

Epistemology of Frontier Sciences: Psychoanalysis and Economics in Dialogue

An initiative curated by Maria Vittoria Ceschi

Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

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Working document — programme subject to additions and changes

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In brief

Epistemology of Frontier Sciences sets psychoanalysis and economics side by side as two **epistemologies** that, starting from different objects, have met the same underlying problem: how does one know an object of which the observer is a part. Freud studies an unconscious of which he is himself a bearer; the economist describes expectations in which his own forecasts are an active part. This constitutive reflexivity — not exclusive to these disciplines, but more acute in them — forces both to rethink the notions of objectivity, law, prediction and cause.

The dialogue is more useful today than ever. After the systemic crises of the last two decades, economics has brought back to the centre categories — uncertainty, conventions, confidence — that describe a subjectivity closer to that of psychoanalysis than to the *homo oeconomicus*; and psychoanalysis, for its part, rigorously reasserts its vocation as a science, confronting the methodological problem in its hardest form — that of suggestion and of the irreducibility of the subject to a medical object.

The **stakes** arise from the different degree of development of the two disciplines. Economics developed to the point of hegemony — the imperialism of the neoclassical paradigm — and today undergoes a pluralization and specialization that risk a loss of relevance and of dialogue across domains. Psychoanalysis, by contrast, experienced an early fragmentation of its own foundations, in which pluralism degenerated into relativism. Two almost opposite trajectories, one and the same lesson: building new objectivities is legitimate when a field of knowledge requires it, but what must follow is to **reconnect the domains** — what we call *naturalization*, the opposite of “bad reduction”.

The programme is organized into **six sessions** — questions of method in Freud and Keynes; beyond the pleasure principle; cosmologies, phylogenesis and ontogenesis; economies and psychoanalyses; decisions, confidence and judgment; the role of formalism — which unfold as

many shared knots: method, hedonism, dualism, cosmologies, pluralism and formalization. The cycle brings together economists, decision scientists and psychoanalysts in a rigorous debate, without either discipline claiming to serve as the metalanguage of the other.

1. Rationale of the Seminar Cycle

1.1 Two frontier sciences

There are disciplines that never manage to coincide entirely with the model of science that nonetheless generated them. Psychoanalysis and economics both belong to this family of **frontier sciences**: fields of knowledge that move along unstable borders — between what already possesses a consolidated theoretical corpus and objectivities still nascent, between the measurable and the non-measurable, between what can be formalized and what resists all formalization — and that continually take from, and give to, other fields of knowledge. Psychoanalysis at its birth and economics as we know it today, that is as *economics*, both take shape at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, within the great crisis of foundations that ran through physics, mathematics and logic. From the outset they have had to interrogate their own epistemological status, and neither has ever ceased to do so.

The **frontier**, here, is not an ornamental metaphor. It denotes a precise condition: that of a knowledge dealing with an object which is at once part of the world and *constituted* by the interpreting activity of the one who observes it. In both cases the observer is internal to the object, belongs to it, is traversed by it. Freud studies an unconscious of which he himself is a bearer; the economist describes a system of expectations of which his own forecasts are an active part. This **constitutive reflexivity** imposes on both disciplines a profound rethinking of the notions of objectivity, law, prediction and cause. A reflexivity that, on closer inspection, is not theirs alone — physics, medicine and other sciences share it, in different forms — but which in them becomes more acute, more profound and more difficult to contain.

1.2 Why now

The question is not why one *can* bring psychoanalysis and economics closer — suggestive juxtapositions have been made for at least a century — but why *today* this dialogue imposes itself as an epistemological necessity and not as a mere interdisciplinary exercise.

The financial crisis of 2007–2008, and the systemic crises that followed, exposed the inadequacy of an economic model built around the figure of the rational maximizing agent. The return of Keynes to the debate, far from being a nostalgic phenomenon, has brought back to the centre

categories — **uncertainty**, *animal spirits*, **conventions**, **confidence** — that describe an economic subjectivity far closer to the one investigated by psychoanalysis than to the *homo oeconomicus* of the neoclassical tradition. *The General Theory* (1936) and its more mature interpretations made clear that the Keynesian problem was not primarily one of economic policy, but of **method**: how does one know an object whose laws depend on the beliefs of those immersed in it.

