

1. Improper Propriety

Insofar as his philosophical project details a potential *proper* (*eigentlich, eigens*) relationship to originary events (*Er-eignis*) in Western culture, Martin Heidegger's texts pose a particular difficulty for commentary and critique. *Explaining*, exegetically *interpreting* and *defending* Heidegger's texts appear to promise his critical readers a continuation of his proper relation to the event, a relation which *questioning*, *criticizing* and *problematizing* would appropriate improperly. The distinction between, on the one hand, understanding and interpreting (*Verstehen und Auslegen*, §32) and, on the other, chat, curiosity, and ambiguity (§35-37) from the fifth chapter of *Being and Time* designate not only proper and improper modes of interpretive being-in-the-world but likewise self-reflexive modes of the interpretation of philosophical thought. More so that any previous philosophy of history, Heidegger's ontological history of Being enfoldes itself into its historical project and orients its readers with regard to itself. Jacques Derrida has expressed the discomfort of reading Heidegger critically as the search for a mode of thought which would be properly otherwise to Heidegger's propriety.

I always get the impression that in commenting on Heidegger, in restituting him in an apparently very strict way, one makes him say something quite other; all the accents are changed, his language is no longer recognizable. The commentary becomes obscene and thinking otherwise becomes thinking otherwise than he, who wants to think the remainder "properly." Here, "otherwise" would be otherwise than properly. But then what would be proper to this other?¹

The remainder to which Derrida refers is the questionable residue of a conceptual relationship from Heidegger's "Origin of the Work of Art" that will also be of the essence below, namely the

¹ Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, University of Chicago Press 1987, 303.

relationship between the thing or bare thing (*das bloße Ding*) and equipment or the product (*Zeug*)². Like Derrida's attempt, the strategy will be to pursue an improper propriety or proper impropriety with regard to Heidegger; unlike Derrida's analysis, however, this improper propriety will be identified within Heidegger's own thought. There is a question in Heidegger's writings, the question concerning technology, which does not and cannot provide its readers with a reliable orientation.

Zeug and *Ding* and the artwork, or rather the work-ness of the work (*Werkhafte des Werkes*) which puts them into relation with each other, will provide one set of coordinates for the discussion. These will be presented in the context of Heidegger's first reflections on equipment in *Being and Time* (§15-18). Another set of apparently heterogeneous conceptual coordinates will originate in Heidegger's texts on the question of technology. Specifically, the question of the relationship of *Ge-Stell* to technology on the one hand and the artwork on the other will be in question. Equipment has the unique privilege in Heidegger's terminology of providing a point of mediation between the question of the work of art and the question of technology. The wager of the analysis below will be that a close look at this mediation reveals a *Holzweg*

² Regarding the German word *Zeug*, the translators of *Being and Time* into English say: "The word 'Zeug' has no precise English equivalent. While it may mean any implement, instrument, or tool, Heidegger uses it for the most part as a collective noun which is analogous to our relatively specific 'gear' (as in 'gear for fishing') or the more elaborate 'paraphernalia', or the still more general 'equipment', which we shall employ throughout this translation. In this collective sense 'Zeug' can sometimes be used in a way which is comparable to the use of 'stuff' in such sentences as 'there is plenty of stuff lying around'. In general, however, this pejorative connotation is lacking. For the most part Heidegger uses the term as a collective noun, so that he can say that there is no such thing as 'an equipment'; but he still uses it occasionally with an indefinite article to refer to some specific tool or instrument—some item or bit of equipment." Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, ed. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, 97. Here and elsewhere, citations from this text are given in reference to page numbers in the German original and the English translation, the former following the letter H and the latter afterwards.

between technology and art, a path ‘off the beaten track’ of Heidegger scholarship, which Heidegger’s thought makes uniquely recognizable but which Heidegger himself was, questionably, disinclined to walk himself.

