


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## Introduction

This edition begins a new phase of revitalization for this journal. After being out of commission for over a year, this journal has striven to highlight the best of our undergraduate scholars. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced the world to reflect on insights of the past as well as the present as a means of striving towards a better future. Likewise, the papers within this edition will offer

both historical and current insights from Africa to Europe as a way of similar reflection in international relations.



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## Africa

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## **“Boko Haram as a Local Phenomenon”**

**By Jakob Levin**

### **Colonizing discourse: on Nigeria**

The “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) is perhaps most commonly viewed in the Western Hemisphere through the lens of the attacks of September 11th and Osama bin-Laden’s call to *jihad*. Western countries, particularly America, became increasingly preoccupied with bringing

the perpetrators to justice; or, from a more critical light, exact revenge. Within the next few years, the United States would be engaged to its fullest capacity in two separate entanglements halfway around the world. In Afghanistan, American forces hoped for retribution against a government that allegedly cooperated with bin-Laden's *al-Qaida*, the Taliban. Backed by allied-N.A.T.O. forces, American efforts overthrew the ruling government without serious considerations for a long-term political strategy that would lead to democratization and stability as evident in the repeated delays of agreed upon troop withdrawal deadlines.

Today, a new threat seems to have aimed its ideological cannon at the West. That is, only if the assertions of the state (and its allies) in retreat are taken at face value. Zenn is one academic who maintains that the aforementioned cases serve as relevant analogues for ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria; a federation of 36 state-provinces with a history of sectarian schisms and a population of 132 million, nearly half of whom are Muslim (2017). The violence that broke out in light of the country's democratization followed a decade and a half "of martial law and several army coups" leaving many Muslims to fear that a moral, all-encompassing way of life could not be sustained in a nascent Christian democracy (Mandaville, 2014, p. 272). Zenn marks his territory in the debate on *Boko Haram*'s positionality by proclaiming their goal is to "govern a Taliban-like state", improperly emphasizing *Boko Haram*'s role in the GWOT which is most accurately understood through the dimensions of reactionary mobilization (2017, p. 182). Seeking to understand their relationship with other Salafi-jihadist transnational movements—primarily through discussions of their training, funding, and rhetoric—Zenn's article is a direct response to the plethora of academic literature on the organization. Perhaps the most authoritative academic on *Boko Haram* is Thurston. He, along with Higazi and Mohammed, argue the organization's inceptions and rise must be looked at holistically. Proper and accurate

research into the organization must take into account the various dynamic actors: theologies, agency, and socio-economic conditions on the ground in Nigeria.

### **Morality in the Public Sphere**

Before discussing the true origins of *Boko Haram*, it is first vital to comprehend an authentic understanding of the larger strain of Islamic theology that seems to be the inspiration for the movement's rigid doctrine. Salafism derives its moniker from *salaf al-salih* and is characterized "by their exclusive reliance on ... this earliest period of Islam"; despite this, its formation as a theological branch of Islam is a "relatively modern phenomenon." (Mandaville 2014). The oft-described fathers of Salafism like Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida actually professed relatively progressive views in contrast to these early days of Islam and contra-literalist scholars. As Mandaville reminds researchers, Abduh rejected the outdated jurisprudential decisions (enshrining a Salafi core principle of Islam's unity which will be discussed later on) and viewed the *salaf al-salih* as a model for Islamic revitalization and a means to find order in life in the face of modernity. The brutal authoritarianism of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser is perhaps the watershed moment for Salafism, as the controversial and radical Islamic theologian Sayyid Qutb turned Salafism from mere political dogma into an active revolution (Ibid., pp. 46-49).

*Boko Haram*'s identity in local politics predates its founding in 2002, tracing itself back to Nigeria's first exposure to Salafism through Sheikh Abubakr Mahmoud Gumi. Thurston describes Sheikh Gumi's being born into a lineage "of Islamic scholars" (2011). Following the consumption of Ottoman empirical institutions, the empire adapted the educational models embracing religion as an institutional functionary which allowed for Islamic thought's continuity

in the public sphere under total political domination. While Gumi's environmental predispositions played a role, Thurston points to the Sheikh's transborder exposures as the proximate source for his unique theological outlook. After Nigeria's independence from Britain, not only did he ascend as the premier jurisprudent in Northern Nigeria but he also took charge within the political administration of the republic in the North (Ibid., pp. 9-12).

A turning point in Gumi's association with Salafism came when "his political patron was killed in a military coup. Gumi shed his official roles and became an anti-Sufi polemicist" (Thurston, 2016, pp. 9-10). His ultimate breakaway from mainstream Islamic jurisprudence would create the power vacuum that would allow for the emergence of *Boko Haram*; his disciples would, nearly twelve years later, subsequently found *Jama'at Izalat al-Bid'a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna*, most commonly known by the moniker Izala. In the 1990s, Gumi passed away and Izala preachers who had returned back to Nigeria from studying in Medina, the powerhouse of contemporary Salafi intelligentsia, found their organization astray and without clear visionary leadership. In response, they subsequently founded *Ahlus Sunnah*, the immediate predecessor to *Boko Haram*.

As Nigeria transitioned into its most current republican state, northern state-provinces emphatically embraced the implementation of *sharia* law (Ibid). These state-provinces saw the federal, democratic system as a medium in which they were permitted "to enforce Islamic law, rather than for a theocracy in which unelected clerics would rule" (Ibid, pp. 15). This rationale seems to affirm Mandaville's thesis that 12 northern state-provinces enshrining *sharia* into legislation over four years from 1999 until 2003 is "first and foremost, a regional response" (2014). Religious leaders were so successful because of their rhetoric that expressed "solutions

couched in idioms –such as Islam– with local appeal” and sought to mobilize support based along ethno-religious lines to claim political domination within the state-provinces (Mandaville, 2014, p. 272).

After the Kannama raid, ostensible leader Muhammad Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia in fear that Nigerian authorities were zeroing in on him. Once he had returned to Nigeria, Yusuf “was hailed as a hero for his criticism of the government and his call for sharia law” and the group saw a dramatic increase in support due to the underdog status Yusuf and *Ahlus Sunnah* cultivated (Thurston, 2016, pp. 11). Tensions then peaked with two specific events: a funeral procession carried out in Borno State was met with violence by the anti-banditry unit Operation Flush II, and Yusuf’s subsequent scathing condemnation titled “Open Letter to the Federal Government of Nigeria”. The ratcheting up of tensions by both *Ahlus Sunnah* and Nigerian security forces led Yusuf to declare a *jihad* and for the group, at Yusuf’s direction, to attempt an uprising in Northern Nigeria. The insurgency was quickly defeated by Nigerian security forces, ultimately only spanning five states and leaving over a thousand dead, including organizational leader Yusuf. The movement suffered its largest blow yet with security services laying waste to many of its leaders and followers when Abubakr Shekau, a trusted ally of Yusuf and the presumable current ‘Big Man’ of *Boko Haram*, proclaimed leadership. He took the group underground until it would reemerge in their current iteration after their successful suicide bombing of the Federal Police Headquarters and U.N. Building in Abuja during the summer of 2011. Since then, *Boko Haram*’s offensive has been overwhelmingly successful.

