

MODULE OVERVIEW

HISTORICAL THINKING SKILLS:

Sourcing and Situation

- 2.A Identify a source’s point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience.
- 2.B Explain the point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience of a source.
- 2.C Explain the significance of a source’s point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience, including how these might limit the use(s) of a source.

Argumentation

- 6.A Make a historically defensible claim.
- 6.B Support an argument using specific and relevant evidence.
- 6.C Use historical reasoning to explain relationships among pieces of historical evidence.

CONTENT:

The global balance of economic and political power shifted during and after World War II and rapidly evolved into the Cold War. The democracy of the United States and the authoritarian communist Soviet Union emerged as superpowers, which led to ideological conflict and a power struggle between capitalism and communism across the globe.

The Cold War produced new military alliances, including NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and led to nuclear proliferation and proxy wars between and within postcolonial states in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

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WAS THE KOREAN WAR A PRODUCT OF DECOLONIZATION OR THE COLD WAR?

CLASS ACTIVITY: Structured Academic Controversy

Students will engage in a Structured Academic Controversy (SAC) to develop historical thinking skills in argumentation by making historically defensible claims supported by specific and relevant evidence.

AP ALIGNED ASSESSMENT: Thesis Statement

Students will analyze primary and secondary sources to construct arguments with multiple claims and will focus on creating a complex thesis statement that evaluates the extent to which the Korean War was a product of decolonization and the Cold War.

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EVALUATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD WERE CAUSED BY DECOLONIZATION OR THE COLD WAR?

CLASS ACTIVITY: Gallery Walk

Students will analyze multiple primary and secondary sources in a gallery walk activity. Students will evaluate to what extent each source reflects the historical developments of the Cold War or the process of Decolonization. Students will need to consider issues of sourcing and how the author supports his/her claim.

AP ALIGNED ASSESSMENT: Short Answer Question and Stimulus Based Multiple-Choice Question

Students will answer a short answer question and/or nine multiple-choice questions that focus on different interpretations of 20th-century historical developments and the influence of the process of Decolonization versus the impact of the Cold War.

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HOW DID THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DIFFER IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE KOREA BETWEEN 1949-1953?

CLASS ACTIVITY: Primary Source Analysis

Students will examine primary sources in order to analyze how the point of view, purpose, historical situation, and audience shape our understanding of what the document says. As an extension activity, students read and listen to veteran interviews in order to analyze how the veterans' experiences as remembered in oral histories shape our understanding of the causes and effects of the Korean War.

AP ALIGNED ASSESSMENT: Document-Based Question

Document-Based Question: Evaluate the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union differed in their efforts to influence Korea between 1949-1953.

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EXPLAIN THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE EFFECTS OF THE COLD WAR WERE SIMILAR IN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN HEMISPHERES.

CLASS ACTIVITY: Argumentation Exercise & Gallery Walk

Students will practice three targeted document-based skills: argument construction, making a claim, and complexity. Students need a basic understanding of global Cold War developments. Teachers could alternatively assign students to write the full AP-aligned DBQ.

AP ALIGNED ASSESSMENT: Document-Based Question

Document-Based Question: Explain the extent to which the effects of the Cold War were similar in the Eastern and Western hemispheres.

MODULE SOURCES

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| AUTHOR | SOURCE | DATE |
|-----------------|--|------|
| Dean Acheson | Memo to Harry Truman | 1945 |
| Soviet Officers | Report on Korea | 1945 |
| Kim Il Sung | Speech, 1st Congress of Korean Workers Party | 1946 |
| UN Resolution | The Problem of Independence of Korea | 1947 |
| U.S. Congress | Korean Aid Act of 1949 | 1949 |
| Syngman Rhee | Correspondence MacArthur to Truman | 1950 |
| Herb Block | Cartoon "Those are the Flags..." | 1950 |

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| AUTHOR | SOURCE | DATE |
|-----------------------|--|------|
| F Roosevelt, et al | The Cairo Declaration | 1943 |
| Terenti Shtykov | Telegram between the Soviets and North Koreans | 1950 |
| Andrei Gromyko | On American Intervention in Korea | 1950 |
| Syngman Rhee | Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist Conference | 1954 |
| David M. Barrett | Sterilizing a "Red Infection" | 1954 |
| Mao Zedong | Minutes of First Meeting with Nehru | 1954 |
| Dwight Eisenhower | Press Conference | 1954 |
| Edwin Marcus | Darkest Africa | 1955 |
| Catholic Cat. Guild | The Red Iceberg | 1960 |
| US Depart. of State | Memo from Rusk to Kennedy: Congo Crisis | 1961 |
| Che Guevara | Pasajes de la Guerra Revolucionaria | 1965 |
| Mao Zedong | We Hope the Arab Countries Will Unite | 1965 |
| Kim Il Sung | Let Us Promote the World Revolution | 1968 |
| US Defense Depart. | The Pentagon Papers | 1971 |
| Wiki Graphics: Semhur | Cold War Map, 1959 | 2008 |

