

Tab 1



SB64 POSITION PAPER

Advancing Climate Justice in an Age of Crisis

Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice (DCJ)

Background

Climate Justice in an Age of Genocide, Militarism and Climate Breakdown

[SB64](#) (the 64th meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC, from June 8-18 in Bonn, Germany) convenes at a moment when the contradictions shaping the international climate regime have become impossible to ignore. Across the world, communities are confronting escalating climate impacts alongside deepening militarisation, debt crises, economic instability, shrinking civic space, rising authoritarianism and the continued concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small number of states, corporations and financial actors. The climate crisis is unfolding not in isolation, but resulting from a global political order structured by histories and ongoing acts of colonisation, imperialism, racial capitalism, patriarchy, extractivism and the continued sacrifice of peoples and ecosystems in the pursuit of profit for a few.

DCJ joins [social justice movements around the world standing in solidarity with the peoples currently resisting the imperial attacks by the nexus of the U.S.-Israel and its allies across the world, especially Palestine, Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Haiti, Cuba, Venezuela, Nigeria, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others](#). We stand in solidarity with peoples across the world who have been on the receiving end of imperial wars, invasions, attacks to their sovereignty and their right to self-determination. We condemn the subjection of civilians to warfare for territory, natural resources, or religious conflict anywhere and everywhere. We stand in strong opposition to the perpetuation of human and environmental suffering across the world. We commit to a solidarity not based in words but in actions. There cannot be emancipation and liberation with ongoing imperial and colonial capitalism, which must be our first priority to dismantle.

This context matters because climate negotiations are not politically neutral spaces. They are shaped by the same global inequalities that produced the crisis. The countries and corporations most responsible for climate breakdown continue to hold disproportionate power over the terms of climate action, while the peoples and communities most affected continue to fight for their rights and justice. Every major issue on the agenda for SB64, from climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage to just transition, fossil fuel phase-out, mitigation and false solutions, reflects a broader struggle over rights, responsibility, redistribution and the future of multilateralism.

The ongoing genocide in Palestine, carried out by Israel with the military, political and economic backing of the United States and its allies, has laid bare the brutality and hypocrisy



of the present international order. The destruction of Palestinian life, land, food systems, water infrastructure, energy systems, homes, hospitals, schools and places of worship is not only a humanitarian catastrophe. It is also a profound indictment of an international system that claims to uphold human rights, international law and multilateral cooperation while enabling impunity for occupation, apartheid and genocide. For climate justice movements, this moment demands political clarity: there can be no climate justice while genocide is normalised, while occupation is greenwashed, and while systems of militarism and fossil capitalism continue to destroy both peoples and ecosystems.

The relationship between militarism and climate breakdown is not incidental. Fossil fuels remain central to modern military power, geopolitical conflicts and domination, and global economic control. Military operations depend on oil, gas and petrochemical supply chains; fossil fuel revenues and infrastructure shape conflicts and geopolitical alliances; and the military-industrial complex absorbs vast public resources that could otherwise be directed towards climate finance, adaptation, public services and just transition. At the same time, war and occupation destroy the very systems that communities need to survive climate impacts: land, water, food, healthcare, housing, energy and social infrastructure.

This is why the climate crisis must be understood as part of a broader crisis of power imbalance. The same global system that drives emissions also drives war, displacement, debt, extraction and ecological destruction. It is a system that allows fossil fuel corporations to profit while communities lose homes and livelihoods; that allows governments to expand military budgets while claiming there is no money for climate finance; that allows financial institutions to enforce austerity while climate-vulnerable countries are forced to borrow to recover from disasters they did not cause.

The Global South continues to bear the brunt of this injustice. Countries and communities that contributed least to the climate crisis are facing the most severe impacts while being denied the resources necessary to respond. Many developing countries are trapped in cycles of debt servicing, austerity and extractive dependency that restrict their ability to invest in adaptation, public services, food sovereignty, energy transformation and resilient development. International financial institutions, unequal trade rules, intellectual property barriers and investor protections continue to constrain the policy space required for a just transition. In this context, calls for ambition that do not address finance, debt, technology and historical responsibility will become new forms of burden-shifting.

COP30 in Belém created important openings, but it did not resolve these contradictions. The establishment of the Just Transition Mechanism represented a significant victory for developing countries, workers, Indigenous Peoples, feminist movements, youth, frontline communities and climate justice organisations. It reflected years of organising to ensure that transition is not reduced to market-led technological substitution but understood as a question of justice, rights, livelihoods and systems transformation. The roadmap process on transitioning away from fossil fuels also opened a political space to confront the root cause of the climate crisis. Progress on adaptation and related implementation processes created additional possibilities for advancing rights-based and people-centred climate action.



Yet COP30 also demonstrated the continued resistance of developed countries to fulfilling their obligations. Finance remained inadequate. Article 9.1 continued to be contested and diluted. Adaptation and loss and damage remained underfunded. Fossil fuel interests and false solutions continued to shape climate action. Carbon markets, offsets, carbon capture, financialised nature schemes and other mechanisms continued to be promoted as substitutes for real emissions reductions, public finance and system change. The outcomes of Belém therefore created both opportunities and risks. SB64 is where many of these political battles now move from recognition to operationalisation.

This distinction is critical. The fight after Belém is no longer only about whether Parties acknowledge the need for climate finance, just transition, adaptation, loss and damage or fossil fuel phase-out. It is about how those commitments are interpreted, governed, financed and implemented. History shows that implementation is often where justice is diluted. Commitments secured through struggle can be narrowed through technical processes, weakened through procedural delays, captured by corporate interests or redirected towards market mechanisms. SB64 must therefore be approached as a political battleground over the future direction of climate action.

For DCJ, the demands ahead of SB64 are rooted in a clear understanding of climate justice. Developed countries must fulfil their obligations under Article 9.1 and provide public, grant-based, predictable and adequate finance to developing countries. Adaptation and loss and damage must be financed as matters of rights and reparative justice. The Just Transition Mechanism must be operationalised in ways that support systemic transformation across energy, food, care, labour, public services, critical minerals and development pathways. The transition away from fossil fuels must be rapid, equitable, anti-extractivist and grounded in the political vision emerging from Santa Marta. Article 6 and other false solutions must not be allowed to delay real action or create new markets for pollution and dispossession. Mitigation must remain anchored in equity, CBDR-RC and means of implementation rather than becoming another tool for shifting burdens onto developing countries.

SB64 must also defend the integrity of climate multilateralism itself. This means protecting civic space, ensuring meaningful participation of rights-holders and movements, and confronting corporate capture within the UNFCCC. It means recognising that fossil fuel corporations, big polluters and actors complicit in militarism, occupation and ecological destruction cannot be allowed to define climate solutions or climate action. It means understanding that climate governance will lose legitimacy if it continues to treat the demands of the most affected as negotiable while protecting the interests of those most responsible.

The climate crisis is often described as a crisis of emissions. It is that, but it is also far more. It is a crisis of colonial history, economic organisation, political power and moral accountability. Addressing it requires more than technical implementation. It requires reparations, redistribution, democratic participation, public finance, energy sovereignty, food sovereignty, gender justice, Indigenous sovereignty and the dismantling of the systems that have made both people and planet expendable.



This position paper sets out DCJ's priorities for SB64 from that perspective. It is written in the understanding that climate justice will not be delivered through incremental adjustments to an unjust system. It will require confronting the structures that created the crisis and building pathways rooted in collective survival, dignity and liberation. Systems change, not climate change.

Climate Finance Work Programme and Article 9.1

Climate finance remains the defining test of whether the climate regime is prepared to uphold the principles of equity and historical responsibility agreed at Rio in the 1992 UNFCCC. Developed countries continue to fall far short of their obligations despite overwhelming evidence that sufficient resources exist to finance transformative climate action. The struggle over Article 9.1 is not merely a debate about financial flows. It is a struggle over responsibility itself.

[As articulated in its official submission](#), DCJ rejects attempts to frame climate finance as aid, philanthropy or voluntary support. Climate finance is an obligation rooted in historical responsibility and climate debt. Developed countries must provide public, grant-based, predictable and adequate finance consistent with their commitments under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. Climate finance must also be understood within a broader framework of reparative justice that includes debt cancellation, reform of the international financial architecture and mechanisms to ensure that those who have profited most from climate destruction contribute proportionately to addressing its consequences.

Adaptation Finance and the Global Goal on Adaptation

Adaptation is a matter of survival for billions of people across the Global South. Yet adaptation finance remains dramatically inadequate despite rapidly growing needs. Communities are already confronting severe climate impacts while lacking access to the resources necessary to strengthen resilience and protect livelihoods.

DCJ calls for a substantial increase in public, grant-based adaptation finance and rejects efforts to rely on private finance and market mechanisms. Adaptation must be grounded in rights, participation, Indigenous knowledge, food sovereignty and community leadership. The continued development of the Global Goal on Adaptation must support implementation rather than becoming an exercise in technocratic measurement detached from lived realities.

Loss and Damage

The climate crisis is already causing irreversible harms that cannot be prevented through mitigation or adaptation alone. Communities are losing homes, livelihoods, ecosystems, cultures and territories as climate impacts intensify. COP27's establishment of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) represented an important political victory, but current levels of finance remain wholly inadequate compared to actual needs.



DCJ reiterates that loss and damage finance must be understood as reparative finance. It must be new, additional, grant-based and distinct from adaptation and mitigation finance. Polluter-pays mechanisms, including taxes on fossil fuel extraction, extreme wealth and corporate windfall profits, should be advanced as important sources of finance.

