

RENMUN XI

REJUVENATION



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Chair Report 1
Security Council

**Addressing the Ongoing Political Disturbance
and Regional Security Issues in Afghanistan**

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Chair Introduction

Dear delegates,

Yo, yo, yo what's pippity poppin'? We're Ridhima Singh 🎤🎵 and Alexander Nolens-Liu, 🤪🧐 your chairs for this year's RENMUN conference. We are both in Year 12 of West Island School and Discovery College respectively.

The United Nations Security Council is one of the six principal organs with the objective of safeguarding international peace and security. As the only committee within the United Nations that has the power to authorize legally binding resolutions, delegates must carefully consider their solutions' feasibility and consequences in effect. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council also possesses the power to impose sanctions, utilise military action against threat, and send peacekeeping forces to areas in conflict, thereby making it a heated area of debate, both in the real United Nations and in Model United Nations.

As proclaimed in the chair email, we expect a high degree of preparation for this committee. Not only do we advise writing and rehearsing a 60 second opening speech, but we also highly encourage delegates to create a 90-second GSL speech, as well as conducting any additional research regarding their delegation and the topic at hand. Reminder, the usage of generative artificial intelligence is strictly prohibited.

With that said, whether this is your first or fiftieth conference, we are exuberant to see you all debating at your fullest potential at RENMUN XI.

Kind regards,

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Topic Introduction

As of early 2026, Afghanistan's political identity remains stained by a lack of legitimate recognition and by a troublesome, fractured state, despite de facto parties taking control. These de facto parties even contribute to a lack of stability. These parties are primarily associated with the Taliban government, which is known for having especially stringent regulations and conditions against women and young girls. Key aspects of the **De Facto Authorities (DFA)** include its form of governance through decrees.

The Taliban runs the DFA, and rather than having formally recognised legislation, they instead rule by decree. Additionally, they have systematically dismantled all institutions of human rights in Afghanistan, preventing protection for women and girls, by extension, banning them from education beyond a secondary level. Most jobs and public spaces have been reserved for men. Afghanistan's current foreign policy can be characterised by a strategic shift towards "Eurasia". This is because it increasingly seeks economic and military support from China, Iran, and Russia to bypass traditional Western-led isolation and, more recently, the complete breakdown of its relationship with Afghanistan.

The violence in Afghanistan is still significant because, as of late 2025, we have observed the most significant cross-border violence in decades between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This included airstrikes in Kabul and Kandahar, thereby resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties. Furthermore, an increase in transnational terrorism, including the presence of the **Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)**, the East Turkmenistan movement, and the **ISIL-K**, continues to threaten regional security, with extremist groups from Afghanistan using Afghan soil to launch attacks across South Asia.

On an international scale, Afghanistan isn't just a local crisis anymore; it's a massive risk to the world's security setup. It acts similarly to a centrifuge, spinning out threats that don't stay inside its borders. Groups like ISIL-K have moved from being local rebels to global networks while we weren't looking. It's also become the center of a 'New Great Game' over issues such as the Five Nations Railway and critical minerals. If the Afghan economy stays broken, the nation will experience a surge in synthetic drugs such as meth, resulting in more people being forced to flee towards Europe. Ultimately, the world must take action — not just for courtesy, but because a collapse in Kabul would eventually impact every major economy's doorstep.