### **Normative Islamic Political Activism**

In Islamic politics, the normative actor will attempt to gain social clout through mobilizing the native population along the themes of morality and order. The existing literature on *Boko Haram* confirms Salafi theology's centrality to the movement's widespread support and meteoric rise. As hinted at previously, Salafism is relatively puritanical as its theology is based on the earliest forms of Islamic jurisprudence and categorically rejects modernity as compatible with the 'true' form of Islam. Salafi thought vehemently believes in the unity of Islam as a totalizing way of life in the social, religious, and political realms. Yet its conception is clearly tinged with modernity. Qutb's transition of Salafism into political activism was a response to secularism and nationalism—both of which, according to him, is antithetical to Islam—and epitomizes its cementation into Islamic political thought. While Thurston is certainly accurate in his presentation of Salafism as more theological doctrine than political ideology (2015), to properly understand *Boko Haram*'s ascent and actions within the Nigerian political context it is necessary to understand the theoretical models in which they seem to follow. Qutb's *Social Justice in Islam*—specifically the chapters regarding its origins, fundamentals, and political theory within Islam—will serve as the foundational text for the conditions in which Islam can serve as a political system. Additionally, Mandaville's discussion of Salafism provides useful distinctions between different applications of Salafi theology.

Qutb's *Social Justice in Islam* is the prime source for analyzing the theological tenets that mobilized Muslims in the North under charismatic leadership of Gumi and Yusuf, and now Abubakr Shekau. Qutb published *Social Justice in Islam* while in the United States to widespread applause from the Muslim Brotherhood: a social organization founded by Hassan al-Banna that advocated for a greater presence of Islam in the public sphere to fill the void left by Nasser's retreat of the state. Qutb saw the "Brethren as defenders of Islam" and was particularly

disturbed by the celebration of al-Banna's assassination in 1949 by the Americans he found himself among (Ibid. pp. 2-3). To properly understand the political theory of Islam and how to enact social justice for all as a reality, Qutb suggests that one must embrace the unity of nature and mankind. He remarks that "creation, issuing as it does from one absolute, universal, and active Will, forms an all-embracing unity" (Ibid. p. 39). Here, he seems to embrace a belief that there is a supreme moral order governing human behavior. Yet by acknowledging the relationship between creator and creation as reliant on the 'active will' (the Quran and *sunna*), Qutb also accepts legal positivism as concurrent with Islam, since for the word of Muhammad to remain 'active', it requires social commitment. Holding both dueling philosophical conceptions together, one can deduce that Islam firmly believes in *consent of the governed* as a core principle to the unity of nature and mankind; a unity that is "suitable, adapted, and ready for the appearance of life in the general sense, and for the appearance of man, the highest form of life, in particular" (Ibid. p. 39). Following this, Qutb also clarifies Islam's strident regard for pluralism and equality (contra-Nasser's illiberalism), stating that humanity's "scattered elements must be brought together" and through its diversity humanity will find unity (Ibid p. 41).

Islam is a quite liberal theology, as Qutb notes its clear enunciation of implied freedoms by writing that "there must be freedom for individual and general abilities, rather than repression and a restrictive constraint. Everything that is not legally forbidden is perfectly permissible" (p. 47). Ultimately, what differentiates Islam from the two dominant political systems of his time (liberal-democracy in America and communism in the Soviet Union) is its holistic assessment of life. Islam's amalgamation of the "material, intellectual, religious, and worldly" spheres of life into a comprehensive unity is perhaps the most vital aspect to understanding its immense draw as a totalizing way of life for native Muslims (p. 49). In essence, the basic nature of a

comprehensive Islamic worldview is one that is socially just. Islam's pursuit of social justice is founded on (i) "the absolute...unity of existence" and (ii) "the general, mutual responsibility of individuals and societies" (Algar, 2000, p. 45).

It is now necessary to address the foundations on which Islam facilitates justice. Qutb outlines the fundamentals on which Islam establishes justice. It is from these, he notes, where Islam receives its mandate to regulate justice in society. The fundamentals of social justice are: "absolute freedom of conscience", "the complete equality of all men", and "the firm mutual responsibility of society" (pp. 51-52). Dealing with freedom of conscience, Qutb explains that social justice must be yearned for by both the individual and the society. He explains Islam's advent came as a result of "freeing the human conscience from servitude to anyone except Allah" and since Allah is the supreme power, there is no permissible form of submission or worship (Ibid. p. 55). One could read this as a simple affirmation of Islam's monotheism, but understanding his positionality in the personalized authoritarianism of Nasser's regime indicates this is more a critique of the materialistic West. Critiquing the irony of the West's professed belief in human equality, he notes various cases in which the West's values do not reflect reality and proclaims Islam's "intense passion for equality" is inherent in the emancipation of the human spirit and conscience (Ibid. pp.71-79). His final cornerstone to establishing justice in society is mutual social responsibility. He explains that limits are placed on an individual's absolute freedom because "there is the important matter of the supreme welfare of society, short of which the freedom of the individual must stop" (Ibid p. 79). He elaborates on the dichotomous nature of freedom and responsibility, stating that mutual social responsibility "makes demands alike on the individual and on society. " (Ibid p. 80). In mutual responsibility, everyone is responsible "with the duty of putting an end to any evildoing", even if there is no personal role. He illustrates that

society must ensure the welfare of its weak and destitute, and elaborates on the perceived harshness of social crimes as necessary for “the safety, the security, and the stability of society” (pp. 87-91).

With the fundamental features necessary to legislate social justice already established, the application of these ideals is of next concern. Qutb discusses his interpretation of political theory in Islam as being primarily “concerned with” the integration of Islamic jurisprudence, social care in totality, the creation of a just and equal society, and the “distribution of wealth” in keeping with Islam (Algar, 2000, p. 113). He is keen to draw a distinction between the political systems of his time (liberal-democratic, communist-totalitarian), the historical analogues (imperialism, colonialism) that many seek to apply to past Islamic rule, and Islam—which he asserts “presents...a complete political system” (p. 114). Cautioning Islamic scholars from looking to history for parallels, Qutb says the “true method is to turn to the fundamentals” of Islam with the theoretical understanding that in itself “lie the complete bases” for the Islamic political system (Ibid. p. 115). Therefore, any attempt by a political scientist—especially one of a Western background—to comprehend Islamic political theory without understanding the spirit of Islam from a reflexive lens is ill-advised. Instead, researchers must turn to Islam’s “theory of unity, fundamental beliefs, and its distinctive methods” to gain the proper conceptions of Islam’s spirit. Perhaps even more important than its belief in “equality of mankind as a species,” Islamic policy thrives on the social conception that “Islam represents the eternal system for the world throughout the future of the human race” (Ibid. p. 117). For Qutb, this truth comes from Islamic theology that believes Muhammad is the prophetic seal of G-d and that Islam “is the most correct of all religions” (Ibid. p. 118). The previous verse certainly gives cause for religious zealots to oppress other minorities. It is perhaps the next assessment by Qutb that is most relevant to the

case of Nigeria. Explaining that Islam's political theory requires both just rule and obedience by the ruled, he stipulates that the individual need not be obedient if the ruler is not abiding by the 'active will' of Allah. Indeed, he goes so far as to emphasize "the necessity of getting rid of a ruler who abandons the law by deed or by word" to ensure those fundamental pillars echoed previously, only upon which social justice can be established (Ibid. p. 121).

Yet, while Salafism is thoroughly puritanical in its theology, it would be an egregious claim to assert that all Salafis are radical extremists. Political activism is largely seen by Salafis as outside the realm of religion and incongruent with their literalist interpretations (Mandaville, 2014, p.46-50). However, Mandaville asserts the formulation of a "political Salafism" where mainstream Salafi dogma is "vested with an activist impulse" to Islamize society, whether gradually or hastened by the use of *jihad* and other forms of violence (Ibid. p. 50). This conception of political Salafism seems to be most in line with the Qutb's theological activism, following Islam as a response to secular and national political hegemony. Therefore, it would be fair to characterize those who fit Mandaville's definition as 'Qutbists'. Qutb viewed the *ulama*—theological gatekeepers to ensure the eternal originality and sanctity of the Quran and *sunna*—as incapable of Islamizing society and professed the direct engagement with *sharia* as the 'true way' for Egypt's Muslims. Through the application of Qutbist thought, *Boko Haram*'s positionality as a primarily local phenomena is perhaps most evident.

