

The Legality of American-Israeli Strikes on the IRGC

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One important question regarding the legality of the operations....or the “war,” as some may call it...with Iran is: What constitutes an armed conflict? This is clearly answered in international law, for example, by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70):

"An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."

Before we go into the discrepancies of direct armed conflict between Iran and Israel, we must first assess the proxy war between Iran and Israel, starting with setting the standards in international law.

This is provided to us by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its seminal 1986 judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, where the Court first articulated the test for attribution of conduct by non-state actors (such as irregular forces or paramilitaries) to a state.

As it states in para. 115:

"For the conduct of the Contras to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed."

The ICJ also reaffirmed this in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007 (the “Bosnia Genocide case”). In paragraphs 396-412 (particularly around para. 400), the Court explicitly relied on the Nicaragua standard and clarified its application under Article 8 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR), which provides:

"The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."

The ICJ in Bosnia (para. 400) emphasized:

"It must however be shown that this ‘effective control’ was exercised, or that the State’s instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations."

So in summary the necessary conditions to attribute a non-state group's conduct to a state under these rules, all of the following must be proven:

1. The group/person was acting on the instructions of, under the direction of, or under the control of the state (any one suffices).
2. The link must be in fact (evidentially established).
3. The state must have exercised effective control (the ICJ's preferred term for the requisite degree of "control" or "direction").
4. This effective control must cover the specific operations or acts in which the wrongful conduct occurred...not just general/overall support, influence, financing, training, equipping, or planning.
5. Mere overall dependency, high-level coordination, or "preponderant" involvement is explicitly not sufficient without proof of effective control over the particular breaches.

Before I provide evidence of the IRGC's activities that fit these necessary conditions thereby placing them in an armed conflict I want to clarify that I am using specifically the standard of international law. If I depart from this standard at any point, I will clearly indicate where. However, as the ICJ has clarified and cautioned, the threshold for state responsibility in international law should not be stretched, so I won't be doing so.¹

The first event I found that substantiates these necessary conditions is the **October 23, 1983, Beirut Marine Barracks bombing**. This was a suicide truck bomb attack during the Lebanese Civil War, targeting U.S. and French peacekeeping forces in Beirut, Lebanon, at approximately 6:22 a.m. local time.

On this day, a yellow Mercedes-Benz stake-bed truck (loaded with an estimated 12,000 pounds or more of TNT-equivalent explosives) crashed through the perimeter of the U.S. Marine compound at Beirut International Airport. The driver detonated the bomb inside the four-story

¹ International Court of Justice. (2007). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43 (para. 406 for the key quote on "stretches too far").

<https://www.acerislaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Application-of-the-Convention-on-the-Prevention-and-Punishment-of-the-Crime-of-Genocide.pdf>

("the 'overall control' test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State's organs and its international responsibility")

Maddocks, J. (2025). Iran and its proxies: Attribution and state responsibility. *International Law Studies*, 106, 712–748. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol106/iss1/26/>

("In addition, as the ICJ observed in its Bosnian Genocide judgment, this test could potentially attribute too much conduct to a State, stretching the links that must exist between the entity and the State too far.")

barracks housing the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines (Battalion Landing Team headquarters). The explosion lifted the building off its foundation and caused it to collapse in seconds.

Casualties included:

241 U.S. service members killed (220 Marines, 18 sailors, 3 soldiers).

Over 60 U.S. personnel were injured.

A simultaneous attack minutes later on the nearby French "Drakkar" barracks killed 58 French paratroopers (and injured 15 others).

Additional deaths: 6 civilians and the 2 suicide bombers (total deaths ~307).

Context: U.S., French, Italian, and British forces were part of the Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF), deployed in 1982–1983 to stabilize the country amid the Lebanese Civil War, oversee PLO evacuation, and support peacekeeping after Israel's 1982 invasion. The MNF faced escalating threats from various factions.

The perpetrators claimed responsibility through the Islamic Jihad Organization (a front/alias for nascent Hezbollah/Hezbollah precursors like Islamic Amal). However, U.S. courts (e.g., *Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran* civil cases) and declassified intelligence have ruled the attack was carried out at Iran's direction and with IRGC support.

Key evidence includes a September 26, 1983, NSA-intercepted message from Iran's Ministry of Intelligence in Tehran to its ambassador in Damascus (Ali Akbar Mohtashemi), instructing him to contact Hussein Musawi (Islamic Amal leader) and direct "spectacular action against the United States Marines" and the multinational force. IRGC commander Hossein Dehghan (later Iran's Defense Minister) oversaw operations/logistics from Bekaa Valley bases.^{2,3}

Four years after the bombing, Mohsen Rafiqdoost (former IRGC minister and logistics chief) boasted about Iran's role, saying:

'Both the TNT and the ideology which in one blast sent to hell 400 officers, NCOs, and soldiers at the Marines headquarters were provided by Iran.'

² *Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003).

<https://casetext.com/case/peterson-v-islamic-republic-of-iran-3>

"The message directed the Iranian ambassador to contact Hussein Musawi, the leader of the terrorist group Islamic Amal, and to instruct him ... 'to take a spectacular action against the United States Marines.'"

³ Levitt, M. (2023, October 23). Echoes of 1983 Beirut bombings in current Iranian proxy escalation (PolicyWatch 3801). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/echoes-1983-beirut-bombings-current-iranian-proxy-escalation>

"U.S. intelligence had intercepted an Iranian directive on September 26, 1983, instructing Hezbollah to 'take spectacular action against the United States Marines.' Tragically, the directive was lost in the bureaucracy until two days after the bombing... In the words of Col. Timothy Geraghty, then-commander of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit in Beirut, 'If there was ever a 24-karat gold document, this was it.'"

"Declassified intelligence shows that the bombings were carried out at Iran's command."

Or: 'The explosives combined with ideology, which sent 400 U.S. Marines to hell in one strike, came from Iran. Both the TNT and the ideology originated in Iran.'⁴

This was the deadliest single-day loss for U.S. Marines since Iwo Jima (1945) and the largest non-nuclear blast in history at the time. It led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon by February 1984 (last Marines left in late February).

Thus, the record establishes: (1) **proven** instructions/direction, (2) **factual** evidentiary linkage, (3) **effective** control exercised over the exact operation (not broadly), and (4) **conduct** transcending mere overall assistance, fully satisfying the ICJ's stringent requirements for attribution.

Under IHL (primarily customary law reflected in the Geneva Conventions and their Commentaries), an international armed conflict (IAC) ends only when hostilities cease with a degree of stability and permanence, such that the objective likelihood of resumption can reasonably be discarded. This requires a factual assessment **showing no credible ongoing**

⁴ National Council of Resistance of Iran. (n.d.). IRGC Deputy Chief underscores Iranian regime's role in bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut. NCR-Iran.org.

<https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/ncr-statements/irgc-deputy-chief-underscores-iranian-regime-s-role-in-bombing-of-us-marine-barracks-in-beirut>

"The US knows the explosives that mixed with ideology and sent up to 400 officers and Marines in the US Marine Barracks to hell; both the TNT and the ideology behind it came from Iran." (State-run daily, Resalat – July 20, 1987).

threats, no bellicose military preparations, demobilization or elimination of capabilities, and a durable end to the conditions that could restart fighting.^{5, 6, 7}

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 1995), para. 70:

“International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”

This establishes that mere cessation of active fighting isn't enough; IHL persists until a general conclusion of peace (or equivalent durable end), applying even without ongoing combat.

ICRC 2024 Opinion Paper: How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law? (April 2024):

“Hostilities must end with a degree of stability and permanence for the IAC to be considered terminated. A general close of military operations means not only the end of active hostilities, but also the end of ‘military movements of a bellicose nature, including those that reform,

⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross. (2024). How is the term “armed conflict” defined in international humanitarian law? Opinion paper.

https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document_new/file_list/armed_conflict_defined_in_ihl.pdf

“Hostilities must end with a degree of stability and permanence for the IAC to be considered terminated. A general close of military operations means not only the end of active hostilities, but also the end of ‘military movements of a bellicose nature, including those that reform, reorganize or reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities can reasonably be discarded’.”

“If both parties continue to exist, the armed conflict will also continue to exist until there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption, based on a factual assessment on the ground.”

⁶ Grignon, J. (2022). The “general close of military operations” as the benchmark for the declassification of armed conflicts and the end of the applicability of international humanitarian law. Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Annuaire canadien de droit international, 59, 99–126.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/cyl.2022.11>

“The ‘general close of military operations’ must be distinguished from the ‘end of (active) hostilities,’ another expression found in some provisions of IHL... [It] marks a moment in time when parties to a given conflict must fulfill certain obligations such as the repatriation of prisoners of war... Therefore, the ‘end of (active) hostilities’ is an expression that has nothing to do with the meaning of the end of an armed conflict but rather with the beginning of applicability of some provisions of IHL... The ‘general close of military operations’ occurs when all military manoeuvres related to a given conflict have ceased.”

⁷ Milanovic, M. (2014). The end of application of international humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross, 96(893), 17–42. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S181638311400011X>

“Because the IAC threshold is relatively easy to satisfy, however, and because it would be both impractical and would open the door to abuse to treat every lull in the fighting as an end to an IAC and each resumption of combat as the start of a new one, hostilities must end with a degree of stability and permanence in order for the IAC to be terminated... In sum, we can conclude that an IAC would end with a general close of military operations, with no real likelihood of a resumption in hostilities.”

reorganize or reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities can reasonably be discarded"."

And further:

"If both parties continue to exist, the armed conflict will also continue to exist until there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption, based on a factual assessment on the ground."

The armed conflict, once initiated, continues until there is a lasting cessation of armed confrontations without real risk of resumption. This requires the end of military movements of a bellicose nature including those that reform, reorganize, or reconstitute forces so that the likelihood of hostilities resuming can reasonably be discarded (ICRC Opinion Paper 2024, drawing on commentaries such as the 2020 Commentary on GC III, para. 311, and related 2024 discussions on conflict termination).

Ongoing financial support, material aid, or logistical assistance to the same proxy group (or closely allied/similar groups within the same network) enables or facilitates their reconstitution, reorganization, or sustained capacity to engage in hostilities.

This qualifies as "military movements of a bellicose nature" (warlike preparations) conducted via proxy, since the proxy functions as an extension of the sponsoring state's hostility.

Even if the specific groups vary slightly (e.g., different militias within the "Axis of Resistance"), sustained support from the same sponsor (e.g., Iran) to entities that continue targeting the same opponent (e.g., Israel) maintains a factual risk of resumption of armed confrontations.

Therefore, such ongoing support prevents a lasting cessation without real risk of resumption (ICRC 2024, p. 10 and related sections).

The armed conflict accordingly continues, as the standard for termination is not met.

We can easily substantiate the claim that Iran continues to support groups that purposely aggress against America. This is evident not only from Hassan Nasrallah's speech on February 7, 2012 (marking the Prophet Muhammad's birthday, broadcast via video link), in which he stated publicly for the first time:

"Yes, we received moral, and political and material support in all possible forms from the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1982."

