

OC Kraut Design Claims

chapter 2: Encouraging contribution to online communities

section: Problems of Contribution

section: Ask and Ye Shall Receive

Design claim 1: Making the list of needed contributions easily visible increases the likelihood that the community will provide them.

Design claim 2: Easy to use tools for finding and tracking work that needs to be done will increase the amount that gets done.

Design claim 3: Asking people to perform tasks that interest them and they are able to perform will increase contributions compared to asking people at random.

section: Structuring Requests to Enhance Motivation

Design claim 4: Compared to broadcasting requirements for contribution to all community members, asking specific people to make contributions increases the likelihood that they will.

Design claim 5: Simple requests will lead to more compliance than lengthy and complex ones for decisions about which members do not care strongly.

Design claim 6: Messages stressing the benefits of contribution will have a larger effect on people who care about the domain of the contribution.

Design claim 7: Fear campaigns lead members to increase contributions in response to persuasive appeals.

Design claim 8: Fear campaigns cause people to evaluate the quality of persuasive appeals.

Design claim 9: Requests from high-status people in the community lead to more contribution than anonymous requests or requests from low-status members.

Design claim 10: People are more likely to comply with requests the more they like the requester.

Design claim 11: Because the following factors influence liking, people will be more likely to comply with requests if they come from others who are similar to them, are attractive, are of high status, or have other noticeable socially desirable characteristics.

Design claim 12: People are more likely to comply with a request when they see that other people have also complied.

Design claim 13: Providing members with specific and highly challenging goals will increase their contributions.

Design claim 14: Coupling goals with specific deadlines leads to increases in contribution as the deadlines approach.

Design claim 15: Goals have larger effects when people receive frequent feedback about their performance with respect to the goals.

section: Enhancing Intrinsic Motivations

Design claim 16: Combining contribution with social contact with other contributors will cause members to contribute more.

Design claim 17: Creating immersive experiences with clear goals, feedback and challenge that exercise people's skills to the limits but still leave them in control causes the experiences to be intrinsically interesting.

Design claim 18: Performance feedback, especially positive feedback, can enhance motivation to perform tasks.

Design claim 19: Site designs that encourage systematic, quantitative feedback generate more verbal feedback as well.

Design claim 20: Performance feedback enhances motivation only when it is judged as sincere.

Design claim 21: Comparative performance feedback can enhance motivation, as long as high performance is viewed as desirable and potentially obtainable.

Design claim 22: Performance feedback, and especially comparative performance feedback, can create a game-like atmosphere that may have undesirable consequences in some communities.

section: Enhancing Extrinsic Motivations

Design claim 23: Rewards, whether in the form of status, privileges, or material benefits, will motivate contributions.

Design claim 24: With task-contingent rewards for small, discrete tasks, larger rewards will motivate people to take on tasks, but will not motivate higher effort on accepted tasks.

subsection: Perverse incentives: Gaming the system

Design claim 25: Rewards cause some people to "game the system", undertaking "counterfeit actions" that will be rewarded but which do not actually contribute to the community.

Design claim 26: Rewards that are task-contingent but not performance-contingent will lead to gaming by performing the tasks with low effort.

Design claim 27: Performance-contingent rewards can be set in a way that prevents gaming; this is true even if performance evaluation is imperfect, so long as it is somewhat informative.

Design claim 28: Status and privileges are less likely to lead people to game the system than are tangible rewards, among people who are not invested in a community.

Design claim 29: Non-transparent eligibility criteria and unpredictable schedules will lead to less gaming of the system than predictable rewards.

subsection: trade-offs between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation

Design claim 30: Adding a task-contingent reward (for doing or finishing a task, regardless of performance) to an already interesting task will cause people to be less interested in the task and to perform it less often. The effect will be larger for monetary rewards than for prizes, status rewards, and charitable donations.

Design claim 31: Small tangible rewards are likely to reduce contributions for intrinsically interesting tasks while larger rewards will increase contributions.

Lia

Motivation vs.

section: Enhancing Expectancy-Value of Group Outcomes

Design claim 32: People will be more willing to contribute in an online group the more that they are committed to the group.

