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Introduction

The literature on 'soft power' is still young. Yet after 8 years of liberal imperialism characterised by a President who arguably, "weakened US material power and brought America's global image to new lows"[1] the concept has become more significant than ever. If we are to believe the rhetoric of our current politicians, governments in China, Europe and America are now emphasizing the importance of soft power. Still however, the concept remains underspecified and there is much debate over how effective it really is.

The phrase 'Soft Power,' was coined by Joseph Nye in his book, "Bound to lead, the changing nature of American Power"[2]. He emphasized how the ability of America to influence world politics could not be completely captured just by simple measures such as the size of its population, economy or military. What was missing from these measures was 'soft power'- the attractiveness of American values. These values made America popular around the world and helped it recruit allies. It also meant that America experienced less opposition than more threatening states like the Soviet Union. Since it faced less opposition, America had more power because it could more easily obtain the outcomes that it desired.

America's attractiveness not only reduced the opposition it faced, but it also helped promote western values abroad; a paramount objective during the ideological era of the Cold War. Even today, the spread of democratisation may be an objective of all western democracies, if 'Democratic Peace Theory' is taken seriously.[3] However, nations cannot be 'forced to be

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[1] Stephen Walt, Was Bush a (Successful) Realist? Foreign Policy, 8th January 2009

[2] Joseph S Nye Jr 'Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power', (Basic Books, 1991),

[3] For example, Soft Power has been argued to help spread democracy, liberalism and free market norms, all of which have been postulated as explanations for the Democratic Peace, most famously of course by Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, trans. and ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1982 [1795]) but also prominently by Michael W. Doyle, (1983). "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs". Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(3)(1983), pp.205-235, David Kinsella "No Rest for the Democratic Peace" American Political

free'. The conventional tools of interstate relations -militaries and economic sanctions- are very difficult and expensive to use for promoting liberalisation. Power resources have to be tailored to their objectives and the resources that win wars cannot easily be transferred to promote democracy. The poor transferability (or 'fungibility') of power resources between different types of contexts is well established[4] and so many authors now argue for states to increasingly rely on soft power to spread values like liberalisation and democratisation.[5]

Unfortunately, spreading liberalisation has not been simple. The spread of democratic practices has been faltering, uneven and often apparently inexplicable. Furthermore, its spread has varied by geography and regime type, with dictatorships tending to see democracy coming in a 'big bang', whilst the appearance of democratic practices in monarchies has been more consistent but also much more piecemeal, where it does appear. In monarchies, on which I focus, *major* movement towards liberalisation has rarely come from overwhelming popular pressure. Rather, monarchs have imposed liberalism from above, seemingly against their own interests. Popular mobilisation by contrast, has (under the right circumstances) tended to invoke small conciliatory reforms. Moreover, the spread of democratic practices has been highly contingent and some monarchies have experienced remarkable progress whereas others have seen no reform. The distribution of these reforms seems to follow no

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Science Review 99(3) 453-457, Michael Mousseau "The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace," International Security, 33,(4) (Spring 2009), pp.52-86 and many others.

[4] Cf Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press 1950) David A. Baldwin "Power Analysis and World Politics" World Politics, 31 (2) Jan 1979 pp161-194, Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph Princeton 1956)

[5] Eg, Joseph S Nye Jr Bound to Lead, The Changing Nature of American Power, (Basic Books, 1991), and Fareed Zakaria The Post American World (W.W. Norton and Company May 2008), Mark Leonard. Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century. (1st ed. New York: Public Affairs), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations Jan Melissen (Ed) (PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2005)

clear pattern, defying categorisation by religion, mineral wealth, GDP, exposure to western culture and opposition strength.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have experienced virtually no lasting political reforms. Yet equally oil dependent countries like Oman and to some extent Bahrain have benefitted from quite far-reaching reforms. Reforms have not been restricted to wealthy monarchic states or those with considerable exposure to western values. Bhutan is a poor country with minimal exposure to the west (television was only legalised in 1999). However, democratic reform in Bhutan has been so considerable that the IMF has described the reform process as a "smooth historic transformation into a parliamentary democracy."[6] In many monarchies, rulers spent decades on their thrones, voicing only nominal (if any) support for liberalisation and then suddenly enacting considerable reforms, without overwhelming pressure to do so.

The soft power literature as it stands has no way of explaining why the reforms have taken place in some states but not in other, similar ones. It also cannot explain the often surprising timings of these reforms. The *whether* and *when* of liberalisation constitute two central empirical questions. Yet the concept of soft power should not be abandoned given its general significance and intuitively compelling logic. However, the problem is that so far, there has been no clear and general explanation of its specific causal mechanisms.

This study seeks to elucidate those specific causal mechanisms that enable soft power to spread liberalisation in monarchies. I argue that theorists have failed to make firm predictions not because, as is claimed, such predictions cannot be made, but because they have ignored

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[6] IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with Bhutan, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 09/141, December 30, 2009

the fact that foreign influences on the constitution of a body politic must necessarily interact with domestic political forces. So far International Relations scholars have yet to seriously tackle this issue and to provide a framework in which to understand the interaction between soft power and domestic politics.

So far the impacts of domestic politics and soft power on liberalisation have been treated in entirely separate literatures, both of which suffer from the division. Therefore, this study seeks to bridge this divide by adding to the soft power literature insights from the comparative politics literature, particularly Samuel Huntington's famous 'King's Dilemma'. In this dilemma, even reformist Kings avoid making positive changes since initially minor actions lead to accelerating demands for liberalisation. This ends only when the King is deposed or made irrelevant. This will make Kings highly resistant to promulgating reforms, even if they broadly favour some liberalisation.

In a nutshell, the approach presented here seeks to use soft power to explain variation in the underlying preferences between Kings, and then uses their age and the political context they face to explain changes in the expression of those preferences. Education operates as an instrument of soft power insofar as it creates a willingness to enact reform that can later be exploited. This study finds that a monarch undergoing a western education is a strong predictor of reform in the long run. However, in the short run, the willingness to reform will be mitigated by the Kings Dilemma. Thus, in order to avoid populations' demand for reform spiralling out of control, Kings will postpone their reforms to the end of their reign or enact them only when they will bring about an end to dissent.

This study is divided into five parts. In part 1, the extant literature on soft power is critically reviewed in order to clarify the definition of soft power and to emphasize the importance of

specifying a model of the causal mechanisms through which it operates.

Part 2 then looks directly at the liberalisation literature. I examine three prominent approaches to monarchic liberalisation, including Samuel Huntington's formulation of the King's Dilemma, Rentier State Theory and Michael Herb's rational choice model. I then discuss the problems that these approaches face in accounting for the observed pattern of reforms in the monarchic world.

In Part 3, a model is developed that seeks to account for the observed pattern of the distribution and timings of reforms. This model adds to some of the key insights of Joseph Nye and Samuel Huntington, in order to provide a new framework to account for the observed pattern of reforms.

In Part 4 the predictions of the model are tested by a cross country comparison in the reigns of active monarchs ruling independent countries for over five years from 1950 to the present day. This is supplemented by a process tracing methodology making use of interview material.

In Part 5 the research designs of the study are evaluated, the model's success is assessed and conclusions are drawn with recommendations for further research.

PART 1: 'Soft Power- The state of the art'

What is soft power?

It is fast becoming a cliché to say that soft power is much misunderstood. Joseph Nye, who coined the phrase, has described it as "the ability to get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs"[7], "attractive power"[8], "the ability to get others to want what you want"[9] and adding that soft power builds on "the second face of power"[10]. These similar but subtly different definitions over what soft power is still require clarification.

The subtle differences in the above definitions have given rise to a large number of misconceptions. Some inaccurately describe soft power as being merely the impact of cultural forces on international politics.[11] However, soft power is about more than just culture, incorporating things such as education, nation branding and multilateralism. Diminishing soft power to purely cultural phenomena ignores many significant ways in which preferences may be formed.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, soft power has been mischaracterised as anything that is not military, e.g., economic sanctions or inducements such as 'Most Favoured Nations clauses'.[12] However sanctions are inherently coercive, which makes them an instrument of

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[7] Josephs S Nye Jr Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics,' (New York Public Affairs 2004) p5

[8] Ibid p6

[9] Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 9.

[10] Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Powers to Lead (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 156.

[11] Niall Ferguson, , "Think Again, Power" Foreign Policy 1st January, 2003.
Josef Joffe, "The Perils of soft power," New York Times Magazine, May 14, 2006,

[12] Interview Material 25/03/10,
Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation is quoted as referring to "the soft power options such as economic sanctions" Quoted in Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Think Again: Soft Power," Foreign Policy 23rd February 2006

'hard power', not soft power.

For these reasons I shall rely upon, "the ability to get others to want what you want" as the clearest definition of soft power. It captures the idea that soft power is about the shaping of preferences through a variety of means, without misleadingly implying that those means can be coercive.

'Soft Power: necessary refinements'

Defining soft power as 'the ability to get others to want what you want' leaves open the question of exactly how soft power is exercised. No formal model or strictly testable hypotheses have been advanced about how soft power operates. The concept therefore remains underspecified and intervening variables which may dampen or enhance soft power are discussed but never fully elaborated.

However, incorporating intervening variables is a prerequisite to comprehensively stating the conditions under which soft power is able to succeed. Making these conditions clear requires an analytically precise model. So far, such a model is missing from the literature, which deals either in abstract ideas or overly specific individual cases, leaving unclear how these two levels are related. Specifying such a model I posit, will require incorporating in a precise way the significance of the context in which soft power operates.

