a given doctor performs and a given hospital hosts, the better the patient outcomes. **Surgery performed by high-volume surgeons at high-volume facilities has lower complication rates, lower re-admission rates, lower mortality rates, shorter lengths of stay, and lower overall costs.**

And it's a simple fact that civilian facilities provide a great deal more relevant patient care than do our MTFs. [The Leapfrog Group](#), a leading health care consultancy, [sets](#) an annual volume standard of 200 open-heart procedures for a facility to be deemed safe (consistent with Aetna and Blue Cross thresholds). In Utah, to pick a state out of the hat, [92 percent of open-heart surgeries are performed](#) in high-volume facilities. In Maine and Kentucky, it's [87 percent and 75 percent respectively](#). For the military, the number is zero. Zero. In fact, [two-thirds of open-heart surgeries performed](#) in MTFs were at facilities with fewer than 50 such procedures, 75 percent below recommended safety standards. That equates to over 200 military patients every year who are at risk for suboptimal care. The volume for individual surgeons is also dangerously low. Consider spinal fusions. It is recommended that surgeons perform 32 to 50 of these procedures every year to maintain competency, and facilities should oversee at least 100 case every year. In 2013, [only 25 percent of military surgeons](#) that completed at least one spinal fusion met the lower bound of 32 cases per year, and only 11 percent met the upper bound of 50 procedures. Or take knee replacements. The minimum safety standard is 50 per surgeon each year and 100 for a facility. [Only 10 percent of the military's orthopedic surgeons](#) that completed at least one knee replacement met the standard, and only 13 percent of knee replacements were performed in MTFs that met that standard. Hip replacements are still another example. [Only 9 percent of Department of Defense surgeons](#) completing at least one hip replacement met the minimum safety standards, and only 43 percent of hip replacements were performed in MTFs that met the standard. The low productivity (if not the variable quality of care) of MTFs is [openly acknowledged](#) by the Department of Defense. Indeed, this is seen as a feature, not a bug, of the MHS. The military Surgeons General, altogether a very admirable group, recently appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where they unsurprisingly asserted that the MTFs ["are the bedrock of medical readiness."](#) To that end, they [testified](#), overstaffing for beneficiary care is both intended and unavoidable; poor productivity is to be expected and is properly seen as the unavoidable if pricey cost of maintaining a ready medical force. It is certainly true that uniformed medical personnel are assigned military duties that take them away

from the provision of health care, a complication their private sector counterparts don't share. But those requirements can't explain away the wide productivity gap between MHS practitioners and their civilian peers. Instead, the argument goes, the MTFs act as a sort of bullpen for deployable doctors, nurses, and medics. If they appear to be overstaffed, it because the demand for labor is mistakenly believed to be set by the lax needs of beneficiary care when it is actually set by strenuous, if unrealized, deployment requirements. The notion that MTFs are overstaffed by design would make more sense if the caseload of the direct care system supported battlefield medicine. But it doesn't. **The great majority of diagnoses at MTFs are for newborn care, pregnancy, and maternal health. MTFs are essentially birthing centers with no caseload alignment to the demands of an operational environment. Indeed, the top ten diagnoses in MTFs do not match a single trauma-related combat injury.** And, as the caseload skews toward the needs of young families, so too does the specialty mix of military doctors, who are surprisingly free to choose their own medical niche without regard for military requirements. For example, **the Army has about 12 trauma surgeons on active duty, but houses three times as many orthodontists and pediatric psychiatrists on full-time orders.** The Cassandras of military medicine are already wailing a steady, if unheeded, warning: The MHS does not broadly create nor specifically maintain a ready medical force, and it may even militate against that goal. As a leading combat trauma surgeon has bluntly written, **military hospitals cannot truly be considered to be combat medical readiness platforms unless they make a significant shift "from an organizational culture chiefly focused on full-time beneficiary care in fixed facilities and part-time combat casualty care—the 'HMO that goes to war'—toward an organizational culture that treats battlefield medical readiness as its essential core mission."**

And failure to provide health insurance hurts readiness and creates budgetary trade-offs with deterrence

Spring 2011

Baker, Kirby Research Fellow @ Heritage Foundation, Building a better military health care system, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/building-better-military-health-care-system>

Washington has a problem. **The men and women who serve and have served** in uniform and their families **deserve quality health care.** Delivering first-class care, particularly in time of war, is a daunting challenge. Furthermore, **care for military members, retirees, and their families in an all-volunteer force must be portable. Service members should not have to choose between volunteering and quality health care.** The Pentagon, however, has built a system that is increasingly flawed. At a press conference on January 6, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted that he had no solution for "the department's unaffordable health costs, and in particular the benefits provided to working-age retirees under the TRICARE program." In order to provide an adequate defense, the nation has to achieve three vitally important objectives with respect to compensation and benefits for all those who serve and have served in the armed forces: Ensure continued recruitment and retention of the top-quality personnel the armed forces need; Honor the country's obligations to members of the armed forces; and Apply effectively taxpayer resources devoted to veteran's concerns. What Is Wrong with Military Health Care? **The state of unpreparedness of the military health care system was reflected in the difficulty of surging care to provide for wartime needs,** including dealing with emerging concerns such as post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, and suicide prevention, as well as spiraling per capita health care costs. **The stress on the system has revealed a cascade of systematic problems.** Lack of Choice. **TRICARE restricts the choices** of military service members and retirees. As a result, the **members and their families cannot tailor their coverage according to their preferences and needs.** Inflexibility. Today's labor force is highly mobile. Many choose to rotate between active and reserve service. Others choose not to make the military a career. No individuals should be penalized for the choices they make in how and when to serve their nation. In addition, TRICARE does not prepare serving military personnel to exercise greater responsibility for managing their health care after they complete their service. Unfairness. **Under TRICARE** the government extends health care benefits regardless of need. That means that **limited resources are spread to provide ever more limited coverage to all.** Thus, the Pentagon strains to provide retirees who have reasonable access to private coverage the same benefits as active-duty service members who are serving in harm's way. Spiraling Costs. The Department of Defense's health care budget request for FY 2012 was \$52.2 billion. **If the cost of health care continues to grow in the future as it has in the recent past, it would "crowd out" spending for other military essentials. Thus, service men and women would likely find themselves receiving mediocre, costly health care and going into battle without the training and equipment they need to do their jobs,** do them right, protect the nation, and come back home. Honest, Fair, and Sensible Reform Given this array of weaknesses in the existing system for military health care coverage, it is appropriate for Congress to consider comprehensive changes.

Trump's adventurism and overstretch is inevitable - our only chance it to deter escalation when he meddles - It's try or die to prevent Great Power Wars

Langlois 2026

Alex, Fellow, Defense Priorities, Real Clear Defense, 2/26, Trump's Global Gunboat Diplomacy Leaves the US Overstretched,

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/03/trumps_global_gunboat_diplomacy_leaves_the_us_overstretched_1162494.html

Those hoping for a calmer new year have experienced a rude awakening in 2026. Rather than follow through on promises to centralize restraint and peace, President Donald **Trump's second term has largely reconstituted a form of 19th century gunboat diplomacy, launching numerous military operations or threats of them around the globe.** The next target could be [Iran](#) as Trump turns to **a dangerous form of US military power that risks further overextending Washington's capacities.** For those keeping a tally, Trump has [ordered](#) strikes on at least seven countries since beginning his second term: Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela. In his first year back in the White House, he has struck foreign soil [more times than](#) former president Joe Biden across his entire 4-year term. Strikes on Venezuela and Syria occurred in the new year. Trump has threatened additional strikes on [Iran](#) and [Greenland](#) – alongside [Mexico](#), [Cuba](#), and [Colombia](#) – just this month. This degree of militarism reflects Trump's so-called "peace through strength" approach to foreign policy, in which the president utilizes massive and rapid force to achieve a stated policy objective. While most of these actions lacked Congressional authorization – making them illegal – **they have also overextended the U.S. military. The Trump administration has repeatedly deployed and redeployed U.S. troops and other military assets to adjust to issues arising in various parts of the globe.** Nowhere is that more apparent than the Middle East, where Washington has both [withdrawn](#) and [surged](#) assets to the region on a whim for much of the last year. Trump has opted to increase the U.S. military's presence in the Middle East to counter Iran. Washington struck the Islamic Republic in June, a move which sparked an Iranian retaliation on a U.S. base in Qatar. Iranian officials have [warned](#) that any new strikes in support of the country's latest protest movement would warrant a far worse exchange of fire, going beyond the clearly choreographed summer strikes. That warning, alongside [pleading](#) from regional leaders to not strike Iran, is possibly why Trump has wavered on an attack. The bigger reason, however, is that U.S. officials almost certainly do not believe they have the proper assets in the region to deter a brutal Iranian response or defend U.S. troops and partner countries from that response – including and particularly Israel. The issue at play is clear: **the United States lacks the military capacity to conduct overt and ongoing military operations at scale in every theater of the globe,** having moved significant resources – including a [carrier strike group](#) – to the Caribbean for its Venezuela operations. That another carrier strike group is redeploying from East Asia only creates a new and worse strategic gap in the name of adventurism well outside of true U.S. interests. The U.S. military in the Pacific operates in a theater that should be a higher focus for U.S. officials given China's position as the only near-peer rival to U.S. power. Yet Iran hawks and Israeli leaders continue to [advocate](#) for U.S.-facilitated violent regime change in the Islamic Republic, pushing interests in Tel Aviv over the real interests of Washington and the American people. Herein lies the fallacy of the global policeman role, in which the world's strongest state must operate everywhere and always, especially for certain so-called "partners." **Even the world's strongest military has limitations,** and in this case, that goes beyond the absurd fiscal cost of overextension. Indeed, the issue is logistical – **the United States cannot possibly deploy adequate resources to cover strategic gaps** that conveniently exist in every corner of the globe. Even with a bloated budget of [\\$1.5 trillion](#) – which Trump has proposed granting the military next year – it cannot afford its current and supposedly inadequate spending in the first place. **Understanding this reality is paramount to a strategically wise and pragmatic foreign policy.** The Trump administration does not need to deploy more military assets to the Middle East to illegally strike Iran in the name of a half-baked regime change "strategy" that will likely [do little to change that regime](#). Washington does not owe Israel such a strategy, nor U.S. taxpayer funded defense for its poor choices – including bombing most of its neighbors with the understanding that Uncle Sam will always come to its rescue. A sound grand strategy understands that the Pacific and the Western Hemisphere are real strategic priorities for the United States. It does not accept creating problems in these important arenas in the name of adventurism in other parts of the world, especially considering the long list of U.S. failures in places like the Middle East. **To meet its interests where they truly count, U.S. officials should understand the risks of overextension, recognizing that Washington does not have the mandate, resources, or political capital to solve every global problem by military means.**

Great Power Wars are the only priority - we need to deter them at all costs, especially with emerging technology
Krepinevich 2020

Dr. Andrew, 2/5, Center for New American Security, Protracted Great Power War,

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/protracted-great-power-war>

This study provides preliminary observations and insights on the character and conduct of protracted great-power war.¹ It finds the U.S. Department of Defense is giving insufficient attention to preparing for such wars. **While the probability of an extended great-power war may be low, the costs involved in waging one would likely be extraordinarily high, making it an issue of strategic significance** for senior Defense Department

leaders. Arguably **the best way to avoid these costs is to demonstrate to great-power rivals that the United States is capable of prevailing in a protracted conflict.** Once the United States became an active world power, in the early 20th century, a great deal of intellectual effort and considerable resources were devoted to planning for an extended great-power war. **The primary purpose of these efforts was not to fight such a war but to avoid one, by discouraging prospective enemies from believing they could**

win. Even during the Cold War, when both superpowers possessed large nuclear arsenals, successive U.S. administrations sought to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the United States could wage an extended conventional war. Following the Cold War, planning for protracted great-power war contingencies was essentially abandoned. Now, however, **with the rise of revisionist China and Russia, the United States is confronted with a strategic choice: conducting contingency planning for a protracted great-power conflict** and how to wage it successfully (or, better still, prevent it from occurring), or ignoring the possibility and hoping for the best. Should they choose the former course of action, U.S. defense leaders and planners must understand the characteristics of contemporary protracted great-power war, which are likely to be far different from those of both recent conflicts and World War II—the last protracted great-power conflict. Why Do Great-Power Wars Become Protracted? Throughout history, several factors have contributed to the protraction of wars between great powers. One factor is great powers' strategic depth, which could make them difficult to defeat in a short period of time, or at all, as World War II Germany discovered when it invaded Soviet Russia in 1941. Another cause of protraction is belligerents' inability to strike directly at their enemies, as occurred in the Napoleonic Wars when Britain and France—the “whale” and the “elephant”—lacked the means to confront the other directly. In World War I, even after the horrific losses incurred by the great-power belligerents early on, a negotiated peace proved elusive, due in part to their need to achieve a victory sufficient to justify the enormous human suffering and material costs already sustained. Still another cause of protraction centers on the interest of third parties in keeping combat going. In making his pre-World War II pact with Adolf Hitler, for example, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin sought to benefit from a war of exhaustion between Nazi Germany and the Anglo-French alliance. A belligerent may also be encouraged to continue fighting in the hope that a major neutral power will come to its aid or that its enemy will lose the will to continue. For example, in the former case, during both world wars Britain was encouraged by the prospect of the United States' entering the war on its side. With regard to the latter case, during the U.S. Civil War the Confederacy continued to resist in part from a hope that a “peace candidate” would win the 1864 U.S. presidential election. The belligerents' war aims may also prolong a war. In the U.S. Civil War, for example, the two sides' aims were fundamentally at odds: The North sought to compel the rebellious states to rejoin the Union while the South sought to secede from the United States, leaving no room for compromise. A contemporary great-power war would be profoundly different in several ways from earlier such wars. The time elapsed between today and the start of World War II, 80 years, is roughly the same as the time between America's entry into World War II and the start of the American Civil War. Just as the combatants in the Civil War would have felt greatly out of place at Pearl Harbor, those who fought in World War II might feel disoriented in a contemporary great-power war. **Given the continued rapid advance of technology, a future protracted great-power war would likely produce surprises,** some of strategic significance.

Scenario Three: Internal Deterrence

Pre-funding veteran's benefits would dramatically increase the cost of conflict, reducing the likelihood the US goes to war, especially a big or protracted one

Cannon 2023

Michael, Director of Health Policy Studies, CATO Institute, 11/7, To protect service members and honor veterans, reform the VA,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/protect-service-members-honor-veterans-reform-va>

When Congress or the president commit troops to battle, the cost of providing veterans benefits to those troops rises. Veterans' benefits are one of the most expensive financial costs of any military conflict. The VA reports that the present value of just the compensation and burial benefits that Congress has promised to current veterans—not including health care, long-term care, or life insurance benefits—[reached](#) \$6.1 trillion in 2022. **If Congress funded those benefits at the moment it committed troops to battle, Members of Congress would approach that decision differently. Going to war would have required them to take the unpopular steps of spending less on other priorities or further increasing taxes. In marginal cases, pre-funding veterans' benefits could prevent unnecessary wars or end them sooner. That's not how Congress operates. Instead of funding veterans benefits at the moment it commits troops to battle, Congress waits until those bills come due. That is often decades later.**

Disability payments, for example, typically do not peak until [30 to 40 years](#) after the end of a military conflict. **This "pay as you go" approach allows Congress to ignore what may be the greatest financial cost of that decision.** It literally makes it easier for Congress to send active-duty personnel off to their deaths. **In marginal cases, such as whether to enter Iraq or when to leave Iraq and Afghanistan, it may well have changed the outcome. Congress should improve veterans benefits while eliminating the current system's perverse pro-war incentives. Congress should pre-fund veterans benefits by increasing active-duty pay. Pay increases should be large enough to enable all military personnel to purchase a standard package of private life, disability, and health insurance comparable to what the VA provides.** Pay increases should therefore vary according to the risks to which each service member's job category exposes them. Service members could then choose among private insurers that compete to offer them the best deal. Pegging salary increases to risk means that, when military action increases the risk of service-related illnesses, injuries, and death, **military pay would automatically rise to keep pace with the greater risk and the resulting higher insurance premiums. Military personnel would draw on that coverage after they leave the service.**

Privatization of the VHA would improve health care for veterans and nonveterans alike. The VHA is the largest integrated health system in the nation. Its financing and delivery system does not exist in most markets. Allowing the VHA to compete for non-veterans would force incumbent health care providers nationwide to improve on dimensions of quality where the VHA is strong and they are weak, like coordinating care, conducting effectiveness research, and offering conveniences like electronic communications, scheduling, and medical records. Congress should then repair the damage the VA's financing structure has done to current veterans by transferring ownership of the VHA to them. In 2021, the VA [estimated](#) the value of its physical capital and investments at \$36 billion. Privatizing the VHA would transfer those resources to veterans—and give the VHA's clients the choice of a health system run by veterans, for veterans. **The right reforms would deliver less war, fewer dead and disabled veterans, and better veterans' benefits.**

Adv Two: Civil-Military Relations

Civilian - Military Relations are low now - they're threatening our national security and democracy

Vindman 2024

Alex, Democracy, Winter, 2024, Vol. 71, Civil Military Relations: Repairing fractured Ties,
<https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/71/civil-military-relations-repairing-fractured-ties/>

What are **civil-military relations**? Simply put, they are the norms governing the interaction between civilian authorities and the uniformed military. The conventional model dictates that military leaders provide military advice to the civilian authorities who control the armed forces, and that the military remains a nonpartisan institution. It's no secret that these relations **are badly frayed right now. A significant body of research examining this phenomenon has emerged** in recent years, with studies coming from academics, military thought leaders, and think tanks. **The overarching conclusion from this body of work is that civil-military relations have worsened to such a point that their deterioration is starting to undermine the military's effectiveness in executing its core mission of national defense. This trend should be deeply concerning to all who support American democracy:** maintaining a delicate equilibrium between career military officers, who hold invaluable expertise and experience, and the elected civilian leadership, who ensure critical political accountability, is vital for our nation's security.

Cross apply Bensahel and Barno 2023 - there is a recruiting crisis now

And the all-volunteer military force is highly dependent on a small number of families to provide soldiers. This concentration threatens civilian - military relations.

Bensahel and Barno 2023

Nora and David, War on the Rocks, 3/10, Addressing the US Military Recruiting Crisis,
<https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/addressing-the-u-s-military-recruiting-crisis/>

Though the all-volunteer force has been a tremendous success by almost any measure, **it has one tremendous Achilles' heel: It created an ever-worsening gap between the U.S. military and the nation it serves.** As noted above, **the young people who are most likely to enlist in the U.S. military today are those who** know it the best — those who **have a relative, especially a parent, who is already serving.** **But that pool is far from large enough to support the long-term health of the force** — and Americans all around the country deserve to see and touch the remarkable military their tax dollars pay for. **Most Americans are deeply ignorant about the U.S. military, so expanding their personal connections with those in uniform is an important first step toward increasing propensity. Doing so will require the U.S. military to actively reach out to populations in ways that it simply has not done before.**

Scenario One: Adventurism

Separation between military and civilian populations risks democracy, military adventurism

Friend and Karlin 2018

Mara, Talbot Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, and Alice, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Senior Fellows, Brookings Institution, Military Worship hurt US

Democracy, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/military-worship-hurts-us-democracy/>

Toward the beginning of the 2012 novel Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk, a U.S. soldier on leave from the war in Iraq reflects on his encounters with civilians. "For so many of them, this is the Moment: His ordeal becomes theirs and vice versa... **They want**

autographs. They want cell phone snaps. They say thank you over and over." The book

explores how **civilians and military personnel caricature each other** and how the admiration on the part of those who have not served for those who have put on a uniform unwittingly puts an artificial distance between them. **The gap in civilian and military experiences in the United States over the 17 years since 9/11 has led to persuasive, persistent, and unrealistic myths that have eroded faith in civilian leadership of defense policy.** Among these myths are the superior virtue of military over other kinds of public service; that battlefield experience is the most authoritative source of military policy expertise; and that an exclusively civilian background is inadequate for strategic defense leadership. In the United States, these myths are nurtured and perpetuated by both military and civilian communities and affect general public opinion as well as the attitudes of national security professionals. **These myths are also corrosive. Unless they are acknowledged, addressed, and challenged, future civilian leaders may struggle to control the use of force—a profound problem for a democratic system.** Downgrading civilian leadership will weaken U.S. national security and the military itself. Downgrading

civilian leadership will weaken U.S. national security and the military itself. The myth with which the majority of Americans are most familiar is the notion that military service tops the hierarchy of civic duties. The Pew Research Center [found](#) in 2011 that 83 percent of American adults believe military personnel and their families have had to make sacrifices since 9/11, but at the same time less than half the population believes the American public has shared the burden of war. The kernel of truth underlying this perception has grown into a sense that there is a deficit on the civilian side of U.S. society. Private companies have picked up on the desire for social penitence and run with it. Think of the advertisements around major televised sports events expressing gratitude to those deployed overseas, such as the [Hyundai car company ad](#) that connected service members based in Zagan, Poland, with loved ones during the 2017 Super Bowl. In the TV spot, deployed service members sit surrounded by a 360-degree screen that enables them to watch the game as if they were alongside their families. There are more quotidian examples as well. Veterans are often offered early boarding for airplanes. Harris Teeter grocery stores provide preferred parking for veterans. Veterans' issues top the list for dozens of major charities and are included among the charitable giving priorities of corporate foundations. On the one hand, this is all as it should be: Admiring and expressing gratitude for military service, especially in wartime, is simply the right thing for a society to do. The problem is that admiration for military service eclipses respect for other national-level institutions and other forms of service. In today's polarized political environment, the chasm has put those in uniform in the awkward position of embodying civic virtue. Veterans themselves are uneasy about this role. Many do not relish it, recognizing that the public tends to outsource not just the fighting of war but also the understanding of it to service members. A Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation poll of veterans [found](#) in 2013 that nearly half believe the American public doesn't genuinely respect their service. Writing in 2014, Carl Forsling [expressed](#) this frustration. "I don't want to board the airplane first. I don't want your first-class seat. I don't want free admission to amusement parks...It only allows Americans to assuage their guilt and feeds an outsized sense of entitlement among many veterans." Talking to a [New York Times reporter](#) in 2015, another veteran ventured that when a non-veteran thanks him for his service, it is akin to saying, "I haven't thought about any of this." In their 2016 book, Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, Kori Schake and now Defense Secretary James Mattis found [worrisome evidence](#) that the American public holds unquestioning, and largely uninformed, faith in the military as an institution and a profession. **Only 22 percent of**

Americans are very familiar with the military, and nearly half think the president should "leave the details of military plans to the generals" when the United States is at war. A 2017 [Gallup poll](#) found Americans' trust in the military is more than twice what it is for the presidency and six times higher than faith in Congress. Put together, these trends mean the military's monopoly on public confidence may be generating both an abdication of civic involvement on the part of civilians and the establishment of a right to override civilian input on the part of the military. **The Trump administration has already used this idea to shut down conversation on defense policy and the use of military force.** "If you want to get into a debate with a four-star Marine general," White House press secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders [commented](#) last fall in response to questions about White House chief of staff John Kelly's remarks on the deployment of military forces to Niger, "that's highly inappropriate."