Design claim 33: People will be more willing to contribute in an online group when the group is small rather than large.

Design claim 34: People will be more willing to contribute in an online group when they think that they are unique and others in the group cannot make contributions similar to theirs.

Design claim 35: People will be more willing to contribute in an online community if they see that others are making complementarity or contingent contributions that they see others making substitute contributions.

section: Conclusion and Implications for Contest Design

section: Summary of Design Alternatives

chapter 3: Encouraging Commitment in Online Communities

Identity-based commitment (IBC)

Effects of IBC

1. leads people to continue ... in the face of membership turnover
2. makes people more compliant with norms than does bond-based commitment

Enhancing IBC 1

3. recruit or cluster ... into homogeneous groups
4. provide a name or tag for a common group
5. ... or identify shared interests
6. named subgroups increase members' commitment to the subgroups ...
7. and to the larger community as long as subgroup identity is not in conflict

Enhancing IBC

8. make community fate, goals, or purpose explicit
9. provide interdependent tasks to reduce conflict among subgroups
10. highlight an out-group (and compete with it)
11. emphasize a threat to the group, especially from an external source... but may alienate peripheral members
12. make group members anonymous to foster identity-based commitment

Bonds-based commitment (BBC)

Enhancing BBC 1

- 13. recruit those with existing social ties to be community members
- 14. facilitating interaction with "friends of friends"
- 15. display photos and info about individuals
- 16. encourage personal conversation
- 17. places, spaces, groups, friend feeds, etc. encourages repeat interactions
- 18. personalized profiles increases self-disclosure and interpersonal relations

Enhancing BBC 2

- 19. pseudonyms increase self-disclosure and interpersonal liking in sensitive contexts
- 20. active self-disclosure with visible response
- 21. highlighting interpersonal similarity fosters closeness

Preserving commitment

Preserving commitment

- 22. community conversations don't scale well without clustering
- 23. diversity of members' interest can alienate, especially those with IBC
- 24. going off-topic can reduce IBC and increases BBC
- 25. going off-topic together can increase BBC and IBC
- 26. personalized filters help with above

Normative (NOC)

- 27. Highlighting a community's purpose and achievements can translate into NC
- 28. Testimonials about people's NC increases others
- 29. Priming norms of reciprocity by highlighting **related concepts** should increase NC
- 30. Showing people what they have received from the community increases NC
- 31. Highlighting opportunities to return favors to **specific others** will increase NC

Needs-based NBC

- 32. Providing participants with experiences that meet their motivations for participating in the community increases their NBC
- 33. Showing information about other communities in the same ecological niche reduces NBC
- 34. Making it difficult for members to export assets or transfer them to other members increases NBC
- 35. Hindrances that prompt community specific investments, even if they are **sunk costs** that do not create valuable assets, will increase NBC

chapter 4: Regulating Behavior in Online Communities

section: 1. Introduction

section: 2. Limiting Effects of Bad Behavior

Design claim 1: Moderation systems that pre-screen, degrade, label, move, or remove inappropriate messages limit the damage they cause.

Design claim 2: Redirecting inappropriate posts to other places will create less resistance than removing them.

Design claim 3: Consistently applied moderation criteria, a chance to argue once case, and appeal procedures increase the legitimacy and thus the effectiveness of moderation decisions.

Design claim 4: Moderation decided by people who are members of the community, are impartial, and have limited or rotating power will be perceived as more legitimate and thus be more effective.

Design claim 5: Reversion tools limit the damage disrupters can inflict in production communities.

Design claim 6: Filters or influence limits can limit the damage of shill raters in recommender systems, but only at the cost of ignoring some useful information from honest raters.

Design claim 7: A widely followed norm of ignoring trolls will limit the damage they can do.

section: 3. Coerced Compliance: Limits on Bad Behavior

Design claim 8: Activity quotas allow people to participate in a community, but prevent repetitive, spam-like activity.

Design claim 9: Gags and bans can limit the continuing damage of a bad actor, but only if it is hard for the bad actor to use a different account or if the ban is disguised.