Given that "all power depends on context"[13], the absence in Nye's work of an in depth discussion of these contexts is surprising. The problem in part is that Nye focuses on the wielder of soft power (the agent), rather than the actor under the influence of power (the

[13] Joseph S Nye Jr, Soft Power, 'The Means to Success in World Politics' p.16

subject). This leads him to conclude that the conditions under which soft power is successful are the "existence of willing interpreters and receivers" or "where cultures are somewhat similar rather than broadly dissimilar" and "where power is dispersed."[14] These are quite imprecise specifications. More precision could be achieved if the fact that different aspects of soft power operate best in different contexts was emphasized.

Liberal Education for example, as an instrument of soft power is more effective at spreading value goals, like democracy and free markets, than bringing about specific foreign policy objectives. However, understanding other factors influencing these goals is crucial to being able to predict outcomes. An agent-based approach cannot take sufficient account of other factors, since most of these factors are located within the subject, not the agent. Relaxing Nye's emphasis on voluntarism (i.e., the voluntary exercise of soft power by an agent) and focussing on the context involved in liberalisation enables us to determine exactly what role soft power plays in spreading liberalisation.

Emphasizing the significance of those subject to soft power confers two advantages. Firstly, as mentioned, it allows us to specify the conditions under which soft power succeeds by incorporating the intervening variables affecting liberalisation. However, emphasizing the subjects also elucidates not just how attraction works but also how it is *produced*. The production of attraction is the formation of preferences, whereas the question of outcome success reflects the interaction of the preferences and power of relevant actors. In other words, when Nye claims things like the impact of soft power "depends heavily on acceptance by the receiving audience" and that "Soft power depends on willing receivers"[15] he appears to

[14] Ibid, p.15

[15] Ibid, p.120

miss a crucial point, which is that soft power is itself in part the creation of this 'willingness' in the appropriate 'receiving audience'. When education influences a subject it not only exploits 'willingness' but also creates it. To understand how 'willingness' is produced, a careful examination of subjects is required and these subjects should be put at the forefront of a theory about soft power.

In order to give some importance to subjects, Nye uses global opinion polls like the 'Pew Global Attitudes survey' to reveal the degree of soft power that America wields.[16] However, this one size fits all approach to subjects is limited as there is no guarantee that populations will have their way. Therefore, although such polls are useful, caution is vital before assuming an automatic connection between public opinion and soft power. In many monarchic states, elites wield a power that is vastly more significant than the power held by the public. As a result, it is crucial to contextualise soft power and to situate it within a specific distribution of power and preferences. In countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia the monarchy has tended to be a lot more pro-western than the population, particularly on foreign policy issues. In Europe, elites may be more 'anti-American' than others: "as the London-based *Economist* points out, anti Americanism is partly a class issue: "Poorer and less-educated Britons like America a lot more than their richer compatriots… Upper class anti-Americanism may be surrogate snobbery." [17] These differences mean that productive analyses of soft power's efficacy have to be contextualised.

In monarchies, the political context is one of concentrated power and hence influencing the preferences of key actors can lead to considerable results. One crucial way that the

[16] Ibid, Chapter 2

[17] Ibid, p.38.

preferences of these actors are formed is through education. Many Royal families choose to educate their children in the west. Consequently, several monarchs are exposed to western values from a young age. I shall argue that the west's highly regarded educational establishments have indeed attracted and influenced foreign monarchs. The evidence suggests that this has driven considerable changes towards more liberal and more democratic institutions in states where the monarch was educated abroad.

Nye refers to the significance of education in much of his work. In "Soft power, the means to success in world politics", he asserts that the USSR's liberalization during Perestroika was influenced by educational exchanges with the United States. Many prominent Soviet figures ended up on these exchanges and were then influential in promoting the changes that took place in the late eighties.

> "For example, Aleksandr Yakovlev was strongly influenced by his studies with the political scientist David Truman at Columbia University in 1958. Yakovlev eventually went on to become the head of an important institute, a Politburo member, and a key liberalizing influence on the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. A fellow student, Oleg Kalugin, who became a high official in the KGB, said in looking back from the vantage point of 1997, "Exchanges were a Trojan horse for the Soviet Union. They played a tremendous role in the erosion of the Soviet system… They kept infecting more and more people over the years""[18].

This study treats education as an instrument of soft power insofar as it directly produces attraction within the 'receiving audience' of the monarch. An education in a liberal country and the experience of living in a liberal democracy during formative years can significantly

[18]Ibid p.46

impact political viewpoints. It is clear therefore that a liberal education can have a direct influence on the preferences of significant actors.

The account presented here focuses on this impact of education on monarchs. It seeks to address how the influence of this education interacts with other considerations that these monarchs must take into account. Kings, like almost all people, tend to have certain innate, deeply entrenched preferences; a desire for power and wealth for example. Clearly, a King's wish to bring democracy back to his own country will interfere with his desire for absolute power. How will these conflicting logics interact? It is impossible to understand why and when liberally educated monarchs enact reform, without answering the question of how their desire for absolute power might interfere with their preferences for reform.

PART 2: 'Monarchic Liberalisation – the state of the art'

The literature on monarchic liberalisation seeks to account for the pattern of reform and political stagnation across monarchies. Samuel Huntington's work on '*The Politics of Changing Societies'* sets the stage for debate on the drivers of monarchic liberalisation and has been followed by two key theoretical approaches, Rentier-state theory, and the 'All in the Family' thesis of Michael Herb.

Huntington's 'King's Dilemma', poses a problem that all Kings face. In beginning the process of reform, they risk opening a Pandora's Box that will lead ultimately to their overthrow. By Huntington's logic, as populations become richer, more educated and freer, they demand more and more political freedoms. Hence King's will try and avoid any form of liberalisation whenever possible. However, their inability to compromise means eventually monarchs will face revolution anyway.

Empirically, however, this work has been shown to be deeply flawed by the continued preservation of Kuwait's, Bahrain's and Qatar's monarchies, despite educated and even wealthy populations. Furthermore, it is not the case that reform has been driven solely by pressure from restless populations. Two questions therefore arise; firstly, why would some Kings go about instituting dangerous reforms and secondly, why is it that some monarchies who do institute such reforms are able to survive indefinitely?

With regards to these questions, debate has largely been between rentier state theory and Michael Herb's thesis, advanced in "All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies."[19] Rentier state theory claims that monarchs

[19] Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (State University of New York Press, 1999)

in control of vast resource wealth may use this to prop up their regime. Michael Herb's thesis claims that Monarchic families have sustained themselves by occupying key governmental posts, thereby preventing real power from devolving. When monarchies are unable to do this, they become destabilised.

Rentier state theory, espoused for example by Lisa Anderson[20] faces several difficulties. Firstly, the monarchies of Bhutan, Jordan, Morocco and Swaziland have persisted without tremendous mineral resources. Secondly, monarchies in Iran, Iraq, Syria and to a certain extent Egypt have collapsed despite possessing considerable oil wealth. What's more, rentier state theory cannot account for the pattern of liberalising reforms, since these have taken place in many allegedly 'rentier' states, such as Bahrain and Kuwait.

Michael Herb's conclusions also find mixed empirical support. He argues that most reforms are merely designed to placate social unrest and thereby preserve the place and power of the ruling family. This conclusion is tempting, but false. Although Herb's analysis focuses on Arab monarchies, there is no obvious reason why this logic should not apply outside of the Middle East. Yet reforms led by the King of Bhutan in 2005, 2006 and 2007 show that occasionally Kings can be willing to step down from power to promote values like democracy. The reforms instituted by King Hussein Bin Talal, King Hassan II and Sultan Qaboos Bin Said towards the end of their reigns go beyond calculations of the best way to preserve power. Even the conservative Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei has unexpectedly favoured partial democratisation as he has aged. It is impossible for Herb's account to explain

[20] Cf. Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," Comparative Politics, 20 (October 1987), 1-18; Jill Crystal, "Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework," in Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 65-84; Dirk Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) Fareed Zakaria, 1997. 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracies,' Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 6, November–December, pp. 22–43.

why.

Both Herb and Rentier state theory accept that often monarch's will use fairly minimalist reforms to placate public mobilizations, but this is not the only option they have; the other is to ignore or crackdown upon such mobilizations. Both approaches leave largely unexplained how King's choose between these two competing options. This is an important anomaly because King's often facing similar domestic political contexts respond very differently to public mobilisation. Unless it is to be believed that King's implement liberalisation only when repression would inevitably fail (a highly implausible assumption, as demonstrated later), this crucial question is essentially left unanswered.

On a more general level, since most of the world's remaining monarchies are Middle Eastern states, both rentier state theory and the 'all in the family' thesis focus on this region. This fails to take account of evidence from Swaziland and Bhutan, both of which provide important extra sources of information. 'Region' itself can only be a proximate variable that impressionistically takes into account some other factor, since 'region' cannot be a structural explanatory variable. "Region only begs the question about the factors actually at work… region is merely a summary of factors that have taken on geographical form"[21] .

[21] Valerie Bunce, 'Rethinking Recent Democratization, Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience' World Politics 55(2) January 2003 pp 191-192

Soft power and Political Liberalisation

The soft power literature, if it wants firm predictive power, must be willing to consider the domestic political factors that influence liberalisation. Meanwhile, the comparative politics literature cannot account for variation in the preferences of the monarch. In order to account for the decisions of the King however, it is crucial to be able to explain the changing preferences of monarchs.

Much of the gradual, piecemeal liberalisation in modern monarchies has taken place from above, not below. Individual Kings and ruling families have at times gone beyond the calls for democratisation within their countries. Without understanding the preferences of the King, seeking to explain such reforms is likely to be a hopeless endeavour.

