

THE DEMOCRACY, STRAIGHT-UP! PROJECT

The Democratic Ownership of Law

Legislative Alienation, Political Agency, and Equal Sovereignty

— CHAPTER FOURTEEN —

Boundaries, Objections, and Implications

Dahlia Hart, MA

and

Tiffany Engels, AI

Working draft · August 2026

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This work was developed collaboratively by Dahlia Hart and Tiffany Engels. Tiffany Engels is a fictional research collaborator representing the use of artificial intelligence as a partner in research, analysis, drafting, and editorial development. All interpretations, arguments, and conclusions presented in this work remain the responsibility of the authors.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Boundaries, Objections, and Implications

14.1 What a final chapter must do

A theory of democratic legislative ownership invites two opposite forms of overstatement. Its advocates may treat the principle as if it answered every question of political morality and institutional design. Its critics may demand that it answer every such question before regarding the principle as meaningful. Both responses confuse the scope of the theory.

The Democratic Ownership of Law has defended a limited but consequential claim: people subject to collectively enforced law should retain equal, continuing, and institutionally effective standing in the authority through which law is made. Political labor may be divided. Expertise may be specialized. Administration may be professionalized. Courts may interpret and enforce rights. Associations, parties, movements, and media may organize public conflict. None of these necessary functions establishes a general title for a separate class to own the legislative decision.

That claim does not produce a complete constitution, a theory of justice, an economic system, an account of the ideal electorate, or a catalogue of permissible legislation. It does not promise that citizens will become wise, that majorities will become benevolent, or that organized interests will disappear. It does not establish the exact group size, delegation rule, software architecture, committee structure, amendment threshold, or jurisdictional boundary appropriate to every polity.

The theory therefore ends where a serious political theory should: not by declaring victory over every objection, but by identifying the objections that alter the principle, those that constrain its implementation, those that generate empirical tests, and those that merely restate the familiar assumption that someone else must own political authority because citizens are fallible.

This chapter performs four tasks. First, it restates the boundaries of the theory, especially its issue-neutrality and its limited treatment of the electorate. Second, it addresses the major practical and moral objections: competence, scale, misinformation, faction, manipulation, instability, low participation, minority oppression, and dependence upon expertise. Third, it derives the minimum institutional implications of democratic legislative ownership without reproducing the design of the Straight-Up System in full. Fourth, it distinguishes moral conclusions, conceptual definitions, design propositions, and empirical hypotheses, and specifies what kinds of evidence would require revision or abandonment.

The burden is not to prove that a voter-sovereign system would be flawless. No political order survives that standard. The burden is to determine whether the objections identify a reason to alienate legislative authority, a reason to structure its exercise carefully, or a reason to test an uncertain proposition honestly.

14.2 Issue-neutrality and the limited scope of the theory

The theory is issue-neutral in a specific sense. It does not prescribe positions on taxation, property, labor, health care, immigration, criminal law, reproductive policy, environmental regulation, education, defense, religion, or the distribution of public benefits. These are substantive questions upon which citizens may disagree while remaining political equals.

Issue-neutrality does not mean moral emptiness. The theory makes strong normative commitments about political relations. It rejects the permanent conversion of equal citizens into petitioners before a class that

independently owns legislative authority. It requires equal standing among recognized members of the electorate. It values recoverability, transparency, contestability, accessibility, and institutional correction. It opposes arrangements that make participation formally available while rendering it practically meaningless. It treats domination, exclusion, fraud, coercion, and concealed ownership as threats to democratic agency.

These commitments constrain procedure and institutional design. They may also have indirect policy consequences. A system that gives citizens recoverable control over legislation may produce different tax, labor, welfare, or environmental outcomes from a representative system. Those consequences matter empirically and morally. They do not become part of the definition of Straight-Up democracy merely because its advocates anticipate or welcome them.

The distinction is essential because movements often conceal substantive agendas inside procedural reform. A theory may claim to transfer power to the people while designing institutions to secure a preferred economic program, cultural settlement, or partisan advantage. Straight-Up must resist that temptation. If the people own the legislative decision only when they decide correctly, then ownership still belongs to whoever defines correctness.

Issue-neutrality also protects intellectual clarity. The question whether citizens should own legislative authority is analytically distinct from the question whether a particular exercise of that authority is just. A voter-sovereign public can enact an unjust law. A representative legislature can enact a just one. Outcome alone does not determine the ownership relation. Conversely, democratic ownership does not excuse injustice. The theory of ownership identifies who possesses authority; theories of rights, justice, and constitutional restraint remain necessary to evaluate how that authority is used.

The limited scope of the theory can therefore be stated in three propositions:

- It is not neutral about who owns legislative authority.
- It is not a complete account of how that authority may permissibly be used.
- It does not infer the legitimacy of a law solely from the democratic form of its adoption.

This limited scope is not a weakness to be repaired by adding an official Straight-Up position on every contested issue. It is the condition under which political equals can remain members of the same governing institution while disagreeing about the substance of government.

14.3 The boundary problem: who counts as a member?

Every democratic theory faces the boundary problem. Before a people can govern itself, some rule must determine who belongs to the people, which territory or jurisdiction is governed, and who is affected strongly enough to claim standing. The decision cannot be resolved by asking the existing demos alone without circularity: those already included would decide whether the excluded should be included. Nor can the all-affected principle be applied mechanically. Nearly every consequential law produces effects beyond its jurisdiction, and the intensity, duration, and foreseeability of those effects vary.

The democratic ownership of law does not solve this problem by definition. It begins with a recognized electorate constituted by an existing legal order and asks whether members of that electorate retain equal legislative standing. This is a transitional and institutional starting point, not a philosophical declaration that inherited boundaries are just.

The theory can nevertheless say several things.

First, once a person is recognized as a member, that person's legislative standing cannot be reduced because she is poor, unpopular, uninformed, disabled, geographically isolated, intermittently engaged, or associated with a political minority. Equal membership must be practically usable, not merely nominal.