On the other side, psychoanalysis is traversed by a reflection on its own status that, far from taking refuge in hermeneutics, rigorously reasserts its vocation as a science — this is the position of the Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana, which aims to revive the Freudian programme, freeing it both from the prejudices of those who declare it obsolete and from metaphysical drifts. Yet this very claim compels one to confront the methodological problem in its hardest form, one that no science of the external observer knows: **suggestion**. The analyst's influence bears in fact on the very formulation of clinical constructions, and controlling it is the condition of their objectivity. Suggestion has an affinity with the placebo effect of medicine, but cannot be reduced to it: here is measured the **irreducibility of the subject to a medical object**. The patient is not an organism onto which a protocol can be lowered from outside, but a subject whose speech is at once the datum and the instrument of the inquiry; therefore every *extraclinical* method fails, and the control of assertions must be sought within the clinic, in an *intraclinical* method.

The comparison with economics is therefore not an external one: the economist too, in formulating forecasts, modifies the system he observes, has no pure laboratory experiment at his disposal, and cannot treat the agent as an inert object. The questions psychoanalysis poses about the objectivity of a knowledge whose observer is internal to the object are — *mutatis mutandis* — the same that economics finds itself compelled to ask today.

It is this convergence — two disciplines that, starting from different objects, arrive at a parallel crisis of their own methodological foundation — that makes the dialogue not only possible but highly useful. It is not a matter of applying psychoanalysis to economics (the reductionist temptation of a *psychopathology of markets*), nor of reading the psyche in terms of exchange and investment (the economic drift). It is a matter of setting side by side two **epistemologies** that have confronted structurally analogous problems, and of asking what each can teach the other on the plane of method.

1.3 An epistemological stake

The stake of the cycle is, in the end, a simple question: what can each of the two disciplines teach the other? The most fruitful answer arises, paradoxically, from their differing degree of development.

Economics developed enormously, becoming for decades the hegemonic social science. A dominant paradigm reigned there — the neoclassical one — which exercised a genuine imperialism over neighbouring disciplines: formal, elegant, mathematized, *economics* was long the model that sociology, political science and other fields looked to as the mantra to imitate (Lazear, 2000; Ambrosino, Cedrini & Davis, 2021). That season, according to a recent thesis, has cracked: the discipline is today traversed by a growing pluralization and specialization, to the point that one speaks of *mainstream pluralism* (Cedrini & Fontana, 2018; Davis, 2019). It is in many respects a healthy development — the specialist sub-fields have often built a rigorous method, tailored to their own object. But it carries a precise weakness: excessive specialization risks a loss of relevance and, above all, the difficulty of dialogue among domains ever more fragmented and mutually opaque.

Psychoanalysis presents an almost opposite trajectory. Its theoretical fragmentation is very early — already contemporary with Freud — and does not take the form of specialization but of a disintegration of the foundations: different schools do not even agree on the definitions of the basic concepts. Here pluralism — a virtue when it arises from the need to do justice to a complex object — has degenerated into a de facto relativism, in which every construction is worth as much as any other and none is truly controllable.

Building new objectivities is legitimate, indeed necessary, when the development of a field of knowledge requires it; what cannot be missing is the subsequent moment, the one in which the different domains must be reconnected. This is what we call naturalization: not the reduction of one level to the one beneath it — the “bad reduction” that dissolves the psyche into biochemistry — but the construction of rigorous transitions between different objectivities, able to connect them without flattening them (Parisi; Baldini, 2024).

The cycle takes this as its own stake: not to let fragmentation — through excess of development in economics, through deficiency of foundations in psychoanalysis — have the last word, and to ask how the domains of knowledge can be connected without renouncing the rigour with which each builds its own object. Economics and psychoanalysis discover themselves here not as model and pupil, but as two opposite cases of the same problem, each able to show the other a risk of its own and a resource of its own.

2. Objectives of the cycle

The cycle pursues an articulated set of objectives, which at the same time shape its structure into thematic sessions.

