Letter From the Secretariat

Our annual conference–which includes both novice and advanced committees operating in docket style debate–will take place on December 2-3, 2017. Los Angeles Invitational Model United Nations prides itself on a tradition of excellence, and we are confident that LAIMUN XXII will be one to remember.

This year’s Secretaries-General are Keeley Parker and Samantha Walley, accompanied by Under Secretaries-General Liam Cook (GA), Hannah Parker (ECOSOC), Jasmine Wu (Crisis), and Ryan Fiorito (Specialized).

LAIMUN’s novice committees will continue to provide delegates with a quality conference to develop skills, while our advanced committees will serve as a forum for more competitive debate.

Please contact us with any questions or concerns.

We hope to see you all at LAIMUN!

Keeley Parker and Samantha Walley

Secretaries-General

secretarygeneral@mchsmun.com

Introduction to the USG

Incoming Delegates:

Welcome to LAIMUN XXIII! We are thrilled to put on our third conference – now with both Advanced and Novice committees.

Our chairs intend to hold all delegates, novice and advanced, to high standards of research, solutions, speech, and diplomacy.

With regard to resolutions and amendments, we have a strict no pre-written policy. All of your work must be original, created following the start of the first committee session.

We hope that you will get as much out of this experience as possible. While we do wish to run a professional conference, that should not hold you back from enjoying spirited debate in each committee.

If you have any questions, procedural or otherwise, you may direct them to ga@mchsmun.org. Please do not hesitate to contact us with any inquiries or concerns. We wish you all the best of luck and look forward to seeing you in December!

All the best,

Samantha Walley and Keeley Parker                                        Liam Cook

Secretaries-General                                                        Under-Secretary General

Introduction to the Dias

Hello Delegates,

My name is Joe Hawkins, and I am thrilled to be your chair for LAIMUN XXIII. For the past four years, I have been a part of Mira Costa Model United Nations. Now, I am a senior teacher and advisor for this year’s freshman class. Model UN has given me tremendous opportunities to learn about the world. With this program, I have ventured across the nation and debated at conferences such as RHSMUN, BUSUN, and NHSMUN. The benefits that coincide with MUN are multitudinous, and I attribute much of my own personal development to this program.

Outside of Model United Nations, I have been a member of the Mira Costa Varsity Lacrosse Team for three years and absolutely love boating and sailing at the local yacht club. I have even turned this passion into an organisation called New Channels, in which all kinds of youth groups can experience the harbour. I am also an avid paddler, so you can always find me on the water. For many of you, this will be your very first MUN conference. My co-chair and I will make sure that you have the opportunity to learn Model UN at a competitive, yet enjoyable level. I truly hope that LAIMUN XXIII Novice 1st DISEC will be a memorable and informative starting point for your Model United Nations journeys. Good luck and see you all in debate!

Hello, Delegates!

My name is Lyndsey Garrett and I am very excited to be your co-chair for 1st DISEC at this year’s conference! I am a senior at Mira Costa High School and have participated in our Model United Nations program for all 4 of those years. This year I’ve had the honor of serving as a senior teacher to the incoming freshman into our program! I cannot stress enough what an invaluable experience MUN has been for me. It is too often high school students view the world from an egocentric perspective, but the program teaches students be self dependent, worldly, and passionate about current events. I have grown as not only a student but a scholar at each conference I debate, some of my favorites taking place Johns Hopkins and UCLA.

If not working on Model UN or school work — which is rare— you can find me running my program at the Manhattan Beach Library, reading books by Kurt Vonnegut, or getting food with friends. I am a huge advocate of gender equality, planned parenthood, and animal rights, so you may also be able to find me at a protest or two. I look forward to hearing from all of you, please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns. My main priority for this upcoming debate is creating a comfortable yet academically stimulating environment for self improvement, so make sure to prepare. Welcome to LAIMUN XXIII!