### **Localizing *Boko Haram* through Salafi rationalism and gradualism**

The clear distinctions between the more widespread Salafi way of life in contrast to implementing an Islamist political order sought by Qutbists has already been established. Understanding the nuances within Salafi theology is crucial to understanding exactly how *Boko*

*Haram* grew out of native disenfranchisement from the central state into its current form that Zenn likens to *Da'ish* and the Taliban (2017). What he fundamentally misses in his assessment of the movement, though, is an authentic understanding of the normative model for Islamic political activism established by Qutb as a response to secular-national systems of governance. Countering Zenn's thesis, Higazi (2018) argues his selective accounts that seem to prove *Boko Haram*'s globalism in fact are influenced by Zenn's Western predispositions, describing him as an "alarmist" and "partisan propagandist" (Higazi et al., 2018, p. 211). While such personal attacks are rarely seen in academia, it underscores the importance of pragmatically approaching ethno-religious conflicts, especially regarding the Middle East and North Africa. Contrary to Zenn's conception that Nigeria's northern Muslims desire for a way of life governed by *sharia* is illiberal, Villalón reminds readers that democratic fervor has actually only increased since the beginning of Nigeria's democratization by providing a space for "religious groups to advocate for policies that are more accommodating of local cultural values" (2012, p. 191). If Zenn hopes for northern Muslims to embrace liberal democracy as opposed to authoritarianism, he would be wise to forgo the fetishization of foreign prescriptions of life and placing native political mobilization as inherently dangerous.

The mainstream Salafi doctrine belief in *tarbiyya*, or education, as the primary instrument for the Islamization of society fits neatly into Qutb's demand for Muslim citizens to engage directly with *sharia* in their nations. In an environment free of external factors, a Muslim provided with an authentic *tarbiyya* from the *ulama* would find himself adhering to the most literal interpretation of the active will of Allah. It was the absence of this rational and gradual Salafi theology that pushed Gumi to issue the "famous Northern Nigerian anti-Sufi tract" that emphatically adopts Qutbist impulses for the pursuit of local political ends (Thurston, 2011, p.

9). It should be no surprise, then, that Gumi's theological heir apparent in Yusuf would publish his "Open Letter to the Federal Government of Nigeria" and subsequent call to *jihad* only in response to years of brutal crackdowns by the state security services— a move by the Abujan authorities to combat an attempt by local Muslims at the start of democracy to implement a way of life *they* saw fit in Nigeria's nascent political system. Yusuf's actions are completely normative within Islamic political activism, yet this is a reality that neither the Nigerian state (and its patrons in the West) nor Zenn are willing to accept.

The inflexibility of the Nigerian state to openly engage with the native Muslim sentiment in the North since 1998 has undoubtedly extended the ethno-religious conflict longer than if dialogue was present from the start. At first, *Boko Haram*'s second iteration under Yusuf was relatively democratic, forming political alliances and backing electoral campaign. Yet, the largely Christian state apparatus tended to view it as antithetical to the federal-republic's values. Instead of vying to diminish the political influence of Salafi theologians through a battle of the heart and mind, the Nigerian state sought—as most nascent states are predisposed—to expand political hegemony and purge popular dissent through repressive force. The militarism in response to Qutbist politics, combined with structural economic barriers and increasingly inflammatory rhetoric, stand as the causal explanation for why Abubakr Shekau would bring the Salafi movement underground; only to reemerge in the wake of their suicide bombing targeting the Federal Police Headquarters and U.N. Building in Abuja during the summer of 2011. It marked a new age that necessitated *jihad* to achieve the movement's ends. Besides the election of another Southern Christian head of state, it remains elusive as to why Shekau would view this moment—just months after the raid that led to Yusuf's assassination— as prime to call upon his Muslim brethren's engagement in political activism. The answer lies in the aforementioned

disenfranchisement of Muslims from society that not only confirmed their conceptions of an Islamophobic Nigerian state, but that also ran completely afoul to the nature and foundations of Islam.

## **Conclusion**

The discourse on *Boko Haram* is vast with a wide range of views on policy initiatives to peacefully settle the conflict that has been ravaging Northern Nigeria for the past two decades. Conflict-resolution policy must reflect the needs of the local people, and a monocausal analysis of *Boko Haram's* founding and character may impede tangible, sustainable research-based solutions. If the central government did not attempt to suppress Qutbist politics in the North and instead allowed it to operate within the bounds of Nigeria's federal-republic, it is likely that access to political participation would have moderated some of the more radical elements and established trust with local communities. The Nigerian government –and its patrons with immeasurable political and economic influence over the country such as the United States– should certainly take note of where they have erred in the past and seek direct negotiations with *Boko Haram* and its leadership. It is important as a researcher to challenge the status-quo conceptions of IR theory, and surely the “Global War on Terror” provides a unique opportunity to critique the mass assertion by Western democracies of “globalized terrorist networks” with no clear resolution to the problem anywhere on the horizon. That is, if such a problem is a reality even worth addressing when one considers the failed policies the Global North has taken to resolve elsewhere in the world. In fact, as has been established through a reflexive interpretation and discussion of contemporary Islamic theology and association, the organization's followers are every-day Northern Nigerians who have felt disenfranchised by what they view as an

increasingly Christian government centralized in the industrialized South. Tensions are only further exacerbated by poor economic conditions and fierce intra-Muslim divisions, typical of social conflicts in the postcolonial Islamic sphere(s) of influence. *Boko Haram* is clearly local in nature– the most generous reading of their activities would indicate a regional character. They primarily come into play in global politics with regards to their political messaging and aggressively antagonistic posturing towards the West, where they do share common ideology with other Salafi-jihadist groups.

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## Europe

### Authors

#### **Shayna R. Schulman**

Shayna is a junior pursuing a major in Political Science with minors in History and Communication Studies. University of Florida courses such as The Holocaust in the Courtroom and The History of Antisemitism, her time studying abroad at Tel Aviv University, and visits to Holocaust memorials and museums in Europe and Israel furthered her knowledge and passion for both Jewish history and the law. Following her acceptance to the University of Florida's University Scholars Program, she was awarded a scholarship to undertake a research project in the 2021-2022 academic year. Her project explores the extent that Americans support religious pluralism and religious freedoms, and their perspectives on the First Amendment. She is also a research assistant studying police violence and brutality in early-twentieth century America. Shayna is a competitor and captain on the University of Florida Mock Trial Team, and has served two years as an executive board member. In addition, she is a copy editor for the Florida Political Review and a second-degree black belt in Taekwondo.

#### **Erin Wright**

Erin Wright is an undergraduate student in the political science and women's studies departments at the University of Florida. With a focus on immigration, her work focuses more broadly on women, peace, and security. Currently, she works in a political behavior research lab and is beginning the University Scholars Program. Ms. Wright is a University of Florida O'Neill Excellence Scholar, and she looks forward to completing her current research on the gendered immigrant economy.