1. **Comparing methods.** To bring into focus the problem of method in Freud and in Keynes, two authors who made reflection on their own way of knowing an integral part of their work. The aim is to clarify the relation between method, theory and practice in each of them — down to the knot, specific to psychoanalysis, of the intraclinical control of assertions — and to identify similarities and differences in the way they construct their objects (Carabelli, 1988; Assoun, 1981; Baldini, 2023).
2. **Overcoming the hedonistic paradigm.** To subject to critique the hedonism that, in the form of the utility principle, grounds much of classical and neoclassical economic theory, and to read it in the light of Freud's *Al di là del principio di piacere* (1920): the discovery that psychic life is not governed by the pursuit of pleasure alone opens a breach that has a precise counterpart in the economic critique of the idea of the utility-maximizing agent (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Esposito, in this cycle).
3. **Interrogating dualism.** To examine the Freudian drive dualism — one single libido, two regimes — not in order to force its analogy with the dualisms of economic thought (calculable/incalculable, certainty/uncertainty), but in order to interrogate its status: what kind of theoretical construction a dualism is, what work it performs in a science, and how far its anchoring to biological phenomena holds (Freud, 1920; 1932).
4. **Analysing cosmologies.** To bring to light the implicit cosmologies of economic theories — their myths of origin, their narratives of value and accumulation — and to compare them with the phylogenetic and ontogenetic constructions of psychoanalysis, from *Totem and Taboo* (1913) onwards, interrogating their epistemic status.
5. **Rethinking pluralism and connecting the domains.** To recognize that there is no *the* economics nor *the* psychoanalysis in the singular, but a plurality of research programmes, and to read their opposite trajectories: the growing specialization of economics after the season of neoclassical imperialism (Cedrini & Fontana, 2018; Ambrosino, Cedrini & Davis, 2021) and the early fragmentation of the foundations in psychoanalysis. The aim is to distinguish fruitful pluralism from relativism, and to ask how to reconnect different objectivities without flattening them — what we call naturalization.
6. **Rethinking decision.** To reconstruct the evolution of decision theory — from expected value to subjective expected utility, up to the theories of ambiguity — and to show how the problem of decision under radical uncertainty calls into play confidence, judgment and desire, categories irreducible to calculation.

7. **Locating formalism.** To clarify what formalism is appropriate to a frontier science: what it means, for psychoanalysis and for economics, to mathematize one's own object, and where the border runs between rigour and the fetish of formalism.

Seven objectives, one single stake: what each discipline can teach the other when both find themselves grappling, from opposite sides, with the same problem — building rigorous objectivities without giving up on keeping them in dialogue.

3. The scientific programme

The cycle is organized into six thematic sessions, each built around an epistemological knot shared by the two disciplines. What follows presents its architecture and the planned talks. (*Programme still being defined.*)

3.1 Questions of method in Freud and Keynes | 13 March

The opening session poses the founding question of the whole cycle: how do two authors proceed, cognitively, who both rejected the deductive model of the exact sciences without thereby renouncing rigour. Keynes, trained in the logic of Moore and Russell and author of a *Treatise on Probability* (1921), develops an idea of rationality as judgment under conditions of incomplete knowledge; Freud builds a conjectural knowledge that proceeds by hypotheses, constructions and provisional models.

Method, theory and practice in Keynes

A. Carabelli — Università del Piemonte Orientale

The talk reconstructs the Keynesian method from its logical-philosophical matrix, showing how the notion of probability as a logical relation and the primacy of judgment over the algorithm inform both economic theory and the practice of economic policy.

Method, theory and practice in Freud

F. Baldini — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

In parallel, the specific status of the psychoanalytic method is interrogated: the relation between clinical practice as a site of knowledge production and theoretical, metapsychological elaboration, and the particular regime of truth that follows from it.

Similarities and differences between Freud and Keynes

M. V. Ceschi — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

The concluding talk compares the two procedures, identifying the convergences (the rejection of reductionism, the centrality of judgment, the provisional nature of models) and the irreducible differences in their respective objects.

3.2 Beyond the pleasure principle | 17 April

The theoretical core of the series. In 1920, Freud introduced a hypothesis that radically unsettled his previous theoretical edifice: the pleasure principle ceased to be the ultimate regulator of psychic life and became a modification, brought about by Eros, of a more primordial tendency towards the zeroing of tension — the Nirvana principle, the expression of the death drive. Economic theory, by contrast, has long been built around the pleasure principle, in the form of utility maximisation, and even its more recent revisions, from behavioural economics to neuroeconomics, have retained its hedonistic core. This session asks what happens when Freud's *beyond* is brought into economics.