Key Terms

Term	Definition
De Facto Authorities (DFA)	De facto governance is a term used by the United Nations and international NGOs to refer to the Taliban leadership. This essentially indicates that they effectively have physical control but lack legal recognition from the international community. This demonstrated that they are a government by force rather than by democracy.
TTP (tehrik-e-taliban Pakistan)	A group aligned with Al Qaeda based in Afghanistan, whose 2025-2026 attacks have significantly destabilised the Afghan-Pakistan border. Their attacks frequently include suicide bombings, thereby killing hundreds of personnel from the Pakistan law enforcement, alongside many civilians. The previous leader, Baitullah Mehsud, has proclaimed that the TTP was behind the attacks on a police academy within Pakistan. The TTP views the Pakistani state as corrupt and secular; thus, it does not adhere to strict Islamic values, which is the root behind the TTP's hostility.
ISIL-K (Islamic State – Khorasan Province) Alternatively: ISIS-K	ISIL-K is the most active and transactional jihad group in Afghanistan. The Islamic State Khorasan Province is a regional branch of the Salafi jihadist group active primarily in central and South Asia. In March 2024, Moscow, ISIL-K was involved in the death of 137 people at a concert hall. In addition, in 2024 alone, they have been involved in an Istanbul church attack, a Kandahar bank

	bombing and Dagestan attacks. Most of the recent attacks have been focused on central former Soviet Asian states as well as Turkey.
Hybrid Governance	A term to describe the situation of the DFA in Afghanistan, where they act as a government but lack international legal recognition (de jure status), unlike diamonds.
Institutionalised discrimination	Afghanistan's current DFA has been widely known to violate CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), including articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10. Afghanistan violates the right to education and employment. In 2025, Germany, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands initiated formal legal proceedings at the ICJK against the DFA for these specific breaches against the women in Afghanistan.
Gender persecution	Afghanistan has frequently violated the Rome statute on gender persecution. Gender persecution is essentially the deprivation of human rights based on gender. The Taliban in Afghanistan infamously bans females from higher education and working in certain fields.

Background Information

The conflict has its roots in Afghanistan during the colonial period, during the infamous “diamond” era. In 1893, British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand drew the Durand Line as a "buffer" between British India and the Russian Empire. This arbitrary 2,640-kilometer boundary was never intended to be a permanent ethnic or national border; instead, it was a strategic tool of the "Great Game" that effectively sliced through the Pashtun and Baloch heartlands. For over 130 years, no Afghan government, including the current DFA, has formally recognised this line as a legitimate international border, viewing it instead as a colonial imposition signed under duress. Contemporarily, this historical grievance has transformed into a modern security catastrophe. This is because the border divides families and tribes, so it remains inherently porous, subsequently allowing groups like the TTP (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan) and ISIL-K to move freely across "sovereign" lines that local populations don't respect. Pakistan's 2025 efforts to militarise and fence this line

have been met with violent resistance from the DFA, who view the fence as a physical manifestation of colonial "theft."

By January 2026, the situation in Afghanistan had shifted from a chaotic transition into a locked-in, permanent crisis. The De facto Authorities (DfA) have tightened their grip through a series of harsh 2025 decrees that fundamentally wiped out any remaining public role for women. This led to a major legal showdown at the International Court of Justice. Regardless, this crisis is more than domestic. In late 2025, the tension with Pakistan finally snapped.

The country saw massive cross-border airstrikes and hundreds of casualties, which consequently turned the border into a militarised zone, uncrackable, similar to diamonds. This hasn't just hurt security; it's killed the local economy. Currently, over 21 million people are struggling to find food and the massive influx of refugees being pushed back from Iran and Pakistan makes the situation more dire. The real *logical* problem for 2026 is that the DFA is now pivoting toward China and Russia for trade, while groups like ISIL-K are using the internal chaos to plan attacks that reach far beyond Kabul.

International Implications: Why the World Can't Walk Away?

The reason countries should care in 2026 isn't just about charity, but instead about their own national security. Firstly, the Terrorism Export factor. ISIL-K has grown into a regional powerhouse, and they aren't just fighting the Taliban anymore; in lieu, they are recruitment machines for attacks in Europe and Central Asia. Moreover, the nuclear proximity. If the fighting between the DfA and Pakistan keeps escalating, there will be a conflict between a nuclear-armed state, comparable to a powder keg. On top of that, Afghanistan has become a massive hub for synthetic drugs, infamously including methamphetamine, which is now flooding into global markets. Lastly, the "Great Power Struggle" surrounding minerals. With the new 2026 railway corridors linking China and Iran, Afghanistan is becoming a central node in a new Eastern economic bloc. If the UN stays silent, it's not just ignoring a human rights disaster, but it's also losing all leverage in a region that is quickly being redefined by other global powers.