Design claim 10: Consistently applied criteria for gags and bans, a chance to argue one's case,

Design claim 11: Paying to take actions in the community with currency accumulated through normal participation will reduce the ability for trolls and manipulators to act.

Design claim 12: Limiting fake accounts with CAPTCHAs or identity checks limits automated attacks.

section: 4. Encouraging Voluntary Compliance

subsection: Making Norms Clear and Salient

Design claim 13: Publicly displaying examples of appropriate behavior on the site will show members what is expected and increase their adherence to those expectations.

Design claim 14: Publicly contrasting examples of inappropriate behavior in the context of a descriptive norm of appropriate behavior will highlight the descriptive norm and increase people's adherence to it.

Design claim 15: Publicly displaying many examples of inappropriate behavior on the site will lead members to believe this is common and expected.

Design claim 16: Displaying feedback of members to others increases members' knowledge of community norms and compliance with them; formal feedback is more effective than informal feedback.

Design claim 17: In large communities, displaying statistics that highlight the prevalence of normative behavior will increase members' adherence to normative behavior.

Design claim 18: Explicit rules and guidelines increase the ability for community members to know the norms, especially when it is less clear what others think is acceptable.

Design claim 19: Prominently displayed guidelines may convey a descriptive norm that the guidelines are not always followed.

Design claim 20: Offering people reminders at the point of an action that may violate norms will reduce the number of offenses.

subsection: Enhancing Compliance

Design claim 21: In more cohesive groups to which members are more committed, members will be more likely to spontaneously comply with the norms.

Design claim 22: Community influence on rule making will increase compliance with the rules.

Design claim 23. Face-saving ways to correct norm-violations will increase compliance.

subsection: Rewards and Sanctions

Design claim 24: Telling search engines not to follow links will discourage spammers from posting links.

Design claim 25: Verified identities and pictures will reduce the incidence of norm violations.

Design claim 26: Reputation systems, which summarize the history of someone's online behavior, help to encourage good behavior and deter norm violations.

Design claim 27: Prices, bonds, or bets that make undesirable actions more costly than desirable actions will reduce misbehavior.

Design claim 28: Increasing the benefits of participating with a long-term identifier will increase the community's ability to sanction misbehavior.

Design claim 29: Imposing costs for or preventing pseudonym switching increases the community's ability to sanction misbehavior.

Design claim 30: Forcing newcomers to post bonds that may be forfeited if the newcomers misbehave or forcing newcomers' sponsors to stake their own reputations increases the community's ability to sanction misbehavior.

Design claim 31: Graduated sanctions increase the legitimacy and thus the effectiveness of sanctions.

Design claim 32: Peer reporting or automatic detection of violations increases the deterrent effect of sanctions.

Design claim 33: Increased community cohesion, graduated sanctions, explicit rules, identifiable perpetrators, formal sanctioning roles, and anti-retaliatory measures increase the likelihood that sanctions will be applied and thus increase the deterrent effect of sanctions.

section: 5. Summary of Design Alternatives

chapter 5: The challenges of Dealing with Newcomers

section: The challenges of dealing with newcomers

section: Problem 1: Recruiting newcomers

Design claim 1: Compared to laissez faire approaches, in which prospective members seek out or stumble upon a community, active recruiting will lead to the community having access to a larger pool of prospective members.

subsection: Interpersonal recruiting.

Design claim 2. Word-of-mouth recruiting a substantially more powerful than impersonal advertising.

Design claim 3. Recruiting new members from social networks of current members increases the number of new members more than impersonal methods.

Design claim 4. Making it easy for users to share content from a community site with their friends (e.g., via easy email, Twitter, Facebook, and similar links) will increase the visibility of the community among the users' friends and thereby increase the likelihood of them joining.

Design claim 5. Identifying the most influential members of the community and encouraging them to recruit others in their social networks is more effective than soliciting referrals from members at random.

subsection: Conventional, impersonal advertising.