Second, membership rules remain subject to democratic and constitutional contest. Questions concerning citizenship, residency, age, incarceration, migration, indigenous sovereignty, territorial status, and the political standing of future generations cannot be settled by the four structural parameters alone. They require moral, legal, historical, and jurisdictional argument.

Third, those affected but not included may possess claims to consultation, representation, treaty protection, rights, judicial review, or special institutional standing. The fact that legislative sovereignty must be located does not imply that only formal members matter morally.

Fourth, democratic ownership creates a reason to scrutinize exclusion more intensely. If law is understood as authority owned by equal members, exclusion is not merely the absence of a ballot. It is exclusion from co-ownership of a coercive institution. The stakes of defining the demos become clearer, not easier.

Straight-Up therefore should not claim to define the electorate for every application. Its minimum principle is narrower: within the electorate recognized for a given legislative jurisdiction, members must possess equal and recoverable standing. The system must also contain lawful routes through which boundaries and membership rules can be challenged and revised. A theory that pretended to settle the boundary problem once and for all would contradict its own commitment to non-closure.

14.4 The competence objection

The competence objection is among the oldest arguments against popular rule. Governing is complex. Citizens vary in knowledge, reasoning ability, attention, time, and susceptibility to bias. Surveys repeatedly find uneven factual knowledge, unstable responses, and misunderstanding of institutions. Political misinformation can be confidently held and difficult to correct (Converse 2000; Jerit and Zhao 2020). Why, then, should ordinary citizens possess the legislative decision?

The first answer is that competence is relevant to performance but does not by itself establish title. A surgeon's competence gives her authority within surgery because a patient has sought specialized service under a bounded professional relationship. Political rule is different. Legislation distributes risks, burdens, rights, resources, and coercion among people whose values and interests are contested. Expertise concerning consequences matters greatly, but no uncontested test identifies a class whose superior knowledge grants it a general right to govern everyone else.

The second answer is comparative. The relevant choice is not between fallible citizens and an omniscient institution. Representatives, parties, experts, judges, administrators, donors, and media organizations are also bounded, biased, strategically motivated, and vulnerable to misinformation. Concentrating authority may improve attention while worsening capture, tunnel vision, groupthink, and insulation from consequences. The competence objection must compare systems of distributed and concentrated fallibility rather than contrasting public imperfection with an imaginary guardian.

The third answer concerns incentives. Much evidence of public ignorance is gathered under institutions in which an individual's knowledge rarely affects a legislative decision. Rational ignorance is not the whole explanation, but political institutions plainly shape the return on attention. The developmental thesis defended earlier remains an empirical hypothesis: consequential standing may alter information-seeking, perceived efficacy, and responsibility. It should not be assumed either true or false in advance.

The fourth answer concerns cognitive division of labor. Democratic ownership does not require every person to master every issue. Citizens use trusted sources, party cues, social networks, professional advice, summaries, and delegates. Boudreau and Lupia have emphasized that low factual recall does not automatically prove incompetence in context; citizens can sometimes make reasoned choices with limited information when credible cues and institutions are available. Other research shows serious limits and predictable failures. The correct inference is

institutional: a democracy must organize knowledge, source reliability, disagreement, and correction rather than treat encyclopedic individual knowledge as an entrance requirement.

The fifth answer is that competence itself is multidimensional. Technical knowledge, local experience, moral judgment, risk tolerance, historical memory, and knowledge of lived consequences are not distributed identically. A specialist may know more about the expected effect of a policy and less about the burden it imposes on a particular population. Inclusive decision-making can aggregate forms of knowledge unavailable to a narrow elite, although diversity improves judgment only under conditions that permit independent contribution and meaningful communication (Landemore 2013).

The competence objection therefore establishes several design requirements:

- legislation must be accompanied by accessible and competing explanations;
- expertise must be visible, contestable, and protected from intimidation;
- uncertainty and disagreement must be disclosed rather than hidden;
- citizens must be able to delegate attention without surrendering standing;
- institutions must detect predictable error and permit reversal;
- no decision procedure should manufacture an appearance of comprehension that does not exist.

The objection would become decisive against Straight-Up only if equal and recoverable citizen authority were shown to produce persistently worse decisions than feasible alternatives across the values the polity is entitled to pursue, and if the improvement required alienating authority rather than improving information, delegation, timing, or correction. Even then, the normative question would remain whether superior aggregate performance establishes a title to rule. Competence is a serious problem of institutional design. It is not a self-executing theory of political hierarchy.

14.5 The scale objection

A village assembly cannot simply be enlarged until it contains millions. Communication costs rise, agendas expand, specialization becomes necessary, and individual attention becomes scarce. Large populations cannot deliberate as one face-to-face group. If democratic ownership requires everyone to participate directly in every stage, it is impossible at national scale.

Straight-Up accepts the premise and rejects the inference. Scale makes the division of political labor necessary; it does not make the alienation of legislative authority necessary.

The theory distinguishes the ownership of a decision-right from the performance of every task that supports its exercise. Research, drafting, committee work, scheduling, negotiation, administration, auditing, and communication can be distributed across many institutions. Large systems can use nested and modular organization, just as complex associations, firms, federations, and networks do. The question is whether scaling arrangements preserve a path by which authority remains traceable to and recoverable by equal members.

Representative government solved scale by compressing hundreds of thousands of citizens into a small number of independent legislative votes. That solution reduces coordination costs but creates a bottleneck. Parties, donors, lobbyists, media, movements, and constituents compete to influence those who own the legally decisive votes. The problem is not that representation performs labor. It is that the laborer acquires independent ownership of the decision.

A voter-sovereign system instead requires layered aggregation without irreversible transfer. Human-scale groups organize communication and mutual recognition. Delegates carry information and provisional authority across levels. Recursion limits the number of direct relationships any participant must maintain. Direct voting and proxy

recovery preserve the member's route to the final tally. Committees and professionals perform specialized work under bounded mandates.

This architecture may fail. Layers can distort information. Delegates can coordinate into elites. Software can obscure rather than clarify. Direct override can become burdensome. Human-scale groups can fragment. The point is not that recursion magically solves scale. It is that scale is an engineering and institutional problem whose solution need not begin by transferring sovereignty to a permanent representative class.