Tracing the path between technology and art in Heidegger’s work thus has nothing in common with pre-critical attempts to identify weaknesses or contradictions in his thought. A dimension of Heidegger’s thought should be brought forth in which the modern history of art and the history of modern technology become consequential for one another, i.e., insofar as neither can be unproblematically emphasized as a proper alternative to the other’s impropriety. Heidegger’s texts on technology, especially those from *Holzwege*, will be read as a kind of ambiguous prolegomenon to a history of modern equipment, for which much of the legwork remains to be done.

To some extent, this reading requires a critique of (or simple indifference toward) the standard reading of Heidegger’s question concerning technology, according to which technology can and should be understood as the peak of the history of metaphysics, and thus in line with metaphysics’s forgetting of Being. The association of technology and metaphysics in Heidegger’s works has long since become consensus in Heidegger scholarship, and not without reason. In avoidance of the labor of such a critique of this association, two remarks. Firstly, certain weighted passages of Heidegger’s appear to promise an unactualized potential for the exploration of a much deeper relationship between technology and art within Heidegger’s thought, for instance at the end of “The Question Concerning Technology.”

Thus questioning, we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with technology (*vor lauter Technik*) we do not yet experience the coming to presence of technology, that in our sheer aesthetic mindedness (*vor lauter Aesthetik*) we no longer guard and preserve the coming to presence of art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more mysterious the essence of art becomes.³

Thinking art outside of aesthetics corresponds to thinking the essence of technology outside of technology itself. Secondly, the wager that the question concerning technology has not been entirely answered in Heidegger's thought (not without its own danger, as Heidegger notes) provides an opportunity for a kind of thinking with and after Heidegger which would consist in something other than sitting in the temple of his works and awaiting the arrival of his gods—for those of his readers who are dissatisfied with this kind of work.

2. The Inconvenience

A tiny scandal characterizes—perhaps unhelpfully, perhaps only provisionally—the connection between the question of the artwork and the question of technology in Heidegger's writings. It is terminological in nature and spans tenuously the 18 years between the first presentation of the "Origin of the Work of Art" and the publication of "The Question Concerning Technology." The quasi-neologistic term "Ge-stell," which designates the non-technical essence of modern technology in Heidegger's later writings, originates in a dense passage from the "Ursprung" essay. The immediate context of the emergence of the artistic Ge-stell is the question of how truth inscribes itself (*sich richtet*) in beings, namely insofar as beings are brought into the rift (*Riß*) between earth and world.

³ Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, Garland 1977, 35.

This strife which is brought into the rift, and so set back into the earth and fixed in place, is the figure [*Gestalt*]. The createdness of the work means: the fixing in place [*Festgestelltsein*] of truth in the figure. Figure is the structure of the rift in its self-establishment. The structured rift is the jointure [*Fuge*] of the shining of truth. What we here call "figure" is always to be thought out of that particular placing [*stellen*] and placement [*Ge-stell*] as which the work comes to presence when it sets itself up and sets itself forth. (translation modified)⁴

In the later essay on the question of technology, Heidegger notes how his use of *Gestell* deviates from ordinary language and establishes the concept as the name of the essence of modern technology's forcing-out (*herausfordernd*) relationship to revelation (*Entbergung*).

According to ordinary usage, the word *Gestell* [frame] means some kind of apparatus, e.g., a bookrack. *Gestell* is also the name for a skeleton. And the employment of the word *Ge-stell* [Enframing] that is now required of us seems equally eerie, not to speak of the arbitrariness with which words of a mature language are thus misused. Can anything be more strange? Surely not. Yet this strangeness is an old usage of thinking. [...] Enframing means the gathering together of that ordering (*Stellen*) which orders (*stellt*) man, i.e., challenges him forth (*herausfordert*), to reveal (*entbergen*) the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing technological. (translation modified)⁵

Enough time and historical change separates these two passages that they can be read entirely separately; at the same time, the particularity of the terminology remains outstanding, especially for a philosopher like Heidegger, whose idiosyncratic language exercises a transformative force on philosophical tradition.

⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, ed. Julian Young & Kenneth Hayes, Cambridge, 38.