Operationalising the Just Transition Mechanism

The establishment of the Just Transition Mechanism at COP30 represented a significant achievement. However, the creation of a mechanism alone does not guarantee justice. A central question in Bonn is whether the way SB64 defines and designs the Mechanism will support transformative change or merely manage the social consequences of existing economic models.

DCJ rejects narrow approaches that reduce just transition to energy sector restructuring or workforce adjustment. Just transition must encompass food systems, care economies, public services, critical minerals, workers' rights, Indigenous sovereignty and democratic control over resources. The Mechanism must be supported by adequate finance and meaningful participation by workers, Indigenous Peoples, peasants, fisherfolk, women, youth and frontline communities.

Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels

COP28's commitment in Dubai to transition away from fossil fuels marked an important breakthrough, but implementation remains contested. The "roadmap" process initiated under the Brazilian COP30 Presidency (as opposed to any agreed mandate by all countries) must not become a vehicle for delaying action or reproducing extractivist development models under new forms.

Drawing on the political vision emerging from Santa Marta, DCJ calls for a transition rooted in justice, sovereignty, care and democratic control. The transition away from fossil fuels must not be used to justify new forms of extraction, including the expansion of critical mineral supply chains that sacrifice communities and ecosystems in the Global South. Climate justice requires confronting both fossil fuels and the systems of power that sustain them.

Article 6 and False Solutions

Climate justice movements continue to confront the expansion of false solutions that allow polluters to delay structural transformation while claiming climate leadership. Carbon markets, offsets, carbon capture technologies, geoengineering and the financialisation of nature all risk entrenching existing power structures while failing to address the root causes of climate breakdown.

The continued promotion of false solutions reflects the influence of fossil fuel interests and corporate actors within climate governance. SB64 must resist efforts to expand reliance in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) on market-based approaches and instead



prioritise real solutions rooted in public accountability, food sovereignty, Indigenous stewardship, community-controlled renewable energy and systemic transformation.

Mitigation Work Programme

The Mitigation Work Programme must remain firmly grounded in equity and CBDR-RC. Developing countries have repeatedly raised concerns regarding attempts to use the MWP as a vehicle for shifting mitigation burdens onto countries least responsible for the climate crisis while developed countries continue to evade obligations on finance and support.

Mitigation ambition cannot be separated from means of implementation. Climate finance, technology transfer, debt justice and policy space remain essential prerequisites for equitable climate action.

Cross-Cutting Priorities

Across all negotiating tracks, DCJ calls for climate action grounded in equity, historical responsibility, human rights, Indigenous sovereignty, feminist climate justice, democratic participation and protection from corporate capture. Climate governance must strengthen civic space, ensure meaningful participation by rights-holders and adopt robust conflict-of-interest policies that prevent fossil fuel interests and big polluters from shaping climate action.

The Challenge Before SB64

A central challenge facing SB64 is not the absence of solutions. Communities, movements and frontline peoples have long advanced pathways capable of addressing both climate breakdown and social injustice. The challenge is whether governments are prepared to confront the structures of power and privilege that continue to benefit from the crisis.

For DCJ, climate action must be rooted in reparative justice, international solidarity and systemic transformation. Anything less will preserve the unequal and unjust systems that created the climate crisis while leaving its underlying causes intact. SB64 must therefore advance implementation in ways that strengthen accountability, uphold historical responsibility and support the system change grounded in the peoples led solutions necessary to secure a just, equitable, healthy life and planet for all.

Palestine, Energy Embargo and Climate Justice

Confronting Genocide, Occupation and Fossil-Fuelled Militarism

The Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice unequivocally condemns the ongoing genocide being carried out against the Palestinian people and the continued occupation, apartheid and settler-colonial violence imposed by the genocidal state of Israel with the political, military and economic backing of the United States and its allies. The systematic



destruction of Palestinian life cannot be treated as a peripheral issue; it is central to any honest understanding of justice, accountability and international cooperation.

The world has witnessed the destruction of entire families, neighbourhoods, refugee camps, hospitals, schools, universities, places of worship, agricultural lands, water systems and energy infrastructure. Palestinians have been murdered, displaced, starved, besieged and denied access to the basic rights necessary for survival. The struggle for Palestinian liberation is inseparable from the broader struggles against colonialism, imperialism, militarism, racism, patriarchy and economic exploitation that climate justice movements have long confronted. The same systems that dispossess Palestinian communities are the systems that displace Indigenous Peoples, destroy forests, privatise water, criminalise land defenders, expand fossil fuel extraction and sacrifice communities across the Global South in the pursuit of profit and geopolitical power.

Ecocide, Imperialism and Palestine Liberation

The violence inflicted upon Palestine is not only the destruction of human life. Across Gaza, agricultural lands have been destroyed, orchards uprooted, fisheries devastated, water infrastructure destroyed or rendered inoperable, sanitation systems collapsed and energy systems repeatedly targeted. Ecocide is not merely environmental damage; it is the large-scale destruction of ecosystems and ecological relationships upon which communities depend. This is particularly significant in the context of climate vulnerability, which is often discussed as a consequence of rising temperatures, extreme weather events and changing ecological conditions. Yet vulnerability is also politically produced. Communities become vulnerable when access to land, water, energy, food, healthcare, housing and social protection is destroyed or denied. Comprehending the ecological destruction taking place within Israel's genocide illuminates the critical intersections that exist between the climate/ecological crisis and the Palestinian liberation struggle. There can be no true global climate justice without Palestinian liberation, just as the fight for Palestinian freedom is inherently tied to the survival of the earth and humanity.

Fossil Fuels, Militarism and the Architecture of Imperial Power

The genocide in Palestine, and the US-Israel led imperialist wars on Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba also reveals the deeper relationship between fossil fuels, militarism and global systems of power. Climate negotiations often treat fossil fuels primarily as sources of greenhouse gas emissions but fossil fuels are also infrastructures of geopolitical power. Modern militaries are among the most fossil-fuel-dependent institutions in the world and the [carbon footprint of Israel's war on Gaza exceeds that of many countries](#). The fossil fuel economy does not merely emit carbon but also fuels the machinery of imperialism, war, occupation, colonialism, extractions and destruction of the planet.

These dynamics are visible across other regions of the Global South. Economic coercion, unilateral sanctions, resource extraction, military intervention and geopolitical competition continue to shape the realities of countries such as Iran, Venezuela and Cuba. Across Africa,



Asia and Latin America, communities confront extractive industries, resource grabs and energy projects imposed without consent in the name of development, security or economic growth. The same global order that treats Palestinian life as expendable also treats territories across the Global South as sacrifice zones for continued extraction and profit.

The [Peoples Summit Declaration](#) emerging from Santa Marta recognised these common realities. Hence the struggle for climate justice is much broader than emissions reductions and must also confront the political and economic structures through which fossil fuels sustain systems of violence and extraction.

Military Emissions, Military Expenditure, and the Climate Governance Blind Spot

[One of the most significant contradictions within international climate governance is the near absence of discussion around militarism and military emissions.](#) The UNFCCC process devotes enormous attention to emissions accounting, transparency frameworks and mitigation pathways. Yet military activities remain among the least scrutinised sources of emissions globally. [Military emissions reporting remains inconsistent, incomplete and frequently shielded from public scrutiny.](#)

This omission is not merely technical. It reflects political choices about which sources of emissions are considered legitimate subjects of international accountability and which are protected by claims of national security, geopolitical interest or military necessity. The contradiction becomes even sharper when viewed alongside climate finance. Governments that argue that public finance for adaptation, loss and damage or just transition is fiscally constrained continue to allocate vast sums to military expansion. [The same states resisting obligations under Article 9.1 routinely mobilise resources for weapons, military bases, border regimes and geopolitical competition.](#) In 2024, worldwide military expenditure had its steepest rise since the end of the cold war, reaching \$2.7tn [an increase of 9.4 per cent in real terms from 2023.](#) The question is therefore not whether public resources exist, but whose security is prioritised and whose lives are considered expendable. SB64 should begin recognising that climate finance, fossil fuel phase-out and mitigation cannot be separated from the structures of militarism that continue to consume resources, produce emissions and devastate communities.

From Solidarity to Accountability: Energy Embargo on Israel

The growing calls emerging from Palestinian movements for a [global energy embargo on Israel](#) is a demand to move from symbolic expressions of support towards material accountability.

These demands recognise that systems of violence are sustained through energy supply chains, financial institutions, insurers, shipping companies, infrastructure providers and corporations that continue to profit from occupation and genocide. Energy embargoes are interventions aimed at disrupting the infrastructures that sustain occupation and not just a foreign policy tool.



This also raises an integral issue around corporate accountability. Fossil fuel corporations cannot simultaneously present themselves as partners in climate solutions while benefiting from systems of militarism, occupation and ecological destruction. Similarly, financial institutions cannot claim climate leadership while underwriting activities that enable violence and dispossession. Governments cannot claim commitment to international cooperation while allowing energy trade and infrastructure to fuel genocide.

Implications for SB64

The climate regime can no longer treat militarism, occupation and conflict as issues external to climate governance. The relationships between fossil fuels, military power, corporate interests and climate breakdown must be recognised and addressed. SB64 should open space for meaningful discussion on military emissions, fossil fuel supply chains in contexts of conflict, conflict-of-interest protections, and safeguards to ensure that climate finance does not support actors complicit in genocide, occupation or ecological destruction.

This also requires confronting corporate capture within the UNFCCC. Fossil fuel corporations and financial actors whose business models depend upon extraction, militarisation and environmental destruction cannot be allowed to define climate solutions. Climate governance must be protected from those whose profits depend on the continuation of the crisis.

The struggle for Palestinian liberation and the struggle for climate justice are therefore inseparable. Both seek to dismantle a global order organised around extraction, dispossession and profit, and to build one rooted in justice, dignity, self-determination and collective survival.