Scenario Two: Modeling:

Dangerous erosion of civilian control of the military occurs when trust in the military is high, trust in politicians are low, and civilian-military tensions are high. It spills over and undermines democracy globally.

Beliakova, Tufts University, 2021

Polina, PHD Candidate, Tufts University, Texas National Security Review, Erosion by Deference: Civilian Control and the Military in policymaking, Vol 4, Iss 3 Summer, Pg. 55-75

<https://tnsr.org/2021/06/erosion-by-deference-civilian-control-and-generals-in-policymaking/>

I also specify **the conditions that enable** or spark certain mechanisms of **erosion, including high and growing popular trust in the military, low and decreasing popular approval of the executive, the executive's departure from previously stated policy goals, high civil-military tensions, and a degree of convergence between civilian and military preferences.** Using detailed case studies from the Trump, Clinton, and Bush (43) administrations, I demonstrate the analytical utility of the new concept of erosion by deference and its drivers. The Trump administration case provides a data-rich research context in which most of the conditions making erosion by deference likely are present. Therefore, studying this case allows for the observance of all three abovementioned drivers of deference while keeping historical, cultural, and personalistic variables constant. The addition of the Clinton and Bush administrations shows that, while the degree and scope of erosion by deference under Trump was unprecedented, this phenomenon is produced by factors outside just the executive's personality. The article then analyzes the qualitative and quantitative evidence for the erosion of civilian control by deference under the Trump administration, showing how delegating policymaking tasks to the military weakened civilian control. The concluding discussion suggests that **erosion of civilian control by deference is relevant outside the United States and is especially alarming for states with high societal trust in the military, populist leadership, and an overall tendency for democratic backsliding.** Why Is Deference a Problem? Before answering the central question of this study, it is important to discuss why **civilian deference to the military in policymaking is problematic, especially in democratic regimes.** To begin, **civilian control of the military is a necessary attribute of democratic governance** and a crucial step in democratization.¹¹ **The actors that control the military in democracies** — be they the executive, the legislature, or both — **acquire legitimacy through public participation in elections.**¹² In addition, besides preventing coups and assuring subordination, democratic **civilian control requires civilian dominance in policymaking.**¹³ including relying on civilian expertise in national security and foreign policy.¹⁴ Thus, while civilian dominance in policymaking is optional for autocracies, it is an essential requirement in democracies.

Democratic consolidation prevents extinction**Diamond, UCLA, 1995**

Larry, UCLA Professor, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm>)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. **Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons**

continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are

associated with or aggravated by **the weakness** or absence **of democracy**, with its provisions for legality,

accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century

offers important lessons. **Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another**. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their

leaders. **Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations**, and they

are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. **They do not**

build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for

investment. **They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their**

own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better

bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to

breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights,

and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity

can be built.

Scenario Three: Deterrence

CMR's key to military effectiveness and readiness

Hoffman, Retired Military, 2007

Frank, retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, December 2007, "Bridging the civil-military gap," Armed Forces Journal, online: <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/12/3144666>

What Ricks detected has not gone away, and it may have been extended. Several reports suggest the gap between an all-volunteer force and the rest of America is widening. One non-academic assessment detected "a kind of embattled alienation, and perhaps even a creeping sense of superiority" emerging in today's military. Other reports suggest a growing degree of mistrust, misunderstanding and overt resentment. Additionally, the military's isolation from its larger civilian component, via its professional educational system and its enclaves around the U.S., has become an issue. Such a cultural divide might weaken the long-term support the military enjoys among the body politic. But it may also negatively affect the ability to recruit and maintain a strong and effective military. An astute but sympathetic Robert Kaplan warns that "a military will not continue to fight and fight well for a society that could be losing faith in itself, even if that society doffs its cap now and again to its warrior class."

Cross Apply Impact from Advantage One

Scenario Four: Domestic Terrorism

And we're approaching a crisis in Civilian-Military Relations which undermines military deployments, increases terrorism and domestic unrest

Vansandt, Catholic University of Louvain, 2019

James, The Relationship between the American People and its Military: The Growing Divide since Operation Iraqi Freedom. Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication, Université catholique de Louvain, 2019. Prom. : Michel Liègeois.

<http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/thesis:21554>

In the United States, there is a perception of a growing divide between the American military and the population. To explore the topic, James Mattis – former 4-star general and Secretary of Defense – published Soldiers and Citizens in 2016, and he later commissioned a study at the Department of Defense (DoD) to form a National

Commission to Explore the Civil-Military Divide and Military Service Policy Options. 2 Politicians, general officers, and national security writers sounded the alarm of **a shift from the American public's sense of duty and obligation to serve in the military – only half of one percent of Americans have served on active duty in the last decade.**³ Secretary Mattis' concern is well-founded, as seen in recent headlines: Foreign Policy reported that **"Civil Military Relations haven't been this Bad in Decades."**⁴ the Los Angeles Times warned that **"U.S. Military and Civilians Are Increasingly Divided,"**⁵ a think-tank researcher declared that **"Those serving in the U.S. Military Don't Actually Represent the Country as a Whole"**⁶ and Stars and Stripes cautioned "Pentagon: Military-Civilian Disconnect Could Endanger All-Volunteer Force."⁷ Senior military officials like

Generals Mattis, Petraeus, and McChrystal, as well as civilian leaders like Secretary Leon Panetta and Ambassadors Karl Eikenberry and Ryan Crocker have all commented on the subject of civ-mil relations. The U.S. Military Academy, Army War College, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and numerous think tanks have held symposiums and panels to discuss the issues regarding modern civ-mil relations in the United States. Thus, if **the brightest minds and leaders of both the civilian and military establishments are concerned about a divide in civ-mil relations,** then the subject is surely worth exploring. This paper will examine this perceived divide, the causes of the divide – whether real or imagined – and possible solutions to bridge the gap. This paper hypothesizes that **the perceived civilian-military divide since 2003 is a result of American reliance on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF),** the types of modern wars fought by the U.S., and the American reliance on technology. Under the current system of American government and employment of armed force, **the United States military must be able to draw upon its population for support – recruitment to fill the ranks,** sympathetic politicians for budgetary allocation, and domestic and

political support for overseas deployments. **If this support link is broken completely, then the U.S. could find itself extremely vulnerable to competitors, nonstate actors, and domestic unrest.** In this context, the study will seek to answer the following: Since the Iraq invasion of 2003, how does the use of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), modern warfare, and development in armament technologies combine to create a greater divide – imagined or real – between the American military and the American people? If this question can be adequately answered, then perhaps viable solutions could be proposed.

Americans are being slaughtered, we must confront the terrorist threat**Simon and Sidner, Reporters, 2019**

Mallory and Sara, May 15th, CNN, Tackle White Supremacy as Terrorism, experts say,

<https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/14/us/white-supremacy-terrorism-soh/index.html>**Americans are being killed.** Murdered not for what they have done or being in the wrong place at the wrong time.**Slaughtered again and again because, whether Jewish, or black, or simply not "pure" white, they are seen as a pestilence to be purged. Their murderers are followers of a vile and hateful ideology that meets the FBI definition of terrorism.** But some top current and former lawenforcement officials say that they are not treated as terrorists, because they are American, and they are white. But **amid the rising number of deadly white supremacist attacks,** the officials say **that must change.****White supremacy must be called terrorism and tackled with the same vigor as ISIS and al Qaeda.** Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance came to that realization while investigating the homicide of a black man in the

center of New York City. 66-year-old Timothy Caughman was walking alone in Midtown Manhattan collecting cans to recycle when a man approached from behind. That man plunged a sword through Caughman's chest. Caughman uttered his last words as he turned toward his killer: "Why are you doing this?" The man continued to stab him. Caughman bled to death. The answer to

Caughman's question would soon become clear. His killer, James Jackson, had come to New York from Maryland with **a plan to start a race war.** This was more than a murder, Vance decided. It was more than a hate crime. It was the targeted killing of ablack man **with the aspiration of dividing the races to keep killing each other,** ending in the death of every black person in the United States and around the world, according to Jackson's manifesto, Vance said. The case was a seminal one for the district attorney's office and for New York state, where it was the first domestic terrorism conviction of its kind.

Vance hopes it sends a message. "I think we needed to call it what it was," he told CNN. "This was an act of terrorism," Vance explained. "This exists in our country and it happened here." Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance charged a white supremacist with a domestic terrorism charge. It's just that Americans are having a hard time admitting it, he said. It is much easier, Vance continued, for people to call someone a terrorist when they have a different skin color, or don't speak English. But if you are trying to spread fear and wipe out a specific group of people, like Jackson was, then you must call them terrorist, he said. Calling someone a terrorist not only raises the profile of the case but can yield additional charges, and higher sentences. On the face of it, the killing of Caughman fits into the FBI's category of "domestic terrorism": Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with primarily US-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature. Caughman's murder may not have sparked a national outcry. But it is part of a very public and growing, deadly trend of domestic

terror attacks committed largely by white men. **From the Charleston church massacre through the killing of a protester in Charlottesville and the shootings at synagogues in Pittsburgh and****Poway, far-right extremists are responsible for -- or suspected of - most of the ideological killings in America in the last 10 years,** according to data from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), which tracks

extremist activity.

White supremacist epistemology is a socio-political system of domination that is the root cause of normalized oppressive hierarchies

Seawright, University of Utah 2014

Gardner, Educational Studies, November, Settler Traditions of Place: Making explicit the epistemological legacy of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism for Place Based Education, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280213813_Settler_Traditions_of_Place_Making_Explicit_the_Epistemological_Legacy_of_White_Supremacy_and_Settler_Colonialism_for_Place-Based_Education

Charles Mills (1998) suggests that **white supremacy can be seen as a sociopolitical system, and a “particular mode of domination, with its special norms for allocating benefits and burdens, rights and duties;** its own ideology; and an internal, at least semi-autonomous logic that influences law, culture, and consciousness,” and as a conception that “encompasses de facto as well as de jure white privilege and refers more broadly to the European domination of the planet that has left us with the racialized distributions of economic, political, and cultural power that we have today” (98). **Central to this white supremacy is a particular conception of the rational social actor** who is driven toward ownership and the domination of nature, subsequently including a unique understanding of personhood in relation to “nature.” Mills explains the parameters of Western society’s rational social actor in his discussions of the operative herrenvolk ethic. The herrenvolk, or **master race ethic, is part of the epistemic package associated with white supremacy,** which facilitates the “cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement” (Mills 1997, 18). To properly situate this ethic, the social epistemology that serves as its foundation must be briefly explained. The **white social epistemology is part of a social contract dictating the norms and regulations at the foundation of dominant society.** In the case of the United States, **the social contract is infused with intersecting forms of domination and social control (patriarchy, white supremacy, heteronormativity, human supremacy, citizenship and civility;** Mills 1997; Pateman 1988; Pateman and Mills 2007). The social contract in question contains within it **the social technologies for the epistemic normalization of socially constructed hierarchies, as well as the impetus for dominant society to reinvest, reproduce, and valorize the status quo. Put simply, the social contract endeavors to teach people how to be oppressors and how to be the oppressed.**

Scenario Five: Democracy

Trump will strain civil-military relations - they need to be strong to withstand his authoritarian tendencies

Nichols 2025

Tom. The Atlantic, The Civil-Military crisis is here.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/newsletters/archive/2025/10/civil-military-crisis-trump-hegseth/684486/>

Trump and his valet at the Defense Department, Secretary of [Physical Training](#) Pete **Hegseth, are now making a dedicated run at turning the men and women of the armed forces into Trump's personal and partisan army. In his first term,** Trump regularly violated the sacred American tradition of the military's political neutrality, but **people around him**—including retired and active-duty [generals](#) such as James [Mattis](#), John Kelly, and [Mark Milley](#)—**restrained some of his worst impulses. Now no one is left to stop him:** The president learned from his first-term struggles and this time has surrounded himself with a Cabinet of sycophants and ideologues rather than advisers, especially those at the [Pentagon](#). He has declared war on Chicago; called Portland, Oregon, a "[war zone](#)"; and referred to his political opponents as "[the enemy from within](#)." **Trump clearly wants to use military power to exert more control over the American people, and soon, top U.S.-military commanders may have to decide whether they will refuse such orders from the commander in chief. The greatest crisis of American civil-military relations in modern history is now under way.** I write these words with great trepidation. When I was a professor at the Naval War College, I gave lectures to American military officers about the sturdiness of civil-military relations in the United States, a remarkable [historical achievement](#) that has allowed the most powerful military in the world to serve democracy without being a threat to it. I so revered this system that I went to Moscow just before the fall of the U.S.S.R. and told an audience of Soviet military officers that they should look to the American military as a model for how to disentangle themselves from the Communist Party and Kremlin politics. I regularly reminded both my military students and civilian audiences that they had good reason to have faith in American institutions and the constitutional loyalty of U.S. civilian and military leaders. This new and dangerous moment has arrived for many reasons, including Trump's antics in front of young soldiers and sailors, through which he has succeeded in pulling many of them into displays of partisan behavior that are both an insult to American civil-military traditions and a violation of military regulations. Senior military leaders should have stepped in to prevent Trump from turning addresses at [Fort Bragg](#) and [Naval Station Norfolk](#) into political rallies; the silence of the Army and Navy secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and some top generals and admirals is appalling. To their credit, those same [officers listened impassively](#) as Trump and Hegseth subjected them to political rants during a meeting at [Quantico](#) last week. But young enlisted people and their immediate superiors take their cues from the top, and one day of decorum from the high command cannot reverse Trump's influence on the rank and file. Trump's rhetoric in his speeches to the military has been awful—he has ridiculed former [commanders in chief](#), castigated sitting [elected officials](#), and told the members of America's armed forces that other Americans are their enemies. But his actions are worse. In deploying troops to American cities, he has set up a [confrontation](#) in which military commanders may soon have to choose between obeying the president and obeying the law. "This is a nation of Constitutional law, not martial law," Judge [Karin Immergut](#)—a conservative Trump appointee—[wrote](#) last week when she blocked Trump's attempt to send troops to Portland. The White House aide [Stephen Miller](#) likely foreshadowed Trump's next moves, including possibly ignoring such rulings, when he lashed out at Immergut's decision. Miller, a man who hates being called a [fascist](#), made the fascist [accusation](#) that a "large and growing movement of leftwing terrorism in this country" is being "shielded by far-left Democrat judges, prosecutors and attorneys general." Trump's attempt to [militarize](#) America's cities is still being tested in court. But he has already issued other orders that are likely illegal. The president has determined—on his own—that he can go to [war](#) against "narco-terrorists," and he has furthermore decided that he can order the military to blow up these suspected drug runners at will. Several boats have been destroyed and many people have been killed, but neither [American law](#) nor international law (including agreements signed by the United States) allow the president to declare a fugazy drug war and then direct the summary execution of people who are not in actual hostilities with the United States and who pose no imminent threat to American lives. The Pentagon keeps fulfilling these orders, but [reports](#) are already surfacing that some military commanders are trying to figure out if they face legal exposure for acting as Trump's personal hit squad. Their questions are likely more difficult to answer since Trump and Hegseth fired the top [military lawyers](#) who would have helped field such queries. **Trump, of course, doesn't care all that much about Venezuelan speedboats or costumed pranksters in Portland. He cares about power,** which is why he is determined to flex military muscle on the streets of American cities. **As opposition grows and his popularity falls, Trump may be tempted to issue orders to the military that will be aimed at suppressing dissent, or disrupting elections,** or [detaining political figures](#); he has already floated the idea of invoking the [Insurrection Act](#), which could enable such actions.

Framework:

Apocalyptic Rhetoric Good

Apocalyptic Rhetoric motivates action and helps us imagine a better world.

Recuber Hunter College, 2011

Timothy, PHD Candidate, Professor, "CONSUMING CATASTROPHE: AUTHENTICITY AND EMOTION IN MASS-MEDIATED DISASTER" gradworks.umi.com/3477831.pd

Perhaps, then, what distant consumers express when they sit glued to the television watching a disaster replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, is a deep, maybe subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community and real human compassion that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, the actions of unadulterated goodwill that become commonplace in harrowing conditions represent the truly authentic form of humanity that all of us, to one degree or another, chase after in contemporary consumer culture every day. And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related media and culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in the public's response to all the disasters, crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—all attest to a desire for real human community and compassion that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today. In the end, the consumption of disaster doesn't make us unable or unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends—it makes us feel as if we already have, simply by consuming. It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, the positive political potential underlying such consumption—the desire for real forms of connection and community—remains the most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism. Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars. They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public, to exert real agency over the policies made in the name of their safety and security. And, when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors, by strangers in their communities, and even by distant spectators and consumers, will be matched by their own government.

Existential Threats Come 1st

Existential threats need to be prevented first, no trial and error and future generations
Bostrom, Yale University, 2002

Nick, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9 - March 2002, <http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html>

The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: ***Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable.** Rather, we must take a proactive approach. **This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs** (moral and economic) of such actions.

*We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. **Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.**[5] **Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat.**

*Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. ***If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied** by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16].

Realism is good and inevitable

Debating practical security questions improves future policy and avoids conflict

Walt, University of Chicago, 1991

Stephen Professor of Political Science, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p. 229-30

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well placed to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations the produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence.

Realism is inevitable, and learning about how realists think and their language is valuable to challenging their worst assumptions

Guzzini, Central European University, 1998

Stefano, Professor of Political Science ("Conclusion: the fragmentation of realism," Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415144027, p. 212)

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

Public Support for Heg

Failure of public support for sustained great power competition is an existential threat - we need to make the case to the people

Krepinevich 2020

Dr. Andrew, 2/5, Center for New American Security, Protracted Great Power War,

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/protracted-great-power-war>

In a democracy, it is essential to develop and sustain popular support for a long-term competition that involves periods of peace but also **the possibility of protracted conflict** between the great powers—**especially if a key U.S. security objective is to avoid such a conflict and the enormous costs it would almost certainly incur in waging it. Toward this end, an effort should be made to explore in depth the effects of protracted war** on the United States and on other great-power societies. Senior national security **leaders**, including the commander in chief, **must make the case for U.S. defense preparedness to the American people.**

CMR Ed Key

Learning about CMR is key to preserving democracy and security

Vindman 2024

Alex, Democracy, Winter, 2024, Vol. 71, Civil Military Relations: Repairing fractured Ties,

<https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/71/civil-military-relations-repairing-fractured-ties/>

First, **education stands as a cornerstone of remedying the growing divide.** Military academies, professional military educational institutions, and civilian universities should emphasize the importance of preserving civil-military boundaries. **By ensuring that future military and civilian leaders alike are well versed in the historical context and contemporary significance of these relations, we lay the groundwork for a future where mutual respect and understanding can thrive.** Second, on the political front, politicians must resist the temptation to exploit the military for partisan gain. However, we cannot trust them to make this important decision for themselves. This goal might be achieved through instituting Department of Defense guidelines for uniformed military personnel and senior military retirees and passing legislation that strictly limits the use of military personnel and symbols in political events and campaigns. By keeping the military nonpartisan, we safeguard it from becoming a pawn in the hands of opportunistic civilian leaders. Third and finally, it is essential to foster open dialogue and promote an environment where service members can express their concerns without fear of retribution. Allowing active-duty officers to speak out about potentially illegal actions by politicians, as I did several years ago, and protecting them against any resulting attacks will lead to constructive outcomes. No other officer should face the attacks I did for doing what is right. **The erosion of civil-military relations is not just a challenge; it is an existential crisis tied to the very health of our democracy and national security. By embracing solutions that prioritize education,** political restraint, and open dialogue, **we can mend the growing chasm** and ensure that both civilian and military entities work cohesively to uphold the democratic ideals upon which the United States was founded.

