

Forced Displacement: Cases and Trends in the Past Decade

Background Paper for the UNHCR *State of the World's Forcibly Displaced* Report

The New School Research Project 2021

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'State of Agony' by Willy Karekezi

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Abstract


The objective of this report is to provide a global overview of selected major situations of forced displacement over the past decade. In order to provide a framework for discussing such diverse situations, we adopt the normative typology of UNHCR that distinguishes amongst different situations of forced displacement. This typology includes not only refugees but other categories of FDPs, namely Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate, internally displaced people (IDPs), asylum seekers and Venezuelans displaced abroad. In the series of case studies that follow, we characterize major displacement situations according to the number of people displaced as per the most recent UNHCR available data, the intensity and duration of displacement, the reasons behind those forced movements and the solutions, opportunities and challenges within each case.

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I. Introduction

In the past decade, the world has witnessed a significant and continuous rise in forced displacement within and across borders. Since 2010, the number of Forcibly Displaced Persons (FDPs) has doubled. Even during the last year's mobility restrictions due to the Coronavirus pandemic, displacement, particularly within countries, has been on the rise as those fleeing danger, continued to seek safe refuge amidst immobility. Today, 70 years after the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, there are 82 million FDPs worldwide¹. Even if these numbers are not historically unprecedented, the doubling of FDPs along with the limited political will to resolve the structural causes of displacement and address the protection of those on the move is of great concern to the international community.

¹ Forcibly Displaced Populations (FDPs) includes refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs of concern to UNHCR, Venezuelans Displaced Abroad. Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/methodology/definition/>.

Figure 1. Global Forced Displacement (at end-year)

Source: UNHCR. “UNHCR Global Trends - Forced Displacement in 2020.” UNHCR Flagship Reports, June 18, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/>.

Displacement during the previous decade has been fueled by prolonged and new crises. Long-standing conflicts have resulted in situations of protracted displacement, as in the case in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Forced mobility due to emergent conflicts, as in Mozambique and Ethiopia, raise worrying concerns for regions that have been characterized by intense displacement patterns during the past decade. Displacement due to rising political violence and rapid economic deterioration in Central America remain unresolved. Ethnic persecution as in the case of Myanmar, has reiterated the need for more effective and equitable protection for those fleeing danger and adverse conditions. Together with new emergent factors of forced displacement such as extreme weather events, natural disasters and the slow onset changes in the environment, the crises that continue to unfold over the past decade emphasize the need for adapting to contemporary and future challenges, expanding reach, and urgently addressing the

apparent limits of current protection regimes so that they address and encompass the diversity and multiplicity of contemporary and future displacement factors.

This need has been recently echoed through the commitment of the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants that called for “...a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees.”² While the intensification of international calls for cooperation and responsibility-sharing for addressing current and future challenges for FDPs, are central to the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact on Migration (GCM), the crucial strategies and mechanisms through which shared responsibility will be operationalized are yet to be developed. Importantly, there are still significant gaps in protection for the majority of those forced to flee and that remain excluded from the legal definition of a refugee ratified in the 1951 Refugee Convention, as for instance in the case of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)³.

Within this challenging context, understanding the nature and complexity of forced displacement is a necessary step for the development of robust responses and inclusive protection mechanisms for FDPs. Overall, the past ten years have shown how forced displacement has been characterized not only by the large number of FDPs, but equally, its increasingly protracted nature due to among other reasons, interacting political, socioeconomic and climate drivers. These characteristics of contemporary forced displacement paint a multifaceted image that requires an analysis of different situations across the world, so that the complex causes and pathways through which displacement occurs in different regional, national and local contexts are captured.

² United Nations General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 19 September 2016.

³ (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Refugee Statistics.” UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/methodology/definition/>.

The objective of this report is to provide a global overview of selected major situations of forced displacement over the past decade. In order to provide a framework for discussing such diverse situations, we adopt the normative typology of UNHCR that distinguishes amongst different situations of forced displacement. This typology includes not only refugees but other categories of FDPs, namely Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate, internally displaced people (IDPs), asylum seekers and Venezuelans displaced abroad. In the series of case studies that follow, we characterize major displacement situations according to the number of people displaced as per the most recent UNHCR available data, the intensity and duration of displacement, the reasons behind those forced movements and the solutions, opportunities and challenges within each case. Specifically, the case studies are organized as follows and provide answers to the questions below:

1. General Information and Data on Forced Displacement
 - a. How many people were forcibly displaced during the past decade?
 - b. What were the peak years?
 - c. What are the main countries of asylum?
 - d. Is the forced displacement mostly internal / external or both?
2. Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements
 - a. What is the background of the situations and what are the main drivers for forced displacement?
 - b. Is it a new or protracted situation?
3. Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation
 - a. Who is being forcibly displaced? (e.g. particular groups due to persecution, anyone affected by generalized violence)
 - b. What specific characteristics make people or marginalized groups most vulnerable in this specific situation

4. Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement
 - a. What solutions have been found so far?
 - b. What are the barriers to finding solutions? (e.g. Were displaced people able to return or to integrate? Are there any prospects for peace?)

II. Case Studies

Middle East and Asia

Syria

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement


The forced displacement in Syria has been severe and protracted. With a population of about 17.5 million⁴, there are about 6.8 million people displaced externally including refugees and asylum seekers and 6.7 Internally Displaced People.⁵ The peak years of forced displacement has occurred during the period 2017-2020 where both the internally and externally displaced population reached over 6 million for the first time on an annual count.⁶

Figure 2. Forced Displacement Situations: Internal Displacement Situations by Country of Origin

⁴ World Bank. "Population, Total - Syrian Arab Republic." Data, 2021.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SY>.

⁵ UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021.
<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=C5IYjq>

⁶ Ibid



Source: [UNHCR Refugee Data Finder](#)
 *Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate. **Internally displaced people protected / assisted by UNHCR.

Source: UNHCR. 2020. “Global Trends.” UNHCR Flagship Reports.
https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/#_ftn1.

The main countries of asylum for Syrian FDPs are in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Western Asia regions, including Turkey with roughly 3.5 million, Lebanon at 1 million, and Jordan, Iraq, Libya and Egypt with under 1 million.⁷ There are about 1 million Syrian refugees in Europe, with the main countries being Germany, Sweden, Austria, and Greece.⁸ In North America, there are about 55,000 in Canada, and 33,000 in the United States.⁹


⁷ Connor, Phillip. “Where Syrian Refugees Have Resettled Worldwide.” Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, May 31, 2020.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/>.

⁸ UNHCR. “UNHCR Refugee Statistics.” UNHCR, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=C5IYjq>

⁹Ibid

Figure 3. Forced Displacement Situations: Internally Displaced Situations by Host Country

Source: UNHCR Refugee Data Finder

*Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate. **Internally displaced people protected / assisted by UNHCR.

Source: UNHCR. "UNHCR Global Trends - Forced Displacement in 2020." UNHCR Flagship Reports, June 18, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/#:~:text=UNHCR%20Global%20Trends%20-%20Forced%20displacement%20in%202020,rights%20violations%20and%20events%20seriously%20disturbing%20public%20order>

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

The displacement situation in Syria is severe and has drastically changed since the civil war began in 2011 after Arab Spring-related peaceful protests turned violent under the President Bashar al-Assad's government.¹⁰ Even prior to the Arab Spring protests, heavy droughts affected people through a series of negative shocks in agricultural productivity that resulted in reduced livestock and displacement from drought prone rural areas to cities.¹¹ The environmental factors acted as a multiplier to the preexisting economic and social concerns at the origins of the Arab

¹⁰ IDMC. "Syria." IDMC, 2019. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria>.

¹¹ Waterbury, John. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ARAB REGION." *United Nations Development Programme*, 2013. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.363.5511&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

Spring protests.¹² Additionally, a result of the violent conflict has been further environmental shocks including land degradation due to predatory mining, deprived access to safe drinking water, wide deforestation for heating in the winter.¹³

There are several key reasons that contribute to large increases in the number of forced displacement in the past decade. The government in Syria has committed human rights abuses and violations including torture and use of internationally illegal weapons, while also attacking civilians and damaging many homes, schools, and markets.¹⁴ Many people continue to be uprooted since “the Syrian government also continued to restrict access to residential buildings and to unlawfully demolish homes without adequate, and often with no compensation at all.”¹⁵ Recently, UN Secretary General equated the situation in Syria to a “living nightmare,”¹⁶ and raised alarm as to the current situation: Furthermore, the already unsettling situation is made worse by challenges presented by Covid-19 as “9.3 million Syrians have become food insecure and over 80 percent of Syrians live below the poverty line”.¹⁷

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Given the generalized nature of the conflict, civilians in active conflict areas are at risk of displacement as “armed groups continue to impose on civilians, rules and codes of conduct that fundamentally violate a range of human rights protected by international law, including the rights to life, liberty and security of person, and the rights to freedom of movement, expression,

¹² Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “The Arab Spring and Climate Change.” Edited by Caitlin E. Werrel and Francesco Femia. *The Center for Climate and Security*, 2013. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/the-arab-spring-and-climate-change_2013_02.pdf.

¹³ ESCWA, UN. “Syria At War: Eight Years On.” United Nations. United Nations, 2020. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3894984?ln=en>.

¹⁴ Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2021.” January 25, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021#>.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 641

¹⁶ Guterres, Antonio. “Ten Years on, Syrian Crisis 'Remains a Living Nightmare': UN Secretary-General || UN News.” United Nations. United Nations, March 10, 2021. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086872>.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2021.” January 25, 2021. pp. 637, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021#>.

peaceful assembly, and association.”¹⁸ Displacement has largely occurred in the northern and southern ends of Syria and specifically in the Dara’a and Quneitra governorates.¹⁹ The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria (COI) has noted women, children, and transgender people have been victims of sexual violence by state and non-state actors.²⁰ Particularly vulnerable groups include the families of those involved with ISIS, and the general civilian population.

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

Turkey, which borders Syria to the north, has received the most displaced people from Syria, and hosts the most displaced people of any country worldwide at about 4 million. About 1 million of the Syrian refugees and asylum seekers are in the EU, with the most in Germany and Sweden.²¹ In 2016, the EU and Turkey made a deal to limit movements from Turkey into the EU, in return for financial support to the hosting of refugees in Turkey.²² Turkey has adopted a unique approach to refugee hosting with a non-camp and government financed approach.²³ Furthermore, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) is focused on social cohesion and self-reliance, however, notes that language barriers and Covid-19 have presented challenges to Syrian refugees in Turkey to find consistent employment, adequate housing, education for their children, and accessing public services.²⁴

¹⁸ Shamdasani, Ravina. “Press Briefing Note on Syria – Idlib Violations and Abuses.” OHCHR, 2020.

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26524&LangID=E>.

¹⁹ IDMC. “Syria.” IDMC, 2019. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria>.

²⁰ Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2021.” January 25, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021#>.

²¹ UNHCR. “Syria Refugee Crisis – Globally, in Europe and in Cyprus.” UNHCR Cyprus, March 18, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/cy/2021/03/18/syria-refugee-crisis-globally-in-europe-and-in-cyprus-meet-some-syrian-refugees-in-cyprus/>.

²² Council, European. “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016.” Consilium, March 18, 2016.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>.

²³ World Bank. “Turkey’s Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Road Ahead.” World Bank, 2021.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/publication/turkeys-response-to-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-and-the-road-ahead>.

²⁴ UNDP and UNHCR. “Turkey Country Chapter 2021-2022.” *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)*, February 23, 2021.

<https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/regional-refugee-and-resilience-plan-3rp-turkey-country-chapter-2021-2022-entr>.

Despite the US and EU continuing sanctions and calls for international accountability, and Russia continuing to make an effort to legitimize the Syrian Government,²⁵ the conflict and displacement situation in Syria remains protracted.

²⁵ Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2021.” January 25, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021#>.

Yemen

Section 1: General Information and Data on Forced Displacement

Yemen has been in an intractable civil war starting in 2014. However, external powers have contributed to prolonging the conflict, and consider the Yemeni Civil War to be a proxy war among regional powers.²⁶ Forced displacement began to increase in 2015 as the conflict intensified. As of 2020, there were 4,190,446 people of concern composed of IDPs, refugees, asylum-seekers.²⁷ The year 2020 was the peak year for IDPs (4,002,012), but 2019 was the peak year for refugees (36,522) and 2018 for asylum seekers (35,876).²⁸ The majority of forcibly displaced are IDPs, however, a significant number has fled across borders to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan.²⁹ Yemen is the country with the fourth highest number of IDPs, after Syria, Colombia and DRC.³⁰ Yemen also hosts many refugees from neighboring countries, such as Somalia and Ethiopia, despite its own internal conflict being a cause of displacement.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

The civil unrest started in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring movement. The uprising forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power and saw his replacement by deputy, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi.³¹ Though discontent did not end there. Ansar Allah, an Islamist militia known as the Houthis, were opposed to the new government and seized the opportunity to overtake the weakened capital in 2014, triggering the civil war that continues today. What started out as an intrastate conflict, quickly expanded into an intractable regional proxy war with Iran supporting

²⁶ Krause, Peter and Tyler Parker. "Yemen's proxy wars explained." MIT Center for International Affairs, March 26, 2020. <https://cis.mit.edu/publications/analysis-opinion/2020/yemens-proxy-wars-explained>.

²⁷ UNHCR. "Yemen Operation." Global Focus, 2021. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/yemen>.

²⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=w7k2YK>.

²⁹ UNHCR. "Yemen Situation Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan." Yemen Situation Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan | Global Focus, 2016. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/9982>.

³⁰ UNHCR. "Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019." *UNHCR*, 2019, pp. 30. <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>.

³¹ Amnesty International. "Yemen War: No End in Sight." Amnesty International, March 24, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/>.

the Houthis and Saudi Arabia backing the Yemeni government. In 2015, the United States began backing the Saudi-led coalition, providing it with arms, training, and intelligence.³²


The rise of forcibly displaced persons in Yemen is largely attributed to violence from the outbreak of civil war beginning in 2014. Over the past seven years, the humanitarian crisis has escalated to the worst in the world. In 2020, it was ranked the worst humanitarian crisis for the fourth year in a row, with an estimated 21 million or 66 percent of Yemenis in dire need of assistance, 4 million of which are internally displaced.³³ In addition, IDPs are at four times more risk of famine than the general population.³⁴

³² Robinson, Kali. "How Severe Is Yemen's Humanitarian Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, February 5, 2021. <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-severe-yemens-humanitarian-crisis>.

³³ UNHCR. "Yemen Operation." Global Focus, 2021. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/yemen>.

³⁴ Ibid

Figure 4: Food Security Outcomes as of June 2021



Acute food insecurity has affected a large part of the country.

Source: FEWS NET. “Yemen Food Security Outlook.” Famine Early Warning Systems Network. US AID, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YEMEN_June%202021_Food%20Security%20Outlook_Report_FINAL_0.pdf

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Generalized violence is causing displacement across the country. One in eight Yemenis are displaced.³⁵ Various areas of the country have been prone to displacement based on the shifting frontlines of the conflict. When the Houthis took control in 2014, displacement was concentrated in Sa’ada, but the largest movements occurred the following year, in 2015, in the south and Aden

³⁵ UNHCR. “Yemen Operation.” Global Focus, 2021. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/yemen>.

governorate.³⁶ And again in 2017 and 2018, in the west around Hodeida. This has left the Marib and Al Jawf governorates as a sort of safehaven for IDPs. However, in early 2020, Marib fell under attack, creating both new and secondary displacements. In addition, intense floods have caused widespread damage and displacement which has fueled the spread of diseases such as cholera, dengue, malaria and diphtheria.³⁷

All parties to the conflict are suppressing freedom of expression and have arbitrarily detained, harassed, and tortured dissenters.³⁸ All parties have also impeded access to humanitarian aid, intensifying the crisis.³⁹ Access to humanitarian assistance is essential and children are particularly vulnerable to starvation. If urgent intervention is not taken, it is estimated that at least 400,000 of Yemeni children under age five could die of starvation this year.⁴⁰ Given the depth and extent of the crisis the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have been felt minimally compared to the widespread malnutrition and threat of famine occurring across the country. However, the virus has worsened the already fraught conditions for FDPs in Yemen who face continued discrimination, abuse, and sexual violence.⁴¹

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

Establishing peace in Yemen is key to alleviating the country's humanitarian crisis and displacement. The solutions to resolve the conflict/forced displacement remain complex. While

³⁶ IDMC. "A Decade of Displacement in the Middle East in North Africa." *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, 2020., pp. 37
https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC_MenaReport_final.pdf.

³⁷ UNHCR. "Yemen Operation." Global Focus, 2021. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/yemen>.

³⁸ Amnesty International. "Yemen War: No End in Sight." Amnesty International, March 24, 2020.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/>.

³⁹ Amnesty International. "Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Yemen." Everything you need to know about human rights in Yemen | Amnesty International | Amnesty International, 2020.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/yemen/report-yemen/>.

⁴⁰ Reuters Staff. "At Least 400,000 Yemeni Children under 5 Could Die of Starvation This Year - UN Agencies." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 12, 2021.
<https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-security-malnutrition-int-idUSKBN2AC18V>.

⁴¹ Amnesty International. "Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Yemen." Everything you need to know about human rights in Yemen | Amnesty International | Amnesty International, 2020.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/yemen/report-yemen/>.

the civil war still rages on, notable changes in U.S. policy are taking place under the Biden administration. In the first days of his presidency, President Joe Biden froze arms sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE, and announced the end of U.S. support for Saudi forces in Yemen.⁴² He also removed the Houthis from the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list. While these steps do not mean an end to the conflict, it should have an impact on both humanitarian operations, given the FTO designation effectively halted food and other essential aid services from being delivered.⁴³ Ceasefires such as the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, while still not fully implemented, have been successful in reducing displacement.⁴⁴

⁴² Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Biden Ending US Support for Saudi-Led Offensive in Yemen." AP NEWS. Associated Press, February 5, 2021. <https://apnews.com/article/biden-end-support-saudi-offenseive-yemen-b68f58493dbfc530b9fcfdb80a13098f>.

⁴³ Jakes, Lara and Eric Schmitt. "Biden Reverses Trump Terrorist Designation for Houthis in Yemen." *The New York Times*. 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/05/us/politics/biden-houthi-yemen-terrorist-designation.html>.

⁴⁴ IDMC. "A Decade of Displacement in the Middle East in North Africa." *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, 2020., pp. 37 https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/IDMC_MenaReport_final.pdf.

Iraq

Section 1: General Information and Data on Forced Displacement

Iraq is experiencing recurring and protracted forced displacement due to armed violence and insecurity.⁴⁵ According to the UNHCR database of 2020, there are approximately 333,418 refugees, 240,695 asylum seekers and 1.224.108 IDPs forcibly displaced during the past decade.

⁴⁶ In the peak years from January 2014 to December 2016, there have been 3.1 million IDPs in Iraq. In 2015, 120,000 sought asylum in the European Union, and about 220,000 Iraqis sought asylum in the region. The ability of displaced people to access safe areas has been limited by the fragmentation of society along sectarian lines and security threats linked to terrorism and counter-insurgency.⁴⁷ The majority are displaced within the country, in refugee camps or in informal settlements in urban areas of the Kurdistan region in northern Iraq.⁴⁸ There are approximately 278,600 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Turkey.⁴⁹ There are significantly more IDPs than refugees and asylum seekers.

⁴⁵ IDMC. "Iraq." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq>.

⁴⁶ UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=ksN1g1>.


⁴⁷ Lina, Grip. "Coping with Crises: Forced Displacement in Fragile Contexts." SIPRI Yearbook 2017: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 2017. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB17c07.pdf>.

⁴⁸ UNHCR. "Iraq Refugee Crisis Explained." How to Help Refugees - Aid, Relief and Donations, 2019. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/iraq-refugee-crisis-explained/#Where%20are%20Iraqis%20fleeing%20to>
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⁴⁹ UNHCR. "Iraq Situation." UNHCR, 2020.

<https://www.unhcr.org/underfunding-2020/wp-content/uploads/sites/107/2020/09/Underfunding-2020-Iraq.pdf>.

Figure 5. Number Iraqi IDPs by District of Displacement in October 2016



Source: DTM. "Iraq, the Middle East and North Africa." Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), 2021.

<https://dtm.iom.int/iraq>.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

The case of Iraq is considered to be a protracted situation. Internal displacement is driven by sectarian and ethnic tensions due to authoritarian rule, armed conflict and the war against ISIL. Displacements are additionally affected by the closure of IDP camps, earthquakes, floods,

droughts, landslides and desertification. The government of Iraq decided to close 15 IDP camps or informal sites, leaving only a few IDP camps operational in Iraq. Habbaniya Tourist City in Anbar Governorate and Zayona in Baghdad Governorate are reclassified as informal sites. There are about twenty five IDP camps in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) that will remain open. This change will leave thousands of people to move back to their areas of origin as well as in a situation of secondary displacement.⁵⁰

In 2010, many were displaced due to armed conflict and sectarian violence following the U.S. invasion. During the Arab spring in 2011, people demanded democracy and economic opportunity, leading to the suppression of government forces. As instability increased in 2012 and 2013, sectarian divisions intensified and the Sunni insurgency increased. The Islamic State originated from al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2006. The group changed its name to Islamic state (ISIL) in 2013, launching attacks which caused mass displacements. Claiming Iraq as part of their “caliphate” in 2014, that same year ISIL’s takeover of Fallujah and its offensive on Mosul increased further displacement. During the Ramadi crisis in 2015, ISIL took over the city furthering mass displacement where more than 500,000 people were forced to leave their homes. ISIL was defeated in the region in December of 2017, when the Iraqi forces reclaimed Mosul.⁵¹ Other recent factors of importance are the election of prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in May of 2020 which left five months of power vacuum, and caused further instability.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Displaced people, and especially families or people with perceived ISIL affiliations, face formal barriers to return, as well as rejection from people at home or from the many victims of ISIL.⁵²

⁵⁰ USAID. “Iraq- Complex Emergency.” USAID: From the American People, 2020.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020_12_16%20USG%20Iraq%20Complex%20Emergency%20Fact%20Sheet%20%231.pdf

⁵¹ UN, HCR. “Iraq.” Iraq | Global Focus, 2021. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/iraq>.

⁵² International Crisis Group. “Exiles in Their Own Country: Dealing with Displacement in Post-ISIS Iraq.” Crisis Group, May 27, 2021. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/b79-exiles-their-own-country-dealing-displacement-post-isis-iraq>.

ISIL targeted religious and ethnic communities, such as Yazidis, Turkmen, Christians, Shia Muslims and Kurds. These ethnicities fled massacres, abductions, destruction of property and sexual enslavement and forced marriages.⁵³ Thousands of abducted Yezidi women and girls were separated from their families and relatives and gifted and sold to ISIL fighters. ISIL, systematically terrorised and performed ethnic cleansing on non-Arab, and non-Sunni Muslims in northern Iraq.⁵⁴ Millions of children have been greatly affected by conflict, struggling to survive in difficult conditions and suffering from trauma. Many are separated from their families; they are vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups, forced into early marriage, and vulnerable to violence and exploitation.⁵⁵

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

As the conflict receded in 2017, some people have been able to return, and returns have outnumbered new displacements every year since. The Iraqi government has supported IDPs and returnees through grants and material support, as well as compensation for property destruction, injuries and deaths caused by ISIL. The resignation of prime minister Adel Abdul Mehdi in November 2019 furthered insecurities in 2020, with small-scale attacks against government and civilian targets triggering new and secondary displacements. Other challenges include conflicts in neighboring countries and tensions between the U.S. and Iran, who have used Iraqi territory to conduct targeted attacks against each other.⁵⁶

⁵³ IDMC. “Iraq.” IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq>.

⁵⁴ Migrants, Refugees. “Iraq.” Migrants & Refugees Section, October 13, 2020. <https://migrants-refugees.va/country-profile/iraq/>.

⁵⁵ UNHCR. “Iraq Refugee Crisis Explained.” How to Help Refugees - Aid, Relief and Donations, November 2019. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/iraq-refugee-crisis-explained/#Where%20are%20Iraqis%20fleeing%20to>

⁵⁶ IDMC. “Iraq.” IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq>.

Afghanistan

Section 1: General Information and Data on Forced Displacement

Decades of war, insecurity, poverty and natural disasters are threatening the people of Afghanistan. The number of forcibly displaced people due to conflict according to the UNHCR database as of 2020 are approximately 2,594,774 refugees, 238,791 asylum seekers and 2,886,317 IDPs.⁵⁷ Between 2012 and 2019, 2.4 million Afghans have fled the country, as the intensity of fighting has increased between insurgent Taliban forces, the Afghan army and U.S. allies. Attacks by the Islamic State have also contributed to displacement. By 2019, 3 million internally displaced people were at an all-time high.⁵⁸ About 193,000 asylum seekers sought refuge in Europe in 2015.⁵⁹

Most refugees are being hosted in neighboring countries, such as Iran and Pakistan. In Pakistan and Iran combined there are about 2,215,445 registered refugees⁶⁰, and Turkey hosts 170,000 registered refugees.⁶¹ Germany hosts 46,292 refugees, Austria hosts 20,220 refugees, and Sweden hosts 16,558 refugees.⁶² The Afghanistan situation is a combination of both internal and external

⁵⁷United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The. "Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=Q7kH2b>.

⁵⁸ Vine, David, Cala Coffman, Katalina Khoury, Madison Lovasz, Helen Bush, Rachael Leduc, and Jennifer Walkup. "Costs of War." Watson Institute. Brown University, September 21, 2021. https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Displacement_Vine%20et%20al_Costs%20of%20War%202020%2009%2008.pdf.

⁵⁹ Pew, Research Center. "Record 1.3 Million Sought Asylum in Europe in 2015." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center, August 20, 2020. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/>.


⁶⁰ UNHCR. "Operational Data Portal." Situation Afghanistan situation, 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan>.

⁶¹ Leghtas, Izza, and Jessica Thea. "You Cannot Exist in This Place." Refugees International, December 2018. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5c12e207575d1fee96a38864/1544741385940/Turkey+Report+-+November+2018+-+in+English+-+2.0.pdf>.