Often Kings have advanced the cause of democracy without overwhelming domestic or international pressure. At times their liberalism even comes as a surprise to local populations. The most powerful and obvious example is that of Bhutan at the end of King Jigme Singye Wangchuk's reign in 2006. Although internal pressure for democratization existed, it was not a crucial consideration, since the government was performing well and the King held near universal reverence throughout the small nation.[22] Bhutan neither had a burgeoning middle class nor a developed economy, which have been widely touted as champions of democratisation[23]. Its culture has no particular proclivity toward democratisation. Public mobilisation seems to have played little part in driving the reform. The ruler's hand was not forced into promulgating reform or backing down. Indeed Bhutan possesses nearly none of

[22] A.C. Sinha 'Himalayan kingdom Bhutan : tradition, transition, and transformation' (New Delhi : Indus Publishing. Company, 2001) p.14

[23] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven Con, Yale University Press 1968)

the conditions under which democratization is likely to occur, as described by the conventional Democratisation literature.

Yet Bhutan is not just a single case. The same processes, though less extreme, can be observed to have happened elsewhere; Jordan's tentative liberalisation towards the end of the reign of King Hussein far exceeded the political reform necessary to secure IMF debt relief. King Hassan II of Morocco's apparently inexplicable rush to create democratic institutions at the end of his reign also fits this strange pattern (the specifics of these and many other examples are dealt with at much greater length later on). Similar changes of heart can be found in many places. The preferences of the monarchs are therefore central in determining the outcomes of liberalisation.

The crucial significance of the preferences of elites in enabling liberalisation is a matter of "widespread agreement".[24] Yet such preferences are often treated on an ad hoc basis, examining the preferences of each leader on a case by case basis. This approach is problematic on two accounts. Firstly, treating the monarch's preferences as exogenous has the effect of making prediction contingent on ad hoc and contentious observations. How should a scholar go about measuring the preferences of a King or autocrat without simultaneously measuring what he does? Simply observing what they say is clearly insufficient, since most rulers *claim* to be in favour of some form of democratisation. Often even the most vehemently autocratic regimes will describe themselves as democratic; such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This gives scholars a golden 'get out of jail free' card, since they can simply claim that in problematic cases, where rulers claim to be pro-democratic but do not enact reform, the monarch's preferences were different to what

[24] Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization Big and Bounded Generalizations," Comparative Political Studies 2000; Volume 33 (6-7); p707

they claimed. To solve this problem this study seeks to endogenise this variable and make it objectively measurable by treating it as a function of the monarch's education. In doing so, I seek to augment the soft power literature with crucial insights from the Democratisation literature from comparative politics. By endogenising the monarchs preferences I hope to be able to shed some light on two key issues, firstly, the conditions under which monarchs genuinely pursue a reform agenda and secondly, the conditions under which monarchs choose to either crack down or appease public mass mobilisation.

Empirical Puzzles

The central questions that this study seeks to answer are these: why has political liberalisation occurred in some monarchies and not in others, and what explains the timings of these reforms? A close look at the world's monarchies and the various liberalisation processes they are experiencing reveals a striking empirical puzzle. The most significant movement towards liberalisation has often taken place towards the end of a monarch's reign. In Bhutan, the 34 year reign of King Jigme Singye Wangchuk ended with remarkable democratisation that endowed the legislature with the ability to impeach the King. In Morocco, the otherwise conservative reign of King Hassan II experienced a strong turn towards liberalisation towards its end ,culminating in 1998 with the opposition party forming a government. King Hussein II of Jordan, who ruled from 1952 began a process of lasting reform in 1989, which lead to free and fair elections, the formal legalization of political parties in 1992 and was cemented by another round of elections in 1993. The lasting impacts on Jordan of these reforms remain to this day. Sultan Qaboos Bin Said of the oil rich sultanate of Oman, who seized power in 1970, introduced in 2003 parliamentary elections. Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei lead a conservative monarchy from 1967 but in 2004 announced that a partially elected Parliament would finally be established. Yet at the same time, no comparable reforms have taken place in Saudi Arabia or in the United Arab Emirates. Why is it that some monarchies have reformed substantially while others have not? Why is it that many monarchs seem to implement their reforms just before the end of their rule? And why is it that monarchs facing very similar public protests react in very different ways? This study presents a model to address these puzzles.

PART 3: 'Analytical Narrative'

The model presented here has as its point of departure Samuel Huntington's King's Dilemma. Huntington's view is that Kings that begin processes of reform ultimately perish under the demands for further democratisation that result from the empowerment of a strong and irrepressible middle class. Even small reforms lead to further demands for liberalisation. This process could, in principle, end up toppling the government. For these reasons, few Kings will pursue a liberal agenda.

However, Kings' preferences are not fixed. Should the aspiring monarch be educated abroad, the King will likely acquire a taste for liberal democracy and in particular, political participation. He will retain these preferences when he returns to his home country but of course his innate desire for power will not have ceased to exist. Therefore, in general, Kings will seek to hold on to power. However, the desire to implement liberalism means that when the costs of reform are minimal, or when the benefits are maximised, reform will prevail. The first proposition advanced here is therefore:

1. Kings who have been educated abroad will be much more likely to implement liberal reforms than those educated domestically.

If reforms may grow out of control and pose greater and greater threats to the monarch's rule, then it follows that the costs of reforms are minimized when the Monarch has the least concern for preserving the absolute rule of the monarchy. The previous literature has treated this as a contradiction. However the apparent contradiction may dissolve when the monarch is old. An ageing monarch is far less likely to be concerned about the costs to his power several years down the line, since he is anticipating his own death. At the same time, he is more likely to have his eye on the legacy he will leave. Intending to bring liberalism to his country, perhaps amplified by the desire to be remembered fondly by history, by his own

population and by the world press, the monarch will feel an ever increasing weight behind the logic of reform. As the prospect of spill-over effects from liberalisation impacting the monarch's own reign diminishes, the logic of power retention loses its strength. Thus the second proposition of this approach is:

2. In order to minimize the costs of reform, Kings will seek to postpone reforms until the very end of their reign. This minimizes the constraints that they face as rulers.

There is also one more scenario in which the conventional logic of the King's dilemma may be overturned. Assuming that the King prefers liberal monarchic politics, then the cost-benefit calculation that the King faces is likely to alter dramatically during public mobilisations in favour of democratic reform.

The way in which public mobilisations can influence transitions to democracy can vary. Mobilisations may increase the likelihood of liberalisation, by encouraging autocrats to compromise, or decrease it by encouraging them to crackdown on opposition. If crackdowns fail to end opposition, then renewed protests and mobilisations are likely to be more vehement and dangerous for the governments. This may precipitate an even more authoritarian response. In other words, crackdowns may have a path-dependent, self reinforcing effect.[25]

However, for a liberal King, enacting reforms may divide the opposition and meet one of the long term aims of the King (liberalisation). Moreover, it accomplishes this without necessarily ceding any power that the King was not ultimately willing to give up. Whilst the King's dilemma means that even these reforms have costs, since the King is more willing to give up a certain amount of power and since enacting reforms may divide the opposition and hence reduce the long term threat, such circumstances will generally lead to reform.

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[25] See Jan Henryk Pierskalla "Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1) p117-145 February 2010

Thus, the final proposition of this model is:

3. In order to maximize the benefits of reform, Kings may use liberalisation as a way of defusing serious political threats to their rule.

In brief, this model has as its dependent variable, political liberalisation. The independent variables influencing the outcomes are; 1) the presence of mass public opposition to the monarchy and 2) the King's education, (whether it was foreign/liberal or domestic). The two key actors are the ruling monarch and political opposition, which may consist of social groups and or political parties. The argument forms three stages, which are summarized as propositions above and in graphical form in figure 1 below.

Figure 1

	Liberal Education	**Illiberal Education**
Public Mobilisation	Early Reforms	Repression
No Public Mobilisation	Late Reforms	No reforms

PART 4: Empirics

In order to test the validity of my model, I will examine the three propositions presented at the end of part 3. The first proposition states that we expect to see liberalisation occur far more frequently under foreign educated monarchs and populations when compared with monarchs who received a domestic education. Measuring actual liberalisation is of course a very difficult process since the significance of a law is subject to its implementation. To resolve this problem liberalisation will be measured by delegation of governmental power to an elected body, and or the formation of a national, directly elected parliamentary body.

The King's Dilemma ensures that such steps, although only first steps by themselves are considerable risks for a King. The reason this particular course of action represents a risk is that a national elected 'parliament' has the capacity to replace the monarchy as the principal locus of power in the Kingdom. By contrast, municipal bodies may represent a step in the right direction but they do not directly challenge the King because municipal bodies cannot pass national legislation and hence do not represent a credible alternative to monarchic power. Therefore, the study focuses on the creation and empowerment of nationally directly elected bodies that legislate or advise on issues of national law, since these have the potential to become fully fledged parliaments that, in principle might sideline the King.

The second proposition states that we expect to see foreign educated monarchs institute liberalising reforms more frequently during the final part of their reign, in the absence of major political opposition. For former Kings, this is considered to mean culminating in the last 5 years of their reign, for present Kings it is considered to mean occurring after the King's 60th birthday.

Finally the third proposition states that foreign educated monarchs are more likely to appease public calls for reforms than domestically educated monarchs. This is measured by observing

monarchs' response to direct public calls for political reform (of the sort covered by proposition one) in each of the countries under study.

This model's ability to account for the pattern of reforms will be tested against Herb's rational choice model and rentier state theory. In a general sense, both the 'all in the family' thesis and rentier state theory treat the King's preferences as given and therefore would not expect to see any relationship between the education of the king and the extent of liberalisation. Michael Herb's work precludes the possibility of any change to the monarch's preferences, since in his model "we have assumed that the *monarch's* preference ordering is absolutism > liberal monarchy > revolution."[26] Similarly, in rentier state theory, which essentially predicts that there will be "No Representation Without Taxation";[27] there ought to be no reason that this sort of variable, i.e., one that influences the preferences of the King or monarch, would correlate with political liberalization.