Design claim 6. Impersonal advertising can effectively increase the number of people joining an online community, especially among potential members with little prior knowledge of the community.

Design claim 7. Recruiting materials that present reasons to join and endorsements by credible sources and sites attract people who are actively searching for and evaluating communities.

Design claim 8: Recruiting materials that present attractive surface features and endorsements by celebrities will attract people who are casually assessing communities.

Design claim 9: Emphasizing the number of people already participating in a community will motivate more people to join than will emphasizing the community need.

Design claim 10: Placing the name of a community in front of people often will activate the familiarity heuristic, their liking of the community and thus their willingness to try it.

section: Problem 2: Selecting the right newcomers

subsection: Self-selection

Design claim 11: Providing potential new members an accurate and complete picture of what the members' experience will be once they join will increase the fit of those who join.

Design claim 12: Forcing potential new members to pay or wait will cause only people who value the community more likely to join.

Design claim 13: Forcing potential new members to undertake "separating" tasks will make those who find the tasks less onerous more likely to join.

subsection: Screening

Design claim 14: Requiring potential members to complete a diagnostic task will screen out some undesirable members.

Design claim 15: Requiring potential members to provide external diagnostic credentials will screen out some undesirable members.

Design claim 16: Requiring potential members to provide referrals from existing will screen out some undesirable members.

section: Problem 3: Keeping newcomers around

subsection: entry barriers and initiation rituals

Design claim 17: Entry barriers for newcomers may cause those who join to be more committed to the group and contribute more to it.

Design claim 18: When newcomers have friendly interactions with existing community members soon after joining a community, they will be more likely to stay and contribute more.

Design claim 19: Encouraging newcomers to reveal themselves publicly in profiles or

Design claim 20. Assigning the responsibilities of having friendly interactions with newcomers to particular community members increases the frequency of these interactions.

Design claim 21: Explicitly discouraging hostility towards newcomers who make mistakes can promote friendly initial interactions between newcomers and old-timers.

section: Problem 4: Teaching the newcomers the ropes

Design claim 22: By using formal, sequential and collective socialization tactics, new members are likely to become more committed to the community, learn how to behave in it and contribute more.

Design claim 23: When old-timers provide newcomers formal mentorship the newcomers will become more committed to the community, learn how to behave in it and contribute more.

section: Problem 5: Protecting the group from newcomers

Design claim 24: Sandboxes both speed up the learning process for newcomers and reduce the harm to the community they might otherwise cause.

Design claim 25. Progressive access controls reduce the harm a newcomer can do to community while learning the ropes.

chapter 6: Starting New Online Communities

section: Carving Out a Niche

section: Opportunities Model

Design claim 1: Lower volume and higher time-sensitivity of interaction opportunities, and lower interruption costs increase the benefits of push notification.

Design claim 2: A mixed-topic scope reduces expected match value.

Design claim 3: An ambiguous scope for an interaction space reduces expected match value.

Design claim 4: Activities that bridge interests in different topics increase match value in spaces with mixed-topic scope.

Design claim 5: A transcendent or bridging topical identity increases match value in communities with mixed-topic scope.

Subsection: communities with multiple spaces

section: Communities with Multiple Spaces

Design claim 6: Personalized collections of “most related content” enhance match-value but reduce shared context.

Design claim 7: Subdividing spaces after they become active creates more net benefits for participants than having lots of inactive spaces.

Design claim 8: In communities with lots of interaction spaces, navigation aids that highlight more active spaces will increase the net benefits members experience.

Design claim 9: In synchronous spaces that are not always active, a schedule of “expected active times” can coordinate visitors and become a self-fulfilling expectation.

Design claim 10: In communities with lots of interaction spaces, recommender systems that help people navigate to spaces that best suit them will increase the net benefits people experience.

Design claim 11: Ambiguity of scope for the community creates opportunities for adjustment and member ownership.

Design claim 12: A larger community leads to lower match-value in bond-based communities.

section: Competing for a Niche

Design claim 13: Differentiated user interface elements in the competitor community create startup costs and thus favor the incumbent community in any competition over members.