⁶² Willner-Reid, Matthew. "Afghanistan: Displacement Challenges in a Country on the Move." migrationpolicy.org, October 22, 2020. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/afghanistan-displacement-challenges-country-move>.

displacement, but there has been significantly more internal displacement over the years. There has been pressure on refugees and migrants in Pakistan and in Iran to return to Afghanistan. The majority of returnees from abroad live a life of internal displacement. The increasing number of people displaced by armed conflict and natural disasters could be contributing factors that create more internal displacement.⁶³

Figure 6. Stock and Flows of IDPs in Afghanistan, 2009-2020



Source: European Commission. “Afghanistan.” European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission, July 6, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/asia-and-pacific/afghanistan_en.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Afghanistan has had a long history of displacement due to conflict. In the 1980s a war broke out between the Soviet-backed government and the mujahideen fighters, and the Soviet occupation triggered refugee flows and internal displacement. This conflict qualifies as the longest protracted refugee population in Asia.⁶⁴ As a result of government collapse in 1992, the rise of Taliban in addition to ethnic conflict between mujahideen factions displaced millions. Due to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, NATO and U.S. forces launched military attacks on the Taliban backed

⁶³Sydney, Chloe. “The Invisible Majority.” IDMC, January 2020.

<https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/202001-afghanistan-cross-border-report.pdf>

⁶⁴Amnesty International. “Afghanistan's Refugees: Forty Years of Dispossession.” Amnesty International, June 20, 2019. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/afghanistan-refugees-forty-years/>.

al-Qaeda network, which caused destabilization, mass displacements and civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Furthermore, between 2009 and 2016, displacement increased due to violence by non-state armed groups, including ISIL. The displacement was also attributed to counter-insurgency operations by the Afghan army and some attributed to international security forces.⁶⁵ In February of 2020 the Taliban and the U.S. signed a peace agreement, which reduced displacement. The violence was reignited after a couple of months and triggered further displacement.⁶⁶

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

The number of internally displaced people in Afghanistan are increasing due to continued conflict, insecurity, poverty and natural disasters. Women and children are among the most affected. A lot of people are suffering from psychological trauma due to longstanding violence and pressure experienced over several years.⁶⁷ Internally displaced people in Afghanistan face a challenging situation characterized by the lack of access to healthcare, services, food, shelter and employment opportunities and children are taken out of school due to economic precarity. People living in Chaman-e Babrak camp inside urban Kabul are experiencing food insecurity. People living in Surkh Diwar IDPs in Nangarhar are experiencing lack of access to water.⁶⁸

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

Even though an agreement was signed in February of 2020 with the involvement of the Trump administration, it is up to the Afghan government and the Taliban to further talks and negotiate peace through the intra-Afghan talks⁶⁹. A breakthrough has still not been reached. The Taliban is still attacking the Afghan army and other government targets.⁷⁰ President Biden has stated that he

⁶⁵ IDMC. "Iraq." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq>.

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ Amnesty International. "Facebook Twitter Afghanistan's Four Million Internally Displaced People - a Glance into Their Lives of Poverty and Displacement during the Pandemic." Amnesty International, August 19, 2020. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/08/afghanistan-and-its-internally-displaced-people/>.

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ IDMC. "Iraq." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq>.

⁷⁰ Cordesman, Anthony H. "Afghanistan: The Peace Negotiations Have Become an Extension of War by Other Means." Afghanistan: The Peace Negotiations Have Become an Extension of War by Other Means | Center

will withdraw American troops from Afghanistan, completing the military exit by September 11. The Taliban will not further any negotiation about Afghanistan's future before foreign troops have left the country.⁷¹

Between 2012 and 2019, more than 3.3 million Afghans returned from abroad, most of them from Pakistan and India. There were also 189,000 returns from non-neighboring countries. However, many of the returnees have gone back to a life of internally displaced.⁷² Some returnees are unable to return to their area of origin due to damaged property, violence and conflict, instead they settle in safe urban areas. Moreover, they experience a continued lack of economic opportunities and ongoing insecurity. Pressure on local services, resources and infrastructure is undermining prospects for reliable solutions.⁷³

for Strategic and International Studies, July 21, 2021.

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-peace-negotiations-have-become-extension-war-other-means>.

⁷¹ Missy Ryan, Karen DeYoung. "Biden Will Withdraw All U.S. Forces from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021." The Washington Post. WP Company, April 14, 2021.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-us-troop-withdrawal-afghanistan/2021/04/13/918c3cae-9beb-11eb-8a83-3bc1fa69c2e8_story.html.

⁷² Sydney, Chloe. "The Invisible Majority." IDMC, January 2020.

<https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/202001-afghanistan-cross-border-report.pdf>.

⁷³ Ibid

Myanmar

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement

According to the UNHCR database as of 2020 there are approximately 1,103,299 refugees, 40,207 asylum seekers and 370,320 IDPs.⁷⁴ Forced displacement of the Rohingya is a combination of internal and external displacement, though cross-border displacement is more significant, especially to neighboring Bangladesh. According to UNHCR, 2017 was the peak year of refugees 1,156,742, and in 2015, IDPs was at a peak of 451,089 as well as for asylum seekers 60,632.⁷⁵ The UN refugee agency states that more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees have sought refuge in Bangladesh in crowded camps of the Cox's Bazar district. As of October 2019, nearly 100,000 Rohingya are in Malaysia. In India the UN refugee agency reports 18,000 registered Rohingya refugees. Thailand is considered to be a transit point for the Rohingya before continuing to Malaysia and Indonesia.⁷⁶

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Since the country's independence in 1948 the military has been involved in armed conflict with ethnic non-state armed groups. Since the coup in 1962, the country has had five decades of military rule.⁷⁷ In 1982, the then Burmese government implemented a citizenship law. This law excluded the Rohingya from a list of 135 national races eligible for full citizenship, ultimately discriminating against the Rohingya and denying them citizenship and as a result rendering them stateless.⁷⁸ The start of a democratic transition in 2011, led to an election victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2015. The signing of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

⁷⁴ UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=43wgFk>.

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Albert, Eleanor, and Lindsay Maizland. "What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?" Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, January 23, 2020.

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis>.

⁷⁷ IDMC. "Myanmar." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/myanmar>.

⁷⁸ HRW. "Burma: Amend Biased Citizenship Law." Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2020.


<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/13/burma-amend-biased-citizenship-law>.

(NCA) in 2015, decreased the number of new displacements and lowered the conflict intensity. Despite the ceasefire ethnic non-state armed groups such as Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army in Shan State, and the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State are still in conflict with the military.

The longstanding religious and ethnic tensions between the Rohingya Muslim minority and Buddhist majority, have contributed to further displacements in 2012. Tensions between the two groups have become worse, intensifying violence and segregation against the Rohingya in the Rakhine state. When the insurgent Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacked, it was met with military attacks on Rohingya civilians in 2016, and 2017, where approximately 800,000 people fled to Bangladesh. On February 1st, 2021, the most recent military coup in Myanmar ousted the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. There have been protests, violence and conflict which put the ceasefire agreement at risk.⁷⁹ Since the coup an estimated 53,000 IDPs and 10,000 refugee movements to neighboring countries such as Thailand and India have been documented⁸⁰. Since the large exodus in 2017, the situation of forcibly displaced people in Myanmar has not improved with ongoing violence, insecurity and instability plaguing the country.

⁷⁹ IDMC. "Myanmar." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/myanmar>.

⁸⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The. "Myanmar Refugees: Key Protection Messages and Definitions." UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/migration/609932274/myanmar-refugees-key-protection-messages-definitions.html>.

Figure 7. Map of Myanmar

Source: Albert, Eleanor, and Lindsay Maizland. “What Forces Are Fueling Myanmar's Rohingya Crisis?” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, January 23, 2020.
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis>.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Ethnic minorities, and particularly the Rohingya, a stateless Muslim ethnic minority group in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar are being displaced. They are being targeted by government efforts to remove them from the country. They are escaping persecution, human rights abuses, discrimination and what the UN describes as “genocidal intent”. The UN Human Rights Council

concludes that the evidence showing genocidal intent on the part of the State have been reinforced, and that there is a serious risk that genocidal actions may occur or recur.⁸¹

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

The Myanmar government has stated that they are willing to take back the Rohingya. What followed was the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of returns in collaboration with the Bangladesh government. The government in Myanmar has also built new reception centers in connection with the returns. However, the MoU does not address the root causes of the crisis as well as the recognition of citizenship.⁸² Durable solutions would be difficult to achieve without a dialogue between the Rohingya refugees and Myanmar authorities enabling internally displaced Rohingya to return to their villages. Furthermore, the Myanmar authorities must get rid of restrictions on freedom of movement and support a pathway to citizenship.⁸³ Repatriation has been attempted but the UNHCR is criticizing those plans because it is not safe for the Rohingya.

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⁸¹ UNHCR. “Genocide Threat for Myanmar’s Rohingya Greater than Ever, Investigators Warn Human Rights Council | | UN News.” United Nations. United Nations, September 16, 2019. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046442>.

⁸² Sullivan, Daniel. “5 Key Priorities to Address the Rohingya Crisis.” Refugees International. Refugees International, September 11, 2019. <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/8/22/5-key-priorities-to-address-the-rohingya-crisis>.

⁸³ UNHCR. “UNHCR: Rohingya Crisis Needs Lasting Solutions.” UNHCR, August 21, 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/8/5f3e60124/unhcr-rohingya-crisis-needs-lasting-solutions.html?query=myanmar>.

⁸⁴ HRW. “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Myanmar.” Human Rights Watch, January 16, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/myanmar-burma#>.

Africa

South Sudan

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement

In the past decade, a total of roughly 4 million people have been forcibly displaced in South Sudan.⁸⁵ With a population of about 11 million,⁸⁶ the displaced population accounts for about 35% of the population. The amount of people who have been displaced externally including refugees and asylum seekers has been recorded at about 2.2 million which is about 600,000 more people than the amount of internally displaced people recorded at about 1.6 million people.⁸⁷

The peak years of displacement for South Sudan was spread out in the past decade, but was mostly concentrated towards the second half.⁸⁸ In 2012 and 2013, the number of asylum seekers went from around 20,000 to 30,000 and has since declined to under 10,000 people.⁸⁹ Between 2015 and 2018, the number of Internally Displaced People reached its peak at 1.9 million and has declined by a few hundred thousand in the past few years.⁹⁰ For refugees the number reached its peak in the past three years between 2017 and 2020 where for the first time it reached over 2 million.⁹¹

One of the main countries of asylum for refugees from South Sudan is Uganda, which has one of the main refugee-receiving countries in the African continent, with other countries being Kenya

⁸⁵ UNHCR. “Refugee Data Finder.” UNHCR Refugee Statistics, 2021.
<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=2CYuNm>.

⁸⁶ World Bank. “Population, Total - South Sudan.” Data, 2021.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=SS>.

⁸⁷ UNHCR. “Refugee Data Finder.” UNHCR Refugee Statistics, 2021.

⁸⁸ Ibid


⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ Ibid

and Ethiopia.⁹² Sudan holds the second highest number of South Sudanese refugees after Uganda.⁹³

Figure 8. Map of Uganda Displaying Refugee Host Districts



Source: Ryan Joseph O’Byrne, Charles Ogeno, Pragmatic Mobilities and Uncertain Lives: Agency and the Everyday Mobility of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Volume 33, Issue 4, December 2020, Pages 747–765, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feaa085>

⁹² African Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 54 (2017), Refugees – South Sudan. 21704A-21704A. <https://doi-org.libproxy.newschool.edu/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2017.07702.x>

⁹³ UNHCR. “South Sudan Refugee Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News: USA for UNHCR.” South Sudan Refugee Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News | USA for UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/south-sudan/#:~:text=There%20are%20currently%204.3%20million.IDPs%2C%20and%20asylum%2Dseekers.&text=Over%20half%20of%20all%20South%20Sudanese%20refugees%20are%20children.&text=Uganda%20and%20Sudan%20both%20host,of%20all%20South%20Sudanese%20refugees.>

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Previous conflicts in the area include the Anya-Nya rebellion during the First Sudanese Civil war beginning in 1955 in the area that is now South Sudan.⁹⁴ South Sudan underwent a succession from Sudan in 2011, making it the youngest nation in the world, however a civil war soon broke out between Dinka and Nuer ethnic people resulting in a current situation of displacement, violence, and famine.⁹⁵ According to IDMC, in 2017 “one in three people in South Sudan had been forced to flee their homes since the outbreak of hostilities”.⁹⁶ In addition to the fighting and violence, possible drivers for forced displacement include “drought and flooding, the violent disruption of farming and the collapsing economy prevent people from accessing livelihoods.”⁹⁷

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

In a recent refugee settlement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from South Sudan, around 90 percent of the people were women and children.⁹⁸ Those displaced from South Sudan entering Uganda and the DRC are additionally facing a cholera outbreak here due to heavy rainfall.⁹⁹ About 100,000 people remain displaced as a result of the 2019 and 2020 floods.¹⁰⁰ A 2017 study found that the state of displacement in South Sudan poses risks to newborn babies since the health care in refugee camps in Juba, Malakal, and Muban were found to be limited.¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ ROLANDSEN, ØYSTEIN H., and NICKI KINDERSLEY. "THE NASTY WAR: ORGANISED VIOLENCE DURING THE ANYA-NYA INSURGENCY IN SOUTH SUDAN, 1963–72." *Journal of African History* 60.1 (2019): 87-107. *ProQuest*. 21 June 2021

⁹⁵ Omer, Reem. "South Sudan: from independence to a detrimental civil war." *Harvard International Review* 37, no. 3 (2016): 11+. *Gale Academic OneFile* (accessed June 21, 2021).
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A459804754/AONE?u=nysl_me_news&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=171fa3a0.

⁹⁶ IDMC. "South Sudan." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/south-sudan>.