Draft Inevitable:

1. Extend **Bensahel and Barno 2023, and Badow 2023 - a draft is coming now**
2. **That means you should refuse to conceptualize the debate space as anything other than a military-training program – military scholarship linearly decreases war casualties - that makes our model the net best for debater's livelihoods outside of the debate space in our future dystopia**

Toronto 2015

Nathan W. associate professor of Strategy and Security Studies at the United Arab Emirates National Defense College. E-International Relations." *E*, 26 May 2015, <https://www.e-ir.info/author/nathan-w-toronto/>

Does Military Education Matter? What is the relationship between military education and battlefield success? Experts have pointed to unit cohesion, numerical superiority, and technology, effective leadership, or ideology to explain battlefield success, but **fewer** scholars have **acknowledged** the **role of military education** (Schifferle, 2010; Matheny, 2011). Military education does not seem essential for motivating a squad of soldiers to repress all natural human instincts and clear a house full of booby traps and bad ~~guys~~ [people], and it can be argued that Dwight Eisenhower did not succeed as commander of Allied forces in WWII because he came in first in his class at Fort Leavenworth, but because he had natural political instincts that would have led to his success anyway. While senior military leaders have emphasized the importance of military education (Dempsey, 2012), these doubts and similar doubts about military education are a persistent refrain in uniformed and civilian ranks (Peters, 2007; Anonymous, 2012; Kelley and Johnson-Freese, 2013; Metz, 2013; see also Ricks, 2013; McGivern, 2014). If military education is of limited battlefield value, however, then why do militaries spend so much money and time on it? **Military education is valuable because it provides an intellectual architecture for battlefield success. It contributes to stable civil-military relations, a culture of reflection, and a capacity for analysis.** This article specifies these conceptual links between military education and battlefield success, and then suggests statistical correlations linking military education and battlefield success. The main point of this exercise is that questioning the purpose of military education is like questioning the purpose of education, period. National education systems are chock full of students who think they are taking useless general education classes, just as there will always be officers who question why they have to go to military schools. The reason is that, regardless of what people do, education helps them do it better. Military education matters because it **cultivates** an aspiration to **excellence**. This is especially true for military education, because **the military usually only has to fix things when they are truly broken, like combating Ebola in West Africa, battling Islamic State, or conducting humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations.** We do not give the military the easy problems. We give them the hardest possible problems we can find. **This nettlesome environment requires a daunting command of everything from book-learned knowledge of history and social science to hard-won experience from the world's remotest battlefields** and military headquarters. Military officers get this through their education, not only by being exposed to new ideas in the classroom, but also by reflecting on their experience in new ways. **Military education becomes a 'force multiplier,'** meaning that it magnifies the positives in what the military is already doing (Lamb and Porro, 2014). However, war is complex. It will always be the province of reason and passion and chance (Clausewitz, 1989[1832]), so it is unreasonable to expect that more military education will always lead to more military success. This article proposes reasons why military education is related to military success, but the claim is probabilistic. **Military education is not an insurance policy against failure, but it is likely to establish the conditions for military success.** Military effectiveness in modern land warfare Military education helps establish the conditions for military success by creating the intellectual architecture to make military operations more effective, and to do so on a continual basis. To assess this assertion, let us examine, briefly, military effectiveness in modern land warfare. The principal tactical problem of modern land warfare is how to survive the lethality of the battlefield longer than an opposing force. Biddle (2004) argues that the most effective military organizations do this by employing the modern system of military tactics. This modern system is characterized by effective communication and coordination between different combat arms (such as armor, infantry, artillery, and air power) in order to maintain the initiative and exploit an opponent's inability to maneuver. For example, artillery barrages roll forward, with infantry advancing behind, squads leapfrogging one another, alternating between moving forward and stopping to lay down suppressive fire on enemy positions. Another example would be creating enough depth in defensive lines and keeping sufficiently mobile forces in reserve to blunt an enemy advance if it achieves breakthrough. The US Army calls this tactical system 'combined arms maneuver', and it is the predominant solution to the lethality problem in large-unit land warfare, or the kind of warfare that has prevailed to date in Iraq, Syria, and eastern Ukraine. But not all land combat is conducted by large units seeking to out-manuever an opponent. Sometimes military units spread out over a wide area in order to neutralize an insurgency. Tactical engagements involve smaller-sized units, but when they do occur the objective is still to make the battlefield more lethal for foe than friend. How to do this when firepower cannot be massed (rolling artillery barrages and civilians do not mix well) and when it

is not clear in which direction the forces should move (the front is all around you)? Informed by the US Army's 'wide area security' concept, one solution is to use time between engagements to gather intelligence on enemy combatants, and then use precision munitions or raids to eliminate or capture them. Close air support with precision munitions can dramatically increase the lethality of the battlefield for the enemy when engagements occur, and friendly forces can maintain initiative by drawing the enemy into engagements at the most favorable time, when the enemy's logistics and ~~manpower~~ resources are strained, and when friendly forces are sufficiently massed. Wide area security is still warfare by maneuver, but it is conceived differently than for combined arms maneuver warfare (Demarest, 2011). It is the type of warfare that has prevailed to date in northern Nigeria and its environs, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Afghanistan. The intellectual architecture of military excellence How does military education create the 'intellectual architecture' to make military organizations better at performing these types of tasks? The answer has to do with aspiring to excellence. When military education includes critical thinking, it contributes to excellence throughout a military organization. Over the years, I have discussed assessments of foreign militaries with dozens of American and allied military officers, and this notion of excellence has been a consistent theme. This is, essentially, inductive theory-building, so it should be regarded as a starting point, not an ending point. These informal (though prolonged) discussions suggest three characteristics of an intellectual architecture of military excellence. The first characteristic is stable civil-military relations, and civil-military relations that allow space for the military to develop its expertise, as well as a specified role for the military in setting security policy and establishing spending priorities (Huntington, 1957; Toronto, 2015). The key point is not that the military should control these policy and spending priorities, but that the military's role in this process be well defined. For example, in the United States the Department of Defense submits budget requests to the White House, but does not act on those spending priorities without Congressional approval. Elements of the US military, both individual officers and Pentagon officials, also contribute to a vibrant discussion on the nation's security policies, at least those policies related to the military's mission. What is more, the US military has very wide latitude in training and equipping its forces. As an element of civil-military relations, this latitude is just as important as stability in contributing to military excellence. But this is not the only characteristic of an aspiration to excellence. A culture of reflection also plays a role. In the United Kingdom, this culture of reflection often plays out in formal legislative oversight (UK Prime Minister, 2010), where the military publicly evaluates its own performance, but this culture of reflection also percolates from national, strategic spheres down to tactical ones. For example, the US Army has a Center for Army Lessons Learned that collects and disseminates lessons that soldiers learn from the battlefield, but junior officers also use resources like War on the Rocks and Small Wars Journal to share lessons from combat. A reflective military looks at itself and its performance, and often undertakes rigorous training regimes to consistently improve its competence, including exercises that practice integration between tactical and strategic decision makers, and exercises that operate on a twenty-four hour basis, instead of just eight hours per day (GlobalSecurity.org, 2015; Losey, 2015; NTC, 2015). Having a culture of reflection does not mean that military operations will always result in unmitigated success, but it does mean that **a military can**

learn from its mistakes and train itself to avoid them in the future (Nagl, 2005). In addition to having stable civil-military relations and a culture of reflection, militaries with an aspiration to excellence also cultivate a **capacity for critical analysis**. In fact, the most **effective militaries** seem to **integrate critical analysis into school curricula** and planning processes. Beginning prior to WWII, for example, the UK military developed its 'estimate of the situation' at all levels of military planning; British officers are now well-versed in the 'seven questions' they are to ask while planning military operations (UK MOD 2010: 6-15–6-17). The US Army has its 'design methodology' and the 'military decision making process', which fulfill similar functions (US Army, 2012). Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the hardest-hitting questions in classroom discussions and after lectures to come from officers who have spent time in combat. During the years I taught for the US Army, armor officers would consistently rail against the inability of crews to meet the tank gunnery standards necessary to be effective in combined arms maneuver warfare. This is not about disgruntled officers seeking out opportunities to step on a soapbox, but about them having an opportunity to examine elements of warfare that the military was not then participating in. Military organizations do not double as graduate school seminars, but manifesting a capacity for critical thinking seems to go hand-in-hand with the aspiration to military excellence. So, an aspiration to excellence—stable civil-military relations, a culture of reflection, and a capacity for critical analysis—is the conceptual link between military education and military effectiveness. In fact, this aspiration to excellence may be the key for states to implement Biddle's (2004) modern system of military tactics. Biddle does not specify the conditions and causes of adopting the modern system of tactics, but I contend that developing this aspiration to excellence is a crucial step in this pathway. We might even call the aspiration to excellence the 'modern system of military thinking', constituting as it does the intellectual architecture behind adopting Biddle's modern system of tactics. Again, while doing so is no guarantee, militaries that adopt this modern system of military thinking are more likely to experience military success. History presents important challenges to this notion that the modern system of military thinking is the link between military education and battlefield success. For example, the German military was regarded as one of the most proficient operationally in the seventy years after the Franco-Prussian War, but German strategic blunders undermined victory in two world wars. The US military has arguably been the most effective force in the post-9/11 world (Anonymous, 2014), but this did not translate into strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is the point of being militarily effective if it does not result in political victory? The answer, of course, is that military success should be defined as political victory, while remembering that war is the province of passion and chance, as well as reason. **Military education is a sensible risk mitigation**

strategy, but it is incumbent on advocates of military education to demonstrate the links to victory.

Statistical plausibility This leads to a corollary question: if adopting the modern system of military thinking is the link between military education and military success, then how much of the modern system of military thinking (or the aspiration to excellence) is enough? Knowing the answer to this question would help countries decide when to stop spending on military education and start focusing on military effectiveness. While we can identify indicators of having adopted the modern system of military thinking, these measures will be inherently unsatisfying from a systemic perspective. Large-n statistics can inform theory-building in this case, but verifying the theory against empirical evidence will also require in-depth qualitative analysis.

Systems, by definition, are more holistic than statistical indicators. A brief glance at a **statistical plausibility probe shows** how **this is the case**. I have conducted a large-n analysis correlating **elements of military education with military effectiveness**. This is the **peer-review equivalent** of a back-of-the-envelope calculation, so it should not be considered definitive. Full descriptions of the data used here can be found in Toronto (2015). This back-of-the-envelope calculation uses two indicators of military education—the number of national military academies and the number of military periodicals published—and correlates them with the number of

battle deaths per year of inter-state combat (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). The data set reports one observation per country per war, and begins after World War I, when the need for the modern system of tactics became obvious. My working hypothesis is that **more military education** (more military academies, more military periodicals) **is associated with military effectiveness (fewer battle deaths per year of combat).**

2AC Evidence

Inherency:

Veterans need respect and effective healthcare

Stand Together 2026

Veterans Advocacy Organization, When It comes to veteran healthcare, why aren't we doing better?

<https://standtogether.org/stories/foreign-policy/when-it-comes-to-veteran-health-care-why-arent-we-doing-better>

In June, the [VA MISSION Act](#), a law that promised expanded health care options for vets, marked its fifth year. **The MISSION Act was intended to expand community care, urgent care, and telehealth for our nation's heroes. However, its execution by the current VA secretary has been "a colossal failure,"** said John Byrnes, strategic director for Concerned Veterans for America. "Everybody thought it was a good bill in terms of getting what we wanted, which was the 'community care access standard' requirement," Byrnes said. **In theory, it was good, but a combination of bureaucratic resistance and fumbled implementation by the current government administration made it ineffective. Veterans are still struggling to access quality, timely health care, with many self-funding private options instead.** Of the [18 million veterans](#) currently in the United States, [more than 9 million](#) are enrolled in **the VA health care system** — a system that **has a history of inappropriately prescribing medications for PTSD and other mental health conditions and where the nearest available provider could be 100 miles away.** This doesn't just harm veterans. It perpetuates a standard of communities across the country failing to help each other heal and thrive to their full potential. "I didn't feel welcome," Villarreal said. "I felt very, very uncomfortable. It can feel like that for a lot of veterans. If you don't have a support system, you don't know where to go. You don't know what to do." The question we're left with is: Where do we go from here? And how can we better uplift not just our veterans, but all of our communities? For those returning from war, more than basic care is needed. Part of the reason the VA's lackluster performance is so damaging is that veterans often grapple with unique difficulties from their experience. "When you're in active duty, you don't have time to process any kind of traumatic experience that you might have," said Villarreal. "When you slow down, the emptiness comes in. ... the silence comes in, and the issues begin to surface." When she returned to civilian life, Villarreal needed treatment for these mental health concerns, as well as for asthma induced by chemical exposure in the field. Also on her list were brain cysts, migraines, and physical therapy — just to start. Her options were far from ideal. The nearest VA hospital she was eligible for was three hours from her home. The outpatient clinics in her vicinity weren't equipped for many services and had limited availability. The clinic nearest her had a one-star rating and no women's health care. Villarreal realized just how critical her situation was when she learned about the cysts on her brain. She wasn't told that these required regular monitoring and MRIs every six months. Her VA providers also didn't alert her that her condition was urgent — despite her complaints of hearing loss and severe migraines. "They failed me there," she said. "It would have been resolved so quickly if I could have gone out to the community to get an MRI, but I had to drive 240 miles to the VA facility where they offered MRIs." When Villarreal's mental and physical health struggles grew so bad that she began having suicidal ideations, she didn't know where to turn. She didn't feel comfortable going to a VA health care provider, but she also didn't have private insurance. "I was desperate," she said. Instead of using VA-provided health care, she was forced to pay out of pocket for mental health services for an entire year before becoming eligible for private insurance. Today, she marvels that her private insurance gives her access to the accountability, flexibility, and attention the MISSION Act should have provided. "I can call my private primary care doctor today and say, 'Hey, I need to see you,' and I get there in 30 minutes," she said. "It's way easier for me to use private insurance than it was when I only had access to VA health care. I don't have to fight for anything that I need." Villarreal is fortunate to have access to private insurance. **For many other veterans, the VA system is their only option. Without access to quality, timely care, many are left to struggle and suffer through debilitating mental and physical injuries. When they don't receive the care they need, they can't pursue the life they want for themselves. That means entire communities are deprived of their potential — and we all suffer.** A reason for hope and healing

Despite the glaring problems with the VA health care system, Villarreal and Byrnes believe **change is possible and imminent.** For all of its faults, the MISSION Act did include the essential tenets needed to ensure comprehensive care for veterans — it was simply implemented poorly. It would likely involve a yearslong bureaucratic struggle to revamp the MISSION Act; instead, veterans and their communities are looking to other avenues for the advocacy they need and deserve. Concerned Veterans for America is pushing for many improvements to health care for veterans, including more transparency and education around community care options, **allowing veterans to choose between a provider they select or one from the VA system, codified standards, and more flexible benefits.** **"The best medical needs of the patient must be determined by the patient and their doctor, not by some bureaucracy a thousand miles away,"** Byrnes said.

"We're trying to get all of those access standards enshrined into law." In particular, CVA advocates for the [Veterans' Health Care Freedom Act](#), which would **mandate full choice for veterans' health care.**

The VA sucks - people die waiting for an appointment

Cannon 2023

Michael, Director of Health Policy Studies, CATO Institute, 11/7, To protect service members and honor veterans, reform the VA,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/protect-service-members-honor-veterans-reform-va>

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is never more than a few months away from scandal for the often-poor service it provides. Yet poor-quality service is not the agency's greatest failing. **The way Congress structures veterans benefits literally threatens the lives of active-duty service members. The most notorious manifestation of poor quality at the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is long waits for care.** Long wait times persist because the VHA does not have a price mechanism to move resources from low- to high-value uses. The VHA aims to schedule medical appointments within 14 days. In 2014, whistleblowers and watchdogs [exposed](#) that **"more than 57,000 veterans have been waiting 90 days or longer for an initial medical appointment."** **Actual waits were much longer because 60 percent of facilities falsified records** to make wait times appear shorter. Veterans at a facility in Phoenix waited 115 days for appointments. One whistleblower [claimed](#) that 40 **veterans died waiting for care.** Congress responded by offering to pay for care outside the VHA for such veterans. In 2019, the Government Accountability Office found the VHA was hiding that "veterans could potentially wait up to 70 calendar days to see a [non-VHA] provider." In 2021, more than 810,000 veterans were still waiting more than a month for appointments, while nearly 197,000 waited more than six months. More than 215,000 veterans waited more than four months for disability and pension benefits. Privatization of the VHA would improve health care for veterans and nonveterans alike. Rationing-by-waiting causes real suffering. Yet it is sort of a run-of-the-mill failure that plagues all socialized-medicine systems that completely banish prices, like Canada's Medicare and the British National Health Service. The VHA outdoes them all by threatening the health and lives of active-duty military personnel.

The VA has tons of money, but sucks at providing care

Beaver and Johnson 2025

Wilson, Senior Policy Advisor, Allison National Security Center, and Ka'Von, Young Leaders Program, Heritage Foundation, 3/12, It's Time to Reform Veteran Affairs,

<https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/commentary/its-time-reform-veterans-affairs>

Despite receiving record-high funding, the VA remains riddled with inefficiency. In 2024, the VA's budget totaled \$307.75 billion—and the department requested a \$32.9 billion increase for 2025. With this increase, the VA's funding would have totaled **\$369.3 billion—money meant to enhance health care services and benefits. Yet somehow, veterans still struggle to access basic health care and disability benefits. The VA's claims system is a bureaucratic disaster, often leaving veterans waiting months or even years for benefits.** A 2022 VA watchdog report found that **68% of claims were mishandled** due to VA representative errors and 38% of cases lacked proper documentation, directly affecting claim approvals. **These errors directly impact medical care and financial support. By 2022, the VA had 635,026 pending disability claims, with 152,560 backlogged for more than 125 days. This leaves veterans victims of a broken system.**

Advantage One: Deterrence

People are key to deterrence, not tech or doctrine

Iyengar et al 2017

Radha, Senior Economist, RAND Corp, Brad Carson, Senior Advisor, Boston Consulting Group, John Winkler, Senior Behavioral Scientist, RAND Corp, and Amy Schafer, Research Associate, Center for New American Security, 7/27, Military Power is all about people: A return to personnel policy,

<https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/military-power-is-all-about-people-a-return-to-personnel-policy/>

The U.S. military is often described as the “best fighting force in the world,” and we agree. It's superior to its possible adversaries in nearly every way. No other military has the globe-spanning responsibilities, the

all-domain combat experience, or the technological edge. **Yet,** as the United States remains militarily engaged around a world that

demands unyielding attention and unwavering commitment, **its military faces a dynamic threat environment**

that includes new and resurgent challenges in emerging battle domains such as cyber. With tensions on the

Korean peninsula, a continuing series of crises in the Middle East, a rising China, and a resurgent Russia, **it would be wise**

to keep front and center the key source of strength in the armed forces — our people.

Policy debates have raged about Syria, Yemen, NATO, North Korea, and beyond. At the same time, defense acquisition experts

publicly debated options related to new technologies and [acquisition reform](#). But **the new and growing challenges**

facing the country **are all the more reason to also think about what additional approaches are**

needed to acquire the key personnel skills and capabilities needed to meet America's

growing and changing military requirements. The new administration has [called](#) for “a larger, more capable,

and more lethal joint force, driven by a new National Defense Strategy that recognizes the need for American superiority not only on

land, at sea, in the air, and in space, but also in cyberspace.” To do this, the Department of Defense has become increasingly

focused on three key objectives: sustaining and improving the deterrent and warfighting prowess; establishing a force with the

capabilities needed to meet the challenges in the coming years; and resetting and rebalancing after decades of conflicts. There are

a number of different lines of effort that would likely go into addressing each of these three objectives. One question worth raising is

whether **there's a need to examine how the Department of Defense recruits, trains, and**

retains talented military and civilian personnel who make up the foundation of U.S.

strategic superiority. Efforts to Modernize Personnel Policy Informed debate and discussion regarding military personnel

policy — and proposed changes thereto — to meet national security needs are nothing new. Almost since the [All-Volunteer Force](#)

[was adopted](#) by the Nixon administration in 1973, it has been subject to [debate and reform efforts](#). By 1981, [the Defense Officer](#)

[Personnel Management Act](#) (DOPMA) established rules regarding numbers of and promotion timing for field-grade officers. While a

critical reform, it [left untouched](#) the military's core human capital management strategies. In the face of active combat in Iraq and

Afghanistan during the early 2000s, a range of [initiatives](#) and programs were undertaken, some of which aimed to expand the pool

of individuals qualified to serve in the active and reserves, as well as to diversify the human capital pool to include civilians and

contractors in combat settings. Other policies restricted the flow of human capital, including stop loss and involuntary mobilizations.

These policies were the subject of some controversy — efforts to aggressively retain or involuntarily extend service members were

[seen by some as unfair](#), while efforts to use civilians or contractors were criticized by others as [dangerous](#) and [expensive](#). Most

recently, in an effort to modernize how the military attracts, develops, employs, and retains the best people available, then-Secretary

of Defense Ashton Carter directed a comprehensive review of the Defense Department's personnel systems and instituted a number

of reforms in 2015 and 2016. He released three tranches: the [first](#) focused on innovation and talent management, the [second](#)

focused on military parents, and the [third](#) focused on increased flexibility to identify, advance, and retain exceptional military and

civilian personnel. While a number of key changes were [initiated in 2015](#), many of the reforms were left [unfinished](#). Like a number of

past efforts, the changes — both those implemented and those not — were controversial and criticized for the high costs and lack of

evidence to support some of the key [initiatives](#) proposed. Re-Starting the Personnel Policy Debate Efforts at reforming defense

personnel policy have [faced controversy](#) amid an uncertain future. Nevertheless, we shouldn't stop talking about the underlying

issues. There is growing awareness that **personnel policies are critical to meeting key defense and**

even broader national security objectives. The president's recently released [budget](#) proposes a 2.1 percent pay

raise. This would amount to about \$50 more per month for junior enlisted troops and about \$115 for junior officers. At the same time,

plans envision increasing the force size by 4,000 for both the Navy and Air Force, and maintaining Army and Marine Corps

personnel numbers at 2017 levels. Planned growth in the reserve component includes 1,000 more personnel in the Navy Reserves,

900 in the Air National Guard, and 800 in Marine Corps Reserve. But these numbers say little about the civilians and contractors

needed to support and enable military personnel and their families. Many of these civilian positions face tremendous pressure under

the [hiring freeze](#) implemented immediately after President Donald Trump took office. **To truly meet many of these**

end-strength levels and broader strategic goals, personnel policy debates need to be

restarted. There are no silver bullets. Most of the policy options are imperfect and require

difficult or complex trade-offs.

While Trump is engaging in global military adventurism, he wants flashy wins, not long-term entanglements, creating a brink

Kelly, 2026

Robert, 1/16, Professor of Political Science, Pusan National University, South Korea. The overstretch trap for US Military Power,

<https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/01/the-overstretch-trap-for-u-s-military-power/>

Trump's apparent enthusiasm for dramatic, made-for-television interventions risks dragging the United States back into the classic problem of military overstretch. The

argument holds that **the Maduro raid validated a preference for visible "wins,"** encouraging talk of coercive action against targets like Greenland, Panama, or Cuba. -But **symbolic strikes and leader-capture**

operations do not solve underlying political resistance and can create pressure for deeper, longer deployments—or even Iraq-style insurgency dynamics if territory must be controlled. -Even absent ground war, maintaining task forces for blockades and coercion would siphon scarce naval and air resources away from East Asia, where China is the primary strategic priority. Trump's Post-Venezuela Temptation: The Overstretch Trap for U.S. Power US President Donald Trump recently declared an interest in [intervention around the Western Hemisphere](#). The tactical success of the US raid to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro appears to have excited him. **Trump has always sought very public displays of presidential**

success. He rarely shows much interest in policy detail, instead demanding 'wins' that will dominate the news cycle. Foreign policy interventions are dramatic, make for gripping television, and illustrate presidential power. That nicely fits Trump's personality,

and in retrospect, it seems strange that Trump did not discover this before. But now that Venezuela went so smoothly, Trump appears to have grasped that the US military is a highly capable instrument. He may imminently use it against [Greenland or Cuba](#).