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| AUTHOR | SOURCE | DATE |
|--------------------------|---|-------------------|
| Winston Churchill, et al | The Yalta Conference/Agreement | February 11, 1945 |
| Joseph Stalin | Notes of a meeting with Kim Il Sung | March 5, 1949 |
| Captain Vyvyan Holt | Confidential report to Ernest Bevin | January 30, 1950 |
| Joseph Stalin | Top secret telegram to Mao Zedong | May 14, 1950 |
| Marguerite Higgins | Newspaper article | May 30, 1950 |
| Harry S. Truman | Public statement | June 27, 1950 |
| Joseph Stalin | Letter to Klement Gottwald | August 27, 1950 |
| Chart | Troop strength during the Korean War | 1950-1953 |
| Harry S. Truman | Memoirs Years of Trials and Hope | 1955 |
| Jack Whelan | Interview, Korean War Legacy Foundation | 2019 |
| Charles Rangel | Interview, Korean War Legacy Foundation | 2013 |
| Glenn Paige | Interview, Korean War Legacy Foundation | 2012 |
| William F. Honaman | Interview, Korean War Legacy Foundation | 2018 |

| D A Y 4 | AUTHOR | SOURCE | DATE |
|------------------|---------------------|---|------|
| | W. Churchill, et al | Potsdam Conference Proceedings | 1945 |
| | Clark Clifford | Certain Aspects of the Euro. Rec. Problem | 1947 |
| | CIA | Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military Conquest of all of Korea | 1950 |
| | John B. Coulter | Letter to South Korean Pres. Syngman Rhee | 1951 |
| | Cornell Capa | Photo of billboard in "Guatemala's Current Situation Can Traced back to the CIA-led Coup" | 1954 |
| | Patrice Lumumba | TASS Interview | 1960 |
| | Kwame Nkrumah | Letter to President Lyndon B. Johnson | 1964 |
| | David Bonoir | House Congressional Record Report | 1985 |

DAY 3

Based on a 60-minute class

Lesson Question: How did the United States and the Soviet Union differ in their efforts to influence Korea between 1949-1953?

AP Curriculum Framework Reference

Unit 8 Learning Objective B: Explain the causes and effects of the ideological struggle of the Cold War

Unit 8 Learning Objective C: Compare the ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union sought to maintain influence over the course of the Cold War.

Historical Reasoning Skills: Sourcing and Situation

OVERVIEW

Students will explore a series of primary sources related to the Korean War. In groups and individually students will explain how the point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience helps inform their understanding of the documents. Students will also discuss the connections that the Korean War has to the present-day rivalry between China and the United States. The attached document-based question utilizes several documents for students to use as part of an in-class workshop or could be used on a separate day as a written assessment. In an extension activity students explore three Korean War veteran interviews in order to explain how oral histories can be used to better understand the causes and the effects of the Korean War.

EXTENSION ACTIVITY OPTION: A document-based extension activity focuses on the experiences of United States combat veterans from the Korean War as recorded in interviews conducted by the Korean War Legacy Foundation. The in-class activity can be done separately after the Day Four activity or in place of the Day Four activity. The veterans’ interviews extension activity can be especially useful if students need additional guidance or practice in the skill of sourcing.

Materials needed for:

Homework

- Textbook readings on the Cold War and the Korean War
- Korean War Legacy Foundation article and video excerpts for the chapter *Multiple Interpretations of the Cold War*
<https://koreanwarlegacy.org/chapters/multiple-perspectives-on-the-korean-war/>

In Class Activity

- Copies of documents 1-5 for the understanding sourcing activity
 - Copies of questions and chart for the understanding sourcing activity
 - Copies of the document-based question directions, prompt and documents
 - Copies of the Korean War Veteran’s Perspective documents and questions
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SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTION

HOMEWORK OVERVIEW

HOMEWORK (45 MINUTES):

- Students should read the text of the [Yalta Conference/Agreement](#).
- Students will complete a short reading from the Korean War Legacy Foundation Memory Bank’s chapter, *Multiple Perspectives on the Korean War*.
<https://koreanwarlegacy.org/chapters/multiple-perspectives-on-the-korean-war/>
- They should also listen to the first two video excerpts from Korean War veterans James P. Arguires and Howard Ballard contained on the same page.
- They should answer the question: Using the readings and the video excerpts, describe why Korea became a point of contention as part of the Cold War after WWII.