Committee Description

The original purpose of the First Committee was to address the technological repercussions and implications of the atomic weapons used against Japan and the development of such technologies in various countries. In its following years, DISEC served as a platform for discussions between the world’s superpower in the Cold War regarding armament stockpiling and territorial disputes^[1]. Today, however, the First Committee focuses on the issues of disarmament and threats against the security and peace of the international community. Standing as the only main committee of the General Assembly, DISEC operates under the scope of the UN Charter. This includes abiding by the concept in which all member states and observers of the United Nations consequently become members of the First Committee and share an equal vote. Due to the concept of equal votes, documents drafted by the committee require a simple majority to pass. Although similar to the Security Council, DISEC is unable to impose sanctions or permit armed intervention. Additionally, the First Committee works in close cooperation with the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and United Nations Disarmament Commission. ^[2]

     The guiding principles of The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) consist of “Cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.” ^[3]The First Committee congregates annually starting in October and concludes debate by early November^[4]. Within past sessions, DISEC has debated and discussed a wide range of topics including but not limited to: nuclear nonproliferation, “dual-use” technology, peaceful uses of outer space, limiting arms trade within areas of conflict, biological terrorism, and prevention of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations^[5]. To this day, the significance and influence of DISEC continues to grow, proving to be an invaluable tool when resolving international crises.

Topic A: Biological Terrorism

I. Background

Bioterrorism is defined as, “...the use by non-state actors of microorganisms (pathogens) or the products of living organisms (toxins) to inflict harm on a wider population."^[6] The use of biological weapons can be found throughout history, dating back to time periods when the science behind such attacks wasn’t fully understood. Whether that be in 1500–1200 BC when victims of tularemia, a zoonotic disease which attacks the skin, eyes, lymph nodes and lungs, were driven into enemy lands, or in the 18th century when British troops contaminated Bostonian citizens with smallpox in hopes of spreading the disease to the continental soldiers. However, biological warfare wasn’t truly revolutionized until a German scientist, by the name of Robert Koch, proved that disease and infection spreads by the existence of microorganisms. In World War I, Germany utilized their extensive knowledge on biological warfare when they intentionally traded infected livestock to the allied powers with the intent of causing a zoonotic epidemic, capable of spreading to human. Approximately two decades later in 1945, Japan launched a large-scale biological attack against China, killing over 10,000 civilians and injuring thousands more. A subdivision of the Japanese Army known as Unit 731^[7] coordinated the attack; its main purpose regarded testing the lethality and effectiveness of biological substances. The Japanese continued to utilize bioterrorism throughout the span of World War II, contaminating food, poisoning wells, and airdropping samples of the plague into Chinese cities^[8].

 During the era of the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and the United States invested heavily into biological warfare as a potential alternative weapon to atomic bombs. In 1969, the US staged an experiment developed to test the effects of biological substances when administered to caged animals in an enclosed, isolated area. The results of the experiment proved the potential, devastating effects of bioterrorism that prompted Nixon to halt the development of biological weapons and instead transfer resources into the biodefense sector. Meanwhile, the USSR developed their own covert biological weapon program.The program was rumored to have developed an antibiotic-resistant “super plague” intended for the west. When an outbreak of anthrax occurred in a city located near a Soviet army laboratory, the international community heavily criticized the development of biological weapons. This led to the USSR, the UK, and the USA in 1972 to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC).^[9] The BWC aimed to prohibit the production of biological weapons, earning over 165 signatories. However, the intent of the conference soon turned void when certain signatories failed to disclose biological weapons operations to the public.

In the 1990’s, Western intelligence accused several countries consisting of Russia, North Korea, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan and the former states of Yugoslavia of developing biological Weapons^[10]. Out of the suspected countries, the global community heavily scrutinized Iraq. This prompted an investigation by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) ^[11]which uncovered a stockpile of biological weapons, including missiles capable of delivering mass epidemics. A few years later in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo — a Japanese cult— gassed several Tokyo subway stations with Sarin gas, killing 13 and injuring thousands more. The event caught the attention of the international community, shocking the masses with the ease and effectivity that the operation was carried out with. Even the most developed countries are not exempt from such a trend.         