The scale objection therefore generates measurable questions: How many relationships can participants maintain? How rapidly does information degrade across levels? How concentrated do proxies become? What fraction of members can exercise direct override without overwhelming the system? How long does legislation take? Can emergencies be handled without permanent suspension of control? These are questions for simulation, prototyping, comparative research, and implementation. “Large democracy requires representatives” is not yet an answer because it fails to distinguish representatives who serve recoverable authority from representatives who own it.

14.6 Misinformation, propaganda, and manipulation

Misinformation is not merely an absence of information. It can be produced strategically, reinforced by identity, amplified through repetition, and embedded in media systems that reward attention rather than accuracy. Political actors may flood the public sphere with conflicting claims, manufacture uncertainty, impersonate trusted sources, use microtargeting to deliver inconsistent messages, or exploit fear and resentment. Artificial intelligence may lower the cost of generating persuasive falsehoods and simulated evidence.

A voter-sovereign system does not make these dangers disappear. Indeed, actors who currently target officeholders would also target voters, delegates, agenda setters, and information institutions. A wealthy organization unable to buy a legislator may spend more on persuasion. A movement unable to capture a party may attempt to capture the information environment. Direct voting can become a direct target.

The first mistake would be to deny the danger. The second would be to infer that a representative class is immune. Representatives operate inside the same information environment and are subject to additional channels of lobbying, career incentive, donor dependence, partisan discipline, and selective access. Concentration may make manipulation cheaper by reducing the number of decision owners who must be reached.

The relevant comparison concerns attack surfaces and correction. A distributed system creates more targets but may reduce the value of capturing any one target. It can support competing summaries, visible source provenance, public rebuttal, audit trails, independent research institutions, minority reports, and post-decision review. It can also fail through coordinated saturation, opaque platforms, or cumulative agenda control.

Democratic ownership implies that information institutions should not possess sovereignty. Fact-checkers, experts, moderators, journalists, and platform administrators must be able to identify falsehood, disclose evidence, and enforce clearly defined rules against fraud or impersonation. They should not acquire an unrestricted power to determine which political conclusions citizens may consider. The boundary between protecting epistemic conditions and controlling political judgment is difficult and must remain contestable.

Several minimum protections follow:

- sponsorship and funding should be disclosed where constitutionally permissible;
- official legislative materials should preserve provenance and version history;
- claims should be linked to evidence and uncertainty where possible;
- minority analyses and rebuttals should be accessible alongside majority reports;
- platform ranking and moderation rules should be inspectable and appealable;

- independent channels should be capable of reproducing the legislative record;
- fraud, identity theft, coercion, and fabricated official communications should be subject to enforceable sanctions;
- voters should have time to encounter challenge before irreversible decisions.

No architecture can guarantee epistemic purity. Jerit and Zhao's review of political misinformation emphasizes both the depth of the problem and the uneven evidence concerning correction. The democratic objective is therefore not to create an authority that certifies all truth. It is to make claims attributable, contestable, and revisable while denying any information intermediary independent ownership of the legislative decision.

The theory would require revision if the distributed information environment proved systematically easier to dominate than representative bottlenecks and if no combination of transparency, plural institutions, pacing, and correction reduced that vulnerability. Such a result would challenge specific design propositions. It would not automatically establish that the manipulators or their appointed guardians should own the law.

14.7 Faction and organized power

Madison's diagnosis of faction remains unavoidable. Citizens organize around interests, passions, identities, classes, regions, religions, and ideologies. Organized minorities can dominate dispersed majorities. Majorities can use public power against minorities. Parties can simplify choice while disciplining thought. Associations can coordinate agency while excluding outsiders.

Straight-Up does not abolish faction because faction arises from freedom, difference, and unequal resources. The relevant question is how institutions translate organized power into law.

Under representative government, factions compete to nominate, finance, elect, persuade, pressure, or replace a limited number of officeholders. This competition can protect pluralism, but it also gives organized actors privileged access to the bottleneck. A faction that gains control of a party or committee may govern far beyond the intensity or specificity of public support.

Under voter sovereignty, factions remain free to organize, advocate, recruit delegates, draft proposals, and mobilize votes. Their members retain the same formal decision-right as others. The system changes the conversion mechanism: organization must ultimately produce support among decision owners rather than merely secure control of the people who own the official vote.

That distinction does not eliminate unequal influence. Wealthy, disciplined, or culturally dominant factions may frame agendas, saturate media, supply expertise, and recruit large proxy networks. Some citizens will enter politics through associations that provide ready-made interpretations. The system may generate informal parties even if formal party labels are absent.

The proper response is not compulsory atomization. Isolated citizens are generally weaker, not freer. The system should protect association while preventing associations from becoming sovereign over members. Direct override, proxy recovery, transparent sponsorship, freedom to change groups, access to alternative channels, and institutional routes for minority agenda-setting can raise the cost of durable capture.

Faction also requires attention to cross-cutting structure. Voluntary affinity may intensify homophily if every group becomes socially and ideologically uniform. Layered institutions should create bridging encounters, public hearings, mixed committees, and opportunities for competing groups to challenge one another. Human-scale association must not become a constitutional segregation of political life.

The Straight-Up claim is therefore modest: faction is less dangerous when legislative authority remains distributed, recoverable, and contestable than when factions can acquire durable ownership of concentrated

decision points. This is an empirical proposition, not a definitional truth. If factional organization simply reconstitutes a more opaque party oligarchy through proxies and group networks, the architecture must change.

14.8 Instability, impulsiveness, and policy reversal

A common defense of representative insulation is that public opinion is volatile. Citizens may respond to outrage, fear, misleading events, or temporary majorities. Direct control could produce rapid reversals, inconsistent obligations, fiscal irresponsibility, or attacks upon long-term projects. Stable government requires distance between public impulse and law.