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Dickinson, Daniel. "UN and Africa: Focus on South Sudan, Refugees in Kenya and UNAMID | Africa Renewal." United Nations. United Nations, 2021.
<https://www.un.org/africarenewal/un-and-africa-focus-south-sudan-refugees-kenya-and-unamid>.

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ IDMC. "South Sudan." IDMC, 2021. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/south-sudan>.

¹⁰¹ Sami, Samira, Kate Kerber, Solomon Kenyi, Ribka Amsalu, Barbara Tomczyk, Debra Jackson, Alexander Dimitti, et al. "State of newborn care in South Sudan's displacement camps: a descriptive study of facility-based

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

Both President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Vice President Riek Machar have attempted to stop the violence, but this has been unsuccessful. Additionally, international efforts such as arms embargoes and sanctions have not been very successful.¹⁰² In mid-June 2021, President Kiir announced that a parliament of 550 lawmakers in South Sudan would write a constitution to try and create peace to end the civil war.¹⁰³ To help carry out the peace process, UN representatives Nicholas Haysom and Rebecca Nyandeng De Mabior are encouraging participation and investment in the process through creating the UNMISS Peace Fellows program that is also supported by the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).¹⁰⁴

deliveries." *Reproductive Health* 14, no. 1 (2017). *Gale Academic OneFile* (accessed June 21, 2021).
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A546303016/AONE?u=nysl_me_news&sid=bookmark-AONE&id=e32dc801.

¹⁰² Omer, Reem. "South Sudan: from independence to a detrimental civil war." *Harvard International Review* 37, no. 3 (2016): 11+. *Gale Academic OneFile* (accessed June 21, 2021).
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A459804754/AONE?u=nysl_me_news&sid=bookmark-AONE&id=171fa3a0.

¹⁰³ (2021), SOUTH SUDAN: New Parliament. *Afr Res Bull Polit*, 58: 23156A-23156B.
<https://doi-org.libproxy.newschool.edu/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2021.09995.x>

¹⁰⁴ Sudan Tribune. "Invest in Peacebuilding Processes, UNMISS Chief Urges." Invest in peacebuilding processes, UNMISS chief urges - Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan, July 18, 2021.
<https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article69830>.

Central African Republic

Section 1: General Information and Data on Forced Displacement

As of 2020 there are about 1.3 million displaced people internally and externally in the Central African Republic.¹⁰⁵ With a population of 4.75 million¹⁰⁶, the displaced population accounts for roughly 25 percent of the population in the Central African Republic. This includes about 650,000 people displaced across borders, including asylum seekers and refugees, then about 680,000 people displaced internally.

The number of forcibly displaced people in the Central African Republic in the past ten years has been concentrated towards the second half of the decade but has remained less than a million year after year in each of the categories of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced.¹⁰⁷ For IDPs, the peak year was 2013 where it reached almost 900,000 however it has been at its most constant peak between 2017 and 2020 over 600,000.¹⁰⁸ The peak of refugee numbers in CAR were in 2019 and 2020, when for the first time in the past decade it reached 600,000 in both years.¹⁰⁹ Asylum seekers were at the highest number in 2017 with about 17,000 people, and was also concentrated towards the second half of the decade with its highest numbers with every year being over 10,000 people.¹¹⁰

Many of the forcibly displaced in the Central African Republic have moved into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Cameroon, Chad and the Republic of the Congo.¹¹¹ Through their

¹⁰⁵ UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=6dulcE>

¹⁰⁶ World Bank. "Population, Total - Central African Republic." Data, 2021.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CE>

¹⁰⁷ UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=6dulcE>

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹¹ United Nations. "Central African Republic: 200,000 Displaced in Less than Two Months | | UN News." United Nations. United Nations, January 29, 2021.

displacement, “Central Africans arriving in the DRC have crossed the Ubangi, Mbomou and Uele rivers which form a natural border between the two countries”.¹¹² Many of the displaced people in refugee camps in Cameroon are of the muslim Peuhl minority.¹¹³ Humanitarian aid and help from UNHCR is meeting resistance by armed forces who have closed access points to this region.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Since the Central African Republic gained independence from France in 1960, it has had political instability with constant changing of powers.¹¹⁴ In 2013 the muslim led Séléka rebellion pushed out the government, however there is worry that the 2016 democratic election established by the UN peacekeeping mission in 2014 will not curb the violence and the situation will remain protracted.¹¹⁵ In the past decade, the main driver of forced displacement in the Central African Republic is the threat of violence, clashes and control of the country by armed groups.¹¹⁶ Poverty, malnutrition and limited access to fresh drinking water are among the numerous challenges that displaced people face. Equally, health concerns such as malaria, Covid-19, diarrhea, and respiratory tract infections are common.¹¹⁷ According to UN spokesperson Boris Sheshirvov,

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1083332#:~:text=Violence%20and%20insecurity%20related%20to,ar e%20facing%20dire%20living%20conditions.>

¹¹² United Nations. “Central African Republic: 200,000 Displaced in Less than Two Months || UN News.” United Nations. United Nations, January 29, 2021.

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1083332#:~:text=Violence%20and%20insecurity%20related%20to,ar e%20facing%20dire%20living%20conditions.>

¹¹³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Central African Republic : Mbororo.” Refworld, 2018. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d3f3c.html>.

¹¹⁴ Pacific, Yapatake Kossele Thales. “Fragility of State in Central African Republic: An Econometric Approach to Efficiency Understanding.” *Global Business Review* 21, no. 3 (June 2020): 681–97. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0972150918779291>.

¹¹⁵ Glawion, Tim, and Lotje de Vries. “Ruptures Revoked: Why the Central African Republic's Unprecedented Crisis has Not Altered Deep-Seated Patterns of Governance.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 56.3 (2018): 421–42. *ProQuest*. 23 June 2021.

¹¹⁶ UNHCR. “Central African Republic Situation.” UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/central-african-republic-situation.html>.


¹¹⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Conditions Dire as CAR Displacement Tops 200,000.” UNHCR, January 29, 2021.

refugees recently settling in the northern provinces of the DRC along the CAR border said “that they fled in panic when they heard gunshots, leaving their belongings behind.”¹¹⁸

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

The situation in the CAR has been described by some as a religious conflict between the Muslim Séléka and the Christian Anti-Balaka armed groups.¹¹⁹ According to Human Rights Watch, “both the Seleka and Anti-Balaka have been implicated in widespread atrocities against civilians.”¹²⁰ During the arrival of armed groups, civilians will often flee into rural areas and return home once it's safe which possibly makes it difficult to quantify the nature of displacement.¹²¹ The possibility of future earthquakes and floods could exacerbate displacement at a number of approximately 10,000 displacements per year.¹²² In the second chart below, the blue circle at 100,000 displacements was the result of an October 2019 flood.

Figure 9. Annual Conflict and Disaster Displacement Figures (Central African Republic)



<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2021/1/6013c5194/conditions-dire-car-displacement-tops-200000.html>

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ Vlavonou, Gino. 2021. "Building the Kingdom of God in the Central African Republic: Trajectories and Strategies for Success Beyond the Traditional Bangui Elite." *Africa Today* 67 (2) (Winter): 128-149. doi: http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.newschool.edu/10.2979/africatoday.67.2_3.07. <https://login.libproxy.newschool.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.newschool.edu/scholarly-journals/building-kingdom-god-central-african-republic/docview/2495035934/se-2?accountid=12261>.

¹²⁰ HRW. "Central African Republic: First Seleka Suspect in ICC Custody." Human Rights Watch, January 25, 2021. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/25/central-african-republic-first-seleka-suspect-icc-custody>.

¹²¹ IDMC. "Central African Republic." IDMC, 2021.


<https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/central-african-republic>.

¹²² Ibid

Source: IDMC. “Central African Republic.” IDMC, 2021.

<https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/central-african-republic>.

Figure 10. Annual Disaster Events Timeline (Central African Republic)



Source: IDMC. “Central African Republic.” IDMC, 2021.

<https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/central-african-republic>.

The semi-nomadic Peuhl minority (also called Fulani or Mbororo) population has been particularly targeted who despite having citizenship are being labeled ‘foreigners’.¹²³ This conflict often is occurring between Christian farmers and the Peuhl cattle herders who have acted in retaliation and even formed one of the militia groups Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation 3R is made up of Peuhls.¹²⁴ Despite the targeting of Peuls, the civilians, women and children are generally at risk of displacement and in need of humanitarian assistance.

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

¹²³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Central African Republic : Mbororo.” Refworld, 2018. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/49749d3f3c.html>.

¹²⁴ Ibid

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MINUSCA, was established in 2014 and is concerned with “security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional implications...with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority.”¹²⁵ There are roughly 14,500 military personnel, with the most troops coming from Rwanda, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and about 3,000 police personnel- with the most coming from Rwanda, Senegal, Cameroon, and Mauritania.¹²⁶ The role of the UN troops has been to support the Central African Republic government forces against attack from the rebel groups, and to support a peace process and peace talks to stabilize the state.¹²⁷

One of the leaders of the Seleka militia group Mahamat Said Abdel Kani was captured and is facing criminal charges for war crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC).¹²⁸ Additionally, a Special Criminal Court was established in the capital of Bangui and may signal to actors in the rebel groups the possibility of accountability.¹²⁹ Despite these advances, a new rebel group called the Coalition of Patriots for Change CPC emerged leading up to the 2020 elections where members have been part of the other groups committing atrocities including civilian murder, rape, and destruction of property.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ MINUSCA. “MINUSCA Peacekeeping.” United Nations. United Nations, 2021.
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusca>.

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ (2021), CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: Rebel Coalition. *Afr Res Bull Polit*, 58: 23016A-23017B.
<https://doi-org.libproxy.newschool.edu/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2021.09836.x>

¹²⁸ HRW. “Central African Republic: First Seleka Suspect in ICC Custody.” Human Rights Watch, January 25, 2021.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/25/central-african-republic-first-seleka-suspect-icc-custody>.

¹²⁹ HRW. “Central African Republic: Rebel Violence Threatens Elections.” Human Rights Watch, December 23, 2020. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/23/central-african-republic-rebel-violence-threatens-elections>.

¹³⁰ Ibid

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement

In the past decade, about 6 million people have been displaced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹³¹ With a population of about 90 million¹³², the displaced population accounts for about 7% of the total population.

In the DRC, the forced displacement is mostly internal at about 85% of the total displacements.¹³³ There are roughly 5 million IDPs compared to about one million externally displaced people. The following infographic from the Regional Refugee Response Plan displays the major refugee crossing and locations.

The peak years for forced displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the past ten years are 2019 and 2020.¹³⁴ During these two years, the refugee population reached its peak above 800,000 and the IDP population reached over 5 million for the first time in the decade.¹³⁵

The main countries of asylum for people from the Democratic Republic of the Congo are Uganda that holds about 45 percent of DRC refugees, then followed by Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda and South Africa each holding about less than 10 percent.¹³⁶

¹³¹ UNHCR. “UNHCR Refugee Statistics.” UNHCR, 2021.

<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=64rFzB>

¹³² World Bank. “Population, Total - Congo, Dem. Rep.” Data, 2021.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CD>.

¹³³ UNHCR. “UNHCR Refugee Statistics.” UNHCR, 2021.


<https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=64rFzB>

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ UNHCR. “Operational Data Portal.” Situation DRC Situation, 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/drc>.

**Figure 11. 2020-2021 Regional Refugee Response Plan, Democratic Republic of the Congo-
Summary**



Source: UN, HCR. "Summary - The Democratic Republic of the Congo Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) 2020-2021." UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP), 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/74426>.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Political instability dates back to the Katanga secessionist war in 1960 when Belgium withdrew its colonial influence.¹³⁷ The region then became Zaire from 1971-1997 and during this time

¹³⁷ Ntung, Alex. "Dynamics of Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges Ahead for President Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 43.2 (2019): 131-50. ProQuest. 5 July 2021.

ethnic conflicts increased for political control.¹³⁸ The Congo War from 1996-1997 and the second Congo War from 1998-2003 contributed to the political instability.¹³⁹ There was a democratic election in 2018- where Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo became president- and although it was a peaceful process the inter-ethnic conflict remained constant to the end of the decade.¹⁴⁰ Additional challenges to the displaced population include Covid-19, measles and Ebola.¹⁴¹

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

In addition to disputes over natural resources and claims to land, “many of the conflicts in the eastern Congo relate to deeply rooted historical practices of marginalization of some groups as the other or as immigrants, based on rights to ethnic political identity asserted by the dominant and aggressive rebel groups.”¹⁴² Much of the ethnic conflict has been between the Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulenge) and Rwandaphone (Hutu) marginalized being labeled migrants, and the Bafulero, Bavira, Babembe, Hunde and Nande groups claiming local rights.¹⁴³

The on-going conflict in this region has created a dangerous situation for all women who are at risk of sexual violence. In the DRC, “rape is not only a consequence of war, but also a weapon of

¹³⁸ Ibid

¹³⁹ Familiar, Itziar, Pamela Nasirumbi Muniina, Chris Dolan, Moses Ogwal, David Serwadda, Herbert Kiyangi, Chantal Siya Bahinduka, Enos Sande, and Wolfgang Hladik. "Conflict-related violence and mental health among self-settled Democratic Republic of Congo female refugees in Kampala, Uganda - a respondent driven sampling survey." *Conflict and Health* 15, no. 1 (2021): NA. *Gale Academic OneFile* (accessed June 23, 2021).
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A665456131/AONE?u=nysl_me_news&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=429650ea.