Critique of economic hedonism

L. Esposito — Università Cattolica di Milano

From its Benthamite origins to the marginalist revolution, economics has turned the agent into a calculator of pleasure. Behavioural economics, despite presenting itself as an alternative, retains the same core: its agent would like to be rational and hedonistic but fails because of cognitive shortcomings. This presentation shows how some central phenomena of contemporary economics, such as the recurrence of bubbles, imitation, and conventions in financial markets, elude this framework. It argues that Freud's post-1920 theory — a theory of the mind that is non-hedonistic yet rational — provides the conceptual tools to make sense of them.

Eros and the death drive: one libido, two regimes

S. Dalto — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

After 1920, Freud distinguishes the Nirvana principle, which aims at the zeroing of tension, from the pleasure principle, which is its modification through the agency of Eros. This distinction gives rise to a further one between *satisfaction* (*Befriedigung*), the point at which the drive's impetus is exhausted, and *pleasure* (*Lust*), which is linked to the rhythm of variations in tension over time. Eros and the death drive do not draw on different energies: they are two regimes of the same libido, one oriented towards binding, the other towards unbinding. This conceptual architecture offers a tool for rethinking the tensions inherent in economic action.

One Investment, Two Regimes

The concluding presentation brings the distinction between pleasure and satisfaction back into economics. It suggests that utility maximisation takes the form of a pursuit of satisfaction rather than pleasure, and reinterprets Keynes's distinction between *animal spirits*, in which drive dynamics find a real object and reach their conclusion, and conventional behaviour under the fetish of liquidity, in which the object is emptied of substance and discharge is endlessly renewed, through the lens of the two regimes of the libido.

3.3 Cosmologies, Phylogenesis, Ontogenesis. The Status of Origin Narratives | 22 May

Every major theory carries an origin narrative. Economics tells of the birth of exchange, money and accumulation. Psychoanalysis, with *Totem and Taboo*, has law and social bonds arise from a founding act. The session reads these constructions at three scales: the ontogenesis of the individual, the phylogenesis of the species, and the cosmology through which a civilization narrates itself. It asks what status they have: hypotheses about events that really happened, regulative myths, or structural necessities? Both disciplines face the same question: what, in an origin narrative, is necessary and what is contingent.

Economic cosmologies in the light of psychoanalysis

M. Spanò — Università dell'Insubria

The talk examines the major economic narratives (the origin of value, accumulation, original exchange, money as a fact of nature) as cosmologies, in the sense Freud gives to the story of origins: constructions resting on instinctual renunciation and on a sense of guilt that history transforms without extinguishing. Following Marcuse and Brown through the metamorphosis of the sacred, from the gift and the archaic link between debt and guilt to the representation of capitalism that "is desacralized and becomes science", it shows how the modern economic narrative is the last form of that story. The comparison with Latour, who reads the crisis of the moderns as the crisis of a cosmology unable to recognize its own hybrids, points to the price of this naturalization: guilt transferred from the individual to the system, and an economic order withdrawn from critique.

Why *Totem and Taboo*. Method and Relevance of Freud's Phylogenetic Hypothesis

P. Cagna — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

Why does Freud move, from the theory of the Oedipus complex, to the prehistory of the species in 1913? The talk reconstructs the theoretical reason for the move: the universality of the castration

complex, which family dynamics alone cannot explain. It also reconstructs the method by which Freud builds the hypothesis of the primal horde. He looks for invariants across peoples and epochs and takes them as converging clues to an unobservable original state, within an explanatory rather than predictive theory. The talk then shows that the biological horizon on which the hypothesis rested, recapitulation and the inheritance of acquired characters, has regained relevance with developmental biology and epigenetics, and that primate ethology offers the scene of the horde something that resembles proof. In the founding act and the common renunciation that follows it, Freud makes the origin of law, exchange and social bonds coincide: a cosmology that has much to say about the foundations of the economic order.

Freud's Phylogenetic Construction between Hypothesis, Myth and Necessity. The Case of the Genesis of Religion

F. Pietrantonio — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

What status does the construction have by which Freud, in *Totem and Taboo*, derives religion from the killing of the primal father: a hypothesis about an event that really happened, a regulative myth, or a structural necessity? Freud holds the reality of the deed firm while loosening its necessity, and neither of the first two answers accounts for this oscillation. The third comes from Franco Baldini's *Fondamenti di metapsicologia formale*, which extends Waddington's epigenetic landscape to the Oedipus complex. What is transmitted phylogenetically is the form of the Oedipal landscape, impressed by selection through the repetition of individual development, and with it the sense of guilt. No memory of the parricide is inherited. The Oedipal configuration is therefore necessary, and the killing of the father contingent. Religion does not generate guilt: it receives it already constituted and gives it an object, a rule and an outlet. A phylogenetic construction is therefore necessary to psychoanalysis, because the developmental law of psychical processes has a form that arises in the species. The criterion holds for every origin narrative, including those of economics: its status is decided by the form it captures, before the truth of the event it tells.