Climate Finance and Article 9.1

Reparative Justice, Redistribution and Climate Finance

Climate finance remains the defining political fault line within the climate regime. More than three decades after the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and ten years after the Paris Agreement, the central question confronting climate negotiations remains unresolved: will those most responsible for the climate crisis provide the resources necessary for an equitable global response, or will the costs of climate action continue to be shifted onto those least responsible for creating the problem?

This question sits at the centre of nearly every agenda item before SB64. The implementation of the Just Transition Mechanism, progress on adaptation, the operationalisation of loss and damage finance, the transition away from fossil fuels and the ability of developing countries to pursue equitable development pathways all depend upon the availability of adequate, predictable and public finance. Climate finance is therefore not



one negotiating issue among many. It is the foundation upon which meaningful implementation across the climate regime depends.

The persistent failure of developed countries to meet their obligations continues to undermine trust in the multilateral process. While climate impacts intensify across the Global South, many developed countries continue to expand fossil fuel production, increase military spending and protect corporate interests while resisting efforts to mobilise climate finance at the scale required by science and justice. The gap between political rhetoric and material commitment has become one of the defining crises of the climate regime.

Defending Article 9.1 and Historical Responsibility

For many developing countries and climate justice movements, Article 9.1 represents one of the most important safeguards against attempts to shift discussions away from obligations and towards broader narratives of shared responsibility, voluntary contributions and private capital mobilisation. These approaches frequently present climate finance as a collective challenge requiring contributions from all actors while downplaying the specific obligations of developed countries.

Such narratives are deeply problematic. They obscure the historical realities that gave rise to the climate crisis and undermining the political foundations of international cooperation. The climate regime was never built on the assumption that all countries bear equal responsibility for climate change. It was built on the recognition that responsibility, capability and vulnerability are distributed unequally and that climate action must therefore be guided by equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).

Industrialised countries accumulated wealth through development pathways that relied upon unrestricted fossil fuel use and the large-scale extraction of resources, labour and ecological wealth from colonised territories in the Global South. These processes enabled a relatively small number of countries to achieve industrialisation while occupying a disproportionate share of the Earth's atmospheric space. The benefits of this development remain concentrated within those economies, while many of the social and ecological costs have been externalised onto communities across the Global South.

The concept of climate debt emerges from this history. It recognises that the climate crisis is not merely the result of emissions but of unequal social, economic and political relations that have shaped both development and vulnerability. Climate debt therefore challenges attempts to frame climate finance as aid or charity. Instead, it locates climate finance within a broader framework of accountability and reparative justice. This perspective is particularly important at a time when many developed countries continue to portray climate finance as discretionary support rather than an obligation arising from historical responsibility

[Many developing countries now face an increasingly unsustainable combination of debt burdens, climate vulnerability and fiscal constraints.](#) Large portions of public revenue are directed towards debt servicing while governments struggle to finance healthcare, education,



social protection, adaptation and climate resilience. Climate disasters frequently exacerbate these pressures, [forcing governments to assume additional debt in order to rebuild infrastructure and support affected communities](#). Hence, debt cancellation, financial reform and expanded fiscal space must therefore be understood as integral components of climate action

Article 9.1 Work Programme

The current climate finance work programme, arrived at as a compromise in Belem due to rigid opposition by developed countries to the original proposal, therefore needs to bring back the rightful focus on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement (PA) which clearly mandates the legal obligations and commitments of developed countries to provide climate finance, “in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention”. Specifically Article 4.3 of the Convention provides for “new and additional” financial resources by developed countries to developing countries as well as the “need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing” among developed countries; furthermore, it directly links to Article 11 of the Convention which defines the “Financial Mechanism” as a “mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology”. All these fundamental elements, based on the underlying principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, are therefore legally tied to Article 9.1 of the PA and must be addressed comprehensively by the thematic pillars of the work programme to arrive at concrete outputs and outcomes that are actionable and meaningful.

The role and delivery of Article 9.1 is key in the context of the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 and the aspirational target of at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. Solid and substantial provision of finance is imperative to enable the mobilisation expected to meet these figures - and to go beyond, given that the NCQG is a highly unambitious goal falling far short of both demand and actual needs (with the latest Needs Determination Report citing USD 5.01-6.88 trillion up to 2030 for developing countries’ NDCs alone, not taking into account additional costs of the energy transition away from fossil fuels).

[Read DCJ's submission on Article 9.1](#)

The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap and the Future of Climate Finance

The decisions adopted at COP29 and COP30 have created a new phase in climate finance discussions. The establishment of the NCQG and the development of the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap have generated expectations regarding the scale, quality and delivery of finance required to support implementation across the climate regime. Yet significant concerns remain regarding the direction of these discussions.

Developing countries and climate justice movements have repeatedly warned against approaches that prioritise accounting exercises and mobilisation narratives while avoiding the central question of public finance obligations. There is a growing tendency within climate



finance debates to focus on aggregate financial flows without adequately distinguishing between public and private finance, grants and loans, or obligations and voluntary contributions. Such approaches create the appearance of progress while leaving underlying inequalities intact.

The success of the Roadmap process will ultimately depend not on the volume of finance that can be claimed on paper but on whether it strengthens accountability, increases public grant-based finance and delivers resources to the communities and countries that need them most. A roadmap that substitutes private investment for public obligations or that obscures developed country responsibilities behind broader mobilisation targets will fail to address the political crisis at the heart of climate finance negotiations.

What SB64 Must Deliver

For climate justice movements, SB64 must reaffirm that climate finance remains an obligation rather than a voluntary contribution and any discussions on implementation must strengthen, rather than weaken, the principles embedded in Article 9.1 and CBDR-RC. Progress on adaptation, loss and damage, just transition and the transition away from fossil fuels will remain impossible without substantial increases in public, grant-based finance provided by developed countries in line with their historical responsibilities.

SB64 should therefore advance discussions that strengthen accountability under the NCQG, defend developed country obligations, support debt justice and fiscal sovereignty, reject efforts to substitute private finance for public responsibility and ensure that climate finance is delivered in ways that support transformative, community-led and rights-based approaches to climate action.

Adaptation Finance

Financing Survival, Resilience and Climate Justice

Adaptation finance has long occupied a paradoxical position within the climate regime. While adaptation is recognised as an urgent priority for billions of people across the Global South, it continues to receive only a fraction of the resources required to address rapidly escalating climate impacts. Communities are already confronting increasingly severe floods, droughts, storms, heatwaves, sea-level rise and ecosystem degradation, yet the financial support necessary to strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability remains profoundly inadequate. Unlike many mitigation discussions that focus on avoiding future warming, adaptation concerns the realities that communities are experiencing today. Across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Pacific, climate impacts are already disrupting food systems, threatening water security, damaging livelihoods and placing enormous strain on public infrastructure and social systems. The need for adaptation finance therefore reflects existing realities rather than future projections.



Adaptation is often presented as a technical challenge involving infrastructure, technology and risk management. While these dimensions are important, such framings can obscure the political and social realities that shape vulnerability as communities do not experience climate impacts equally. Exposure to climate hazards is profoundly influenced by access to land, housing, healthcare, education, social protection, public services and political power. The communities most vulnerable to climate change are also confronting poverty, marginalisation, land dispossession, discrimination and economic exclusion. Financing adaptation cannot be reduced to building infrastructure or deploying technologies. It must also support the social, economic and political conditions that enable communities to respond to climate impacts with dignity and agency. Adaptation finance must therefore strengthen food sovereignty, public services, social protection systems, community-led adaptation, Indigenous territorial governance and ecosystem stewardship rather than focusing narrowly on technical interventions.

The Adaptation Finance Gap

Despite repeated commitments by developed countries, adaptation finance remains dramatically below identified needs. The [Adaptation Gap Report 2025 by UNEP](#) clearly shows that the need for adaptation finance is at more than US\$365 billion a year, yet the international public adaptation finance flows to developing countries were US\$26 billion in 2023. At the same time, National Adaptation Plans submitted by developing countries estimate [total adaptation finance needs at \\$842-844 billion](#). While climate impacts continue to intensify, financial support has failed to keep pace with growing needs. This gap reflects broader political choices regarding how climate finance is mobilised and distributed. Adaptation requires large scale grants-based public financing to strengthen public healthcare systems, climate resilient food systems and agriculture, restoring ecosystems, improving water management and expanding social protection. However, the lack of adaptation finance clearly demonstrates why public finance remains indispensable to climate justice. However, one of the most troubling trends within adaptation finance is the continued reliance on loans as a source of support.

Communities are being forced to adapt because they are experiencing the consequences of a crisis disproportionately created by others. Requiring vulnerable countries to assume additional debt in order to respond to climate impacts effectively transfers the costs of climate breakdown onto those least responsible for causing it. Climate-vulnerable countries should not be forced to choose between investing in resilience and managing debt burdens. Adaptation should not become another mechanism through which wealth is extracted from vulnerable countries under the guise of climate support. Rather, adaptation finance must contribute to expanding fiscal space and strengthening public resilience. Countries must come together and set a replenishment target for adaptation that is ambitious and meets the trillions of dollars of the scale of need of the Global South.

Food Sovereignty, Agroecology and Community Resilience



The growing climate crisis is placing enormous pressure on food systems across the Global South. Unpredictable rainfall, prolonged droughts, flooding, soil degradation and ecosystem disruption are already affecting the ability of communities to produce food and sustain livelihoods. [Adaptation finance must support transformative approaches to food systems](#) rather than reinforcing industrial agricultural models that contribute to environmental degradation and dependence on fossil-fuel-intensive inputs. Agroecology, food sovereignty, Indigenous food systems and community-controlled seed systems offer pathways that strengthen resilience while supporting biodiversity, local economies and community autonomy.