In 2001, following the 9/11 attacks, Anthrax spores, known to cause serious bacterial illness when inhaled, were sent through several letters addressed to members of U.S. Congress and American media outlets, killing five and poisoning twenty-two. In 2013 alone, two cases of bioterrorism were documented.^[12] One of which involved the decimation of a bomb beneath a biological agent in the Philippines, and the other involving samples of ricin, a highly toxic, naturally occurring substance found in the seeds of castor oil plants, being sent through the mail to Washington DC and New York City. Today the biggest threats of bioterrorism reside within the middle east: Islamic State militants have been accused of having the intent of using biological weapons against western nations.

Despite being primarily utilized by cults and terrorist organizations, a dozen countries are still suspected of running offensive biological weapons programs. These countries include China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Taiwan^[13]. If successful, biological attacks can create epidemics which grow progressively more severe as the substance-self replicates. Bioterrorism stands as a particularly dangerous weapon compared to other types of terrorism. This is because most biological agents appear naked to the human eye and can transfer through food, water, bodily fluids, and bodily contact^[14]. With the turn of the 21st century, biological weapons — diseases, viruses, and toxins — are capable of being modified to possess novel features such as an increased infectivity rate, a wider host range, or deadlier symptoms. It is within the capability of modern biological weapon programs to create a virus capable of killing millions with relative ease and a low budget. Therefore, it is crucial that the international community works together in order to stop such a growing threat to collective security.

II. UN Involvement

With an increased interest and risk of biological weapons throughout the twentieth century, international anxiety has translated into a series of diplomatic efforts with the intent of diminishing the threat of bioterrorism through global negotiations. The first effort to limit the use of biological weapons occurred in 1925. It was in this year that The Geneva Protocol^[15] was passed, which forbade the use of chemical and biological weapons in times of war. The Cold War brought about a new era of legislation for bioterrorism due to the increasing tensions between the US and USSR. In 1972, these tensions sparked the creation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) which prohibited the development and accumulation of biological weapons of any kind, as well as demanding that signatories of BWC destroy any biological agents or weapons within their possession.

As of 2001, 162 countries have signed the BWC, yet several countries have yet to ratify the legislation. In order to further strengthen the influence of the BWC, the United Nations has held multiple review conferences and installed various enforcement mechanisms such as Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), and the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit (ISU)^[16] tasked with aiding the implementation of the Convention guidelines within various countries. Within recent years, the U.N. General Assembly has placed an emphasis on countries to develop and incorporate new biological defense mechanisms including a program consisting of biotechnology experts tasked with preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring and using biological weapons. Along with this, the General Assembly created an international database which tracks and documents all instances of bioterrorism.

III. Topics to Consider

The Islamic State’s Possession of Biological Weapons

     Islamic State has been known to utilize chemical weapons in the past, having used mustard and chlorine gases in Iraq and Syria, but as of recently the radical Islamic group has started to explore the realm of biological weapons as an alternative. The use of bioterrorism offers a low budget, large-scale attack which could be advantageous in the case of a lack of funding to the Islamic State. With the discovery of a laptop belonging to a Tunisian physicist aligned with ISIS, the group has been suspected of planning a biological attack against Europe.^[17] The laptop contained a document detailing how to weaponize the bubonic plague bacteria harvested from animal carcasses. After the release of such information, the governments of France and Belgium have been developing contingency plans^[18].

It is within ISIS’s capability to develop biological weapons due to the lack of biocontainment security measures within the Middle East, along with an extensive list of scientists on their payroll.^[19] Within the Islamic State’s territory, pharmaceutical companies, vaccine manufacturing facilities, and laboratories are all civilian owned, enabling ISIS to easily obtain biological substances. If biological substances are sparse within ISIS territories, Islamic State can obtain pathogens from defectors within Europe and the United States. However, a drawback that may prevent ISIS from enacting a biological warfare is due to the fact that a biological attack is incapable of targeting a specific set of victims. Along with this, a biological attack also runs the risk of infecting ISIS’s own population. Whether or not ISIS plans to carry through with a biological attack, it is crucial to prevent the acquisition of biological substances from terrorist organizations and create contingency plans in the case of a bioterrorism attack.