Teacher Notes

Students should have an understanding of the Cold War and the general background of the Korean War before engaging with the document activities in class. Readings from a college-level world history textbook should provide the needed background information.

CLASS ACTIVITY: WARM UP/INTRODUCTION

WARM UP/INTRODUCTION (5 MINUTES):

The homework reading from the Korean War Legacy Foundation website says, “A historian’s job is to account for as many different perspectives as possible.” Ask the students in the class what different perspectives on the origin of the Korean War were reflected in the homework reading and the video excerpts

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 1:

CLASS ACTIVITY (10 MINUTES):

Teachers divide the class into groups of three students. Each group reads [Document 1](#) by Joseph Stalin to Mao Zedong and answers the five questions that follow.

Teacher Notes

The third question that asks for historical situation refers to the larger context in which the document was created. The last question [How does an awareness of this document’s author, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience shape our understanding of what the document says?] is the most important and should lead to the most discussion. Students in their groups should think about how the various aspects of the source, such as point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience, inform how they interpret the information in the source.



Teaching Tip

Classes that have successfully worked on sourcing activities with primary sources will have an easier time with the questions. If students have less successful experience with sourcing, the teacher may need to model examples of appropriate responses.

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 2:

CLASS ACTIVITY (5 MINUTES):

Individually students read [Document 2](#) by Harry Truman and answer the four questions that follow. When finished students may share their responses within their group.

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 3:

CLASS ACTIVITY (20 MINUTES):

As a group students read documents [3](#), [4](#), and [5](#) and answer the questions on the understanding sourcing chart.

Teacher Notes

Be aware that some groups of three may want to take a shortcut by dividing the three documents among themselves so that each student only reads and answers questions for one document. For better understanding of how to source documents, however, all three students should work together on all three documents.



Teaching Tip

Individual students and groups may need more or less time to read the documents, answer the questions, and discuss possible responses in their groups. Keep in mind that the goal of the lesson is for students to analyze how a document is shaped by the document's author, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience. If student groups get too bogged down with the details of the documents, focus their attention on the last question.

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 4:

CLASS ACTIVITY (10 MINUTES):

As a whole class, review answers to all five documents. The discussion should focus on the skill of sourcing: explaining the significance of a source's author's point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience including how these might limit the utility of a source. Student volunteers should share their thoughts on how sourcing shapes their understanding of what the documents say about the origins of the Korean War.

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 5:

CLASS ACTIVITY (10 MINUTES):

The last part of the lesson involves connections to the modern-day rivalry between the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China. No treaty was signed to end the Korean War, so officially the war on the Korean Peninsula is still not over. In this lesson the secret document from Joseph Stalin to Mao Zedong indicates that China had a large role in the Cold War conflict in Korea. The chart of troop strength numbers that is document 7 in the DBQ exercise clearly shows the enormous commitment that China had in the war itself. Traditional history textbooks emphasize the Cold War conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., but the Korea War offers an example of the role of Communist China in the Cold War and provides a continuity to the present-day tensions involving China's growing military and economic power. Guide students in the reasoning process of continuity by having them discuss the on-going rivalry between the United States and China and how it connects to the military conflict between the United Nations forces and China in the Korean War about 70 years ago.

Teacher Notes

The teacher should finish the discussion and the lesson by directing students to include sourcing analysis within the body paragraphs of their document-based essays. When doing so, students need to go beyond merely mentioning a source's point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience. Instead they must explain how that source's point of view, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience is relevant to an argument.

Teacher Notes

After students have completed the Day Four activity on understanding sourcing, they can complete the attached document-based question, which uses three of the documents that they analyzed in the sourcing activity. The document-based question can be done as an assessment in class, as a homework exercise, or as an in-class activity.

HOMWORK MATERIALS

Text of the Yalta Conference

Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions...

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

- (a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
- (b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
- (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and
- (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration....

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
- (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;
 - (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
 - (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria....

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945.

IN-CLASS ACTIVITY MATERIALS

Understanding Sourcing

Read Document One as a whole group

Document One: Top Secret Telegraph from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, May 14, 1950.

Comrade Mao Zedong!

In a conversation with the North Korean comrades I expressed the opinion, that, in light of the changed international situation, the Chinese agree with the proposal of the North Koreans to move toward militarily uniting North and South Korea. I agree that the question should be decided finally by the Chinese and North Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades, the decision on the question should be postponed until a new discussion.

--Stalin

Who was Joseph Stalin?

Who was Mao Zedong?

What was the historical situation when this document was created?