But there are serious risks. Trump's actions [grossly violate](#) the core foreign policy principle of his 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA) movement; **they also threaten US overstretch.** MAGA's Best Contribution to US Politics Has Been Restraint Trump has been a hugely divisive figure in American politics. American academics [routinely rate](#) him among the worst

presidents ever. His domestic policies have sharply divided the country, as seen in the current polarization over the behavior of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency in US cities. But one area where **most Americans have**

welcomed Trump is his deep aversion to US interventionism—particularly in the developing world.

Trump grew up during the Vietnam War. As an adult, he watched the Soviet Union overstretch itself in Afghanistan. As a potential political candidate, he saw the US lose its way in the Middle East. He seems deeply affected by these experiences. Perhaps because of his own ramshackle, up-and-down career over the decades, he seemed to grasp how difficult large, complex projects in forbidding environments are. Expounding this in the 2016 Republican primary famously helped him beat the Bush family and neoconservatives to take over the party. Keeping the US out of unnecessary wars has been the one unalloyed good of the Trump years. **Pushing US allies to spend more and do more – part of the larger Trump restraint**

project – has also been good. The Europeans, for example, should carry most of the weight of the Ukraine war and re-arm to deal with Russia with far less US assistance. All of these achievements—so badly needed after two decades of American overextension—are now in jeopardy. And their blatant, public violation should embarrass MAGA. That movement should turn on

Trump for his massive betrayal of one of its defining beliefs. Sadly, it has not. US Over-Extension, Again The list of countries Trump has flirted with attacking has [grown dramatically](#). While **Trump is likely to restrict US action to airstrikes**, the Maduro raid illustrates the limit of that approach. **Maduro has been removed—and it surely made for great television**—but the rest of his regime is intact and has even demanded that [Maduro be returned](#).

Failure to increase military recruitment will either cause conscription or a collapse of the military's ability to do its job

Bensahel and Barno 2023

Nora and David, War on the Rocks, 3/10, Addressing the US Military Recruiting Crisis,

<https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/addressing-the-u-s-military-recruiting-crisis/>

Conclusion For 50 years, the U.S. military has relied upon an unbroken stream of willing volunteers to fill its ranks in times of peace and war. However, most of the trends that have created the present recruiting crisis will not change anytime soon, and **if left unaddressed, they could soon threaten the ability of the all-volunteer force to protect the nation. A return to conscription is neither desirable** nor politically viable, since as we often like to joke, the only groups in America who oppose a draft are Democrats, Republicans, and independents. **So without urgent action to improve eligibility and increase propensity, the military may find itself continuing to involuntarily shrink** for wholly non-strategic reasons **and may soon be too small to address the growing security challenges facing the United States** in the next few years and beyond. The many intertwined causes of the recruiting crisis defy quick fixes, and none of them are likely to abate on their own even if unemployment rates increase once again. **The services**, military personnel and veterans, and the broader national security community all **need to think creatively about ways to** expand eligibility and **increase propensity without undermining the strength and professionalism of the force.** We hope that these recommendations provide a useful starting point for this important national conversation, and help catalyze broader efforts to develop innovative solutions to these deeply challenging problems.

Trump policies are perceived as hegemony in the Global South

Spektor 2025

Matias, Jan / Feb Foreign Affairs, The Rise of the Non Aligned,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/rise-nonaligned-multipolar-world-matias-spektor?utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=fa_edit&utm_campaign=post_release_trump_jf25_activ es&utm_content=20250115&utm_term=all-actives

Trump's campaign pledges on trade, climate, migration, and taxation are often understood as a retreat from the world. **From the perspective of the global South**, however, these commitments suggest the opposite: they **augur an attempt to reassert U.S. hegemony. When Trump threatens to withdraw from international agreements, he is actually insisting that the United States can go it alone—and that others should just fall in line** if they know what's good for them. **By sowing uncertainty about the credibility of American commitments, Trump incentivizes countries to align more closely with the United States or risk losing out. His proposed tax cuts and tariffs will fuel inflation, leading to higher U.S. interest rates. This, in turn, will raise borrowing costs globally, especially for countries with significant debt, and will drive investors away from emerging markets toward safer returns in the United States.** The resulting currency depreciation will make imports more expensive, increasing inflation while reducing productivity in many developing countries. Rather than signaling isolation, **Trump's campaign pledges are interpreted in the global South as a calculated strategy of revisionism—a bid to restore U.S. primacy** by making other countries pay heed, align with Washington, or be left vulnerable in an increasingly uncertain order.

Pre-funding veterans benefits would deter conflict Cannon 2023

Michael, Director of Public Health, CATO Institute, 12/19, The largest fiscal cost of war is veteran's benefits. Honest budgeting can save lives,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/largest-fiscal-cost-war-veterans-benefits-honest-budgeting-can-save-lives>

Congress funds veterans' benefits like it funds Social Security and Medicare. It promises all sorts of benefits now but does not fund those promises until they come due, often decades later. **This "promise now, pay later" approach encourages politicians to make more promises, leaving it to future politicians to deliver on them** (e.g., when Congress expanded veterans' benefits in 2022). It also leaves politicians free to renege on those promises after recipients become dependent on them (e.g., when congressional analysts suggest cutting projected spending on veterans to the tune of half a trillion dollars over the next decade) The \$886 billion 'defense' bill making its way through Congress costs a lot more than \$886 billion. In the case of veterans' benefits, **"promise now, pay later" also hides the largest fiscal cost of the decision to go to war. As a result, it allows and encourages the president and Congress to risk U.S. lives when public opposition would otherwise prevent it.** Veterans' benefits are the largest fiscal cost of any war. Annual **disability payments to 1.7 million Vietnam-era recipients reached \$30 billion in 2022 yet still haven't peaked, though that conflict ended 50 years ago. Congress didn't stop paying Civil War-era benefits until 2020** — i.e., 155 years after Appomattox. Official projections suggest that, were Congress to fund these promises when it makes them, it would have had to scrape up an additional \$2 trillion in 2023. One trillion to cover new promises Congress made since 2022: active-duty personnel accruing benefits (\$200 billion) plus new benefits Congress created for current veterans (\$800 billion). The other trillion would cover promises Congress made in prior years but underestimated the cost of. These obligations rival the annual budgets of the Departments of Veterans Affairs (\$300 billion) and Defense (\$800 billion). The \$886 billion "defense" bill making its way through Congress costs a lot more than \$886 billion. Hiding those costs increases policymakers' willingness to risk the lives of U.S. troops. **Politicians are highly sensitive to the burden war imposes on taxpayers.** In 2002, President George W. Bush fired economic adviser Larry Lindsey for projecting that invading Iraq could someday cost \$200 billion. **In 2012, President Barack Obama cited the \$100 billion annual cost of keeping troops in Afghanistan when ordering a partial withdrawal. In 2021, Biden cited the \$40 billion annual cost when ordering a complete withdrawal. Concealing the cost of veterans' benefits distorts congressional and public debates about the use of force.** It hides both the largest fiscal obstacle to putting U.S. lives at risk and the largest fiscal benefit of reducing that risk. Hawks don't have to justify the full cost of their policies. Doves cannot show the full benefits of theirs. Heads, war wins. Tails, military families lose. This asymmetry distorts U.S. foreign policy. **If Congress had to reveal and justify the full cost of invading Iraq** — which exceeded Lindsey's pessimistic projections by a factor of four to 15 — **the 4,505 U.S. soldiers who lost their lives in that conflict might not have** (to say nothing of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis). When Presidents Obama, Donald Trump and Biden rallied support for bringing U.S. troops home from Afghanistan, they did so with one arm tied behind their backs. Biden is sending thousands more soldiers and sailors into combat zones in the Middle East in part because he need not acknowledge, much less justify, the largest fiscal cost of his decisions. Would Congress and the president keep exposing U.S. troops to current levels of risk if it meant either increasing taxes, increasing the deficit or cutting other spending by at least \$200 billion? Maybe. Then again, opposition to cutting just \$10 billion from the least popular federal agency (the IRS) was enough to stall a package of military aid for Israel. In a new book — "Recovery: A Guide to Reforming the U.S. Health Sector" — I propose funding veterans' benefits in a way that reveals their cost (including real-time updates of how war would increase those obligations), requires policymakers to justify those costs, and prevents politicians from reneging on their promises to veterans. **Pre-funding veterans' benefits would not add a penny to the burdens taxpayers bear. It would make existing burdens transparent, and make politicians account for them.** Veterans' benefits are a proxy for the costs war imposes on military families. **When Congress and the president conceal the cost of veterans' benefits, they are literally valuing those sacrifices at zero. You don't have to be an economist to know that's just wrong.**

Pre-funded veterans benefits would deter conflict.**Cannon 2024**

Michael, Director of Health Policy, CATO Institute, 11/24, Honor Veterans by improving the benefits of military service, nad reducing the risks,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/honor-veterans-improving-benefits-military-service-reducing-risks>

Private ownership, consumer choice, and competition would deliver better benefits to veterans — and force policy-makers to confront the costs of military engagements.

The basic problem is that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is a fully socialized, state-run health system without market prices to guide resource allocation or create incentives for innovation. Congress can improve health care and other veterans benefits with a

handful of reforms that includes what former Soviet-bloc nations did with their state-owned industries. First, **let active-duty military personnel purchase private insurance that would provide** life, disability, and **health**

coverage once they leave active duty. Let them buy this coverage at actuarially fair premiums in a competitive marketplace. Second, give active-duty personnel enough money to buy that coverage by boosting military pay. In effect, that boost would **pre-fund veterans benefits that Congress currently funds on a pay-as-you-go basis.**

Third, have that additional pay automatically rise and fall with those “veterans benefits” insurance premiums. More about this feature below. Fourth, use the VA’s existing budget to give current veterans annual, risk-adjusted subsidies that they can use to purchase private veterans-benefits coverage in those markets. Fifth, turn the VHA into a shareholder-owned, private corporation — and give those shares away to current veterans. With this handful of reforms, private ownership, consumer choice, and competition would deliver better benefits to veterans. Veterans would literally gain ownership of the VHA and its [\\$36 billion](#) in assets. Perhaps the best

part is that **these reforms could reduce the number of dead and disabled veterans by forcing policy-makers to confront the full cost of putting U.S. troops at risk. Congress does not fund veterans-benefits obligations until they come due. That’s significant. Veterans benefits are the most expensive fiscal cost of any conflict. Five decades after the last helicopter left Saigon, spending on Vietnam-era benefits hit \$33 billion last year and continues to climb.**

Congress was still paying Civil War–era veterans benefits in 2020. Official [estimates](#) suggest that Congress would have had to set aside an additional \$1 trillion just to cover the new veterans-benefit obligations it incurred in 2022.

Pay-as-you-go funding of veterans benefits enables policy-makers to put U.S. troops at risk even when the costs exceed the benefits.

When the president and Congress decide whether to invade Iraq, or whether to keep troops in Afghanistan for an 18th or 19th year, they get to ignore the cost of the benefits that help military families deal with the resulting physical and emotional damage. **Veterans’ benefits are the tail that wags the**

foreign-policy dog. Pre-funding and privatizing veterans benefits would force policy-makers to confront justify those costs.

Since premiums, military pay, and government spending would rise automatically when policy-makers put U.S. troops in harm’s way, policy-makers would have to justify the full cost of every decision to do so. **Having to face the full costs of these**

decisions could rally more members to the cause of restraint.

Failure to recruit new troops the old fashioned way will cause stop-loss policies, or the draft.

Luxembourg, 2016

Benjamin, 9/8, War on the Rocks, Does Free College Threaten Our All Volunteer Military, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/does-free-college-threaten-our-all-volunteer-military/>

The military's ability to recruit is critical not only to its success but to the very existence of the all-volunteer force. If the all-volunteer military cannot recruit sufficient numbers of new personnel, it cannot survive. The number of new recruits the military needs varies with government policy and defense requirements.

During the height of the Iraq War, it had so much difficulty recruiting — and with retaining personnel already serving — that it **instituted the “stop loss” program.** **Under this policy, the military unilaterally cancelled the end dates on thousands of service members' contracts, forcing them to stay on active duty.** If there had been no G.I. Bill to attract the flow of new recruits in that period that it did, what would the military have been forced to do to swell its ranks? Making college more affordable and accessible is necessary.

However, there are no clear solutions to fixing what could be the undermining of the G.I. Bill and exacerbating the costs of sustaining a volunteer force. Perhaps the government could reallocate the funds it would have spent on tuition payments to pay a larger percentage of veterans' living costs while in school. But if college is free, will doubling the living expenses allowance to \$4,000 a month persuade sufficient numbers of the right people to sign their lives over for four years? Or would simply higher pay be sufficient? If it were, it would have to be substantially higher than current pay levels, likely compounding objections regarding the government budget deficit and defense spending in general. Some may argue that access to higher education is more important than the military's ability to recruit. While that may be true, government's traditional primary function has been national defense. It is national defense that ultimately enables all people — whether or not they have ever served in the military — to pursue higher education in peace and security. Nor does service preclude people from pursuing higher education. It simply delays it, while also equipping veterans with valuable life skills. Other critics may say that linking free college to military service amounts to coercion and is inherently unequal.

To address the issue of inequity while also remaining effective, the only remaining stopgap option may be the least politically palatable of all: **the reinstitution of the draft.** No serious stakeholders want a return of the draft.

Military leaders prefer the reliability and precision of the professional force over conscription. Similarly, few civilians — parents or young people — want compulsory service. **But** as the government universalizes healthcare and, now possibly, higher education, **it may tie its own hands, requiring the re-imposition of involuntary military service.**

Advantage Two: Civilian - Military Relations

Policy actions matter more than superficial disagreements

Golby, UT Austin, and Feaver, Duke University, 2021

Jim, Senior Fellow, Clements Center for National Security, UT Austin, and Peter, Professor at Duke University, Center for New American Security, Biden Inherits a Challenging Civil-Military Legacy,

<https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/biden-inherits-a-challenging-civil-military-legacy>

This legacy is disturbing, but it remains to be seen how enduring the harm will be. The [nomination of retired general Lloyd Austin](#), only four years after Trump ignored the norm against appointing a retired general as secretary of defense, suggests some of Trump's actions may have fundamentally transformed the civil-military playing field. But **it is worth distinguishing between a civil-military violation — which can range from minor to severe — and the lingering consequences of that violation — which can range from transient to enduring.** To be sure, **the more severe the violation, the more likely it is that the damage will take some time to undo.** But not always. It is also worth noting that **some parts of the civil-military system may recover from the same harm sooner than other parts.**

U.S. CMR's modeled globally---key to democratic consolidation

Perry, Foreign Affairs, 1996

William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, 1996, Foreign Affairs

Many nations around the world have come to agree that democracy is the best system of government. But important steps must be taken before worldwide consensus can become a worldwide reality. Most of the new democracies are fragile. Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a free society; democracy is learned behavior. **Democratic values must be embedded in the key institutions of these nations if they are to flourish as democracies.**

The Defense Department has a pivotal role to play in that effort. **In virtually every new democracy -- in the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, and in Asia -- the military is a major force.** In many cases it is the most cohesive institution in the country, containing a large percentage of the educated elite and controlling important resources. **In short, it is an institution that can help support democracy or subvert it.**

Societies undergoing the transformation from totalitarianism to democracy may well be tested at some point by a crisis, whether economic, a reversal on human rights and freedoms, or a border or an ethnic dispute with a neighboring country. If such a crisis occurs, **the United States wants that nation's military to come down on the side of democracy and economic reform and play a positive role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role in fanning the flames or using the crisis as a pretext for a military coup.** This administration has sought to exert a positive influence on these important institutions through regular, working contacts with U.S. military and civilian defense personnel -- **a task made easier by the fact that every military in the world looks to the U.S. armed forces as the model to be emulated.**

Specifically, accelerationist white supremacists are seeking to poison the water supply, derail trains, spread COVID, and spark a broader conflict

MacFarquhar and Goldman, Reporters 2020

Neil and Adam, New York Times, Jan 22nd, A New Face of White Supremacy: Plots expose danger of the Base, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/us/white-supremacy-the-base.html>

The plans were as sweeping as they were **chilling**: **“Derail some trains, kill some people, and poison some water supplies.” It was the blunt, bloody prescription for sparking a race war** by a member of the Base, a white supremacist group that has come under intense scrutiny amid a series of stunning recent arrests. Federal agents, who had secretly recorded those remarks in a bugged apartment during a domestic terrorism investigation, pounced on seven members of the group last week in advance of a [rally on Monday by gun rights advocates in Richmond, Va.](#) Three members of one cell in Maryland affiliated with the group [plotted attacks at the rally, hoping to ignite wider violence](#) that would lead to the creation of a white ethno-state, law enforcement officials said. The “defendants did more than talk,” Robert K. Hur, the United States attorney for Maryland, said after a detention hearing on Wednesday in federal court in Greenbelt, Md. “They took steps to act and act violently on their racist views.” The details that emerged in court and in documents from active cases in three other states — Georgia, Wisconsin and New Jersey — unveiled a disturbing new face of white supremacy. The Base illustrates what law enforcement officials and extremism experts describe as an expanding threat, particularly from adherents who cluster in small cells organized under the auspices of a larger group that spreads violent ideology. **“We have a significant increase in racially motivated violent extremism in the United States and, I think, a growing increase in white nationalism and white supremacy extremist movements,”** Jay Tabb, the head of national security for the F.B.I., said at an event in Washington last week. Experts who have studied the Base say it seems to have followed the model of Al Qaeda and other violent Islamic groups in **working to radicalize independent cells or even lone wolves who would be inspired to plot their own attacks. They describe the Base as an “accelerationist” organization, seeking to speed the collapse of the country** and give rise to a state of its own in the Pacific Northwest by killing minorities, particularly African-Americans and Jews.

Domestic unrest in the US is a high and real threat

Simon and Stevenson 2023

Steven, MIT Center for International Studies, and Jonathan, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Politico, The threat of civil breakdown is real,

<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/04/21/political-violence-2024-magazine-00093028>

We and others have written of the prospect of a new civil war in the United States, which seemed a real, if still remote, possibility immediately after Jan. 6. Now it **is starting to look less plausible, given the strength shown by the political center in the 2022 midterms** and President Joe Biden's largely effective tenure in the White House. Yet full-scale civil war is not the only danger. **Far-right Americans are highly unlikely to coalesce into a cohesive force that could wage war**, but an army is not required to wreak sustained havoc and destabilize the country. **In a deeply polarized environment, smaller pockets of armed unrest could easily ignite and spread disorder. The hyperbolic reactions of far-right Republican political figures and media commentators to the Trump indictment signal that they certainly do not believe the MAGA fever among their constituents and consumers has broken. As the 2024 election approaches, the threat of political violence and civil breakdown is only going to increase.** And despite all that U.S. national security and law enforcement officials have learned since Jan. 6, **the country is still not prepared for a far-right revolt**. Several discomfiting questions arise: How many right-of-center Americans believe violence will be necessary to repel a perceived racial or cultural threat? Do those who harbor that belief have genuine intent to take up arms? If so, what it would take to make them shoot? **Senior U.S. counterterrorism officials assess that the risk of major civil disruption is still salient.**

While most domestic political violence is perpetrated by lone actors, and federal law enforcement's post-Jan. 6 crackdown has undeniably had a deterrent effect on fence-sitters while incarcerating many who followed through on their beliefs, **political polarization has not materially diminished**. And it is precisely political polarization that has hindered the federal government's ability to counter domestic extremism. The term "domestic terrorism," however appropriate it may be, is politically toxic to most congressional Republicans. As a result, **the federal strategy for countering domestic extremism appears piecemeal and poorly integrated**. No single agency is really in charge, and much of the jurisdictional authority lies with locally elected prosecutors reluctant to step on the toes of those who put them in office. And, unlike the United Kingdom, for example, the United States has no nationwide government agency authorized and equipped to counter radicalization. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) would be a logical convenor and coordinator of federal law enforcement agencies charged with executing a variety of counterterrorism missions. But both the NCTC and the Department of Homeland Security lack full access to FBI files. By default, this makes the FBI, for all its known limitations, the analytic lead for producing strategic intelligence on domestic terrorism for the U.S. government. The NCTC has no domestic counterterrorism remit and isn't authorized to produce polished intelligence on domestic terrorist threats, unless there is a transnational link. In the present context, this is a substantial restriction. Despite a transnational convergence of bellicose conservative agendas, there has so far been little practical interaction among activists across the country.

Far-right American militias pose the greatest threat, and they are predominantly built from the bottom up, by mundane, practical drivers — for instance, as anti-vaccine activists become anti-government activists. There do not appear to be strong links between them and foreign organizations except among white supremacist groups, and even that is mainly online, through propaganda mechanisms like Telegram Messenger. It's rare to find the kind of operational coordination that might be actionable for federal law-enforcement agencies. Coordination between federal agencies responsible for counterterrorism and their state and local counterparts — a crucial ingredient of the overall law-enforcement effort — is also a serious problem. There is no federal mandate for state and local authorities to report to federal authorities, so federal agencies must proactively elicit their cooperation. But non-federal agencies often have little interest in this work, because they entertain lower threat perceptions,

contentious legal understandings or adverse conceptions of the role of government. In exceptional cases, county law-enforcement officials may not regard a vocally anti-government gun owner as a present danger or even as ideological, and may consider the state government the highest one to which they are answerable. And while most state and local officers are duly concerned about employee grievances, which often do produce mass-casualty events, many of these officers are indifferent to ideological ones. The net effect is that there is no nationwide structure that provides federal agencies with effective interlocutors at the state or local level.