These approaches are particularly important because they simultaneously address multiple dimensions of vulnerability. They improve food security, strengthen livelihoods, support ecosystem health and reduce dependence on external inputs. Yet they remain significantly underfunded compared to large-scale infrastructure and market-based interventions.

A climate justice approach to adaptation finance therefore requires a substantial shift in priorities towards community-led and ecosystem-based approaches that strengthen resilience from the ground up.

Adaptation Finance After COP30

The outcomes emerging from COP30 reinforced the importance of adaptation while highlighting the continuing challenges associated with implementation. Progress on adaptation frameworks and indicators has generated new opportunities for monitoring and accountability, but these developments cannot substitute for the mobilisation of adequate resources. For this reason, adaptation finance must remain central to discussions at SB64. The success of adaptation-related outcomes adopted in recent years will ultimately be judged not by the sophistication of reporting systems but whether communities gain access to the resources necessary to strengthen resilience and protect livelihoods.

What SB64 Must Deliver

- Substantially increase public, grant-based adaptation finance in line with developed countries' obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement.
- Close the adaptation finance gap through predictable, accessible, and adequate finance that does not create additional debt burdens.
- Ensure adaptation finance reaches frontline communities directly and supports locally led adaptation efforts.
- Prioritise funding for food sovereignty, agroecology, Indigenous Peoples' stewardship, ecosystem restoration, public services, and social protection systems.
- Guarantee that adaptation action advances climate justice, self-determination, human rights, and democratic participation.
- Reject loan-based approaches and ensure adaptation finance supports sustainable development pathways rather than deepening inequalities.



Loss and Damage Fund

From Recognition to Reparative Justice

The creation of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was a hard-won victory secured through decades of struggle by climate-vulnerable countries and climate justice movements. It reflected the recognition that communities across the Global South are already experiencing irreversible climate impacts, including the loss of lives, livelihoods, ecosystems, cultures, territories and ways of life, despite having contributed least to the climate crisis. At its core, loss and damage is not simply a question of finance but of reparations, historical responsibility, accountability and climate justice.

Today, climate-related losses are escalating at an unprecedented pace. Communities are confronting increasingly severe floods, droughts, typhoons, sea-level rise, devastating heatwaves, and ecosystem collapse, while non-economic losses such as cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, biodiversity and community identity continue to disappear. Yet current financial commitments remain dramatically disconnected from the scale of need. [Existing pledges to the FRLD](#) represent only a tiny fraction of the hundreds of billions of dollars lost to losses and damages annually, while projected needs are expected to reach trillions of dollars by 2030. The gap reflects not a lack of available resources, but a continued refusal by developed countries to meet their historical responsibilities.

As discussions continue at SB64, there is a growing risk that loss and damage is reduced to a humanitarian or charitable issue rather than being treated as a matter of reparative justice. Loss and damage finance is an obligation arising from historical emissions, climate debt and the polluter-pays principle. The finance is needed to respond to climate impacts that already exist and will increase over the years and should include measures such as diverting military spending, ending fossil fuel subsidies, taxing big polluters, windfall profit taxes, etc.

What SB64 and the FRLD Must Deliver

At SB64, Parties must move beyond discussions on institutional arrangements and focus on delivering finance at the scale required by affected communities. The FRLD must be resources with at least US\$1 trillion annually by 2030 in new, public, grant-based finance from developed countries and other polluters, reflecting their historical responsibility for climate breakdown. Finance must be additional to existing climate finance commitments and must not create new debt burdens for developing countries.

SB64 and the FRLD must also:

- Secure predictable, adequate, new and grant based public finance to the tune of 1 trillion USD annually by 2030
- Ensure direct and simplified access for frontline communities, Indigenous Peoples, farmers, small landholders, pastoralists, peasants, forest dwellers and workers,



fisherfolk and coastal communities, youth, women, workers and other affected groups.

- Recognise and respond to both economic and non-economic losses and damages.
- Establish democratic, transparent and rights-based governance that prioritises affected communities over financial and corporate interests.
- Maintain loss and damage as a distinct pillar of climate action, separate from adaptation and mitigation finance.

The credibility of the FRLD will ultimately be judged not by the sophistication of its governance structures but by whether it delivers meaningful, accessible and adequately resourced support to communities already bearing the costs of a crisis they did not create.

Operationalising the Just Transition Mechanism

From Managing Transition to System Change

The establishment of the Just Transition Mechanism at COP30 marked a significant political breakthrough, recognising that addressing the climate crisis requires not only emissions reductions but also confronting the social, economic and political transformations associated with moving away from fossil fuels. However, the creation of the Mechanism is only the beginning. The key question facing SB64 is whether it will support a genuinely transformative transition rooted in justice, equity and democratic participation, or whether it will simply manage the social consequences of a transition shaped by existing economic and political interests.

Climate justice movements continue to challenge narrow approaches that frame transition primarily as a technological, investment and market-driven process. Emphasis needs to be on a just transition that addresses the structural drivers of the climate crisis, including colonialism, extractivism, corporate power, patriarchy and economic inequality. Transition must go beyond energy systems to encompass food sovereignty, care economies, labour rights, public services, resource governance and peoples led solutions for the development pathways.

The discussions and political declarations emerging from the Peoples' Assembly and movement spaces in Santa Marta reinforced this broader vision. Movements from across Africa, Asia, Latin America stressed that transitioning away from fossil fuels must be inseparable from struggles for Indigenous sovereignty, economic justice, gender justice, peace, self-determination and food sovereignty. Energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy must not be through new forms of extraction and corporate control as critical mineral mining rapidly expands due to high demand and can lead to creating new sacrifice zones across the Global South.



At the same time, major challenges remain. Developed countries continue to fall short of providing the public, grant-based finance, technology transfer and means of implementation required for developing countries to pursue equitable transition pathways. Without adequate support, just transition will become an unfunded political aspiration while the costs of decarbonisation are shifted onto countries and communities least responsible for the climate crisis. Discussions on just transition therefore cannot be separated from climate finance obligations under Article 9.1, debt justice and broader questions of development justice.

What SB64 Must Deliver

At SB64, Parties must ensure that the operationalisation of the Just Transition Mechanism and the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels are firmly grounded in climate justice principles. This includes:

- Ensuring the Just Transition Mechanism is guided by equity, CBDR-RC, human rights, Indigenous Peoples' rights and democratic participation.
- A mechanism that ensures active civil society participation, especially from the Global South to help shape a mechanism that delivers for the communities at the frontline of the crisis
- Recognising food sovereignty, care economies, labour rights, public services and community-controlled development as central pillars of just transition.
- Rejecting false solutions, green extractivism and market-led approaches that reproduce existing inequalities and corporate control.
- Guaranteeing meaningful participation of workers, Indigenous Peoples, peasants, fisherfolk, women, youth and frontline communities in all transition-related processes.
- Securing substantial new, public, grant-based climate finance in line with Article 9.1 obligations to support equitable transition pathways across the Global South.
- Ensuring that the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels delivers a feminist, rapid, just, equitable and fully funded phase-out of fossil fuels while advancing development justice and peoples led solutions for a system change
- Operationalising Just Transition Mechanism by 2027

The struggle over just transition is ultimately a struggle over who shapes the future economy. SB64 must ensure that the Just Transition Mechanism becomes a vehicle for system change rather than a tool for managing the social impacts of an unjust economic model.

Feminist, Rapid, Just, Equitable and Fully Funded Transition Away from Fossil Fuels

From Santa Marta to SB64: Advancing a Climate Justice Roadmap Beyond Fossil Fuels



The launch of a roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels at COP30 marked an important political milestone after decades of pressure from climate justice movements. The roadmap process now enters a critical phase where the key question is no longer whether fossil fuels must be phased out, but how the transition will occur, who will control it, who will benefit from it, and whether it will address the structural injustices that underpin the fossil fuel economy.

The Peoples' Assembly and movement convenings in Santa Marta provided a clear climate justice vision for this transition. The [Peoples Declaration](#) emphasised that the climate crisis is inseparable from systems of colonialism, extractivism, militarism, patriarchy and corporate power. [Movements called for a transition rooted in self-determination, Indigenous sovereignty, food sovereignty, democratic control over resources, gender justice and public goods, new, additional, non-debt creating grant based finance for transition away from fossil fuels while rejecting market-led approaches that seek to create new opportunities for profit from the climate crisis.](#)

A major challenge facing the roadmap process is the growing promotion of false solutions that allow fossil fuel production and corporate power to continue under the guise of climate action. Carbon markets, offsets, carbon capture and storage (CCS), direct air capture, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), geoengineering, fossil hydrogen, and large-scale nature commodification schemes continue to be advanced as pathways to delay real emissions reductions and avoid a genuine phase-out of fossil fuels. Rather than addressing the root causes of climate breakdown, these approaches often deepen land grabs, human rights violations, financial speculation and corporate control while shifting burdens onto communities in the Global South.

At the same time fossil fuel dependence cannot be replaced with a new era of extractivism driven by the demand for critical minerals. Across Africa, Asia and Latin America, communities are already confronting displacement, ecosystem destruction and violations of Indigenous rights linked to mining projects justified in the name of the energy transition. A just transition away from fossil fuels cannot simply replace one extractive model with another. It must transform systems of production, consumption and ownership while respecting community rights and ecological limits.

The transition debate must also extend beyond energy systems. Food sovereignty, agroecology, Indigenous food systems, public services, care economies and social protection are essential pillars of a just transition. Similarly, developed countries must provide substantial public, grant-based finance, technology transfer and means of implementation in line with Article 9.1 and CBDR-RC to support equitable transition pathways across the Global South.