What was Stalin's purpose in writing this letter?

How does this document's author, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience shape our understanding of what the document says about the origins of the Korean War?

Read Document Two individually

Document Two: Statement by United States President Harry S. Truman June 27, 1950, two days after the start of the Korean War

In [South] Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel [previous border between North and South Korea]. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security....

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

Who was Harry S. Truman?

What was the historical situation when this document was created?

What was Truman's purpose for making this statement?

How does this document's author, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience shape our understanding of what the document says about the origins of the Korean War?

Working in small groups, read Documents Three, Four and Five and answer the questions in the chart.

Document Three:

Source: Diplomatic letter from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to Czechoslovakian leader Klement Gottwald, August 27, 1950.

America became entangled in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt that America is now acting as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that it is not as militarily powerful as it claims to be. In addition, it is clear that the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It undoubtedly does.

Let us suppose that American government continues to be tied down in the Far East and also pulls China into the struggle for the freedom of Korea and its own independence. What might come of this?

First, America, just like any other country, cannot cope with China, a country with such large armed forces at the ready. It follows that America would overextend itself in this struggle. Second, having overextended itself in this matter, America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future. Therefore, a third world war would be postponed for an indeterminate period, which would provide the time necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe, not to mention that the struggle between America and China would revolutionize the entire Far East. Does all this not give us an advantage from the perspective of the global balance of power? It unquestionably does.

Document Four:

Source: President Harry S. Truman, in his memoirs, *Years of Trials and Hope*, 1955.

In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong had attacked the weak.... I remember how each time the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores.... If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war.

Document Five:

Source: Jack Whelan, Korean War veteran from the United States, from an interview with Dr. Jongwoo Han, president of the Korean War Legacy Foundation, 2019.

Interviewer: Did you know what you were doing over in Korea?

Jack Whelan: In a political sense or in a military sense, I was well aware of the principle of containment [of communism] that controlled the American point of view and that there was a serious containment leak [in Korea]. So it seemed to me a reasonable thing to do. I thought that containment was a bright idea. I still do. The United States has placed itself all around the world in order to protect the United States. So that may be the center of your question. An American fighting in Korea wasn't fighting for South Korea as much as he was fighting for its own country. He wasn't there as a generous soul to help a country that needed it. He was there because his country needed it. Now I don't think that makes us as good as you might like to think of us, but that is a fact.

Understanding Sourcing Chart

| Sourcing Questions | Document Three | Document Four | Document Five |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Who made the document? | | | |
| Who was the intended audience for this document? | | | |
| What was the historical situation when this document was created? | | | |
| What was the purpose for making this document? | | | |
| How does an awareness of this document's author, purpose, historical situation, and/or audience shape our understanding of what the document says about the origins of the Korean War? | | | |
| What limitations might this document have for historians studying the Korean War? | | | |

ASSESSMENT MATERIALS

DBQ

Suggested reading and writing time: 1 hour

You should spend 15 minutes reading the documents and 45 minutes writing your response.

Note: You may begin writing your response before the reading period is over.

Directions

Question 1 is based on the accompanying documents. The documents have been edited for the purpose of this exercise.

In your response, you should do the following.

- Respond to the prompt with a historically defensible thesis or claim that establishes a line of reasoning.
- Describe a broader historical context relevant to the prompt.
- Support an argument in response to the prompt using specific and relevant examples of evidence from at least six documents.
- For at least three documents, explain how the author’s point of view, author’s purpose, historical situation, and/or audience is relevant to an argument.
- Explain how at least one additional piece of historical evidence beyond those found in the documents relates to an argument about the question.
- Use evidence to corroborate, qualify, or modify an argument that addresses the prompt.

1. **Evaluate the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union differed in their efforts to influence Korea between 1949-1953.**

SOURCE 1

DOCUMENT

Notes of a meeting between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and North Korean (DPRK) leader Kim Il Sung, March 5, 1949

Kim Il Sung: The Korean government understands that without further economic and cultural aid from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for the DPRK to restore and develop its national economy and culture. The assistance of the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean economy and culture.

Comrade Stalin: What kind of aid?

Kim Il Sung: Economic and cultural.

Comrade Stalin: What precisely is needed?

Kim Il Sung: We have confirmed a two year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy. We need economic assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the foundation of the economy. We need machines, equipment and spare parts for industry, communications, transport and also for other branches of the national economy. We also need technical assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea, drafting plans for the construction of new objects (factories and plants), conducting geological exploratory work....

Comrade Stalin: Fine. In what amount do you need credit?

Kim Il Sung: From 40 to 50 million American dollars.

Comrade Stalin: Fine, what else?