¹⁴⁰ (RRRP) “The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Regional Refugee Response Plan - 2021.” UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP), January 2021. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/86008>.

¹⁴¹ Ibid

¹⁴² Ntung, Alex. "Dynamics of Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges Ahead for President Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 43.2 (2019): pp. 137, 131-50. ProQuest. 5 July 2021.

¹⁴³ Ibid

war to intimidate local communities and to punish civilians for collaboration with armed military groups”.¹⁴⁴

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUSCO was established in July 2010 replacing the former mission in the region- the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUC. The current mission, MONUSCO, has a directive of “protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts”.¹⁴⁵ There are about 14,000 military personnel- with the most troops coming from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh- and nearly 600 police officers- with the most coming from Egypt and Senegal MONUSCO 2010). Within MONUSCO is even a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) whose mission is to neutralize the armed groups mostly in the eastern region including the Rwanda backed M23, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).¹⁴⁶

Despite the high number of internally displaced people IDPs and refugees from elsewhere in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi

¹⁴⁴ Kitharidis, Sophocles ‘Rape as a weapon of war: Combating sexual violence and impunity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the way forward’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal pp. 450, 449-472 <http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2015/v15n2a11>

¹⁴⁵ “MONUSCO Peacekeeping.” United Nations. United Nations, 2010. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco>.

¹⁴⁶ Garcia, Antonio. 2018. South Africa and United Nations Peacekeeping Offensive Operations : Conceptual Models. Oxford: Mwanaka Media and Publishing Pvt Limited. Accessed July 5, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

commended the local people for helping feed, shelter, and integrate children into schools in a display of inclusion.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “UNHCR's Grandi Calls on the International Community to Stand with DR Congo.” UNHCR, April 23, 2021.
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/4/60827c6b5/unhcrs-grandi-calls-international-community-dr-congo.html>.

Ethiopia

Section 1: General Information and Data on Forced Displacement

Since the conflict in the Tigray region began in November 2020, millions of Ethiopians have been forcibly displaced, either internally or crossing the border into neighboring Sudan.¹⁴⁸

Displacement was present in the country before the Tigrayan conflict. The primary cause of previous displacement events related to longstanding ethnic and border disputes (Oromia-Somali regional border dispute; conflict between Gedeo and Guji Oromo tribes), followed by the second highest cause of displacement: drought, then seasonal floods, and flash floods.¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰ In 2020, the

forcibly displaced were largely IDPs (2 million) compared to refugees/asylum-seekers (803,000).

¹⁵¹ The year 2020 was the peak year of refugees (151,336) as well as for internally displaced (2,733,628).¹⁵² In 2019, asylum-seekers were at a peak of 136,752. Given Ethiopia's conflict in Tigray began in late 2020, 2021 should show higher levels of IDPs as well as refugees and asylum seekers.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

The main drivers of displacement are from generalized violence and food scarcity with large numbers from the Tigray region. Beginning in November 2020, conflict broke out between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) after Prime Minister

¹⁴⁸ Dahir, Abdi Latif and Marks, Simon T. "Tigray Rebels in Ethiopia Celebrate a Victory." The New York Times. The New York Times, July 2, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/29/world/tigray-ethiopia>.

¹⁴⁹ International Organization for Migration. "Ethiopia National Displacement Report 7, Round 24: December 2020 - January 2021 - Ethiopia." ReliefWeb, 2021. <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-national-displacement-report-7-round-24-december-2020-january-2021>.


¹⁵⁰ IOM UN Migration. "IOM Report: Ethiopia Records More Than 1.8 Million Internally Displaced in 2020." International Organization for Migration, October 2, 2020. <https://www.iom.int/news/iom-report-ethiopia-records-more-18-million-internally-displaced-2020>.

¹⁵¹ IOM UN Migration. "A Region on the Move: 2020 Mobility Overview in the East and Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula." IOM UN Migration. European Union, 2021. pp. 17-18, https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/IOM_RoMR_EHoA_2020.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=11455.

¹⁵² UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=OB0vyJ>

Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive at TPLF in an attempt to subdue resistance forming in the region. Contrary to the current state of affairs, Mr. Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 – just nine months before the violence erupted – for the progress made in Ethiopia towards peacekeeping and successful efforts at detente with its neighbor Eritrea, which had been in a hostile relationship for decades. The Tigray region in Northern Ethiopia is home to six million Tigrayans, or 6 percent of the Ethiopian population. TPLF is in direct conflict with the Ethiopian government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali as well as Eritrean forces.

Figure 12. Tigray Region, Ethiopia



The forced displacement is occurring in Northern Ethiopia with Tigrayans internally displaced or fleeing to Sudan.

Source: Production © 2021 Human Rights Watch

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas>.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Ethnic clashes, including persecution of individuals based on their ethnicity, have been a significant component to the conflict.¹⁵³ The war has killed thousands of people – many of which have been mass killings – and has also caused a widespread famine already affecting 400,000 people; food insecurity and the threat of famine has consequently displaced millions.^{154,155} Furthermore, more than 5.5 million people in Tigray, as well as in neighboring regions Amhara and Afar, are suffering high levels of acute food insecurity which could slide into starvation if immediate action is not taken.¹⁵⁶

The people who live in the region of Tigray, are presently the most vulnerable to displacement. Eritrean troops, who have joined the Ethiopian forces against TPLF, have perpetrated violence via killings and sexual assault in the region. In addition, ethnic Amhara militias have attempted to seize what the group considers lost territories and have been accused of ethnic cleansing. Similarly Tigrayan militias have been accused of committing atrocities against neighboring ethnic Amharas.¹⁵⁷ The blame for the killings and consequent displacement has been dispersed. “Among incidents where blame can be confidently determined, Ethiopian soldiers appear to have been responsible for 14 percent of the killings, Eritrean troops who have fought alongside federal

¹⁵³ BBC. “Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed: The Nobel Prize Winner Who Went to War.” BBC News. BBC, June 14, 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43567007>.

¹⁵⁴ Lemma, Tsedale. “He Promised Peace. Then He Tore His Country Apart.” The New York Times. The New York Times, June 21, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/21/opinion/ethiopia-election-tigray-abiy.html?searchResultPosition=2>.

¹⁵⁵ Lederer, Edith M. “UN: Over 400,000 People in Ethiopia's Tigray Face Famine Now.” AP NEWS. Associated Press, July 2, 2021. <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-africa-ethiopia-famine-016864947ec243e27cc3d97d58bed8f0>.

¹⁵⁶ United Nations. “UN Agencies Scale-up Response to Address Looming Famine 'Catastrophe' in Tigray || UN News.” United Nations. United Nations, June 19, 2021. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/06/1093722>.

¹⁵⁷ Dahir, Abdi Latif and Marks, Simon T. “Tigray Rebels in Ethiopia Celebrate a Victory.” The New York Times. The New York Times, July 2, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/06/29/world/tigray-ethiopia>.

forces 45 percent, and irregular paramilitaries from the neighboring province of Amhara 5 percent.”¹⁵⁸

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

Many roads in and to the Tigray region have been inaccessible, which has created serious hindrance to the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁵⁹ Humanitarian aid has increased in Sudan to reach the recent influx of Ethiopian refugees. Those internally displaced in Tigray have been receiving assistance through the government and aid organizations, though the risk of famine is still high. Regarding the conflict, Mr. Abiy recently announced a ceasefire although the TPLF have been skeptical of its validity.¹⁶⁰ They have regained territory that was overtaken by Ethiopian forces and are demanding the withdrawal of all Amharan and Eritrean troops from Tigray before accepting the ceasefire. Prospects for peace are still too early to determine given how quickly things are evolving, though both sides appear unwilling to compromise. The Ethiopian government has refused to negotiate with TPLF and has classified them a terrorist organization.¹⁶¹ If the government and TPLF are unwilling to stop aggressions, there is a strong chance the fighting could resume. Likewise, if the Ethiopian government continues to repress the northern resistance rather than strike a compromise, a long-lasting conflict could persist and risk destabilizing the region.

¹⁵⁸ Burke, Jason. “Ethiopia: 1,900 People Killed in Massacres in Tigray Identified.” *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, April 2, 2021.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/ethiopia-1900-people-killed-in-massacres-in-tigray-identified>.

¹⁵⁹ UNHCR. “ETHIOPIA OPERATION – TIGRAY UPDATE.” UNHCR, March 31, 2021. pp. 7,
<https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20update%2031%20March%202021.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ Endeshaw, Dawit. “Ethiopia's Tigray Demands Troop Withdrawals for Ceasefire Talks.” *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, July 4, 2021.
<https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-tigray-demands-troop-withdrawals-ceasefire-talks-2021-07-04/>.

¹⁶¹ BBC. “Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis: Accept Our Rule or No Ceasefire, Rebels Say.” *BBC News*. BBC, July 4, 2021.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57714799>.

Somalia

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement

Somalia is considered one of the world's longest-running refugee situations.¹⁶² Many Somalis have lived in exile for two decades; children born in refugee camps have grown up never knowing their homeland.¹⁶³ The conflict has been ongoing for thirty years. Looking at the past decade, 2020 was the peak year for IDPs (2,967,500) but 2013 was the peak year for refugees (1,121,760) and 2016 for asylum seekers (60,491).¹⁶⁴ The vast majority of Somali refugees reside in neighboring countries. The three top countries hosting Somali refugees are Kenya (256,186), Yemen (250,500) and Ethiopia (192,082). Yemen and Ethiopia, despite having their own forcibly displaced, have been historically welcoming of Somali refugees.¹⁶⁵ As of 2021, the forcibly displaced were largely IDPs (2.97 million) compared to refugees/asylum seekers (24,000).¹⁶⁶


¹⁶² UNHCR. "Regional Summaries: Africa." UNHCR Global Report 2019, 2019. pp. 77, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2019/pdf/03_Africa.pdf#_ga=2.148581877.358752474.1624146474-1012013990.1623799780.

¹⁶³ Amnesty International. "Somalia." International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2021. <https://www.rescue.org/country/somalia#what-caused-the-current-crisis-in-somalia>.

¹⁶⁴ UNHCR. "UNHCR Refugee Statistics." UNHCR, 2021. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=Zr31qk>

¹⁶⁵ UNHCR. "Somalia Refugee Crisis Explained." How to Help Refugees - Aid, Relief and Donations, January 7, 2020. <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/somalia-refugee-crisis-explained/>.

¹⁶⁶ IOM UN Migration. "A Region on the Move: 2020 Mobility Overview in the East and Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula." IOM UN Migration. European Union, 2021. pp. 17-18, https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/IOM_RoMR_EHoA_2020.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=11455.

Figure 13. Estimated IDPs in Somalia by Zone

The vast majority of forcibly displaced are IDPs. The majority of IDPs are in Somalia's South Central region.¹⁶⁷

Source: UNHCR. "Operational Data Portal." Situation Horn of Africa Somalia Situation, 2021.

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn/location/192>.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Starting in 1991 with the ousting of the Barre government, Somalia has been engaged in a protracted civil war with various actors fighting for control. This conflict has been the root cause of forced displacement. Although Somalia is one of the most ethnically unified countries of sub-Saharan Africa – sharing the same religion (predominantly Sunni Islam), history, and language – the country is divided on the basis of clans. Though the majority of armed clashes in 1991 have been clan-based, they have often been manipulated by political leaders for personal gain.¹⁶⁸ The insurgency of terrorist group al-Shabaab, which is tied to al-Qaeda, has driven

¹⁶⁷ UNHCR. "Operational Data Portal." Situation Horn of Africa Somalia Situation, 2021.
<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn/location/192>.

¹⁶⁸ World Bank. 2005. *Conflict in Somalia : Drivers and Dynamics*. Washington, DC. © World Bank.
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8476> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. page 9

aggressive actions after Ethiopian troops withdrew from the region in 2010. The group is notorious for conducting large attacks that kill dozens of civilians at a time in Somalia and East Africa. Its presence is still felt today. Over a decade since it appeared, terrorist attacks are recurring in populous areas like Mogadishu.¹⁶⁹ The withdrawal of American troops in place to fight al-Shabaab and slowed drone strikes may have emboldened the group to reassert itself in the country.

Climate is another major driver of displacement in Somalia. Given the already high level of vulnerability among Somalis due to lack of government stability, exposure to climatic shocks and extreme weather events put the population at increased risk for displacement. The 2011 drought, along with the intensification of conflict and increase in food insecurity, forced many Somalis to permanently flee the country. Reports from USAID and UNHCR noted a rapid increase in refugees and IDPs in the drought period.¹⁷⁰ By September 2011, it is estimated that more than 140,000 new refugees had entered the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Currently, 80 percent of the country is experiencing drought conditions, causing both livestock and crops – two of Somali's main resources – to die.¹⁷¹ Seasonal floods, and tropical storms – such as Cyclone Gait, the strongest cyclone recorded in Somalia – have also negatively impacted livelihoods across the region.¹⁷² Finally, a recent severe locust invasion has worsened the situation by destroying crops and pastures that both farmers and herders depend on.

¹⁶⁹Dahir, Abdi Latif. "Suicide Explosion Kills 10, Injures Dozens in Somalia." The New York Times. The New York Times, July 3, 2021. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/03/world/africa/suicide-suicide-explosion.html>.