Food Sovereignty and the Transition Beyond Fossil Fuels

Discussions on the transition away from fossil fuels tend to focus almost largely on energy systems, while ignoring the industrial food systems that are deeply embedded within the



fossil fuel economy. Fossil fuels play a large role in fertiliser production, petrochemical inputs, industrial processing, long-distance transportation and highly concentrated supply chains. Large scale industrial agriculture not only contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions but also drives biodiversity loss, soil degradation and contamination of the water systems, and elimination of the traditional knowledge and practices of the food systems.

Hence a meaningful transition away from fossil fuels must therefore include the transformation of food systems. Agroecology, food sovereignty, Indigenous food systems, traditional agricultural practices, and community-controlled seed systems offer pathways that reduce dependence on fossil-fuel-intensive production models while strengthening resilience, biodiversity and local economies. These approaches are increasingly recognised as important contributions to mitigation and adaptation, but they also represent an essential component of just transition. The roadmap process should explicitly recognise food sovereignty as a central pillar of transition.

Financing the Transition and Upholding Equity

The transition away from fossil fuels will not occur in a just or equitable manner without substantial financial support for developing countries. Many countries across the Global South continue to confront energy poverty, infrastructure deficits, debt burdens and development challenges while simultaneously facing pressure to decarbonise. The ability of these countries to pursue equitable transition pathways depends heavily on access to finance, technology transfer, broader means of implementation, and capacity building.

Hence the discussion on the roadmap cannot be separated from Article 9.1, climate finance and broader questions of historical responsibility. The trillions of dollars due can come from [six major sources of financial flows](#), including redirected Global North military budgets and fossil fuel subsidies, as well as new arrangements for international tax, trade and debt justice, including waivers on intellectual property rights for climate technologies. Developed countries bear a responsibility not only to reduce emissions domestically but also to support transition efforts in countries that contributed least to the climate crisis. Without such support it will be just another mechanism through which costs are transferred onto those least responsible for climate breakdown.

What SB64 Must Deliver

As Parties advance discussions on the roadmap, SB64 must ensure that the transition away from fossil fuels remains grounded in climate justice principles rather than market mechanisms. The roadmap should be explicitly aligned with CBDR-RC, human rights obligations, Indigenous Peoples' rights, and the right to development. It should recognise food sovereignty, democratic governance, feminist energy justice and community control over resources as central dimensions of transition rather than peripheral considerations.

The roadmap must also reject approaches that rely on new forms of extractivism, corporate capture or false solutions to delay the phase-out of fossil fuels. It should be supported by substantial public finance provided in accordance with Article 9.1 and linked to broader



efforts to operationalise the Just Transition Mechanism and support equitable development pathways across the Global South. Hence the priorities at SB64 for a feminist, fast, just, equitable, and fully funded fossil fuel phase out must prioritise:

- A clear and time-bound pathway for the equitable phase-out of fossil fuels.
- Rejection of carbon markets, offsets, CCS, geoengineering and other false solutions that delay real action.
- Safeguards against new forms of extractivism linked to critical minerals and renewable energy supply chains.
- Recognition of food sovereignty, agroecology, feminist energy justice and community-controlled renewable energy systems as central pillars of transition.
- Substantial public, grant-based finance and means of implementation from developed countries to support just transitions in the Global South.
- Strong links between the roadmap process and the operationalisation of the Just Transition Mechanism to ensure participation of affected communities and workers.

For climate justice movements, the transition away from fossil fuels will be judged not only by emissions reductions but by whether it dismantles the systems of exploitation, inequality and corporate capture that created the climate crisis in the first place. A transition built on false solutions and new sacrifice zones is not a just transition.

Article 6 and False Solutions

Ensuring Climate Action Centers Real Solutions over Market Expansion, Technofixes, and Corporate Capture

As the climate crisis accelerates, the gap between what science demands and what action governments are prepared to take remains stark. While communities around the world and especially across the Global South continue to experience escalating climate impacts, many of the policy responses advanced within international climate governance remain fundamentally disconnected from the scale and urgency of the transformation required.

There is a continued promotion of schemes that attempt to retroactively account for continued emissions— false solutions like market-based mechanisms, carbon trading systems and a growing array of technological interventions like geoengineering.

For decades, climate justice movements, Indigenous Peoples, frontline communities and civil society organisations have warned that many of the mechanisms promoted under the banner of climate action do not address the root causes of climate change. Instead, they allow continued fossil fuel extraction, delay structural transformation and create new opportunities for profit and accumulation while further shifting social and ecological burdens onto communities least responsible for the crisis.

The debates surrounding Article 6 are therefore not simply technical discussions concerning carbon accounting or international cooperation. False solutions offer pathways through



which governments and corporations can claim climate leadership while avoiding the deeper transformations required to address the crisis. They allow fossil fuel expansion to coexist with climate commitments by creating opportunities for continued extraction while presenting technological innovation and market mechanisms as substitutes for structural change. Most importantly, they preserve existing concentrations of wealth and power by minimising disruption to the economic interests that have benefited from fossil fuel dependence.

This dynamic is particularly visible in debates surrounding “net-zero” commitments. Across multiple sectors, companies continue to announce ambitious climate targets while simultaneously investing in new fossil fuel infrastructure and relying heavily on offsets, carbon removals and future technological interventions to justify continued emissions. Such strategies frequently postpone meaningful action into the future while allowing current patterns of extraction, production and consumption to remain largely unchanged.

Article 6 and the Expansion of Carbon Markets

Article 6 remains one of the most contested components of the Paris Agreement because it institutionalises the possibility of using these faulty market mechanisms and international carbon trading as the bedrock of fulfilling climate commitments. [Extensive research shows carbon markets do not meaningfully reduce emissions but create mechanisms that spur harm and delay action](#). Rather than requiring polluters to directly reduce fossil fuel use or emissions-intensive activities, carbon markets allow emissions to be theoretically displaced geographically while maintaining the appearance of climate action, regardless of whether those reductions actually happen or not.

Investigations into offset schemes have repeatedly exposed concerns regarding additionality, permanence, double counting, inflated baselines and the over-crediting of projects that would likely have occurred regardless of carbon finance. Multiple independent studies have concluded that a significant proportion of carbon credits issued through major voluntary market schemes fail to represent genuine emissions reductions.

By allowing polluters to purchase credits rather than directly reduce emissions, carbon markets delay the structural changes required to phase out fossil fuels. They create incentives to search for the cheapest available offsets rather than pursue transformative changes within energy, transport, food and industrial systems.

Under many offset schemes, forests, agricultural lands, wetlands, oceans and other ecosystems are transformed into units of carbon storage that can be measured, traded and used to compensate for emissions elsewhere. While often presented as conservation initiatives, such approaches frequently reduce complex ecosystems and social relationships to their carbon value alone.

This process has significant implications for Indigenous Peoples, local communities, smallholder farmers, forest-dependent peoples, and fisherfolk and coastal communities. Communities are often excluded from decision-making processes concerning lands they have stewarded for generations. Forests, grasslands, rivers, oceans, and agricultural



landscapes support livelihoods, cultures, biodiversity and systems of knowledge that cannot be reduced to carbon accounting frameworks.

Emerging False Solutions in the Transition Debate

As pressure for fossil fuel phase-out grows, new forms of false solutions continue to emerge. Technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), direct air capture and storage (DACs) and various forms of geoengineering are increasingly promoted as pathways for achieving climate goals while allowing continued fossil fuel use. The primary concern is not technological innovation itself but the tendency to use speculative future technologies to justify delays in emissions reductions today. Many scenarios promoted by fossil fuel companies and supportive governments rely heavily on large-scale deployment of carbon removal technologies despite significant concerns regarding feasibility, costs, environmental impacts and governance.

Similarly, certain forms of hydrogen development are increasingly being used to extend the lifespan of fossil fuel infrastructure rather than accelerate its phase-out. The roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels must avoid becoming dependent on speculative technologies that postpone action while creating new opportunities for corporate profit.

Real Solutions for Climate Justice

The critique of false solutions is not a rejection of climate action but a recognition that real solutions already exist and are being advanced by communities and movements across the world. These solutions include the rapid and equitable phase-out of fossil fuels, public investment in renewable energy, community-controlled energy systems, agroecology, agroforestry, food sovereignty, ecosystem restoration, care-centred economies and democratic control over resources. They are rooted not in market expansion but in collective wellbeing, ecological sustainability and social justice.

Indigenous Peoples, peasant and farmer movements, fisherfolk communities, workers' organisations, youth movements, feminist movements and frontline communities have long demonstrated that climate action can strengthen resilience, improve livelihoods and support more equitable societies when organised around rights and participation rather than profit. These experiences provide important lessons for the future direction of climate governance.

What SB64 Must Deliver

As Parties continue advancing Article 6 implementation and broader discussions on climate action, SB64 must ensure that market mechanisms do not undermine the integrity of climate commitments or delay the transition away from fossil fuels. The implementation of Article 6 must include robust human rights safeguards, protections for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, strong accountability mechanisms and meaningful participation by affected rights-holders.



At the same time, Parties must reject efforts to use carbon markets, carbon offsets, carbon removals and other false solutions as substitutes for direct emissions reductions and fossil fuel phase-out. Climate action must remain focused on reducing emissions at source, advancing just transition pathways and supporting community-led solutions rooted in equity and self-determination.