Some pockets of excellence exist, but they are not replicated at scale. Furthermore, while U.S. intelligence agencies have the capabilities needed to map far-right groups, for good constitutional reasons they can't freely apply those capabilities at the domestic level. The face of the state, therefore, is federal law enforcement — and this is no more conducive to winning hearts and minds in the U.S. hinterland than it is in the fight against Muslim extremism in Leeds or Molenbeek. At the same time, gaps in domestic counterterrorism arrangements leave space for far-right radicalism to continue to flourish. By virtue of Jan. 6 and the

increasing normalization of domestic political violence, senior U.S. officials already have strategic warning. That means they most value tactical warning, yet that's harder to come by. In terms of combustibility, of course, the United States is not comparable to Bolshevik Russia and Enrique Tarrio is no Vladimir Lenin. U.S. militia groups do not appear to be strongly networked. Yet it would be imprudent to assume that the MAGA movement is still just an inchoate insurgency, as its grievances are widely shared. Law enforcement's limitations suggest that the key factor in staving off civil breakdown is not state power but rather political dynamics. Federal officials are concerned about "targeted violence" based on ideology — such as the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Va., in August 2017 — that may not constitute terrorism but eventually could rise to that level. Those dynamics are still worrying. Attacks on individual political figures — such as the one on Paul Pelosi intended for his wife, former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, an apex Trump antagonist — have increased, as have those on law-enforcement personnel. Moreover, Trump has incited violence against judges and prosecutors by branding them "haters" of him and his family. Federal officials have said they are concerned about "targeted violence" based on ideology — such as the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017 — that may not constitute terrorism but eventually could rise to that level. Radicalized Republicans ultimately may be too feckless and atomized to mount a revolution, with Trump incapable of transforming them into a truly revolutionary force. Perhaps a free-rider effect is at work, where many would revolt but only if all went at once. While desperate

East Germans surmounted such a hurdle in 1953, relatively comfortable Americans are less likely to do so. But **large-scale civil collapse need not involve the concerted efforts of a critical mass of people**. For every Northern Ireland, there is a Somalia. Purposeful militias aren't required, **only spiraling acts of violence by small numbers of people that may originate spontaneously but, fueled by retaliation, develop their own momentum. The fallout could be disastrous**. Gradually escalating attacks triggered by key events and facilitated by the growing accumulation of privatized high-powered weapons like AR-15s, largely on the right, could increase polarization to a point of irreversibility. **A contagion of localized but widespread tit-for-tat violence could produce mass abdications on the part of local law enforcement and overwhelm the capacity of the federal authorities**, turning expanding pockets of U.S. territory into essentially Darwinian enclaves. **Such a scenario** — recall "Bleeding Kansas" in the 1850s — **is broadly in line with the**

run-up to the Civil War. Clearly, we are not there. But the critical indicator of how U.S. politics will tilt in the long term is still more than a year and a half out: The 2024 election. Presidential elections are won or lost in the center, and moderates and independents — most of whom don't want to think about politics — do seem increasingly alert to the dangers of Trump. In addition, Democrats are now just about as ideologically cohesive as Republicans. Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis' challenge to Trump's political primacy may also give him little option but to veer hard right. And the former president's fraught legal situation compels him to attack the legitimacy of a wider and wider swath of American institutions — executives and legislatures as well as courts — further deprecating American democracy. Given recent trends, it is reasonable to hope that moderates and independents will have had enough in November 2024. A clear rejection of Trumpism might then deflate the MAGA movement for the time being. But **if the Republican nominee loses narrowly, declares himself the winner and rallies dispersed local groups prone to violent local resistance rather than an easily repulsed assault on the Capitol, it might be too late for orderly de-escalation**.

We have to know supremacists in order to challenge them**Hamid 2019**

Shadi, Foreign Policy Magazine, March 21st, White Supremacism isn't insanity

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/murderous-white-nationalism-isnt-insanity-new-zealand-christchurch/>

I won't link to the accused shooter's manifesto. But I think it's important for analysts and government officials to read it carefully. This is what many of us did when the Islamic State would release its recordings and statements. We tried to understand why young Tunisians would travel to Syria to fight in disproportionate numbers for a group that seemed so ostentatious in its savagery. In the process, **the analytical and policy community was able to reach a fairly sophisticated understanding of not just the group's objectives but also of its particular way of looking at the world,** including [the end times](#). **In dealing with an apparent global rise in violent white supremacism, we may, once again, be obliged to immerse ourselves in a disturbing, sometimes terrifying universe** of thought that will, at least at first, seem foreign. Seventeen years of trying—and often failing—to combat Islamic extremism offers some important lessons, one of which is the importance of contending with, studying, and understanding the ideas that drive extremist sentiment. Even with a group as plainly ideological as the Islamic State, there was often a tendency to de-emphasize its religious motivations and to characterize its aims in more prosaic terms: that it was using Islam for power, rather than the other way around, or that it couldn't truly believe what it said it believed about its almost unprecedentedly harsh interpretations of Islamic law. Could anyone truly believe that? But apparently they can, and they do. In reading the accused Christchurch shooter's 74-page manifesto, it becomes clear that he thought carefully about what he hoped his savagery might accomplish. If we're thinking about rationality in the [instrumental sense](#) of whether ends can plausibly flow from the means, then the killer was at least somewhat rational. Still, this searching for explanations may seem beside the point. Why should it matter why he did what he did if we (almost) all readily acknowledge the sheer evil of the act? **Taking white nationalist ideas seriously, studying how such ideological communities are organized and motivated, suggests a more effective set of responses to the question of violent extremism.** I support a strong response to the New Zealand attack.

Solvency

The bureaucracy will derail any reforms without Sec. Def. Leadership - CP fails Carson and Plummer 2016

Brad, Former Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel, Trump Administration, General Counsel of the Army, Former Congressman, Veteran, and Morgan, Staff for Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel, Obama Administration, Former Army, War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-pentagons-fig-tree-reforming-the-military-health-system/>

The next secretary of defense needs to do more to modernize the MHS. The ideas we articulate here would save money — probably a lot of money. More importantly, though, they will save lives. The MHS has too much infrastructure, the wrong mix of providers, and predominantly serves the needs of beneficiaries who could easily have their health care needs satisfied by civilian providers at far less cost and with equal or better quality. It won't be easy to make these changes, of course. MHS governance is fractured by parochial allegiances, constant staffing turnover, and a penchant for inertia, all of which inhibit a shared effort to address institutional challenges. Moreover, health care is fiendishly complex, and people without a background in health care— basically, the entire cadre of Pentagon senior officials — can easily be intimidated into inaction. Yet hope can be found from the recent example of Secretary Robert Gates. In 2009, Secretary Gates mandated the “golden hour policy,” despite resistance from the Pentagon bureaucracy. The new policy required helicopter transport of critically injured service members from the battlefield to a hospital in 60 minutes or less. Prior to this mandate, the military's goal was twice that — two hours from call to hospital arrival. Gates directed that helicopters previously set aside for rescuing downed pilots be reassigned to medical evacuation, because not a single fighter jet or bomber had been shot down in the war. The controversial policy proved to be an extraordinary success. Gates' unilateral action has been credited with saving more than 350 lives. Great leadership requires moral courage — an ability to make decisions inside a politically charged environment when outcomes are uncertain and facts are ambiguous. It is this quality that separates a McClellan from a Grant. Reform of the MHS might seem too banal to justify such lofty talk, but Gates showed otherwise, demonstrating how the effects of E-ring decisions can be measured in lives, just like decisions made on the battlefield. Without the personal backing of the secretary of defense, the needed changes to the MHS will never arrive. The size and scope of the medical system means that secretary cannot definitively rebut the invariable objections that the bureaucracy will lodge. “There is no problem,” some will say. “The solution won't work,” others will argue. “What you propose is actually counter-productive,” still more will add. These are the three stages of bureaucratic grief. They can paralyze many. The next secretary must have the moral courage to avoid indecision.

Answers to Security K

Saving lives right now while developing a framework for critical theory is the most practical and ethical option.

Linklater, Aberystwyth University, 2005

Andrew, renowned international relations academic, and is the current Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University. "Political Community and Human Security" Book: Critical Security Studies and World Politics; Edited by Ken Booth (pg. 125) His answer **blended realism with more Utopian concerns**.⁵⁹ Kant advocated several **transitional strategies** that were divided into two main groups: **those that were immediately binding** on political subjects (such as ensuring the ethical conduct of war), **and those that could only be realized gradually**, conceivably over centuries, as estrangement and suspicion yielded to mutual respect and trust (such as abolishing standing armies). Kant's inventory is obviously dated, but his act of dividing strategies of transition into two main groups has more contemporary illustrations. **Approaches that distinguish between immediately binding duties to promote confidence-building measures and the longer-term goal of negotiated demilitarization rest on the same dichotomy**.⁶⁰ The key point behind this distinction is that **common interests may permit limited experiments in transparency and reciprocity from which more radical commitments to publicity, dialogue, and consent may develop in time**.⁶¹ **Problem-solving responses to conditions of insecurity should be informed then by the longer-term ethical aspirations of critical theory; these are also the means by which the more demanding normative aspirations of critical theory can be embedded in political institutions and practice**

Scenario planning is inevitable and good - combats cognitive bias and increases creativity.

Barma et al. Professors, 2016

Naazneen, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, Attorney, Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, 11/6/15 “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” *International Studies Perspectives* 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf

Building on its corporate roots, **scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool.** For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.⁴ As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). **Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.**⁵ **Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges.** Yet **the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias** (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). **The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking** and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.

Negative Arguments

On Case Debate:

AT Inherency

Military HC is strong now, and reforms are ongoing.

O'Hanlon 2014

Michael, 12/22, Senior Fellow, Talbott Center for Security, Brookings Institution, US Military Health Care Reform, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/u-s-military-health-care-reform/>

Among Woodson's most important points were that **the value of military medicine has to be determined across the broad missions that the military health system is responsible for— readiness, health and hospital care, public health,** research and development and education and training; and that **global security and global health crises have increased the demand for DoD's health expertise even as combat operations are diminishing.** Woodson pointed out that **the DoD has made important strides in military health care in recent years, including in technologies such as advanced prosthetics, in battlefield survival rates for casualties and also in responsibly holding down cost growth through reforms in areas such as pharmaceutical prescriptions, payment reform** and the stand-up of a Defense Health Agency to better integrate care across the military departments. He also spoke of progress in linking the DoD health care system to the Veterans Affairs (VA) system (a separate organization with a separate and even larger health care budget), while acknowledging that a great deal of integration and further improvement remains. He also noted, in response to a question, that it is important to facilitate the access to health care services for activated reservists, and DoD is working hard to make the associated procedures simpler for reservists and families. After his remarks, a panel made up of former DoD Comptroller Robert Hale, Carla Tighe-Murray of the Congressional Budget Office, Alice Rivlin of the Engelberg Center on Health Care Reform at Brookings, Henry Aaron of the Economic Studies Program at Brookings and Jack Mayer, Executive Vice President at Booz-Allen-Hamilton, convened to continue and broaden the discussion, with O'Hanlon moderating. Among the key points raised were the following: Secretary Hale noted **the success DoD has had in recent years in reducing provider costs** and having beneficiaries share a modestly greater fraction of the military cost burden. **Further efforts are underway,** motivated in part by the assessment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in a budget-constrained environment, resources for training and equipment could be compromised if compensation costs were allowed to grow excessively. Hale made this argument while defending the premise that military compensation should be adequate to meet recruiting and retention needs, that those personnel less able to afford any premium increases should be assisted, and that in general the goal of compensation reform should be to limit future cost growth rather than to make significant cuts. Secretary Hale also advocated closing or streamlining some military treatment facilities that have inadequate caseloads to justify their expense. He suggested a new way of budgeting – return of health care funds to the military services along with centralized execution financed with a working capital fund – that might increase the incentives for the military services to streamline facilities. Tighe-Murray explained that much of the growth in military health care costs in recent times has been due, not to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but to expanded benefits, as well as a failure of DoD premiums and co-payments to keep up with the general growth in health care costs in the United States. This set of factors has translated into more enrollees, more use of services and higher costs per doctor or hospital visit than would have otherwise been the case. While Secretary Hale had talked about options for DoD health care reform that would save the Pentagon, and taxpayer, perhaps a couple billion dollars a year, Tighe-Murray outlined options that might ultimately save nearly \$10 billion annually. Rivlin and Aaron placed DoD health care in broader context. They recognized that the Department of Defense must provide certain kinds of capabilities, including for battlefield expeditionary medical care, that the private sector does not need to offer in similar ways. But nonetheless, they talked of the pros and cons of more fundamental possible DoD health care reform. For example, in less densely populated parts of the country or for population groups such as retirees that had other options, it might seek to encourage migration of more individuals from the military health care system to the private sector and the civilian system. This option may take on new feasibility in light of the Affordable Care Act. Rivlin and Aaron were careful to emphasize, however, that the DoD could still subsidize the health care costs of its personnel, and perhaps particularly its lower-salaried personnel, under such an approach. Acknowledging the complexities of the issue, however, Aaron also pointed out that **it was not clear that the DoD (or the VA system) were necessarily any less efficient as health-care providers than the private sector,** at least in some areas of the country.

AT Solvency

AT Advantage One: Deterrence:

Joining the military isn't popular anymore - unjust wars, reckless leadership

Bandow 2023

Doug, The American Conservative, 8/17, No Final Draft, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/no-final-draft>
 What if potential recruits don't believe him? **It was one thing to join the military to combat the infamous Evil Empire, which seemed to threaten all that mattered. But dying to seize nonexistent nukes in Iraq, remake rural theocracy in Central Asia, and protect a gaggle of licentious Mideast royals? Or playing wet nurse to the Europeans,** who almost eight decades after the end of World War II still act helpless when confronting Moscow? **Moreover, why would any sensible recruit**—speaking as someone whose father, mother, uncle, brother-in-law, and nephew all served—**want to submit to the current political leadership?**
 The egregious Madeleine Albright [spoke for](#) America's arrogant, self-serving ruling class when she asked Gen. Colin Powell: "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" To members of [the infamous foreign policy "blob,"](#) those in uniform are but a cheap means to an imperial end. Indeed, the Pentagon's sales pitch faces surprising opposition from relatives, friends, and even veterans. Reported the [Wall Street Journal](#): The children of military families make up the majority of new recruits in the US military. That pipeline is now under threat, which is bad news for the Pentagon's already acute recruit problems, as well as America's military readiness. **"Influencers are not telling them to go into the military,"** said Adm. Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. "Moms and dads, uncles, coaches and pastors don't see it as a good choice."
 Moreover, enlisted personnel, who make up the bulk of the service, and their families [are less likely](#) to recommend that their children volunteer. **Such dissatisfaction reflects multiple causes, including low pay and family stress. Incompetent, stupid wars are another.** [More than](#) 7,000 US military personnel and nearly 8,000 contractors died in combat since 9/11. A shocking 30,000 military personnel and veterans of the "Global War on Terrorism" committed suicide over the same period. At least 52,000 service members were [wounded in combat](#).

Countries act as if the world is multipolar now

Mohan 2026

Raja, Professor at Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal University, March / April 2026, Foreign Affairs, The Multipolar Delusion, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/multipolar-delusion-mohan?utm_medium=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&utm_source=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&utm_campaign=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&utm_content=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&utm_term=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&check_logged_in=1

From Washington to Beijing and Moscow to New Delhi, a consensus is emerging that the world has entered a multipolar era. Political leaders, diplomats, and analysts routinely declare that unrivaled American dominance has ended and global power is now dispersed across multiple centers.

The assertion has become so commonplace that it is often treated as a self-evident fact rather than a proposition to be examined. Even officials in the United States, long the principal beneficiary of the unipolar post-Cold War order, have adopted this language. At the start of President Donald Trump's second term, Secretary of State Marco **Rubio observed that** Washington's moment as the sole superpower was historically "not normal" and that **the international system would inevitably tend toward multipolarity.** Rubio's statement appeared to echo the growing belief in China, Russia, and much of the developing world that the United States' power is declining and its long-standing global primacy is unsustainable.

The US - Iran war has punctured the illusion of US military dominance.

NYT Editorial Board 2026

April 30th, The US Military was losing its edge. After Iran, everyone knows it.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/30/opinion/iran-us-military-challenges.html?campaign_id=39&emc=edit_ty_20260430&instance_id=174880&nl=opinion-today®i_id=86657740&segment_id=219085&user_id=fc4f9d4b0e43e0f67a75621a106cfad5

On paper, **the war in Iran should not be much of a contest. The United States spends around \$1 trillion a year on its military, more than 100 times as much as Iran. That money buys a** vastly larger Air Force and Navy, as well as **advanced weapons technologies that Iranian generals can only dream about.** In the war's early days, the mismatch played out as one might expect. American forces destroyed much of the Iranian military. Now, however, the contest looks less one-sided. Iran [has taken control](#) of the Strait of Hormuz, and its missiles and drones still threaten America's allies in the region. While President Trump seems eager for a negotiated truce, Iran's leaders do not. **Somehow, the weaker nation is in the stronger negotiating position.**

That reality exposes the vulnerabilities in the American way of war. Tactical success has not yielded victory. Mr. Trump's [recklessness in conducting the war](#) is one reason. But the problem is bigger than any single commander in chief. **The United States has left itself unprepared for modern war. America has spent hundreds of billions of dollars on ships and planes that are good at defeating competitors' ships and planes but ineffective against cheaper, mass-produced weapons. The American economy does not have the industrial capacity to produce enough of the weapons and equipment it does need. And the country has struggled to fix these problems because of a sclerotic government and a consolidated defense industry that resists change.** Three months before Mr.

Trump attacked Iran, we warned that the United States was at risk of [being overmatched in the wars of the future](#). The last two months have shown that alarm was justified. The war in Iran, unwise as it is, should serve as a warning about the rising threats to American security and an incentive to fix them. "Never in recorded history has a nation's military been so quickly and effectively neutralized," Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth claimed on March 26. The next day, Iran [launched a drone](#) and missile attack on an American base in Saudi Arabia that wounded more than a dozen service members, [destroyed a radar surveillance plane](#) and damaged at least two refueling tankers. The immediate debunking of Mr. Hegseth's bombast points to the reform agenda that

America's military needs. There **are** four main priorities. First, the United States needs to invest in **counter-drone technologies**, like those that Ukraine has developed in its war against Russia. The lack of such defenses is one reason that the vaunted U.S. Navy has been [unable to prevent](#) the closing of a vital waterway, the Strait of Hormuz. Second, the United States needs more of its own **cheap, disposable weapons** like one-way attack drones and unmanned ships. Although much of the war in Ukraine has been fought by mass-produced drones, the Pentagon is pouring money into much more complex equipment, including pilotless "wingmen" that [can fly alongside](#) a piloted plane. Third, the country needs **larger and more flexible industrial capacity.** Until recently, a single factory made all of America's Tomahawk cruise missiles, and there is a constant shortage of Patriot missile interceptors. Congress should pass laws that help the private sector build up its manufacturing capacity. The Pentagon, for its part, needs to stop buying so many of its weapons from just five big weapons makers and start betting on dynamic tech companies that can quickly adapt. Lastly, the United States [needs to](#)

collaborate with other industrialized democracies. Mr. Trump's pleas for help in reopening the Strait of Hormuz from the very allies he spurned at the start of the war are just the latest proof that America can't go it alone. In the years ahead, keeping pace with China's economic and military expansion will require collaborating with like-minded democracies. All of these steps are not merely about winning the next war. They also can help prevent it — by making our enemies believe they would lose any war they start. **Instead, the war in Iran has provided a road map for any country that wants to resist the United States in the future,** including Russia and North Korea. For China, the country with the greatest potential to challenge American military might, the war validates its focus on new forms of warfare such as drones, cyberweapons and space power. The picture for the American military is not entirely grim. The Iran war has shown that it has an astonishing ability to find and destroy enemy targets. In the conflict's first six weeks, the U.S. military hit over 13,000 military and industrial targets. American losses in the war, while tragic, have been limited, considering the scale of the attack and Iran's resources: at least 13 service members killed and more than 300 wounded. Mr. Trump has made some positive moves toward

military reform. His administration has taken several steps to break the hold of major contractors on the supply of weapons to the Pentagon and has pressured some of them to increase production of much-needed missiles. The Army secretary, Daniel P. Driscoll, has moved to cancel outdated and failing programs. But Mr. **Trump's chaotic, destructive approach to governance has undercut much of this progress.** He ordered an expensive new fleet, the "Trump class" battleships, even though they are vulnerable to air attack. Mr. Hegseth has fired a cadre of reformers and is feuding with Mr. Driscoll. In April, the administration proposed a \$1.5 trillion budget that is likely to amplify our shortcomings rather than building on our strengths.

US lacks deterrence strategy, and simply asserting capability superiority is irrelevant Sisson 2022

Melanie, Fellow, Brookings Institution, June 15th, America's real deterrence problem, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/15/americas-real-deterrence-problem/?utm_campaign=Brookings%20Brief&utm_medium=email&utm_content=217115871&utm_source=hs_email

The United States has a deterrence problem. Precisely what that problem is, however, depends upon whom you ask. The answer for some is that **Washington suffers from an overall lack of credibility, caused by a recent past in which red lines in Syria were "written in disappearing ink" and threats of reprisal for Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were hollow. For others, the issue is Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's recent transition to "integrated deterrence" — a concept that elevates the role of non-military levers,** such as diplomacy, economic sanctions, and information operations. Because **this approach to deterrence mistakenly under-weights the importance of military might,** they argue, **it failed to protect Ukraine and for the same reason is unlikely to deter China from acting forcibly against Taiwan.** These explanations diverge on the mechanism of U.S. deterrence failure, but they converge on **the root cause: inadequacy of a willingness to threaten — and ultimately to use — military force. Deterrence is a form of coercion,** an effort to convince another actor to choose to behave in the way the United States prefers by manipulating expectations of the costs to be borne and the benefits to be won. This requires knowledge, or as close to it as possible, of how that actor defines gain and loss, and identifying ways to work on those sensibilities. The possibility that the U.S. military could be brought to bear if the other actor makes the wrong choice can be quite persuasive. But all too often, calling a potential adversary's attention to the fact of U.S. military superiority — generally, or in specific circumstances — is conflated with a strategy for coercive success. **The deterrence problem** the United States actually has, that is, **is the tendency to treat deterrence as though it were a capability and not a strategy.** When the relative U.S. advantage in material capabilities doesn't then translate into the target's forbearance, commentary tends to overlook the possibility of misalignment between U.S. strategy and the target's perceptions, values, and goals, and proceeds directly to indict policymakers for being inadequately forceful or to absolve them by making claims about the target's irrationality.

Great Power Wars don't happen - too costly, defense department hype

Colvin 2023

Nathan, 6/13, US Army Officer, The Strategy Bridge, What happens if great powers don't fight great wars?