## **“Holocaust Memory Politics in Israel, West Germany and France in the 1960s and 1980s”**

**By Shayna R. Schulman**

### **Abstract**

The legal systems and political attitudes of Israel, West Germany, and France molded the narratives that dominated Holocaust trials of the 1960s to 1980s. The politics of memory describes the collective memory formed or discarded by political agents. Specifically, Holocaust memory is the lens through which the Holocaust was remembered at a certain place and time. This paper analyzes the political influence of Holocaust memory in the Kasztner Trial, Eichmann Trial, Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial, Lischka Trial, and Barbie Trial. Each country's trials are examined through their laws, national attitudes surrounding the Holocaust, and effect on Holocaust memory in the years following their occurrence. These trials did not occur in a political vacuum. With time, the Holocaust faded into the background of international attention

as more pressing issues took the spotlight. This trend was evidenced through media portrayals, national identity questions, legal obstacles, antisemitism, and inapt political goals. I argue that memory politics influenced the trials' faithful representation of the Holocaust, both during and after the trial, at varying levels depending on the country. On a scale from least to most influence, I rank the countries as Israel, West Germany, and France, respectively.

*Keywords:* Holocaust, Israel, West Germany, France, Nazism, Jewish people, politics

## **Introduction**

Holocaust justice was an uphill battle. The sheer immensity of horrors and perpetrators proved challenging to try in a judicial setting. The law laid the foundation for what defendants could be tried and what evidence could be presented. In certain cases, the choice of whether or not to apply a certain law or to change it was a political choice. Public opinion in each country surrounding the Holocaust influenced how the trials played out. In the Kasztner Trial, the Israeli government sued Malchiel Gruenwald for his disparaging accusation that Rudolf Kasztner collaborated with Nazis during the Holocaust. As a Jew living in Hungary, Kasztner made a deal with Nazis to save some Jewish lives at the expense of others. Most notably he spoke with Adolf Eichmann, who faced his own trial in 1961. Eichmann, a high-ranking Nazi official, was charged with 15 counts of crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and membership of a hostile organization. West Germany's Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial consisted of 22 defendants, including Nazi officials, guards, and medical personnel. They were charged with murder and accomplice to murder for their actions at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. In the Lischka Trial, state authorities in North Rhine-Westphalia charged Kurt Lischka with aiding and abetting mass murder. Lischka's role in facilitating deportations of French Jews during the Holocaust gave this trial a French focus. In the Barbie Trial of 1987, France indicted

Klaus Barbie on 41 counts of crimes against humanity. Barbie, a Nazi during the Holocaust, was notorious for torturing French resistors and Jewish prisoners in Lyon, France. As criminal proceedings, these trials delivered justice. However, the politics of the trials' respective time period and country permeated laws, national attitudes, and post-trial memory. National memory politics affected how the trials ensued and how the Holocaust was remembered in all three countries but to different degrees: Israeli trials the least, West German trials more so, and French trials the most.

## **Literature Review**

Scholars have found that memory is political; it is a communicative process that is simultaneously contested and negotiated (Maurantonio, 2014, p. 3). Memory politics determines what is and is not acceptable in society. It governs pride, shame, fear, revenge, and comfort for a large number of a country's citizens (Markovits & Reich, 1997, p. 9). I examine how memory politics contributed to each country's collective memory of the Holocaust. Beginning with Israel, the Kasztner and Eichmann Trials exemplified how Israel was still figuring out what their identity as a people was. Uri Avneri described the conflict as a struggle between the "Israeli" and the "Exile" (Segev, 2005, p. 279). I explore this conflict in identity and what it meant for Holocaust memory.

Due to West Germany's 1949 prohibition on retroactive legislation, all that was left for post-war trials was the German Penal Code of 1871, the *Strafgesetzbuch* (StGB). For murder, the StGB required the prosecution to prove that a crime occurred and that the defendant had the individual initiative to commit murder (Wittman, 2012, p. 46). Originally, the 20-year statute of limitations on murder was set to expire in 1965. That year, after the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial was long underway, the Bundestag extended the statute of limitations to 1969. As that deadline

approached, it was extended ten additional years before it was eradicated completely. I examine how these legal battles and a national identity realization impacted the effectiveness of the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial at preserving Holocaust memory.

Moving on to France, there were concerns about the identity of French Jews. It was questionable whether or not they would be grouped together with French deportees or viewed as their own distinct group (Goda, 2020a, p. 2). The Lischka Trial offered hope of a distinct Jewish memory, yet I explore how this hope vanished in the Barbie Trial. When the United Nations voted to broaden the definition of crimes against humanity in 1968, France abstained from the vote. African and Arab states wanted the charge to include “colonial crimes,” which they viewed as comparable to Nazi crimes, and “eviction by occupation,” which was targeted toward Israel (Goda, 2020b, p. 25-26). I examine how France’s past reemerged to hurt them during the Barbie Trial nearly 20 years later. Defense attorney Jacques Vergès claimed that Barbie’s signature on damning documents was forged, and witnesses lied or exaggerated the truth. I argue that Vergès recognized how weak this defense strategy was and shifted the trial’s focus onto red herrings.

Memory politics has the power to determine how history is written and passed on. I end with a discussion of how the Holocaust was remembered decades after the trials’ occurrence. All the evidence and testimony that emerged brought new knowledge to light. Sometimes this knowledge was beneficial to Holocaust memory, other times not so much. Through the examination of five trials across three countries, I analyze how laws and public opinion shaped how the Holocaust was portrayed during and after the trials.

## **Israel**

### **Laws**

In 1950, Israel passed the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law. The original intent of the law was to punish Jewish collaborators, such as Kapos who were recognized by fellow Jews (Lipstadt, 2011, p. 195). The creation of this law was purely political. Holocaust survivors pressured the Knesset to pass a law to grant Israel the authority to arrest and hold suspected collaborators. The issue, which came to fruition in the Kasztner Trial, was that Israelis had varying definitions of “collaborator.” Israel did not expect to try a Nazi with this law, but nonetheless it occurred with Adolf Eichmann. Without this retroactive and extraterritorial law in place, Israel may not have been able to try Eichmann in 1961.

### **National Attitudes**

The Kasztner Trial of 1955 served as a precursor to future trials. Israel had only been a state for one decade. The influx of Holocaust survivors who moved to Israel altered the demographic of Jews in the new state. Molded by their experience fighting for the State of Israel, Hebrew Israelis were characterized by self-reliance, youthfulness, and rebellion. To them, the Exile Jew was meek, old, and required protection (Lipstadt, 2011, p. 194). With emotional scars still raw, Israelis struggled with Holocaust memory. To some, Kasztner’s negotiations with Nazis and failure to warn Hungarian Jews of their impending doom were clearly evidence of collaboration. To other Israelis, saving several hundred Jews was better than saving none at all. This conflict can be attributed to the fact that Hebrew Israelis had not yet fully grasped the extent of the horrific experiences of Holocaust survivors. Israelis were so consumed with fighting to protect their new nation from neighboring countries that little attention was given to Holocaust survivors.

During the Eichmann Trial six years later, Hebrew Israelis’ misunderstanding of Holocaust survivors was still apparent. To Hebrew Israelis, the Jewish survivors who did not

resist against the Nazis did not represent their image of the tough, steadfast sabra. Abba Kovner's powerful witness testimony helped bring attention to this issue. He defended those who did not fight back because "only people with a strong will may do so, and people with strong wills are not to be found amongst the desperate and broken" (Prazan, 1997, 43:51). As someone who did fight back, Kovner represented the type of Jew that Hebrew Israelis wanted their image to be. Hearing this plea from a man like Kovner started to open people's eyes to be more empathetic of Holocaust survivors, rather than critical.

Gideon Hausner, the lead prosecutor, sought to connect the Holocaust with persistent antisemitism that dated back centuries (Lipstadt, 2011, p. 63). Critics accused Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of manipulating the Eichmann Trial with his Zionist agenda. To Ben-Gurion, the trial was an opportunity to teach the younger generation of Israelis about antisemitism and the importance of Israel because of it. While this narrative was noticeable in the trial, it did not hinder the trial so much as to hurt its efficacy of faithfully portraying the Holocaust. Hearing the harrowing testimony gave Israelis who did not experience the Holocaust first-hand a taste of what survivors endured. Ultimately, they began to realize that those Jews may not have been as weak as they originally believed them to be. In this sense, the trial and testimony actually helped solve a national memory issue.