In terms of the monarch's responses to protests, both rentier state theory and the 'All in the Family' thesis would predict that countries will either ignore or repress public demands for reforms whenever such a strategy is likely to succeed. However, the soft power model advanced here says that the outcome hinges on the preferences of the King, as measured by his education. The evidence shows that often the King's concessions to protests far exceeds the necessary actions, especially given the possibility of repressing those protests.

In this section I will test the three hypotheses of the model described above against the available data on surviving monarchies with active monarchs from 1950 to the present day.[28]

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[26] Michael Herb "All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies" p.260

[27] See for example Philip Bobbitt 'No Representation Without Taxation' Foreign policy May 2007

[28] Monaco and Lichtenstein represent contentious cases since both have theoretically powerful monarchies. I exclude them however since they operate more like parliamentary democracies than monarchies. Freedom House 2009 scores them both as electoral democracies, with Lichtenstein getting the highest possible score (1,1) and Monaco getting the next highest possible score (2,1). The next closest contender included in this study is

I exclude periods in which countries are not independent nations since monarchs that were custodians of territory of the British Empire were not absolute monarchs at all.[29]

Throughout the list of monarchies all three of these predictions are strongly held out by the data. This concurs with the view of prominent diplomats that soft power is essential in promoting reform, particularly in the Middle East[30]. The only exception to the model presented here is Kuwait, which aside from having a rather unique history was also influenced by the invasion by Iraq and subsequent liberation by western powers in 1991. These events explain the failure of the theory to predict the reforms in Kuwait. Excluding Kuwait, reform that establishes, reconvenes or empowers parliaments comes exclusively from Kings who have received a liberal education. Such Kings also tend to appease rather than crack down upon public mobilisations as well as preferring, where possible, to reform in the late stages of their lives as Kings.

Bhutan, which in the same study is scored at (5,4) which demonstrates a considerable, non arbitrary distinction.

[29] There is little evidence of correlation between a country's status as a former colony and its propensity to educate its monarchs abroad.

[30] Interview

1. ***Reform occurs mainly under Monarchs educated in liberal democracies***

	REFORM	NO REFORM	TOTAL
LIBERAL EDUCATION	**6**	**0**	**6**
NO LIBERAL EDUCATION	**1**	**10**	**11**
TOTAL	**7**	**10**	**17**

Table 1

Table 1 provides an overview of the empirical findings on the impact of a liberal education on the likelihood of a monarch enacting reform. Amongst all the countries in the study (Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland and the UAE), those that experienced significant moves towards liberalisation were Bhutan under Jigme Dorji Wangchuk and Jigme Singye Wangchuk, Jordan under Hussein bin Talal, Kuwait following the First Gulf War, Morocco under Hassan II, Bahrain under Hamad Bin Isa Khalifa and Oman under Qaboos Bin Said. Reform has been promised but not yet enacted in

the Kingdom Brunei under Hassanal Bolkiah and the nation of Qatar, under Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani (these cases are unresolved and so are not included in the above table). Saudi Arabia and The United Arab Emirates are the only countries yet to experience any major reforms. All of the reformist monarchs listed above were educated abroad. Equally, Saudi Arabia and The United Arab Emirates are yet to have a foreign educated leader.

Bahrain

KINGS	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM?
Isa Ibn Salman Al Khalifa	**No**	**No**
Hamad Ibn Isa Al Khalifa	**Yes**	**Yes**

Bahrain has had two monarchs since its independence, Ibn Isa Al Khalifa and Hamad Ibn Isa Al Khalifa. The former died leaving no elected institutions in place, the latter, has established an elected legislative body. Bahrain's independence from the British Empire came in 1971 after talks with The United Arab Emirates failed to end in a union. At the time, the Emir was Isa Ibn Salman Al Khalifa who ruled Bahrain until 1999.

Initially, the new state had an elected parliament and the first elections of Bahrain took place in 1973. However, the King dissolved it when the parliament refused to pass the State Security Law of 1974 which allowed for arbitrary arrests of up to three years. Moreover, the parliament was not reconvened again under his reign. "From the royal family's perspective, constitutional government implied no conception of popular sovereignty or democratic rule." [31] The reign was characterised by repression and Amnesty International reported widespread human rights abuses.[32] The latter part of the Emir's reign then witnessed widespread violent opposition to the King's autocratic policies.

The Emir died in 1999 and was succeeded by Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain. The State

[31]Fred. H. Lawson, Bahrain: The modernization of Autocracy p.87 (Colorado: Westview Press 1989)

[32]Amnesty International Annual Human Rights Report, Bahrain, 1992.

Security act was repealed and the new King quickly enacted institutional reforms in response to the protests. The reforms came into force in 2001, establishing parliamentary and municipal elections, with all adult Bahrainis eligible to vote.[33]

However, the reforms implemented only allow the election of one house and the opposition was guaranteed to be in the minority. The 'Bahraini model' of political reform has been described as an example of "institutional reform without power sharing".[34] But viewed in the context of incrementalism and gradual decompression, the policy of Hamad Ibn Isa Khalifa clearly represents a marked break from the repressive policies of his father.

The 'all in the family' hypothesis would predict that the strength of the opposition would have been increasing leading up to reform but in fact the opposition was losing momentum. Bahrain's reforms came *after* the most severe political turmoil. Arson attacks, which became a staple of the protests in 1996 and 1997 disappeared by the time Hamad ibn Isa came to the throne and The Economist Intelligence Unit, which warned of serious and escalating conflict in 1997 was referring to "low level unrest"[35] by 1998, before the new emir ascended to the throne. At the time, Bahrain drew considerable (although qualified) praise for the reforms it implemented, being described by the Economist as "the star reformer"[36] and being re-categorised as 'partly free' (a rare accolade for a Gulf State) by Freedom House in 2002.[37]

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[33] Dr Omar Al-Hassan, Human Rights, Human Development and Political Reform in Bahrain, p.107 (London: Gulf Centre For Strategic Studies, 2003)

[34] Marina Ottaway and Michele Dunne "Incumbent Regimes and the "King's Dilemma" In the Arab World Promise and Threat of Managed Reform" Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program Number 88 December 2007, p.6

[35] The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report Bahrain 1997

[36] The Economist, No Taxation, No Representation. Mar 21st 2002

[37] Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Bahrain, 2002 .

The rentier state theory would anticipate these reforms arising out of the regimes loss of legitimacy or power through its inability to control the mineral resources to finance the apparatus of the state. However Bahrain's oil reserves remained abundant enough to maintain Bahrain's status as a rentier state and there was no income tax in Bahrain at the time.[38]

On the other hand, Hamad ibn Isa Khalifa was educated at The Leys School in Cambridge in the UK, as well as at Sandhurst (also in the UK) and Fort Leavensworth in the USA. His father was educated at the royal court.[39] There remain serious limitations to these reforms and the country still stands a long way short of democracy. Yet it is indisputable that real reforms have occurred. The soft power model accounts for these reforms far better than either rentier state theory or the 'all in the family thesis.'

[38] The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report Bahrain 2000

[39] Hamad Bin Isa Khalifa official biography

Bhutan

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM?
Dorji Wangchuk	**Yes**	**Yes**
Jigme Wangchuk	**Yes**	**Yes**

Table 2

Bhutan has had four rulers since 1950, Jigme Wangchuk (who died in 1952) Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, Jigme Singye Wangchuk and the current King, who ascended to the throne very recently (2008). Both Dorji Wangchuk and Singye Wangchuk implemented liberal reforms during their lifetimes.

King Jigme Dorji Wangchuk assumed the throne of Bhutan in 1952. Early on he established a local representative body which was intended to act on behalf of the people, although this was unelected. Although Dorji Wangchuk was liberal minded, having abolished slavery and instituted an (unelected) National Assembly, for the most part, the King maintained control of political life.[40] However, in 1968 the King decreed that the National Assembly would be democratically elected. He voluntarily surrendered his veto over it and in 1969 he recommended that the King could be forced to abdicate by a two thirds vote of the National Assembly. With some modifications, the rule was passed.

After Dorji Wangchuk's death in 1972, the National Assembly voted to undo the previous legislation. This was in keeping with national reverence for the monarchy and there is no evidence to suggest that it was brought about by duress or threats. King Jigme Singye

[40] Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Bhutan, (Online) (2009).

Wangchuk however was also much ahead of his people in terms of his taste for reform. The King's announcements in 2005 of Bhutan's imminent democratisation came as a surprise to the population. Whilst there had been some calls for reform, few expected the reforms that did come to be so far reaching. The Economist reported that King Jime Singye Wangchuk had "shocked his people in late 2006" and that "most Bhutanese would have preferred to preserve royal rule, but loyally obeyed the king's order to rule themselves."[41] The reforms themselves were considerable in scope- giving the people and the parliament the power to forcibly retire him.

It is clear that the relative bargaining position of the Monarch and the Opposition was not such as to endanger the position of the King. It is more likely that the reverse was the case since the monarchy was held in such reverence that any move against it would have lacked popular support. The change cannot be put down to a burgeoning middle class; "The former kingdom's 635,000 citizens are mostly poor subsistence farmers."[42]

Bhutan is not in any sense a rentier state, possessing no great mineral resources. Its economic development of recent years has been driven in large part by the construction of a single hydroelectric electricity plant. Rentier state theory would therefore predict that the King would be under immense pressure or that the monarchy would be overthrown but there is very little evidence of any such pressure.

However, both Kings Jigme Dorji Wangchuk and Jigme Singye Wangchuk were educated abroad, or specifically, in Britain and India. Dorji had been educated in India in Kalimpong and in Britain by a friend of his father's; George Sheriff, a British botanist. Jigme Singye was

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[41] The Economist, Crowning Glory, Nov 13th 2008,

[42] Ibid,

also educated privately in Britain.[43] Thus the soft power model is the only model that can successfully account for both the occurrence and timings of reforms that have occurred in Bhutan.