¹⁷⁰ FEWS, NET. "Famine Early Warning Systems Network." Somalia - Special Report: Wed, 2011-07-20 | Famine Early Warning Systems Network, July 2011. <https://fews.net/east-africa/somalia/special-report/july-2011-0>.

¹⁷¹ International Rescue Committee. "Triple Threat of Drought, COVID-19 and Insecurity in Mogadishu Driving Severe Humanitarian Need in Somalia, Warns IRC." International Rescue Committee (IRC), April 28, 2021. <https://www.rescue.org/press-release/triple-threat-drought-covid-19-and-insecurity-mogadishu-driving-severe-humanitarian>.

¹⁷² IOM UN Migration. "A Region on the Move: 2020 Mobility Overview in the East and Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula." IOM UN Migration. European Union, 2021. pp. 17, https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/IOM_RoMR_EHoA_2020.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=11455.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Generalized violence and food insecurity are forcing people to flee, though certain regions of the country are at higher risk for displacement. In the South, around the capital Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle, there has been a concentration of violence by al-Shabaab.¹⁷³ Somalis are fleeing due to droughts in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions.¹⁷⁴ In terms of who is at risk of forced displacement, there are ongoing indiscriminate attacks against civilians, journalists have been targets of intimidation, physical attacks, arrests, and some have been killed. Women and girls are victims of sexual violence.¹⁷⁵

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

From the millions of Somali refugees who have been displaced over the years, only a fraction have returned (92,199).¹⁷⁶ Prospects for peace remain fragile but renewed dialogue in May 2021 between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States was successful in establishing an election process where clan elders would elect a parliament, and parliament would then elect the president. This could be the beginning of strengthening stability in the country. Several attempts to counter al-Shabaab and stabilize the country have been made, particularly with the Somali government and U.S. assistance. After the withdrawal of American troops and cessation of drone strikes, al-Shabaab suicide terrorist attacks have picked back up. The U.S. – under a new administration – is considering re-entering the country to counter the group once again.

¹⁷³ HRW. “World Report 2020: Rights Trends in Somalia.” Human Rights Watch, January 15, 2020.
<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/somalia>.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

¹⁷⁵ Amnesty International. “Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in Somalia.” Everything you need to know about human rights in Somalia | Amnesty International | Amnesty International, 2020.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/somalia/report-somalia/>.

¹⁷⁶ UNHCR. “Operational Data Portal.” Situation Horn of Africa Somalia Situation, 2021.
<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn/location/192>.

The Americas

Venezuela

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement

External and internal displacement in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is a relatively new and ongoing displacement situation that has progressed rapidly. The displaced migration of Venezuelans is the second largest external displacement crisis in South America following Colombia with nearly five million IDPs¹⁷⁷ and 5.4 million refugees and forced migrants abroad, totaling the number of impacted FDPs well over 10 million.¹⁷⁸ Considering that Venezuela's population was 30 million in 2014, the situation's fast development is concerning.¹⁷⁹ Still, Venezuelans are not recognized under the same logistical framework as put forth in typical refugee law recognized globally and their access to rehabilitation may vary by state actors.

Venezuelan displacement is the result of political and economic instability. Venezuela's influx of Colombian migrants along with Venezuela's own worsening internal displacement has heightened to an unprecedented level since 2014. Due to many socioeconomic factors in Venezuela, Colombia is now a primary host country for Venezuelan refugees and cross-border displaced migrants. The two countries represent an ongoing relationship of inter-state accountability in aiding crises of internal to cross-border displacement, although the Venezuelan situation has grown into increasingly more of a crisis whereas the situation in Colombia is in a precarious state of rebuilding and repatriation. Many Venezuelans are not considered refugees, but remain under the status of asylum seekers in neighboring Southern American host countries,

¹⁷⁷ UNHCR. 2020. "Global Trends." UNHCR Flagship Reports.
https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/#_ftn1.

¹⁷⁸ UNHCR. 2020. "The Americas." 2020.
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.

¹⁷⁹ The World Bank. 2021. "World Development Indicators." *Data Catalog*, (June).
<https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>.

as seen in the case of 851,000 of Venezuelan forced migrants.¹⁸⁰ However, asylum processes are slow given the rapidly growing reality of 85% of Venezuelan forced migrants (4.6 million people) relocated to Latin-American countries and Caribbean islands and may be left out of categorical census data that focuses on refugees and IDPs. As a result, many forcibly displaced Venezuelans continue to face a range of issues such as inability to work, immigrant detention, inequality, and extreme poverty. Venezuelans are reported to have been charged with illegal entry and succumbed to cycles of elongated detention and deportation.¹⁸¹

Primary host countries for Venezuelans are Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.¹⁸² Between 2015 and 2021, the Venezuelan migrant and refugee population in Colombia rose from less than 39,000 people to 1.72 million,¹⁸³ an 8,000 percent increase in Venezuelans seeking refugee status worldwide from 2014 to 2021.¹⁸⁴ Venezuelan forced migrants qualify for their own category of a temporarily-forcibly displaced population when observing trends of global forced displacement, as seen in the figure provided below.

¹⁸⁰ UNHCR. 2020. "The Americas." 2020.

https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.

¹⁸¹ Refugees International and Melanie Teff. n.d. "Forced into Illegality: Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in Trinidad and Tobago." *Report*.


<https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/1/27/forced-into-illegality-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-in-trinidad-and-tobago>.

¹⁸² UNHCR. 2020. "Venezuela situation." UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html>.

¹⁸³ ACAPS. 2021. "Colombia- Venezuelan Refugees." ACAPS.

<https://www.acaps.org/country/colombia/crisis/venezuelan-refugees->

¹⁸⁴ UNHCR. 2020. "Venezuela situation." UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html>.

Figure 14*. Venezuelan Displacement in Comparison with Other States**Forced displacement situations**

Source: UNHCR Refugee Data Finder
 *Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate. **Internally displaced people protected / assisted by UNHCR.

Source: UNHCR. 2020. "Global Trends." UNHCR Flagship Reports.
https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/#_ftn1.

Although the above chart reports only 3.8 million displaced Venezuelans abroad, totaling the number of forcibly displaced Venezuelans to 4.9 million persons, there are concerns that the number in actuality is higher. This may be due to categorical and regional discrepancies in reporting Venezuelan displacement figures, as it is unclear whether situations of flight may be voluntary or involuntary as a result of a lack of opportunity, violence, structural collapse, and poverty due to high inflation. To more inclusively account for Venezuelan FDPs (refugees and migrants alike), the most accurate number for externally displaced Venezuelans is 5.4 million as delineated in the above section and reported in official government figures (see source #176).


Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Since 2000, Venezuela has been dealing with ongoing political and socio economic instability following the death of Hugo Chavez and his successor, Nicholas Maduro. Though it is difficult to determine whether the socioeconomic status of the country solely reflects its political corruption, Venezuela proclaims itself as a predominantly socialist State while still practicing a policy of disregard towards human rights, low resources, high inflation, food insecurity, and a lack of indigenous collective rights. Two years after the United Socialist Party of Venezuela inaugurated the office in 2010, the government renounced the Inter-American Convention on

Human Rights, demonstrating a clear lack of priority in the state's protection of human rights moving forward. The situation has only exacerbated in the past decade, with the peak years of displacement showing a significant pattern of increase from 2015-2020. In 2015, there were approximately 15,000 Venezuelan asylum seekers, compared with the stark reality of 850,000 asylum seekers by the end of 2020.¹⁸⁵ A 2020 independent fact-finding mission by the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) found high-level authority figures in abuse of their power and responsible for crimes against humanity. The report found that "the government of Nicolás Maduro and its security forces are responsible for extrajudicial executions and short-term forced disappearances and have jailed opponents, prosecuted civilians in military courts, tortured detainees, and cracked down on protesters",¹⁸⁶ although further international investigations are still in progress.

FDPs have described wide shortages of fuel, food, medicines, and civil repression condoned by the governing party as primary reasons for their flight. Hyperinflation is of utmost concern, mostly as a result of dropping oil prices and economic mismanagement, and has resulted in the equivalency of 1.8 million sovereign bolívars to 1 U.S. dollar.¹⁸⁷ General insecurity is common among civilians, given that the estimated homicide rates in Venezuela are especially high compared to other nations (see figure #15 below). Venezuela's state of socio-economic instability has been analyzed as a primary driver for intraregional violence and is particularly related to regional drug trafficking hotspots. This continues to exacerbate forced displacement.

Figure 15. Venezuela's Violent Crime Rate.



Source: Center for American Progress and Silva Mathema. 2018. “They Are (Still) Refugees: People Continue to Flee Violence in Latin American Countries.” (June). <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/06/01/451474/still-refugees-people-continue-flee-violence-latin-american-countries/#fn-451474-4>.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Similar to many other displacement situations, the poor are disproportionately affected and are often in direct peril of being exploited by violent groups, or suffer as collateral in violent hotspots. The forcibly displaced demographic mainly consists of indigenous and migrant populations, many of whom are women and children. Because of a lack of formal jobs and a stagnant economy, the only informal sector jobs available to the working poor offer little in pay and security. They reside in ‘slums’- more affordable run down urban areas characterized by their persistent poverty and crime. Such areas that often house FDPs from Colombia, easily fall prey to cartels, government repression forces, and even gangs with transnational illegal activities. The majority of middle-class civilians who once owned property or businesses that remain in the country face two main shortages: a shortage of incoming business and a shortage of product. As a result, a third of the local population that once relied on tourism and other economic activities now primarily lives off of the remittances of family members abroad.¹⁸⁸ Most of the wealthy class have had the monetary means to flee and have already fled the nation. This is detrimental to Venezuela whose socialist party depends greatly on the amount of money that can be extradited from income taxes. Wealthy Venezuelans have generally moved their finances abroad to combat currency fluctuations and capital control and primarily relocated to the U.S. and Spain. As a result, what remains of one of the prior most wealthy countries in Latin America is civil and socioeconomic neglect in a collapsing state structure.

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

¹⁸⁸ ADP, Génesis C. Soto, and Luisa Rollenhagen. 2021. “Pipelines of dollars in Venezuela.” ADP ReThink Now. <https://rethink.adp.com/quarterly/pipelines-dollars-venezuela/#:~:text=Relying%20on%20remittances&text=This%20could%20end%20up%20being.abroad%20between%202014%20and%202019.>

The starkest challenge that displaced Venezuelans face is that only half (2.5 million) of nearly 5 million externally displaced people have been provided legal means for residency in relocating countries.¹⁸⁹ Without established status, relocation may lead to a life without access to health care, education, and employment. Venezuelans escaping violence have been subject to Xenophobic crimes and concerns not only among other Latin-American countries, but also in the Western hemisphere where there is a disconnect between how to handle the Venezuela situation, which is notably one of the largest migrations in the modern era. In Ecuador, one of the main countries of Venezuelan asylum, the influx of over 385,000 Venezuelan migrants and refugees has led to considerable tightening of immigration policies.¹⁹⁰ Policies of deterrence have been proposed due to Xenophobic crimes committed among displaced migrants and local communities, and have suggested certified background checks and ID cards for incoming Venezuelans. These provisions were eventually trumped by the approval of a two-year temporary humanitarian visa guaranteeing residency to Venezuelans¹⁹¹. Although this was a positive development, in practice it is difficult for Venezuelans to apply amid a lengthy approval process. This problem affecting Venezuelans in Ecuador is just one of the many results of an unequal global compact responsibility in addressing the integration of displaced populations, and will only continue to grow more evident in Latin America as the Venezuelan crisis continues. Another factor to consider moving forward is the hindering impact that COVID restrictions had on mobility for Venezuelan FDPs. Closed borders created barriers to those displaced, especially for the most vulnerable persons of interest in urban centers (see section 3). It is expected that once mobility restrictions due to the pandemic will be lifted, a higher number of Venezuelans will be applying for temporary status and will seek cross border refuge.

As a response to the recent events in Venezuela, Columbia has opened its own borders to welcome Venezuelans by hosting and granting them refugee status among other work permits

¹⁸⁹ UNHCR. 2020. "Venezuela situation." UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html>.

¹⁹⁰ HRW. 2020. "World Report 2020: Ecuador." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/ecuador#>.

¹⁹¹ HRW. 2020. "World Report 2020: Ecuador." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/ecuador#>.

and legal residency benefits. At the global scale, Venezuelans make up the fastest asylum-seeking group in the United States and constitute a significant portion of global displacement. In 2018, The Trump administration on behalf of The United States approved the allocation of \$16 million in monetary assistance to aid Venezuelans in leaving their country and resettling elsewhere.¹⁹² More recently, the Biden administration has approved the provision of Temporary Protected Status garnered towards 320,000 Venezuelans already in the country¹⁹³ and promised the reform of economic sanctions placed on Venezuela (which have been arguably more destructive to civilians than the targeted government's illegitimacy). Despite these policy changes, approximately one-third of Venezuelans still depend and survive on remittances sent from family members that have fled abroad from 2014-2019.¹⁹⁴ Because remittances often evade official transactions, the unquantifiable number of remittance dependencies may be a significant challenge in reforming Venezuela's labor force and economy. As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, remittances dropped from \$3.5 billion in 2019 to only \$2 billion in 2020.¹⁹⁵ In the region, Colombia authorized the construction of 18 camps to provide assistance ranging from documentation to personal supplies for roughly 36,000 displaced Venezuelans amid the country's crisis.¹⁹⁶ The inability to establish financial stability still greatly affects the flight of Venezuelans and will continue to shape their displacement as not only an economic one, but contextually a result of state corruption, human rights violations, and burdensome sanctions where a multiplicity of local actors continue to create a situation of displacement migration. A question

¹⁹² U.S. Department of State, "United States Assisting Venezuelans in Need," Press release, April 13, 2018, available at <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280464.htm>.