SB64 should also advance discussions on conflict-of-interest policies and corporate accountability within the climate regime. The credibility of climate governance depends upon its ability to resist undue influence from actors whose interests are fundamentally incompatible with climate justice. The climate crisis cannot be solved through mechanisms that preserve the systems responsible for creating it and requires confronting those systems directly while advancing solutions capable of transforming them.

[Read DCJ's briefing on challenging the inclusion or reinforcing of false solutions in any outcome of the First Conference on Transition away from Fossil Fuels](#)

Mitigation Work Programme

Equity, Development Justice and the Limits of Burden-Shifting

The climate crisis demands urgent and deep emissions reductions, but climate justice requires that mitigation efforts remain firmly grounded in equity and historical responsibility. Since its establishment, the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) has become one of the most politically contested areas of the UNFCCC, with growing concerns that discussions are increasingly treating mitigation as a technical exercise rather than a question of justice, development, and differentiated responsibilities. Emissions reductions are treated as a universal technical challenge rather than a political question shaped by profoundly unequal histories of development, responsibility and capacity. This will lead to creation of pathways through which countries that contributed least to climate breakdown are subjected to increasing pressure to act while those most responsible continue to evade their obligations regarding finance, technology transfer and capacity building support.

A key challenge at SB64 is the continued push by some developed countries, most responsible for the ongoing climate crisis, to use the MWP to increase pressure on developing countries to enhance mitigation ambition while failing to deliver adequate finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building support. Developing countries continue to stress that mitigation cannot be separated from the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), the right to development, and the provision of means of implementation. Countries with greater historical responsibility and greater financial and technological resources must undertake deeper and faster emissions reductions while also providing support for climate action elsewhere.

Climate finance under Article 9.1 remains a prerequisite for equitable mitigation, yet financial commitment from the developed countries continues to fall short.



Technically, negotiations remain focused on the scope and purpose of the MWP, including whether it should remain a non-prescriptive platform for sharing experiences and identifying opportunities, or evolve into a mechanism that indirectly increases expectations on developing countries. Discussions also continue around sectoral pathways, energy transitions, food systems, and the relationship between mitigation ambition and implementation support. MWP discussions tend to focus heavily on mitigation ambition while allowing little attention to means of implementation.

Calls for increased ambition are frequently directed towards developing countries even as commitments regarding climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building remain inadequately fulfilled. The result is a growing disconnect between expectations placed upon developing countries and the support made available to enable climate action. The ability of countries to pursue low-carbon development pathways depends heavily on access to finance, technology, institutional capacity and policy space. Without these provisions, calls for increased ambition is just pushing the Global South to do more with less.

At SB64, climate justice movements are calling for:

- Reaffirmation that the MWP must remain firmly grounded in equity and CBDR-RC.
- Recognition that mitigation ambition cannot be separated from finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building support.
- Protection of developing countries' policy space and right to development.
- Greater focus on systemic transformation, including food sovereignty, agroecology, and sustainable consumption patterns, rather than narrow techno-fixes.
- Rejection of any efforts to use the MWP to impose new mitigation expectations on countries least responsible for the climate crisis.

Adaptation and the Global Goal on Adaptation

Defending Rights-Based, People-Centred Adaptation

For many communities across the Global South, adaptation is no longer a future challenge. It is a present reality. Rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, increasingly severe storms, sea-level rise, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation are already transforming livelihoods, food systems, water availability and public health. Across regions, communities are adapting to climate impacts that are occurring at a faster and at a much greater intensity than anticipated. These realities underscore a fundamental truth that climate justice movements have highlighted for decades: mitigation failures have consequences, and adaptation has become a matter of survival. At the same time adaptation raises fundamental questions about justice, power and responsibility. Who is most vulnerable to climate impacts? What conditions produce vulnerability? Whose knowledge informs adaptation responses? And who controls the resources required to adapt?



Climate vulnerability is not simply the product of exposure to the impacts of the climate crisis. It is shaped by historical and contemporary inequalities, including colonial legacies, land dispossession, poverty, discrimination, debt burdens and unequal access to resources and political power. As a result, adaptation must be understood as part of a broader struggle to address the structural conditions that make communities vulnerable in the first place.

This understanding is particularly important for the Global South, where climate impacts frequently intersect with long-standing inequalities rooted in colonialism, extraction and uneven development. Indigenous Peoples, smallholder farmers, forest dwellers and workers, fisherfolk and coastal communities, pastoralists, informal workers, youth, women and marginalised communities often face heightened risks because of historical patterns of exclusion and dispossession. Climate change amplifies these vulnerabilities, but it does not create them in isolation.

A climate justice approach to adaptation therefore requires moving beyond narrow conceptions of resilience. Adaptation must strengthen rights, expand access to resources, support community self-determination and address the structural drivers of vulnerability. The effectiveness of Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) will depend on whether it remains grounded in the realities of communities confronting climate impacts rather than becoming increasingly detached through technocratic approaches that prioritise measurement over action.

The Global Goal on Adaptation After COP30

Progress made in recent years, including work on indicators, targets and frameworks associated with the GGA, reflects growing recognition of the need to better understand adaptation needs and track implementation. These discussions have generated opportunities to improve transparency and support more effective planning. Climate justice movements have repeatedly warned that adaptation cannot be reduced to a collection of indicators, metrics and reporting frameworks. While measurement may contribute to accountability, it cannot substitute for implementation. It is important to ensure that discussions on indicators and monitoring remain connected to means of implementation. Without adequate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support, adaptation frameworks will essentially become exercises in documenting vulnerability rather than reducing it.

Whose Knowledge Counts?

Adaptation debates frequently raise questions about expertise and authority. Climate governance has historically privileged forms of knowledge generated through scientific institutions, international organisations and technical processes with the assumption that expertise resides exclusively within formal institutions.

Across the world, Indigenous Peoples, smallholder farmers and pastoralists, fisherfolk and coastal communities, local communities, youth and women possess extensive knowledge regarding ecosystems, land and forest, biodiversity, rivers and oceans and climate resilient



knowledge. These knowledge systems have often evolved over generations and are deeply rooted in relationships with particular territories and ecosystems. They provide critical insights into adaptation pathways that may not be captured through conventional scientific approaches alone.

The challenge confronting adaptation governance is therefore not choosing between scientific and local knowledge but creating frameworks that recognise the value of multiple forms of expertise. Climate justice requires moving beyond hierarchical models in which communities are treated as passive recipients of technical knowledge and instead recognising them as active producers of knowledge and solutions.

This principle is particularly important within the GGA process. Adaptation indicators, methodologies and planning frameworks must be developed through meaningful participation by rights-holders and frontline communities. Adaptation cannot be imposed from above and must be shaped by those who are living the impacts of the climate crisis at the frontline.

Preventing Maladaptation

As adaptation efforts expand, so too does the risk of maladaptation—actions that may reduce vulnerability in the short term while creating new risks, reinforcing inequalities or shifting harms onto others.

Maladaptation often emerges when adaptation is treated primarily as an engineering or investment challenge rather than a question of justice. Large-scale infrastructure projects, land-use changes, resource management interventions and private-sector adaptation initiatives may be promoted as climate solutions while simultaneously displacing communities, undermining livelihoods, or restricting access to resources.

Examples of maladaptation can be found in projects that prioritise commercial interests over community needs, reinforce existing inequalities or create new forms of dependency. In some cases, adaptation initiatives have contributed to land concentration, privatisation of resources and increased vulnerability among marginalised groups. Instead adaptation should strengthen community agency rather than weaken it. Projects that undermine self-determination, erode rights or deepen inequalities cannot be considered successful adaptation regardless of their technical achievements.

Food Sovereignty, Territorial Rights and Community Resilience

The ability of communities to adapt to climate change is closely linked to access to land, water, biodiversity and other resources necessary for sustaining livelihoods and ecosystems. Territorial rights therefore play a central role in adaptation. This relationship is particularly visible within food systems. Smallholder farmers, Indigenous Peoples, fisherfolk and pastoralists continue to provide food for millions of people while simultaneously confronting some of the most severe climate impacts. Their ability to adapt depends not only on access to climate information or technological innovations but also on direct access to finance,



securing rights to land and territories, healthy ecosystems and control over productive resources.

Climate justice movements have long argued that food sovereignty, agroecology, and agroforestry represent some of the most effective adaptation strategies available. These approaches strengthen biodiversity, improve soil health, support local economies and reduce dependence on external inputs while enhancing resilience to climate crisis. Unlike many top-down adaptation initiatives, they build upon local knowledge and community leadership.

The GGA and broader adaptation discussions should therefore recognise food sovereignty, agroecology, agroforestry, and territorial rights as central pillars of adaptation rather than treating them as peripheral concerns. Adaptation that fails to address questions of land, food and resource governance will struggle to address the underlying drivers of vulnerability.

Adaptation, Transformation and the Future of Climate Governance

The climate crisis is often framed as a challenge requiring societies to adapt to changing environmental conditions. While adaptation undoubtedly involves responding to climate impacts, climate justice movements have increasingly argued that adaptation must also involve transforming the systems that generate vulnerability. Adaptation should create opportunities to strengthen public services, expand social protection, enhance democratic participation, recognise Indigenous governance systems and support more equitable forms of development. Adaptation approaches need to centre rights, participation and structural change rather than technocratic approaches disconnected from lived realities.

What SB64 Must Deliver

As Parties continue advancing work under the Global Goal on Adaptation, SB64 must ensure that adaptation remains firmly grounded in justice, equity and means of implementation. Discussions on indicators and monitoring frameworks should support accountability while avoiding the reduction of adaptation to technical measurement exercises. Progress on adaptation governance must be accompanied by substantial increases in public, grant-based adaptation finance and stronger commitments regarding technology transfer and capacity-building.