3.4 The role of formalism | 9 october

The session returns to a question that runs throughout the entire series: what kind of formalism is appropriate for a frontier science? Where does mathematization capture its object, and where does it replace it with a manageable yet empty simulacrum? Four contributions address this question from different angles: the shift in framework that renders classical formalism inadequate when the observer becomes part of the phenomenon; the genealogy of the pursuit of exactness in

economics; attempts to formalize psychoanalysis and their epistemological status; and the contemporary testing ground in which the mind is described in computational terms.

Einstein and Keynes: Formalism after the Fall of the Absolute Framework

D. Togati — Università di Torino

In Togati's comparison between "Einsteinian" and "Newtonian" macroeconomics, the General Theory emerges as a revolution of the same kind as relativity: in both cases, an absolute frame of reference collapses, and the observer, together with their context, becomes constitutive of the phenomenon. The paper draws a methodological consequence from this shift. Once the assumption of an external standpoint and invariant parameters falls away, a formalism built upon it can no longer describe the same object. The question that follows, and runs through the subsequent contributions, is what kind of mathematics remains available when the observer is part of what they observe.

Economics as an Exact Science? The Genealogy of a Formal Ambition

G. Tusset — Università di Padova

A long Italian tradition, from Galilean-school monetarists to Pareto and contemporary econophysics, has sought to ground economics in invariant empirical laws by borrowing concepts, tools, and standards of rigour from physics. This contribution traces that genealogy and asks what economics has gained and what it has lost at each stage. In the background lies a circumstance that history brings to light: the physics from which economics has continued to draw is, to a considerable extent, the very physics that physics itself had already left behind.

What Kind of Formalism for Psychoanalysis, and Where Does It Belong?

F. Baldini — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

An overview of the forms of formalization attempted in psychoanalysis, from Freud's energetic models to Lacanian mathemes, and of their epistemological status. The central argument is that a formalism is valuable for what it enables us to discriminate, and that it should be assessed before and independently of what it may subsequently reveal, just as the principle underlying a thermometer can be assessed before any measurement is taken. Formalism becomes a fetish when adopted for the authority it confers rather than for the work it performs. This leads to a precise account of the place of formalization within the architecture of theory, and to a test it must pass if it is to be more than a notation.

Formalism and the Theory of Mind

L. Possati — University of Twente

Artificial systems are now the arena in which a formal theory of mind is materially put to the test, revealing what a formalism of the psyche actually captures. Drawing on research into the algorithmic unconscious, this contribution asks what computational models formalize and what they leave out, and poses the same question to the formalisms of psychoanalysis: how can we distinguish what a formal structure genuinely enables us to discriminate from what it merely renames in symbolic terms?

3.5 Economics and Psychoanalyses: The Necessity, Promise, and Risks of Pluralism | 6 November

The plural is programmatic: there is neither a single economics nor a single psychoanalysis. Both fields encompass different schools and research programmes, and the process of specialization that made modern science possible continues to multiply them. This session examines the relationship between pluralism in research programmes and the drive towards specialization, viewed through the questions of objectivity and ontology that run through both fields: when does the division of knowledge reflect different levels of its object, and when does it risk losing sight of its unity? The aim is to establish a common framework for interpreting both disciplines.

Carving Up the World: Specialization from Smith to Contemporary Science

S. Fiori — Università degli Studi di Torino

The division of labour that Smith describes in manufacturing also applies to knowledge: every discipline emerges by carving out a portion of the world, gaining precision at the cost of complexity. This contribution traces the process from Smith to Darwin, Kuhn, and Gould, examining specialization as an evolutionary mechanism that has driven scientific progress. It asks under what conditions specialized knowledge can remain mindful of its original assumptions and engage in dialogue with what it has left out.