¹⁹³ CFR and Elliott Abrams. 2021. "The Biden Administration and Venezuela." Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/biden-administration-and-venezuela>.

¹⁹⁴ ADP, Génesis C. Soto, and Luisa Rollenhagen. 2021. "Pipelines of dollars in Venezuela." ADP ReThink Now. <https://rethink.adp.com/quarterly/pipelines-dollars-venezuela/#:~:text=Relying%20on%20remittances&text=This%20could%20end%20up%20being.abroad%20between%202014%20and%202019>.

¹⁹⁵ ADP, Génesis C. Soto, and Luisa Rollenhagen.

¹⁹⁶ UNHCR. 2020. "The Americas." 2020. https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.

remains of how to incorporate the state's derangement into the international framework: are Venezuelan FDPs "Economic Migrants, or Refugees?"¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Frier, Luisa F. 2018. "Understanding the Venezuelan Displacement Crisis." *E-International Relations*, (June). <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/06/28/understanding-the-venezuelan-displacement-crises/>.

Colombia

Section 1: General Information and Data on Forced Displacement

The crisis of displacement in Colombia is the largest instance of conflict-affected internal displacement in the world, and certainly the direst instance of displacement in South America. In 2014, the international community reported that Colombia held the largest population of IDPs globally, with that number exceeding over 8.3 million as of 2020, nearly one-fifth of its population¹⁹⁸ Of the millions forcibly displaced, only about 3.14 percent (260,800 people) have been granted refuge or asylum in another country.¹⁹⁹ Although undocumented displaced migration might show a much higher figure, Colombia's situation has been a protracted situation for the past two decades, and has reached an ultimate peak in its displaced population since peace demonstrations began in the nation.

Colombia's politics and persistent violence has been a result of decades of the Drug War and cartel activity predominantly affecting safety in the Global South. Colombia is a hotspot for drug trafficking and violent gang groups that often run into direct conflict with local civilians and leads to displacement due to an absence of security. Though there has been a significant protracted displacement crisis since 2002, the government of Colombia along with foreign nationals have been working towards a common goal for repatriation, reintegration, and rebuilding since 2016. The primary area of concern regarding this potential resolution is the persistent violence that still occurs daily in conflict-zones of resource-rich areas and illegal production hubs between militia groups, cartels, gangs, law enforcement, and local civilians. In addition to the recent turn of events, Colombia has become the second most host country for

¹⁹⁸UNHCR. 2020. "The Americas." 2020.

https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.


¹⁹⁹UNHCR. 2020. "The Americas." 2020.

https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.

displaced persons in the world and embraced approximately 2 million of its neighboring Venezuelans.²⁰⁰ Meanwhile, over 1 million forcibly displaced Colombians still reside within Venezuela, though there are concerns that estimates may be higher. The two neighboring countries have developed what seems to be a relationship of inter-displacement and mutual accountability. Despite Colombia's path of noticeable reforms and progress towards reconstruction and stability, millions of Colombians still reside among the primary Latin American host countries of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. The number of granted refugee and asylum claims abroad from Colombia has only decreased in recent years. Repatriation is made difficult, as violence associated with criminal activities and drug trafficking continue to plague the possibility for durable solutions. .

Figure 16. Colombia Leads in IDPs.

Forced displacement situations



Source: UNHCR Refugee Data Finder

*Excludes Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate. **Internally displaced people protected / assisted by UNHCR.

Source: UNHCR. 2020. "Global Trends." UNHCR Flagship Reports.

https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/#_ftn1.

²⁰⁰UNHCR. 2020. "Refugee Data Finder." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/#fifth>.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Armed guerilla groups, gang violence, and drug trafficking are the main actors responsible for the exacerbated plight of forced internal and external displacement in Colombia. In context, these groups come into conflict over a lack of economic resources. There is a power struggle among numerous armed organizations fighting for control in conflict zones of interest that coincide with illegal mining, coca plantations, or the areas that export the illegal products—primarily drugs.²⁰¹ This has been the brutal reality for the past several decades, making the situation in Colombia a definitive protracted situation. The violence can be traced back to the insurgency of Colombia's largest guerrilla faction in the mid-1960's, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP), which is responsible for direct harm against civilians and crimes against humanity. The FARC-EP has held predominant control over Colombia because of its disregard toward international legal norms, facilitating attacks such as “the killing and abduction of civilians, hostage-taking, disappearances, the use of child soldiers, grossly unfair trials, the cruel and inhuman treatment of captured combatants, attack on medical workers, and the forced displacement of civilians”.²⁰² This paramilitary group has been notoriously responsible for the use of prohibited weapons in the age of disarmament, such as land mines and gas cylinder bombs, with civilians as the main victims.

The peak of Colombian displacement can be traced all the way from 2002, although the numbers have significantly escalated in the past decade. The most recent turning point for Colombia's crisis occurred in 2016 with the Peace Agreement establishing a ceasefire between Colombia's government and its paramilitary groups. The end to the direct violence between law enforcement and paramilitary groups is a step towards the return of externally displaced Colombians, although

²⁰¹ UNHCR. 2020. “Colombia Global Focus.” The UN Refugee Agency Global Focus.
<https://reporting.unhcr.org/colombia>.

²⁰² HRW. 2005. “Colombia: Displaced and Discarded III.” Human Rights Watch.
<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia1005/5.htm>.

it does not promise a safe haven for internally displaced persons that are still in a state of flight from conflict-zones and the dangers of paramilitary groups themselves. Despite provisions for peace, Colombia's peak years of displacement have been reported as 2017-2021, with the first quarter of 2021 reporting a 64 percent increase in displaced persons compared with 2020's first quarter numbers.²⁰³

Recent affairs that led to protest demonstrations over corruption, proposed increased taxes and health care reform by the Democratic party of President Iván Duque Márquez have also contributed to an increase in displacement, especially from urban areas of conflict.²⁰⁴ The violent protests lasted over two months, from April 2021 to June 2021, in many of Colombia's major cities and resulted in the deaths of nearly 68 civilians due to police brutality and aggregated abuse against civilians.²⁰⁵ Overall, despite recent civil and political unrest, Colombia's crime rate has been on a slightly downwards trend since 2015. In 2018, Colombia had a violent crime rate of 25.34 percent, compared to 26.90 percent in 2015.²⁰⁶ Colombia's displacement crisis is more prevalent in urban poverty settings, possibly as a result of the large influx of displaced civilians who previously fled resource-rich zones under conflict and find themselves yet again in situations of escalated violence.

²⁰³ UNHCR. 2021. "Large-group internal displacement January to March." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Colombia%20internal%20displacement%20update%20January-March%202021.pdf>.

²⁰⁴ HRW. 2021. "Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protestors." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/09/colombia-egregious-police-abuses-against-protesters>.

²⁰⁵ HRW. 2021. "Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protestors." Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/09/colombia-egregious-police-abuses-against-protesters>.

²⁰⁶ The World Bank. 2021. "World Development Indicators." *Data Catalog*, (June). <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>.




Figure 17. Colombia's Displacement Evolution.

Source: UNHCR. 2021. "Large-group internal displacement January to March." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Colombia%20internal%20displacement%20update%20January-March%202021.pdf>.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Lower-income civilians and vulnerable communities such as Afro-Latinos and the indigenous population carry the largest burden of Colombia's displaced statistics. Similar to Venezuela, these community groups primarily reside in 'slums' that are predominantly preyed upon by drug cartels, traffickers, and armed militia groups. Such urban settings plagued by poverty and a lack of adequate law enforcement allow the growth of a crime epidemic in the country. Kidnappings for ransom, rape, and homicides continue to happen on a daily occurrence.²⁰⁷ Civilians in these zones often do not have means for escaping violence, and many have already used their

²⁰⁷ Stubbett, C.H., Pires, S.F. & Guerette, R.T. Crime science and crime epidemics in developing countries: a reflection on kidnapping for ransom in Colombia, South America. *Crime Sci* 4, 23 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-015-0034-5>.

resources to flee other areas of conflict. Among vulnerable communities, women and children and persons of diverse sexual orientation and gender identity (LGBTQ) are the most preyed upon targets. In 2020 alone, there was an 11 percent increase in persons of interest in Colombia and that number equates to roughly 11.3 million people recognized to be in the possibility of harm.²⁰⁸ Ex-combatant children in Colombia are of primary concern to the international community as they are often viewed as dangerous criminals when applying for asylum or refuge processes. Under international scrutiny, the government of Colombia recently ended a legal provision that forced the recruitment of underage children to be used as soldiers in combat against militia groups, although male students are enlisted in military schools from the age of fifteen.²⁰⁹ Still, children are one of the greatest victims of Colombia's displacement and violence- "Children as young as eight-years-old are fighting with guerrilla and paramilitary groups in Colombia. Children are often recruited forcibly and face harsh punishments, including death if they attempt to desert".²¹⁰ The recruitment of children into guerilla groups, and further on into cartels, is one of the most serious problems contributing to Colombia's cycle of instability.

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

One of the biggest challenges facing Colombian rebuilding and repatriation is that the situation has not been guaranteed as safe for returning Colombians. Of the one-half (500,000) of the one million displaced Colombians have been reported as returnees from Venezuela by Migración Colombia,²¹¹ only 25,300 have been actually registered by the National Registry of Returnees.²¹²

²⁰⁸ UNHCR. 2021. "Colombia Global Focus." The UN Refugee Agency.
<https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2542?y=2021#year>.

²⁰⁹ Refworld and Child Soldiers International. 2001. "Child Soldiers Global Report 2001- Colombia." Refworld/ UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency.

²¹⁰ Refworld and Child Soldiers International. 2001. "Child Soldiers Global Report 2001- Colombia." Refworld/ UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency.

²¹¹ UNHCR. 2020. "Colombia Global Focus." The UN Refugee Agency Global Focus.
<https://reporting.unhcr.org/colombia>.

²¹² UNHCR. 2020. "Colombia Global Focus." The UN Refugee Agency Global Focus.
<https://reporting.unhcr.org/colombia>.

The stark difference between these statistics represent a larger issue of quantitative data, in which these numbers only reflect a portion of the displaced documented migration; there very well may be more instances of retracted displacement, such as displaced Colombians in Venezuela residing among family or friends that fled before the state's structural collapse and have integrated through generations. Another crisis that can be potentially threatening to the stability of Colombia is the influx of displaced Venezuelans, which can be easy targets for violent groups and subject to growing xenophobia.

In addition to Colombia's major internal displacement crisis in recent years the country bears the responsibility of hosting 37 percent of Venezuela's externally displaced population.²¹³ In this way, durable solutions for those internally displaced take place as a new cross border displacement unfolds. Regardless, Colombia has been working closely with UNHCR correspondents to provide ten-year temporary protection status to Venezuelans that will open pathways of opportunities for jobs, education, and civil protections including healthcare amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

In regards to Colombia's own reform towards peace, the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) continue peace negotiations that started in October 2012. A ceasefire was officially passed in 2016 ending the state of war, though violence persists due to cartels, armed groups, and gang activity. Recent headways for peace on the UN's part have been the deployment of UN verification missions to administer the ceasefire operations. These are administered and observed as special political missions instead of peacekeeping operations. The United States has played a key role in providing \$391 million in financial assistance to Colombia for the advancement of human rights, rule of law, development, counternarcotics, law enforcement, and security.²¹⁴ Some of the reforms towards stability include

²¹³UNHCR-IOM. 2021. "UNHCR and IOM welcome Colombia's decision to regularize Venezuelan refugees and migrants." *The UN Refugee Agency*, (February).
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/2/60214cf74/unhcr-iom-welcome-colombias-decision-regularize-venezuelan-refugees-migrants.html>.

²¹⁴ Foreign Assistance. 2021. "U.S. Foreign Assistance Colombia." Foreign Assistance.
<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Colombia>.

“coca eradication and interdiction; institutional presence and licit economic opportunities in conflictive regions; land restitution; demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and rehabilitation of soldiers; respect for human rights; access to justice; protection of and services to internally displaced people, Afro-Colombians, indigenous populations, and other vulnerable citizens; global climate change and environmental conservation through the President's Global Climate Change Initiative; and humanitarian assistance and reparations for conflict victims and vulnerable populations”.²¹⁵ It is possible that such demonstrations aimed towards conflict resolution will allow higher numbers of Colombian repatriation and lower figures of displacement, although a proliferation of small arms is ongoing that is displacing communities regionally.²¹⁶ Colombia is being viewed as a country in the works of reintegration and rebuilding, while at the same time growing to be an important host figure for 16 percent of the world’s refugee population in Central and South America.²¹⁷ For the most part, Colombia recognizes the plight of displacement situations procuring in other countries, as has witnessed firsthand in their own country, and has allowed entry for displaced persons, along with temporary protected status provisions to Venezuelans among other local state conflicts.

²¹⁵ Foreign Assistance. 2021. “U.S. Foreign Assistance Colombia.” Foreign Assistance.
<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore/country/Colombia>.

²¹⁶ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2020. “Global Study on Firearm Trafficking 2020.” *UNDOC Research*.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf.