He added context about previous reticence:

*"In the past we used to tell half the story and stay silent on the other half... When they asked us about the material and financial and military support we were silent."*⁸

⁸ Reuters. (2012, February 7). Hezbollah says gets support, not orders, from Iran. <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/hezbollah-says-gets-support-not-orders-from-iran-idUSTRE81629I>

But we also have declassified intelligence, ongoing U.S. government reports, and more recent public statements that confirm this support has persisted for decades, including into the 2020s and up to 2026.^{9,10} This includes funding, arms, training, and coordination from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly its Quds Force, to Hezbollah... a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the U.S. since 1997, with a long history

"Yes, we received moral, and political and material support in all possible forms from the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1982," Nasrallah told supporters by videolink in a speech marking the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Mohammad.

"In the past we used to tell half the story and stay silent on the other half ... When they asked us about the material and financial and military support we were silent."

⁹ For the Iranian role in founding Hezbollah following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, see Central Intelligence Agency. (1985?). Iran's use of terrorism and unconventional warfare (or similar intelligence report title; declassified document).

<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP09-00438R000605820019-9.pdf>

("Iran began to develop close links with Lebanese Shias soon after the Israeli invasion in June 1982. Some 800 Revolutionary Guards were sent to Lebanon through Syria to help recruit Hezbollahi, provide political and religious indoctrination and military training, including instruction in terrorist tactics."); Maher, A. (2017). The Middle Eastern advisory competition: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force. Australian Army Journal, 14(1). Australian Army Research Centre.

<https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-14-number-1-autumn/middle-eastern-advisory-competition-islamic-revolutionary-guards-corps-quds-force>

("In 1982, 'Iran sent approximately 1,500 IRGC officers to Lebanon with Syrian permission to help build and direct a Shi'a militia proxy force to fight the Israelis, the origin of Lebanese Hizbollah.'" It also mentions six training camps in the Bekaa by 1984, salaries/benefits, and guerrilla/terrorist training.); United States Institute of Peace. (2023, October 19). Timeline: Iran and Hezbollah. The Iran Primer.

<https://iranprimer.usip.org/index.php/blog/2023/oct/19/timeline-iran-and-hezbollah>

("Within weeks, Iran deployed 1,500 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisers to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley to recruit, train and [form] a new Shiite militia that evolved into Hezbollah."); Wilson Center. (2023, October 25). Hezbollah's record on war & politics.

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hezbollahs-record-war-politics>

("Iran fostered and facilitated the embryo of Hezbollah after dispatching some 1,500 IRGC trainers and advisers to Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley in 1982. The Iranians did not fight Israeli forces, but they mobilized, trained, funded and equipped a new underground militia in Lebanon that evolved into Hezbollah."); Cox, S. J. (n.d.). H-080-1: Operation "No Name"—The U.S. Navy in the Lebanon Crisis, 1982–84 [H-Gram]. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command.

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/about-us/leadership/hgram_pdfs/H-Gram_080-1.pdf

("allowed the IRGC to set up a terrorist training facility at a former Lebanese army barracks at Baalbek, in the Syrian-occupied Bekaa Valley of Lebanon.").

¹⁰ AFP. (2016, June 25). Hezbollah brushes off US sanctions, says money comes via Iran. The Times of Israel. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-brushes-off-us-sanctions-says-money-comes-via-iran>

Nasrallah stated, "We are open about the fact that Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran... As long as Iran has money, we have money... Just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our money"

of attacks on U.S. interests (e.g., the 1983 Beirut bombing, 1984 embassy annex, Khobar Towers 1996, and support for anti-U.S. militias in Iraq/Syria).^{11, 12, 13, 14}

¹¹ Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (2024, December 22). Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan.

<https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/captured-documents-reveal-how-iran-smuggles-weapons-via-syria-and-jordan>

"Syria was the main smuggling route for arming Hezbollah with advanced precision weapons... [and] network smuggling weapons and funds."

From Document 1: "The smuggling routes of the axis of resistance and the measures taken to prevent them"

"The first route passes through Baghdad, continues through Ramadi, reaches the Albukamal crossing on the Syrian-Iraqi border, proceeds through Deir ez-Zor in Syria, then to Palmyra, Damascus, and finally to Beirut. The second route begins in Tehran, passes through Basra in Iraq, from there to Baghdad, continues to the al-Tanf Crossing on the Syrian-Iraqi border, and from there to Damascus. The third route starts in Iran, passes through Mosul in Iraq, then to Hasakah in Syria, continues to Adlah, and finally to Latakia. The route is currently inactive."

"Monitor the steps taken to prevent smuggling, specialize in the field, and optimize operations. Members of the 'axis' should provide 'brothers' in Syria with electronic equipment to jam the Jordanian army's drones... Establish relations with smuggling networks in Yemen or the Horn of Africa... Invest in 'dead zones' in the Syria-Israel-Jordan border triangle... Develop trade relations between the Gaza Strip and Jordan and build trust between traders from both sides to establish financial networks which support 'popular movements' in Jordan and the 'resistance' in the West Bank, bypassing security inspections."

"The route begins at Iran's Bandar Abbas port in the Arabian Gulf, continues to the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea, and from there to the port of Latakia in Syria or the port of Beirut in Lebanon. Iran falsifies the identification documents of the ships, claiming they carry oil, enabling them to smuggle weapons."

From Document 2: "Explanation for the blow in Jordan" (July 11, 2023)

This details a disrupted Hamas-IRGC-linked smuggling network in Jordan, with coordination elements.

"In April, Brother Omar Asida contacted me and said he could bring ammunition from Jordan to the West Bank and requested several things. I asked Brother Ibrahim to place the amount of TNT he had purchased at the stash point... I sent the point to Brother Asida, but he requested that we forward the point to a contact in Jordan... Our courier stayed at the location for three days, but the brother from Asida's side did not show up."

"We removed all individuals we could reach who had connections to the detainees. The brothers' phones were disconnected from the communication network. We provided financial and moral support to the brothers we exfiltrated from Jordan, and we continue to handle their interests."

"The verbal agreement with Jordanian intelligence, which some senior members of the movement speak of, was in the context of what is called the eastern front... The mission of this array was to fight the enemy from Jordan through incursions and rocket fire... Therefore, the agreement concerns stopping the movement's activities in Jordan and has nothing to do with support and assistance in Judea and Samaria."

¹² U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025, November 6). Treasury sanctions Hizballah operatives exploiting Lebanon's cash economy. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0308>

"Since January 2025, the U.S.-designated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) has transferred over \$1 billion to Hizballah, mostly through money exchange companies"

¹³ U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Foreign terrorist organizations.

<https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>

¹⁴ 1983 U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut (April 18, 1983): Declassified CIA historical accounts attribute the attack (which killed 63 people, including 17 Americans and 8 CIA officers) to the Islamic Jihad Organization (a precursor to Hezbollah) with Iranian support, as Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility to force U.S. withdrawal. Direct quote: "The Islamic Jihad Organization, which later became part of

I do suggest more reading about Iran and its engagement with proxies, such as:
Iran and Its Proxies: Attribution and State Responsibility by Jennifer Maddocks,
The Iran-Gaza War by Eugene Kontorovich,
Hezbollah-Iran Dynamics: A Proxy, Not a Partner by Hanin Ghaddar,
Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God by Matthew Levitt.

These are especially useful for more reading on international law aspects, as they are relevant in the grand scheme of things but not necessarily for the purposes of this specific document.

Now that I have successfully proved there has been an ongoing international armed conflict between America and Iran, logically, to argue the legality of the strikes on Iran not just by America but also by Israel considering from my knowledge none of the attacks I listed were directed at Israel and America at the same time, using those same parameters, I will prove Israel has been in an ongoing war with Iran.

Hizballah, claimed responsibility. The terrorists targeted the Embassy in an effort to force Americans to leave the country."

Central Intelligence Agency. (2023, April 18). Beirut embassy attack 40th anniversary.

<https://www.cia.gov/stories/story/beirut-embassy-attack-40th-anniversary>

1983 Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing (October 23, 1983): A declassified September 26, 1983, intercepted Iranian directive from Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in Tehran instructed Iran's ambassador in Damascus to contact Hussein Musawi (leader of Islamic Amal, a Hezbollah precursor) and direct "spectacular action against the United States Marines." This is cited in U.S. federal court testimony (e.g., Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran) as proof of Iranian/Hezbollah orchestration, with the attack killing 241 U.S. service members. Direct quote from Col. Timothy Geraghty (Marine commander): "If there was ever a 24-karat gold document, this was it."

Levitt, M. (2023, October 23). Echoes of the 1983 Beirut bombings in current Iranian proxy escalation. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/echoes-1983-beirut-bombings-current-iranian-proxy>

Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003).

<https://casetext.com/case/peterson-v-islamic-republic-of-iran-26>

1984 U.S. Embassy Annex Bombing in Beirut (September 20, 1984): Declassified Reagan-era documents link the attack (killing 23 people, including 2 Americans) to Hezbollah/Iranian-backed elements using similar networks as the 1983 attacks. Direct quote from White House Situation Room chronology (declassified): "A massive car bomb went off near the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Beirut... Possibly a Dutch Embassy bombing of U.S. EMS" (partial redacted report).

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. (2022). Declassified collection:

40-522-R03-055-2022.pdf. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/2022-10/40-522-R03-055-2022.pdf>

1996 Khobar Towers Bombing (June 25, 1996): Declassified U.S. intelligence attributes the attack (killing 19 U.S. airmen and injuring ~500) to Saudi Hezbollah (Hezbollah al-Hijaz) with direct Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support, including planning from ~1993–1994 and alleged authorization by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. FBI investigations and 2006 court rulings cite "overwhelming" evidence, including money, explosives, plans, and maps from detained agents. Direct quote from U.S. court ruling: "Iran and Hezbollah were directly and personally responsible for the attack... leading experts on Hezbollah presented 'overwhelming' evidence of the group's involvement."

National Security Archive. (2010, June 25). The Khobar Towers bombing, 1996.