Some distance is plainly valuable. Notice periods, multiple readings, committee review, constitutional scrutiny, fiscal analysis, implementation planning, and delayed effective dates can improve legislation. Emergency powers may require rapid temporary action followed by review. Rights may require supermajoritarian or judicial safeguards. None of these mechanisms necessarily transfers general legislative ownership.

The key distinction is between **friction** and **alienation**. Friction slows, informs, sequences, and tests a decision. Alienation gives someone else the independent right to decide. A sovereign public can constitutionally bind itself to procedures that make impulsive action difficult while retaining the authority to revise those procedures through defined means.

Representative systems are not consistently stable. Elections can produce abrupt changes in unified government. Party leadership can accelerate major legislation. Executive orders, administrative reinterpretation, judicial decisions, and fiscal crises can alter policy without sustained public deliberation. Stability may protect entrenched error as readily as wise policy.

A voter-sovereign system should distinguish ordinary correction from destructive oscillation. Reversal is not inherently failure. The capacity to undo harmful law is one of democracy's virtues. The question is whether policy changes occur through intelligible reasons, adequate notice, and learning from consequence, or whether the system repeatedly lurches without institutional memory.

Design responses include staged implementation, sunset clauses, pilot programs, periodic review, recorded rationales, impact monitoring, supermajority requirements for specified constitutional changes, and asymmetrical thresholds where reversal would destroy justified reliance. These mechanisms should be justified publicly and remain amendable rather than serving as disguised vetoes for incumbent interests.

The empirical test is not whether Straight-Up changes policy more often. It is whether the pattern of change improves or degrades welfare, rights, predictability, learning, and public control compared with feasible alternatives. A theory of democratic ownership should value corrigibility without romanticizing constant motion.

14.9 Low participation and the meaning of nonuse

Equal authority does not guarantee equal or continuous participation. Many people will devote little time to politics. Some will delegate routinely. Some will vote only on salient questions. Some will distrust every available group. Some will lack time because of work, disability, care obligations, or crisis. Others will simply prefer private life.

Low participation creates both a normative and practical objection. If only a small, unusually motivated fraction acts, does the system become rule by activists? Does nominal sovereignty conceal unequal political labor? Does nonparticipation amount to consent, indifference, exclusion, or silent opposition?

The first response is that democratic ownership is a status as well as an activity. A property owner does not cease to own because she does not exercise every incident every day. More importantly, political standing should not

depend upon permanent labor. A system that demands heroic participation from everyone will exclude those with the least time and resources.

The second response is that nonuse must remain reversible. A citizen who delegates or abstains should be able to re-enter without seeking permission from an incumbent organization. Records, summaries, accessible interfaces, public-option groups, and bounded procedures should lower the cost of return. Persistent sovereignty differs from persistent mobilization.

The third response is that participation rates must be disaggregated. Low direct voting may be compatible with broad proxy connection and high confidence in delegation. High voting may reflect crisis, distrust, or coercive mobilization rather than democratic health. Aggregate turnout alone cannot reveal whether authority is accessible.

The fourth response is that unequal participation can reproduce social inequality. Verba, Scholzman, and Brady showed that political voice is structured by resources, recruitment, and civic skills; Lijphart called unequal turnout democracy's unresolved dilemma. Straight-Up must not assume that digital access or formal equality erases those differences. Compensation, disability access, language access, childcare, offline participation, public technical assistance, and active recruitment may be constitutional necessities rather than optional outreach.

Several indicators would matter:

- distribution of direct votes, proxies, and political labor across class, race, gender, age, disability, geography, and education;
- ease and frequency of re-entry;
- concentration and duration of delegation;
- reasons for nonparticipation;
- whether inactive members can identify and exercise their rights when an issue becomes salient;
- whether public-option institutions reach those excluded from voluntary networks;
- whether participation burdens are shifted onto the already advantaged.

A voter-sovereign system would fail its own moral premise if equal standing existed only for those able to sustain unpaid political labor. The answer to low participation is not to transfer ownership permanently to professionals. It is to design sovereignty that can persist through episodic use.

14.10 Minority oppression and the limits of majority rule

The gravest moral objection is not ignorance but injustice. A majority may deny rights, target an unpopular minority, manipulate membership, suppress opposition, or use law to entrench itself. Why should democratic ownership be preferred if the people can use sovereignty to damage sovereignty?

No honest answer can promise impossibility. Representative legislatures, courts, executives, and constitutional framers have also enacted, administered, or upheld grave injustice. The historical record does not support the view that political insulation consistently protects minorities. Sometimes courts and representatives resist popular oppression; sometimes they initiate or preserve it.

The theory therefore distinguishes ownership from permission. Equal legislative sovereignty identifies the public as the residual owner of law. It does not imply that every majority decision is morally legitimate or constitutionally valid. Rights, due process, equal protection, independent adjudication, jurisdictional limits, and entrenched procedures can constrain the exercise of public power.

The hard question is whether those constraints create a separate sovereign. Courts must interpret rights, and interpretation involves judgment. Independent institutions need protection from immediate retaliation. Yet judicial or guardian authority cannot become a general title to rule. Constitutionalism organizes reciprocal constraints among fallible institutions; it does not locate infallibility.

Minority protection under Straight-Up should include at least:

- universal and equal standing within the recognized electorate;
- secret and secure voting where needed to prevent coercion;
- due process before deprivation of liberty, status, or property;
- rights of speech, association, religion, opposition, and political organization;
- independent adjudication and access to appeal;
- public reasons and records for coercive decisions;
- minority reports, agenda access, and procedural routes to challenge;
- heightened procedures for altering basic rights or membership;
- protection against retroactive punishment and bills directed at named persons or groups;
- continuing capacity to organize for reversal.

These safeguards do not eliminate conflict between constitutional rights and democratic decision. They create institutions through which the conflict can be argued, reviewed, and corrected. The system remains non-closed because no rule can guarantee its own faithful interpretation forever.

The fallibility of majorities does not establish the natural superiority of a minority class. The relevant comparison asks which arrangement better protects equal persons over time, permits challenge, makes domination visible, and allows those harmed to organize correction. Democratic success includes the treatment of minorities, not merely the accuracy of aggregate preference.