<https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2023/6/13/what-happens-if-great-powers-dont-fight-great-wars>

Some argue that great power war is inevitable. Russian tanks roll across the heart of Europe. China dramatically increases capability across all domains. Great powers are back with a vengeance. Analogies drawn from the Cold War and World War II return. Multipolarity challenges the United States' hegemonic position. Deterrence makes its way back into strategic thought. Great nations with big armies renew conversations about power balancing. Theorists are proud to make realism great again. **Like an elastic band snapping into place, Army culture returns to familiar**

conversations about relative combat power, fires, and maneuver. **The military is expert at retroactively creating narratives. However, just because a narrative resonates does not mean it is true**

or complete. As the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviewed, it is critical that the lessons learned and the narratives that are derived from those lessons, are thoroughly examined for bias. For example, in what ways does the Ukraine war resemble our definition of Large Scale Combat Operations? While there is more armor artillery in action than in our collective memory recalls, is quantity truly a quality all its own? Or, from a strategic standpoint, is it more important to examine this conflict as the outcome of unmanaged nuclear non-proliferation, insufficient security guarantees, the failure of understanding autocratic thinking, but the value of security assistance? While certainly dangerous, are Large Scale Combat Operations inevitable amongst great powers, or only possible when a minor power is in play? **While geopolitical dynamics may resemble historical**

conditions that lead in the past to direct great power wars, today states are more interdependent than ever, are restricted by the nuclear weapons revolution in military

affairs, and are constrained by the costs of conventional war. The proper lesson for us to draw from history is that conflict abhors a vacuum, and threats will take advantage of whatever domain is available. Certainly an argument should be made for increasing traditional lethality in the force, but must that come at the expense of other required capabilities? If we believe that wars are prevented in competition and that adversaries will use all available ways and means in conflict, then the Army must consider diverse solutions to deter and win in both Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) and non-LSCO Multi-Domain Operations. What is so great about these powers anyway? What makes a great power great? Although definitions vary, the common thread is that great powers can exert themselves beyond their near abroad to achieve goals. Today, to be a great power, actors extend their capabilities at a global scale through their level of capability, geographic reach, but also recognition as such by other nations.[1] For example France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, United States, Russia/USSR, and China were each considered great powers. Great powers may interact within the world cooperatively or competitively. When competition between two powers leads to direct military clashes, conflict occurs. Where cooperation occurs both states benefit from the transaction, while in competition or conflict, one or both powers suffer. The dynamics of these interactions create a hierarchy of states, first formally recognized in the 1814 Concert of Europe. Realists argue that states vie to be the most powerful while limiting other states' ability to overtake them. The resulting phenomenon of states allying with the leading nation through bandwagoning or against the leading power through balancing is known as balance of power theory.[2] When one power is on the rise, another declines – which puts them on a crash course for a zero-sum conflict.[3] The current dominant narrative puts China on the rise, Russia trying to rise, and the United States in relative decline.[4] Realists would point to this as a recipe for a coming conflict. But is great power war inevitable? Since the Concert of Europe, great powers fought each other from the Hundred Days War to World War II. However, during the same period, there were as many small and/or proxy wars as great power wars. **After World War II, the dynamic towards hybrid confrontation continued towards**

distributing conflict in such a way, that it reduced the likelihood of existential defeat. “The resultant Cold War was an approximately 40 year-long political, military and economic confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union and their respective allies... [that] never escalated into direct military confrontation between the superpowers, but involved an unprecedented arms race with both nuclear and conventional weapons as well as plethora of proxy conflicts.”[5] Korea, Vietnam, and Russian-Afghanistan wars were the closest that Great Powers came to direct conflict, but they remained proxy wars.

What can we attribute to this nearly 80-year lack of Great Power Conflict? (Not) Going Nuclear **In the pre-WW II**

examples, Great Powers could gain from conflict. Zero-sum outcomes incentivized the use of force and created conditions for increasingly lethal battlefield capabilities. Increased capability extended the scale of vertical escalation possible. This trend continued until the Cold War. **The parallel expansion of nuclear arsenals created a**

new dynamic. As Bull points out, “it is only in the context of nuclear weapons and other recent military technology that it becomes pertinent to ask whether war could not now be both ‘absolute in the results’ and take the form of a single instantaneous

blow' in Clausewitz' understanding of those terms.”[6] In other words, **nuclear weapons capped the escalation race, especially once stockpiles ensured Mutually Assured Destruction**. At that point, winner-takes-all possibilities shifted to a likely lose-lose situation. If vertical escalation is capped, what are other choices? Investments in hypersonics, long-range precision fires, future vertical lift, space, and cyber capabilities extend geographic range, all support horizontal escalation options. Alternatively, great powers could avoid military confrontation with each other, instead choosing to escalate both vertically and horizontally in the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. In the Cold War, that led to the exclusive use of proxies. **Today, adversaries reverse complex interdependence to employ “hostile acts outside the realm of armed conflict to weaken a rival country, entity, or alliance” known as gray-zone aggression,** which leads to a sort of diagonal escalation.

AT Advantage Two: CMR

Trump has killed CMR - abused military for personal loyalty

Adolph and Lawton 2025

Robert, and Benjamin, retired Lt. Colonels, 6/24, Small Wars Journal, Loyalty in Crisis, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/24/loyalty-in-crisis-civil-military-tensions-in-the-second-trump-presidency/>

American military personnel swear an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” This oath intentionally avoids reference to any individual, including the president. **Civil-military theorists** such as Samuel [Huntington](#) and Peter D. [Feaver](#) **have long emphasized the necessity of constitutional loyalty in preserving democratic civil-military balance. However, under the second Trump administration, personal loyalty has increasingly replaced institutional accountability** as the perceived measure of allegiance to democratic norms. **Several recent events suggest this shift toward loyalty to the individual rather than to the constitutional system:**

- **The [dismissal](#) of Department of Justice lawyers investigating the president’s role in the January 6th insurrection.**
- **The [removal](#) of judge advocates general (JAGs) from the military branches without public justification.**
- **The [termination](#) of the National Security Agency (NSA) director and deputy, reportedly for political disloyalty.**
- **The [activation](#) of the California National Guard absent a request by Governor Newsom.**
- **The [deployment](#) of U.S. Marines in support of the California National Guard.**

We asked ourselves: where do these decisions leave the military? These actions reflect a pattern in which legal and institutional checks are systematically eroded in favor of personal loyalty to the commander-in-chief. Such behavior is inconsistent with the principles upon which the military oath is based and sends a chilling message: adherence to constitutional norms may be grounds for dismissal.

CMR are strong, ignore the day to day gossip of the media**Gventer, Texas National Security Review, 2018**

Celeste Ward, Associate Editor, Texas National Security Review, Fellow, Clements Center for National Security, University of Texas, former Dep. Ass. Secretary of Defense, March 27th, Policy Roundtable: Civil-Military Relations Now and Tomorrow,

<https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-civil-military-relations-now-tomorrow/>

Yet, despite the administration's seemingly limitless disregard for established norms, making every day Christmas for the cable news channels, it is unclear how lasting are the dynamics associated with Trump's civil-military arrangements, such as they are. As Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider point out, "... understanding of U.S. civil-military relations might be distorted by the often narrow focus of the mass media. Rumors of disagreements within the Pentagon, or between the Pentagon and the White House or the Congress, are too often presented as if they were the whole substance of civil-military relations."⁸ They argue that one must look instead at the core "interdependent relationships," lest we neglect "other dynamics that are more significant or that have long-term ramifications."⁹ In other words, it would be easy to get distracted by the day-to-day, the public brawls, personal takedowns, and court gossip—particularly in this administration — and draw broad conclusions about civil-military relations based on them. But what captures our focus today may not, in fact, be the trends that matter most over the long term.

Mild CMR tensions inevitable, and impacts exaggerated**Feaver & Kohn, Duke University 2000**

Peter D. Feaver, Professor political science, Duke University; Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense; October 1; "The gap: Soldiers, civilians and their mutual misunderstanding"; The National Interest;

<http://www.allbusiness.com/government/3583819-1.html>

THREE MAIN critiques have been offered by those who think that the civil-military gap is much ado about nothing. First, divides of this sort have been around since the beginning of the Republic. Second, the principal challenges facing national security today are recruiting, retention, modernization, organization, and the growing mismatch between military missions and the resources devoted to defense—none of which is chiefly caused by this gap. Third, such divergences do not really matter because, at the highest policy levels, civilian and military elites have "fused"—that is, suppressed their differences to cooperate and work together amicably.¹⁷

US CMR Not modeled**Pion-Berlin, Armed Forces Society, 2009**

David, Armed Forces Society, April, vol.35, No. 3, Defense Organization and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48608923>

These chains of command are not modeled after the United States. The United States has a single chain of command, but, unlike countries in Latin America, its military subordinates are not the heads of each service branch but rather are commanders of multiservice, regional units spread throughout the globe. Each is composed of army, air force, navy, and marine personnel, has its own theater of operations, and takes orders directly from the Secretary of Defense.

Global Democracy is already declining**Repucci and Slipowitz, Freedom House, 2021**

Sarah and Amy, Freedom House, Democracy Under Siege, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege>

As a lethal pandemic, economic and physical insecurity, and violent conflict ravaged the world in 2020, democracy's defenders sustained heavy new losses in their struggle against authoritarian foes, shifting the international balance in favor of tyranny. Incumbent **leaders increasingly used force to crush opponents** and settle scores, sometimes in the name of public health, while beleaguered activists—lacking effective international support—faced heavy jail sentences, torture, or murder in many settings. **These withering blows marked the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. The countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began in 2006. The long democratic recession is deepening.** The impact of the long-term democratic decline has become increasingly global in nature, broad enough to be felt by those living under the cruelest dictatorships, as well as by citizens of long-standing democracies. **Nearly 75 percent of the world's population lived in a country that faced deterioration last year.** The ongoing decline has given rise to claims of democracy's inherent inferiority. Proponents of this idea include official Chinese and Russian commentators seeking to strengthen their international influence while escaping accountability for abuses, as well as antidemocratic actors within democratic states who see an opportunity to consolidate power. They are both cheering the breakdown of democracy and exacerbating it, pitting themselves against the brave groups and individuals who have set out to reverse the damage.

White Supremacists aren't that big of a threat**Barron, New York Post, 2019**

Seth, April 12th, The truth about the 'global white extremist threat',

<https://nypost.com/2019/04/12/the-truth-about-the-global-white-extremist-threat/>

Last week, The New York Times featured [an illustrated timeline of "white extremist" killings](#) over the last nine years. According to the Times, **the record shows "an informal global network of white extremists whose violent attacks are occurring with greater frequency in the West."**

The idea that white supremacist violence is a growing global threat has gained more currency recently, notably in the wake of the ghastly Christchurch mosque massacre. New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, for instance, [asserted that "White supremacists committed the largest # of extremist killings in 2017."](#) **No one will deny that people who kill in the name of white supremacy commit evil, but is it true that white extremists are sowing a growing amount of worldwide mayhem? The evidence suggests otherwise. Even a superficial glance at the record indicates that of the nearly 20,000 people killed in thousands of extremist killings in 2017, white supremacists were responsible for very few.** The worst terrorist event of 2017, according to the State Department, was the explosion of a truck bomb in Somalia, which killed more than 580 people.

Patriotism Disadvantage

The 1AC is a rejection of liberalism and US military power – their criticism contributes to neo-isolationism and prevents American dominance

Kagan 1998

Robert, History professor at Georgetown, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The benevolent empire", Foreign Policy

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do.

But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying

American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present.

In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget — even if most of the rest of the world does not — just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

US hegemony is sustainable and prevents great power wars, escalation in Taiwan and Ukraine, climate change, disease, and poverty.

Ikenberry 2022

John, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton, Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Foreign Affairs, Nov. / Dec. Why American power endures, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-american-power-endures-us-led-order-isnt-in-decline-q-john-ikenberry>

EMPIRE BY INVITATION The United States enters today's struggle to shape the twenty-first century with profound advantages. It still possesses the vast bulk of the material capabilities it had in earlier decades. It remains uniquely positioned geographically to play a great-power role in both East Asia and Europe. Its ability to work with other liberal democracies to shape global rules and institutions is already manifest in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and will stand it in good stead in any future collective response to Chinese aggression in East Asia. Although China and Russia seek to move the world in the direction of regional blocs and spheres of influence, the United States has offered a vision of world order based on a set of principles rather than competition over territory. Liberal international order is a way of organizing an interdependent world.

It is, as the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad called it, an "empire by invitation." Its success depends on its legitimacy and appeal and not on the capacity of its patrons to force obedience. If the United States remains at the center of world politics in the decades to come, it will be because this type of order generates more supporters and fellow travelers around the world than that offered by China and Russia.

The U.S. confrontation with China and Russia in 2022 is an echo of the great-power upheavals of 1919, 1945, and 1989. As at these earlier moments, the United States finds itself working with other democracies in

resisting the aggressive moves of illiberal great powers. The Russian war in Ukraine is about more than the future of Ukraine; it is also about the basic rules and norms of international relations. Putin's gambit has placed the United States and democracies in Europe and elsewhere on the defensive. But it has also given the United States an opportunity to rethink and reargue its case for an open, multilateral system of world order. If the past is any guide, the United States should not try to simply consolidate the old order but to reimagine it. U.S. leaders should seek to broaden the democratic coalition, reaffirm basic values and interests, and offer a vision of a reformed international order that draws states and peoples together in new forms of cooperation, such as to solve problems of climate change, global public health, and sustainable development. No other great power is better placed to build the necessary partnerships and lead the way in tackling the major problems of the twenty-first century. Other powers may be rising, but the world cannot afford the end of the American era.

2NC/1NR Overview:

The affirmative's project is an intellectual challenge to the US led global order that has been net beneficial to the globe for the last 90 years. This round matters, debates actively formulate epistemic, intellectual, and public support for US leadership, **which the plan does not do.**

Extend Ikenberry, 13 Brookings scholars agree, the US pursuit of Heg is happening and inevitable, its try or die for the DA

Hass Et Al 2023

Ryan, Bruce Jones, Mireya Solis, David Dollar, Patricia Kim, Tanvi Madan, Joshua Meltzer, Chris Mesarole, Michael O'Hanlon, Eswar Prasad, Melanie Sisson, Tom Stefanick, Andrew Yoo, Brookings Institution, Updating America's Asia Strategy,

<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/updating-americas-asia-strategy/>

In the face of these risks, **the United States and its partners have been advancing a concerted strategy** to build a more densely integrated web of relationships in the region. Through a combination **of partnerships, alliances, issue-specific groupings, and formalized structures, countries in the region have begun cohering to hedge against risks from China.** Even so, China continues to grow its military, strengthen its central position in the regional economy, and make diplomatic inroads across the region. Meanwhile, there is a latent perception in parts of Asia that the United States is failing to meet the moment. This assessment is most pronounced on trade issues, where the United States finds itself on the outside of the region's two main trade agreements, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). To evaluate the merits of these anxieties and identify potential policy remedies, Ryan Hass, Bruce Jones, and Mireya Solís convened 10 Brookings scholars for a written dialogue on steps the United States could take to strengthen its overall strategy in Asia. These experts, drawn from a range of disciplines, were asked to offer recommendations on regional economic strategy, diplomatic strategy, and security strategy. The following are a few key takeaways from the exchanges that included David Dollar, Patricia Kim, Tanvi Madan, Joshua P. Meltzer, Chris Meserole, Michael E. O'Hanlon, Eswar Prasad, Melanie W. Sisson, Tom Stefanick, and Andrew Yeo: **China is coordinating economic, military, and diplomatic tools in pursuit of regional leadership in Asia. In the face of this formidable challenge, the United States cannot afford to do more of the same and expect to sustain a favorable balance of power.**

Extend Kagan -- The key ingredient in Hegemony is intellectual and popular support, which the aff undermines. Here's more evidence

Cooley and Nexon 2020

Alex, Political Scientist, Barnard College, and director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute, and Daniel, Professor, Walsh School Georgetown University, Foreign Affairs, How Hegemony Ends, July/August,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>

Some analysts believe that **the United States can still turn this around, by restoring the strategies by which it**, from the end of World War II to the aftermath of the Cold War, **built and sustained a**

successful international order. If a post-Trump United States could reclaim the responsibilities of global power, then this era—including the pandemic that will define it—could stand as a temporary aberration rather than a step on the way to permanent disarray. After all, predictions of American decline and a shift in international order are far from new—and they have been consistently wrong. In the middle of the 1980s, many analysts believed that U.S. leadership was on the way out. The Bretton Woods system had collapsed in the 1970s; the United States faced increasing competition from European and East Asian economies, notably West Germany and Japan; and the Soviet Union looked like an enduring feature of world politics. By the end of 1991, however, the Soviet Union had formally dissolved, Japan was entering its "lost decade" of economic stagnation, and the expensive task of integration consumed a reunified Germany. The United States experienced a decade of booming technological innovation and unexpectedly high economic growth. The result was what many hailed as a "unipolar moment" of American hegemony. But **this**

time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are

today driving its dissolution. Three developments enabled the post-Cold War U.S.-led order. First, with the defeat of communism, **the United States faced no major global ideological project that could rival its own**. Second,

with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational

activists and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the

liberal order. Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but permanent. **THE VANISHING UNIPOLAR MOMENT** It may seem strange to talk of permanent decline when the United States spends more on its military than its next seven rivals combined and maintains an unparalleled network of overseas military bases. Military power played an important role in creating and maintaining U.S. preeminence in the 1990s and early years of this century; no other country could extend credible security guarantees across the entire international system. But U.S. military dominance was less a function of defense budgets—in real terms, U.S. military spending decreased during the 1990s and only ballooned after the September 11 attacks—than of several other factors: the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a competitor, the growing technological advantage enjoyed by the U.S. military, and the willingness of most of the world's second-tier powers to rely on the United States rather than build up their own military forces. If the emergence of the United States as a unipolar power was mostly contingent on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then the continuation of that unipolarity through the subsequent decade stemmed from the fact that Asian and European allies were content to subscribe to U.S. hegemony. Talk of the unipolar moment obscures crucial features of world politics that formed the basis of U.S.

dominance. The breakup of the Soviet Union finally closed the door on the only project of global ordering that could rival capitalism. Marxism-Leninism (and its offshoots) mostly disappeared as a source of ideological competition. Its associated transnational infrastructure—its institutions, practices, and networks, including the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the Soviet Union itself—all imploded. Without Soviet support, most Moscow-affiliated countries, insurgent groups, and political movements decided it was better to either throw in the towel or get on the U.S. bandwagon. By the middle of the 1990s, there existed only one dominant framework for international norms and rules: the liberal international system of alliances and institutions anchored in Washington. The United States and its allies—referred to in breezy shorthand as "the West"—together enjoyed a de facto patronage monopoly during the period of unipolarity. With some limited exceptions, they offered the only significant source of security, economic goods, and political support and legitimacy. Developing countries could no longer exert leverage over Washington by threatening to turn to Moscow or point to the risk of a communist takeover to shield themselves from having to make domestic reforms. The sweep of Western power and influence was so untrammelled that many policymakers came to believe in the permanent triumph of liberalism. Most governments saw no viable alternative. During the 1990s, most governments saw no viable alternative to Western sources of support. With no other source of support, countries were more likely to adhere to the conditions of the Western aid they received. Autocrats faced severe international criticism and heavy demands from Western-controlled international organizations. Yes, democratic powers continued to protect certain autocratic states (such as oil-rich Saudi Arabia) from such demands for strategic and economic reasons. And leading democracies, including the United States, themselves violated international norms concerning human, civil, and political rights, most dramatically in the form of torture and extraordinary renditions during the so-called war on terror. But even these hypocritical exceptions reinforced the hegemony of the liberal order, because they sparked widespread condemnation that reaffirmed liberal principles and because U.S. officials continued to voice commitment to liberal norms. Meanwhile, an expanding number of transnational networks—often dubbed "international civil society"—propped up the emerging architecture of the post-Cold War international order. These groups and individuals served as the foot soldiers of U.S. hegemony by spreading broadly liberal norms and practices. The collapse of centrally

planned economies in the postcommunist world invited waves of Western consultants and contractors to help usher in market reforms—sometimes with disastrous consequences, as in Russia and Ukraine, where Western-backed shock therapy impoverished tens of millions while creating a class of wealthy oligarchs who turned former state assets into personal empires. International financial institutions, government regulators, central bankers, and economists worked to build an elite consensus in favor of free trade and the movement of capital across borders. Civil society groups also sought to steer postcommunist and developing countries toward Western models of liberal democracy. Teams of Western experts advised governments on the design of new constitutions, legal reforms, and multiparty systems. International observers, most of them from Western democracies, monitored elections in far-flung countries. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) advocating the expansion of human rights, gender equality, and environmental protections forged alliances with sympathetic states and media outlets. **The work of transnational activists, scholarly communities, and social movements helped build an overarching liberal project of economic and political integration.** Throughout the 1990s, **these forces helped produce an illusion of an unassailable liberal order resting on durable U.S. global hegemony. That illusion is now in tatters.**

Foreign Policy Apathy undermines Heg, causes policy paralysis and capture by special interests.

