Fodor, "The Mind-Body Problem"

Dualism: The mind is not a material thing, but the body is a physical thing
Problems?

(1) **Success of science objection:** Dualism makes the success of methods in psychology/cognitive science mysterious
    (a) These methods look at physical processes or entities
    (b) But if the mind is not physical, it's unclear why these methods which look at the physical successfully explain/predict mental things
(2) **Causality**:
    (a) Cause and effect seem to usually involve physical causes and physical effects
    (b) It seems like we can have mental causes for physical effects (and vice versa)
    (c) Dualism says: Mental states, thoughts, etc. are non-physical
    (d) But then a non-physical thing causes a physical thing (or, a physical thing causes a non-physical thing)
    (e) Dualism is committed to a special type of causality where non-physical things can cause physical things, or vice versa

Materialism: the mind (/the stuff cognitive sciences study) is just the physical stuff

- Versions
    - **Radical Behaviorism**: the mind does not exist at all, and what cognitive science studies is just how bodies react to their environments
        - Law of psychology: Whenever Griffin is pinched, Griffin shouts
        - Law of psychology: Whenever someone's eyes receive light that matches the visual impression of raindrops hitting pavement, that person brings their umbrella
        - ~~Law of psychology: I see lightning in the window, so I ***know*** there's going to be thunder~~
    - Problems with Radical Behaviorism?
        - 1. Contemporary scientific practice gives successful theories that are non-behaviorist
            - Law from social psychology: If you ***believe*** that someone is the same religion (or some other social identity) as you are, you will ***treat*** them better.
            - ~~Law from social psychology$_{\text{Radical Behaviorist}}$: If someone is the same religion (or some other social identity) as you are, you will give them gifts.~~
        - 2. Cannot capture mental state talk!
    - **Logical behaviorism**: mental language means stimulus-response dispositions
        - Example: Sophie **wants** to go to the beach.
        - Detour on disposition
            - Example: a glass is disposed (or has the disposition to break)
            - Rephrased in terms of **if-then** statements: if the glass falls or is hit, then it will break

        - "Sophie **<u>wants</u>** to go to the beach" means if Sophie has a way to get to the beach, then she will go to the beach.
    - Advantages of Logical Behaviorism
        - 1. Captures normal mental state talk by offering to translate it into physical terms
    - Problems with Logical Behaviorism
        - 1. Limited to too narrow a type of dispositions/if-then statements
            - Example: "[1] Griffin **<u>wants</u>** some ice cream, but then [2] Griffin **<u>remembers</u>** that he has to save money" =
                - 1. If Griffin has the opportunity to eat ice cream, then he will eat ice cream
                - 2. But Griffin prefers to save money.
            - We need something like this: If thought 1, then thought 2.
                - But this goes against the Logical Behaviorist's view that we should specify all mental acts in terms of physical causes ("ifs") and physical effects (or "thens").
    - Central-state identity theory: all mental states are just identical with physical (here, neural) states.
        - Each mental state corresponds to some activation of brain activity
    - Advantages
        - 1. Captures causality
            - Even the types that Logical Behaviorism struggle with (thoughts causing other thoughts)
        - 2. Captures normal talk of mental states
    - Problem
        - 1. Type physicalism limits the amount of mentalizers to what we currently know, and no cross-species or cross human states, potentially
            - **Token-physicalism**: every mental state has some physical realization
                - Compatible with different sorts of brains having same mental state
            - **Type-physicalism**: every given mental state corresponds to *a single type* of physical realization
                - Incompatible with different sorts of brains having same mental state
            - Central-state identity theory is committed to type-physicalism!

Functionalism: a mental state is defined by its causal relations to other mental states

Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know"

- Scenario: Imagine Mary is in a black-and-white room and knows all the physical facts, but hasn't ever seen a color.
- Basic argument
    - P1. Mary knows all the physical facts

- P2. If physicalism is true, then Mary's knowledge of all the physical facts = Mary's knowledge of all facts
- P3. Mary doesn't know everything
  - (a) If Mary knows everything, she cannot learn anything.
  - (b) Mary learns something upon leaving the room.
  - (c) Thus, Mary doesn't know everything
- C. Thus, physicalism is not true (by modus tollens)