By the beginning of 2026, the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan had transitioned from an acute emergency to a state of "permanent neglect." In 2026, despite the United Nations launching a \$1.71 billion appeal to support roughly 17.5 million people, the international community has largely moved into a phase of "aid fatigue." As of January 2026, around 21.9 million people (nearly 45% of the total population) remain in desperate need of assistance, yet funding levels have collapsed. The primary driver of this withdrawal was the late-2024 "Propagation of Virtue" laws, which many Western donors, including Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands, cited as a "red line" for continued cooperation. This political standoff led

to a 29% reduction in the UN's financial requirements compared to 2025. This is not because the needs have decreased, but because agencies have been forced to "hyper-prioritize" only the most life-threatening cases.

For example, during the current 2025–2026 lean season, an estimated 17.4 million Afghans are facing crisis-level food insecurity, yet the World Food Programme (WFP) has had to cut millions from its rosters due to a global funding shortfall led by the U.S. and EU. This lack of support is further compounded by the massive returnee crisis. In 2025 alone, 2.6 million Afghans were pushed back from Pakistan and Iran, arriving in a country with no social safety net and an economy that is 20% smaller than it was in 2021. Logically, many countries have stopped trying to help because they see no "exit strategy" or political progress, choosing instead to divert limited resources toward more "visible" conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, effectively leaving Afghanistan to face a silent collapse of its basic services and public health infrastructure.

Potential Clashes

The business of terrorism vs The international community's pleas


One of the reasons that terrorism hasn't been properly eradicated in Afghanistan is due to the fact that there is an extremely lucrative business behind it, which hinders any counterterrorism progress. Taking examples such as Osama bin Laden, who has probably one of the most notorious terrorist organizations through al-Qaeda, he turned to traditional crime to fund terrorism, such as kidnapping and collecting ransoms and conducting large-scale robberies.

In modern Afghanistan, the Taliban levies taxes on local businesses, traders, and opium farmers within their areas of control, including on commodities such as diamonds. They also extort funds from international aid agencies and kidnapping-for-ransom operations. Despite various pleas from the United Nations to halt the extortion, the efforts have gone in vain, as the willful ignorance of the DFA has stopped legal proceedings against them from taking place.

Afghanistan is a party to several important global treaties. These include core agreements on civil, social, and economic rights, as well as specific protections for vulnerable groups. They've also committed to international rules on climate change and the ethics of warfare. Because these are formal international obligations, the country is still held to these standards regardless of shifts in the political landscape

Where The Economic Impact Of Terrorism Is Strongest

Impact of terrorism as a share of GDP in 2019



Source: Institute for Economics and Peace



statista

Humanitarian blockages

The primary obstacle to resolving the Afghan crisis is a fundamental discordance between the Taliban's idiosyncratic application of Sharia and the normative interpretations of Islamic law upheld by the international community. The Taliban's governance is rooted in a rigid fusion of Deobandi fundamentalism and Pashtunwali tribal codes, which they frame as a non-negotiable expression of divine sovereignty. This interpretation mandates a total erasure of women from public life—enforced through the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice—which the Taliban views not as a policy choice, but as a religious imperative. Consequently,

when the international community conditions humanitarian aid on the protection of human rights, the Taliban perceives these conditions as "secular interference." This creates a circular deadlock: the Taliban cannot compromise without undermining their internal religious legitimacy, while donor states cannot provide unconditional support without violating International Humanitarian Law and their own mandates against funding gender-based discrimination.