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/index.htm>

William J. Clinton Presidential Library and Museum. (n.d.). Declassified memo on Iranian role [Item 119210]. <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/119210>

The first example that fits the necessary conditions for attributing a non-state group's conduct to a state under international law is the **March 17, 1992, bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina**. This event predates the 1994 AMIA bombing (another strong candidate) and is often cited as the first major extraterritorial attack by Iranian proxies against Israeli targets after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

A suicide bomber drove a Ford F-100 pickup truck loaded with approximately 100 kg (220 lbs) of high explosives directly into the Israeli Embassy building.¹⁵ The explosion completely destroyed the embassy, severely damaged a nearby church and school, killed 29 people (including 4 Israeli diplomats, 5 Argentine Catholic parishioners, and 20 civilians), and injured more than 242 others.¹⁶ The attack took place amid heightened tensions following Israel's assassination of Hezbollah leader Abbas al-Musawi in Lebanon just one month earlier, on February 16, 1992.¹⁷

¹⁵ Levitt, M. (2013, March 19). Hezbollah's 1992 attack in Argentina is a warning for modern-day Europe. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollahs-1992-attack-argentina-warning-modern-day-europe>

"Around 2:45 p.m. on March 17, 1992, a Ford F-100 panel van drove down Arroyo Street in tranquil neighborhood of Buenos Aires. It approached the front of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires -- then drove up onto the sidewalk and blew up. The explosion wreaked havoc up and down the street, destroying the front of the building, causing the entire consulate building and part of the attached embassy building to collapse. The 220 pounds of high explosives and shrapnel, concentrated in the back right section of the vehicle, left twenty-three people dead and another 242 injured."

EBSCO. (n.d.). Terrorists attack Israeli embassy and Jewish center in Argentina. Research Starters: Diplomacy and International Relations.

<https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/diplomacy-and-international-relations/terrorists-attack-israeli-embassy-and>

BBC News. (2024, January 3). Suspects held over alleged Argentina parcel plot.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67872044>

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State archive: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>

"Hizballah claimed responsibility for a blast that leveled the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, causing the deaths of 29 and wounding 242."

¹⁷ Levitt, M. (2013, March 19). Hezbollah's 1992 attack in Argentina is a warning for modern-day Europe. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollahs-1992-attack-argentina-warning-modern-day-europe>

"Hussein was the five-year-old son of Hezbollah leader Abbas Moussawi, both of whom were killed in an Israeli air strike on his car on February 16, 1992. In its claim of responsibility, delivered to a Western news agency in Beirut, Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization declared 'with all pride that the operation of the martyr infant Hussein is one of our continuing strikes against the criminal Israeli enemy in an open-ended war, which will not cease until Israel is wiped out of existence.' Speaking at Moussawi's funeral, Hezbollah leader Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah warned that 'Israel will not escape vengeance. We have received the message that there is no need to respond in an emotional fashion.' Fadlallah assured his listeners in another statement that 'there would be much more violence and much more blood would flow"

For context, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires symbolized Israel's presence in Latin America. The bombing marked Iran's expansion of proxy warfare beyond the Middle East, leveraging Hezbollah's global network. Islamic Jihad, an alias used by Hezbollah, claimed responsibility shortly afterward, explicitly citing revenge for Musawi's death.¹⁸ (As a side note, Hezbollah's and other Iran-supported Islamist militant groups' activities in Latin America is a fascinating and under-discussed topic worth exploring further.)¹⁹

To be clear, while the most recent Argentine court ruling focuses primarily on the 1994 AMIA bombing, the country's judiciary including the April 2024 decision by the Federal Court of Criminal Cassation has consistently linked the 1992 embassy attack to the same pattern of Iranian responsibility. The courts have found that Iran organized, planned, financed, and executed these operations through Hezbollah under IRGC oversight.²⁰ Argentine prosecutors, led by Alberto Nisman in investigations covering both the embassy and AMIA cases, along with supporting U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments, concluded that Mohsen Rabbani (Iran's cultural attaché in Buenos Aires at the time) scouted potential targets in the lead-up to the 1992 bombing.^{21, 22} Similarly, Ahmad Vahidi (then commander of the IRGC Quds Force) was charged

¹⁸ Levitt, M. (2013, March 19). Hezbollah's 1992 attack in Argentina is a warning for modern-day Europe. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollahs-1992-attack-argentina-warning-modern-day-europe>

"In its claim of responsibility, delivered to a Western news agency in Beirut, Hezbollah's Islamic Jihad Organization declared 'with all pride that the operation of the martyr infant Hussein is one of our continuing strikes against the criminal Israeli enemy in an open-ended war, which will not cease until Israel is wiped out of existence.' Hussein was the five-year-old son of Hezbollah leader Abbas Moussawi, both of whom were killed in an Israeli air strike on his car on February 16, 1992."

¹⁹https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/latin-american-intersections/id1387623373?at=1000IHKX&ct=linktree_http&itsct=lt_p&itscg=30200&ls=1

²⁰ Raszewski, E. (2024, April 12). Argentine court says Iran was behind Israeli Embassy and Jewish center attacks. The New York Times.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/12/world/middleeast/argentina-iran-1992-1994-attack.html>

"The judges said Tehran was also to blame for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires that killed 22 people."

²¹ United Against Nuclear Iran. (n.d.). Mohsen Rabbani: Iran's principal proselytizer in Latin America.

<https://www.unitedagainstanucleariran.com/ideological-expansion/mohsen-rabbani-irans-principal-proselytizer-latin-america>

"Rabbani took on a leadership role in Hezbollah's operational activities on the continent, and is alleged to have scouted targets for the terrorist movement in the run-up to the first major Iran-linked terror attack in South America, the bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992"

²² Levitt, M. (2015, December 16). Iranian and Hezbollah operations in South America: Implications for U.S. homeland security. PRISM, 5(4). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Levitt20151216-PRISM.pdf>

"The investigation also began to reveal the central role Rabbani had in Hezbollah's Latin American operations. Two weeks after the bombing, on April 3, 1992, Rabbani placed a call from his home phone to the secretary of Sheikh Fadlallah, a Lebanese Shi'ite religious leader with close ties to Hezbollah. Argentine intelligence detected the call and prosecutors pointed to it as timely evidence, not only of his relationship with Hezbollah, but of the leadership role he played in their operations."

with masterminding the broader attack chain, with intelligence tying the Quds Force to target selection and explosives sourcing.^{23, 24}

The event fits the ICJ's effective control test precisely. Hezbollah acted under direct Iranian instructions and IRGC direction for this specific bombing.²⁵ Evidence indicates that Iran's Supreme National Security Council approved retaliatory operations against Israeli targets abroad via Hezbollah proxies.²⁶ The factual evidential links are established through court-adjudicated proof rather than speculation: Abolghasem Mesbahi, a former Iranian intelligence officer, testified publicly in Argentine proceedings starting in 1998 about Iran's SNSC approving attacks on Israeli targets abroad, with Rabbani managing Buenos Aires operations and the IRGC (under Vahidi) providing direction.²⁷ Messages intercepted by the U.S. National

²³ Buenos Aires Times. (2026, March 2). Iran taps AMIA suspect Ahmad Vahidi as Revolutionary Guards commander.

<https://batimes.com.ar/news/world/iran-taps-amia-suspect-ahmad-vahidi-as-revolutionary-guards-commander.phtml>

"According to the late prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who led the AMIA investigation before his death in 2015, Vahidi chaired the Iranian leadership group that evaluated and approved the proposal to carry out an attack on Argentine soil in 1993."

²⁴ Nisman, A. (n.d.). Office of criminal investigations AMIA case [Indictment excerpts]. Americans for Peace and Tolerance.

<https://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/01/nismanindict.pdf>

"We deem proven the fact that Ahmad Vahidi devised the specific proposal for the AMIA attack; that this proposal was discussed during the meeting held by the [Supreme National Security Council]... and that Vahidi... played a leading role in proposing that our country be the target of the attack"

²⁵ International Law Commission. (2001). Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, with commentaries. United Nations.

https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf

ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA, 2001)

Article 8: "Conduct directed or controlled by a State" "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."

²⁶ Nisman, A., & Martínez Burgos, M. (2006). Office of criminal investigations AMIA case [Indictment report]. Americans for Peace and Tolerance.

<https://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/01/nismanindict.pdf>

"The decision to carry out the AMIA attack was made, and the attack was orchestrated, by the highest officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the time, and that these officials instructed Lebanese Hezbollah – a group that has historically been subordinated to the economic and political interests of the Teheran regime – to carry out the attack."

²⁷ International Court of Justice. (2007). Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment. ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43.

<https://www.icj-cij.org/case/91>

"The Court does not agree with the ICTY either in its reasoning, or as to the applicable rules of international law... [T]he test [of effective control] is one that requires proof of effective control over the specific operation in question."

International Law Commission. (2001). Articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, with commentaries. United Nations.

https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf

Security Agency showed Iranian knowledge of the impending attack and the complicity of Hezbollah operative Imad Mughniyeh.^{28, 29} In addition, a 1998 telephone call intercepted from the Iranian embassy in Argentina implicated Iran in the bombing, which directly contributed to Argentina's decision to expel seven Iranian diplomats that year and conclude Iranian involvement.^{30, 31, 32}

Iran exercised effective control through IRGC oversight: Vahidi coordinated from Tehran, approving plans and sourcing explosives, while Rabbani managed local operations, including

"The three terms ['instructions', 'direction' and 'control'] are disjunctive... [T]he factual connection between the person or group acting and the State must be one of direction or control exercised and the specific conduct complained of."

²⁸ Nisman, A., & Martínez Burgos, M. (2006). Office of criminal investigations AMIA case [Indictment report]. Americans for Peace and Tolerance.

<https://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/01/nismanindict.pdf>

"The decision to carry out the AMIA attack was made, and the attack was orchestrated, by the highest officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the time, and that these officials instructed Lebanese Hezbollah – a group that has historically been subordinated to the economic and political interests of the Teheran regime – to carry out the attack."

²⁹ Levitt, M. (2012, December 14). Did Iran bomb AMIA? The evidence is clear. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/did-iran-bomb-amia-evidence-clear>

"Abolghasem Mesbahi, a defector from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), testified to Argentine investigators that the AMIA building was picked from a list of targets at a meeting of senior Iranian officials in Mashhad, Iran, on August 14, 1993."

³⁰ The New York Times. (1998, May 17). Argentina arrests 8 Iranians and ousts 7 in anti-Jewish bombings.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/17/world/argentina-arrests-8-iranians-and-ousts-7-in-anti-jewish-bombings.html>

"The Argentine Government, saying it is nearing a breakthrough in the investigation of two bombings of Jewish centers in recent years, has arrested eight Iranian residents and ordered the expulsion of seven of Iran's eight embassy employees stationed here. Senior officials say Argentina is close to breaking relations with Iran, acknowledging that American and Israeli intelligence officials have been correct for years in asserting that Teheran played a direct role in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy here and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association..."

³¹ World Jewish Congress. (2021, March 16). This week in Jewish history: Bombing at Israeli Embassy in Argentina kills 29 people and wounds hundreds more.

<https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/this-week-in-jewish-history--bombing-at-israeli-embassy-in-argentina-in-kills-29-people-and-wounds-hundreds-more>

"In 1998, a telephone call intercepted from the Iranian embassy in Argentina implicated Iran in the attack on the embassy. While Argentina proceeded to expel six Iranian diplomats from the country, it was never determined which specific individuals were culpable for the attack."

³² Jewish Virtual Library. (n.d.). Terrorism: Bombings in Argentina.