Kim Il Sung: Cultural ties with the USSR. It is hoped, for example, that Soviet teachers could be sent to Korea for work in Korean institutions of higher education, that Korean students could be sent to the Soviet Union for study, that Korean specialists could be sent to the USSR for practical work in production technology, that teaching programs and literature for institutions of higher education and technical schools could be sent to Korea and that there be exchanges of cultural and artistic figures.

Comrade Stalin: It is possible to do this.

SOURCE 2

DOCUMENT

Confidential report from Captain Vyvyan Holt, the British diplomatic minister to South Korea, to Ernest Bevin, the British Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 30, 1950

No picture of Korea would be realistic which did not give a conspicuous place to American influence. Radiating from the huge ten-storied Banto Hotel—now the American Embassy—situated in the heart of the capital it penetrates into every branch of the administration and is fortified by an immense outpouring of money. The staff of the embassy—including the Economic Co-operation Administration—must number well over 300 men and women. Among them are specialists qualified to help the Korean Government deal with a wide range of subjects including purchasing, distribution, agriculture, fisheries, irrigation, forestry, mining, textile and metal industries, geology, electric power, transport, technological training, higher education, health and welfare and demographic statistics. American aid keeps the factories and mines working, provides vessels and nets for the fishing fleet and petrol for every motor vehicle in the country, besides financing all major public works and supplying the thousands of tons of chemical fertilisers indispensable for Korean farming. The Korean troops all wear American uniforms, carry American arms and move with American transport. Without this help the Republic of Korea could not have come into being and the people of the country owe an immense debt of gratitude to the United States for its munificent and disinterested bounty.

American cultural influence is also exceedingly strong. Information centres and libraries in the principal cities, a score of travelling cinemas, a symphony orchestra, touring puppet shows, news bulletins and a hundred or more annual scholarships for studies in the United States are all included in the activities of the appropriate branches of the embassy.... Moreover, the recreation of the people is as much dominated by America as their more serious hours. The cinemas, for the most part show American films, the “Voice of America” is picked up on radio sets in thousands of homes, and the children everywhere play volleyball, basketball, and baseball.

SOURCE 3

DOCUMENT

Top Secret Telegraph from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, May 14, 1950

Comrade Mao Zedong!

In a conversation with the North Korean comrades I expressed the opinion, that, in light of the changed international situation, the Chinese agree with the proposal of the North Koreans to move toward militarily uniting North and South Korea. I agree that the question should be decided finally by the Chinese and North Korean comrades together, and in case of disagreement by the Chinese comrades, the decision on the question should be postponed until a new discussion.

Stalin

SOURCE 4

DOCUMENT

Marguerite Higgins, war reporter for the *New York Herald Tribune*, from an article, May 30, 1950 interview with the commander of the Korean Military Advisory Group, Brigadier General W.L. Roberts

The South Korean Army, now 100,000 strong, has responded with astonishing quickness to American training during the last year, according to General Roberts. He said: "I would not hesitate to place any battalion of these soldiers bodily in the American Army. Man for man, they are far better than the Japanese Army ever was."

General Roberts said he considers the South Korean Army, which is both well trained and well equipped to be the best insurance the Western World has in these parts against Communist aggression. American military observers who have passed through this area seem to agree with him that this is one place where a minimum of American investment has produced top-notch military results....

The training of the South Korean forces is costing the American taxpayer about \$11,000,000 a year, considered a small price for a first-class garrison in this part of the world.

SOURCE 5

DOCUMENT

Statement by United States President Harry S Truman June 27, 1950, two days after the start of the Korean War

In [South] Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel [previous border between North and South Korea]. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security....

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

SOURCE 6

DOCUMENT

Letter from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to Czechoslovakian leader Klement Gottwald, August 27, 1950

America became entangled in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt that America is now acting as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that it is not as militarily powerful as it claims to be. In addition, it is clear that the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It undoubtedly does.

Let us suppose that American government continues to be tied down in the Far East and also pulls China into the struggle for the freedom of Korea and its own independence. What might come of this?

First, America, just like any other country, cannot cope with China, a country with such large armed forces at the ready. It follows that America would overextend itself in this struggle. Second, having overextended itself in this matter, America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future. Therefore, a third world war would be postponed for an indeterminate period, which would provide the time necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe, not to mention that the struggle between America and China would revolutionize the entire Far East. Does all this not give us an advantage from the perspective of the global balance of power? It unquestionably does.

SOURCE 7

DOCUMENT

Troop strength numbers for countries other than North and South Korea during the Korean War 1950-1953.