Biosurveillance

    Currently, the General Assembly has focused its attention on the development of bioterrorism response plans and surveillance mechanisms, such as a global biological surveillance system and prepared outbreak contingency plans. Biosurveillance is defined as the process of accumulating, examining, analyzing and relaying information that relates to disease activity and threatens public health^[20]. This can range from standard medical practices to complex technological systems. Despite the intended purpose of biosurveillance, there is often insufficient data to accurately interpret and analyze information that can be utilized to prevent bioterrorism.^[21] This can be due to a number of factors including inadequate epidemiological infrastructure, poor economic and geographical conditions, a lack of technological capacities and proper biological practices. Often times a country’s government will relay false information and statistics in an attempt to protect their country’s reputation.        

 In order to improve the credibility of the data reported to the biosurveillance systems, several countries have utilized public health response activities.^[22] Such activities include verifications of diagnosis, stricter guidelines for the handling of microorganisms, and case investigations. It is necessary to improve upon the current mechanisms of biosurveillance and active response systems in order to properly prepare for and prevent any future biological attacks.  

Agroterrorism

What is often ignored when discussing bioterrorism is the vulnerability of a country’s agricultural infrastructure and food supply in the face of biological weapons. In 2002, a list of pathogens and a schematic diagram were discovered in a cave used frequently by al-Qaida.^[23] The list of pathogens not only included substances intended to endanger the public, but substances targeted to destroy crops and livestock. If agroterrorism is successful, the economic, social, and political effects to a country can be devastating. Within the US alone, the agricultural sector is worth more than a trillion dollars and employs roughly 10% of the nation’s population; an attack on its agricultural infrastructure could not only severely damage the United States’ economy but the economies of countries importing American agriculture. Additionally, two-thirds of all livestock pathogens are zoonotic^[24] ( transferable to humans): thus an attack against a country’s livestock industry has the potential to spread into a public health crisis.         

Rice and wheat stand as the two crops with the highest risk of agroterrorism due to the fact that they account for nearly 40% of the global total calorie consumption.^[25] A biological weapon catered to these specific crops can lead to starvation and famine across the globe. Currently, very few countries possess a biodefense plan, let alone one which accounts for the threat of agroterrorism. In order to ensure food security to every nation, it is necessary to develop biodefense plans which focus specific attention towards the threat of an attack against a country’s food security and agricultural industry.

IV. Case Study

Wasco County, Oregon Attacks

    In the fall of 1984, America witnessed its first and largest bioterrorist attack on US soil. Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh— the founder of a Buddhist cult dedicated to worshipping love, beauty, and guiltless sex—- coordinated the attack^[26]. Members of the Rajneeshee cult congregated and developed the city of Rajneeshpuram in the rural area of Oregon. In the process, the cult gained political influence in the neighboring town of Antelope. Relations with the citizens of Antelope and the cult soon became strained over disputes of land use and the cult’s territorial expansion. In order to gain political control over the region, two members of the cult ran for two seats on the Wasco County Circuit Court, along with the sheriff's office.The cult planned to influence the elections of November 1984 through the “Share-a-Home" program in which the cult planned to import thousands of homeless people to Rajneeshpuram and register them to vote in favor of cult’s candidates. The Wasco County Clerk countered the program through legislation which made the “Share-a-Home” program void^[27]. The cult then turned to the use of biological weapons as a tactic to sway the votes in their favor.

The main planners of the attack consisted of Rajneesh's chief lieutenant, Sheela Silverman, and the secretary-treasurer of the Rajneesh Medical Corporation, Diane Yvonne Onang^[28]. The two women  purchased Salmonella bacteria from a Washington Medical company and cultured the bacteria in the commune’s labs. The cult ran “trial runs” by contaminating local salad bars, grocery store produce, and doorknobs and urinary handles in the courthouse with salmonella samples. In September and October of 1984, the cult and its following contaminated 10 local restaurants’ salad bars with cultured samples of salmonella. The attack infected 751 people, forty-five of which were hospitalized. The victims of the attack all tested positive for Salmonella enterica Typhimurium^[29]. Victims ranged from a newborn infant to an 87-year-old man with common symptoms of  “diarrhea, fever, chills, nausea, vomiting, headaches, abdominal pain, and bloody stools.”^[30] Citizens of the county suspected the cults were behind such attacks and stormed the election booths in mass, causing the Rajneeshees to withdraw their candidates from the election.    