<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/terrorist-bombings-in-argentina>

"Finally, in 1998, a telephone call intercepted from the Iranian embassy in Argentina demonstrated conclusively that Iran had been involved in the attack on the embassy. Argentina expelled six Iranian diplomats from the country, but that was the extent of their action, and it was never determined which individuals were culpable for the attack."

target scouting, safe houses, and vehicle rigging.³³ The control was specific to this exact operation not merely general support, influence, financing, training, equipping, or planning. Evidence points to targeted planning, explosives sourcing, and execution direction for the Buenos Aires embassy bombing itself. Most importantly, this goes beyond mere dependency or coordination. The IRGC did not simply aid or loosely coordinate with Hezbollah; courts ruled that Iran commanded the operation, with Vahidi's oversight transcending "preponderant involvement." Argentine rulings describe Iran as organizing, planning, financing, and executing the attack via proxy, consistent with international standards.

This structure satisfies the ICJ's stringent requirements: evidential proof of control over the specific wrongful act, not just broad proxy ties. While Iran continues to deny involvement, the cumulative judicial findings provide the strongest publicly verifiable basis for attribution in discussions of state responsibility and proxy warfare.

To maintain the ongoing status of this international armed conflict (IAC) between Iran and Israel via proxy, we must prove military movements of a bellicose nature including those that reform, reorganize, or reconstitute forces such that the likelihood of hostilities resuming cannot reasonably be discarded.^{34, 35} This is the easier element to establish, as we continuously observe clear evidence of such activity.

For instance, Hezbollah has repeatedly launched thousands of rockets at Israel using Iranian-provided systems (e.g., Zelzal and Fajr models), with IRGC advisors assisting in

³³ Nisman, A., & Martínez Burgos, M. (2006). Office of criminal investigations AMIA case [Indictment report]. Americans for Peace and Tolerance.

<https://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/01/nismanindict.pdf>

"As for the proposal that was discussed and approved at the 14 August 1993 meeting, it should be pointed out that the proposal was originated by the so called Office of Intelligence and Security, which was headed by president Rafsanjani himself, and whose personnel were as follows; Fallahijan, the commander of the Quds Force; Ahmad Vahidi; the commander of the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) Mohsen Rezei; and the foreign minister... We will also show that the then minister of intelligence Ali Fallahijan was in charge of orchestrating the various aspects of the operation from Iran, and that he instructed Imad Moughnieh (head of Hezbollah's international operations at the time) to coordinate the operational aspect of the attack."

³⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2025, December 23). Frequently Asked Questions: International Armed Conflict (IAC). <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-armed-conflict>

"A general close of military operations means not only the end of active hostilities, but also the end of military movements of a bellicose nature, including those that reform, reorganize or reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities can reasonably be discarded."

³⁵ International Committee of the Red Cross. (2025, December 23). Frequently asked questions: International armed conflict (IAC). <https://www.icrc.org/en/article/faq-international-armed-conflict>

"Hostilities must end with a degree of stability and permanence for the IAC to be considered terminated. A general close of military operations means not only the end of active hostilities, but also the end of military movements of a bellicose nature, including those that reform, reorganize or reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities can reasonably be discarded."

planning, precision upgrades, and overall coordination.^{36, 37} Iran has supplied rockets, missiles, and other arms (e.g., Zelzal rockets, Fajr models, AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles, and long-range

³⁶ Missile Threat Project. (n.d.). Hezbollah's rocket arsenal. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal>

"According to Israeli sources, Hezbollah fired close to 4,000 rockets and missiles at Israel from their arsenal of around 15,000 held before the war. ... During the war, the Hezbollah rocket force fired between 3,970 and 4,228 rockets at a rate of more than 100 per day... Hezbollah fighters fired a Fajr-5 rocket for the first time during the 2006 Lebanon War. ... Analysts also believe Hezbollah used Fajr-3/-5 missiles to strike Israel's northern port city of Haifa. ... Iran reportedly began delivering the Zelzal-1 and -2 rockets to Hezbollah in the early 2000s"

³⁷ Knights, M. (2019, May 13). If Iran deploys missiles in Iraq: U.S.-Israeli response options. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/if-iran-deploys-missiles-iraq-us-israeli-response-options>

"During the 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah launched around 4,000 of these weapons across the border... Iran's ballistic support to Lebanese Hezbollah... is decades long. By 2006, the group had built up an arsenal of around 12,000 munitions—mainly short-range rockets, along with a few hundred 75 km Fajr-5 artillery rockets, 300 km Zelzal-3 missiles."

The Wilson Center. (2023, October 25). Hezbollah's record on war & politics. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hezbollahs-record-war-politics>

"Hezbollah [fired] at least 3,900 rockets at Israel during the 34-day conflict... Since 2016, Iran has reportedly provided conversion kits to [upgrade] Hezbollah's arsenal from short-range rockets to precision-guided missiles... The suitcase-sized kits can [add] a GPS navigation... that increases the Zelzal-2 rocket's accuracy and range to 300 km."

systems) via smuggling routes through Syria, alongside consistent annual financial aid that has sustained Hezbollah's military infrastructure.^{38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44}

This pattern of reconstitution and bellicose action is further evidenced by captured Hamas documents (reviewed by The New York Times, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, and analyst Kyle Orton), which show Hamas sought Iranian approval and

³⁸ Missile Threat Project. (n.d.). Missiles and rockets of Hezbollah. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal>

"Iran began delivering the Zelzal-1 and -2 rockets through Syria to Hezbollah in the early 2000s... Hezbollah's arsenal includes hundreds to thousands of Zelzal rockets, with ranges up to 210–300 km after upgrades."

³⁹ Israel Alma Research and Education Center. (2026, January 27). Hezbollah's weapons recovery efforts in Syria - January 2026.

<https://israel-alma.org/hezbollahs-weapons-recovery-efforts-in-syria-january-2026>

"Syrian security forces announced the foiling of a shipment... which included 9M113 Konkurs anti-tank missiles, RPG-7 rounds, Fajr rockets, Tandem HEAT rockets, and other light weapons."

⁴⁰ Alhurra. (2025, November 26). Hezbollah's weapons networks are facing fresh scrutiny.

<https://alhurra.com/en/7801>

"The smuggled shipments include... hundreds of advanced Kornet anti-tank missiles and Grad rockets... smuggling small systems, such as Kornet missiles (each is roughly 120 cm long) may be feasible."

⁴¹ Defense Update. (2014, November 24). Iran: We supplied ballistic guided rockets to Hezbollah.

https://defense-update.com/20141124_fatah110.html

"The Iranian backed Lebanese group Hezbollah has received the Iranian Fateh-110 guided ballistic missiles, and inducted the weapon into its missile arsenal."

⁴² Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (2024, December 22). Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and Jordan.

<https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/captured-documents-reveal-how-iran-smuggles-weapons-via-syria-and-jordan>

"Syria was the main smuggling route for arming Hezbollah with advanced precision weapons... overland convoys from the Iraq-Syria border... Documents captured from Hamas... expose Iran's aerial, maritime and overland routes to smuggle weapons to Syria."

⁴³ Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (2025, November 14). Iran assists Hezbollah's post-ceasefire reconstruction.

<https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/iran-assists-hezbollahsvpost-ceasefire-reconstruction>

"The United States Treasury Department reported that since the beginning of 2025, the IRGC's Qods Force had transferred close to \$1 billion to Hezbollah... The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has transferred more than \$1 billion to Hezbollah in Lebanon during the first 10 months of 2025... The Treasury Department said the \$1 billion is only part of Tehran's support for Hezbollah. Iran also provides weapons, training, logistical support, and political backing to the group."

⁴⁴ Adesnik, D. (2018, January 10). Iran spends \$16 billion annually to support terrorists and rogue regimes. Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/01/10/iran-spends-16-billion-annually-to-support-terrorists-and-rogue-regimes>

"FDD recently published a comprehensive assessment of Iran's annual support, which is believed to be \$700-\$800 million. This echoes the assessment of Israel's top general, Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, who also estimated the figure at \$800 million."

help for a major attack, coordinated preparations for approximately two years, requested IRGC assistance (e.g., striking sensitive sites), and adjusted plans based on IRGC input (e.g., delays to "prepare the environment") ahead of the October 7, 2023, massacre.^{45, 46} Additionally, Hamas leaders (e.g., Yahya Sinwar and Khalil al-Hayya) pitched the plan directly to IRGC commanders in Lebanon (e.g., Muhammad Sa'id Izadi), while Iran provided specialized training for ~500 Hamas/PIJ fighters in Iran in September 2023, funding spikes (up to \$350

⁴⁵ Rosset, D. U. (2025, March 13). Hamas' strategy to destroy Israel: From theory into practice, as seen in captured documents. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2025/03/E_051_25.pdf

From a letter dated June 5, 2021, signed by Yahya al-Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa, addressed to IRGC Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani:

"we will never close our eyes, rest or remain silent until we achieve this sacred goal" (referring to the elimination of Israel).

A similar letter on the same date to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei:

"This imagined entity is weaker than people think. With the help of Allah, with your assistance, and with the support of our nation, we are capable of uprooting it and removing it, in the near future, with Allah's help."

From a letter by al-Sinwar to Ismail Haniyeh on June 19, 2022, describing a scenario for attack coordination that does not require full Iranian Supreme Leader approval:

"This scenario is the minimum agreement that can be reached, and according to our assessment, the decision regarding it falls within the authority of Nasrallah and the party, without requiring the approval of the Guide [Iran's supreme leader]."

From a letter by Haniyeh to al-Sinwar on July 1, 2022, after meeting Hassan Nasrallah:

"The matter will be presented to the Leader of the Revolution in Iran, and he will be updated on what has been agreed upon. Sayyid Hassan will ensure this, and I will speak with the Leader during our next visit to Iran."

Haniyeh added: "If so, this scenario [the first scenario] was approved in the discussion we held with our allies; we are awaiting its final review in additional meetings, particularly with the Iranians."

⁴⁶ Goldman, A., Bergman, R., & Becker, A. (2024, October 12). Secret documents show Hamas tried to persuade Iran to join its Oct. 7 attack. The New York Times.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/12/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-war.html>

"Iran and Hezbollah were supportive in principle but 'needed more time to prepare,' leading to a delay of the originally planned fall 2022 attack." This refers to a July 2023 meeting in Lebanon between Hamas deputy leader Khalil al-Hayya and IRGC commander Mohammed Said Izadi."

Orton, K. (2025, March 26). More evidence Iran was behind the 7 October 2023 massacre in Israel.

<https://www.kyleorton.com/p/more-evidence-iran-role-oct-7-captured-hamas-documents> Sinwar pitched for initiating the attack in the autumn of 2022, but Tehran put the brakes on. In July 2023, Sinwar's deputy, Khalil al-Hayya, went to Lebanon to present the plan and new proposed date—25 September 2023, during Yom Kippur—to Izadi, who approved the plan, while again delaying its execution 'to prepare the environment."

million per year pre-attack), and weapons (including Iranian-pedigree rockets and missiles).^{47, 48, 49}

Now that we've clearly provided evidence on how Israel and America are in an international armed conflict with Iran, we now show you can lawfully target (i.e., attack with lethal force) militants who are part of a conflict with you.⁵⁰ We will examine the first direct strike I've seen that can be definitively attributed to Israel.