A Plural Economics: Specialization and Pluralism in the Contemporary Discipline

M. Cedrini — Università degli Studi di Torino

Contemporary economics is a plural discipline: specialization has divided it into fields, methods, and communities that coexist and evolve. Drawing on research into the discipline's recent evolution, this contribution takes such plurality as both a given and a resource, and asks what turns it into

pluralism: under what conditions do different research programmes engage in dialogue rather than merely coexist? This is the question the session extends to psychoanalysis, which has an equally long experience of plurality.

Objectivity or Ontology? Husserl, Freud, and the Plurality of Psychoanalyses

S. Dalto — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

Husserl and Freud offer different answers to the same question: where does the plurality of forms of knowledge reside? Husserl locates it in ontology, with regional ontologies — nature, psyche, and spirit — coordinated by a formal ontology. The Freudian approach, interpreted in metapsychological terms, locates it instead in objectivities: the world is one, while what multiplies are the ways of knowing it, each constituted by its own invariants. Objectivity and ontology do not coincide: objectivities are plural, ontology is singular. This yields a criterion for the plurality of psychoanalyses: schools may legitimately differ in the level of objectivity they adopt, whereas when their differences extend to the object itself, going so far as to posit different unconscious processes, the ground for comparison is lost.

Frontier Concepts: Epistemological Fragmentation and Ontological Fragmentation

M.V. Ceschi — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

The closing contribution brings the three papers together through a distinction between epistemological fragmentation, which reflects irreducible levels of objectivity and is therefore legitimate, and ontological fragmentation, which splits the object itself and should be avoided. This leads to the idea of bridge concepts that enable rigorous transitions between levels, and to a parallel: Keynes's General Theory as a general framework encompassing specific models, and Freudian metapsychology as a general framework encompassing particular theories. Two architectures that accommodate plurality without dissolving into it.

3.6 Decisions, Confidence and Judgment | 4 December

Deciding under uncertainty is the problem common to the economic agent and the subject of psychoanalysis. The session reconstructs the evolution of decision theory and shows how, at its limits, it calls into play non-calculable categories: confidence, judgment, desire.

The evolution of decision theory

Carlo Zappia — Università di Siena

From expected value to subjective expected utility, up to the theories of ambiguity and of non-probabilizable uncertainty: a path showing how decision theory has progressively had to reckon with the irreducibility of judgment to calculation.

Fat tails and extreme risk: the limits of calculation in decision and the role of perception

Pasquale Cirillo — Zurich University of Applied Sciences

In the presence of fat-tailed distributions, ordinary statistical tools — sample means, variances, interpolations — systematically underestimate the probability and the impact of extreme events. Through extreme-value theory and cases drawn from finance, conflicts and pandemics, it is argued that rational decision in these contexts does not consist in predicting the rare event, but in building choices robust to one's own ignorance: a form of rationality that converges, from a wholly different route, with the irreducible uncertainty of Knight and Keynes.

Uncertainty as a symmetric state and the three ways of judgment

M. V. Ceschi — Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana

Contribution under development.

4. Network

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- Cagna, Pamela (SPF)
- Cedrini, Mario (Università di Torino)
- Ceschi, Maria Vittoria (SPF)
- Dalto, Silvana (SPF)
- Esposito, Lorenzo (Università Cattolica di Milano)
- Fiori, Stefano (Università di Torino)
- Pietrantonio, Fabio (SPF)
- Possati, Luca (Twente University)
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- Togati, Dario (Università di Torino)
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- Zappia, Carlo (Università di Siena)

4.2. Confirmed Partners/Sponsors

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- [AISPE](#) - Associazione Italiana per la Storia del Pensiero Economico
- [Association of Heterodox Economics](#)
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6. Format and practical information

The cycle is organized into **six meetings** over the course of **2027**, each devoted to one of the six thematic sessions of the scientific programme. The meetings will normally be held on **Saturday mornings** — or on other days and times identified case by case as more favourable to public attendance — in **Milan**, at the premises of the **Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana** or at those of the other participating partner bodies.

Each meeting hosts the **three talks** foreseen for the session, each lasting at most **twenty minutes**, followed by an open **debate** to the public as well. Ensuring the unity and pace of the discussion is, for each session, a **moderator**.