[43] Pico Iyer, Time Magazine, '100 People Who Shape Our Time, Jigme Singye Wangchuk', Sunday, April 30th 2006

Brunei

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM?
Hassanal Bolkiah	**Yes**	**Promised**

Table 3

Hassanal Bolkiah has ruled as Sultan since Brunei's independence. His rule has been characterised by the conservative doctrine of Malay Islamic Monarchy[44]. The state gained full independence in 1984 but until very recently has seen little movement towards political participation.

Technically, Brunei has remained under martial law since a revolt against the British in 1962. Although the legislative council was reconvened in 2004 after its dissolution in 1984, it remains appointed. This council passed a constitutional amendment with the Sultan's approval which expanded its own size to 45 seats and included 15 elected positions. However, in September 2005 the Sultan convened a new 29-member Legislative Council, including five indirectly elected members.[45] Plans for the 45-person legislature with 15 directly elected seats remain but elections have yet to be scheduled. Bolkiah's project of reform when viewed in the context of the King's Dilemma was an opening for liberalisation but was not presaged by any major internal conflict of any sort. Without genuine elections however it should be treated cautiously.

Michael Herb's approach would expect any reforms to be brought about by opposition strength. However, opposition to the monarchy is virtually non-existent. The only significant

[44] Graham Saunders, A History of Brunei (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p.187

[45] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, Brunei

opposition was in 1962, prior to independence. Even then, the intentions of the revolutionaries vis a vis the palace is unclear; at the time, leaders of the revolt claimed (perhaps dubiously) to be acting on behalf of the monarchy.[46] Therefore, the lack of directly elected institutions in Brunei does fit within the Herb thesis. However, the Sultan's announcements of impending reforms, if enacted, would directly contradict the 'all in the family' thesis.

The Oil and Gas sector of Brunei (owned by the Sultan), in 2007 was responsible for 12,321.8 million Brunei Dollars, or 66.6% of GDP.[47] So the monarchy's ability to maintain power could be accounted for in the context of rentier state theory. Again however, if the King's recent emendation to the constitution is implemented, it will undo the rentier state model since the Sultan remains vastly wealthy.

The soft power model predicts that these reforms will be implemented, since Hassanal-Bolkiah was educated at the Victorian Institute in Malaysia as well the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst (he also received private tuition in England before he went).[48] Final judgement on which explanation best suits Brunei will depend on whether elections for the Majlis Mesyuarat Negara are held before the Sultan's death.

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[46] Lord Chalfont By God's Will, a portrait of the Sultan of Brunei, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, c1989) p.75

[47] IMF Country Report, Brunei Darrusalam Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 09/142

[48] Lord Chalfont, Ibid, p.15

Jordan

KINGS	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM?
Hussein II	**Yes**	**Yes**
Abdullah II (present day)	**Yes**	**Not Yet**

Table 4

Jordan has had four different monarchs since its independence. The British mandate over Jordan (then Transjordan) ended in 1946. However, the then King Abdullah I, was killed by an assassin in 1951. The second King, Talal was forced to abdicate due to health reasons in August 1952. King Hussein II of Jordan then came to power. Jordan was ruled by King Hussein from 1952 to 1999 after which the present King, Abdullah II, assumed the throne.

King Hussein's rule oscillated between authoritarianism and gradual liberalisation. Elections were held in 1956, but abolished along with political parties in 1957.[49] However, Hussein did eventually implement lasting reforms. The process of reform began with the reconvention of a National Parliament in 1989. This came with the freest elections in the region, with the "fairness of the parliamentary elections acknowledged by winners and losers alike"[50]. Although early reforms were reversed, the 1989 reconvention of parliament was followed by the adoption of the National Charter in 1991 and, on July 5th 1992, the Parliament, with the King's approval, legalized political parties. This was cemented by another round of elections in November 1993.

[49] Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan, p111 & p 141 (London: Penguin Books, 2008)

[50]Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan, p270 (London I.B. Tauris 1998)

After Hussein died in February 1999, Abdullah II ascended to the throne. Abdullah has sought to refocus Jordan's development on the economy which he has stated "time and again."[51] He announced a political reform plan in 2006, calling for equal rights for women and increased freedom of association. Though there was progress in 2007 on legislation governing political parties, "essential electoral reforms continued to stall."[52] Due to a number of arrests and the government's response to popular desire to annul the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, Freedom House decreased the overall Freedom rating of Jordan to Not Free, in 2010.[53]

Despite this, Freedom House deems that Jordan remains one of the freest countries in the Middle East. The reforms of King Hussein remain seminal and substantive in this regard. The Parliament remains entrenched and in "recent elections the government has not directly manipulated the results of balloting."[54] Moreover, the current King has been described as "a committed modernist and reformist, a liberal with a wide vision of how Jordanian society needs to be transformed."[55]

Contrary to the 'all in the family' hypothesis, Jordan's 'liberalisation' cannot be wholly explained by the relative bargaining positions of the King and opposition. Although these reforms were partially driven by public mobilisation, this cannot possibly tell the whole story. Public demonstrations were primarily driven by frustration with corruption and fuel price increases associated with structural adjustment, rather than monarchic authoritarianism. Although the 1994 peace treaty with Israel intensified frustration, opposition to monarchic

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[51] Philip Robins A History of Jordan, p203 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004)

[52] Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2009, Jordan

[53] Arch Puddington, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010, Overview Essay, p2

[54] Michael Herb, Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World, The Middle East Journal 2004 58,3, p379

[55] Telephone Interview 23/03/10

power per se has been subdued. The fact that the political arrangements set up in the years following 1989 survive to this day is testament to their sincerity.

Nor can Rentier state theory explain the reforms. Jordan is not a rentier state and it has relied on subsidies from the British, Americans and its varying Arab allies. In the 3 years preceding the Second Gulf War, Jordanian grants varied from between 4.9% to 5.4% of GDP, including subsidised petroleum imports from Iraq.[56] Rentier state theory cannot be used to explain these reforms since it predicts that the monarchy would be completely unseated.

King Hussein was, however, educated at Harrow School in the UK, as well as later on at Sandhurst.[57] King Abdullah attended St. Edmund's School in Surrey, England and for his secondary education, he attended Eaglebrook School and Deerfield Academy in the United States of America. Later on he also entered the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.[58] He has sat on the throne for only 11 years and since he is 48 years old the soft power model presented here correctly predicts that he will not have promulgated any major reforms in his lifetime as yet. Therefore the model employed here correctly predicts the observed pattern of reform during the reign of both King Hussein and King Abdullah.

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[56] IMF Country Report Jordan Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, p206

[57] Hussein (King of Jordan), Uneasy Lies the Head: an autobiography of his Majesty King Hussein of Jordan pp.21-33 (London Heineman 1962)

[58] Official Biography of King Abdullah of Jordan, (Online)

Kuwait

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION	REFORM
Sabah III Al Salim Al Sabah	No	No
Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah	No	Yes
Sabah IV Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah	No	No

Table 5

Kuwait has had four emirs since independence in 1961. The first, Abdullah III Al Salim Al Sabah showed liberal inclinations but lived for only four years after Kuwait attained independence. The signs of democracy following independence negotiations were then somewhat extinguished. The 1967elections were rigged by the monarchy[59] and in 1976 and 1986 the Parliament was dissolved. Uzi Rabi commented that "whenever the National Assembly has mounted a coherent opposition to the government, it has been suspended."[60]

However, since 1992 Kuwait's has had the most powerful parliament in the Middle East. As Michael Herb has said "nor can this [the Kuwaiti] parliament be dismissed as mere window dressing"[61] It has the power to override the Sheikh with a 2/3 vote and has a track record of

[59] Ghannim Alnajjar, The Challenges Facing Kuwaiti Democracy, The Middle East Journal; Spring 2000; 54, 2; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 245

[60] Uzi Rabi "The Kuwaiti Royal Family in the Post Liberation Period: Reinstituionalizing the "First Among Equals System" in Kuwait" in Joseph Kostiner (ed) Middle East Monarchies, "The Challenge of Modernity" p.155

[61] Michael Herb, "Democratization in the Arab World? Emirs and Parliaments in the Gulf." Journal of Democracy 13(4), October 2002 p41

passing laws the government disapproves of. In an illiberal demonstration of the parliament's power, it rejected the King's plan to extend suffrage to women in 1999.

Its power flows from the considerable changes made to the parliament in 1992 following the First Gulf War. A New York Times article included a comment from 'leading opposition legislator' Hamad al Jouan saying "Things have gone far better than we expected… Our work has been unprecedented. The issues we have addressed in the last few months would have exploded in our faces if we'd touched them in the old Parliament."[62]

In 1990, when the Al Sabah family reconvened their legislature after the 1986 suspension, the legislature was 50% appointed, giving the Al-Sabah's firm control. However, during the war, with the Al-Sabah's in exile and dependent on the American's for their ability to return, the family was forced into compromises since "what had started in 1989 as an elite movement to restore the National assembly had in 1992 become a broad-based movement, critical of all aspects of al-Sabah policy"[63].

The success of Kuwait's parliament is well explained by rational choice explanations centred around the strength of the ruling family vis a vis oppositions. As Herb's analysis predicts, the reforms occurred when the strength of the opposition was at its greatest and the strength of the King at its lowest, since the King was in exile.

As predicted by the rentier state theory, the Al Sabah family's oil wealth granted them a great deal of power up until 1990. Although that oil wealth still remained an asset to the Al Sabah's the unique circumstances of invasion and subsequent liberation meant that they were unable

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[62]Quoted in Chris Hedges, 'The world; Kuwaiti Parliament is Acting Like One' New York Times, 14 February 1993 p44

[63] Uzi Rabi, Ibid, p159

to maintain as firm a grip on power as they had hoped. Therefore, rentier state theory cannot explain the reforms that have taken place in Kuwait.

