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Harvey Goldberg Lecture Transcript: Beginning of Capitalism (#41). Feb. 25, 1977. Double click on the arrow **ABOVE** the title to listen directly (click on the = to stop, double click on the arrow to start again where you left off—as long as you are in the same session). Click on the title to download an .mp3 version for your computer or .mp3 player. If you are simultaneously listening and reading this transcript, note that times are kept on the audio playback.

Nothing then affords us a more critical insight into the acceleration of Capitalism in 16th and early 17th Century England than the persistent and repeated efforts of the state to slow it down. And of the established Anglican Church, which emerged from the English Reformation, to moralize the social practices and the economic practices of 16th Century England. And nothing affords us a more critical clue to the causes of that great English Revolution which was to explode in the 1640s, than the patent failure in that exercise in social restraint and economic regulation. For by the time you get to the middle of the 17th Century you will find that those emerging capitalists, who are rich and resentful, who have in no way been curbed by this kind of exercise in restraint, who are operating in agriculture and in trade and in industry, are now hell bent on removing the fetters to their enterprise. And of so subordinating the state to their purposes that it will be from then on a very pliant ally, and not a very suspicious disciplinarian. The point I am making is certainly not that in any doctrinal or systematic way the Tudor and early Stuart monarchs were opposed to trade or industry. What I am saying is that their interest and their support for trade and industry was very sporadic, it was always half hearted, and inevitably it was self interested. That that support—after all—was grounded in considerations of national power and of national security rather than in any solicitude for the profits and the opportunities of the emergent capitalists of England. And so it was that those monarchs of the 16th and the early 17th Century did support overseas trade, in so far as that trade really increased the customs revenues that went into the royal treasury. But if it were a question, for example, of deploying the power of the State in order to break open new overseas or colonial markets, then the State was extremely reluctant to do that. Consider, if you please, that in the first two decades of the 17th Century, English overseas merchants entreated their government over and again to give them support in their struggle against Dutch rivals who were driving them off the seas, who were taking one overseas market after another from them. And that those entreaties—after all—fell on deaf ears—both the ears of Elizabeth, the last of the Tudors, and James the First, the first of the Stuarts.

It is true that we find instances in that 16th and early 17th Century, in which the state supported the promotion of native industry. We find it, for example, in the law of 1553 when the State places a prohibition on the import into England of foreign hats and caps¹ in order to buttress the native hat making industry. We find it more dramatically in 1557 when the State legislates that there shall be a limit

¹ *Statutes of the Realm*: Vol. 4, Pt. 1, 1 Mary, St. 2, c. 11. Section 19, p. 210. "An acte for the Sale of Hattes and Cappes made beyonde the Sea." Available at Google Books: at the address click on "Contents" then Sec. 19.

<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R7CZMMbcOx4C&pg=PP9#v=onepage&q&f=false>

now placed on the amount of white unfinished cloth² that can be exported to foreign cities where it will then be finished and dyed. And that, of course, in the interest of creating employment in the native dyeing and finishing industry in England. But all of those instances that we can gather together have nothing to do with a doctrinal support for industrial Capitalism. What they have to do with is the fear that unless there is sufficient employment there will be social upset and social unrest in England which can threaten the stability of the Realm. It is true that we do find those pieces of legislation that effectively try to protect what we call nascent or infant industries in 16th and early 17th Century England. And the instrument chosen for that is the Patent or the Right of Monopoly.³ So that monopolies are sold by the Crown to certain very fortunate and selected entrepreneurs, who thereby avoid the risk of their capital investment. Who, so long as they have a monopoly, can be assured of large and steady return. But in its origin, that system of monopolies, which we date back to the Elizabethan period in the middle of the 16th Century, in its origin that policy—after all—was geared toward military considerations. It was geared toward buttressing the military capability of the Crown. So that those monopolies were originally given for the production of those commodities that are basically war materiel, like saltpeter or like gunpowder. And the very first of them, which is the Elizabethan Royal Mines, was created in order to make England independent of foreign sources and supplies of copper. And then when you get down to the turn of the 17th Century, even that purpose disintegrates, and the granting of monopolies for money becomes sheerly a fiscal racket. So that what the state is doing is selling those monopolies in certain industrial fields in order to buttress its treasury. All of which means, of course, that there are all kinds of very ambitious would be capitalists, who become bitterly resentful of the fact that they are excluded from the expanding of production and the creation of new markets.