United Nations allies of South Korea

United States -- 1,789,000

United Kingdom -- 60,000

Canada -- 27,000

Australia -- 17,164

Turkey -- 15,000

Philippines -- 7,400

Thailand -- 6,500

Colombia -- 6,200

The Netherlands -- 5,300

Greece -- 5,000

New Zealand -- 4,500

France -- 4,000

Ethiopia -- 3,518

Belgium -- 3,498

South Africa -- 811

Luxembourg -- 89

Communist allies of North Korea

China -- 2,970,000

Soviet Union -- 3,277

(Note: Soviet troops were not officially deployed in frontline combat. Many were airplane pilots wearing Chinese uniforms and working out of military bases in China.)

DAY 3+

Based on a 60-minute class

DAY 3 EXTENSION ACTIVITY

Three Views of the Korean War from the Korean War Veterans' Perspective: A Congressman, a Scholar, and a Christian Missionary. This document-based extension activity focuses on the experiences of United States combat veterans from the Korean War as recorded in interviews conducted by the Korean War Legacy Foundation. The in-class activity can be done separately after the Day Four activity or in place of the Day Four activity. The veterans' interviews extension activity can be especially useful if students need additional guidance in the skill of sourcing.

SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTION

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 1:

CLASS ACTIVITY (10 MINUTES):

All students read the biographies of the three Korean War veterans and answer two questions:

- 1) Based on their biographies, how might the background of Charles Rangel, Glenn Paige, and William Honaman influence their view of the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?
- 2) What do you predict that they might say about the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

Teacher Notes

This examination of the veterans' biographies may be best done individually. After students have read the biographies and answered the questions, they should share their responses with a partner. After the paired sharing, the teacher can open up the questions to a full class discussion.

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 2:

CLASS ACTIVITY (25 MINUTES):

All students read the edited transcripts, sources 2-4, of the three Korean War veterans and answer three questions:

- 1) What do Charles Rangel, Glenn Paige, and William Honaman say (if anything) about the causes and/or effects of the Korean War?
- 2) After reading the transcripts, who seems to have the most reliability when discussing the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?
- 3) How accurate was your prediction about what the veterans might say about the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

CLASS ACTIVITY PART 3:

CLASS ACTIVITY (25 MINUTES):

As a whole class watch and listen to portions of the video clips (provided within sources 2-4) of the three Korean War veterans speak about their experience. As a whole class discuss the following questions:

- 1) Does listening to the veterans speak about the Korean War alter your impression of their reliability when discussing the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?
- 2) What are the strengths and limitations for historians using oral histories such as these as historical documents.
- 3) What types of historical issues of the Korean War could be best addressed through the use of oral histories? What historical issues might not be as well addressed?

IN-CLASS ACTIVITY MATERIALS

Three Views of the Korean War from the Korean War Veterans' Perspective A Congressman, a Scholar, and a Christian Missionary

PART 1

All students read the [biographies](#) of the three Korean War veterans (Doc 1) and answer two questions:

- 1) Based on their biographies, how might the background of Charles Rangel, Glenn Paige, and William Honaman influence their view of the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

- 2) What do you predict that they might say about the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

PART 2

All students read the edited transcripts of the three Korean War veterans and answer three questions:

- 1) What do [Charles Rangel \(Doc 2\)](#), [Glenn Paige \(Doc 3\)](#), and [William Honaman \(Doc 4\)](#) say (if anything) about the causes and/or effects of the Korean War?

- 2) After reading the transcripts, who seems to have the greatest reliability when discussing the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

- 3) How accurate was your prediction about what the veterans might say about the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

PART 3

As a whole class, watch and listen to portions of the video clips of the three Korean War veterans speak about their experience. As a whole class, discuss the following questions:

- 1) Does listening to the veterans speak about the Korean War alter your impression of their reliability when discussing the causes and/or the effects of the Korean War?

- 2) What are the strengths and limitations for historians using oral histories such as these as historical documents.

- 3) What types of historical issues of the Korean War could be best addressed through the use of oral histories? What historical issues might not be as well addressed?

SOURCE 1

DOCUMENT

Korea War Veteran Biographies

Congressman Charles Rangel <https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/congressman-charles-rangel/>
Interview video clip: <https://youtu.be/3WSqIFLHUIQ>

Bio: Charles Rangel was born June 11, 1930 in Harlem, New York. At these of 17, he enlisted in the military as a way to help support his family. During the Korean War Mr. Rangel served in the 2nd Infantry Division. He was awarded the Bronze Star and Purple Heart for leading a group of men out of a Chinese encirclement at Kunu Ri. Rangel is best known for his life after the military in which he served in the U.S. House of Representatives representing New York from 1971-2017.