No emir of Kuwait has yet received a foreign education and although Kuwait's history has forced the ruling monarchy into bargains that might seem implausible under the model presented here, Kuwait's circumstances are so unique, since they were invaded and liberated by foreign powers, that the model makes no clear predictions for these circumstances. This is because, in exile, with the country under foreign occupation and the Royal Family somewhat in thrall to their western liberators, the King did not have the choice of attempting to suppress dissent. Instead, in order to return to the country as Emir he was forced into compromise.

Morocco

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM
HASSAN II	YES	YES
ABDULLAH VI	YES	NOT YET

Table 6

Morocco has had three Kings since its independence in 1956, Mohammed V, Hassan II, and the current King, Mohammed VI. Mohammed V died in 1961. His successor, King Hassan II, reigned from 1961 until his death in 1999. Hassan's son Mohammed VI has ruled Morocco from then until the present day.

Hassan was troubled by assassination attempts and other threats to his rule including attempted military coups in 1972. Much of his rule was dominated by the desire to consolidate the position of the monarchy. When this was stable however, Morocco did enjoy considerable reforms. These culminated in 1998, when Hassan's approval was given to alternation in the government, the very first time this had occurred in the Arab world. In the elections of November 1997 that facilitated this, for the first time the entirety of the parliament was directly elected by universal suffrage, which was made possible by a constitutional amendment made in 1996. These reforms gave rise to the widely held belief "that the ruler of Morocco is now … a constitutional monarch."[64]

However, Hassan had abolished the parliament in 1965. National and local elections were eventually held again between 1976-77. Threats of coups and riots lead to a weak human rights record, but this improved in the 1990s with the authority of the monarchy established.

[64] C.R. Pennell, Morocco Since 1830, a History, p.389 (London: Hurst and Company 2000)

In 1999, in a publication entitled "Turning the Page," Amnesty International reported: "In the course of the past few years, a number of legislative and institutional measures have been taken in Morocco which have resulted in significant improvements in the human rights situation."[65]

Hassan's son Mohammed has liberalise Morocco socially rather than politically and he has formed the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to look into human rights abuses. However the Commission is limited to looking into violations occurring before Mohammed's reign. Moreover, no major measures have empowered the legislature or political parties and Freedom House reports that "significant institutional" reform in the immediate future is "doubtful"[66]. Despite these facts the British ambassador claimed that "although the pace of reforms slowed somewhat" following Mohammed V's ascension, the current King is "very sincere about reforming the country"[67]. Despite this, the Ministry of the Interior maintains its tight grip on Morocco, which has been perhaps made less problematic by recent American intransigencies over human rights.[68]

The 'all in the family' thesis cannot account for the reforms enacted by Hassan. Some of Morocco's reform efforts were brought about by popular struggles but to explain the totality of reforms in this context is misleading: Hassan's popularity was rising in the 1990s following his efforts to fight corruption. The monarchy was thus able to acquire the necessary popular support from the rural Moroccans and did not require any further consent than it

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[65] Amnesty International, Morocco/Western Sahara "Turning the Page": Achievements and obstacles, August 3rd 1999

[66] Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Morocco 2009.

[67] Telephone Interview 13/04/10

[68] Interview 21/01/09

already possessed from the urban middle classes.[69] Moreover, high barriers between Morocco and EU membership meant that prospective membership of the EU could not have been a factor in explaining Morocco's reforms.[70]

Rentier state theory also has little traction since the Moroccan government has always required taxation income. The top income tax rate is 42%.[71] The biggest single sector of Morocco's economy is not minerals but the manufacturing sector, which is around 17.4% of Moroccan GDP.[72] Rentier state theory would anticipate that this government would have collapsed entirely, however, the most significant round of institutional reform (in the 1990s), was lead by the King and the alternance government of 1998 was possible only through the King's sanction.

Whilst neither Herb's account nor rentier state theory can explain the extent of Morocco's liberalisation, the model presented here does so well. Hassan received his law degree from the University of Bordeaux, which controlled his syllabus and examined his work. (although much of the study was actually undertaken, geographically at least, in Rabat).[73] This nonetheless ought to be treated as a form of foreign education, since the educational syllabus was French by design and he received much of his instruction from French tutors.[74] Despite the early 'years of lead' his reign ended with positive steps. This model also predicts correctly the fact that institutional reforms have slowed considerably, but not reversed under

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[69] Remy Leveau, "The Moroccan Monarchy: A Political System in Quest of a New Equilibrium" in Kostiner, Ibid, p120-121

[70] Interview

[71] The Heritage Foundation, The 2010 Index of Economic Freedom, Morocco

[72] IMF Country Report No. 04/163 June 2004 Morocco p.4

[73] Landau Rom, Hassan II, King of Morocco, pp37-41 (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD 1962)

[74] Ibid.

the young King Mohammed VI, who received his Doctorate from the French University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

Oman

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM?
SAID BIN TAIMUR	**NO**	**NO**
QABOOS BIN SAID	**YES**	**YES**

Table 7

Oman emerged as an independent state in 1951. Since then, it has been led by Said bin Taimur and Qaboos Bin Said. Bin Taimur ruled from 1932 until 1970, when his son, overthrew him in a palace coup.

Said Bin Taimur oversaw a "domestic tyranny"[75]. He had been unpopular, but powerful. "Until 1970, the Sultanate of Oman was one of the world's most reclusive and backward states."[76] Moreover, "The Sultan kept several thousand slaves and presided over a barbaric justice system with torture endemic."[77] His reign ended with no representative institutions intact.

By contrast, Qaboos has installed an elected national parliamentary body. The appointed shura consultative council was followed by the establishment of the indirectly elected Majlis Al-Shura, inaugurated on 21st December 1991. This was "revolutionary by Arab Gulf Standards."[78]

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[75] Calvin Allen Jr,, W. Lynn Rigsbee II, Oman under Qaboos : from coup to constitution, 1970-1996, p26 (Frank Cass Publishers 2000)

[76] Caroline Sevier, "The Cost of relying on Aging Dictators." Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2008 p17

[77] Mark Curtis, "Britain's Real Foreign Policy and the Failure of British Academia" International Relations 2004, 18(3), p278

[78] Joseph, A. Kechichian, "A Vision of Oman: State of the Sultanate Speeches by Qaboos bin Said, 1970-2006,"

Then came the 'Basic Law of the State'. In a sense, this represented Oman's first Constitution.[79] "Oman was not just experimenting with participatory government", but in fact it was choosing to "stay well ahead of changing circumstances."[80] In 2007, the Majlis was elected by universal suffrage for those over 21. Oman's new institutional framework may yet experience further reform, since Qaboos remains alive.

Despite considerable improvements, limitations remain. The Majlis remains consultative and political parties are still banned. These represent considerable, but not insurmountable barriers. Certain members of the council are pushing openly for legislative powers and have not been suppressed by Sultan Qaboos. This contrasts strongly with the authoritarian rule of his father.

The rule of Qaboos Bin Said cannot be described as a monarch bowing to pressures from an expectant population. The Dhofar rebellion (which began in 1965 under his father and ended in 1975 shortly after his ascension to the throne) was the only serious threat to the Sultan's reign and began before it started.

The pattern of reforms in Oman openly contradicts the 'no representation without taxation' claim of rentier state theory. Oman remains very much a rentier state insofar as it possesses considerable oil reserves despite its small population. In 2008 Oil and Gas exports contributed 47.9% of GDP based on IMF estimates.[81] There are no personal income taxes in

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Middle East Policy, Volume 15(3) Fall 2008, p.129

[79] Ibid.

[80] Joseph. A. Kechichian, Oman and the world, the emergence of an independent Foreign Policy, p54 (RAND, 1995)

[81] IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultation with Oman, Public Information Notice (PIN)

Oman and corporate taxes are low[82].

On the other hand, Sultan Qaboos Bin Said was educated at the Bury St Edmunds School in the UK and later received further education at Sandhurst. Qaboos' father Said Bin Taimur was educated in Oman.[83] Therefore, the Soft Power model performs considerably better than either the rentier state hypothesis or the 'all in the family' thesis at accounting for the reforms occurring in Oman.

No. 10/21 February 17, 2010

[82] The Heritage Foundation, the 2010 Index of Economic Freedom, Oman,

[83]Sergeï Plekhanov, A reformer on the throne, Sultan Qaboos Bin Said Al Said (Trident Press, 2004) p70-78

Qatar

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	REFORM?
Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani	**NO**	**NO**
Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani	**YES**	**PROMISED**

Table 8

Qatar has had three leaders since its independence, on 3rd September 1971. The first, Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, was deposed in 1972. The second, Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani ruled until 1995 when he too was overthrown. Qatar has yet to experience considerable institutional reform.

Khalifa Bin Hamad was the second Emir of Qatar but made no attempt to introduce representative government. In January 1992, 50 eminent Qatari citizens demanded that the Emir establish an elected consultative assembly as well as proposing other reforms.[84] Khalifa Bin Hamad responded with arrests and "various degrees of pressure" to force the petitioners to remove their signatures.[85]

By contrast, reform was implemented by the new Emir Hamad Bin Khalilfa. He began with economic reforms and then began liberalisation. An election was held to the post of Qatar's Chamber of Commerce.[86] In 1998, the King established an elected municipal council which has seen elections as recently as 2007. Qatar also has some of the freest press laws in the

[84] Louay Bahry, 'Elections in Qatar, a Window of Democracy opens in the Gulf' Middle East Policy, 6, June 1999

[85] Yousseff Ibrahim '54 Qatar Citizens Petition Emir for Free Elections' New York Times, May 13, 1992

[86] Andrew Rathmell, Kirsten Schulze Political reform in the Gulf: the case of Qatar, Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 36(4) October 2000, p53.

autocratic world. In 2005 a new constitution was promulgated anticipating the existence of an elected consultative council with the power to review legislation.