On April 1, 2024, Israel conducted an airstrike on a 4-5 storey annex building (consular section), adjacent to (but separate from) the main Iranian Embassy building in the diplomatic compound

⁴⁷ Goldman, A., Bergman, R., & Becker, A. (2024, October 12). Secret documents show Hamas tried to persuade Iran to join its Oct. 7 attack. The New York Times.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/12/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-war.html>

"In July 2023, Sinwar's deputy, Khalil al-Hayya, went to Lebanon to present the plan and new proposed date—25 September 2023, during Yom Kippur—to Izadi, who approved the plan, while again delaying its execution 'to prepare the environment.'"

"In July 2023, Hamas dispatched a top official to Lebanon, where he met with a senior Iranian commander and requested help with striking sensitive sites at the start of the assault. The senior Iranian commander told Hamas that Iran and Hezbollah were supportive in principle, but needed more time to prepare."

⁴⁸ Faucon, B., Nissenbaum, G., & Kalin, S. (2023, October 25). Hamas fighters trained in Iran before Oct. 7 attacks. The Wall Street Journal.

<https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fighters-trained-in-iran-before-oct-7-attacks-e2a8dbb9>

"About 500 terrorists from Hamas and allied Palestinian Islamic Jihad reportedly participated in training exercises in September. Both Palestinian and Iranian military officials were reportedly in attendance."

⁴⁹ Toumaj, A., & Gordan, A. (2021, May 19). Iran transfers rockets to Palestinian groups. Wilson Center.

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-rockets-palestinian-groups>

"Iran has transferred several types of artillery rockets—including Fajr 3 and Fajr 5 rockets as well as M302s originally made in Syria—to Gaza."

⁵⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross. (1977). Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (Article 43). <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-43>

Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva

"Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities."

in Damascus, around 5 p.m. local time, likely launched from the Golan Heights.^{51, 52, 53, 54} This destroyed the building in the Mezzeh district of Damascus.⁵⁵

The geolocated coordinates of this building are 33.503889°N, 36.260444°E.⁵⁶

⁵¹ The New York Times. (2024, April 1). Middle East crisis: Airstrike in Damascus kills several top Iranian commanders, Iran says [Live updates].

<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/04/01/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news>

“Four Israeli officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence matters, confirmed that Israel had been behind the strike in Damascus, but denied that the building had diplomatic status.”

“The ruling also characterized Iran as a terrorist state at a moment when tensions are running particularly high between Iran and Israel. Iran has repeatedly said it will launch an attack against Israel in retaliation for a recent bombing in Syria that killed several top Iranian commanders.

“The 1994 attack in Buenos Aires was organized, planned, financed and executed under the direction of the authorities of the Islamic State of Iran, within the framework of Islamic Jihad,” said the ruling by the three-member court that declared the attack a crime against humanity.”

⁵² BBC News. (2024, April 1). Iran accuses Israel of killing generals in Syria strike.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68708923>

“Syria's defence ministry said Israeli aircraft targeted the Iranian consulate building... from the direction of the occupied Golan Heights at about 17:00 local time... Syrian air defences shot down some of the missiles...”

⁵³ Al Jazeera. (2023, March 30). Israeli missile attack on Syria's Damascus area wounds 2 soldiers.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/30/israeli-missiles-fired-at-targets-in-syrias-damascus-area-media>

“At around 01:20 am (10:20 GMT), the Israeli enemy carried out an aerial aggression from the direction of the occupied Golan Heights targeting several positions in the vicinity of Damascus.”

⁵⁴ Louai Beshara. (2024, April 2). Rescue workers search in the rubble of a building annexed to the Iranian embassy a day after an air strike in Damascus, Syria [Photograph]. AFP via Getty Images.

<https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rescue-workers-search-in-the-rubble-of-a-building-annexed-news-photo/2126118781>

Sheikh Ali, H. (2024, April 1). This photo taken with a mobile phone on April 1, 2024 shows a destroyed building within the compound of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria [Photograph]. Xinhua.

<https://english.news.cn/20240402/479721a3e66946779a75ccde9cc00d06/c.html>

Mihaschw [@mihaschw]. (2024, April 15). I hope this helps. I know the truth hurts you, the haters, but you'll get use to the pain.

Serving TRUTH and FACTS every day.[Post]. X. <https://x.com/mihaschw/status/1779957941526757837>

⁵⁵ Syrian Archive. (2025, March 10). Israeli airstrikes on the Iranian consulate in Damascus.

<https://syrianarchive.org/en/investigations/israeli-airstrikes-on-the-iranian-consulate-in-damascus/>

“Images and videos shared on social media show the destruction of a four-story building adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, alleged to house the consulate and the residence of the Iranian ambassador, as well as the home of civilians, the Mriden family. [Image from a post by Mohammed Al-Halou on Facebook shows the completely destroyed building...”

⁵⁶ Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved [current retrieval date, e.g., March 12, 2026], from

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_airstrike_on_the_Iranian_consulate_in_Damascus

Israel's spokesperson, Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, clarified in a CNN interview that this was not a consulate or embassy but a military building of the Quds Force disguised as one.⁵⁷ We will substantiate this claim with the evidence below; however, we must first clarify that the primary Iranian embassy building (the larger, main diplomatic structure in the same compound) is visible in many images standing undamaged immediately adjacent to the rubble pile. Windows might have been shattered by blast effects in nearby areas, but the core embassy facade and structure show no major structural damage or collapse.⁵⁸

Iran itself acknowledged that 7 IRGC members died in the strike, including senior Quds Force commanders such as Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a long-time Quds Force commander

⁵⁷ CNN. (2024, April 1). Iranian consulate strike; Iran claims two Revolutionary Guard commanders killed; Israeli forces leave Al-Shifa in ruins [Transcript].

<https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fmjc/date/2024-04-01/segment/01>

"According to our intelligence, this is no consulate and this is no embassy. I repeat, this is no consulate and this is no embassy. This is a military building of Quds forces disguised as a civilian building in Damascus."

⁵⁸ Chehayeb, K., & Aji, A. (2024, April 1). Israeli strike on Iran's consulate in Syria killed 2 generals and 5 other officers, Iran says. AP News.

<https://apnews.com/article/israel-syria-airstrike-iranian-embassy-edca34c52d38c8bc57281e4ebf33b240>

("While Iran's consular building was leveled in the attack, according to Syria's state news agency, its main embassy building remained intact."); PBS NewsHour. (2024, April 1). Israeli airstrike destroys Iran's consulate in Damascus....

<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israeli-airstrike-destroys-irans-consulate-in-damascus-occupants-kill-ed-or-wounded-syria-says>

(same quote via SANA); Syrian Archive. (2025, March 10). Israeli airstrikes on the Iranian consulate in Damascus.

<https://syrianarchive.org/en/investigations/israeli-airstrikes-on-the-iranian-consulate-in-damascus/>

("destruction of a four-story building adjacent to the Iranian embassy... completely destroyed building").

for Syria and Lebanon.^{59, 60, 61, 62, 63} He coordinated with Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and other

⁵⁹ Mehr News Agency. (2024, April 2). IRGC confirms martyrdom of 7 advisors in Israel attack. <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/213410/IRGC-confirms-martyrdom-of-7-advisors-in-Israel-attack>

“Seven of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military advisors were martyred following the Israeli attack on Iran's consulate in Damascus... Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi, Hossein Amanollahi, Seyyed Mahdi Jelalati, Mohsen Sedaghat, Ali Agha Babaei, and Seyyed Ali Salehi Rouzbahani were the IRGC military advisors martyred by the regime of Israel in Syria.”

⁶⁰ Press TV. (2024, April 1). Senior IRGC commander, his deputy assassinated in Israeli attack on Iran Embassy's consular section in Syria. <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/04/01/722889/Iran-Syria-Damascus-IRGC-Quds-Force-Lebanon-Brigadier-General-Mohammad-Reza-Zahedi-assassinate-Consular-Section-Mezzeh->

“The aggressive and desperate action of the Zionist regime in attacking the consulate building of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus resulted in the martyrdom of Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Brigadier General Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi and five of their companions.”

⁶¹ Long War Journal. (2010, August 6). Iranian Qods Force commanders linked to Taliban: US Treasury. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/iranian_qods_force_c.php

“Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Qods Force commander in Lebanon, for acting as a 'liaison to Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services' as well as 'guaranteeing weapons shipments' to Hezbollah”

⁶² Fulton, W. (2013, January 14). IRGC shows its (true) hand in Syria. Critical Threats Project. <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irgc-shows-its-true-hand-in-syria>

“IRGC Quds Force Lebanon unit Commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi” (listed among signatories in elite IRGC communications, confirming his role in the Quds Force's Lebanon unit, which encompassed Syria operations).”

⁶³ Gold, D. (2022, July 13). Inside the Octopus: Unraveling Iran's terrorist Quds Force. Jerusalem Center for Foreign Affairs. <https://jcfa.org/article/inside-the-octopus-unraveling-irans-terrorist-quds-force>

“The force's intelligence headquarters, which is responsible for overseeing activity in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel... operates under the command of Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, who frequently shuttles from Beirut to Damascus using his diplomatic passport.”

proxies⁶⁴; was sanctioned by the US, UK, and EU for terrorism and proxy support^{65, 66, 67}; sat on Hezbollah's Shura Council (as the only non-Lebanese member)⁶⁸; and was linked to arms

⁶⁴ Iran Watch. (2023, December 21). Mohammad Reza Zahedi.

<https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/mohammad-reza-zahedi>

("Has acted as a liaison to Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services; reportedly guaranteed weapons shipments to Hezbollah.")

The Guardian. (2024, April 2). Mohammad Reza Zahedi: who was the Iranian commander killed in an Israeli strike in Syria?

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/02/mohammad-reza-zahedi-who-was-the-iranian-commander-killed-in-an-israeli-strike-in-syria>

("Zahedi became pivotal in the supply of Iranian-made missiles to Hezbollah... began regularly meeting with Hassan Nasrallah.")

Asharq Al-Awsat. (2024, April 2). Mohammad Reza Zahedi, The IRGC Mastermind in Syria, Lebanon.

<https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/4944751-mohammad-reza-zahedi-irgc-mastermind-syria-lebanon>

("Zahedi... contributed to expanding the activities of the Quds Force in Lebanon, especially by arming Hezbollah and facilitating exchange with the Syrian intelligence services. Available information indicates that Zahedi was a regular participant in the consultative meetings of the Lebanese Hezbollah leadership.")

