

## Objective

To address [secure naming](#) delivery with SDS, the original issue is raised on [envoy#4763](#) to allow deliver trust CA as a separate resources from CertificateValidationContext. This is mainly for upstream TLS context.

Secure naming is a 1:N mapping from service (cluster) to service accounts (subject alt name).

## Current Implementation

- CVC contains verify\_subject\_alt\_name from CDS
- Trust CA is delivered locally and when pilot agent does hot restart if it changes

## Available Options

### 1. CertificateValidationContext from NodeAgent (SDS)

Citadel and NodeAgent figure out the secure naming mapping and deliver along with Trust CA via SDS

#### Pros

- No code change required in Envoy
- Secure naming change doesn't drain cluster/listener
- SDS as single source of truth for authentication

#### Cons

- Substantial amount of work in Citadel/NodeAgent to figure out service to service account mapping
- A lot of duplicate work with Pilot

### 2. CertificateValidationContext from Pilot (CDS/LDS)

Pilot to figure out the secure naming mapping and deliver along with Trust CA via SDS

#### Pros

- No code change required in Envoy
- Easier than 1 for pilot to get root CA vs citadel to get secure naming mapping via service registry

#### Cons

- Pilot need to fetch root CA to deliver with secure naming.

### 3. TrustCA secret type

Proposed in [PR#4730](#), add a new secret type as Trust CA.

Pros

- Less code change to Istio control plane implementation, Node agent to deliver trust CA

Cons

- Nested xDS resource dependency (need to avoid)
- Complex config provider with dynamic trust CA

### 4. Merge semantics

Use protobuf to merge CertificateValidationContext delivered from LDS/CDS with the one from SDS.

Pros

- Less code change to Istio control plane implementation, Node agent to deliver CVC with trust CA

Cons

- Hard to figure out what is the actual CertificateValidationContext used in particular Listener/Cluster,
- Priority is confusing: perhaps SDS override LDS/CDS? Reject if a field exist in both?
- Code change involves secret manager with inline and dynamic providers

### 5. Delivery SAN verification via EDS (pilot)

Use EDS to deliver SAN verification field by allowing specifying some validation context per endpoint, CertificateValidationContext delivered from SDS.

Pros

- Strong consistency when a service account (pod) is added/removed from a service
- Stronger mapping between endpoint and SAN
- Secure naming change doesn't drain cluster/listener

Cons

- Larger scope of Envoy API change and substantial code changes to support.
- Medium code change to pilot.

## Recommendation

5 to be long term solution:

- secure naming discovery (service name to service account mapping) and endpoints discovery (service name to ip mapping) naturally fits together.

In short term, figure out how easy 2 is, 3 or 4 is acceptable if 2 is too large work.