The 'All in the Family' thesis would anticipate these reforms as being forced by a powerful opposition but these reforms have not been necessitated by "a renegotiation of the…political bargain" but rather represented "a conscious policy choice."[87] Indeed "reforms have been promulgated from the top and presented to an often surprised population, rather than coming in response to popular discontent."[88] Apart from one incidence in 1992, there has never been any major demand for liberalisation in Qatar since its independence. As yet however, the elected legislative body the constitution foresees has yet to come into being, although, given the extent of the reforms that have been implemented already there is little reason to doubt that these reforms will take place. This thesis therefore is totally unable to explain the reforms that have taken place and appear to be on the horizon. Of course, if these reforms fail to materialise, then there may be some more legitimacy to the 'all in the family' Thesis, however, the reforms that have taken place appear significant and the fact that they have been sustained points to the strong likelihood that they will ultimately be fully enacted.

The emergence of political representation in Qatar cannot be explained within the context of a rentier state model either. Qatar has an extraordinary supply of mineral resource wealth in oil and gas. Estimates of the GDP per capita seem to vary considerably; according to the CIA World Factbook, Qatari GDP per capita is $121,700 as of 2009,[89] but the IMF reports the

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[87] Ibid, pp.59-60

[88] Amy Hawthorne, Arab Reform Bulletin, 'Qatar's New Constitution: Limited Reform from the Top,' August 26, 2008.

[89]CIA World Factbook, Qatar, 2009

more modest, although still considerable figure, $76,000.[90] Those same IMF figures estimate that in 2008 (the latest available figures) oil and gas represented 61% of GDP. Qatar's status as a rentier state (there are no income taxes in Qatar) means that the emergence of political representation does not fit into this model.

Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani was not educated abroad but Hamad Bin Khalifa was educated at Sandhurst. This model therefore predicts that the promised elected legislative body will be implemented, but that its implementation will be delayed for as long as possible. As this seems to be occurring this model appears to perform exceptionally well at predicting the pattern of reforms observed in Qatar.

[90] IMF Country Report No 10/62, Qatar, Statistical Appendix, March 2010 p2

Swaziland

KING	*LIBERAL EDUCATION?*	*REFORM?*
NGWENYAMA SOBHUZA II	NO	NO
MSWATI III	YES	YES

Table 9

Swaziland has seen two Kings since its independence. The first, Ngwenyama Sobhuza II, ruled under British mandate from 1899 to 1968 and then as King until August 1982. After a brief interregnum, Mswati III assumed the throne in 1986 and has remained King until the present day.

In 1968, Swaziland's constitution protected political parties and the political participation of tribal groups. However this arrangement was not to last long. The first elections after independence were held in May 1972. The Imbokodvo National Movement (INM), the government party, received 75% of the vote. However, the 25% that went to Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) (and consequent 3 seats out of 24) precipitated the government to dissolve parliament and arrest seven of the leaders of the NNLC for 60 days.[91] After the coup, the parliament was replaced by one filled through appointments by the King and indirect elections by tribal leaders. Ultimately, "it was reduced to enacting into law the

[91] Richard Levin, Swaziland's Tinkhundla and the myth of Swazi tradition, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Volume 10(2), 1991, p5

decisions of Sobhuza and his advisers."[92]

After Sobhuza's death there was a brief regency from 1982 to 1986 when two Queen's ruled Swaziland on behalf of Mswati III who became King in 1986. Mswati's rule has seen gradual movement towards democratic practices, notably, the constitution of 2005 and the restoration of the parliament in 1993.

Following the new constitution in 2005, the House of Assembly consists of 55 elected members. It also includes 10 members appointed by the King, supplemented by up to four women indirectly elected by the House. The Senate consists of 10 members elected by the House of Assembly and 20 appointed by the King. Half of each group of Senators must be women. Whilst it is of course an imperfect and whilst many political parties in Swaziland continue to boycott elections, it is a marked improvement on the developments that emerged during Sobhuza II's rule.

Rational Bargaining models can only partly account for the pattern of reforms in Swaziland. Sobhuza's authoritarian rule reflected the concentration of real power in his hands. Mswati's reforms came around through the activities of the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) who were calling for democratic reforms, leading to elections in 1993 and a new constitution in 1996. Since these reforms were deemed insubstantial PUDEMO declared that their demands for reform had been ignored.[93] Yet these electoral reforms have to be situated in the contrasting context between Mswati's and Sobhuza's reigns. Whilst Mswati was responding to popular calls for reform, he rejected the option of simply seeking to repress

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[92]John Daniel, Johnson Vilane, Sawiland: 'political crisis, regional Dilemma,' Review of African Political Economy Volume 13 (35), May 1986 p57

[93] Richard Levin (revised by Hugh Macmillan), in 'Africa South of the Sahara 2004' Editor Katherine Murison, (Europa Publications, Thirty Third Edition, Volume 3, 2004) P1096

(although some repression occurred) dissent. In January 1990, for example, when Dr Ambrose Zwane former leader of the NNLC argued publicly for direct elections, he was not arrested. This was the option that Sobhuza had chosen to avail himself of. Instead, Mswati sought to partially compromise. Although Mswati's tolerance of organisation and dissent did lead to increasing power for the opposition, that followed from a policy choice, rather than from organic structural changes.[94]

Swaziland is not a rentier state. 90.7% of government revenue is from taxation.[95] Therefore, rentier state theory fares badly in accounting for the success of the Swazi Monarchy in maintaining political power in their own hands. Whilst there has been liberalisation, reforms have been very cautious. Whilst those reforms have been in response to pressure, they have not been inevitable and in the early stages of the reform movement Mswati could have chosen to ignore or arrest those pressing for reforms.

King Sobhuza II was educated privately in Swaziland, therefore the soft power model correctly predicts that under Sobhuza very little substantive reform will have occurred. The soft power model also offers the best explanation for the reforms occurring under Mswati's rule. Mswati was educated at Sherborne School, in the UK and hence the soft power model anticipates that there would be some, tentative reform under his rule.

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[94] Ibid, p.1095

[95] Based On IMF Statistics, IMF Country Report No. 08/355, Kingdom of Swaziland: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix October 2008, p30

Saudi Arabia and the UAE:

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the only countries (Kuwait excepting) that have had no foreign educated monarchs since their independence. They are also the two most authoritarian monarchies in the world.

The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared on 22nd September 1932, with its head of State, Ib'n Saud.[96] Since Ib'n Saud's death in 1964, Saudi Arabia has been ruled by King Saud, King Faysal, King Khaled, King Fahd and now King Abdullah. It has never had an elected consultative council.

This is not to say that all Saudi Kings' have opposed any form of social decompression; King Faysal supported the education of women and bought off the ulama to achieve this. However, minor social actions aside, the only genuine political liberalisation was the holding of municipal elections in 2004. Despite their being scheduled for 2009, the event was not repeated and the government has made no firm commitments to hold them again in the near future. This is not simply due to the power of religious conservatives. The King holds much sway and the direct influence of religion on the monarchs of Saudi Arabia should not be downplayed.[97]

There were noteworthy reforms in 1992 in response to the fierce Islamic protests that broke out after the Gulf War. These reforms included a Basic Law, a Consultative Assembly and the Law of the Provinces. However, the reforms are very limited. The Consultative Assembly is entirely royally appointed and its agenda is set by royal decree. Thus these reforms operate as

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[96] David E. Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p33 (University Press of Florida, 1997)

[97] Interview

a vessel for the expression of Royal power, rather than its dispersion.[98]

Unsurprisingly, very few members of the Royal Family call for reform, particularly amongst the first generation of Ib'n Saud sons, who have thus far monopolized the throne. Few of Ib'n Saud's sons received education abroad. Amongst the few calling for reform, Prince Talal (never a crown prince) was the most prominent as the leader of the 'Free Princes'. He was educated at Sandhurst.

The UAE has had two President's (de facto monarchs) since it was formed in 1971. At that time, the President was Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. Zayed was succeeded by Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan. Neither has installed a directly elected parliamentary body during their reign.

The UAE "represents one of the purest autocracies in the world…second only to Saudi Arabia"[99]. It has no directly elected consultative assembly or directly elected parliamentary institutions nor has it even held direct municipal elections at any point in its history. It does have an advisory assembly which is partially indirectly appointed by an electoral college (comprising of less than 1% of Emirati citizens). Not only is the Electoral College a tiny proportion of the Emirate, but it comprises of delegates 'hand-picked' by the government.[100]

Although the UAE has indeed enjoyed considerable social decompression which has been necessary to bring in Western companies, political delegation has remained nominal. These facts can be explained within the context of rational bargaining models since the UAE "has

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[98]Said. K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud p.116 (London: Bloomsbury, 2005)

[99] Christopher M. Davidson, 'After Shaikh Zayed: The politics of Succession in Abu Dhabi and the UAE' Middle East Policy, Volume 13(1), Spring 2006, p42

[100] Reuters News "Hand Picked Voters Cast ballots in Dubai Poll" Monday December 18 2006

never experienced any serious opposition"[101].

The rentier state model also appears to be able to account for this. The UAE is oil rich, and oil and gas sectors contributed 38.7% of the UAE's GDP according to IMF statistics for 2007.[102] Around 70% of the government's revenue is from the hydrocarbon industry and there are no personal income taxes for citizens. With such little taxation, the lack of representation is accounted for within the rentier state model.