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2010, August 3). Fact sheet: U.S. Treasury Department targets Iran's support for terrorism; Treasury announces new sanctions against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force leadership. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg810>

"ZAHEDI, Mohammed Reza... Program: IFSR; SDGT; IRGC... Added on August 3, 2010, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list... pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism"

⁶⁶ Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. (2025, October 1). UK sanctions list: Mohammad Reza Zahedi (INU0289). <https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk/designations/INU0289/Individual>

"Mohammad Reza ZAHEDI is an involved person within the meaning of the Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Mohammad Reza ZAHEDI is a member of, or associated with, the IGRC-Qods Force."

⁶⁷ OpenSanctions. (n.d.). Mohammad-Reza Zahedi [Entity profile].

<https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/Q4188894>

"Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi was listed pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as read with resolutions 1747, 1803 and 1929, as: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons. (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)"

⁶⁸ Middle East Monitor. (2024, April 9). Iran military leader killed in Syria was member of Hezbollah's Shura Council, source says.

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240409-iran-military-leader-killed-in-syria-was-member-of-hezbollahs-shura-council-source-says>

("Zahedi was the only non-Lebanese member of Hezbollah's Shura Council, according to the source. Hezbollah's Shura Council, the decision-making body of the group, consists of seven members in addition to the Secretary-General of the party, Hassan Nasrallah, according to the source.")

Al Arabiya. (2024, April 8). Iran general killed in Syria was on Hezbollah's top council: Group source.

<https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/04/08/iran-general-killed-in-syria-was-on-hezbollahs-top-council-group-source>

("Zahedi was the only non-Lebanese on Hezbollah's eight-member Shura Council, the equivalent of the powerful Shia Muslim movement's political bureau, led by secretary general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.")

Times of Israel. (2024, April 8). Top Iranian general killed in Damascus strike sat on Hezbollah's decision-making body.

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-iranian-general-killed-in-damascus-strike-sat-on-hezbollahs-decision-making-body>

transfers and attack planning against Israel.⁶⁹ Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah even eulogized him in April 2024, noting their close collaboration since the 1990s/2000s, including Zahedi's role in regional "resistance."⁷⁰ Also killed were Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi (his deputy) and others tied to Quds Force roles in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine.^{71, 72, 73}

("Zahedi was the only non-Lebanese on Hezbollah's eight-member Shura Council, the equivalent of the powerful Shiite terror group's political bureau, led by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, the source said, requesting anonymity because the matter is sensitive.")

⁶⁹ MEMRI. (2024, April 9). Close associate of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei: The IRGC Quds Force commander for Syria and Lebanon who was killed in Damascus was involved in planning and execution of October 7 Hamas attack.

<https://www.memri.org/reports/close-associate-iranian-supreme-leader-khamenei-irgc-quds-force-commander-syria-and-lebanon>

"The strategic role of the martyr Zahedi in consolidating and strengthening the resistance front, and in the planning and execution of Al-Aqsa Flood, are part of the great pride that will transform the quiet efforts of this great commander into the eternal history of the struggle against the occupation by the Zionist regime"

⁷⁰ IRNA. (2024, April 5). Nasrallah praises martyr General Zahedi for assisting resistance.

<https://en.irna.ir/news/85435977/Nasrallah-praises-martyr-General-Zahedi-for-assisting-resistance>

("Hezbollah Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has praised the martyred Iranian General Mohammad Reza Zahedi for his role in the growth of the Resistance forces in the region... Nasrallah praised the martyred General Zahedi for assisting resistance.")

Al-Ahed News. (2024). Sayyed Nasrallah Challenges "Israeli" Red Lines.

<https://english.alahednews.com.lb/75876/613>

("His Eminence expressed deep admiration for Haj Zahedi, affirming that 'with his remarkable presence, Haj Zahedi served as the best helper...")

⁷¹ Mehr News Agency. (2024, April 2). IRGC confirms martyrdom of 7 advisors in Israel attack.

<https://en.mehrnews.com/news/213410/IRGC-confirms-martyrdom-of-7-advisors-in-Israel-attack>

("Seven of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) military advisors were martyred following the Israeli attack on Iran's consulate in Damascus... Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi, Hossein Amanollahi, Seyyed Mahdi Jelalati, Mohsen Sedaghat, Ali Agha Babaei, and Seyyed Ali Salehi Rouzbahani were the IRGC military advisors martyred by the regime of Israel in Syria.")

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2024, April 2). Israel has killed senior IRGC Quds Force officials in Damascus.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/04/israel-has-killed-senior-irgc-quds-force-officials-in-damascus>

("Seven members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force were killed... This included Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi, the Quds Force's commander for Syria and Lebanon... and Maj. Gen. Mohammed Hadi Haji Rahimi, the commander for Palestine.")

⁷² Critical Threats Project. (2024, May 14). Iran Update, May 14, 2024.

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-14-2024>

"Mohammad-Hadi Haji-Rahimi who was killed in ... Rahimi, also functioned as the IRGC Quds Force commander for the Palestinian territories."

⁷³ Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. (2023, December 14). Iran - Financial Sanctions Notice.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65817cebed3c34000d3bfb4f/Notice_Iran_141223.pdf

("Mohammed Saeed Izadi, the head of IRGC-QF Palestine branch... The IRGC-QF transferred hundreds of millions of dollars in financial assistance and provision of weapons and operational training to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.")

These individuals have been engaging in hostilities against the state of Israel, which makes them lawful combatants. These substantiated facts establish an effective contribution to military action via Zahedi's "purpose" (command and coordination of proxy forces in active hostilities) and the Quds Force's "use" (directing attacks on Israel).

As Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I states:

"Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

We see Israel abiding by this principle very strictly, as only the annex building was struck, not the main embassy. Zahedi (as a senior Quds Force commander) and the site (used for his meetings and command) contributed effectively to military action through proxy coordination. Neutralizing him degraded Iran's ability to direct Hezbollah attacks, offering a definite military advantage amid ongoing border hostilities (not potential or indeterminate).

This being an annex building possibly used by leaders and ambassadors does not take away from its headquarters-like use by commanders. This is backed up in the ICRC Commentary on Article 52:

"Most civilian objects can become useful objects to the armed forces. Thus, for example, a school or a hotel is a civilian object, but if they are used to accommodate troops or headquarters staff, they become military objectives. [...] In this case the object has a dual function and is of value for the civilian population, but also for the military."

And also in the ICTY Final Report on NATO Bombing (2000) (dual-use analogy):

"For the station [RTS TV] to be a military objective within the definition in Article 52 of Protocol I: a) its nature, purpose or use must make an effective contribution to military action and b) its total or partial destruction must offer a definite military advantage... If the media is the nerve system that keeps a war-monger in power and thus perpetuates the war effort, it may fall within the definition of a legitimate military objective."

Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (2025, February 3). Activities of Saeed Izadi, Head of the Quds Forces' "Palestine Branch," Reflected in Captured Documents." <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/activities-of-saeed-izadi-head-of-the-quds-forces-palestine-branch-reflected-in-captured-document>
("Saeed Izadi... heads the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps' (IRGC) Quds Force Palestine Branch, which is responsible for liaising with Palestinian terrorist organizations, primarily Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), to attack Israel. Izadi led Iranian efforts to smuggle weapons, provide funding and conduct training for Palestinian terrorist organizations in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip." Jerusalem Post. (2025, June 21). Israel kills IRGC commander tasked with funding, arming Hamas's October 7 attacks in Iran.) <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-858459>
("Correspondence between Sinwar and Izadi revolves around a 'Tufan 1' project, under which the killed IRGC commander attempted to transfer weapons, valued at some \$21 million, from Iran to the Gaza Strip... and 'Tufan 2' to provide an additional \$25 million in armaments.")

After this attack, Iran ironically and swiftly accused Israel of violating international law and diplomatic norms. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, called it a "gross violation of international conventions" during a phone call with his Syrian counterpart and held Israel accountable for the consequences.^{74, 75}

A letter was sent to the United Nations Security Council, reserving Iran's "legitimate and inherent right to respond decisively."⁷⁶

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly stated that Israel "will be punished by the hands of our brave men" and would "regret this crime." He added that the attack "will not go unanswered."⁷⁷ Eventually, Iran embarrassingly retaliated by launching its first-ever direct attack on Israel from its own territory, firing over 300 projectiles, including approximately 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles.⁷⁸ The IRGC claimed the strikes targeted Israeli

⁷⁴ Islamic Republic News Agency. (2024, April 1). Attacking Iran's consulate violates all int'l obligations, conventions.

<https://en.irna.ir/news/85432290/Attacking-Iran-s-consulate-violates-all-int-l-obligations-conventions>

"Terming the attacks on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus as a violation of all international obligations and conventions, he held the Zionist regime responsible for the consequences of this action."

⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2024, April 1). Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman strongly condemns Zionist regime's attack on Iran's consulate building in Damascus.

<https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/742325>

"Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Nasser Kanaani has strongly condemned the Zionist regime for its attack on the consular building of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus. Kanaani described the brutal attack a gross violation of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, saying the international community and the UN should condemn the act in the strongest possible terms and should take necessary measures against the aggressor. Kanaani underlined that all the aspects of this abhorrent act are under investigation, and the Zionist regime will be held responsible for the consequences thereof."

⁷⁶ Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations. (2024, April 1). Letter dated 1 April 2024 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/78/838-S/2024/281).

United Nations. <https://undocs.org/en/A/78/838>

⁷⁷ Office of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. (2024, April 2). We will make Zionist regime regret this crime.

<https://english.khamenei.ir/news/10671/We-will-make-Zionist-regime-regret-this-crime>

"The evil Zionist regime will be punished at the hands of our brave men. We will make them regret this crime and the other ones."

⁷⁸ Hagari, D. (as cited in Associated Press). (2024, April 13). Israel says Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles, 99% of which were intercepted. Associated Press.

<https://apnews.com/article/strait-of-hormuz-vessel-33fcffde2d867380e98c89403776a8ac>

"Iran fired 170 drones, more than 30 cruise missiles and more than 120 ballistic missiles... more than 300 projectiles... 99% of which were intercepted."

military sites, including the airbase from which the Damascus attack was allegedly launched.⁷⁹ Iran framed this as a limited, retaliatory operation in self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter which doesn't apply when you were in fact the aggressor that started this war, but anyway... ironically, this attack had no reported deaths.^{80, 81} One 7-year-old Bedouin girl was critically injured by shrapnel from an intercepted projectile in the Arad region of southern Israel. At least 31 other people in Israel were treated for minor injuries (mostly from shrapnel while rushing to shelters) or anxiety/post-traumatic stress.⁸²

The next major attack after Iran's April 13-14, 2024, direct missile and drone barrage on Israel (Operation True Promise) was Israel's limited retaliatory strikes on Iran, which occurred on April 19, 2024.