You see the point I am making is that both the Tudor and the Stuart Monarchies, especially down until the Civil War of 1640, had a profound apprehension about the staggering and the shattering impact of an aggressive and expansionist Capitalism upon the stability of the Realm. Upon its social peace and order. You see that those monarchs—after all—were the legatees of the Medieval social order, and of the theory of that Medieval social order. They—after all—thought to deploy the power of the State in very good Gramscian fashion in order to preserve the hegemony of the traditional ruling class. They had no more exalted purpose in their politics and in their social policy than—after all—to preserve the social pyramid. To make sure that the society of ranks and estates was kept intact. To make sure that everyone

² *Statutes of the Realm*: Vol. 4, Pt. 1, 4 & 5 Phil. and Mary, c. 5. Section 28, p. 323-326. "An Acte towching the making of Woolen Clothes." Available at Google Books: at the address click on "Contents" then Sec. 28.

<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R7CZMMbcOx4C&pg=PP9#v=onepage&q&f=false>

³ From *Statutes of the Realm* "Statute of Monopolies 1623" (21 Jac. 1 c3): "An Act concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures thereof," transcribed into modern English at Wikisource:

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Statute_of_Monopolies

It is unclear that this is what Goldberg is referring to, as he is referring to events during the reign of Elizabeth I. This statute was passed much later. For more on the background of the statute see the article at Wikipedia on "Statute of Monopolies."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Monopolies

in his rank and estate had some kind of protection. To make sure that the laboring poor were not driven to that brink of despair which would make them—after all—a class in revolt. And consequently Capitalism constituted a tremendous problem, because it moves like a bull in a china shop. It is expansionist. It is aggressive. It —after all—overturns rule and custom. It threatens a society of ranks. It threatens a society of customary protections. Old laws and old customs fall like flies. And against that inflationary spiral which cannot be controlled in the 16th Century, what alternatives did the monarchs of 16th and early 17th Century England have, except to curb the appetites of the capitalists? To curb that expansionism or to risk and to face social upheaval from below.

And it's in that context that you can understand that phenomenal fact that in the year 1549, the year of so called Kett's Rebellion.⁴ The year when there was a great peasant rebellion in the north of England. Peasants driven to that insurrection by their despair at the enclosure movement and at the expropriation of their land. In that very year of Kett's Rebellion the king, Edward VI's favorite ideologue, the man who so deeply influenced him, produced a tract in which he urged upon the king to practice the traditional ancient strategy of stewardship. We are talking, of course, about Thomas [sic] Bucer.⁵ Thomas Bucer, who is the tutor to the king, Edward VI, and who is himself a Professor of Divinity at Cambridge. And who, in 1549, writes a tract that will be influential, called *De Regno Christi—On the Christian Commonwealth*. And in that tract, he not only elaborates the principles of Christian politics as he sees them, but he also elaborates a strategy of social conservatism to which every Tudor and early Stuart monarch in one variant or degree or another would finally adhere. And what is it that Bucer preaches to the King that so influences him? What is—after all—this idea of stewardship which is to inform the monarchy and is to keep that conservative social order intact? It is, of course, that able bodied idlers must be excommunicated by the Church and must be punished by the State. But it is also, says Bucer, that the State must be a pious mercantilist. That it must guarantee that the woolen industry will remain intact because people are clothed that way. It must guarantee that arable land is not converted into pasture because people eat that way. And finally it must beware of the merchants. It must beware of the capitalists because they are driven by ambition. They are driven by ego. They do not concern themselves

⁴ For more on Kett's Rebellion listen to the audio lecture by Peter Clark for the Bristol Radical History Group at:

<http://www.brh.org.uk/dwtf2008/kett.html>

The most exhaustive online summary is at Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kett%27s_Rebellion

⁵ For more on Martin Bucer and *Di Regno Christi*, see the editor's introduction in *Melanchton and Bucer* edited by Wilhelm Pauck (Library of Christian Classics Vol. XIX, Westminster Press, 1969, p. 155-173). Both *Melanchton and Bucer* and the Wikipedia Bucer article at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Bucer

contain bibliographies for further reading on both Bucer and *Di Regno Christi*.

with the good of the commonweal. “For though trade in itself,” writes Bucer,” is honorable, most merchants are rogues. Indeed, next to the sham priests of the Roman Church, no class of men is more pestilential to the commonwealth.”⁶ And so what Bucer recommends, really is like an echo out of those scholastic tracts of the 13th Century. Because he recommends that the State set just prices regardless of what the market says. That the State concern itself with the quality of goods. That the State prevent usury, quite an impossibility in that feverish age of speculation. But most of all, that it discipline all of those private entrepreneurs, all of those property holders who live only for their own profit and who are menaces to the welfare of the entire society. And so Bucer ends his tract by saying “Neither the Church of Christ nor the Christian Commonwealth ought to tolerate such as prefer private gain to the public weal, or seek it to hurt their neighbors.”⁷