This theological impasse manifests on the ground as a systemic bureaucratic blockade, where the De Facto Authorities (DFA) employ hundreds of restrictive directives to control and redirect the influx of assistance. A critical rupture in this framework is the ongoing ban on Afghan women working for NGOs and the UN, which has crippled the "By Women, For Women" operational model. Because male aid workers are culturally and legally prohibited from interacting with unrelated females, millions of women are systematically cut off from maternal healthcare, nutrition for infants, and basic hygienic care. This exclusion has led to a catastrophic decline in public health, as the most vulnerable populations become "invisible" to a male-dominated aid apparatus. Compounding this is a collapsing domestic economy where soaring food prices have far outpaced stagnant wages, rendering basic survival impossible for families already strained by the forced return of millions of refugees from neighboring countries. Furthermore, the DFA has demonstrated a sophisticated ability to engage in systemic aid diversion, using humanitarian resources as political leverage by siphoning aid through arbitrary taxes and directing supplies toward loyalist communities. This environment forces international donors into an ethical quagmire: continuing aid risks subsidizing a repressive regime, while withdrawing it ensures a preventable famine for tens of millions of civilians trapped in this irreconcilable moral stalemate.

Some key geographical areas the DFA has blocked include:

- The Hazara Highlands (Bamiyan & Daikundi): In late 2025 and 2026, local De Facto Authorities (DFA) have been accused of "Access Denial," preventing independent assessments and diverting aid away from Hazara minority communities toward Taliban-aligned groups.
- Panjshir Valley: This region remains a site of "Strategic Plundering." Aid intended for civilian populations is frequently intercepted and redirected to sustain local Taliban security forces.
- Kunduz & Northern Hubs: Reports in early 2026 revealed that Taliban officials in Kunduz seized nearly half of all humanitarian packages provided by international relief centers (such as the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre) for their own members.

Key Findings

The consolidated access severity mapping across all humanitarian partner groups – UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and (sub-national) cluster leads – revealed the following:

- High access severity in nine districts (representing 2 per cent of all districts).
- Moderate access severity in 234 districts (representing 58 per cent of all districts).
- Low access severity in 158 districts (representing 40 per cent of all districts).

The most frequently reported access constraint across operational areas was interference by de facto authorities (DFAs). This was followed by challenges related to the physical environment, restrictions or obstruction of access to services and assistance for affected populations, and limitations on the movement of agencies, personnel or goods within the country.

Methodology

OCHA Afghanistan conducted its seventh bi-annual Access Severity Mapping Exercise, aimed at providing a comprehensive and evidence-based overview of the humanitarian access landscape across the country. This exercise serves as a critical tool to identify district-level access constraints and supports advocacy, operational decision-making and resource allocations.

The methodology combined both quantitative and qualitative approaches. It included focus group discussions (FGDs) with humanitarian actors comprising UN agencies, national NGOs (NNGOs), international NGOs (INGOs), (sub-national) cluster leads, as well as women and men community members affected by and in need of humanitarian assistance. These discussions were complemented by a review of access incident data reported through the Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF)¹, enabling a triangulated analysis of the operational environment.

Between June and July 2025, a total of 69 focus group discussions with humanitarian partners were conducted across all eight regions, covering 401 districts. In parallel, 17 FGDs with women and 29 with men from affected communities were held to ensure the inclusion of both community and gender perspectives in the analysis.

District-level access conditions were assessed using a standardized three-tier severity scale (low, moderate, high), based on the extent to which access constraints impacted humanitarian operations and affected people's access to assistance and services. The findings were then consolidated to generate an average severity rating for each district.

The Afghanistan Access Severity product serves as a key tool for the humanitarian community, supporting collective efforts to monitor access trends, engage in targeted advocacy with relevant stakeholders and guide principled, needs-based humanitarian responses.


Legend:

- Low access constraints (Level 1): Relatively few access constraints. Armed actors, checkpoints, or other impediments such as administrative obstacles may be present and may impede humanitarian activities. However, with adequate resources and clearances, humanitarian organizations can still operate and reach all or nearly all targeted people in need.
- Moderate access constraints (Level 2): Armed actors, checkpoints, lack of security, administrative impediments, or other impediments including physical and bureaucratic constraints may be present and often result in restrictions on humanitarian movements and operations. Operations continue in these areas with regular restrictions.
- High access constraints (Level 3): High access constraints (Level 3): Armed actors, checkpoints, high levels of insecurity, administrative obstacles, as well as other impediments including physical and bureaucratic constraints are present and very often result in restrictions on humanitarian movements and operations. Operations in these areas face high difficulties and sometimes are impossible.