On this day, Israel launched a limited airstrike targeting the IRGC's air defense radar site near Isfahan in central Iran. This site was linked to protecting the Natanz nuclear facility and included an S-300 surface-to-air missile system (Russian-supplied).⁸³

⁷⁹ Al Jazeera. (2024, April 14). 'True Promise': Why and how did Iran launch a historic attack on Israel? <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/14/true-promise-why-and-how-did-iran-launch-a-historic-attack-on-israel>

"The operation achieved a level of success that exceeded our expectations," said IRGC commander-in-chief Hossein Salami, adding that the projectiles only targeted military sites, including the Nevatim airbase in the Negev desert that was allegedly used to launch the Israeli strikes on the Iranian consulate in Syria."

⁸⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2024, April 14). The official statement regarding the response to the aggressive action of the Zionist regime. <https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/743288>

"On 14 April 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran's armed forces have carried out a series of military strikes on Israeli's military bases in response to, and in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense as recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, against Israel's recurring military aggressions, resulting in the martyrdom of the Iranian military advisors present in Syria at the invitation of the Syrian government, in particular the 1 April armed attack against diplomatic premises of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus."

⁸¹ Wikipedia contributors. (2024). April 2024 Iranian strikes on Israel. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel

"There were no deaths, but a number of injuries from the strikes were reported."

The Times of Israel. (2024, April 14). Young girl seriously hurt in Iran attack remains in life-threatening condition.

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/young-girl-seriously-hurt-in-iran-attack-remains-in-life-threatening-condition>

"A 7-year-old girl, Amina Hassouna, was seriously injured by shrapnel from an interception in the Arad area."

⁸² Wikipedia contributors. (2024). April 2024 Iranian strikes on Israel. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel

"At least 31 others were treated, either for minor injuries sustained from shrapnel while going to protected areas, or for anxiety."

⁸³ Institute for Science and International Security (satellite imagery analysis): <https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/assessment-of-israeli-strike-on-iran-near-esfahan>

The attack itself used air-launched missiles (possibly Israeli-produced "Rampage" supersonic missiles), fired from Israeli aircraft.⁸⁴ Satellite imagery later confirmed damage to a mobile radar component of the S-300 battery at the Eighth Shekari Air Base, but there was no extensive damage to the base itself or broader infrastructure.^{85, 86} This concluded the April tit-for-tat events

"Satellite imagery acquired by Planet Labs and Umbra on April 19 and 20, 2024, showed damage to an S-300 mobile radar at the Eighth Shekari Air Base in Isfahan province... The S-300 system is reportedly a key part of the air defenses for both the Esfahan and Natanz nuclear sites"

⁸⁴ APA citation: Staff, T. (2024, April 21). Report: Israel used air-to-surface missile called 'The Rampage' in Iran attack. The Times of Israel.

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-israel-used-air-to-surface-missile-called-the-rampage-in-iran-attack

"The missile used in the alleged Israeli attack on a military base near the Iranian city of Isfahan overnight Thursday-Friday was a locally-developed air-to-surface missile dubbed The Rampage"

McNeill, R. (2024, November 4). Israel's strikes on Iran spark interest in air-launched ballistic missiles. Reuters.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-strikes-iran-spark-interest-air-launched-ballistic-missile-s-2024-11-04>

"Experts say high-speed, highly accurate air-launched ballistic missiles such as the Rampage, developed by Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries, get around problems facing ground-based ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles."

⁸⁵ Albright, D., Burkhard, S., & Pabian, F. (2024, April 23). Assessment of Israeli strike on Iran near Esfahan. Institute for Science and International Security.

<https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/assessment-of-israeli-strike-on-iran-near-esfahan>

"Post-attack satellite imagery analyzed by The New York Times reportedly showed damage to the S-300 system at the Eighth Shekari Air Base in Esfahan... the attack 'damaged or destroyed the 'flap-lid' radar, which is used in S-300 air defense systems to track incoming targets."

Langmaid, V. (2024, April 21). Satellite image shows 'Israeli missile' destruction at Iranian base near nuke site: report. New York Post.

<https://nypost.com/2024/04/21/world-news/satellite-image-shows-israeli-missile-destruction-at-iranian-base-near-nuke-site-report>

"Satellite images of the Iranian air base struck by alleged Israeli forces last week appear to show extensive damage to a radar system unit... at the Eighth Shekari airbase."

⁸⁶ Holder, J., & Seddon, M. (2024, April 19). Iranian air defence systems activated as Israel launches strikes – visual guide. The Guardian.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/19/iranian-air-defence-systems-activated-israel-launches-strikes-visual-guide>

"Iranian state media says air defences brought down three small drones over the central city of Isfahan...

Air defence systems were also activated over several other cities... but US officials were quick to brief that Israel was behind the attack [with limited damage]."

Fassihi, F., & Bergman, R. (2024, April 20). Israeli weapon damaged Iranian air defenses without being detected, officials say. The New York Times.

<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/04/20/world/israel-iran-gaza-war-news>

"An Israeli airstrike on Iran on Friday damaged an air defense system... and appeared calculated to deliver a message that Israel could bypass Iran's defensive systems undetected and paralyze them [with minimal broader damage]."

for that month (as far as I know), and a senior Iranian official stated Tehran had no plans to respond or retaliate against Israel at that moment.⁸⁷

Now, the next attack was Iran's second direct missile and drone barrage on Israel, occurring on October 1, 2024. Iran launched around 180–200 ballistic missiles (primarily medium-range models like Emad and Fattah-1) at Israeli military targets, including airbases and intelligence sites. Ironically enough, one Palestinian man (a Gaza laborer in the West Bank) was killed by falling shrapnel near Jericho, with a handful of minor injuries in Israel from debris or shelter rushes, as he was looking up and Palestinians around him were recording; this was seen on CCTV footage. Iran described it as retaliation for the killings of Haniyeh, Nasrallah, and other figures, framing it as defensive under UN Charter Article 51.

Israel eventually responded on October 26, 2024, known as Operation Days of Repentance.⁸⁸ It launched three waves of airstrikes using fighter jets (likely including F-35s), targeting around 20 military sites across Iran.. primarily near Tehran and in western/southwestern provinces (e.g., Ilam and Khuzestan). They targeted missile and drone production facilities, several Russian-supplied S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries, and associated radars.⁸⁹ At this point, 4 Iranian Army soldiers (regular military air defense personnel) and 1 civilian security guard were reported killed. From the prior attack, there was the Palestinian man, plus IRGC officers (military personnel) and a mother and son.^{90, 91}

⁸⁷ Perdomo, J. (2024, April 25). The tit-for-tat exchange between Israel and Iran amid de-escalatory aspirations. Jack Detsch Institute for Policy Studies. <https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/news-events/the-policy-spotlight/2024/the-tit-for-tat-exchange-between-israel-and-iran-amid-de-escalatory-aspirations.html>

"The next day, on April 20th, the Iranian foreign minister stated that Iran would not respond to the Israeli attack, ending the cycle of escalation for the moment."

⁸⁸ Savill, M., & Ozcelik, B. (2024, October 28). Operation Days of Repentance: The impact of Israel's strikes on Iran. Royal United Services Institute. <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/operation-days-of-repentance-impact-israels-strikes-iran>

"In the early hours of 26 October, Israel announced that it had launched 'precise and targeted' strikes on 'military targets' in Iran, as part of Operation Days of Repentance."

⁸⁹ Savill, M., & Ozcelik, B. (2024, October 28). Operation Days of Repentance: The impact of Israel's strikes on Iran. Royal United Services Institute. <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/operation-days-of-repentance-impact-israels-strikes-iran>

"Details now being briefed to US media suggest that air defence systems (Russian-supplied S-300s, including radars) were struck... some missile development and drone facilities... at Khojir and Parchin.."

⁹⁰ Wikipedia contributors. (2025). October 2024 Iranian strikes on Israel. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel

"1 Palestinian civilian killed (by missile debris)... The two fatalities caused by the attacks were a Palestinian man in Gaza, killed by debris from an intercepted missile, and an Israeli man who died due to a shock-induced heart attack."

⁹¹ The Defense Post. (2024, April 4). Toll rises to 16 in Israeli strike on Iran's Damascus consulate: Monitor. <https://thedefensepost.com/2024/04/04/toll-israeli-strike-iran-consulate>

"Two civilians, a woman and her son, were also killed, the Observatory added."

Though the Supreme Leader had threatened vows of retaliation, the next major attack did not occur until the 12-Day War, which began on June 13, 2025.

The 12-Day War started on June 13, 2025, when Israel launched a surprise unilateral military strike on Iran. This targeted:

- Nuclear facilities (including key enrichment and research sites).
- Missile factories and production facilities.
- Senior military officials and nuclear scientists.
- Other regime infrastructure.

One question raised is the legality of strikes specifically on nuclear scientists. This is quite clear under case law and international humanitarian law. A target (in this case, an individual) qualifies as a legitimate military objective if:

1. The target makes an effective contribution to military action by their nature, location, purpose, or use.
2. Their total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.

Nuclear scientists are generally protected civilians and shielded from direct attack unless they meet the criteria for legitimate targets. In this context, they would qualify, as Iran had been enriching uranium...we have evidence of reaching 60% enrichment levels...building new centrifuges, and constantly defying and obstructing IAEA investigators.⁹² Based on reasonably available information to the commander, Iran was enriching uranium near nuclear warhead enrichment capacity.

Ebrahim Jabbari threatened that a third missile attack by Iran, to be carried out “at the right time,” would “wipe out” Israel.⁹³ He also noted that the “resistance fronts” were at their peak of readiness. On May 17, 2025, Khamenei criticized Israel and the United States for bombings in

⁹² International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025, May 31). Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (GOV/2025/24). <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf>

“As of 17 May 2025, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235... was 408.6 kg (U mass)... This represents a net increase... since the previous reporting period.”

“The Agency’s ability to verify and monitor... continues to be seriously affected by Iran’s decision to withdraw the designation of several experienced inspectors... The significantly increased production and accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only non-nuclear-weapon State to produce such nuclear material, is of serious concern.”

⁹³ Iran International. (2025, February 21). Israel will be wiped out in a major attack 'at the right time', IRGC General says. <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502215094>

“Operation True Promise 3 will be carried out at the right time, with precision, and on a scale sufficient to destroy Israel and raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground.”

Gaza and Lebanon and predicted that Israel would be “eradicated.”⁹⁴ On May 26, 2025, the Army’s Commander in Chief, Abdolrahim Mousavi, threatened a “decisive strike” if Israel made “another mistake”, a phrase that may imply an Israeli act harming Iranian interests comparable to the events leading to the April and October attacks.