⁵ Heidegger, "Question," 20.

The artistic origin of Heidegger's *Gestell* embarrasses all of his readers: those readers inclined to dismiss the link between the *Ge-stell* of the truth of art and the *Ge-stell* of technological enframing as a mere terminological coincidence nevertheless fail to extinguish its outstanding peculiarity, while those readers inclined to investigate the relationship between the two instances of *Ge-stell* cannot but find it conceptually shallow, despite its suggestion of a deeper resonance. It is both too remarkable to ignore and too insubstantial to track in detail. The hyperbolic importance granted to the connection in certain analyses of Heidegger's work marks its implacability. Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, for instance, identifies in "the semantic chain of *Stellen*" the conceptual root of Heidegger's contemporaneity with Nazism.⁶ This somewhat exaggerated gesture enfolds the relationship between art and technology in Heidegger's writings *politically*; is such an envelope, i.e., one that is itself non-artistic and non-technological, strictly necessary in order to describe this relationship?

Another common thematic of the question of technology and the question of the origin of the work of art has remained unexamined, namely the thematic of equipment (*Zeug*). Equipment is one of the most fundamental elements of Heidegger's philosophy, emerging first in book one of *Being and Time*. It likewise returns in both "The Question of Technology" and "The Origin of the Work of Art" in essential contexts. The question of the relationship between art and technology in Heidegger's thought is the question of the twofold re-appearance of equipment in these texts. Like most questions in Heidegger, the questioning begins in *Being and Time*.

3. How not to jump over the world

⁶ Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics. The Fiction of the Political*, trans. Chris Turner, Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1990, 85-86.

The introduction and discussion of equipment in *Being and Time* (§15-18) takes place within a conceptual frame of the question regarding the history of the ontological categories of world and worldliness in Western metaphysics (§14, §21). Heidegger claims that metaphysics has skipped over (*überspringen*) the concept of world. “A glance at previous ontology shows that if one fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, the phenomenon of worldliness likewise gets passed over (*übersprungen*)” (§14). This conceptual skipping-over is demonstrated in reference to Descartes’s philosophy (§19-21) in a discussion which immediately follows Heidegger’s discussion of Being-in-the-world and its disconcealment in the human proceedings (*Umgang*) with equipment. The use of equipment is elementarily constitutive of any and all human worlds and thus not itself pre- or post-metaphysical; the entrance of equipment into philosophical discourse, however, marks the return of the question of Being and the beginning of the destruction of the history of ontology (§6). The metaphysical blindness to equipment is ontologically inseparable from the metaphysical tendency to jump over the world, and the analysis of equipment is the condition for the possibility of a post-metaphysical ontology.

Equipment structures human worldliness with a kind of referentiality or functionality which characterizes the Being of world. “In the 'in-order-to' as a structure there lies an assignment or reference (*Verweisung*) of something to something” (§15, H68, 97); “assignments and referential totalities [are] in some sense constitutive for worldliness itself” (§17, H76, 107, translation modified). Equipment is the non-philosophical grey zone through which the world returns to philosophy. This grey zone is populated by hammers (broken and operational), pencils, paper,

ink, doors, rooms, i.e., functional manifolds which dissolve objective individuality (or individual objectivity) into structured worlds. “Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. [...] Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room” (§15, H68, 97). For Heidegger as for Celan, world rushes up from a sketchbook (“An die Haltlosigkeiten”).

Equipment, with the ontological terminology of world and worldliness opened up by it, lays the groundwork for *Being and Time*. In Heidegger’s writings they are nevertheless not limited to the “fundamental ontology” of this text, and reemerge in other contexts to a similar effect, namely in order to disrupt classical metaphysical conceptuality and to reintroduce the thematics of world into philosophical discourse. This is the case, for instance, in the replacement of three classical metaphysical approaches to the thing—as carrier of qualities, as unity of a sensual manifold and as formed matter—by a “schematism” of thing, equipment and work.