## **West Germany**

### **Laws**

Konrad Adenauer, West Germany's chancellor, wanted the country to "put the past behind us" (Wittman, 2012, p. 28) and future trials posed a threat to that goal. With the StGB as the only available option for post-war trials, the list of defendants that could be tried in court narrowed. If the burden of proof had not been so strict, more perpetrators could have been tried.

The question of statute of limitations garnered legal battles that persisted for decades. The fact that the Bundestag dragged out these battles to extend the statute of limitations shows how they were evading Holocaust trials and memory. With more time comes more evidence. As time went on, more and more documents and records from the Holocaust were being discovered. Waiting to extend the statute of limitations until after the start of the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial was a political choice. It meant that Bauer needed to rush through processing evidence and maybe did not have as strong of a case as he could have had with more time. By stringing along these decisions, perhaps West Germany was attempting to limit the number of prosecutions that took place. This debate reflected the larger issue of dealing with “collective, national, and individual guilt” (Wittman, 2012, p. 49). This issue of guilt became apparent as it overshadowed the narrative of the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial.

### **National Attitudes**

For years following the war’s end, Germans saw themselves as the victims. They remembered how their towns were decimated with bombs and their soldiers were killed on the Eastern front. Before the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial, it was not unusual for Germans to be ignorant of the extent to which Nazism operated concentration and extermination camps (Wittman, 2012, p. 271). Afterall, Auschwitz was in Poland. Thanks to the newly formed Central Office of the State Justice Administrations, a plethora of evidence surrounding Nazi crimes was collected and ultimately used in the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial. Thus, making it more difficult for Germans to claim themselves as the victims of the war.

However, this realization did not come easily. Regular Germans struggled to make the connection between the National Socialist Party and the sadistic defendants in the dock at trial.

This was due to both the narrow confines of German law and journalists. Because German law required proof of motive to be convicted of murder, journalists portrayed the defendants as vicious killers. Headlines such as “The Devil Sits on the Defendants’ Bench” and “Just Like Beasts of Prey” (Wittman, 2012, p. 177) were broadcast by the media. This created distance between the defendants and the German people. Germans were quick to point out the evilness in defendants who brutally shot someone on their own accord yet exonerated those who killed thousands while following orders. This narrative dominated the trial. It took attention away from the fact that thousands of perpetrators contributed to the horrors of the Holocaust, not just the select few defendants who were chosen to be tried. In this sense, the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial presented a distorted portrayal of the Holocaust. The need to prove murder based on the confines of the law took precedence over an accurate portrayal of the Holocaust as a historical occurrence.

## **France**

### **Laws**

By the time Klaus Barbie was captured, it had been four decades since his alleged crimes. With the statute of limitations on war crimes expired, Barbie could only be charged under crimes against humanity. The issue was that French resisters did not qualify as victims of crimes against humanity, only Jewish victims did. These resisters were central to the French memory of Nazism and the French may have gotten upset if Barbie was only tried for crimes against the Jews. In order to satisfy public opinion, France expanded crimes against humanity to include French resisters in 1985. This change was not lost on African and Arab states who remembered France’s

abstention from the 1968 United Nations vote. These changes foreshadowed the narratives that Barbie's defense counsel used in his trial.

### **National Attitudes**

Following the Holocaust, French Jews struggled with how they would be remembered. The Lischka Trial seemed to solidify Holocaust memory as distinctively Jewish. Thousands of French Jews traveled to Cologne to watch the proceedings. It was truly a historic moment to hear Lischka testify about the horrors he was responsible for. For French Jews, Lischka's guilty verdict was a win. The fact that so many young people attended the trial gave French Jews hope that "they will be the collective memory of the Jewish people" (Goda, 2020a, p. 58). Unfortunately, their efforts to create a distinct Jewish memory in France would not continue in the Barbie Trial.

The narratives that overpowered the Barbie Trial hindered the trial's efficacy more than any of the other trials. To accommodate for his weak defense, Vergès made comparisons between the Holocaust and other horrors around the world. Elie Wiesel testified that while other horrors must be remembered, they must not be compared to the Holocaust. This did not deter Vergès from comparing France's actions in Algeria, South African apartheid, and Palestinian suffering at the hands of Israelis to Barbie's crimes in the Holocaust. Furthermore, Vergès claimed that too much attention was given to the Jews. Why, Vergès professed, was Barbie being tried for crimes against the Jews four decades after the fact when perpetrators of more recent crimes against humanity were left off the hook? The defense counsel's rhetoric enmeshed centuries-old antisemitic tropes with the state of Israel. There were claims of Jewish lobbying, Jewish-controlled media, and Jewish money all at the hands of Israel. Vergès's narratives of colonialism in the Barbie Trial were the very same ones used by African and Arab states in the

1968 United Nations vote. By using tropes of antisemitism, Vergès claimed that it was Israel's power that allowed Jewish victims to hold this trial, yet Africans and Arabs did not receive the same treatment.

Another key point about the narrative of the Barbie Trial was the makeup of the defense counsel. Defending Barbie was Jacques Vergès, Jean-Martin Mbemba, and Nabil Bouaïta. These men were of Asian, Black, and Arab descent, respectively. Alain Finkielkraut noted the absurdity in this. The attorneys defended a man and ideology who would have deemed them as subhuman at the time that these crimes were committed (Weiss, 2018, 4:15:22). The public was so consumed with arguments about colonialism and Vergès's dynamic speaking skills that many did not realize the irony of the attorneys defending Barbie. These colonial narratives, laced with antisemitism and antizionism, overshadowed the trial. People felt compelled to compare the Holocaust to other atrocities, rather than viewing the Holocaust as a distinct event in history.

### **Post-Trial Memory**

Even though politics determined the narrative of the trials, there was a silver lining. These trials presented an enormity of records, documents, and testimony that lived on past the trials. Hausner's goal to connect the Holocaust with an enduring chain of antisemitism meant bringing in dozens of witnesses to testify at the Eichmann Trial. The trial became less about crimes specific to Eichmann himself and more about witnesses telling their story. To this day, their stories are told to keep the memory alive. In West Germany, the Frankfurt-Auschwitz Trial garnered the attention of young Germans. With an abundance of information now made available, the younger generation questioned the actions of their parents and grandparents during this time. It was a starting point to changing West Germany's original unwritten "policy of

silence” (Wittman, 2012, p. 49) surrounding the Holocaust. In France, Vergès’s arguments were not notably remembered after the Barbie Trial. At the 30-year commemoration of the trial, Vergès’s colonial narrative was swept under the rug. The trial itself and French national memory did not portray the Holocaust as a distinct Jewish struggle. Still, French Jews fostered their own memory in France through the creation of the *Mémorial de la Shoah*, a Holocaust museum and archival center.

Analysis of Holocaust trials in Israel, West Germany, and France exemplified just how much Holocaust memory differed between them. Each country was influenced by a combination of media narratives, identity issues, legal barriers, antisemitism, and hidden political agendas. The narratives that permeated these trials can still be seen today. Comparisons of Nazis with politicians or Holocaust survivors with victims of other atrocities happen all the time, and they are not that far-fetched from Vergès’s comparisons in the Barbie Trial. Such comparisons stain the memory of the Holocaust for what it truly was: the deliberate extermination of European Jewry.

