

## Societal Contextual Knowledge

So far, deductive beliefs have been made from the self. But what of other people? Can I deductively believe other people exist? I will define other people as other “I’s”. Recall “I” is “a discrete experiencer”. Distinctly, I know a language and have written ideas expressed in this language on this paper. To comprehend this language, a thing must be able to discretely experience and be an “I”. I have written words down, and if another being, which would be you, is reading the words right now then you too are an “I”. Therefore, if you are reading this, then you exist as an “I.” If I come across you reading these words and understanding these words,, and you are not correlative with my will, then you are an “I” separate from myself. For my current purposes in applicably knowing other people exist, this is enough.

If other people exist as other “I’s” like myself, then they too can have deductive beliefs. I will call another I a “subject” and their ability to deduce is their “subjective deduction”. How do we handle that two of us can have different distinctive knowledge? The sensible way is to realize we must come to agreement on two things. First, there needs to be agreement about our distinctive knowledge. To agree, there must be an agreement of enough essential properties that we would conclude the same deductive result when applying this new distinctive agreement.. What properties are agreed to be essential between two people is called “distinctive context”.

To demonstrate a resolution of conflicting distinctive context, imagine I walk by a field and spy what I distinctively and applicably know to be a sheep. It has curly fur, hooves, and lacks a beard. A rancher is in the field tending the sheep. I call to him saying, “Nice sheep!” The rancher turns to me puzzled and states, “Actually, that’s a goat.”

I assume it is a difference in distinctive knowledge within the definition,, so I politely ask the rancher what it is that makes that a goat.. Smiling the rancher explains not all goats have beards, but one distinction between sheep and goats is their tails. He shows me the short upright tail of the creature and explains that this property is essential to define a goat.

I reply,, “I didn’t know that, thanks!” If I do so, I am expanding my distinctive knowledge to equal the rancher’s. However, context adds another layer of choice and complication. My agreement

might amend my personal definition, or, it could be my definition is only within the context of speaking with ranchers, while keeping my old sheep definition the same for non-rancher contexts.

Alternatively, I could reject the distinctive knowledge of the rancher. Instead, I could state “The tail is unimportant. Its just a sheep with a short upright tail! Its silly to call it a goat when the defining feature of a goat is its beard.” There is nothing innate to reality which requires I accept the distinctive context of the rancher, just as there is nothing innate to reality that requires the rancher to accept my personal distinctive context. Distinctive contexts are choices of “I”s, and not laws of reality.

As there are potentially as many distinctive contexts as there are combinations of people in the world, societies invented languages as distinctive contextual standards. A language is a societal construct of distinctive knowledge one may reference when communicating with another person. If someone decided to define a goat as a “sheep,” they could not do so within the established prescripts of the English language. A language gives a standard of distinctive knowledge to encourage a common ground for communication. As such, we will go forward with more confidence that we are using English in this paper’s communication, with a few of my own distinctive words that we are agreeing to for this topic.

Even within a language, people’s ways of discretely experiencing the world can change the distinctive context.. A person’s genetics or past experiences may incline them to discretely experience properties different from others when experiencing the same stimulus. A colorblind person will discretely experience a green and red apple differently than a person who sees color. A weak person’s experience of what is heavy will differ from a very strong person. One person may look at a sheep for the first time and marvel at its wool while another thinks nothing of the wool and marvels at its tail. As such, a language is usually only a baseline, and a contextual context of essential properties must be agreed upon within each new group of communicating people.

For example, one way to establish a discrete context is to agree to forgo discussing any discrete experiences two people are unable to share. For example, when speaking with a blind person, both people may decide to forgo any communication regarding sight. Such an applicable context does not negate the distinctive knowledge of a sheep having visual properties, those properties are simply not important or useful in this particular contextual communication. Thus I could file away in my head, “Sheep that is in

the English language for people with sight, sheep for people without sight, and sheep between me and a group of friends,” and these would all be valid distinctive contexts.

Imagine two friends are lifting weights in the gym. One lifts 100 pounds with every ounce of their strength while the other lifts 100 pounds with ease. When communicating, the stronger weight lifter praises their friend for lifting such a “heavy weight.” The intention of this context is to enter into the weaker weight lifters distinctive experience, and is not addressing the stronger weight lifters personal context of “heavy” that he uses for only his self-context..

In some cases, there may be a distinctive disagreement two people can never agree on. One person might like the color blue more than any other, while another person likes the color green more than any other. In this case, we cannot enter into the same distinctive context regarding the appeal of colors. Our understanding of this and acceptance of another’s self-subjective distinction is called an opinion.

Just like a language is a standard baseline to share a contextual discrete set of beliefs, there are often standards set to deal with the differences within perceptions and measurements. One such standard in society is math. Math does not consider the specifics of what a person is discretely experiencing. Instead, math considers the logic of discrete experiencing itself. A discrete experience is “one”. The act of discretely experiencing two discrete experiences as a group is “two”, therefore,  $1+1=2$ . These standards are translated into tools of application. As the distinctive knowledge of math is consistently applied and deductively confirmed as a representative of the logic of discrete experiences itself, it is one of the standardized languages of discrete experience.

Yet even with math as a baseline, its application is still within a context as well. For example, we can measure a large group of people together and say, “X height is higher than average, so we’ll call that ‘tall’”. Tall of course can change, even with math, based on the group of people one is measuring. If I’m only measuring Americans, what is tall might differ greatly when comparing to Chinese people. And of course, the context of tall may change once again when I apply it to both countries.

Once contextual agreements are established, the deductive steps needed for an applicable conclusion are the same as within a self-context.. If those contextual beliefs are applied to reality without contradiction, they are applicably known within that context.

While optimally, we should use distinctive contexts that lead to clear deductive beliefs, deduction takes time and energy, and is not always practical. When a well-designed context runs into limits, there is no recourse but induction. Fortunately, the theory of subjective deduction also reveals a rational way to evaluate induction which will be tackled in the final section.

Part 3 End

Part 4-Final part here:

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