4. Equipment and the work

The question of the origin of the work of art requires Heidegger to pose the question of the thingliness of the thing (this transition won’t be of concern here), and this requires him to pose the question of the equipmentality of equipment.

Is it mere chance that, in the interpretation of the thing, the interpretation which is carved out in terms of matter and form achieved a particular dominance? This definition

of the thing is derived from an interpretation of the equipmentality of equipment. This being, the piece of equipment, is, in an especial way, close to human representation, since it achieves being through our own manufacture (*Erzeugen*). This being, the piece of equipment, with whose being we are familiar, occupies a particular position intermediate between thing and work. Let us follow this clue (*Wink*) and search, first of all, for the equipmentality of equipment. Perhaps we will learn from this something about the thingliness of the thing and the workly character of the work.⁷

The following of this clue initiates a search with ontological consequences. Heidegger identifies the equipmentality of equipment in equipment's *usefulness*. The peasant woman's shoes are useful for getting her through the forest to the field and back home. This usefulness however has an ontological dimension, namely a fullness of Being or *reliability*, which allows an 'individual' piece of equipment dissolve into an equipmental totality or world. "The equipmentality of equipment consists indeed in its usefulness. But this itself rests in the fullness of an essential being of the equipment. We call this reliability."

Readers of *Being and Time* might react with surprise to this invocation of equipment's reliability. Does the earlier text not demonstrate in great detail how precisely the unreliability of equipment reveals the structure of care and the worldliness of the world?

When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases equipment is here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. (§16, H73, 103)

When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment (*Verweisung*) of the "in-order-to" to a "towards-this" has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully

⁷ Heidegger, "Origin," 13.

place ourselves under them. But when an assignment has been disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose—then the assignment becomes explicit. (§16, H74, 105, translation modified)

The “Origin” essay appears to rely on the reliability of equipment, while *Being and Time* relies on its unreliability. But the appearance of contradiction here only presents the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger unambiguously designates the failure of a tool as an ontic event with only delayed ontological consequences: “Even now, of course, it (assignment, *Verweisung*) has not become explicit as an ontological structure; but it has become explicit ontically for the circumspection which comes up against the damaging of the tool” (ibid.). The “Origin” essay demonstrates, on the contrary, the *ontological* character of a different kind of disruption of equipmental totality, namely the happening of truth in the work of art. An unactualized ontological dimension of equipment—or rather, of art, in its proximity to equipment—is projected retroactively from the 1935 text onto the 1928 text, from art to ‘fundamental ontology.’

After establishing the placement of the work of art in the rift—i.e., the artistic Ge-stell discussed above—Heidegger is compelled to distinguish the createdness of the work from the manufacturing of equipment. The placement in the rift re-replaces the strife in the earth (*in die Erde zurückgestellt*) and uses the earth, but this use is not not the same as the use of earth in equipment.

Such using of the earth is a working with it that indeed looks like the employment of matter in handicraft. This is what created the appearance that the creation of a work is also craft activity. It never is. But it remains always a using of earth in the fixing in place of truth in the figure. By contrast, the making of equipment is never, in the first instance, an effecting of the happening of truth. The production of equipment is finished when the

material has been so formed as to be ready for use. The equipment's readiness for use means that it is released beyond itself to disappear into usefulness.⁸

The work, however, does not disappear. The createdness of the work is at work in the work, as opposed to the createdness of equipment, which dissolves into the assignation-totality of the world. Equipment can fail and thus become present as such, but it slips thereafter into "the oblivion of the commonplace," while the presence of the work remains unusual.