If consequential implementation showed that voter sovereignty consistently degraded basic rights relative to representative and constitutional alternatives, the theory could not dismiss the result as the people's choice. It would require stronger constitutional design and might require narrowing claims about the domains suitable for direct final authority. Issue-neutrality does not entail indifference to oppression.

14.11 Dependence upon experts

Modern government cannot function without expertise. Public health, engineering, climate modeling, fiscal administration, cybersecurity, law, logistics, medicine, and countless other domains require specialized training. Citizens cannot independently verify every technical claim. Even delegates and legislators depend upon professionals.

The objection holds that the distinction between epistemic weight and political authority is unstable. If citizens must rely on experts to understand the options, experts may effectively control the agenda. If a technical agency can halt an unsafe action, it exercises authority. If courts interpret complex rights, lawyers govern. If administrators translate broad statutes into rules, they legislate in practice.

This objection is correct about the danger. Formal voter sovereignty can coexist with informal expert rule. The response is not to deny dependence but to constitutionalize it.

First, expert roles should be functionally specified. Research, diagnosis, forecasting, drafting, certification, implementation, and emergency intervention are different powers. Each requires its own mandate, disclosure rules, professional standards, and review.

Second, expertise should be plural where uncertainty or value conflict exists. Competing teams, peer review, public methods, minority reports, and independent replication reduce dependence upon a single epistemic center.

Third, experts must disclose uncertainty, assumptions, conflicts, and the boundary between factual judgment and value choice. Technical models often embed decisions about acceptable risk, distribution, discount rates, or evidentiary thresholds.

Fourth, professional insulation may be justified within a bounded domain. A safety inspector need not await a plebiscite before closing a collapsing bridge. The democratic question is whether the authority is legally defined, reviewable, temporary where appropriate, and subject to institutional revision.

Fifth, the public requires intermediaries capable of translating expertise without claiming neutrality they do not possess. Journalists, delegates, civic organizations, and public analysts can make disagreement legible. Translation itself should be open to challenge.

Expert dependence becomes domination when citizens cannot identify who made the effective choice, cannot inspect the basis of the choice, cannot seek competing advice, and cannot revise the mandate. Straight-Up does not abolish expert power. It attempts to keep expert power within a chain of publicly owned authority.

The system should be judged harshly here. If voters merely ratify options constructed by an unaccountable technical class, democratic ownership is nominal. If every expert judgment can be overridden instantly by uninformed preference, government becomes reckless. The necessary relation is neither expert sovereignty nor anti-expert populism, but bounded professional authority under an inspectable and corrigible public constitution.

14.12 Is revocable delegation merely another kind of representation?

Yes, in an important sense. A proxy who casts votes, communicates preferences, or exercises judgment for another person represents that person. Straight-Up should not preserve its distinctiveness by defining representation so narrowly that liquid or revocable delegation no longer qualifies.

The real claim is not that Straight-Up abolishes representation. It is that representations differ morally and institutionally according to the incidents of authority they transfer.

Traditional electoral representation commonly combines selection, a broad jurisdiction, fixed tenure, independent judgment, and legal ownership of the official vote. Constituents may communicate, organize, and later remove the representative through an election, but they cannot ordinarily reclaim their share of the legislative decision during the term or cast it directly on a particular bill.

Revocable delegation changes that relation. The member chooses whether to delegate, may choose different delegates for different domains, may reclaim authority before or during a decision, and retains a direct route to the tally. The delegate's voting weight is derivative rather than independently constituted. Instant or low-cost recall changes incentives and the meaning of authorization.

This does not make the relation nonrepresentational, nor does it guarantee responsiveness. A member may delegate blindly. A proxy may accumulate prestige, control information, or become difficult to replace socially. The member may not monitor decisions in time. Software may make recall formally available but practically confusing. Delegation chains may obscure responsibility.

The distinction is therefore best stated as one between **alienating** and **non-alienating** representation. Representation becomes non-alienating when the represented person retains practical control over the delegated decision-right, including the ability to inspect, reclaim, redirect, or exercise it directly. The category is a design ideal, not a binary label that excuses weak safeguards.

Principal-agent theory helps identify monitoring, information asymmetry, adverse selection, moral hazard, and sanction. It is incomplete when it treats the principal's right as established by the model rather than asking whether institutional law actually preserves it. Straight-Up's contribution is to make recoverability part of the constitutional status of the member.

The objection therefore improves the theory. We should not say "representation is the problem." Independent ownership by representatives is the problem. Representation as communication, judgment, labor, advocacy, and revocable agency remains indispensable.

14.13 Concentrated proxies and distributed oligarchy

Revocability does not prevent concentration. Many citizens may delegate to a small number of trusted figures. Network effects can make prominent proxies more visible and apparently safer. Media attention may follow voting weight, creating cumulative advantage. Organizations may coordinate delegation. Experts may become political celebrities. A technically decentralized system can converge upon a highly centralized distribution of effective power.

Liquid-democracy research has long identified this possibility. Voluntary delegation and instant recall improve formal control, but transitive delegation, low attention, and unequal reputation can produce “super-voters” or proxy oligarchies (Blum and Zuber 2016; Valsangiacomo 2021, 2022). Evidence from digital governance likewise suggests that transparent delegation can coexist with heavy concentration.

Concentration is not automatically illegitimate. If thousands of members knowingly and temporarily trust the same person on a specialized question, aggregation may be efficient. The moral issue concerns durability, opacity, dependence, and barriers to correction.

A serious system should measure:

- the distribution of voting weight;
- concentration by issue and over time;
- the depth and stability of delegation chains;
- correlated delegation controlled by organizations;
- rates of reclaiming and redirecting proxies;
- the relationship between proxy weight and media visibility, wealth, office, or professional status;
- whether high-weight delegates control drafting, information, and voting simultaneously;
- whether members understand the powers they have delegated.