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## **“An Examination of Multicultural Policy Effects on Citizenship Acquisition: Evidence from International Migration Among Western Democracies”** **By Erin Wright**

### **Introduction**

In developed democracies, policymakers continue to debate how to best incorporate immigrant populations into the national fabric. As western states continue to experience shrinking populations, finding the most effective way to successfully integrate immigrant populations into the political, social, and economic frameworks of a given country is more pressing than ever. Beyond the debate in theory and academia, current leaders of democratic states give clear remarks concerning their opinions of multicultural policies. For example, Angela Merkel, Prime Minister of Germany, made the comment that “multiculturalism leads to parallel societies and therefore remains a ‘life lie’”, and the policy has “utterly failed” (Noack, 2015). Also, former U.S. presidential candidate Jeb Bush said, “we should not have multicultural policies... it limits people’s [immigrants’] aspirations” (Beaumont, 2015). Both politicians bring

up important arguments in the debate surrounding multicultural policies. The general question prompted by these two politicians, of which I will address in this essay, is whether or not multicultural policies hinder the integration of non-citizen populations by either creating isolated communities or by limiting incentive to integrate, respectively?

Integration policies have profound impacts for countries all over the world. The unity of the state, the functionality of its economy, and the viability of its welfare programs are at risk. Various stakeholders are positioned to gain from effective integration policies. For example, if parallel societies are emerging due to multicultural policies, then citizens who desire to have a cohesive national identity should take issue with them. However, if multicultural policies are not the cause of parallel societies, citizens should care about what is actually causing isolated communities to emerge. Business owners have something to gain or lose in the effectiveness of integration policy, as well. The workforce may be greatly expanded or decreased based on the immigrant population's ability to acquire language skills, an understanding of local markets, and a network of personal connections. Lastly, state operators of welfare programs have immense stake in the effectiveness of their state's integration policies. If immigrants fail to acquire the means to provide for themselves and adapt to their new environment, welfare programs experience severe strain. Everyone in some way has an interest in integration policy whether they directly involve themselves or not. So, it is important to examine the effectiveness of existing policy choices, and for people to be informed of the implications of the findings.

Two major policy positions have emerged from the debate surrounding the effect of multicultural policies, multiculturalism and civic integration (Joppke, 2004). The idea of multiculturalism policy was presented prior to that of civic integration. Multiculturalism is based on the premise that a state should seek to maintain differences by enacting policies and programs

in order to foster belonging and inclusion among immigrant populations, which in turn will encourage integration and naturalization (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). Civic integration policy challenges the idea that a state should take any steps towards preserving cultures that are counter to its national majority. Civic integration policies put the focus on anti-discrimination laws, requiring immigrants to acquire certain levels of financial stability, language proficiency, and cultural knowledge (Joppke, 2004). Though theorists, such as Joppke or Koopmans, claim that civic integration and multiculturalism are at odds, an analysis of existing policies in western democracies shows an overlap of the two approaches (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013) working together.

Unlike Joppke's claim that multiculturalism is declining, Kymlicka and Banting show that multiculturalism and civic integration policy have actually both been increasing. Although a large amount of research is being done to determine what policies are used by states in an attempt to integrate immigrant populations, very little research is being done to determine the impact of multicultural policies on citizenship acquisition as a measure of integration. It is this essay's goal to examine whether or not the steady increase of multicultural policy, shown by Banting and Kymlicka's MCP Index, has a positive impact on integration in a sample of western democracies. In order to test this, I compared the number of naturalizations over time, from 1991 to 2010, to the corresponding Multicultural Policy Index (MCP) score for Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. These countries provide a spectrum of low to high MCP Index scores.

I found that although the MCP index score increased for all of the countries, with the exception of the Netherlands, from 1991- 2010, the number of citizenship acquisitions actually decreased or stayed stagnant for all countries with the exception of the United Kingdom. The

negative, or neutral, correlation between multicultural policies and citizenship acquisition suggests that implementing MCPs is not the most effective way to integrate immigrant populations into western democracies.

The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. I start by discussing the logics of integration to assert the expected relationship between multicultural policies and citizenship acquisition. I then highlight alternative outcomes, and the anticipated explanations for those outcomes. I then discuss my data and the indicator of integration, citizenship acquisition. I will outline how I measured multicultural policy and citizenship acquisition. I will then explain my findings, and continue on to discuss some of the possible limitations of my observations. I then explain the implications of my finding and how it may inform policy decisions among western democracies that wish to increase integration and citizenship acquisition.

### **Brief History of Multiculturalism Policy**

Multiculturalism began to gain momentum in the early 1990s as proponents, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, theorized that “state support and protection for [immigrants’] languages, cultures and ethnic organizations and institutions” (Koopmans, 2009), would foster integration. Many policymakers saw multiculturalism as a way to accommodate an ethnically diverse population that did not contain minority groups large enough to form their own entities, based on the Wilsonian principle of self-determination (Jupp and Clyne, 2011). More recently, academics such as Koopmans and Joppke argue that multicultural policies have failed and are being eradicated and replaced with civic integration.

However, research done by Kymlicka and Banting shows that multicultural policies are actually still on the rise in most countries (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). These scholars argue that MCPs are being adopted alongside new civic integration policies, and are often disguised

“under the heading of ‘diversity policies’ or ‘intercultural dialogue’ or ‘community cohesion’ or even ‘civic integration’”(Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Therefore, as mentioned in the introduction, two camps of thought have emerged, those who think multicultural policies are still effective and implemented and those who think multicultural policies are “dead” and ineffective. Most of the scholars, such as Joppke, who believe multicultural policies are dying believe they are being replaced by civic integration policy.

### **Relationship Between Multiculturalism and Integration Policies**

Kymlicka and Banting discuss the relationship between civic integration policy and multicultural policies as complimentary as long as states have enabling integration policies instead of prohibitive, which they assert by comparing their MCP index to Goodman’s CIVIX index (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). Jupp and Clyde even admit that “some aspects of multiculturalism are found in many societies which have not adopted it as a national policy” (Jupp and Clyne, 2011), which bolsters Kymlicka and Banting’s claim that multiculturalism is not being phased out; it is just going by a different name. Although Jupp and Clyne claim that Australia has moved away from multiculturalism to integration policy, Australia still scores the highest possible score on the MCP index, an 8, which signifies a high amount of multicultural policy (Jupp and Clyne, 2011). Also, according to Kymlicka, multiculturalism seeks to make recognition of diversity part of a country’s national identity, and therefore may be accomplished with a varying degree of inclusive measures (Kymlicka, 1995). Citrin and Sears refer to this range as “soft” and “hard” multiculturalism, where soft multiculturalism is more symbolic compared to hard multiculturalism’s explicit call on states to implement legislative measures to preserve cultural differences (Citrin and Sears, 2014; Citrin et al. 2001). This literature, however, does not address how the varying range of implementation may impact multicultural policies’

effectiveness in integrating non-citizens. “Hard” versus “soft” multiculturalism may serve as more of a sign of inclusivity to encourage integration, but that has yet to be tested.