Consolidated Access Severity Scoring



United Nations



International NGOs



National NGOs



¹ Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF) is a tool used to collect and analyse data on the impact of access constraints on the humanitarian response, based on the access incidents reported by the humanitarian partners.
Creation date: 29 July 2025 Feedback: ochaafgaccess@un.org www.unocha.org www.reliefweb.int www.response.reliefweb.int/afghanistan https://humanitarianaction.info/

[Detailed report of humanitarian aid routes Afghanistan](#) ^^

Varying Interpretations of a “True Islamic State”


The central obstacle to resolving the Afghan crisis is a fundamental discordance between the Taliban's idiosyncratic application of Sharia and the normative interpretations of Islamic law upheld by the international community and other Muslim-majority states. The Taliban's governance is rooted in a rigid, isolationist fusion of Deobandi fundamentalism and Pashtunwali tribal codes, which they frame as a non-negotiable expression of divine sovereignty. This interpretation mandates a total erasure of women from public life enforced through the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice which the Taliban views not as a policy choice, but as a religious imperative. Consequently, when the international community conditions humanitarian aid or diplomatic recognition on the protection of human rights, the Taliban perceives these conditions as "secular interference" and a direct violation of their religious mandate. This creates a circular deadlock: the Taliban cannot compromise without undermining their internal religious legitimacy, while the United Nations and donor states cannot provide unconditional support without violating International Humanitarian Law and their own domestic mandates against funding gender-based discrimination.

Furthermore, this conflict is exacerbated by the Taliban's rejection of the "modern state" model in favor of a pre-modern, clerical autocracy where the supreme leader's

(Amir al-Mu'minin) decrees supersede all previous civil and international treaties. While bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and scholars from Al-Azhar University have attempted to engage the Taliban by arguing that education and work are inherent rights within the Maqasid al-Sharia (the higher objectives of Sharia), the Taliban leadership in Kandahar has largely dismissed these interventions as being tainted by Western influence. This ideological "blockade" effectively nullifies traditional diplomatic levers, such as economic sanctions or incentives, because the Taliban prioritizes their specific vision of spiritual purity and social control over national economic stability. For the purposes of this committee, the challenge lies in determining whether a "middle ground" of Sharia interpretation exists that can accommodate both the Taliban's demands for religious autonomy and the global community's requirement for universal human rights.

Key Stakeholders

Geopolitical Map of Afghanistan's Connection to Stakeholders



Stakeholder	Involvement with the Issue
China	Security Measlin Routes, Economic 1 Road Initiative (NATO-US Influences)
India	Border Skirmishes & TPP Conflict Zone, Chabahar Port: India's Trade Route (Existential Crisis)
Pakistan	Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, Chabahar Port: India's Trade Route (Existential Crisis)
Iran	Water Rights Dispute (Eide Route (Existential Crisis))
Qatar	Political Mediation & Aid
UNAMA	Humanitarian Crisis & Mediation
ISIS-K	Central Afghanistan, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban DFA)
US	Sanctions & Frozen Assets, US Economic Lever
Taliban	Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban DFA)
TPP	Safe Haven Instability
Iran (Tehran)	January 2026 Tehran Meeting Regional-First Consensus
Chabahar Port	India's Trade Route (Existential Crisis)
Kandahar	Central Afghanistan
Mazar-i-Sharif	Central Afghanistan
Kabul	Central Afghanistan
Hera	Central Afghanistan
Udaistins Malskame (Tinnent Island)	Central Afghanistan
State Statisties, Anti-Tehalieltan, Condon	Central Afghanistan
High-Impact Regional (Fatsitter, Water & Sanctions)	Central Afghanistan
Air Corridor to Kabul Airport	Central Afghanistan
Migration Control & Geo-economic Focus	Central Afghanistan
Emerging Trade Routes	Central Afghanistan
Development Aid & Soft Power (Hospitals, Clinics)	Central Afghanistan
Damaged Line	Central Afghanistan
Frequent Closures/Trade as Lever	Central Afghanistan