The cult’s act of bioterrorism cost the local restaurants hundred of thousands of dollars and traumatized the citizens of Wasco County for years to come. After an investigation into the attack, the Oregon State Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation discovered a sample of bacteria in the Rajneeshpuram medical laboratory which matched the contaminant found in the salad bar months prior. The two leading orchestrators of the biological attack were charged with attempted murder and served 20-year sentences in a federal prison^[31].

V. Guiding Questions

1. What regulations and restrictions should be put into place in order to prohibit the development of biological weapons, if any?
2. How can the international community prevent terrorist organizations from receiving/creating biological weapons?
3. How does the growing use of technology and technological innovation affect bioterrorism?
4. What precautions or standards should be implemented in existing biological weapons programs to improve the safety in such facilities?
5. What are some common biological agents used today? What characteristics make them favorable and how can they be limited?  

Works Cited

Riedel, Stefan. "Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism: A Historical Review." Proceedings (Baylor University. Medical Center). Baylor Health Care System, Oct. 2004. Web. 22 May 2017.

DeNoon, Daniel J. "Biological and Chemical Terror History." WebMD. WebMD, n.d. Web. 22 May 2017

"United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly." United Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web. 22 May 2017.

"Overview of Potential Agents of Biological Terrorism." SIU School of Medicine. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 May 2017.

Zebra, The Plaid, and Jessica Beuker. "This Oregon Tantric Sex Cult Committed the Largest Incidence of Bioterrorism on U.S. Soil." The Plaid Zebra. N.p., 26 Mar. 2015. Web. 22 May 2017.

Harris, Elisa D. "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Prospects and Priorities after September 11 | Brookings Institution." Brookings. Brookings, 28 July 2016. Web. 22 May 2017.

"Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Daesh / ISIS." Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Daesh / ISIS | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 May 2017

"Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 03 Feb. 2017. Web. 22 May 2017.

Ben-Gedalyahu, Tzvi. "Tzvi Ben-Gedalyahu." The Jewish Press. N.p., 07 Dec. 2015. Web. 22 May 2017.

"Biological Warfare." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, 23 Apr. 2007. Web. 22 May 2017.

Topic B: Illicit Arms Trade in South Sudan

I. Background

        The convoluted and increasingly violent conflict in South Sudan can largely be attributed to the illicit arms trade. The illicit arms trade is an international illegal industry, in which arms, weapons, and ammunition are trafficked from supplier to buyer. In today’s society, the illicit arms trade consists primarily of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). They are fairly easy to transport around the globe, especially to areas of heavy conflict where weapons are in high demand. SALW are the most common weapons and are used in almost every nation by police forces, security teams, and local militias.^[32]  Small arms consist of weapons used by an individual in an armed force. They include handguns, rifles, carbines, shotguns, semi-automatic/fully automatic machine guns, etc. On the other hand, light weapons consist of arms that are typically utilized by a team of individuals and often explode, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, grenade launchers, landmines, grenades, etc. Primarily, the illicit arms trade takes place by private entities, however, there are a few governments who actively take part in this illegal industry.^[33] This easy accessibility to SALW on the black market is why the international illicit arms trade is so profitable. According to Amnesty International, the illicit arms trade is worth upwards of $100 billion.^[34]  One of the most prolific forms of the illicit arms trade, the “ant trade,” takes place on a more local and regional level. The “ant trade” occurs when many individual operators smuggle only a handful number of weapons across a border at a time, just as how many ants carry individual pieces of food. Smaller scale operations like these are prevalent in South Sudan, leading to the nightmare that millions of civilians are facing each and every day.

        The Sudanese and South Sudanese conflict can be dated back to when both countries were unified. Since Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the region has been plagued with Civil Wars and suffering, ultimately leading to the secession of South Sudan in 2011. Throughout this time period, the civilians in South Sudan have become progressively more armed, both through legal and illegal means of obtaining weapons. The mass collection of weapons has led to the nation of South Sudan to be labeled “Africa’s arms dump.”^[35] The illicit arms trade in South Sudan began in the 1960s and 1980s, during the First and Second Sudanese Civil War, with large shipments of West and East German SALW to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). These instances of German arms trafficking has also spurred the illicit arms trade in the rest of the Greater Horn of Africa and its surrounding countries.^[36]  Later on in the century, other South Sudanese groups, more specifically rebels fighting against the SPLM, gained access to large numbers of SALW during the Libya-Chad War. This has been a common trend in South Sudanese history. When conflicts and wars break out in neighboring regions and countries, arms end up in South Sudan.