### **Formation and Support for Multicultural Policies**

Multicultural policies are not only dictated by policymakers but also by the attitudes of the current citizens of a state. Studies show that support for multicultural policies is directly impacted by negative out-group attitudes in a given state (Citrin et al., 2001). As much as negative out-group attitudes may impact multicultural policies, positive views can do the same. According to Berry, cultural diversity is good for intergroup relations and increases support for multicultural policies (Berry, 2001). It, therefore, makes sense that Alarian and Goodman found that national belonging and out-group attitudes have an impact on support for inclusive policies (Alarian and Goodman, 2019). Inclusive and achievable national identities are more likely to support multiculturalism, while ascriptive, exclusive national identities are not (Alarian and Goodman, 2019). This makes sense when compared with the findings of Berry. If a state is culturally diverse, then it is more probable that diversity has become part of the state’s national identity. For Kymlicka, this is the very goal of multiculturalism, for diversity to become embedded in the national fabric. Therefore, it makes complete sense that Alarian and Goodman found that an inclusive national identity indicates higher support for multicultural policies. It seems possible, from the mentioned research, that multicultural policies are the product of an already inclusive state and not the start of inclusivity. Multiculturalism may have been a way for inclusive states, such as Australia and Canada, to put a name to their already inclusive agenda informed by the diversity of their society.

### **Downfalls of Multiculturalism in Western States**

For Canada specifically, The Canadian Multicultural Act of 1988 claims that multiculturalism helps combat discrimination, ensures the recognition of diversity, promotes a feeling of shared citizenship, and fosters a feeling of cross-cultural understanding that encourages unity and integration among immigrant populations (Jupp and Clyne, 2011). However, despite these claims by the Canadian government and data produced by Kymlicka and Banting supporting the growth of multicultural policies cross-nationally, academics such as Jupp, Clyne, Joppke, and Koopmans take the stance that multicultural policies are harmful and on the decline. Joppke uses the case of the Netherlands to support his theory that multiculturalism is on the decline while civic integration is on the rise. According to Joppke, states are trading neglect for affirmation of their own culture, since “it is logically impossible to recognize all cultures as equal (Joppke, 2004). To Joppke, recognizing the culture of a distinct group through state policy and programs leads to isolation and marginalization, which was evidenced by the ‘unemployment, poverty, school drop-outs, and criminality concentrated among the ethnic minorities’” (Joppke, 2004) in the Netherlands.

Koopmans holds similar sentiments towards multicultural policies as Joppke. Koopmans argues that multicultural policies lead to social and economic marginalization, especially in many European welfare states. He also claims that since multicultural policies “grant immigrants easy access to equal rights” (Koopmans, 2009) there remains very little motivation or incentive to integrate in order to attain citizenship among immigrant populations. Due to this lack of incentive, immigrants do not acquire language skills or interethnic connections and therefore remain largely segregated from the majority population and outside the labor force (Koopmans, 2009). Koopmans assertion that multicultural policies produce a lack of incentive is very similar to the cost-benefit resource logic discussed by Yang in a 1994 study. The argument is that since

multicultural policies provide ease in achieving equal rights and maintaining opposing cultures, the cost of integrating is no longer worth the benefit of inclusion and belonging among the majority population (Yang, 1994). This logic suggests that multicultural policies actually harm the integration of immigrant populations, along the lines of what Joppke, Koopmans, Jupp, and Clyne discuss, and lead to lower citizenship acquisition among countries that adopt these policies.

Though the previous argument is convincing, I hypothesize that the presence of multicultural policies increases the rate of citizenship acquisition in countries, because these policies serve as a normative signal of inclusion to the non-citizen population. Paluck and Tankard, in a study done on the impact of a Supreme Court decision on social norms, found that an institutional decision can impact social norms and guide behavior in the case of same-sex marriage (Paluck and Tankard, 2016). If a Supreme Court decision affirming gay marriage serves as an inclusionary social signal, then the institutional decision to enact multicultural policies upholding cultural differences could also act as an inclusionary signal towards immigrant populations. This inclusionary signal is what I believe acts as a driver for increased citizenship acquisition, since multiculturalism policy creates a feeling of national belonging among non-citizens. According to the inclusion logic, immigrants feel that they are being welcomed by their new host country through these policies, and therefore more easily integrate. I predict that a feeling of reciprocity will compel immigrants in countries with multicultural policies to integrate and achieve citizenship at a higher rate than countries without these policies.

My hypothesis is partly based on a precedent established by research conducted on the impact of enfranchising non-citizens on citizenship acquisition done by Dr. Hannah Alarian in 2020. She finds that granting local suffrage acts as a normative signal of inclusion which

increases the non-citizen population's desire to apply for and acquire citizenship in Spain. Based on Alarian's finding, it seems logical to predict that multicultural policies will act similarly as a normative signal, and will therefore result in a rise in citizenship acquisition. To strengthen this assertion further, Wright and Bloemraad conducted a study in 2012 that concluded that "multiculturalism in no case hinders engagement with society and government, and in many cases seems to foster it" (Wright and Bloemraad, 2012, pg.77). This finding undermines the claims of Joppke, Koopmans, Jupp, and Clyne, by showing that socio-political integration is often strengthened by multicultural policies not harmed. In the next section, I discuss the methods I employ to conduct this research study, which I use to answer the question of whether or not multicultural policies foster integration and therefore increase citizenship acquisition?

### **Citizenship Acquisition as a Measure of Integration**

\_\_\_\_\_ In order to answer the question of whether or not multicultural policies foster integration and therefore increase citizenship acquisition, I analyze international migration statistics from the OECD database produced in 2015 and the MCP Index. I use citizenship acquisition as my indicator of integration, and I compare the number of naturalizations overtime to the adoption of multicultural policies in Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. This allows me to determine, first, whether or not multicultural policies are increasing, decreasing, or remaining stagnant, and then it allows me to determine whether or not a growth in multicultural policies is associated with an increase in citizenship acquisition.

Therefore, my dependent variable is citizenship acquisition (count) and my independent variable in the MCP Index score. I use numbers instead of rates for citizenship acquisition, because according to the OECD "nationality law can have a significant impact on the measurement of the national and foreign populations" (OECD Metadata Viewer, 2020), which

makes it very hard to determine an accurate rate at which the foreign population is acquiring citizenship. Also, although it is ideal to measure the number of naturalization applications, since this measurement better reflects the desire of the immigrant to acquire citizenship, the OECD mentions that these numbers are not accurately reported and paired with an inaccurate foreign population measure, this is not a viable measure for this research. Due to these factors, I conclude that the citizenship acquisition count is the best available measure. To confirm the use of this measure further, in a research study done by Hannah Alarian, she mentions that “observed changes in an acquisition rate may... be an artifact of changes in a country’s estimation of their non-national population” and for this reason “the EU’s statistical office warns against inferring patterns from a naturalization rate or ratio” (Alarian, 2020), which is consistent with information published by the OECD in regard to acquisition of nationality.


I use the MCP index score as my independent variable, because it provides a quantitative measure of the presence of multicultural policy in a given country. By using a quantitative measure, I am able to conduct an empirical analysis on how policy affects naturalization. I utilize the MCP index specifically because it focuses solely on multicultural policy, while other policy indexes do not isolate this variable. I also use this index because the contributors recognize that multicultural policies may exist in a country but not be an official national policy. Multicultural policies often go by different names, as mentioned earlier in this paper, and the MCP index sets forth guidelines for what constitutes a multicultural policy and analyzes countries based on this (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013). Therefore, the MCP index scores countries based on what policies they actually have, not what they say they theoretically have.

I evaluate the following countries -Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands - because they constitute a wide range of MCP Index scores. This


allows me to see if low MCP scores have low citizenship acquisition and if medium and high scores have medium and high acquisition counts. Also, all countries are western democracies to create uniformity, and also because the MCP index only scores western countries. Denmark and Switzerland comprise the low bracket, the UK and the Netherlands comprise the medium bracket, and Australia and Canada comprise the high bracket. I then analyze scores accordingly. The MCP Index scores countries on a scale from 0 to 8, and this score is provided for each decade from 1990 to 2010.