SB64 should also strengthen recognition of Indigenous knowledge, community-led adaptation, food sovereignty, agroecology, agroforestry, and territorial rights as essential dimensions of resilience. Adaptation governance must create meaningful opportunities for participation by rights-holders and frontline communities while ensuring that adaptation efforts do not contribute to maladaptation, displacement or new forms of inequality.

Adaptation needs to be about creating the conditions under which communities can continue to live with dignity, exercise self-determination and shape their own futures in a rapidly deteriorating world due to climate crisis.



Trade and Climate: WTO Dialogues with UNFCCC

After decades of brewing tensions recently bubbled over to a burst of climate-related unilateral trade measures (UTMs), COP30 mandated a series of direct dialogues between UNFCCC and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to address differences between the rules of trade and climate.

WTO's core principles of free trade and overlapping agreements that govern the global exchange of goods and services in many ways undermine economic justice and ecological sustainability, yet when UNFCCC was first signed in Rio in 1992, countries explicitly agreed to refrain from using UTMs. Yet Global North nations are now imposing carbon tariffs and other restrictive measures on imports from Global South countries, pointing to less stringent rules on greenhouse gas emissions that are undercutting their domestic industries, such as [steel, aluminum, iron and cement](#).

WTO Dialogues with UNFCCC need to address new ways of resolving these differences on the proliferation of UTMs. One way would of course be by the Global North's delivering the finance and technology they've already agreed to provide under 1992 UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which would support Global South transitions to less polluting production methods.

DCJ also wants to see broader discussion to address inherent contradictions between the trade and climate regimes, including intellectual property rights hindering the transfer of technology, the expansion of export in emissions intensive industries, and the direct undermining of climate measures as being too "trade restrictive". WTO also allows almost no participation from civil society and excludes its critics from its so-called public forums in Geneva, so trade policy negotiations need to improve their inclusion of and accountability to the public.

CTCN, TIP

One of the achievements of climate justice movements has been the establishment of both the Finance Mechanism and the Technology Mechanism under the Paris Agreement, creating new institutions other than the World Bank for channeling support from Global North to Global South. Yet much work remains to find enough funding for making these international instruments operate at the scale and speed of today's climate crisis.

The "Tech Mech's" Climate Technology Center and Network, housed at the UN Environment Program, diligently responds to requests for technical assistance and advice from developing countries, yet has an annual budget of only \$10 million, when much more money is needed to rollout renewables apace with accelerating climate impacts.

COP30 mandated a new "Belem Technology Implementation Programme" that now must elaborate an operational plan for amplifying and accelerating implementation of technology



transfer by increasing support for countries' National Designated Entities (NDEs) by project preparation assistance, matchmaking with providers of finance and technology, follow-up support after technical assistance, and support for pilot and demonstration activities.

DCJ also demands that developing country proposals, championed by the Africa Group, to relax WTO's strict rules on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) by waiving them for climate-friendly technologies as royalty payments drain developing country budgets. Developed countries committed in UNFCCC and the PA to facilitate the transfer of technology yet they hide behind WTO rules by resisting calls for new flexibilities in IPRs.

Roadmap on Forests

Cross-Cutting Climate Justice Principles

Democracy, Rights, Accountability and System Change

The multiple crises confronting humanity today are deeply interconnected. The climate crisis is unfolding alongside escalating militarisation, widening inequality, democratic backsliding, shrinking civic space, rising authoritarianism and growing concentrations of corporate power. Communities across the Global South are simultaneously confronting climate impacts, debt burdens, economic instability, conflict, and authoritarianism, right wing fascism, and attacks on human rights and human rights and [environmental defenders](#). These crises do not operate independently of one another. They emerge from political and economic systems that prioritise extraction, exploitation, corporate profit and greed, and imperialism over peoples rights, collective wellbeing, and ecological and climate justice.

The climate crisis therefore cannot be understood solely as an environmental challenge. Nor can it be resolved through narrow technical approaches that leave underlying systems of power intact. Climate justice movements have consistently argued that climate governance must be rooted in broader struggles for human rights, democracy, self-determination and social transformation, and system change.

The positions advanced throughout this paper are grounded in a set of interconnected principles rooted in climate justice and social justice that cut across all areas of climate policy and governance. These principles are not supplementary to climate action. They are essential conditions for achieving meaningful and lasting system change.

Human Rights, Self-Determination and Collective Liberation

Climate change is fundamentally a human rights issue. Its impacts threaten rights to life, health, food, water, housing, culture, livelihoods and self-determination. Yet climate policies



themselves can also undermine rights when they are implemented without meaningful participation, accountability or safeguards.

Climate justice movements have long emphasised that climate action must strengthen rather than erode human rights. This includes respecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples, protecting the rights of workers and communities affected by transition processes, ensuring gender justice and advancing the rights of peoples living under occupation, colonial domination and other forms of systemic oppression.

The ongoing genocide in Palestine serves as a stark reminder that environmental justice cannot be separated from broader struggles for human rights and collective liberation. The destruction of homes, agricultural lands, water systems, energy infrastructure and cultural heritage demonstrates how violence against peoples and violence against ecosystems are often deeply intertwined. Climate justice movements reject attempts to isolate climate politics from these broader realities and reaffirm that genuine climate action must be rooted in solidarity with all peoples struggling for dignity, freedom and self-determination.

Defending Civic Space and Climate Democracy

Meaningful climate action requires meaningful participation.

Yet across many parts of the world, communities, social movements, journalists, environmental defenders, trade unionists, Indigenous leaders and human rights advocates face growing restrictions on their ability to organise, advocate and challenge powerful interests. Criminalisation of protest, surveillance, judicial harassment and attacks on environmental defenders continue to undermine democratic participation precisely at a moment when public engagement is most needed.

These dynamics are also reflected within international climate governance. Despite repeated commitments to inclusivity and participation, significant barriers continue to limit the ability of grassroots organisations and Global South constituencies to engage effectively in climate negotiations. Financial barriers, visa restrictions, language barriers and unequal access to resources frequently shape who is able to participate and whose voices are heard.

Climate justice movements have consistently argued that climate democracy requires more than formal opportunities for participation. It requires creating conditions under which affected communities can meaningfully influence decisions that shape their lives and futures. The legitimacy of climate governance depends not only on the outcomes adopted by Parties but also on the extent to which those outcomes are shaped by the people most affected by the climate crisis.

Protecting civic space is therefore not a procedural issue. It is a prerequisite for climate justice.

Big Polluter Influence and Corporate Capture and Conflicts of Interest



The continued influence of fossil fuel and other polluter interests within climate governance remains one of the most significant obstacles to meaningful climate action. The continued promotion of false solutions cannot be separated from the influence of fossil fuel interests within climate governance.

Research by civil society organisations, including the Kick Big Polluters Out coalition, has repeatedly documented the extensive presence of fossil fuel interests within climate negotiations. Over successive COPs, representatives linked to fossil fuel corporations, trade associations and affiliated interests have participated in climate processes in significant numbers, often exceeding the representation of many climate-vulnerable countries and frontline constituencies.

This influence matters because the interests of the fossil fuel industry are fundamentally incompatible with the rapid and equitable phase-out of fossil fuels required to limit warming. Market-based mechanisms, offsetting schemes and technological approaches that promise future emissions reductions while allowing continued extraction offer pathways through which fossil fuel interests can maintain legitimacy and delay regulation. The prevalence of false solutions within climate governance therefore reflects broader questions of power and access. Mechanisms that permit continued emissions while generating new financial opportunities are often politically attractive precisely because they minimise disruption to incumbent industries. They enable governments and corporations to avoid confronting the economic and political implications of a genuine transition away from fossil fuels.

For climate justice movements, addressing false solutions and climate action delays therefore requires addressing corporate capture. This includes advancing robust conflict-of-interest policies within the UNFCCC and ensuring that actors whose business models depend upon continued fossil fuel expansion and other emissions-intensive products do not shape the rules governing climate action.

For decades, corporations responsible for driving climate breakdown have enjoyed privileged access to decision-making processes while communities experiencing climate impacts continue to struggle for recognition and resources. Fossil fuel companies, financial institutions and associated industries have repeatedly used their political influence to weaken regulation, delay action and promote false solutions that allow existing business models to continue largely unchanged.

This influence is not limited to fossil fuel extraction itself. It extends across climate finance, carbon markets, critical minerals, infrastructure development and emerging technologies. Corporate actors increasingly shape narratives regarding what forms of climate action are considered feasible, desirable and economically rational.

Climate justice movements have therefore long advocated for an Accountability Framework that includes robust conflict-of-interest policies within the UNFCCC that protect climate policymaking from undue influence and reset the system so it works for people and the planet. The UNFCCC must also end the ability of emissions-intensive industries or those enabling these industries to bankroll or sponsor climate action, or oversee the climate talks



in leadership positions. Institutions responsible for responding to the climate crisis cannot effectively fulfil their mandates while allowing actors whose profits depend upon continued climate destruction to shape policy outcomes. Addressing corporate capture is not about excluding particular viewpoints from political debate. It is about recognising the incompatibility between the public interest and business models that depend upon continued environmental harm.

The credibility of the climate regime increasingly depends upon its willingness to confront this challenge.

Indigenous Sovereignty, Territorial Rights and Traditional Knowledge Systems

Indigenous Peoples have long been among the strongest defenders of ecosystems, biodiversity and climate justice. Across the world, Indigenous territories continue to protect forests, watersheds, grasslands, oceans, and other ecosystems critical to climate stability despite persistent threats from extraction, exploitation, destruction, dispossession and violence.

Indigenous Peoples are not merely stakeholders within climate governance but rights-holders whose sovereignty, governance systems and knowledge traditions must be respected and protected. Climate policies that undermine Indigenous rights cannot be considered just regardless of their stated environmental objectives.