Professor Glenn Paige

<https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/glenn-paige/>
Interview video clip: <https://youtu.be/QrfPIAGZoI4>

Bio: Dr. Glenn Paige was born in Brockton, MA on June 28, 1929. He had completed his freshman year at Princeton University when he enlisted in the Army in August 1948 before the outbreak of the Korean War. He received the Korean Service Medal with 7 Bronze Stars, and the Army Commendation Medal. After returning from Korea, he studied politics, Princeton 1955; Asian Studies (Korea), Harvard 1957; Political Science, and at Northwestern, earning his Ph.D. in 1959. His doctoral dissertation: *The Korean Decision Reconsidered: June 24-30, 1950?*, was based on interviews with President Truman and other top leaders. He returned to Korea as a research adviser at Seoul National University. After teaching at Princeton and the University of Hawaii, he founded the nonprofit Center for Global Nonviolence, which then became the Center for Global Non-Killing.

William F. Honaman

<https://koreanwarlegacy.org/interviews/william-f-honaman/>
Interview video clip: <https://youtu.be/GzO74VOy9NM>

Bio: William F. Honaman enlisted with the National Guard Reserve when he was in high school, which resulted in his call to active duty for the Korean War. He was given officer training and sent to Korea to lead his own platoon. He earned the Purple Heart, as a soldier he was walking with set off a landmine. After the war he served as an Anglican lay missionary in Japan from 1958-2000.

SOURCE 2

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| DOCUMENT | Congressman Charles Rangel Interview Transcript |
| Interview Clip | Transcript corresponds to 2:19-4:24 https://youtu.be/3WSqIFLHUI0?t=139 |

Well Korea has really been a pride of the United Nations and America that young Koreans may not know or have reason to know, the devastating effect that the Communist invasion had on their country in 1950, and when you couple this with the cruel way in which you had the Japanese occupation, then these are classic examples of man's inhumanity to mankind, and when you see a bright light where people survive and become stronger, then the Korean people should thank God and that they had the resiliency to come from a country one that was suppressed in their self-esteem, suppressed in terms of who they were compared with the, Japanese, but also in having a country run over, by their own families and friends, in the Civil War and America's gone through that and uh you can't imagine the pain it is, to be fighting in a war but when you're fighting with your own blood. And the Korea that I left in 1951, there was not a building standing erect I mean there was no way for me to think that I would ever go back to Korea, but there was never any thought of Korea being restored to the elevation in terms of civilization that she is now. To be a world power metropolitan industrialized country a democracy a trading partner of the United States, to have so many Koreans want to become American citizens, I think completely justifies our intrusion in stopping the Communists.

SOURCE 3

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| DOCUMENT | Professor Glenn Paige Interview Transcript |
| Interview Clip | Transcript corresponds to 13:14-18:15 https://youtu.be/QrfPIAGZol4?t=794 |

Interviewer: What was the kind of, uh, social mood in America in late 1940's, and how that was related to the Korean War? What was people's reaction to that, when you first heard about it?

Glenn Paige: You know, I think, after 1945, of course there was a, a big demobilization in the United States, demobilize the Army and then all the things have been rationed and, to build tanks and airplanes and stuff like that that we convert today building washing machines, refrigerators and automobiles and things. So that was going on. And, but after 1948, the Iron Curtain and the Soviet, tension between Eastern Europe, Soviet occupation and the tension between the United States and Russia, Stalin, Truman, Churchill, there was a real sense of Cold War, the Communism is coming. So it wasn't a relaxed time of, it was a real sense of tension and calculations what's going on, and the Chinese Civil War. You, you gotta put the Chinese Civil War into this in 1949 was a triumph of Communism the Chinese have stood up. They stood up, you know. And so at the tension in the United States, you're gonna have a struggle with Communism. It's dangerous. That's the atmosphere. And so when the Korean War breaks out, of course, well, little things happen with a Communist country attacking one of our friends. We don't know much about our friends, but, it was supposed to be democratic. America didn't know it was not all that democratic, and they didn't know there'd been a lot of killing inside of Korea North and South. They didn't know everything that had happened since 1945 to '48. And when I think about the butchering on Jeju Island over there. They didn't know anything about this. And, but it's just a good guys being attacked by the bad guys, but even then, you know, what I found out in my book, even the Washington pundits in the newspapers didn't expect Truman was going to do anything. They didn't think that the U.S. was so, made a decision right away, uh, sometime around, I mean, uh, June 24, 25th was quite a surprise. But then when the United States gets into a war and whether people like it or not, it's only a small minority that really object at first. So most people accepted that, and then there was a big military build-up. Budget went up and the developed NATO and start attacking North Korea really militarized the United States. It might have been on a less trajectory turn a more peaceful mobilization if the United States had got along with Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong wanted to somehow make peace with the United States, but Truman rejected that, and we could have been on a more friendly feeling with them in 1950, along that area. But that attack in Korea just made it bad for everybody. It made them militarize the Chinese. It made a miracle of Japanese economic recovery because they benefited from all the American build-up, and it did make a terrible influence on the people of South Korea, militarized the North Koreans. It's just a disaster. All the way around. We'll have six million of us and plus all the other 21 countries, I think we were most of us young people. We weren't political strategists or anything. We were all just human beings caught up in