### **Analysis of the Current Data**

The previous analysis of existing research and theory provides evidence for the positive relationship between citizenship acquisition counts and multicultural policies. However, my own analysis of the available data challenges this assertion. After analyzing the following graphs produced from plotting the growth of citizenship acquisition counts overtime and from plotting the growth or decline in multicultural policies overtime for the mentioned countries, it becomes clear that multicultural policies have either a negative or neutral impact on citizenship acquisition counts. My data does show that multicultural policies have increased in most observed countries, though.



Source: OECD 2015



Source: MCP Index 2020

The graphs show that although multicultural policies increased or remained neutral from 1990 to 2010, in all countries except the Netherlands, citizenship acquisition counts did not increase for any country except the United Kingdom. This suggests that multicultural policies do not have a significant positive effect on integration. Also, although Australia and Canada have the highest citizen acquisition counts, when paired with the fact that they are also the largest countries, they have the most liberal citizenship regimes as settler nations, and their counts did not increase along with their increase in multicultural policies; it seems more likely that these other factors account for their higher counts not their multicultural policies. Also, multicultural policies, unlike Joppke's claim, are not declining, but instead staying relatively neutral or increasing across the observed countries.

Denmark and Switzerland have the lowest citizenship acquisition counts (CAC) along with the lowest MCP index scores, however this may be explained by the fact that they also have incredibly restrictive citizenship regimes instead of by a low number of citizenship applications. Additionally, Switzerland's CAC does marginally increase at the same time their MCP index score increases by one point. It is not encouraging for my initial hypothesis, though, that the Netherlands' CAC decreased substantially while the country was still implementing multicultural policies. The United Kingdom is the only country that saw a dramatic increase in its CAC as well as an increase by two points in its MCP index score. However, this dramatic rise in the CAC in the UK around the year 2000 is most likely accounted for by the fact that "[the UKs'] numbers have risen swiftly and steadily so that immigration has been exceeding emigration by more than 100,000 in every year since the turn of the century" (Puzzo, 2016, pg.1). Also, considering the general demographic growth of the world population over the 30 year period this study analyzes, I expect to see a natural growth in the citizenship acquisition count equal to that of the

population growth, however this does not appear. Taking this into consideration, all of the countries that stay neutral or decline in their CAC actually decline more than the data suggests when accounting for natural population growth. After analyzing the quantitative data on each country, it appears that multicultural policies are a signal of how liberal or restrictive countries are in regards to the acquisition of nationality, which impacts how many individuals achieve citizenship status, but multicultural policies do not independently increase citizenship acquisition counts.

A few limitations of my findings warrant discussion. The number of countries I examine is limited, and the scope is confined to western, developed democracies. An analysis of multicultural policies and integration in the global south would be an interesting avenue for further research. Secondly, since civic integration and multicultural policies are often layered on top of one another it is difficult to distinguish any causal relationship without controlling for civic integration policies, which would be incredibly difficult to do. Beyond just the extraneous variable of competing integration policy, there are a variety of other contextual variables that could impact CAC, such as immigrant demographics, economic growth or decline, host country attitudes towards immigrants, and the ease of acquiring citizenship if an immigrant wishes to achieve it. An immigrant may desire to achieve citizenship status, and even apply for it, but if state requirements are very prohibitive they may not be able to. Therefore, it is very hard to measure the desire of non-citizens to acquire citizenship, since the citizenship acquisition count does not measure all who apply, just those that achieve citizenship status. The CAC thus proves to be a better measure of state willingness to grant citizenship than non-citizens' desire to achieve citizenship status. A better measure of non-citizens' desire to achieve citizenship would

be application counts, but according to the OECD these numbers are not accurately reported, and therefore cannot be used as a measure (OECD Metadata Viewer, 2020).

## **Conclusion**

Do multicultural policies increase citizenship acquisition counts among western democracies? Although an inclusion logic would suggest that multicultural policies would act as a normative signal of inclusion, foster integration through feelings of belonging, and therefore increase citizenship acquisition; this was not the case (Paluck and Tankard, 2016). This study shows that the resource logic proposed by Yang based on a cost-benefit analysis prevails (Yang, 1994). Multicultural policies appear to reduce the incentive among the non-citizen population to integrate, and therefore the cost no longer justifies the benefit. This in turn lowers the CAC, and as Joppke and Koopmans discuss, creates segregation between the citizen and non-citizen populations.

The conclusion that multicultural policies do not act as a signal of inclusion to produce higher citizenship acquisition counts may affect policymakers' views of multicultural policy. This study's findings suggest that countries should not spend money on multicultural programs or policies that maintain other cultures' languages, traditions, or ceremonies, but instead should focus on fostering their own national majority to create unity through shared, not differing, values. However, I would caution that more research should be done to study specific multicultural policies in order to determine if multicultural policies overall increase the segregation of immigrant communities, or if it is only specific policies. It is possible that some policies are beneficial in creating a sense of belonging and inclusion while others are not. This study also supports what Joppke would deem a shift from multicultural to civic integration policy as the best policy decision (Joppke, 2004).

There is also another theory stating that although countries are passing multicultural policies, it is more so to save face than it is to actually implement these policies. For example, in Australia multicultural policies have “been resisted by many established politicians, bureaucrats, academics and business leaders who still conceptualize Australia as an homogenous and uniform society, as it largely was in the era in which they grew up” (Jupp and Clyne, 2011). This behavior by officials and lack of implementation would serve to undermine multicultural policies’ normative signal of inclusivity, and would explain why they are not effectively increasing CAC. However, this is just evidence from one country, and would need to be further explored. With the current data available, it seems pretty clear that phasing out multicultural policy may be the best policy decision for countries, in order to help their non-citizen populations integrate and achieve citizenship. There is of course the normative debate that respecting other cultures is important, which I tend to agree with (Banting and Kymlicka, 2013), however Joppke makes an argument that respecting cultures does not mean that countries with their own cultural agendas need to actively create policy to promote different cultures (Joppke, 2004). Joppke has a convincing argument, and I would agree that cultures may be maintained and respected without the state interfering or participating. It would be an interesting course of research to explore why countries continue to implement multicultural policies, although data does not support their success for creating a more integrated society.

Now, more than ever, with growing international migration numbers as the world population increases and globalization makes transportation more accessible, countries need to solidify what the best policy mechanisms are for creating unity and integration amidst their foreign populations. Countries risk losing national sentiments and a cohesive identity if they are not able to successfully integrate their new inhabitants into flourishing members. My research

supports Joppke and Koopmans' assertion that multicultural policies create social and economic marginalization (Koopmans, 2009; Joppke, 2004), which is an impactful conclusion to draw. In order to confirm that multicultural policies are indeed correlated with low CAC, since this conclusion was counter to my original hypothesis, all other confounding variables must be either tested or controlled for.

A possible confounding variable is civic integration policy. Since Kymlicka and Banting discuss the layering of multicultural and integration policy, it is clear that the effects of the two are difficult to distinguish. I would like to see this study of the existing data and literature replicated with civic integration policy using Goodman's CIVIX index. This would help to untangle whether civic integration policies or multicultural policies are the determinant of a country's CAC. Furthermore, as mentioned in the evidence portion of this paper, immigrant demographics, the state of the economy, historical attitudes towards immigrants, and the liberal or restrictive policies surrounding citizenship acquisition are all possible extraneous variables that could have affected the results of my study. An area for improvement I recognize is the need for a measurement of citizenship applications. This measure is not currently available due to issues with accurate counts of foreign population size. If this measure could replace the CAC measure, this study would be greatly improved to better assess the impacts of multicultural policy on non-citizen behavior. In order to have a more conclusive answer as to whether or not multicultural policy, as Angela Merkel said, has "utterly failed" further studies accounting for all of the mentioned variables need to be conducted.

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