Lindsay 2000

James, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Sept. 1st, Foreign Affairs The New Apathy, How an Uninterested Public is Reshaping Foreign Policy,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/new-apathy-how-uninterested-public-reshaping-foreign-policy>

What explains this gap between what Americans want and what Washington does? The common answer -- that politicians are misreading the public -- is as mistaken as it is popular. It rests on the flawed premise that in politics, majority preferences trump all. But politicians worry less about what the public thinks about an issue than about how intensely it cares. And therein lies the great irony of the post-Cold War era: at the very moment that the United States has more influence than ever on international affairs,

Americans have lost much of their interest in the world around them. This apathetic internationalism is reshaping the politics of American foreign policy -- encouraging the neglect of foreign affairs, distorting policy choices to favor the noisy few over the quiet many, and making it harder for presidents to lead. Left unchecked, these impulses will prevent the United States from capitalizing on its great power. So the most important foreign policy challenge

facing the next president is not encouraging democracy in Russia, coping with a rising China, or advancing a liberal economic order. Instead, **it is persuading the American people to pay more than lip service to their internationalist beliefs.**

THE INTERNATIONALIST HABIT Despite fears that Americans would turn inward when the Cold War ended, they still consistently support an internationalist foreign policy. Since 1947, the Gallup polling organization has periodically asked, "Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" In 1999, 61 percent of those surveyed responded that active American involvement in the world was critical -- roughly in the middle of the range of responses recorded over the past 50 years. The public's internationalist inclinations hold up when one moves from the abstract to the specific. During the Kosovo war, Gallup found that public support for "U.S. participation in NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia" reached as high as 61 percent, and the war always had more supporters than foes, despite widespread criticism of the Clinton administration's strategy. The Pew Research Center found in February that 64 percent of Americans think free trade is good for the country; 62 percent say the same about U.S. membership in the World Trade Organization. These numbers are virtually identical to those in polls taken before the failed WTO meeting in Seattle last year. Unlike many on Capitol Hill, Americans have not embraced unilateralism. A 1998 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 72 percent of Americans say that the United States should not act in international crises without its allies' support. This multilateralist preference also carries over to support for international organizations, which most Americans, as polls consistently show, want to strengthen, not weaken. Moreover, the American public's internationalist attitudes span all parts of the country and key demographic groups. Despite fears that "Generation X" would turn its back on the world because it came of age after the Cold War, polls show it to be as internationalist, if not more so, than the World War II generation. And nothing in the polls suggests that isolationism or unilateralism has much appeal. Eliation Why, then, has the public's embrace of internationalism not translated into greater political support in Washington for American engagement abroad? The answer lies in **a basic rule of politics:**

What really counts is not how many people line up on each side of an issue but how intensely each side holds its opinions.

Politicians know that opposing impassioned voters may mean looking for a new job, so silent majorities get ignored. In politics, as in the rest of life, squeaky wheels get the grease. Consider the saga of Elián González. Roughly two out of three Americans favored sending the six-year-old back to Cuba to live with his father. But while many politicians raced to the cameras to demand that Elián be allowed to stay in the United States, few argued publicly for returning him to Cuba -- because the minority of Americans who backed Elián's Miami relatives cared passionately enough about the issue to reward their friends and punish their enemies. By contrast, the majority that favored returning Elián to Cuba was unlikely to remember the boy in six months, let alone use the voting booth to punish politicians who favored letting him stay.

Intensity is crucial to the politics of foreign policy today because the public's commitment to internationalism has ebbed over the past decade. During the Cold War, foreign affairs almost always topped the country's political agenda. Gallup regularly found that 10 to 20 percent -- and sometimes even more -- of those polled named a foreign policy issue as the most important problem facing the United States. But today most Americans dismiss foreign policy as relatively unimportant. Only two to three percent name foreign policy concerns as the most important problem facing the country, and Americans have trouble identifying foreign issues that concern them. When the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations asked people in 1998 to name the "two or three biggest foreign-policy problems facing the United States today," the most common response by far, at 21 percent, was "don't know."

The "don't know"s predominate because fewer Americans follow foreign affairs. In February 1999, as the Rambouillet summit convened, Pew found that only one in nine Americans said they followed news about Kosovo "very closely." By comparison, one in six said they closely followed the news of Joe DiMaggio's death. Or take the Senate's rejection of the CTBT, which The New York Times likened to the Senate's 1920 defeat of the Versailles Treaty: immediately after the CTBT vote, Pew found that half of those surveyed admitted they had heard nothing about it. **Americans ignore much of what happens overseas because they see little at stake.** In September 1997, Pew asked 2,000 Americans how much impact other parts of the world had on the United States. Solid majorities answered "very little," even when asked about America's allies. (About 60 percent said that western Europe had little or no impact on their lives.) These poll numbers all jibe with what people at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue know firsthand: Americans endorse internationalism in theory but seldom do anything about it in practice. Americans may have wanted to pay their U.N. debt, but few wrote to Congress demanding action. Similarly, most Americans supported the CTBT, but they did not descend on Washington in busloads to save it. **Americans approach foreign policy the way they approach physical fitness -- they understand the benefits of being in good shape, but they still avoid exercise.** THE WASTELAND **Apathetic internationalism** is reshaping American foreign policy in three ways. First, it **encourages politicians**, who naturally gravitate toward issues that matter to the public, **to neglect foreign policy**. Of course, foreign affairs still matter after the Cold War, but the political credit that once came with handling them has faded. President Bush discovered this when he was attacked in 1992 for being too interested in foreign affairs and defeated by a candidate who argued that the country should focus on domestic policy. Over his two terms, Bill Clinton largely delivered what he promised, and to judge by the polls, he did not suffer for it. Foreign policy remains a low priority in the 2000 campaign. The neglect of foreign policy is, if anything, even worse on Capitol Hill. Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee have trouble recruiting members. "Foreign Relations has been kind of a wasteland," admits Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), a staunch internationalist. "It is not a particularly strong committee to fundraise from." The House Republicans' famous "Contract with America" ignored foreign policy (save for a plug for national missile defense and a broadside against U.N. peacekeeping), and congressional Democrats have virtually purged foreign policy from their vocabulary. **Second, apathetic internationalism empowers squeaky wheels.** This happens partly because **politicians who abandon foreign policy** for greener political pastures **cede power to colleagues whose interest in foreign policy arises from personal passion.** As former Representative David Skaggs (D-Colo.) noted about life on Capitol Hill, "When there are a few people who will die for the issue, and nobody else gets anywhere close to that, they can have their way." "Skaggs' Law" clearly operated during the debates over U.N. dues and the CTBT. Once the U.N. bill passed the Senate, Representative Christopher Smith (R-N.J.) linked it to aid for international family-planning programs and for two years resisted intense pressure to back down. In the CTBT case, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) and a few colleagues lobbied fellow Republicans and pressed Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) to hold a vote. Their zeal -- and the prospect that they would make Lott's life miserable if he postponed the vote -- more than outweighed the fact that 24 Republican senators had publicly asked that the treaty be withdrawn. **Apathetic internationalism also favors the noisy few because it encourages politicians to cater to groups with narrow but intense preferences.** That, after all, is where the political credit lies when the broader public is looking elsewhere. Indian-Americans have used their growing political clout (membership in the Congressional Indian Caucus is nearly double that of the Congressional Study Group on Germany) to block efforts to cut aid to India and persuade Congress to condemn Pakistani "aggression" in Kashmir. Human rights activists, labor unions, and environmentalists kept Clinton from winning "fast-track" negotiating authority in trade. The extreme right has turned U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions into political poison. Of course, narrow interests have always been part of American foreign policy. But without a countervailing push from the political center, they are fast becoming its defining feature. Third, **apathetic internationalism makes it harder for presidents to lead.** During the early Cold War, both political savvy and policy arguments encouraged Congress to rally around the president; public rebuffs could embolden Moscow and bring punishment at the polls. Vietnam destroyed this knee-jerk support for the president, but congressional deference survived (albeit tattered) well into the 1980s. Ronald Reagan's great ally in fights over arms control, contra aid, and other issues was moderate Democrats' reluctance to defeat his policies outright. That caution partly stemmed from policy considerations -- a major public defeat would weaken the president's standing abroad -- but also reflected Democrats' fear that Reagan would blame them for playing politics with national security. But in the 1990s, with no major threat to U.S. security on the horizon and with public interest waning, the costs of challenging the president plummeted. In April 1999, during the Kosovo war, the House refused to vote to support the bombing. Not to be outdone, the Senate voted down the CTBT in October even though President Clinton and 62 senators had asked that it be withdrawn. These episodes were major departures from past practice. When Congress sought to wrest control of foreign policy from the president on issues such as Vietnam, the MX missile, and contra aid, it had vocal public support. On Kosovo and the CTBT, Congress challenged Clinton even though most Americans backed his positions. The decline in congressional deference has accompanied a growing politicization of

foreign policy, for the same basic reason. When the public is engaged, foreign policy is a risky way to score political points; demonizing opponents and exaggerating policy differences energizes core supporters but alienates less fervent voters. But when the public is disengaged, foreign policy becomes -- to paraphrase Clausewitz -- the continuation of domestic politics by other means. The temptation to use foreign policy for partisan gain is hardly restricted to members of Congress or Republicans; witness Clinton's insistence, against all available evidence, that the CTBT had fallen victim to "the new isolationists in the Republican Party." And Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) was simply being more honest than most when he pointed out an upside to a vote against the CTBT by William Roth, a Republican senator up for reelection. "Bingo!" Biden said. "That's \$200,000 worth of ads." Without denying the enmity that many congressional Republicans reserve for Clinton, Congress is not likely to start deferring again to the White House when he leaves it. Strikingly, 45 percent of current senators and 61 percent of current representatives first took office after 1992. They have known only fractious relations with the commander in chief. Resurrecting the old norms that members should defer to presidents and leave politics at the water's edge will hardly be automatic, and members are certainly under no pressure from the public to behave. In 1998, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that 43 percent of Americans thought that Congress' role in foreign policy was about right -- the highest number recorded since the Council's quadrennial surveys began in 1974. **MALIGN NEGLECT** The consequences of **apathetic internationalism** -- however much they please isolationists, pandering politicians, and ethnic groups relishing their newfound clout -- **should trouble anyone who believes that the United States must be engaged in world affairs. They are eroding America's capacity to lead** and encouraging what Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has called the "malign neglect" of U.S. global standing. International affairs spending provides a clear case in point. Just as everyone wants to go to heaven but no one wants to die, politicians routinely deride the idea that global leadership can be had on the cheap but do little to adequately fund American diplomacy. The fiscal year 2000 budget allotted only \$22.3 billion to international affairs -- a 40 percent drop in real spending from the peak of the mid-1980s even though the overall federal budget is running a surplus for the first time in decades. The resulting tin-cup diplomacy is penny-wise and pound-foolish. The few tens of millions the United States will save by lowering its U.N. dues, for instance, hardly make up for the damage done to the U.N. as an instrument for U.S. foreign policy. **This myopia about what the United States needs to accomplish its goals abroad goes beyond international affairs spending.** Human rights, labor, and environmental groups blocked fast-track and cost the United States the opportunity to push ahead with the trade liberalization that most Americans believe will enhance their prosperity. **Narrow-minded laws** like the Helms-Burton sanctions, which punish other countries for trading with Cuba, **needlessly squander allied goodwill while offering almost no prospect of success.**

AT: One Round Doesn't Matter

1. Every round matters -- debaters are developing their political ideologies and the win/loss paradigm guides research and reading.
2. The judge needs to draw a line in the sand and force all debaters to think about the consequences of the aff's counter hegemonic advocacy.

Hegemony is socialized, every round is key**Kasku-Jackson 2016**

Jonty, ""Prohibiting Interference with Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing,"

National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/19432/ocr>

Primacy's popularized story has been the dominant rationale under various names with various tweaks at least **since the Cold War's end.** Arguably its reign began when the Truman administration imagined the Soviet Union's containment as a global struggle with communism 86 Its popularity has risen along with US relative power. **As with other successful ideologies the story's repetition by influential people convinces others some of whom are or become leaders Intellectual dominance also gives primacy social cachet** People in Washington's foreign policy circles adopt it outwardly even if they are not fully convinced **which in turn convinces others or encourages them to act convinced** 87

AT: Non-Unique, Other Challenges To Heg

Extend Cooley and Nexon -- they have studied dozens of historic hegemonies and isolated the decline of intellectual cohesion and counter hegemonic movements as the key lynchpin of collapse.

AT No Link, Too Small / Irrelevant

We'll isolate two links:

1. Debate is a critical training ground for future activists and leaders -- we pick topics before the rest of the world even knows about issues, and debaters go on to publish, serve in every level of government, activism, and
2. Extend the aff's spill up claim
 - a. Double Bind: Either the aff has a spill up claim, and will effect something beyond this round, thus linking to the K, or they don't, and the only thing they solve is nihilist, symbolic activism.

Ballot is key -- it signals intellectual endorsement of an idea or political strategy.

The plan mobilizes to influence public discourse, wields epistemic and agenda setting power. Either they solve, and link, or they don't solve, and should lose on presumption.

Laginder 2013

Ann-Marie, Editor, Professor, Linkoping University, Henrik Nordvall, Professor, Orebro University, and Jim Crowther, University of Edinburgh, Popular Education, Power, and Democracy,

<https://education.uw.edu/sites/default/files/1279/Popular-Education-Power-Democracy-WEB.pdf>

Attempts to define the concept of power often state that the concept is controversial and highly contested. Different theories give completely different approaches to interpreting power and power relations (Engelstad, 2006; Lukes 2004/2008; Petersson, 1987). Starting from the inextricably intertwined relationship between power and knowledge, Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) discuss three dimensions of power drawing on Luke and Gaventa's previous work. The analysis in Gaventa and Cornwall (2001) is focused on power and knowledge in relation to participatory research. However, we have found their elaborated interpretations of power and knowledge helpful in understanding these intertwined concepts and also in study circles as learning contexts. The first dimension of **power through knowledge may**, in Gaventa and Cornwall's interpretation, **be conceived as resources to be mobilised to influence public debate**. They stress that **this view risks blaming the silent majority for not taking part in the public debate**, instead of recognising how some groups are prevented from taking part. From the second dimensional view, **empowerment through knowledge could mean challenging expertise but it also highlights the importance of possibilities to participate in the process of shaping knowledge**. However, this view may allow the powerful to set the agenda. Using and producing knowledge affects people's awareness and consciousness and affects their lives. The third dimension emphasises the ways of influencing consciousness **by taking control of the agenda in the first place (power through ideology)**. Gaventa and Cornwall claim that **all three dimensions of power focus on the 'repressive side of power, and conceptualize power as a resource that individuals gain, hold and wield'** (ibid., p. 72).

No Link:

Extend Kagan -- they haven't contested that intellectual movements and civil society key to heg, apply Cooley and Nexon here. We've got generationally renown historians, prefer their research to the assertions of high school students.

2NR Overview:

Counter order movements have undermined hegemonic powers in the past, its try or die Cooley and Nexon 2020

Alex, Political Scientist, Barnard College, and director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute, and Daniel, Professor, Walsh School Georgetown University, Foreign Affairs, How Hegemony Ends, July/August,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>

Over the last decade, **illiberal networks—generally but not exclusively on the right—have challenged the establishment consensus within the West.** Some groups and figures question the merits of

continued membership in major institutions of the liberal order, such as the European Union and NATO. Many right-wing movements in the West receive both financial and moral support from Moscow, which backs “dark money” operations that promote narrow oligarchic interests in the United States and far-right political parties in Europe with the hope of weakening democratic governments and cultivating future allies. In Italy, the anti-immigrant party Lega is currently the most popular party despite revelations of its attempt to win illegal financial support from Moscow. In France, the National Rally, which also has a history of Russian backing, remains a powerful force in domestic politics. **These developments**

echo the ways in which “counter-order” movements have helped precipitate the decline of hegemonic powers in the past. Transnational networks played crucial roles in both upholding and challenging prior

international orders. For example, Protestant networks helped erode Spanish power in early modern Europe, most notably by supporting the Dutch Revolt in the sixteenth century. Liberal and republican movements, especially in the context of the revolutions across Europe in 1848, played a part in undermining the Concert of Europe, which tried to manage international order on the continent in the first half of the nineteenth century. The rise of fascist and communist transnational networks helped produce the global power struggle of World War II. Counter-order movements achieved political power in countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, leading those nations to break from or try to assail existing structures of international order. But

even less successful counter-order movements can still undermine the cohesion of hegemonic powers and their allies. Not every illiberal or right-wing movement that opposes the U.S.-led order seeks to challenge U.S.

leadership or turns to Russia as an exemplar of strong cultural conservatism. Nonetheless, **such movements are helping polarize politics in advanced industrial democracies and weaken support for the order's institutions.** One of them has even captured the White House: Trumpism, which is best understood as a counter-order movement with a transnational reach that targets the alliances and partnerships central to U.S. hegemony.

Critique of US exceptionalism has prevented war, and while elite capture is real, being ready for a crises will allow the academy to shift opinion

Friedman and Logan 2016

Benjamin, research fellow, and Justin, Former director of Foreign Policy Studies, CATO Institute, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Why Washington Doesn't Debate Grand Strategy, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/AFRI_Friedman.pdf

Both critics and backers of primacy predicted that the Afghanistan and Iraq wars' unpopularity, recession, and deficits would restrain US grand strategy or at least shift debate that way. ¹¹¹ Concern about the deficit produced the 2011 Budget Control Act's budget caps, which restrained Pentagon spending. **Antiwar sentiment made it difficult for US leaders to propose the use of ground forces in new conflicts.** ¹¹² **These shifts were not without effect, but the establishment consensus favoring primacy held.** No other major defense policy changes have occurred, despite military spending cuts. Were a political constituency rejecting primacy likely to arise from these forces, it should have arrived already. If we are right, few think tanks will push for a reevaluation of US grand strategy. **Only the academy can sustain a critique of primacy. That creates a special responsibility to do so.** This need not entail a rush to the partisan barricades or prescriptive writing extending beyond what research supports. **It means questioning the assumptions that underlie policy—pointing to the tradeoffs and faulty assumptions politics avoids acknowledging.** ¹¹³ While immediate results are unlikely, **policy ideas often matter a lot eventually**, but they are not self-ratifying. **They get adopted when a shock**, like a lost war, **or crisis provokes widespread demand for change.** ¹¹⁴ **Because it is nearly impossible to predict when this may happen, academics should continue producing ideas about strategy so they are on the bookshelf when politics goes in search of new ideas. Efforts to move the political ground beneath leaders have greater promise. Academics can consider not just the wisdom of grand strategies but the basis of their support**, which generates insight about how to alter them. Institutional reforms might fracture support for primacy. ¹¹⁵ For instance, more aggressive spending caps requiring more painful cuts from powerful constituencies might have produced a real push to reevaluate primacy, possibly creating lasting change in the establishment's ideological landscape. Similarly, a law requiring taxes to pay for wars would concentrate some of primacy's costs and, given sufficient expense, likely split primacy's support base. Another means to provoke strategic debate is increasing competition among military services for budgets and relevance. That might induce the services to promote strategic alternatives. Beyond this, **scholars who care about changing US grand strategy should continue their work** but lower their expectations. Permissive international and domestic environments allowed Washington's variously warring tribes to agree on a remarkably ambitious grand strategy. **The market for alternatives is small**, at best, so most politically relevant analysts stay operationally focused. Those of us bothered by that situation can take solace in the national good fortune that produced it. Only the richest, safest nations can persist in a foolish grand strategy without bothering to debate it.

Marijuana Counterplan

Counterplan: The United States Military should adjust its standards to allow ADHD diagnoses and marijuana use to no longer disqualify military recruits.

Studies show ADHD diagnosed soldiers and former marijuana users thrive in military environments, and doing so would increase recruiting, solving the Aff

Eichelberger 2024

Master Sgt. Robert E., Army Press, April 15th, Aligning Recruiting Standards with evolving health trends,

<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2024/April/Aligning-Recruiting-Standards-with-Evolving-Health-Trends/>

This downward recruiting trend requires a comprehensive review of recruiting operations and policies. **A 2020 Pentagon Qualified Military Available Study reported 77% of Americans do not qualify for service** (Novelly, 2022). The U.S. Office of People Analytics (OPA) further reports **60% of 17- to 24-year-old males do not meet medical fitness standards** (Joint Advertising Market Research & Studies [JAMRS], 2023). **The U.S. Army's medical fitness standards for enlistment effectively prevent more than two-thirds of Americans from enlisting. The critical areas of consideration for the medical fitness standards enlistment problem are efficient background screening, juvenile mental health history, and marijuana legalization.** Efficient Background Screening Efficient medical background screening is essential to ensure recruit quality. The Military Health System Genesis (MHSG) became mandatory for MEPS background screening in February 2022 (MEPCOM, 2023). MHSG now provides potential recruits' entire medical history, allowing for health-based enlistment decision-making. **The prevalence of ADHD diagnoses and marijuana use in recruit medical histories dramatically impacts medical processing.** The Pentagon reported 17% of 2022 enlistments required waivers, an increase of six percent and 8,000 waivers overall from 2021 (Cohen, 2023). The MHSG was an outstanding update to medical background screening. It effectively screens life-threatening health conditions such as heart disease and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). MHSG electronic health records also reflect juvenile mental health and marijuana legalization societal shifts. Juvenile Mental Health The recruitment target population ranges are from 17 to 24 (JAMRS, 2023). **Today, more than one out of every 10 American youths in that age range are diagnosed with ADHD** (Bitsko et al., 2022). The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) report that 6.6 million American youths have ADHD (CDC, 2023). The estimate was compiled before MHSG implementation and may logically increase parallels to medical waiver increases. The medical fitness standard for ADHD disqualifies an American population that shifted toward juvenile mental health treatment. **The societal shift toward marijuana legalization is equally detrimental to the Army recruiting mission.** Marijuana Legalization Marijuana is the most used federally illegal drug in the U.S. (CDC, 2023). In a 2021 Monitoring the Future Survey, **more than 30% of American high school students reported using marijuana in the past 12 months** (Miech et al., 2023). **Army Regulation 600-85 prohibits service member marijuana use** (Department of the Army, 2020b). **Medical fitness standards apply to applicants before they enlist, and legal marijuana use routinely disqualifies law-abiding citizens.** During initial screening by recruiters, marijuana use in the last 30 days temporarily disqualifies applicants. Applicants must later undergo drug testing for marijuana metabolites per the DOD Drug Testing System. In California, for instance, potential recruits face disqualification when the MEPS-administered drug and alcohol test detects previous legal marijuana use. **74 percent of Americans live in an area with state-legalized marijuana** (Schaeffer, 2023). The societal shift toward marijuana use creates a disconnect with Army medical fitness standards for enlistment. Solution A review of medical fitness standards displays an opportunity to implement changes in the doctrine, training, and policy elements. **The U.S. Army can feasibly align medical fitness policy with juvenile mental health and marijuana legalization without lowering standards** using DOTMLPF-P. Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder **The Secretary of the Army can change Army Regulation 40-501 to allow applicants with a history of ADHD to complete successful academic or employment experience 12 months before enlisting.** The MHSG background screening process would find ADHD diagnoses and juvenile mental health issues. Each potential recruit would need to provide examples of successful experience, such as high school transcripts and work references. Recruiters could then make qualification determinations without disqualifying potential recruits during the initial

screening process. **Removing ADHD disqualifications would immediately broaden the qualified pool of recruits,** increase processing efficiency by removing waivers, and provide positive gains toward removing the stigma of mental health treatment in the Army. The Army can achieve these benefits without lowering standards or force quality.