To foster a real exchange and not a mere juxtaposition of papers, the **draft papers will be shared among the speakers at least fifteen days beforehand** of each meeting: a condition of method, even before an organizational one, so that the dialogue between psychoanalysis and economics may proceed from an actual knowledge of each other's positions.

In short, each meeting comprises: three twenty-minute papers, a debate with the public, a moderator, and the prior circulation of drafts among the speakers.

7. Outcomes and products of the cycle

The cycle is conceived not as a series of isolated events, but as a path meant to leave a durable trace and to widen its audience beyond the room. Three main outcomes are foreseen.

First, each session will be **recorded and published** on the YouTube channel of the Scuola di Psicanalisi Freudiana, in collaboration with the channels of the participating partners, so as to make the talks and debates freely accessible to a wide audience even after the cycle has ended.

Second, the contributions will converge into a **monographic issue of the journal *Metapsychologica* – Rivista di Psicanalisi Freudiana**, which will collect the papers in written and revised form, consolidating the results of the dialogue into a stable, citable bibliographic reference.

Third, a **social media editorial plan** will accompany the whole initiative, promoting its meetings, anticipating its themes and disseminating its materials to a wider community of interested people.

8. Project timeline

The project unfolds over about eighteen months, from July 2026 to the editorial close of late 2027 / early 2028. The phases are not rigidly sequential: partner search, programme construction and talk selection proceed partly in parallel in the first months, while communication, the social media editorial plan and the editorial work accompany the cycle throughout. The first session is assumed to start in March 2027, with a monthly cadence and a summer break for the six sessions.

Fase 0 — Impostazione (luglio – settembre 2026)

The first months lay the foundations. The organizing and scientific committee is formed, the **general programme** is defined in its main lines — the rationale, the six thematic knots, the architecture of the sessions — and the presentation document to be used in institutional contacts is drafted. In

parallel, the **search for partners and supporters** begins: mapping of potentially interested bodies (academic institutions, schools, organizations, possible sponsors), preparation of presentation materials, and first exploratory contacts.

Phase 1 — Building the programme and the network (September – December 2026)

The partner network is consolidated with formal agreements, identifying the venues and any economic and organizational support. The **definition and selection of the talks** proceeds: confirmation of the speakers already identified, filling of the still-open slots (the contributions marked as “to be defined” in the programme), assignment of moderators, and definition of the precise calendar of the six dates. By December the scientific programme is closed in its definitive version, with titles and speakers confirmed.

Fase 2 — Preparazione operativa e lancio comunicativo (gennaio – febbraio 2027)

The infrastructure is set up. On the **social media editorial plan** front, the graphic and visual identity of the cycle is defined, along with the content calendar and the recurring formats (session announcements, speaker cards, teaser quotations). On the **communication** front, the event page, the registration channels and the materials for the press and for academic settings are prepared, and the promotion of the first session begins. Logistical and technical aspects are checked, in particular the audio-video recording setup.

Phase 3 — Running the cycle (March – October 2027)

The six sessions are held monthly: **March, April, May, June** before the summer break, **September and October** after. For each session the operational cycle repeats: sharing of the **drafts among the speakers at least fifteen days beforehand**, dedicated social and communication promotion in the preceding two weeks, holding of the meeting (three twenty-minute talks, debate with the public, moderator) and **recording**. In the days following each meeting, editing proceeds, along with **publication on YouTube** on the SPF and partner channels, and the collection of the texts revised by the speakers in view of the monographic issue.

Phase 4 — Editorial close (September 2027 – January 2028)

The **editorial** phase opens already during the cycle, with the progressive collection of the contributions, and concentrates after the last session. Revision and possible *peer review* of the texts, editing and layout are carried out, up to the **publication of the monographic issue of *Metapsychologica***. A final social and communication campaign promotes the release of the volume and the complete *playlist* of the recordings, ideally closing the circle between the live event and its durable trace.

In summary form, by work stream:

Work stream	Start	Peak	Close
1. General programme	Jul 2026	Sep–Nov 2026	Dec 2026
2. Talk definition / selection	Sep 2026	Oct–Dec 2026	Dec 2026
3. Partner / supporter search	Jul 2026	Sep–Nov 2026	Dec 2026
4. Social media editorial plan	Jan 2027	Mar–Oct 2027	Jan 2028
5. Communication	Jan 2027	Mar–Oct 2027	Jan 2028
6. Editorial work	during the cycle	Nov–Dec 2027	Jan 2028