In more recent times, almost all of the illicit arms trade occurring in South Sudan happens across the borders between its neighboring nations.^[37] These illegal exchanges occur along the borders where there is little to no security in the region, allowing arms dealers to not be convicted of their crimes.  For example, Israel has been taking part in this trade for years and was just exposed in late 2016. This, along with the fact that South Sudan is currently still dealing with a four year Civil War, is partially why the illicit arms trade is rampant in the country. While the government struggles to maintain stability, rebel groups along the nation’s border are given the opportunity to gain illicit arms for combat. South Sudan’s current Civil War has resulted in the rapid militarization of the rural rebel tribes, who now, with large numbers of SALW, pose immense problems to South Sudan’s national security.^[38] After many years of combatting the illicit arms trade in their country, South Sudan has now turned to the United Nations to put an end to this industry, threatening the peace within its borders.

II. UN Involvement

        The United Nations’ extensive efforts to counter the effects of the proliferation of SALW in the South Sudanese illicit arms trade date far back before the new country gained its independence on July 9, 2011. The main UN body that oversees disarmament and the international illicit arms trade is the UNODA, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, which was established in January 1998.^[39] Within the UNODA, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa helps provide a more focused and cooperative force against the illicit arms trade.^[40] These bodies’ top priorities are promoting disarmament of nuclear weapons and SALW from civilians and regimes alike. They help prevent the illicit arms trade from expanding and attack the problem at the start: with the arms producing nations. The day that the Republic of South Sudan gained its independence on July 9, 2017, the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) for the purpose of improving security, supporting peacebuilding, and protecting civilians. One year later and the UN Security Council took another step in easing tensions along the Sudan-South Sudan border with resolution S/RES/2046.^[41] This resolution called for a cease to all hostilities and a gradual disarmament of SALW possessed by the belligerents.

In late 2014, the United Nations made one of the most impactful developments in international disarmament and security with the entrance of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).^[42] This monumental treaty regulates the international trade in conventional arms, ranging from handguns to warships. The ATT has been ratified by 89 nations and signed by 130, however, South Sudan has neither signed nor ratified the treaty. This is because of the South Sudanese government’s disdain towards the UN. If South Sudan were to ratify the ATT, massive gains would be made in putting a halt to the illicit arms trade damaging the country. South Sudan could then impose new regulations and receive aid for the implementation of arms trade countermeasures. Choosing to take a different path than advised by the international community, the South Sudanese government has relied heavily on the UNMISS to aid in the disarmament of SALW and the end of the illicit arms trade. There are currently over 17,000 UNMISS troops, all working to disarm civilians peacefully in South Sudan, and the mission has a fairly large budget at $1,081,788,400, according to resolution A/RES/70/24.^[43]  South Sudan has commonly found themselves unable to work with the United Nations because of their incredible political and civil instability. As the UN begins to call for more radical change and reform within the government, problems worsen every day for millions of civilians. The civilians have been dealing with a terrible famine for years, resulting in additional aid from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). With a plethora of issues plaguing the nation, the conflict in South Sudan can trace almost all of its problems back to the illicit arms trade.

III. Topic Sections

How the Illicit Arms Trade Affects the Political Climate of the Nation

        The current instability within South Sudan began years prior to the country’s independence in 2011. However, the conflict quickly escalated after the new government and opposing forces clashed only two years after independence was gained. In December 2013, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir accused his own Vice President Riek Machar of planning a coup against him.^[44]  The troubles first started when Kiir, a Dinka tribesman, began to retire several government members, many of whom belonged to the Nuer tribe, a rival to the Dinka, including Machar. These two South Sudanese tribes are notorious for being involved with the illicit arms trade across the borders of neighboring countries. In 2011, the Small Arms Survey found approximately 3.2 million illicit SALW inside the nation’s borders.^[45]  All sides in this conflict have an incredibly vast and advanced supply of arms, which are used on whoever opposes their ideals. This then led to fighting between the SPLM and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - In Opposition (SPLM-IO).^[46]  The SPLM and SPLM-IO have both used their illicit weapons against each other and other civilians, often committing genocides and mass killings against their own ethnic minorities.