Now is this all just pious, wishful thinking? Is this—after all—simply on paper? No, not if you realize that for well over a hundred years in that long Tudor Century, that there were repeated efforts, for example, on the part of the Tudor Monarchy, to legislate against the enclosure movement and to prevent the depopulation of the villages, to prevent the expulsion of the peasantry. The first of those laws in 1488, the last of them in 1621. And in that period of time a tremendous effort to rein in the forces of market Capitalism. Now granted that the monarchs had very special interests in wanting to end and stop enclosures. One was a military interest. That—after all—they provided themselves with armed forces largely through recruited militias. And who was good for a militia? Certainly not a vagabond. Certainly not a fatigued urban worker. But those sturdy peasants, those small peasants on the land, from the yeomanry all the way down to the poorest cotters.⁸ They were the ones with a stake in the land. They

⁶ This is from a paraphrase of *Di Regno Christi* by R.H. Tawney in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (p. 142, 1998 reprint, Transaction Publishers. Originally published, 1926, Harcourt, Brace and Company., Inc.). The actual quote from *Melanchthon and Bucer, De Regno Christi* Chapter L (The Reform of Marketing, p. 342-343) is:

“Marketing is a business which is honest and necessary for the commonwealth if it confines itself to the export and import of things that are advantageous to the commonwealth for living well and in a holy way, but not those which encourage and foster impious pomp and luxury. In order to benefit men’s piety, this purpose ought never to be absent from the thoughts and deeds of Christians but should always be considered and weighted as scrupulously as possible.

Therefore, inasmuch as merchants pretty commonly reject this purpose, they burst forth with wickedness and greed, so that next to the false clergy there is no type of men more pestiferous to the commonwealth.”

⁷This is an almost exact quote from the epigram preceding Chapter 2 (p. 63) of R.H. Tawney’s *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. I have been unable to find the exact quote in *Melanchthon and Bucer*. The closest I was able to find was near the end of Chap. LVI: The Tenth Law: On the Revision and Elaboration of Civil Laws, p. 360:

“Then in the third place there may follow laws to regulate the exchanges of goods and services in this life and voluntary and involuntary contracts. ... In the formulation, emendation, and elucidation of laws of this kind, one must take the greatest care to exclude from the commerce of the citizens all greed...and also all fraud and deceit. If such creeps in, it should receive the strictest attention and be gotten rid of. The citizens must be made to realize that that person ought not be tolerated, neither in the Church of Christ nor in any Christian commonwealth, who is found to prefer private to public advantage or to seek his own interests to the disadvantage of others, and who is not disposed to cultivate among his neighbors mutual benevolence and beneficence, trust, honesty and appreciation.”

⁸ Cotters: agricultural laborers.

were the ones that would fight. And there was with that a financial and a fiscal interest. Because—after all—the Treasury was filled mainly from land taxes. Mainly from the so called Subsidy on the Land, which meant—after all—that given that very class orientation of tax assessments, that meant that the richest landowners paid the least. That if you drove the small peasants off the land, you would deplete your financial resources. But let's not underestimate that the driving force behind this anti-enclosure legislation was a conservative social theory in the best sense of the word "conservative." That there was an effort to preserve the social pyramid. To preserve—after all—those unequal class relationships upon which that social pyramid rested. To protect the peasant and the craftsman in his estate, just as the merchant and the landowner was protected in his estate. The estate to which Divine Providence had called everyone in the Commonwealth. And so you get those laws, like the law of 1532, [sic]⁹ which set the limit of 2,200 sheep that anybody could own. And that would mean that you didn't need those immense sheep runs. And that would mean that you would reduce the passion to enclose land for pasture. Or the law of 1549, [sic]¹⁰ a little bit fantastic, that placed a poll tax on each head of sheep.

And then of course, in the end, it failed. And we know that the anti-enclosure legislation failed. And therein lies a story. Are the forces of the market, is Capitalism so immensurable, that not even legislation really can stop it? And what is at the root of that failure? In part of course, that the Crown itself in the Tudor period, contributed to that very fever of commercialization of agriculture, which we have already described. To that conversion of land into a commodity to be bought and sold on the market. We know the Henry VIII seized the monastery lands. We know that he put them up for sale. And that he habituated an entire society to coming to view land as a commodity for the market. To dropping those inhibitions which had traditionally said that you do not alienate land. That you do not sell it because it is a human environment.

But even more important than that, you legislate against something, how do you enforce it? And the enforcement machinery is not adequate to the monarch's will. Because that enforcement machinery in England belongs to the class which will contest these regulations. It belongs, in the local areas, to the Justices of the Peace. To those very men, whether they be gentry or merchants who are into active—uh market activity, up to their necks. And so when they enforce the law, they do not enforce it against their own interests. They let those pieces of legislation lapse, which will undercut their own sense of gain.