Enrichment facilities (as well as...not power plants) generally fall outside strict protection and could be targetable if they meet the military objective criteria. These facilities and programs were linked to ballistic missile delivery (e.g., IRGC oversight, missile fuel production components hit).⁹⁵ Destroying them reduced Iran's ability to threaten Israel with nuclear-capable or conventional missiles amid active hostilities (e.g., prior 2024 exchanges and proxy attacks). Thus, destroying them provided a definite military advantage by stopping or delaying missile and nuclear capacity.^{96, 97}

This also addresses the U.S.'s involvement. The U.S. was not directly involved offensively at the start early statements from U.S. officials (e.g., the Secretary of State) described it as an Israeli action, with the U.S. providing defensive support (e.g., intercepting Iranian missiles/drones via U.S. assets like 6th Fleet destroyers in the Mediterranean). There has been no definitive

⁹⁴ Just Security. (2025, June 15). A New War or a New Stage in an Ongoing War – Observations on June 13 Israeli Attack against Iran. <https://www.justsecurity.org/114641/israel-iran-un-charter-jus-ad-bellum> “Khamenei criticized Israel and the United States for bombings in Gaza and Lebanon and predicted that Israel will be 'eradicated.'”

⁹⁵ CSIS Nuclear Network, "Damage to Iran's Nuclear Program—Can It Rebuilt?" (August 6, 2025). Available at: <https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/damage-to-irans-nuclear-program-can-it-rebuild> “The Isfahan nuclear conversion facility was also used to deconvert the gaseous UF6 into uranium metal. That uranium metal could be used in a nuclear bomb.”

⁹⁶ Dumont, A., & Budelmann, K. (2025, July 25). Beyond the reactor: Targeting nuclear facilities and their personnel under (customary) international law. *Völkerrechtsblog*. <https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/beyond-the-reactor> “If reports are accurate and the Natanz, Esfahan, and Fordow facilities were indeed engaged in uranium enrichment of over 60%, they exceed the enrichment of 3-5% usually required for civil use fission. This suggests not only a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the facilities were used for military purposes – it even points to the intent to do so. There is no plausible justification for enriching uranium to levels 15 to 20 times higher than those required for civilian energy production. Consequently, they would at least be regarded as dual-use objects and therefore lawful targets.”

⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Israel). (2025, September). Operation 'Rising Lion': Key factual and legal aspects of the Iran-Israel hostilities, June 13-24, 2025 (Updated to August 12, 2025). https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/operation-rising-lion-key-factual-and-legal-aspects-of-the-iran-israel-hostilities-june-2025-11-aug-2025/en/English_Swords_of_Iron_DOCUMENTS_Operation_Rising_Lion_2025_Israel-Iran-Key_Factual_and_Legal_Aspects2.pdf “Since 2021, the Iranian regime had enriched uranium to levels, and in quantities, far beyond plausible civilian-use levels, reaching 60% purity, a threshold widely recognized as a critical technical threshold towards weapons-grade uranium (90%). [...] Iran’s enrichment yielded a stockpile capable of fueling several nuclear warheads, approximately half of which was accumulated in the six months prior to the Operation, making Iran the only non-nuclear-weapon State enriching uranium to this level, in clear defiance of peaceful use norms. Having nearly achieved military-grade enrichment – with less than one percent of the enrichment effort remaining – the regime was only days away from accumulating enough fissile material for a functional nuclear arsenal.”

evidence that America gave instructions for, or exercised direction or control over, the strikes in a way attributable to the U.S. Simple knowledge of the strike does not suffice. However, irrespective of this, the parties had already been in an international armed conflict (IAC), initiated by Iran as previously laid out.

Eventually, President Trump authorized Operation Midnight Hammer, in which U.S. forces struck three key Iranian nuclear sites: Fordow (a deep underground enrichment facility, hit with GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators from B-2 Spirit bombers), Natanz, and Isfahan (using Tomahawk cruise missiles from a submarine and air-launched weapons).

However, all good things come to an end. Trump first declared on Truth Social (around 6:02 p.m. EDT / late evening GMT) that Israel and Iran had agreed to a "complete and total ceasefire," labeling the conflict the "12-Day War." He stated it would take effect the next day (June 24). Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi initially contested a formal agreement but indicated Iran would halt if Israel did so "no later than 4 a.m. Tehran time" (around 00:30 GMT on June 24). The truce went into effect early that morning, with a phased cessation:

- Iran halted hostilities first (around 4–5 a.m. Tehran time / ~00:30–01:30 GMT).
- Israel followed about 12 hours later (per some reports, aligning with the phased structure Trump described: 12 hours of Iranian cessation, then mutual).
- Trump posted around 1:08 a.m. EDT (early June 24) confirming it had begun and urging no violations.

There were minor exchanges; however, after U.S. pressure, both sides paused. The text of this alleged ceasefire has not been published; therefore, we can assume there is no formal text or specific rules for this ceasefire beyond both sides needing to refrain from direct or indirect attacks on each other.

As we know in international law, direct attacks alone do not suffice to end an IAC. Since both entities continued to exist after the 12-Day War, the end requires not only the cessation of active hostilities but also the end of military movements of a bellicose nature including those that reform, reorganize, or reconstitute so that the likelihood of resumption can reasonably be discarded.

Although Trump announced that he had "obliterated" Iran's nuclear program, and there is evidence of significant setback, there are also reports of salvage, access, or potential relocation of existing stockpiled uranium, which survived the strikes in buried tunnels or protected

areas.^{98, 99, 100} Satellite imagery has shown this, and there were reports of Trump possibly sending special forces or ground troops to seize/recover the stockpile, implying belief that it remained accessible and recoverable by Iran.^{101, 102}

⁹⁸ Trump, D. J. (2026, February 28). President Trump's statement on Iran attacks. PBS NewsHour. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/read-trumps-full-statement-on-iran-attack>

⁹⁹ Reuters. (2025, July 3). Iranian nuclear program degraded by up to two years, Pentagon says. <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-nuclear-program-degraded-by-up-two-years-pentagon-says-2025-07-02>

"We have degraded their program by one to two years, at least intel assessments inside the Department (of Defense) assess that... We're thinking probably closer to two years — like degraded their program by two years."

¹⁰⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025, June 22). Update on developments in Iran (5). <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-5>

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated (June 22, 2025)

"It is clear that Fordow was also directly impacted, but the degree of damage inside the uranium enrichment halls can't be determined with certainty... Based on the analysis of commercially available satellite imagery... FFEP [Fordow] is expected to have suffered very significant damage."

Albright, D. (2025, November 21). Comprehensive updated assessment of Iranian nuclear sites five months after the 12-day war. Institute for Science and International Security.

<https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/comprehensive-updated-assessment-of-iranian-nuclear-sites-five-months-after-the-12-day-war>

"The attacks... caused considerable damage... Iran's uranium enrichment program remains significantly set back. At present, Iran does not appear able to enrich uranium in any significant manner or make gas centrifuges in significant numbers"

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025, July 15). Iran's nuclear programme after the strikes.

<https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/07/irans-nuclear-programme-after-the-strikes>

"The strikes have significantly disrupted its nuclear programme and potential weaponisation options but not eliminated them... it remains to be seen if and how quickly Iran can rebuild."

Royal United Services Institute. (2025, June 22). RUSI experts react to US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities.

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/rusi-experts-react-us-strikes-irans-nuclear-facilities>

"The US strikes achieved... a significant setback to Iran's nuclear program... The fundamental reality remains that military action alone can only roll back the programme by degrees, not eliminate it fully."

¹⁰¹ New York Post. (2025, July 10). Some enriched uranium survived US strikes on Iran nuclear sites, is still accessible: senior Israeli official.

<https://nypost.com/2025/07/10/world-news/some-enriched-uranium-survived-us-strikes-on-iran-nuclear-sites-is-still-accessible-senior-israeli-official>

"Parts of Iran's stockpile of near weapons-grade enriched uranium survived last month's US airstrikes and could be accessed by Tehran's nuclear engineers... some of the 60% enriched uranium at Isfahan — apparently buried too deep to be hit — remains accessible, as are stockpiles at other sites."

Associated Press. (2026, January 31). Satellite photos show activity at Iran nuclear sites.

<https://apnews.com/article/iran-protests-nuclear-enrichment-satellite-d5c78b5fe974ec2fc338b8ad6d6a7d68>

"The images from Planet Labs PBC show roofs have been built over two damaged buildings at the Isfahan and Natanz facilities... they are likely part of Iran's efforts 'to assess whether key assets — such as limited stocks of highly enriched uranium — survived the strikes.'"

¹⁰² Fortune. (2026, March 8). U.S. considers idea of special operation to seize Iran's uranium stockpile.

<https://fortune.com/2026/03/08/us-special-operation-forces-raid-iran-uranium-nuclear-weapons-program>

I will not comment on the alleged schoolgirl massacre, as all the information has not yet come out. I will update if any allegations of other massacres emerge, along with evidence about them, as I do not use claims from the same state media that described homosexuality as an illness that should be cured, denies mistreatment of trans and gay people (even though we have documented evidence of death penalties for them, as well as sexual abuse toward trans Iranians after encounters with the morality police), or when the IRGC shot down a passenger jet carrying 176 people and initially denied it, or the many documented cases of their missiles failing or misfiring.^{103, 104}

"President Donald Trump is weighing the option of deploying special forces on the ground to seize Iran's near-bomb-grade uranium... US and Israeli officials are actively searching for the highly enriched material and have contingency plans that include deploying special forces if its location is confirmed."

Axios. (2026, March 8). U.S. weighs sending special forces to seize Iran's nuclear stockpile.

<https://www.axios.com/2026/03/08/iran-ground-troops-special-forces-nuclear>

"The U.S. and Israel have discussed sending special forces into Iran to secure its stockpile of highly enriched uranium at a later stage of the war... Trump told reporters... ground troops were possible — but only 'for a very good reason.'"

¹⁰³ Guardian. (2013, March 14). Iranian human rights official describes homosexuality as an illness. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2013/mar/14/iran-official-homosexuality-illness>

BBC Persian. (2025, February 16). [Video]. روایت زن‌ترنس که در ویدیوهای زندان اوین و بند افراد ال‌جی‌بی‌تی دیده شده است.

YouTube. https://youtu.be/X3xO-E_NJg

"If they went to the prison hospital, they were mistreated there too."

"The same psychotherapists who prescribe sleeping pills would touch them inappropriately"

"On the way to the prosecutor's office, [trans prisoners] were sexually harassed and groped."

Guards and others forced trans prisoners "into [sexual] acts against their will."

¹⁰⁴ Browne, M., Hill, E., Mitchell, L., & Marcolini, B. (2020, January 14). New video shows two Iranian missiles hit Ukrainian plane. The New York Times.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/14/world/iran-plane-crash-video.html>

Iran Observatory [@IRObservatory]. (2026, February 28). Zanzan: Two IRGC missiles malfunctioned and crashed in Iran shortly after launch. #IranMassacre #Iranrevolution2026 [Image attached] [Post]. X.

<https://x.com/iobservatory/status/2027749418913398864>

Zarif, J. [@JZarif]. (2020, January 11). A sad day. Preliminary conclusions of internal investigation by Armed Forces: Human error at time of crisis caused by US adventurism led to disaster. Our profound regrets, apologies and condolences to our people, to the families of all victims, and to other affected nations. ❤️ [Post]. X. <https://x.com/jzarif/status/1215847283381755914>