our personal you know, lives and soldiers doing what they're ordered to do and, you know, and, they all participated, and everyone's a victim of it, and the people suffered. The people that suffered the most were the Korean people from all this, and Chinese who remember, too.

SOURCE 4

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| DOCUMENT | William Honaman Interview Transcript |
| Interview Clip | Transcript corresponds to 29:41-36:24 https://youtu.be/GzO74VOy9NM?t=1781 |

William Honaman: The stated reason that was always given was to prevent Communism from taking over.

Interviewer: South Korea.

William Honaman: Yeah. Well, we were there to protect the, you know, when, at the time, of, I wasn't aware really. I had had a course in Asian History in college, but to really know what was going on and what the people thought and, it wasn't until later that I internalized and really knew and understood this position of the Korean people.

Interviewer: Tell me about it now.

William Honaman: Because of their long under the thumb of control of Japan, that the, September, I mean the victory in the Pacific, the end of the Second World War for the Koreans, the most important thing was they got freedom from Japan.

Interviewer: Liberation.

William Honaman: Liberation. They, it, it wasn't about the end of the war. That their big thing was they were liberated from the Japanese control. And Japan had been very bad to Korea since 1910. And still, you know, everybody knows the Koreans and Japanese are always wary of each other and

Interviewer: Still fighting.

William Honaman: Still, and still fighting in a way. Cultural fighting. But you know, not until you live and experience it and realize what the segregation is and the oppression.

Interviewer: But what's got to do with the Korean War that you fought for?

William Honaman: Well, uh, it helped keep the Chinese out from expanding into Korea, and what, who knows where, uh, Japan or

Interviewer: So now you think what do you think about the legacy of the Korean War? Why you were there? From your current contemporary perspective after you all put that into perspective. Do you know why you were there, and what is the meaning of you being there and so many other Americans for the war?

William Honaman: To help, to help keep freedom for people. And to help to stop Communist aggression, but now, I, you know, Communism, political Communism is political Communism and economic Communism and social Communism are all a little bit different. The way the Chinese Communists liberated China, well, a dictatorship is the kings, the emperors of China were not ideal, and that was not an ideal way, and it's, and it needed to be changed. But it was rather drastic the way that Mao Zedong went about it. But that kind of political Communism where you oppress and kill people is not necessarily good. It's, it's a different, I think it was, we used to always talk about don't cut that tree down. We'll have to pay Syngman Rhee for it. There was an order that you couldn't cut down trees because Syngman Rhee didn't want the trees being denuded from the, so, enough of them got blown up anyway. But, well, there was always something about Syngman Rhee. He was the President of South Korea at the time, but not too popular amongst the American military.

Interviewer: Also, the North Korea was, the Kim Ill Sung was a very popular and legitimate leader because he's the one who stood up against Japanese colonial control

William Honaman: That's right.

Interviewer: In Manchuria and in, in Soviet Union. So in all only North Korean period, he was upheld as a father, and he's the national leader, legitimate leader and until 1970's, North Korea was better off than South Korea. So I think your point, deliberation, has a lot to do with this whole thing on North Korea and the Korean War, and that problem hasn't been solved yet.

William Honaman: But I think it will be.

Interviewer: Yeah. What do you think?

William Honaman: Oh, I, I think it's, uh, it, ridiculous is a dumb word, but I think it's, it's just immoral that people of the same language and the same culture are separated just because of human error. I mean some junior grade officer in the middle of the night decided that that's the line.

Interviewer: Exactly. Yeah, Dean Rush, another fool, draw the line along 38th. And some officer in the military looked at the map. Oh, that looks like a good place. I mean, no reason. Why is it, you know, Imjin River is here. Oh, that's good, and we'll just draw it across here, and it doesn't go on the 38th Parallel. It starts below it and goes up above it. Um, but it's impossible for, those people are natural to live together, and originally before all that separation, there were more Christians in the north than the south. But most of them fled or got out somehow. But I mean, I think eventually they'll be reunited.

Interviewer: We hope so.

William Honaman: And maybe, maybe, maybe Christianity can help with that.