Afghanistan (the DFA) also referred to as the Taliban	Unsurprisingly, Afghanistan or more specifically, the de facto authorities in Afghanistan, is a key stakeholder. The DFA has significantly reduced active combat across the country. However, their inability to fully suppress ISKP (ISIS-K) and their alleged harbouring of groups like TTP (Pakistani Taliban) creates regional instability and risks of cross-border conflict. Social instability through a series of decrees (e.g., the 2024 "Morality Law"), the DFA has banned women from education, work, and public life. This "gender apartheid" creates a silent instability where half the population is marginalized, leading to long-term human capital collapse. The DFA's policies have led to international sanctions and the freezing of central bank assets. While they have improved tax collection and reduced corruption, the lack of foreign investment keeps 90% of the population in poverty, making the country prone to humanitarian disasters.
United States of America (USA)	The USA remains a decisive stakeholder in Afghan politics as they have donated a substantial amount of military and economic aid to Afghanistan with hopes of reducing the intensity of the crisis. The United States is the primary architect of the current international sanctions against Afghanistan, most notably due to the Trump administration's America First policy, Afghanistan has lost almost 7 billion in central bank reserves that could, if managed correctly, more or less revitalise the Afghan economy. The United States previously resettled over 150k refugees, but now, with the new refugee and immigrant policy, this has become unrealistic. The USA also has a popular anti terrorism policy by monitoring groups like Al Qaeda and ISKP
Pakistan	Pakistan is a primary regional stakeholder. Pakistan occupies a dual role as both a primary

	victim of and a major contributor to Afghan instability. Its security interests are dominated by the resurgence of the TTP, leading to frequent cross-border military incursions that undermine Afghan sovereignty. Furthermore, Pakistan's use of border closures and mass refugee repatriations as political leverage serves to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis within Afghanistan, making Pakistan a volatile but essential stakeholder in any regional peace framework
India	India serves as a vital regional stabilizer through its 'Invest and Endure' strategy. Moving away from its previous policy of total isolation, New Delhi's 2025-2026 approach focuses on functional diplomacy and humanitarian infrastructure. India's primary stake is the containment of trans-border terrorism; however, its role as a developmental partner specifically through the expansion of the Chabahar trade corridor and medical assistance offers a critical alternative to the humanitarian vacuum left by Western disengagement. India's influence is a major factor in determining whether the Afghan economy can transition toward self-sufficiency via regional trade. If there are any hopes of a revitalised economy, India serves as a strong supporter for Afghanistan due to their consistent investments and strategic interests against Pakistan. Despite this, India is still yet to recognise Afghan sovereignty formally.
Iran	Iran's involvement in this conflict is driven by human security imperatives such as water, migration and counter terrorism. Tehran remains a key economic partner through infrastructure projects like the Khaf-Herat railway. In spite, Iran's aggressive deportation of Afghan refugees, and its clandestine ties to Afghan opposition groups create a layer of

	'managed instability.' Similarly to India and China, Iran has not formally recognised Afghanistan's new government, but remains having a "half open" door policy.
Turkey	Rather than being directly involved in any military affairs, Turkey instead acts as a mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is done by both encouraging and facilitating the peace talks between the two hostile nations. The goal of Turkey is to stabilize the region in order for them to maintain their influence. Despite this, in 2026, Turkey withdrew from mediation after their efforts seemed ineffective considering the deeply-rooted disagreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Tajikistan	The relationship between Afghanistan and Tajikistan is filled with tension due to the frequent border clashes between one another. These border clashes are usually caused by Afghan terrorists in Tajikistan. Despite this, as Tajikistan is highly dependent on Russia, and Russia has begun to recognise the Taliban, Tajikistan has been prompted to follow suit.
Russia	In mid-2025, Russia became the first country to officially recognise the Taliban, even removing them from the list of terrorist organisations. This support of the Taliban is because of their common enemy being the ISKP. The ISKP destabilised the region, while simultaneously targeting Russian interests, hence providing a rationale for Russia's support of the Taliban.