These events have turned the very complex South Sudanese Civil War into a scramble of who can control key cities and borders. The cities hold immense stockpiles of SALW that either side can claim and use in combat. Seizing the borders is also an important task for each side, because it decides who will command the arms trafficking routes across neighboring states. The Civil War revolves around the illicit arms trade in South Sudan. It dictates the daily lives of the 12 million civilians living in the country, and gives opportunities for the power hungry to take advantage of the weak.^[47]  For the past three and a half years, South Sudan has struggled to deal with a Civil War fueled by decades of illicit arms trafficking into the region. As more and more SALW are brought into South Sudan, the political instability within the nation soars to new heights. Delegates should focus on methods to ease the hostile situation among the many belligerents, who take part in the illicit arms trade, that are involved in this Civil War. More specifically, look into possible solutions to limit the illicit arms trade and arms trafficking to the dominating political movements wrestling for power in the government.

Security and Surplus Management

        One of the major reasons that South Sudan has not been able to fully halt the illicit arms trade is the complete lack of security within the nation’s borders.^[48]  Currently, there are South Sudan National Police Services (SSNPS), Prison Service, Fire Brigade, and Wildlife Protection Services.^[49]  As of 2012, there were an estimated 66,000 men and women serving in these services. In addition, there were upwards of 79,240 firearms, more than half of which were transferred illicitly.^[50]  In the past two years, there have been discrepancies among these services, including up to 58,200 lost SALW, which have most likely ended up in the hands of SPLM-IO and other tribal militias.^[51]  In addition to this, most of these service workers are unfit to work in such positions and have almost no experience. In 2011, President Kiir gave many of these executive roles to his fellow Dinka tribesman, upsetting the Nuer and increasing tensions which led to the Civil War. The illicit arms trade undermines South Sudan’s national security, and the problem grows worse day by day. This is a result of poor surplus management by the South Sudanese government.

        One of the most overlooked aspects in any case of the illicit arms trade is surplus management. This includes location and identification of the titanic number of SALW in South Sudan, as well as the registration of these weapons. Today, South Sudan currently has no surplus management system in place, and millions of illicit arms and weapons are circulating around the country. This is able to occur because the government does not have any arms management policies in place.^[52]  Unregistered weapons are able to be easily brought across the neighboring borders, and the government can do little to prevent this because of their lack of decent security. Once inside the borders, these SALW are almost impossible to be determined as illicit, since there is no registration system for surplus management. The SSNPS made some of the first steps to improve surplus management with the SSNPS Regulation 2010 which included procedures for weapon handling and excess storage.^[53]  This could be effective in the future, however, all government services should begin to formalize their own surplus arms management systems and adhere to them whenever possible. In this case, delegates should look into other surplus management systems and see what works in other countries, and what does not. Research registration techniques of other nations, states, or groups to find ways to combat the illicit arms trade.

The Illicit Arms Trade and Human Rights Violations

        In the South Sudanese conflict, one illegal activity begets another. The illicit arms trade in the region is often carried out by several groups of people, all with different motives. For example, the Dinka and Nuer both operate their own illicit arms trading routes across South Sudan’s borders.^[54]  The SPLM and SPLM-IO also does this to gain advantages in their regional conflicts. The South Sudanese government, as well as its many public services, takes part in this illegal trade too, in order to gain access to weapons for a cheaper price.^[55]  Because of the increasing involvement in the illicit arms trade, there is one SALW transferred illicitly for every four people. However, these weapons belong to the heavily militarized tribes, living in the rural regions of the country, just out of the government’s reach. This allows these tribes to get away with many criminal activities, putting millions of lives at risk every day.

