


Imagine a small child who learns that height is correlated with basketball skills. Excited, the child starts practicing basketball in order to become taller.

This is an instance of **Causal Goodhart**: The child optimizes a [proxy](#), but that proxy does not actually *cause* the thing they want.



Causal Goodhart is important for [AI alignment](#) because we may end up building AIs which act as [optimizers](#). For example, if the optimization target is implemented as a variable on a computer (the proxy), then the AI might just directly set the variable to a high value instead of optimizing for what we intended it to optimize for. This failure mode is called [wireheading](#).

Causal Goodhart is a form of the more general phenomenon of [Goodhart's law](#), which states that

> As soon as a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

For Causal Goodhart, the proxy ceases to be a good measure because the proxy does not *cause* the thing we want, and thus intervening on the proxy eliminates the correlation. However, there are other ways in which the proxy starts becoming a bad measure when it is optimized: Other types of Goodhart are [Extremal Goodhart](#), [Regression Goodhart](#) and [Adversarial Goodhart](#).

You can read more in the [Goodhart Taxonomy](#) by Scott Garrabrant, which introduces these four types of Goodhart.

Alternative phrasings

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Related

- [What is Goodhart's law?](#)
- [What is Extremal Goodhart?](#)
- [What is Regressional Goodhart?](#)
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