The soft power model also anticipates the lack of reform. The UAE's lack of political opposition and the fact that none of its current leaders have experienced an education in the west means that the soft power model correctly predicts that the country will not have implemented any substantive political reforms to promote democracy. The lack of political opposition in the UAE compounded by its conservative leaders and considerable oil wealth make the UAE a very straight-forward case to explain.

[101] Fatma Al Sayegh, Post-9/11 Changes in the Gulf: The Case of the UAE, Middle East Policy; Summer 2004; 11,2 p114

[102] IMF Country Report No. 09/120, United Arab Emirates: Statistical Appendix, April 2009 p.3

Responding to Oppositions:

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	CONCESSIONS
Ibn Isa Al Khalifa (Bahrain)	**No**	**No**
Hamad Ibn Isa Al Khalifa (Bahrain)	**Yes**	**Yes**
Hussein II (Jordan)	**Yes**	**Yes**
Hassan II (Morocco)	**Yes**	**Yes**
Said Bin Taimur (Oman)	**No**	**No**
Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah (Kuwait)	**No**	**Yes**
Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud (Saudi Arabia)	**No**	**No**

Table 10

Having laid the groundwork in the preceding comparative section, this section uses the data to ask how well the model presented here accounts for the likely responses of Kings to opposition to their rule. The table above indicates the monarchs that faced major organised opposition to the autocratic rule of the monarchy to which they were forced to respond. Each King had their own ways of responding to these pressures. Although virtually all monarchs faced some opposition, the table above focuses on opposition that was directed primarily against the rule of the monarchy.

The political opposition Hussein II faced is included contentiously but this is fairly insignificant since even if these protests do not fall under this category, the reforms that

followed them could also easily be explained in terms of their timing culminating 5 years before the King's death.

In Bahrain, as has already been discussed, Ibn Isa Al Khalifa chose to try to suppress the rioters whereas his son, Hamad Ibn Isa Al Khalifa took the opposite strategy and made major concessions early on in his reign instituting full elections in 2002. His reign has been characterised by Amnesty International as an "historic period" for human rights (although far from perfect).[103] In Jordan, reforms were implemented in the midst of national protests and a national debt crisis which prompted the IMF to offer a debt relief package. The political reforms were not necessitated by the IMF loan but were implemented as part of a package of reforms. The elections have been described as "relatively free and fair, with abuses not noticeably different from those in many democratic elections."[104]

Hassan II faced serious opposition to his rule, some of which he compromised with and some of which he sought to suppress. Major compromises discussed above include the reinstitution of elections which were held in 1977. Eventually he was successful in securing the authority and position of the monarchy since by the 1990s the opposition to his rule had effectively died out.

The former Sultan of Oman Said Bin Taimur faced serious opposition to his rule particularly during the Dhofar rebellion. However, he sought to stamp it out militarily and offered no political concessions, and his reign ended with no consultative assembly or political representation of any form.

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[103] Amnesty International, "Promising Human Rights Reform Must Continue," 13 March 2001, p1

[104] Glenn E. Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 30, (03), August 1998, p399

Kuwait is the country whose reforms have responded most to the demands of political opposition, and the reason for this is the extraordinary strength that the opposition had for a brief period in 1991 and 1992. In exile, the Al Sabahs had no choice but to agree to the demands of the Kuwaiti political opposition. This concession could not be attributed to the democratic preferences of the King or the Al Sabah family; since as already mentioned after the parliament was unconstitutionally disbanded in 1986, it was replaced by a rubber stamp consultative parliament in 1990 which consisted of 50% royal appointees.

In Saudi Arabia, in 1992 drastic changes in Saudi public opinion caused by the presence of western troops on Saudi soil in the 1st Gulf War encouraged King Fahd to appear to make compromises. However, in reality the Consultative Council he established was meaningless. Its formation was followed by perhaps thousands of arbitrary arrests of opposition leaders in one of Saudi's "fiercest campaigns" against those advocating reform.[105] Moreover, the council was royally appointed and purely consultative. Fahd was against any actual reform since in 1991 he refused to look at a petition signed by 453 religious scholars, judges, and university professors calling for 12 political reforms, including a consultative assembly, fair judiciary and an end to corruption. King Fahd refused to cooperate in any substantial way and instead sought to repress the dissent.

In Swaziland, whilst Sobhuza II was King public opposition was suppressed and the national parliament was dissolved immediately after its first election. By contrast, King Mswati III, Sobhuza's son, has offered major compromises including in the 2005 constitution. Following his dismissal of the Liqqoqo, Mswati had more power at his disposal than his father Sobhuza and could easily have chosen to crack down on these dissidents, had he wanted to. Instead he

[105] Madawi Al Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambriduge University Press 2003), p.175

engaged in a policy of national debate that lead to some, limited reforms

Aside from Kuwait, it can be seen from the above table that those Kings responding to dissent with concessions were educated in liberal institutions abroad. These concessions were often mixed with suppression of the most hardline opposition but in general liberally educated Kings have pursued significant compromises. Compromises pursued by other Kings have not only not delegated real power to elected representatives but they have not established a national assembly with elected representatives at all. In all of these cases (once again excepting Kuwait), those King's that resisted making any real concessions were educated domestically, whilst those that have conciliated political oppositions were educated abroad.

Timings of Reforms

KING	LIBERAL EDUCATION?	START OF REIGN	DATE OF MOST SIGNIFICANT REFORMS	END OF REIGN	REFORMS DEMANDED BY OPPOSITION?
Dorji Wangchuk	Yes	1952	**1967-1969**	**1972**	No
Hussein II	Yes	1952	**1989-1993**	**1999**	No
Hassan II	Yes	1961	**1996-1998**	**1999**	No
Qaboos	Yes	1970	**2003-2007**	ACTIVE MONARCH	No
Jigme Wangchuk	Yes	1972	**2005-2007**	**2007**	No
Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber	No	1977	1992	2005	Yes
Mswati III	Yes	1986	2005	ACTIVE MONARCH	Yes
Hamad Ibn Isa	Yes	1999	1999-2002	ACTIVE MONARCH	Yes

Table 11

In this section I test the final hypothesis that monarchs with liberal educations will often postpone their most significant reforms until the very end of their reign. Table 11 clearly shows that where reform has not come in response to public mobilisation, it has come at the very end of the King's reign. Dorji Wangchuk waited almost twenty years before implementing his major reforms. Hussein II, whose reforms did follow opposition protests but not strictly concerted demands for political liberalisation waited three and a half decades. Qaboos Bin Said, still Sultan of Oman, waited 33 years before beginning a process of reform and Bhutan's democratic reforms in 2005, 2006 and 2007 coincided with the end of the Jigme Wangchuk's reign in 2007, 35 years after he came to power. Morocco's most significant

political reform, which culminated in the alternance of the government occurred in 1998, just one year before the King's death. That King had been on the throne for 38 years whilst enacting previous reform only in 1976 in response to opposition. Of the remaining Monarchs, Jaber Al Ahmad was forced to compromise by the First Gulf War and the other two, monarchs Mswati and Hamad are both still active and relatively young monarchs –they ought not to be included in this table since it remains to be seen what exactly their most significant reforms will be (although I leave them there for the sake of completeness). Aking this alteration would leave virtually all of the most significant political reforms coming at or near the end of the reign of the King who implemented them (Qaboos is now 69). Alternative explanations of reform cannot account for this preponderance of liberalising reforms to occur right at the end of the monarchs reign.

PART 5: Conclusion

This study finds soft power to be an extremely important factor in determining where liberalisation occurs. It also finds that soft power is mediated by two factors: domestic political opposition but also the age of the King. Domestic political opposition tends to bring some modest reforms and old Kings nearing the end of their reigns tend to be much more likely to institute reforms, assuming that they have been influenced by soft power.

The soft power model considerably outperformed two competing hypotheses, specifically, rentier state theory and the 'all in the family' thesis. These competing theses tend to perform well only when explaining a lack of reform.

The findings of this study have strong implications for further research on soft power and liberalisation. Firstly it implies that the soft power literature can benefit from focusing on subjects. Secondly it suggests that the literature on liberalisation cannot ignore the variation in preferences of monarchs. Yet this study has only scratched the surface on this issue. Soft power operates in many ways and education is only one of these. Further research should consider the other mechanisms through which soft power works and also the significance of its effects not just on the monarch but also the population at large.

The focus on Monarchies in this study, at the exclusion of other autocratic regimes was practiced because the authority of Monarchs and Autocrats may have differing foundations. Monarchs' legitimacy is often explicitly couched in Divine Right or 'tradition', whilst autocrats generally rely on the pretence of representation. These differences may mean that partial democratisation may be easier for Monarchs, since a monarch is less undermined by a competing locus of governmental legitimacy. Although generalising the results of this study to autocrats more generally would be one possible way to extend the research, these

differences would have to be accounted for before such a study could occur.

Secondly, there are two independent variables treated as exogenous in this model that could be further endogenised. These are 1) when and why young heirs are sent to education abroad and 2) the conditions under which mass public mobilisation occurs. Social Movement Theory and more specifically the Political Process Model[106] might be a useful framework to depart from here.

This research also focuses mainly on the Monarchs themselves but of course total and absolute power is rarely concentrated in one pair of hands. More frequently, there are complex informal or formal power sharing agreements between elites and particularly Royal Families, as in Saudi Arabia amongst the Royal Family, or in Swaziland, between the King and his mother. Hence, it is possible that more light would be shed on this issue if the impact of foreign education on elites more generally was to be examined in detail.

Finally, the dependent variables here are treated in a binary fashion, that is to say liberal reforms either occurred or did not, whilst public mobilisations were either appeased or resisted. However, both of these variables could in principle be measured on a continuum scale, if a sufficiently objective measure might be found.

With these qualifications in mind, the research should be understood as being a first step in the evaluation of the impact of the soft power of education on liberalisation.

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[106]Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd Edition, 1999).

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