At the same time, Indigenous knowledge systems offer critical insights into adaptation, resilience, ecological stewardship and sustainable relationships with nature. Climate governance must move beyond tokenistic recognition and create meaningful opportunities for Indigenous leadership and decision-making across all areas of climate policy.

Protecting territorial rights, ensuring free, prior and informed consent and recognising Indigenous self-determination are therefore central components of climate justice.

Feminist Climate Justice and the Politics of Care

The climate crisis is deeply shaped by gendered inequalities. Women, particularly in the Global South, often face disproportionate climate impacts while simultaneously carrying significant responsibilities for care, food production, water collection and community wellbeing. Yet climate policies in general frequently overlook these realities and fail to recognise the central role of care in sustaining societies and ecosystems.

Feminist climate justice challenges approaches that reduce climate action to questions of technology, infrastructure and markets. Instead, it emphasises relationships, interdependence, collective wellbeing and the social reproduction necessary to sustain life. It asks how climate policies can strengthen care systems, expand rights and redistribute resources rather than simply facilitating economic growth.



This perspective is increasingly important as climate negotiations move beyond questions of emissions reductions and towards broader discussions regarding transition, resilience and system change. A just transition must be organised not only around new energy systems but around new social priorities. The politics of care therefore offers a powerful alternative to economic models based on extraction, exploitation and accumulation.

International Solidarity, Multilateralism and UNFCCC Reform

The climate crisis exposes the limitations of a global order characterised by unequal power relations, geopolitical competition and selective approaches to international cooperation. While governments frequently invoke the language of partnership and solidarity, climate negotiations continue to reflect deep inequalities in wealth, influence and access to resources.

For climate justice movements, international solidarity is not a rhetorical aspiration. It is a practical necessity. The scale of the climate crisis requires forms of cooperation capable of addressing historical injustices while supporting equitable and sustainable futures. Such cooperation must be grounded in accountability, reparative justice and respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of peoples and nations.

This requires defending and transforming multilateralism simultaneously. Climate justice movements continue to support multilateral cooperation because global challenges require collective responses. At the same time, existing institutions must become more democratic, more accountable and more responsive to the needs of communities rather than powerful states and corporate actors. The future of climate governance depends not only on stronger commitments but on stronger forms of internationalism rooted in justice, equity, international solidarity, rather than pursuit of domination by few. DCJ and its members will continue to join the [global call for a comprehensive UNFCCC reform](#) that includes restoring power and equity, ending the trade show and corporate capture, moving away from accountability free blackbox negotiations, respecting and protecting human rights, and aligning and strengthening international climate governance.

What SB64 Must Deliver

As Parties gather at SB64, they must recognise that progress across all negotiating tracks depends upon the political principles outlined above. Climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, just transition, fossil fuel phase-out and mitigation ambition cannot be separated from questions of rights, democracy, participation, self-determination, and accountability.

SB64 should strengthen protections for civic space, advance discussions on conflicts of interest within the UNFCCC, support meaningful participation by rights-holders and reaffirm commitments to human rights, Indigenous sovereignty, gender justice and CBDR-RC across all negotiating processes. It should resist efforts to narrow climate governance to technical questions while ignoring the broader political conditions that determine whether climate action advances justice or reproduces inequality.



The climate crisis is ultimately a crisis of power as much as a crisis of emissions. Addressing it requires not only transforming energy systems and economic structures but also expanding democracy, strengthening solidarity and ensuring that those most affected by climate change are able to shape the decisions that determine their futures. These principles must remain at the heart of climate action at SB64 and beyond.

Conclusion

Climate Justice in an Age of Crisis

SB64 takes place at a moment of profound global uncertainty and escalating crisis. Across the world, communities are confronting the accelerating impacts of climate breakdown alongside deepening inequality, rising authoritarianism, shrinking civic space, growing militarisation and the continued concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small number of states, corporations and financial actors. The ongoing genocide in Palestine, the expansion of military spending, the persistence of debt crises across the Global South and the continued expansion of fossil fuel production all expose a global political and economic system that remains fundamentally incapable of addressing the interconnected crises it has helped create.

These realities are not separate from climate negotiations. They shape the conditions under which climate action is debated, financed and implemented. They influence who bears the costs of climate breakdown, who controls resources, whose voices are heard and whose interests continue to dominate decision-making. For climate justice movements, the climate crisis cannot be understood as an isolated environmental challenge. It is inseparable from broader systems of colonialism, imperialism, patriarchy, racial capitalism and extraction that have generated both ecological destruction and profound global inequalities.

The climate regime stands at a crossroads.

The commitments secured in recent years, which includes progress on loss and damage, the establishment of the Just Transition Mechanism and the growing recognition of the need to transition away from fossil fuels, reflect the persistence and determination of developing countries, social movements, Indigenous Peoples, farmers, small land holders and pastoralists, fisherfolk and coastal communities, workers and unions, youth and feminist organisations, and frontline communities that have fought for decades to demand CBDR-RC, historical responsibility, and justice and equity be central to climate governance. These gains matter as they represent important political victories achieved against very powerful resistance.

Yet recognition alone does not constitute transformation and the political battles that shaped these victories continue. Efforts to dilute historical responsibility, weaken finance obligations, expand market mechanisms, promote false solutions and preserve fossil fuel and big polluter interests remain deeply embedded within climate negotiations. The danger confronting the



climate regime is not only insufficient ambition. It is the possibility that implementation becomes detached from justice and that the language of transformation is used to legitimise pathways that ultimately reproduce existing inequalities and systems of power.

This is particularly evident in the growing contest over the meaning of transition. As governments, corporations and international institutions increasingly acknowledge the need to move beyond fossil fuels, a new struggle has emerged over what comes next. Will the transition be organised around public goods, democratic participation, food sovereignty, Indigenous rights, care, redistribution and ecological sustainability? Or will it be shaped by new forms of extraction, financialisation, corporate concentration and geopolitical competition? The answer to this question will determine not only whether climate targets are met but whether climate action contributes to a more just and equitable world.

For climate justice movements, there can be no meaningful transition without justice.

A just transition requires confronting the structures that produced the climate crisis, not merely replacing one set of technologies with another. It requires recognising that adaptation, loss and damage, mitigation, energy systems, food systems, finance and development are all interconnected. It requires acknowledging that countries and communities least responsible for climate breakdown cannot continue to bear its greatest burdens. And it requires ensuring that climate action is guided by the rights, needs and aspirations of peoples and communities rather than by the interests of corporations and elites.

Throughout this paper, the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice has argued that climate action must be grounded in historical responsibility, reparative justice and systemic transformation. Defending Article 9.1, advancing public and grant-based climate finance, securing adequate adaptation and loss and damage finance, operationalising the Just Transition Mechanism, advancing a genuinely just roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels and rejecting false solutions are not separate struggles. They are interconnected components of a broader project to transform the political and economic structures that continue to drive both climate breakdown and inequality.

At the heart of these struggles lies a simple but fundamental principle: those who contributed most to the crisis must bear the greatest responsibility for addressing it. This principle remains as relevant today as it was when the Convention was first adopted. Without it, there can be no equity. Without equity, there can be no trust. And without trust, meaningful international cooperation becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

SB64 must therefore be more than a technical negotiating session. It must serve as an opportunity to reaffirm the foundational principles of the climate regime and to resist growing efforts to weaken them. Parties must advance implementation in ways that strengthen accountability, uphold historical responsibility, expand democratic participation and support the transformative changes required to secure a just future. They must reject approaches that treat climate action as a market opportunity while ignoring the communities already



paying the price of climate breakdown. And they must recognise that climate justice cannot be achieved without confronting the systems of power that continue to fuel both environmental destruction and human suffering.

The future being contested within climate negotiations is ultimately a question of political choice.

The resources necessary to address the climate crisis exist. The knowledge exists. The solutions exist. Across the world, communities, Indigenous Peoples, workers, women, youth, peasants, fisherfolk and social movements are already advancing pathways rooted in solidarity, care, ecological stewardship and democratic control. What remains uncertain is whether governments are prepared to challenge entrenched interests and act at the scale that justice demands.

Climate justice movements have long understood that real change rarely emerges from political will alone. It is won through collective struggle, international solidarity and the persistent efforts of people who refuse to accept that exploitation, inequality and ecological destruction are inevitable. The progress achieved within the climate regime has always been the result of such struggles, and the advances still required will depend upon them as well.

As Parties gather at SB64, the choice before them is increasingly clear. They can continue pursuing pathways that manage the symptoms of crisis while preserving the structures that created it. Or they can embrace the transformative changes necessary to build a world rooted in justice, dignity, self-determination and ecological balance.

For the Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice, the path forward is unequivocal. The task before the international community is not simply to negotiate climate action. It is to advance climate justice. The urgency of the moment demands nothing less.

The [Global Campaign to Demand Climate Justice \(DCJ\)](#) is a membership-driven network of more than 200 climate justice and human rights organisations, grassroots movements, and communities, largely from the Global South, working to advance climate justice and system change. DCJ and its members work to challenge corporate capture and false solutions in global climate policy and advocate for peoples led real solutions rooted in principles of historical responsibility, equity, and justice. This position paper is developed in consultation with DCJ members to articulate a clear climate justice perspective on key agenda items and issues at SB64. It can be used by DCJ members, climate justice and social movements, civil society actors, and allied negotiators to strengthen coordinated messaging around strong climate justice and global south positions and demands during UNFCCC negotiations.

Note: this position paper does not reflect positions of the entire DCJ network but is developed in close consultation with DCJ membership.