²¹⁷ UNHCR. 2018. “Global Trends- Forced Displacement in 2018.” The UN Refugee Agency.
<https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/>.

Northern Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras)

Section 1: General information and Data on Forced Displacement

The most turbulent region in the Americas is Northern Central America, a sub-region that includes El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These countries are characterized by similar factors of displacement. Coping with a range of issues from socio-economic instability to climate change, there are an estimated 890,000 displaced people in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.²¹⁸ Of these, 550,000 people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras solicited refuge and asylum in countries dispersed among both the North and South of the Americas region²¹⁹ and are excluded from internal displacement figures. With regards to the joint populations of the three countries of focus, there are 30 million people in this region and 318,000 persons reported to be internally displaced in Honduras and El Salvador;²²⁰ Guatemala's internally displaced population is estimated at 242,000 persons.²²¹

In terms of cross border displacement, the majority of FDPs from the sub-region are found in Mexico, the United States, and other neighbouring South American countries. Mexico hosts over 97,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the Northern Central American region²²² and has invested into large-infrastructure plans affiliated with the civil and political stability of these nations. Resettlement opportunities in the North for migrants from this region had such an influence that Hondurans account for the largest share of Northern Triangle migrants intercepted by U.S. border authorities, followed by Guatemalans and then Salvadorans.²²³ It is estimated that

²¹⁸ UNHCR. 2020. "Central America Refugee Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/central-america/>.

²¹⁹ UNHCR. 2020. "The Americas." 2020. https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.

²²⁰ UNHCR. 2020. "Displacement in Central America." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/displacement-in-central-america.html>.

²²¹ IDMC. 2020. "Guatemala." Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/guatemala>.

²²² UNHCR. 2020. "Displacement in Central America." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/displacement-in-central-america.html>.

²²³ CFR and Amelia Cheatham. 2021. "Central America's Turbulent Northern Triangle." Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northern-triangle>.

in the aggregate more than 2 million people have fled their own countries into the Northern Central American region, however there is still a high number of displaced persons and forced migrants that reside among the tri state borders (not necessarily considered IDPs). A protracted crisis has proven anew, with the period of 2013-2020 seeing the highest figures of reported internal displacement for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras alike.²²⁴ It is important to note that while each country in this region faces its own structural inequalities and violent trials, they still cooperate to register and take in refugee sharing from one another.

Figure 18. The Flows of Cross-Border Displacement North from Northern Central America



Source: UNICEF. 2018. "Uprooted in Central America and Mexico." UNICEF. <https://www.unicef.org/child-alert/central-america-mexico-migration>.

Section 2: Background and Drivers Explaining Forced Movements

Organized crime, socioeconomic instability and poverty, gang violence, threats, extortion, recruitments into gangs, prostitution, and sexual and gender-based violence are the main factors

²²⁴ IDMC. 2020. "Guatemala." Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/guatemala>.

explaining forced displacement in Northern Central America. Violence is the most severe cause of displacement in this region- refugees and asylum seekers have reported extraneous forms of brutality or physical/sexual abuse, particularly women and children. Coincidentally, all three of the Northern Triangle countries rank among the world's top 10 countries for homicides.²²⁵ The history of violence in this region is nearly five decades old, but it can be traced back to the region's political instability and civil wars following postcolonial independence in the 1970's- "In the late 1980s, the conclusion of the so-called Esquipulas II agreements between the countries of Central America— Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras —began the peace process that ended a decade of civil war and instability in the region."²²⁶ Instead of peace, Colombia has been a violent protracted situation for decades due to its paramilitary actors' influence in international criminal activity.

In the modern era, the end to many forms of government-militia violence have only led to a rise in inter-civilian violence, especially in urban settings. Even yet, political corruption among enforcement groups has been prevalent in Guatemala, "whose army and paramilitaries made a policy of killing civilians on an enormous scale during its long civil conflict."²²⁷ As civilians have increasingly grown more and more of a target to government and insurgent groups, displacement during the past decade has reached an all-time high. Violent gang activity is often orchestrated by the *maras*, one of the deadliest organized criminal gangs in Northern Central America that has assumed the deaths of over 20,000 Salvadoreans from just 2014-2017.²²⁸

More recently, displacement due to climate change and extreme weather events has become another significant push factor. Hurricanes Eta and Iota were some of the worst hurricanes in the prior two decades. They have led to the displacement of over 100,000 people in the Northern

²²⁵World Vision and Chris Huber. 2019. "Central America migration: Facts, FAQs, and how to help." World Vision. <https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/central-america-migration-facts#facts>

²²⁶Weiss, Thomas G., Coate, Roger A., and Pease, Kelly-Kate. 2016. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Boulder: Taylor & Francis Group. ProQuest Ebook Central.

²²⁷Weiss, Thomas G., Coate, Roger A., and Pease, Kelly-Kate. 2016. *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Boulder: Taylor & Francis Group. ProQuest Ebook Central.

²²⁸ International Crisis Group (ICG), *Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador*, 26 December 2018, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c07a4f94.html>

Central American region having to evacuate their homes and communities and relocate. Guatemala has had over 640,000 natural disaster displacements due to landslides, sinkholes, and flooding.²²⁹ Similarly, Honduras's "extensive rains and overflowing rivers"²³⁰ provide a stark warning of the effects of climate change on human mobility. El Salvador, like the latter two countries, experienced the effects of climate change in a tropical environment firsthand. Crop retention²³¹ is especially growing more difficult in rural areas and creates a pattern of displaced migration of several indigenous and regional communities.

Section 3: Characteristics of FDPs in Each Situation

Low-income communities are among the most vulnerable populations. They often reside in areas witnessing high violence activity. A hotspot for civilians in poverty, gangs and cartel groups are able to maintain their civilian casualties and victims of violence. Of these victims, persons of diverse sexual orientation and gender identity (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people), and women and children are the most affected subgroups. Women and children often fall vulnerable to armed cartel groups and trafficking in low-income communities where there is nearly no active law enforcement. They flee rape, murder, and extortion.²³² LGBTI are also fleeing persecution due to homophobic policies in this region and they are also preyed upon for sex trafficking, which is neglected by the mainstream party. It is especially concerning that displaced households have higher numbers of minors than non-displaced households.²³³ Children

²²⁹ UNHCR. 2020. "UNHCR joins response to victims of hurricane in Central America and Mexico." *UN Refugee Agency*, (November). <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/11/5fae985b4/unhcr-joins-response-victims-hurricane-central-america-mexico.html>.

²³⁰ UNHCR. 2020. "UNHCR joins response to victims of hurricane in Central America and Mexico." *UN Refugee Agency*, (November). <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/11/5fae985b4/unhcr-joins-response-victims-hurricane-central-america-mexico.html>.

²³¹ Welsh, Teresa. 2019. "To face climate change, Guatemalan farmers change their ways." *Devex*, (September). <https://www.devex.com/news/to-face-climate-change-guatemalan-farmers-change-their-ways-95685>.

²³² UNHCR. 2015. "Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico." The UN Refugee Agency. <https://www.unhcr.org/56fc31a37.pdf>.

²³³ JIPS. 2015. "Honduras." Joint IDP Profiling Service. https://www.jips.org/uploads/2018/11/original_HondurasP_G_web.pdf.

growing in this generationally protracted situation have been showing a ten-fold rise of apprehensions at both the U.S. and Mexican borders, usually with prospects of family reunification.

Section 4: Opportunities and Challenges in Responding to Forced Displacement

Around 500,000 migrants from the Northern Central American region have been able to find refuge in neighboring countries.²³⁴ Mexico works closely with countries of the region to provide assistance and legal entry for refugees and asylum seekers, although most internally displaced persons still remain neglected from many forms of institutional aid and resettlement. Nonetheless, Mexico has granted visas to an estimated 180,000 people from Northern Central America²³⁵ amid the effects of climate change which “will become to be known as the Great Derangement.”²³⁶ What fails to be mentioned is that the most in-need forcibly displaced populations either do not have documentation processes or the monetary means for relocation.

Children fleeing Northern Central America remain a primary group of concern. Fifty-eight percent of children are estimated to be living in regular instances of violence worthy of international recognition.²³⁷ Socioeconomic instability and violence still plagues the region with a lack of opportunities and will continue to impede the foreseeable return for displaced persons in the near future. Externally displaced populations are unlikely to be repatriated to this region because of the stress from the Covid-19 pandemic and lack of adequate healthcare systems,

²³⁴ UNHCR. 2020. “Central America Refugee Crisis: Aid, Statistics and News.” The UN Refugee Agency.
<https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/central-america/>.

²³⁵ UNHCR. 2020. “The Americas.” 2020.
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/gr2020/pdf/Chapter_Americas.pdf#_ga=2.206455956.620499862.1624408434-1788517807.1624408434.

²³⁶ Ghosh, Amitav. 2017. *The Great Derangement*. Berlin Family Lectures. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

²³⁷ UNHCR. 2020. “Children on the Run.” The UN Refugee Agency.
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-report.html>.

although repatriation is a key goal coinciding with stability, peace, and rebuilding. NGOs have played a significant role in providing humanitarian assistance in this region. Local organizations, churches, and international organizations, including UNHCR, have worked closely with the governments of this region and neighboring countries to reduce the effects of violence and instability by providing funding for displacement shelters.

Given that the United States is a primary host country for Northern Central Americans, the Biden Administration has put forth \$4 billion in structural reform assistance to aid in the future goal of relocation and reintegration.²³⁸ In early 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris convened with national Northern Central American authorities to address subsequent funding and rehabilitation for the region, while also delivering a stark warning that northern migration into the United States is not a viable option to either nation. The United States, on the one hand, tries to mitigate and address the root causes of displaced migration from this region while at the same time facing a challenging situation at the Southern border in terms of controlling entries, adjudicating cases, and recognizing foreign entities. The politicization of displaced migration has and shows a trend of continuing to affect Northern Central America FDP apprehensions. To this regard, the plight of displaced persons is made more difficult through burdensome restrictions limiting international criteria of refugees if they are in a country of second asylum. This becomes a problem for FDPs from Northern Central America who have to pass through Mexican border authorities if they are reaching for the U.S. border, as family relocation is a likely pursuit. FDPs may just as well be refugees, but because of this provision many are still denied a chance at entry and asylum. United States and European state influencers have addressed displacement by stressing sovereign responsibility and democracy building in alignment with SDGs that will hopefully reduce the number of displaced persons in this region, among many others, by 2030.

The lack of global international responsibility sharing remains a significant barrier for the *Americas*, among the *Middle East* and *Asia*, and *Africa* regions, all of whose local states take on

²³⁸ CIS and David North. 2021. "A Biden Plan for the Northern Triangle." *Center for Immigration Studies*, (April). <https://cis.org/Report/Biden-Plan-Northern-Triangle>.

host state responsibilities, causing intercorrelated displacement situations. It is important to take away that the total number of displaced people constitutes nearly 1 percent of the world population, so global responsibility sharing pertaining to displacement crises is a strong, and realizable possibility.

III. Conclusion

This report provided an overview of displacement situations over the past decade by looking into major cases of displacement around the world. The selection of cases discussed here aimed to cover a wide range of displacement situations. Through this case-study approach it has become apparent that displacement during the past decade occurred through diverse, but often interacting causes, has taken different forms both within and across borders, and has been addressed through a range of solutions spanning across multiple policy fields, including through humanitarian and developmental actions. Certainly, specific historical contexts help explain the nature and scale of displacement. As such, each of the situations described here are unique, and comparing and contrasting between them is fraught with complexity. While each situation is relative, a non-linear lens contextualizes displacement by areas in need of international assistance.

However, seen together, the cases offer a stark warning to the international community, humanitarian and development institutions and national and local actors. In particular, there are three global trends that this review highlighted.

- First, during the past decade, the people who had to escape danger and hardship, forced to leave their homes have been on the rise. This is not only due to the proliferation of conflicts, but increasingly natural disasters and the growing effects of climate change on peoples' lives and livelihoods. In many of the cases studied, displacement occurred through a combination of reasons and natural events often have acted as a significant multiplier to other drivers of displacement, including conflict, instability and violence. Internal displacement databases indicate that the majority of displacement is due to these reasons that are expected to intensify in the coming future.
- Second, the majority of the situations studied here are protracted situations of displacement that span years and thousands, if not millions of people, beyond what

official definitions define as *protracted displacement*.²³⁹ This raises important questions as to the ability of countries, regions and the international community to find timely and durable solutions for those displaced. It also brings to light the need for rethinking solutions, and approaches that do not replicate past failures that result in long periods of *virtual limbo* for those displaced.

- Third, though local knowledge on the experience of those forcibly displaced is growing, we are still far from understanding displacement from the perspective of those who are forced to flee. Programs, responses and solutions still pay limited attention to the inputs of those displaced in their design. A greater understanding of the needs, preferences and aspirations of FDPs could lead to more efficient and equitable programs, and importantly to greater life prospects for those forced to flee. Recognizing that the incorporation of more normative approaches in legal frameworks is growing evermore evident in the past decade, with a similar trend in early 2021. Such approaches have been applied in UNHCR operations and in urban contexts in IDP neighborhoods. However, they can be further mainstreamed into responding to displacement situations so that solutions are informed by more in depth local knowledge and participation of those on the move and their hosts.

²³⁹ UNHCR identifies a major protracted refugee situation as one where more than 25,000 refugees have been in exile for more than five years.

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