Recent **studies show people with ADHD typically thrive in the heavily structured and directive military environment** (Bahn et al., 2018). Force resilience may improve as people with ADHD tend to show increased mindfulness and self-regulation compared to control populations (Asherson et al., 2018). **A medical fitness policy change as it pertains to legalized marijuana provides added opportunity for Army accessions.** Marijuana Legalization Applicants who used marijuana 30 days before beginning the enlistment process are disqualified from enlistment (USAREC, 2022). The USAREC commander approves changes to USAREC doctrine and could remove this disqualification criteria for instances of legal marijuana use. The DOD drug testing program would test for illegal and illicit substances at MEPS, but with a policy adjustment that prevents legal marijuana use from disqualifying applicants. **Once enlisted, Soldiers would still be required to adhere to Army Substance Abuse Program**

guidelines. Marijuana use in the Army is unauthorized, and violations are punishable under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The National Center for Studies for Education Statistics (NCES) reports 15.4 million students attended public high school in 2021 (NCES, 2023). A medical fitness marijuana policy alignment would qualify approximately 30 percent of them, a total of 4,620,000 potential recruits. The U.S. Army can avoid lowering standards by allowing only legal marijuana use. **Recent studies show “recruits with a history of marijuana use were just as likely to complete their first term and make Sergeant, and less likely to leave the Army for health or performance reasons”** (Asch et al., 2021, p. 1). The Army may also benefit from improved tracking and statistics reporting by incentivizing applicant transparency for those who used marijuana. DOTMLPF-P Implementation The proposed medical fitness policy change requires doctrine, training, and policy element integration. USAREC doctrine may support medical fitness policy changes by removing USAREC Manual 3-32 guidance to disqualify for marijuana use and ADHD diagnoses during initial screening. USAREC makes rapid doctrine revisions by email, using the USAREC Message Portal. A USAREC message outlining policy changes and processing instructions may be issued instantly to the recruiting force, ensuring instant implementation. Army doctrine and policy changes require training to ensure compliance and competence. Army recruiting leaders would be required to train the recruiting force on doctrinal changes as prescribed in training and leader development program regulations. Newly assigned recruiters would complete updated applicant screening training in the Army Recruiter Course. The costs associated with medical fitness policy change are minimal due to current organizational and training infrastructure. The USAREC and MEPS facilities would not need to change during implementation. Army doctrine, training, and policy element integration would ensure successful medical fitness policy change implementation. Conclusion U.S. Army recruiting faces complex challenges in the talent competition. Senior leaders prioritize and **tackle these challenges comprehensively.** Recent annual recruiting shortcomings indicate the need to adjust and improve the strategic approach. **American society is consistently evolving, and the U.S. Army must remain flexible.** It must exploit emerging trends to achieve mission accomplishment. **By aligning medical fitness policies with the realities of ADHD diagnoses and marijuana legalization, the Army can broaden its recruit base without compromising force quality.**

The Army would improve recruiting performance without lowering standards by aligning medical fitness standards with societal health trends.

Security K

Generic Link: Attempts to increase our security create a self-fulfilling prophecy of insecurity, and our dependence on so-called experts blinds us to alternative possibilities of peace.

Foster, National Defense University, 1994

Gregory, Professor, In Search of A Post Cold War Security Structure,
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA276903.pdf>

The late Kenneth Boulding made the astute observation that **there is a reciprocal, escalatory dynamic** associated with threat imagery. For example, **Country A, feeling itself threatened** (however and for whatever reasons) **by Country B, increases its armaments to reduce its insecurity. This makes B feel threatened, and so B increases its armaments** to bolster its security. **This makes A feel even more threatened**, so A again increases its armaments. This growing threat “forces” B to further increase its armaments. **And so on until either war breaks out** or some other change (such as internal economic collapse) reverses the process. This is how threatthink becomes threat. **If there is a single, documentable truth to be derived from an assessment of threat-based thinking, it is that the perception of threat—at least where that threat has a human component—almost invariably becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.** For this reason alone—the fact that we have shown ourselves perversely capable of creating unwanted inevitability—we must face up to a third fundamental issue: the more general failure of our overall approach to envisioning the future. Most of us justifiably consider ourselves unqualified to divine the future. **We therefore typically defer to experts and authorities—futurists and assorted government technocrats presumably possessed of special powers or information the rest of us do not have—who end up thereby dictating not only our future** but our present as well. These are the individuals who tell us not only that there are threats, but what they are and how we must deal with them. What we refuse to recognize is that the future these purported visionaries are able to see is invariably nothing more imaginative than a simple projection of what already is happening. It also is an assured way for them to solidify and perpetuate their own power over us. **The future they see, because the rest of us accept it on authority as all but inevitable, closes out any perceived need to pursue other potentially fruitful possibilities;** it provides an excuse for ignoring present needs that, if fulfilled, might well produce a markedly different future; it ensures nothing more enlightened or progressive than creeping incrementalism and evolutionary drift; **it creates false expectations about what can and will be;** and when it fails to materialize—as it so often does because of the unexpected—it produces feelings of helplessness, not among the purveyors of the deception, but among those of us who have so carelessly relinquished our fate to them.

The logic of security reduces human freedom and agency to a calculation- this is uniquely dehumanizing and destroys the value to life

Dillon, University of Lancaster, 1996

Michael, Professor of Political Science, Politics of Security, p. 26

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seem to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further- the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found its paradigmatic expression for example in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. The logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse- even if the details have changed.

The Alternative: We embrace Anti-Security Politics to re-think our relationship with security, the state, and threat construction.

Neocleous and Rigakos, Professors, 2011

Mark, Brunel University London, and George, Carleton University, 2011 "Anti-Security: A Declaration," Anti-Security, Red Quill Books Pg 15-19

The purpose of the project, put simply, is to show that **security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion.** Less simply, that security is a dangerous illusion. Why 'dangerous'? Because **it has come to act as a blockage on politics: the more we succumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation;** the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we come to share in the fetish of security, the more we become alienated from one another and the more we become complicit in the exercise of police powers. Fleshing out how we got here is the first challenge; showing how damaging this has been is an even greater challenge; doing these things in a way that contributes to a radical, critical and emancipatory politics even more so. But it is a challenge that must be made, and must be made collectively. As a start, **we therefore offer the following declarations about an Anti-Security politics. We deny all false binaries that obfuscate and reify the security problematic and serve only to reinforce its power. We therefore reject: * Liberty versus Security:** In the works of the founders of the liberal tradition - that is, the founders of bourgeois ideology - liberty is security and security is liberty. For the ruling class, security always has and always will triumph over liberty because 'liberty' has never been intended as a counter-weight to security. Liberty has always been security's lawyer. * Public versus Private: No post-hoc juridical determination about accountability, legal standing, uniforming, or legitimate use of force can undo the historic inter-operability of public and private police, state and mercenary armies, corporate and government security, or transnational corporations and international relations. The public sphere does the work of the private sphere, civil society the work of the state. The question is therefore not 'public versus private' or 'civil [end page 16] society versus the state', but the unity of bourgeois violence and the means by which pacification is legitimized in the name of security. * **Soft versus Hard:** Such dichotomous constructions - soft versus hard policing for suppressing dissent; soft versus hard military intervention for stamping out local and indigenous resistance; soft versus hard power to impose global imperial hegemony - are but aspects of the unity of class violence, distracting us from universal pacification carried out in the name of capital. * **Barbarism versus Civilization:** The history of civilization after the Enlightenment is the consolidation of wage labour, the cultural and material imposition of imperial domination, and the violence of class war. In the form of the 'standard of civilization' the majesty of the Law was central to this project. To civilize is to project police power. 'Civilization' is code for enforcing capitalist relations; which is to say: bourgeois civilization is barbarism. [end page 17] * **Domestic versus Foreign:** The greatest tyranny of security is its insistence on the construction of the 'other'. Security creates both internal domestic and external foreign threats, generating the fear and division that underpins raison d'état. The colonial pacification of subjects abroad is soon turned into domestic pacification of subjects at home. New international policing initiatives are but a laboratory for the militarization of domestic security. The 'war on terror' is a permanent multi-front assault that lumps jihadists with peaceniks, feminists with Islamists, and socialists with assassins. No pretence at a distinction is necessary because the capitalist state is insecure in all directions. * Pre- and post-9/11: Let's be clear: the murder of 3,000 on September 11, 2001 was horrific, but it did not change anything. To believe so is to engage in a deliberate act of forgetting. The security apparatus that revved up in the days after the attack had been in the making for decades as the [end page 18] terrain of the class war shifted. The targets of the new 'war' - this time on terror - were not new. The cry of 'insecurity' was again answered with two familiar demands: you consume, and we will destroy. Go to Disneyland, and let the state continue the work it had been conducting for generations. If 9/11 accomplished anything, it was to make security all but unassailable. * **Exception and Normality:** This is not a state of exception. The capitalist state riding roughshod over human rights in the name of security is normal. The ruling class carrying out acts of violence in the name of accumulation is normal. The devising of new techniques to discipline and punish recalcitrant subjects is normal. Targeted assassinations, the bombing of civilians, imprisonment without trial... normal, normal, normal. And, lest we forget: liberals falling over themselves justify such things? Normal. [end page 19] We understand instead that security today: * operates as the supreme concept of bourgeois society. * colonizes and de-radicalizes discourse: hunger to food security; imperialism to energy security; globalization to supply chain security; welfare to social security; personal safety to private security. Security makes bourgeois all that is inherently communal. It alienates us from solutions that are naturally social and forces us to speak the language of state rationality, corporate interest, and individual egoism. Instead of sharing, we hoard. Instead of helping, we build dependencies. Instead of feeding others, we let them starve... all in the name of security. * is a special commodity, playing a pivotal role in the exploitation, alienation and immiseration of workers. It produces its own fetish, embedding itself into all other commodities, producing even more risk and fear while intensifying and distracting us from the material conditions of exploitation that have [end page 20] made us inherently insecure. It makes concrete our ephemeral insecurities under capitalist relations. It attempts to satiate through consumption what can only be achieved through revolution. The call of this Declaration is that **we: * name security for what it really is; * stand against the securitization of political discourse; * challenge the authoritarian and reactionary nature of security; * point to the ways in which security politics shifts attention away from material conditions and questions, in the process transforming emancipatory politics into an arm of police; * fight for an alternative political language that takes us beyond the narrow horizon** of bourgeois security and its police powers.

Security K Extensions

Framing Argument: Defining security defines the potential policy actions that can respond to it, we have to understand securitization comes before policy action.

Lipschutz, UC Santa Cruz 1998

Ronnie, Professor, On Security, <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html>

Conceptualizations of security--from which follow policy and practice--are to be found in discourses of security . These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather **the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state**, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them. Hence, there are not only struggles over security among nations , but also struggles over security among notions . **Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security**, as well. As Karen Litfin points out, "As determinants of what can and cannot be thought, **discourses delimit the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes. . . . The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought**--an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices." 15 These discourses of security, however clearly articulated, nonetheless remain fraught with contradictions, as the chapters in this volume make clear

The other team's view of American Exceptionalism positions us as the pinnacle of human civilization, so any other nation's success must be a threat to us

Pan, Australian National University, 2004

Chengxin, Department of Political Science at Australian National University, "The 'China Threat' in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics", *Alternatives*, June-July

What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To put it simply, this self-knowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to be known. **By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope** and sees them as inevitably traveling toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out, we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, **rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness**. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just "others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way, the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," so **the threat of the other is not**

some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self-imagination. Consequently, there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness.

Russia threat is exaggerated

Rumer and Sokolsky, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2021

Eugene and Richard, June 30th, Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy,

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/30/grand-illusions-impact-of-misperceptions-about-russia-on-u.s.-policy-pub-84845>

Russia's international activities over the past several years **demonstrate** the reach and **the limits of its power**: **Opportunity Knocks: Russia's global ambitions have benefited from multiple opportunities rather than from a well-resourced strategy.** It has been agile and at times daring in seizing opportunities created by the West's lack of interest or poor performance. A more competent, consistent, and coherent U.S. foreign policy as well as improved coordination with its allies could help deprive Moscow of new openings and limit its capacity to build on existing ones. Relationships built on opportunity rather than enduring interests and a commitment to partnership are often fragile. The Lonely Ex-Superpower: **Russia has no real allies, only weak client states** that add little to its power and influence. It is surrounded by countries that are either hostile or wary toward it. Even within what Moscow regards as its "sphere of privileged interests," other countries, notably China, have been able to achieve high levels of penetration. The former Soviet countries in Central Asia, in particular, are increasingly dependent on China for trade, investment, and infrastructure. Friends Without Great Benefits: **Russia's attempts to expand its influence and geopolitical sway are self-limiting.** While much of the Kremlin's activism in different regions has not been resource-intensive, **it lacks many of the tools to win friends as it offers very little in the way of foreign investment, trade, or technology.** There is little evidence to suggest that most countries in the developing world seek to emulate Russia's economic model. Likewise, Moscow has not been able to leverage China's growing presence and influence in these regions to its own advantage. Transactional, not Transformational: **Russia's international engagement has been largely transactional,** driven by geopolitical, commercial, and energy interests. It has little interest in helping countries solve their most pressing challenges—whether in organizing security in conflict-torn regions, or in offering partnerships to deal with the serious transnational challenges of pandemics, climate change, international terrorism, crime, corruption, and illicit trafficking. Plucking Low-Hanging Fruit: In most regions of the world—Africa and Latin America in particular—**Russia's strongest ties have been established with the weakest countries,** which lack alternatives to dependence on it. Moscow has had little success in cultivating strong ties with regional powers such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa. Overreach: In several countries, Russia has overreached, alienating local elites and squandering its influence. In the Balkans, the Russian-instigated coup attempt in Montenegro and Moscow's effort to undercut the agreement between Greece and North Macedonia that paved the way for the latter's admission to NATO revitalized efforts by countries in the region to achieve greater Euro-Atlantic integration. **The invasion of Ukraine had a similar impact and, more importantly, doomed Russia's dream of making the country the keystone of the struggling Eurasian Economic Union.**

The securitization of climate change wrecks mitigation efforts, leads to military intervention, and retrenches security

Lucke, Wellman, and Diez, Political Science Researchers 2013

Franziskus, Master's Program, University of Hamburg, Zehra, Ph.D Candidate, University of Tübingen, and Thomas, Professor, University of Mannheim, "What's at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach" 21st September 2013,

http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/vonLucke_Wellmann_Diez_Whats%20at%20Stake%20in%20Securitizing%20Climate%20Change.pdf

If we move to the different levels of securitisation, are some normatively preferable to others?

On the territorial level, we agree with other scholars¹⁰⁶ that **the securitisation of climate change in terms of conflicts between groups or states and national security conceptions is hugely problematic.** On the positive side, this discourse helps to raise attention and is conducive in forging coalitions between actors that would otherwise not have approached the topic seriously, as has happened for example in US debates¹⁰⁷ or UN Security Council meetings.¹⁰⁸ However, **such an argumentation also detracts the attention from the core issues – slowing down climate change through decisive mitigation efforts – to rather ad-hoc adaptation measures and interferences in risk countries that could in the end take the form of military intervention.**¹⁰⁹ As a consequence, there is an increasing involvement of military and defence actors in climate politics as well as the adoption of concepts from the climate sector into military planning.¹¹⁰ **Actors prepare themselves to cope with climate change's secondary effects instead of preventing global warming from happening in the first place.**¹¹¹ Moreover, **using a territorial securitisation and national security conceptions reinforces Othering and friend-enemy conceptions** (in line with the original CS argument) **and shifts the attention to questions of security between states, thereby losing sight of the one most severely affected, that is poor populations within those states.**

Democratic peace theory justifies violent interventions to promote US interests.**Barkawi, London School of Economics, 2015**Tarak "Scientific Decay," *International Studies Quarterly*, 59 (4) (2015): 8127-29

The **Democratic Peace, as a scientific claim about the world, retrospectively justifies US Cold War policies. Interventions in the Third World** were really about promoting democracy, and not about supporting dictatorial regimes out of paranoid anti-communism. At the same time, those Cold War interventions—which we should, by rights, see as challenging the Democratic Peace—reappear as validating that claim. **Overthrowing elected leaders with the wrong ideology, or repressing popular movements abroad, is actually pro-democracy** and ultimately sustains the peace between democracies, objectively speaking. Here we catch a whiff of how Poz- nansky's article, and the research program of which it is a part, **participates in US power and reproduces its logics of intervention in the present.** This sort of scholarship perpetuates the nearly complete failure of our discipline to confront its own implication in the US security state in and beyond the Cold War (cf. Asad 1973; Amadae 2003; Oren 2003).² The purpose of science should be to stand outside of ideology, to critique it, not to ratify it (Weber 1946 [1919]). Consider Poznansky's closing lines about the present-day worldwide construct through which the US legitimates intervention, the War on Terror. He writes: "the prospects for a democratic peace in the Middle East will hinge in large part on whether moderate elements within these countries successfully keep anti-democratic Islamists out of power and forestall the belief that their countries have stepped out onto the slippery slope of democratic decay" (2015:10). Having reproduced Cold War ideology in stark simplicity—anti-communism equals pro-democracy—Poznansky does the same for the War on Terror. We have the whole panoply here: US friends (moderate Islamists), US enemies (anti-democratic Isla- mists), and the idea that any Islamist regime is inherently susceptible to authoritarianism. This think tank-level analysis wishes away the popular (that is, democratic) power of US opponents, whether or not they formally elect parties and governments. It disappears from inquiry their democratic projects and any relations those projects might have with peace, war, or the prospects for popular rule. It identifies the analyst with the US project in the world and with its enmities.² **That the chief findings of liberal and empiricist IR reflect the worldview of the US security state in no way confirms the hypotheses of democratic-peace theory. They indicate instead the co-constitutive character of power/knowledge relations and the need for a reckoning with the multifaceted ways in which US power has shaped, and continues to shape, the discipline** (Lowen 1997; Cumings 1999:173–204; Gilman 2003; Isaac 2007; Stampnitzky 2013).

Absolute security is impossible. The pursuit of security by the state can only lead to war and oppression, turning the case.

Ukeje, Obademi Awolowo, 2005

Charles Professor of International Relations at Obafemi Awolowo and scholar at the Centre for African Studies, Submitted at 11th CODESRIA General Assembly, Rethinking Africa's Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the 21st Century,

http://codesria.org/Links/conferences/general_assembly11/papers/ukeje.pdf

Howbeit, the quest to redirect security towards human centred concerns raises several problems. In the first instance, "human security" is still heavily contested in its definition, scope and utility. The concept is criticised for overstressing the traditional notion of security- much the same way that environmental security did over the last decade. Another criticism is that 'human security' is far too universalistic, containing "conceptual flaws" **that raises false priorities and hopes regarding the securitization of human beings.** The orthodox conception of security, either focusing on the internal or external dimensions to insecurity, tend to restrict the concept to the political survivability and effectiveness of states and regimes, and in doing so, excluded economic, environmental, cultural and other non-political threats. **It puts the state (and politics) at the centre of the conceptualisation of security,** suggesting that non-political threats "become integral components of our definition of security only if they become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, and regime survival" (Vayrynen, 1995: 260). Another limitation of the concept of human security is **that it cannot be fully consummated for as long as the quest for peace and security remains tied to the authoritarian values and motivations of those in power, human security would continue to suffer breaches and abuses as regime/ state security further allows official violence to multiply** (Sabelo, 2003: 306; Niukerk, 2004). Adele Jinadu (2000) offered further perspectives on how human security suffers in the attempts by custodians of the state to retain and extract compliance through the instrumentality of force and coercion. He explained that the problematic of peace and security is **"intrinsically bound up with human nature,** especially the dialectics of the social psychology of human interactions, under conditions of scarcity and choice". Accordingly, **the problem of peace and security "cannot and should not be divorced from the dialectics of domination** and subjection, in order words from considerations of superordinate/ subordinate relations at the community, national and global levels" (Jinadu, 2000: 1). The crucial question, as he pointed out is **"[I]f humankind cannot create a perfect society,** given human nature and the reality of scarcity, as well as the difficult and contentious questions of choice which scarcity poses, what needs to be done to create a less imperfect society? Under what conditions can such a less imperfect society expected to emerge and thrive? He argued that **the "modern state...continues to be the pre-eminently contested terrain of hegemonic groups in national and international society, serving predatory group interests, and itself becoming part of the problem, the core avenue of contention and conflict, a major impediment to structural reform and, therefore, a major obstacle to peace and security,** which requires in many cases, reconstitution and reconstruction as a necessary condition for the enthronement and durability of peace and security" (Jinadu, 2000: 2-3). As shall be discussed in the next section, what the above implies, in part, is that NEPAD must first resolve the underpinning motivation of power and militarism; of superordinate and subordinate.

The alternative radically and critically confronts the assumptions of security thinking. Place yourself in opposition to the affirmative's uncritical security discourse.

Lipshutz, University of California, 2000

Ronnie, Professor, *After Authority*, p. 53-55

Such a consensus is by no means immutable. Things change. A catastrophe can undermine a consensual national epistemology, as in the case of Germany and Japan after World War II. But it is also possible that what might appear to others to be a disaster, for example, Iraq's defeat in 1991, can also provide an opportunity for reinforcement of that epistemology, as has been apparent in Iraq since 1991. The systemic changes discussed earlier can also undermine consensus, although much more slowly. **Domestic and external forces can act so as to chip away or splinter hegemonic discourses by undermining the ideational and material bases essential to their maintenance and the authority of those who profess them.** If there is some question about the legitimacy of the state and its institutions, or the validity of its authority, those in positions of discursive power may decide to rearticulate the relationship between citizen authority and state idea. Russian president Yeltsin's (unsuccessful) search for a new "national idea" is an example of this. Another involves the restoration or refurbishment of old epistemologies (as in "despite the end of the Cold War, the world remains a dangerous place; therefore rely on our judgement which so often before has proved valid"). To put my point another way, **a consensual conception of security is stable only so long as people have a vested interest in the maintenance of that particular conception of security. If social change undermines the basis for this conception—for example, by diminishing the individual welfare of many people, by making the conception seem so remote as to be irrelevant, by forgetting the civic behaviors that once reminded everyone about that conception—consensus can and will break down.**