Design claim 14: Non-shared user IDs and profiles between incumbent and competitor communities creates startup costs and thus favors the incumbent community in any competition over members.

Design claim 15: content sharing between competing communities raises awareness of the exporting community and the value of posting there, but raises the value of consuming content in the importing community.

Design claim 16: Conveying a succinct unique selling proposition will attract members.

Design claim 17: Advertising and celebrity endorsements can help to create awareness of a community and thus make it a focal point in a competition between communities.

section: Getting to Critical Mass

Subsection: Bootstrapping: Leveraging Early Members to Get More Members

Design claim 18: incentives for early members to generate content can increase bootstrapping.

Design claim 19: User-generated primary content will do more to bootstrap additional membership than will user-generated metadata, in the community startup stage.

Design claim 20: services that enable displays of membership that are visible to non-members will lead to bootstrapping

Design claim 21: services that make members' actions in the community visible to their acquaintances outside the community will lead early participants to attract later participants.

Design claim 22: services that allow members to forward content from the community to their acquaintances outside the community will lead early participants to attract later participants.

Design claim 23: services that allow members to invite acquaintances outside the community to join will lead early participants to attract later participants.

Design claim 24: pay-for-referral and revenue-sharing from referrals increase bootstrapping

Subsection: Attracting Early Members

subsection: Increase Stage 1 Value of the Community

Design claim 25: single-user and small-group productivity, entertainment, or commerce tools can attract people to an online space before the community features are successful.

Design claim 26: providing access to professionally generated content can help attract people to an online space before the community features are successful.

Design claim 27: providing access to syndicated data can help attract people to an online space before the community features are successful, if the syndicated data is not otherwise easily accessible or if it is presented in a novel way that adds value.

Design claim 28: participation by professional staff can help attract people to an online space before the community features are successful.

Design claim 29: starting with a limited scope and expanding later allows focusing of staff resources toward getting to critical mass in the limited scope.

Design claim 30: If professionals act as contributors of last resort, they will be needed less and less as the community achieves critical mass.

Design claim 31: bots that simulate other participants can help attract people to an online space before the community features are successful.

Subsection: Early Adopter Benefits

Design claim 32: Promising permanent discounts to early adopters can attract early adopters to the community.

Design claim 33: Promoting the status or readiness benefits of being early to an online community can attract early adopters to the community.

Design claim 34: Promoting a site as cool but undiscovered can attract early adopters.

Design claim 35: Creating scarce, claimable resources can induce prospective members to join earlier.

Design claim 36: Contribution minima for maintaining scarce status can lead to greater contribution by status-holding members.

subsection: Setting Expectations for Success

subsection: Signals of Convener Quality and Commitment

Design claim 37: Professional site design increases expectations about the probability of success.

Design claim 38: visible expenditures can be a credible signal of commitment to future investment in a community, and thus help to increase expectations about the probability that the community will eventually succeed.

subsection: Signals of Positive Member Response

Design claim 39: Images of members will convey the presence of other people, and thus expectations of future success.

Design claim 40: Prominent display of user-contributed content will convey activity, and thus expectations of future success, as long as there is new user-contributed content.

Design claim 41: Indicators of participation levels will convey activity, and thus expectations of future success, as long as there actually is activity.

Design claim 42: Indicators of membership and content growth signal a higher probability that the community will eventually reach critical mass, provided there really is growth.

Design claim 43: When a community is small and slow growing, acknowledging each new member or contribution creates a more favorable signal of growth than showing total numbers or percentage change.

Design claim 44: When a community is small and fast growing, displaying percentage growth creates a more favorable signal of growth than displaying absolute numbers.

Design claim 45: When a community has reached critical mass, displaying absolute numbers conveys a signal that the community is already successful.

Design claim 46: Conditional participation commitments can draw people to join communities that they would not join if they had to do so without knowledge that others were also joining.

Design claim 47: Drawing analogies to successful communities can raise expectations that a new community will be similarly successful.

Design claim 48: drawing attention to external publicity and endorsements can raise expectations about future success.

subsection: Summary of Design Alternatives