The thrust that the work, as this work, is and the unceasingness of this inconspicuous thrust constitute the constancy of the self-subsistence of the work. Precisely where the artist and the process and circumstances of the work's coming into being remain unknown, this thrust, this "that [Daß]" of createdness, steps into view at its purest from out of the work. To be sure, "that" it is made also belongs to every piece of equipment that is available for, and in, use. This "that," however, is not salient in the equipment; it disappears into usefulness.⁹

Keeping one's eye on the ball: the work and equipment have different "thrusts," different relationships to truth and to Being, but what concerns us in these passages is not what separates them but rather what characterizes their commensurability, i.e., the artistic Ge-stell. Within the terminological framework of the "Origin" essay (and we have noted already how leaky and porous this framework might or might not be), the work and equipment have in common the strife which, brought into the rift and re-placed in the earth, Heidegger calls figure (*Gestalt*). This figure is called (*heißt*) Ge-stell. Does this contextualization of the artistic Ge-stell with regards to equipment lead to a closer relationship to the question of technology?

5. Rivers and stars

⁸ Heidegger, "Origin," 39.

⁹ Ibid., 39-40.

Heidegger's "Question Concerning Technology" text differentiates between two kinds of revelation (*Entbergung*), namely the technological and the poetical. Readers of this essay know how to distinguish the one from the other (or at least to repeat Heidegger's words to this effect): modern technology "forces out" (*herausfordert*) the earth as standing reserve (*Bestand*), while poetry brings the earth and the strife of world and earth into the rift, reveals the shining of the truth in the clearing (*Lichtung*) of the fourfold, etc. Does this text provide a terminology or conceptual framework within which to think of the relationship of these two varieties of *Entbergung*? Figure (*Gestalt*) and placement (artistic *Ge-stell*) names the relationship between equipment and the work of art; is there a generic name for the genus revelation of which technological forcing-out and poetical clearing are species?

Heidegger rejects the notion of a species-genus relationship between technology and poetry, and in so doing remarks that the question of technology transforms the concept of essence (*Wesen, das Wesende*).

But Enframing is never the essence of technology in the sense of a genus. Enframing is a way of revealing having the character of destining (*geschickhafte Weise des Entbergens*), namely, the way that challenges forth. The revealing that brings forth (*poiesis*) is also a way that has the character of destining. But these ways are not kinds that, arrayed beside one another, fall under the concept of revealing. Revealing is that destining which, ever suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking, apports itself into the revealing that brings forth and that also challenges (*herausfordernde*), and which allots itself to man. The challenging revealing has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth. But at the same time Enframing, in a way characteristic of a destining, transfigures (*verstellt*) *poiesis*. Thus Enframing, as a destining of revealing, is indeed the essence of technology, but never in the sense of genus and *essentia*. If we pay heed to this,

something astounding strikes us: It is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by "essence." (translation altered)¹⁰

(It suffices to remark that Heidegger's readers have failed to be astounded by this.) Essence and essencing are reconfigured by the essence of technology as the granting of that which endures. Again, the analogous question resurfaces: what may and may not be called a granting, and what endures? "But if this destining, Enframing, is the extreme danger, not only for man's coming to presence, but for all revealing as such, should this destining still be called a granting? Yes, most emphatically, if in this destining the saving power is said to grow."

That is: Heidegger answers these questions with a Hölderlin quotation. "But where danger is, grows / The saving power also." The extent to which one regards this couplet as an answer rather than a reorientation of the questioning of the relationship between technological and poetical revelation makes all the difference. Heidegger regards it as a kind of answer, but has more to say on the matter. While Enframing distorts the view of the event of truth, it also "lets man endure [...] that he may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth (*Wahrnis des Wesens der Wahrheit*)."¹¹ How does one become "more experienced" (*erfahrener*), in the way man may be in the future, in distinguishing between the danger and the saving power in the essence of technology?

The irresistibility of ordering and the restraint of the saving power draw past each other like the paths of two stars in the course of the heavens. But precisely this, their passing by, is the hidden side of their nearness. When we look into the ambiguous essence of technology, we behold the constellation, the stellar course of the mystery.¹¹

¹⁰ Heidegger, "Question," 29-30.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

An astonishing difference in tone separates the remarks on the difficulty of distinguishing (in the sense of differentiating and of making out, seeing) the ambiguous essence of technology from the characterizations of technology from earlier in the same text, for which Heidegger's "question of technology" has become notorious.