Possible Solutions

Implementing an inclusive government

Given the restrictive nature of the current Taliban administration, transitioning toward a more inclusive governance model is essential for addressing systemic human rights violations. However, to achieve long-term stability and alleviate the humanitarian crisis, Western and regional actors should move away from

high-conditionality, zero-sum policies in favor of pragmatic engagement that encourages incremental reform

Regional economic integration

Another pillar for stability is regional economic integration, which aims to transform Afghanistan from a "landlocked" conflict zone into a "land-bridge" for trade and energy. Major infrastructure projects like the CASA-1000 electricity transmission line and the TAPI gas pipeline provide high-stakes incentives for both the de facto authorities and neighboring countries to maintain peace, as the financial benefits of transit fees and energy security far outweigh the gains of continued volatility. By tying Afghanistan's economic survival to the success of regional partners like Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, the international community can create a structural environment that discourages extremist activity and encourages a more predictable, functional legal framework. Delegates should keep in mind that this economic integration requires diplomatic dialogue with the Taliban and this is often seen as a deterrent to formalising economic relations with Afghanistan.

Past Actions

Economic Sanctions and Asset Freezes

Multiple nations and IGOs have imposed economic sanctions and asset freezes on Afghanistan to restrict the Taliban's access to funds and pressure the regime to alter its oppressive policies. For instance, UN sanctions were initially imposed in 1999 in response to the Taliban providing a sanctuary and training for international terrorist groups. Current UN sanctions on Afghanistan consist of asset freezes, travel bans, and an arms embargo, which is overseen by the 1988 Sanctions Committee. The European Union (EU) has imposed restrictive measures against senior Taliban leaders for human rights abuses, preventing these individuals from entering or transiting through EU territories. Moreover, the U.S. has frozen nearly \$9.5 billion in assets belonging to the Afghan central bank and stopped shipments of cash to the nation.

However, the imposition of such measures risks exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Sanctions could further destabilise Afghanistan's already fragile economy after decades of war. Additionally, they create legal complexities for NGOs and businesses, hindering their ability to deliver crucial aid.

NATO's invasion of Afghanistan in 2001

Operation Enduring Freedom began in 2001 as a targeted response to 9/11, utilizing advanced precision-guided munitions to dismantle al-Qaeda's leadership across Kabul and Kandahar. Supported by the collective defense clause of Article 5, the coalition expanded to include more than 40 countries, successfully driving the Taliban from power and eventually locating Osama bin Laden in 2011. Yet, military success did not translate into political permanence.

The Taliban's return to power in 2021 underscored the failure of the state-building project; the nascent Afghan government suffered from endemic corruption and a "loyalty-over-competence" patronage system. This internal rot, coupled with staggering financial waste, eroded the state's domestic credibility and paved the way for the Republic's rapid collapse.

Guiding Questions

- How can international organizations effectively support the rights of Afghan women and girls to education and employment while operating under a regime that actively suppresses these freedoms?
- Given that Afghanistan has estimated 3 trillion USD in reserves How can Afghanistan's assets be utilised to stabilise the economy without fueling further internal conflict?
- To what degree was internal corruption of the ousted islamic republic of afghanistan responsible for the eventual rise of the taliban as afghanistans leaders and if given a second term what measures can we take to ensure corruption is not as rampant as before?
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the previous NATO intervention and what does this tell us about the success of a military intervention
- What does my delegation believe? Which potential solution aligns best with this stance? How can I showcase my stance during the conference?

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