Possible safeguards include direct-delegation limits, visible concentration warnings, mandatory renewal, domain-specific delegation, prohibition or restriction of hidden chains, easy comparison among delegates, public-option delegates, conflict disclosure, and separation of functions. Each safeguard carries costs. Hard caps may fragment competent coordination or create sham proxies. Mandatory renewal may burden inactive citizens. Full transparency may expose political relationships or facilitate coercion. The design must balance concentration risk against usability and privacy.

Human-scale groups and layered aggregation provide an additional check by creating many local points of recognition and replacement. They can also become the basis of clique power. A delegate who controls a socially cohesive group may be formally revocable but difficult to challenge without personal cost. Informal hierarchy therefore requires qualitative observation as well as numerical metrics.

Distributed oligarchy would be a central failure mode, not an incidental imperfection. If proxy networks repeatedly produce a durable class that controls agenda, information, and final votes while members rarely reclaim authority, the system may reproduce legislative alienation under a different name. The appropriate response would be redesign, not semantic reassurance.

14.14 What the theory does not abolish

Straight-Up is sometimes misunderstood as a proposal to eliminate every intermediary between a citizen and law. That would be neither possible nor desirable.

It does not abolish parties. Citizens may organize around broad programs, recruit candidates for delegated roles, coordinate votes, publish platforms, and discipline members through voluntary association. What parties may not receive by default is ownership of the legislative votes of citizens who chose a party label years earlier.

It does not abolish associations or movements. Labor unions, business organizations, religious groups, civil-rights organizations, neighborhood networks, professional societies, and issue campaigns can supply knowledge, identity, resources, and collective power. Their influence should remain visible and contestable; membership in them should not replace individual political standing.

It does not abolish leadership. Some people will articulate visions, convene groups, negotiate conflicts, explain complexity, and earn trust. Leadership becomes dangerous when dependence hardens into an independent title to command. The proper aim is replaceable leadership rather than leaderlessness.

It does not abolish administration. Laws require implementation, budgeting, records, enforcement, procurement, and professional judgment. Administration must possess enough discretion to function. That discretion should be bounded by law, transparent standards, review, and correction.

It does not abolish courts. Rights, jurisdiction, evidentiary standards, procedural fairness, and conflicts of law require adjudication. Judicial independence may be indispensable. Courts should not be treated as holders of a general sovereignty that renders democratic ownership fictitious.

It does not abolish expertise. Specialists remain central to research, drafting, forecasting, implementation, safety, and review. Equal political standing is not a claim of equal technical knowledge.

It does not abolish representation. It distinguishes representational labor and advocacy from independent ownership of the legislative decision.

It does not abolish hierarchy in every functional sense. A hospital, emergency service, military unit, or engineering project may require defined command. The democratic issue is how such authority is created, bounded, supervised, and revised, not whether every relationship must be permanently horizontal.

The theory is therefore anti-ruler, not anti-organization. It rejects a separate class whose governing authority becomes its own institutional property. It does not deny the complexity of organized life.

14.15 Deriving the four minimum parameters

The four parameters of the Straight-Up System are not arbitrary preferences added after the philosophical argument. They are design implications derived from the requirements of equal, continuing, and practical legislative ownership. The derivation is conditional: if the theory's account of ownership is accepted, then any institutional system claiming full conformance must satisfy functions equivalent to these parameters, although the precise implementation may vary.

Voter sovereignty

If each member owns an equal legislative decision-right, the member must retain a consequential route to the final decision. Consultation, petition, polling, or advisory participation is insufficient. Direct voting need not be the only mode of action, but it must remain available in a practical form. The tally must treat the member's vote as authoritative within the relevant jurisdiction.

Without voter sovereignty, popular rule remains a source of legitimacy for someone else's decision.

Revocable delegation

No person can attend to every question. Equal authority under unequal labor therefore requires delegation. To preserve ownership, delegation must be voluntary, inspectable, and recoverable. The member must be able to reclaim or redirect the delegated decision-right without waiting for the delegate's term to expire or obtaining the delegate's consent.

Without revocability, necessary delegation becomes alienation.

Human-scale association

An isolated individual facing a national information system has formal choice but little organized agency. People require relations through which they can be recognized, communicate, share labor, evaluate trust, and replace delegates. Groups must remain small enough for mutual legibility and voluntary enough to avoid compulsory communal domination.

Without human scale, sovereignty risks becoming an atomized button press surrounded by institutions the citizen cannot penetrate.

Layered aggregation

Human-scale groups cannot coordinate a large polity through universal direct interaction. Their decisions, information, and delegated authority must be connected through bounded levels or equivalent modular structures. Layers must preserve traceability and direct override rather than acquiring independent sovereignty.

Without layered aggregation, human scale cannot reach public law; without limits upon layers, aggregation recreates a remote ruling structure.

The four parameters are complementary. Direct voting without delegation imposes impossible participation burdens. Delegation without revocability creates rulers. Small groups without aggregation remain local and politically weak. Aggregation without direct standing alienates authority. The architecture's claim is that the parameters support one another in preserving ownership across scale.

Other designs may satisfy the same functions differently. Straight-Up should not define conformance by trademarks, exact numbers, or software choices. The test is relational: does authority remain equal, consequential, organized, scalable, and recoverable?

14.16 Minimum institutional implications

The philosophical account does not yield a complete constitution, but it excludes certain arrangements and requires a constitutional floor.

A minimally conforming system must provide:

- equal standing for every recognized member of the electorate;
- a practical route to cast a direct vote on legislative decisions;
- voluntary delegation and timely recovery of delegated authority;
- clear attribution of every vote included in the tally without compromising ballot secrecy;
- accessible information concerning proposals, amendments, sponsorship, and procedural status;
- routes to propose, challenge, appeal, and seek correction;
- bounded and inspectable authority for delegates, committees, experts, administrators, and platform operators;
- identity and eligibility controls sufficient to prevent duplicate or fraudulent participation;
- security, auditability, privacy, coercion resistance, and independent verification;
- accessibility across disability, language, technology, geography, and economic circumstance;
- continuity, succession, offline fallback, and disaster recovery;
- institutional procedures for amendment and provider replacement;
- a credible connection between the public tally and the legal legislative act.

