

## **UNIT 09: SHORT TERM CAUSES PRACTICE PAPER 1**

**Source A: Hitler announces the Four Year Plan to his closest advisors (1936)**

Germany will have to be regarded, as it always was, as the focus of the western world against Bolshevist attacks. I do not consider this a joyous mission but rather as a severe handicap and burden upon our national life, resulting from our disadvantageous position in Europe. But we cannot avoid this destiny... It is not the aim of this memorandum to prophesy the moment at which the untenable situation in Europe will reach the stage of open war. I only want to express in these lines my conviction that this crisis cannot and will not fail to come, and that Germany has the duty of securing her existence against this catastrophe at all cost, and to protect herself from it, and that this obligation gives rise to a series of consequences involving the most important tasks ever imposed upon our people. For a victory of Bolshevism over Germany would not lead to a new Versailles Treaty, but to a definitive annihilation and even to an extermination of the German people... Military development shall be accomplished through the new army. The extent and the pace of the military development of our strength cannot be too large or too rapid... I herewith set the following tasks:

- \* I. The German armed forces must be ready for combat within four years.
- \* II. The German economy must be fit for war within four years.

**Source B: AJP Taylor in "The Origins of the Second World War" (1961)**

Of course, in British eyes, their government only wanted to keep things quiet, whereas Hitler wanted to stir them up. To the Germans, the status quo was not peace, but a slave treaty. It all depends on the point of view. The victor powers wanted to keep the fruits of victory with some modifications, though they did it ineffectively. The vanquished power wanted to undo its defeat...the two ideas of "liberation" and "domination" merged into one. There was no separating them. They were merely two different words for the same thing; and only use of the particular word decides whether Hitler was a champion of national justice or a potential conqueror of Europe...Far from wanting war, a general war was the last thing Hitler wanted. He wanted the fruits of total victory without total war; and thanks to the stupidity of others he nearly got them.

**Source C: Chamberlain, in a national radio broadcast after the Bad Godesberg Conference (1938)**

How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing....However much we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbor, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that. I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me; but if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted. Under such a domination life for people who believe in liberty would not be worth living; but war is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark upon it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call to risk everything in their defense, when all the consequences are weighed, is irresistible.

**Source D: Herbert Morrison, a Labour MP, writing in his memoirs after World War Two.**

Neville Chamberlain was a sad and to me pathetic man. He appeared to have but little love for his fellow men. The coldness of his character encompassed him like an aura... I believe that in 1938 and 1939 he genuinely felt that God had sent him into this world to obtain peace. That he failed may or may not be due to the inevitable ambition of Hitler to dominate the world, but there can be little doubt that in his mental attitude Chamberlain went the wrong way about it. He decided in the early stages of his discussions to treat Hitler as a normal human being and an important human being at that. At the time of the Munich crisis I said extremely critical things in public speeches about the German Chancellor with the result that I was approached by one of Chamberlain's more important ministers who asked whether I would be good enough to desist, as the prime minister had been informed that Hitler resented it.

Source E: George Strube's view of Chamberlain (1938)



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- 1a. Why, according to Source A, did Hitler need to prepare Germany for war? [3]
  - 1b. What message is conveyed by Source E? [2]
  2. With reference to their origins, purpose and content assess the value and limitations of Sources B and C for historians studying the Origins of World War Two. [6]
  3. Compare and contrast the views on Chamberlain expressed in Sources D&E. [6]
  4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, explain to what extent you agree with this statement:  
"Appeasement was both unethical and unrealistic" [9]