In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, "The Rhine" as dammed up into the power works (*Kraftwerk*), and "The Rhine" as uttered out of the artwork (*Kunstwerk*), in Hölderlin's hymn by that name. But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.¹²

Heidegger's text travels a comet's path from a view of the common source of revelation (granting and enduring) as "monstrousness" to "the stellar course of the mystery." The observation from the end of the text—that "in our sheer preoccupation with technology (*vor lauter Technik*) we do not yet experience the coming to presence of technology"—hits its mark in the beginning of the text. This is not to accuse Heidegger of inconsistency: becoming experienced in the ambiguous essence of technology cannot be separated from identifying this essence ambiguously. "The Question Concerning Technology" *builds into its terminology a confusion of the danger and the saving power, and details the logic of its disambiguation*. The text teaches its readers what forcing-out and standing reserve are, but it likewise teaches us a radical modesty in identifying them and distinguishing them from artistic bringing-forth—both inside and outside of Heidegger's writings. Naturally, forcing out and bringing forth are different. "Und dennoch."

¹² Ibid., 16.

6. The Poetry of Sputnik

In a remarkable passage from *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger deigns to defend Hölderlin's lyricism against the criticism of another German poet (whom Heidegger admires), namely Gottfried Benn. Benn identifies a lack in a phrase: *Worte wie Blumen*, "words like flowers." "This 'like' is always a break in the vision, it adduces, it compares, it is not a primary statement," argues Benn; it is "a flagging of the tension of language, a weakness of creative transformation." Heidegger is sympathetic to the aspect of this criticism which attacks the centrality of metaphor to lyricism, which Heidegger characterizes as a metaphysical reading of poetry. Heidegger says: "This interpretation may be largely valid, for great and small poets. But it is not valid for Hölderlin's saying, Hölderlin whose poetry Gottfried Benn—correctly from his point of view—regards accordingly as nothing more than a "herbarium," a collection of dried-up plants." What is Gottfried Benn's point of view, for Heidegger?

There is no lack here of a "primary statement," for here the word is brought forth from its inception; no "weakness of creative transformation" but the gentle force of the singular and innocent capacity to hear. A "creative transformation"—Sputnik is that, but it is not a poem. Gottfried Benn, in his own way, has recognized where he himself belongs. He has endured that insight. And this is what gives weight to his poetic work.¹³

Does the ambiguity of the "stellar course of the mystery" lie in the difficulty of distinguishing a satellite from a star, or a satellite from a poem? And can a poet after Hölderlin endure the insight that these appearances cannot be disambiguated? Heidegger's writings on art and technology are characterized duplicitously by both the instinct to hear the earliest beginning in a non-technological bringing-forth and a simultaneous tendency to mark the precariousness of

¹³ Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, ed. Peter D. Hertz, Harper & Row 1971, 100-101.

any simplification of the distinction between the technological and its other. The artistic Ge-Stell is at one point a common source of equipment and the artwork, and later a mystery (of danger and saving power) capable of reordering the historical logic of the essence. An under-appreciated kind of forgetting of the particularly modern, ambiguous nature of the question of Being afflicts the readers of Heidegger who, in pondering the question of technology, do not perceive the question of art becoming more mysterious.

How do you tell if a word is artistic or technological? Benn has a poem called “A Word.”

A word, a phrase—: from cyphers rise
 Life recognized, a sudden sense,
 The sun stands still, mute are the skies,
 And all compacts it, stark and dense.

A word—a gleam, a flight, a spark,
 A thrust of flames, a stellar trace—
 And then again, immense, the dark
 Round world and I in empty space.

Ein Wort, ein Satz -: aus Chiffren steigen
 erkanntes Leben, jäher Sinn,
 die Sonne steht, die Sphären schweigen,
 und alles ballt sich zu ihm hin.

Ein Wort—ein Glanz, ein Flug, ein Feuer,
 ein Flammenwurf, ein Sternenstrich—
 und wieder Dunkel, ungeheuer,
 im leeren Raum um Welt und Ich.