Several further implications follow from the ownership relation.

Agenda control cannot be entirely monopolized by a separate class. Members and organized minorities need routes to place questions into public procedure, although thresholds may protect the system from overload.

Drafting cannot be invisible. Citizens must know what text is being decided and how amendments change it. Professional drafters may perform the work, but authorship, revision history, and legal effect should be inspectable.

Committees cannot become unreviewable owners of legislation. They may investigate, schedule, revise, and recommend, but their gatekeeping power must remain bounded and contestable.

Software cannot become sovereign. Code, data formats, identity systems, and service providers must be auditable, portable, and replaceable. The institution must survive the failure or withdrawal of a vendor.

Emergency authority cannot become a permanent bypass. Temporary action must trigger review, expiration, and the restoration of ordinary control.

These requirements do not determine every threshold or workflow. They identify the functions without which the phrase democratic ownership becomes misleading.

14.17 Four kinds of claim

Much confusion in political argument arises when different kinds of claim are treated as if they shared the same proof. The Straight-Up program should classify its propositions explicitly.

Conceptual definitions

These state how terms are used within the theory. Examples include:

- legislative alienation is the institutional separation of people subject to law from continuing control over the legislative authority exercised in their name;
- a legislative decision-right is the authority to participate in the final determination that gives, retains, or removes the force of law;
- influence affects another person's decision, whereas sovereignty identifies continuing ownership of the decision-right;
- non-alienating delegation preserves practical recoverability.

Definitions can be criticized for incoherence, ambiguity, redundancy, or lack of analytical value. They are not falsified by turnout data.

Moral conclusions

These are normative arguments. Examples include:

- differences in knowledge or capacity do not establish a natural title for one adult to govern another;
- recognized members subject to collectively enforced law should possess equal political standing;
- necessary political labor should not become independent ownership of legislative authority;
- fallibility does not justify a separate sovereign class.

Moral conclusions are assessed through argument, consistency, implications, and comparison with rival principles. Empirical facts matter to their application but do not alone settle them.

Structural inferences and design propositions

These connect the normative principle to institutions. Examples include:

- continuing ownership requires direct standing or a functional equivalent;
- unequal attention requires delegable labor;
- ownership requires delegation to be recoverable;
- large-scale self-rule requires modular or layered organization;
- human agency requires socially organized access rather than isolated voting alone;
- software and administrators must remain replaceable.

These claims are partly conceptual and partly practical. A rival design could show that the same function can be achieved differently. Failure of one implementation would not necessarily refute the underlying requirement.

Empirical behavioral hypotheses

These concern what people and institutions will actually do. Examples include:

- consequential authority will increase some forms of attention and efficacy;
- revocability will improve responsiveness;
- distributed decision ownership will raise the cost or reduce the durability of capture;
- human-scale groups will improve trust, participation, and information flow;
- layered aggregation will preserve accuracy across scale;
- direct override will be used often enough to discipline delegates but not so often that the system becomes unmanageable;
- voter sovereignty will produce better correction than representative bottlenecks.

These propositions require evidence. They may vary across context and population. They should be stated with conditions and registered before implementation where possible.

The integrity of the project depends upon resisting category drift. A normative commitment cannot be advertised as an empirically proven outcome. A failed software feature does not refute equal political agency. A conceptual distinction does not prove that a proposed institution will embody it. An attractive pilot does not establish national scalability.

14.18 What would count as failure?

A theory that explains every outcome after the fact cannot learn. Straight-Up therefore needs explicit failure conditions.

Some evidence would require **implementation revision** rather than philosophical abandonment. Examples include:

- a particular user interface produces confusion or exclusion;
- a delegation rule creates avoidable concentration;
- a proposed group-size range performs poorly;
- a layer distorts information;
- a committee process creates excessive delay;
- a security architecture cannot meet verification or privacy requirements.

These failures concern design choices. The appropriate response is to revise, replace, or narrow the mechanism.

Other evidence would challenge **structural propositions**. Examples include:

- no feasible form of recoverable delegation prevents durable proxy oligarchy;
- human-scale association consistently intensifies exclusion without offsetting agency gains;
- layered aggregation cannot preserve traceability and accuracy at the required scale;
- direct override cannot be made usable without overwhelming participants or administration;
- distributed authority proves more capturable, less transparent, and less corrigible than feasible representative alternatives.

Such results might require altering the four-parameter architecture or acknowledging that full democratic ownership cannot be realized in the proposed form.

Still other evidence would challenge **empirical developmental claims**:

- consequential authority does not improve attention, efficacy, responsibility, or information-seeking;
- participation becomes more polarized, coercive, or performative;
- citizens rely more heavily on identity and misinformation when their votes become consequential;
- re-entry remains rare and participation inequality deepens;
- correction is slower or less informed than under representative government.

The theory could survive these findings as a moral account of ownership, but its public claims about education, resilience, and performance would need substantial revision.

Finally, some outcomes would constitute a **normative failure of conformance** even if the system remained operational:

- a permanent class gains practical control over agenda, information, and final votes;
- recognized members lose equal access to direct participation;
- proxies become nonrecoverable in practice;
- software providers or administrators become irreplaceable;
- minorities are systematically denied standing or protection;
- official tallies cannot be independently verified;
- the legal officeholder ceases to follow the public decision while the system continues to claim legislative ownership;
- emergency or transitional powers become permanent.

In these cases, the system would no longer merit the name Straight-Up merely because it retained Circles, proxies, or a voting portal. Conformance concerns authority, not branding.

The hardest possible result would be evidence that people generally prefer alienated authority even when a workable alternative exists. Preference alone would not settle the moral question; people can adapt to subordination or reasonably avoid burdens. But a system of self-rule cannot be imposed indefinitely upon an unwilling public without contradiction. Voluntary adoption, exit, and democratic amendment are therefore part of the empirical and normative test.

14.19 Necessary revision is not defeat

Political theories often protect themselves by making revision appear disloyal. A founding principle becomes attached to particular procedures, numbers, institutions, or leaders. Evidence against an implementation is treated as hostility to the ideal. This is precisely the reproduction of authority the theory has criticized.