        Several of these militarized groups commit horrific atrocities and human rights violations, including ethnic cleansings, civilia massacres, and peacekeeping attacks. Much of the violence in the region has ethnic motives. Dinka troops, more specifically the Mathiang Anyoor battalion, have committed ethnic cleansings, pogroms, and genocides against their own neighbors.^[56]  In late 2013, these Dinka tribesmen conducted house to house raids looking for Nuer people. Up to 240 Nuer were killed within a week, but the Mathiang Anyoor continued this violence, along with the Bentiu, who committed the Bentiu massacre in 2014.^[57]  Ethnic violence is not the only human rights problem in South Sudan, as attacks on civilians and UN workers became popular during the Civil War. In January 2014, government troops violated a ceasefire and attacked a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders, causing thousands to flee into the surrounding jungle. Soon after this, the government attacked the village of Yei and burned down 3,000 homes. Now, in April of this year, rebel troops attacked a hospital in Bor and killed 126 out of 127 patients. These problems continued to escalate, and as of now, both sides have recruited a total of 17,000 child soldiers. Millions of civilians have fled as refugees to camps in hope of finding safety. However, the problems did not end there. As of now, 70% of women in camps have been raped since 2013. In two years after the conflict began, 300,000 have been killed in South Sudan, the same number killed in Syria over a span of five years.^[58]  All of this violence has been caused by the illicit arms trade, and peace can not be restored unless it is stopped. Delegates should focus on alternative methods to limit and, ultimately, end these human rights violations by targeting its source. Look into management and security reform, as well as solutions to prevent further violations of human rights.

IV. Case Study

Kidepo Valley

        Perhaps the most active case of the illicit arms trade in South Sudan occurs across the nation’s southern border in the Kidepo Valley. This National Park and Game Reserve is the border between South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. For the most part, powerful tribes dominate the region with very little influence or regulation from the government. South Sudan’s Toposa, Uganda’s Dodoth, and Kenya’s Turkana tribes all work together to create a complex network of groups, all cooperating in this illicit arms trade.^[59]  For many years, these developed tribes have illegally traded arms across the three borders in this valley. They all share common roots and speak the same languages. The tribes often share SALW to protect their cattle from raids against bandits.^[60]  This all changed when the Civil War began in South Sudan in 2013. The tribes in Southern Sudan along the Kidepo Valley border began to become incredibly militarized. Not only do they have a resentment towards the government, but they also distrust other tribes in the nearby regions. The Southern people of South Sudan have been the victims of ethnic violence for many years. The illicit arms trade in the Kidepo Valley has allowed the Toposa and other tribes to procure arms for their own protection. In addition to this, they also provide weapons to other groups, including the government and SPLM for payment.^[61]

        The Kidepo Valley illicit arms trade is also the gateway for a much larger arms trafficking network within South Sudan. Once the weapons are inside South Sudan, smaller southern tribes, like the Toposa, are able to transport the SALW to their more established allies.^[62]  A majority of these arms make their way to the Nuer White Army (NWA).^[63]  The “White Army” is one of the dominant groups in the SPLM-IO, which frequently combats the SPLM. The illicit arms trade in South Sudan is the fuel for its own Civil War. As rebel groups gain access to SALW, they gain the ability to fight back against their opposition. The NWA in South Sudan, as well as the rest of the SPLM-IO, use weapons received from the illicit arms trade against their own government. In South Sudan, whoever controls the arms trade, controls the region. In the Kidepo Valley, the SPLM-IO controls the trade and the region. Until this type of fighting and violence is put to an end, the illicit arms trade will keep growing, and so will the nation’s perilous Civil War.

V. Guiding Questions

1. In what ways can the illicit arms trade perpetuate the violence of South Sudanese conflicts, like the Civil War and ethnic clashes?
2. What can the international community do to limit the flow of SALW throughout South Sudan both before and after the arms arrive in South Sudan?
3. How does the absence of a proper national security and surplus management system affect the results that the illicit arms trade has on civilian safety?
4. In what ways do the government officials in South Sudan contribute to the growth of the illicit arms trade?
5. How does the many tribes and militia groups have an effect on the scale of the illicit arms trade?  Is it positive or negative?

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