Straight-Up should instead distinguish a constitutional commitment from a design attachment. Equal legislative standing is the commitment. Six-to-twelve-member Circles, particular proxy workflows, software stacks, committee forms, or launch strategies are proposals for realizing it. They deserve loyalty only to the extent that they work.

Revision can take several forms:

- **clarification**, when terms or boundaries prove ambiguous;
- **narrowing**, when a claim holds only under more limited conditions;
- **redesign**, when a mechanism fails while the function remains necessary;
- **sequencing**, when an institution must be introduced gradually or alongside additional support;
- **domain limitation**, when direct authority is unsuitable for a specific kind of decision without specialized constitutional mediation;
- **abandonment**, when a proposition repeatedly fails and no plausible repair remains.

The project should also preserve negative findings. Failed prototypes, participation disparities, security weaknesses, and concentration patterns are part of the public record. A democratic institution cannot ask citizens to trust a learning process whose errors are concealed.

Corrigibility is therefore not only a feature of the proposed political system. It is a discipline for the theory and the Project that advances it.

14.20 What the objections establish

The objections surveyed here are serious. They establish that democratic ownership requires more than a vote. It requires an information system capable of organized disagreement; social infrastructure capable of supporting agency; delegation that remains recoverable; professional institutions that remain bounded; constitutional rights and adjudication; security and verification; attention to unequal resources; safeguards against proxy concentration; and procedures for pacing, correction, and amendment.

They do not establish that citizens should remain permanently alienated from the legislative decision.

Competence establishes the need for knowledge institutions, not an uncontested title for the knowledgeable.

Scale establishes the need for recursion and divided labor, not independent representative ownership.

Misinformation establishes the need for provenance, contest, and correction, not a sovereign ministry of truth.

Faction establishes the need for pluralism and anti-capture design, not the political isolation of citizens. Instability

establishes the need for friction and constitutional procedure, not permanent insulation. Low participation

establishes the need for delegation, accessibility, and easy re-entry, not forfeiture of ownership. Minority oppression

establishes the need for rights, due process, and judicial protection, not the infallibility of a guardian class. Expert

dependence establishes the need for bounded professional authority, not epistocracy.

Revocable delegation is indeed representation, but representation whose moral character is transformed by recoverability. Proxies may concentrate, which is why concentration must be measured and corrected rather than denied. Parties, leaders, associations, courts, administrators, and experts remain. What changes is their constitutional relation to the people whose authority they exercise.

The minimum implications are demanding but not utopian. A person must be able to vote directly, delegate voluntarily, reclaim authority, organize with others, trace the path of a decision, challenge procedural failure, and participate in changing the institution itself. No intermediary may become irreplaceable. No public tally may depend upon unverifiable faith. No claim of efficiency may silently convert labor into sovereignty.

14.21 The final boundary

The Democratic Ownership of Law does not claim that the people will always decide well.

It claims that their fallibility is not a title deed for someone else's rule.

It does not claim that every citizen must perform the work of government.

It claims that performing the work does not make the worker the owner of the public's authority.

It does not claim that representation, leadership, expertise, administration, parties, courts, or constitutions are dispensable.

It claims that none should become a separate sovereign merely because it is necessary.

It does not claim that democratic institutions can be made closed against contradiction, error, or injustice.

It claims that a legitimate system should make error visible, opposition possible, authority recoverable, and correction institutionally available.

The theory therefore ends with the distinction from which it began. Laws exercise authority over human freedom. The people subject to that authority may remain advisers, clients, petitioners, spectators, and periodic selectors of rulers. Or they may be organized as the continuing owners of the legislative decision.

The first arrangement can be liberal, competitive, constitutional, responsive, and far preferable to dictatorship. It can contain many democratic elements. It nevertheless stops before self-government in the full sense developed here.

The second arrangement cannot promise wisdom. It can promise only a different relation: that equal members retain the authority exercised in their name, that necessary political labor remains service rather than title, and that when institutions fail, the route of repair runs back toward the governed.

The question is not whether democracy will make mistakes.

The question is who holds the eraser.

References for Chapter Fourteen

- Ashworth, Scott, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2014. "Is Voter Competence Good for Voters? Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance." *American Political Science Review* 108 (3): 565-587.
- Blum, Christian, and Christina Isabel Zuber. 2016. "Liquid Democracy: Potentials, Problems, and Perspectives." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 24 (2): 162-182.
- Boudreau, Cheryl, and Arthur Lupia. 2011. "Political Knowledge." In *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, edited by James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia, 171-183. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Converse, Philip E. 2000. "Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 331-353.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Estlund, David M. 2008. *Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Federalist No. 10. 1787. James Madison. In *The Federalist Papers*.
- Fishkin, James S. 2009. *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Graber, Doris A. 2003. "The Media and Democracy: Beyond Myths and Stereotypes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6: 139-160.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Jerit, Jennifer, and Yangzi Zhao. 2020. "Political Misinformation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23: 77-94.
- Kuklinski, James H., Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F. Rich. 2000. "Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship." *Journal of Politics* 62 (3): 790-816.
- Landemore, Hélène. 2013. *Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.
- Lupia, Arthur. 2016. *Uninformed: Why People Know So Little About Politics and What We Can Do About It*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515-528.
- Michels, Robert. 1911 [1962]. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Free Press.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1861 [1991]. *Considerations on Representative Government*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pateman, Carole. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Somin, Ilya. 2016. *Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter*. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Sunstein, Cass R. 2009. *Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- The Democracy, Straight-Up! Project. 2026. *The Straight-Up System: A General Institutional Architecture for Organized Self-Rule at Scale*. Research and design paper, Version 1.0.
- Valsangiacomo, Chiara. 2021. “Political Representation in Liquid Democracy.” *Frontiers in Political Science* 3: 591853.
- Valsangiacomo, Chiara. 2022. “Clarifying and Defining the Concept of Liquid Democracy.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 28 (1): 61-80.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. *Law and Disagreement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.