⁹ *Statutes of the Realm* V 3, 25 Henry VIII, c 13, 1533-34, An Acte concyng Fermes and Sheep, p. 451-454. Available via Hein Online database. Check your library for availability. Note that the penalty was set at 3s 4d per sheep for every sheep over 2,000. Marx discusses this statute in *Capital*, Vol. 1, Chap 27.

<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch27.htm>

See third paragraph

¹⁰ *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 4, Part 1, 2&3 Edward VI, c36, section 13, 1548, p. 78-93. An Acte for a Relieff graunted to the Kyngs Majestie by the Temporalitie. Poll tax is on P. 80, second paragraph. Available at Google Books: at the address click on "Contents" then Sec. 13.

<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R7CZMMbcOx4C&pg=PP9#v=onepage&q&f=false>

And so those market forces prove to be inexorable. But look, let's face it. That there's something rather remarkable about the activity of a century to try to stop something that for small cotters and small peasants, was a social catastrophe. Granted that it is rooted in paternalism. Granted that it is rooted in that social conservatism. But you see, it tells us something about the trauma of the transition to a capitalist mode of production, that so many people in such high place in fact, were worried about a community coming apart at the seams. Compare that to the two century later enclosure movement at the end of the 18th Century. And then you realize what it means when a whole society becomes habituated to thinking of everything as a vendible commodity. Because in the late 18th Century, when you have the great grain enclosures that effectively depopulate the villages, that create Oliver Goldsmith's deserted villages.¹¹ That effectively capitalize agriculture once and for all in England, the state doesn't murmur a protest. But in fact approves, and all applaud who have anything to do with the ruling classes.

And so it is of some importance anyway that in the 16th Century and early 17th, there was that deep apprehension that echoed so much in the past, that we have tried to ferret out and root out. And that fundamentally meant that monarchs, for whatever self interest, would run by that idea of stewardship that was so very well explicated by Thomas Lever, the favorite divine of Edward VI, who preached a sermon in 1550 before the King, in which he said this: "He who exploits his property with a single eye to its economic possibilities at once perverts its very essence and destroys his own moral title."¹²

¹¹ *The Deserted Village* (1770). Full text available in several formats at archive.org:

<https://archive.org/details/desertedvillagep00golduoft>

or listen to the poem at librivox.org:

http://ia700401.us.archive.org/28/items/long_poetry_007_librivox/desertedvillage_goldsmith_dgd_64kb.mp3

For more on Oliver Goldsmith see Washington Irving's *Oliver Goldsmith: A Biography* (1849). Available in several formats at:

<http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7993>

¹² Sermons at archive.org The quote is a direct quote taken from R.H Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (p. 149). Tawney, in a footnote, references it to *Sermons, 1550* (English Reprints, edited by Edward Arbor, 1895). An 1870 version of *Sermons, 1550*, edited by Arbor is available at:

<https://archive.org/details/sermons00levegoog>

"A Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross", 14 December 1550, p. 91-143. Quote is on p. 130. Tawney's quote is a paraphrase. The actual language is

" I saye these marchuants of mischiefe commynge betwixt the barke and the tree, do make all things dere to the byers: and yet wonderfull vyle and small pryce to many, that must sett or sell that whyche is their owne honestlye come bye. These be far worse than anye other that hathe bene mencyoned heretofore: for although benefycyd men and offycers haue many mennes liuynges, yet they do some mennes dutes. But these haue euerye mannes lyuyng, and doo no mans duteye."

But you see, a discussion of anti-enclosure legislation in itself hardly distends to its full limits that entire anti-capitalist bias which you find in the social policy of Tudor and early Stuart monarchs. Because if you look, for example, at the data that have been adduced by Peter Ramsey in his very good book ***Tudor Economic Problems*** you find that Dr. Ramsey has listed 250 different pieces of legislation¹³ that sought to regulate economic activity and to restrain economic activity. They are pieces of legislation that try to impose something of a just or customary price. That try to control the quality of products. That try to prevent apprenticeship from dying, so that the quality is kept up. And that most certainly try to preserve the society of orders and ranks so that each shall be able to live protected within that rank. And no body of legislation is more imposing in that direction than that legislation which was to culminate in the great Statute of Apprentices in 1563,¹⁴ by which the state tried to prevent the spread and the efflorescence (?) of industrial Capitalism, unregulated into the countryside. Legislation against the spread of that industrial Capitalism into the villages and into the small towns of England. Out of the cities and among the peasants.

The actual quote Tawney uses (after the referenced quote in the lecture) is “for he has ‘every man’s living and does no man’s duty’.”

For more on Lever see: ***The Cambridge History of English and American Literature: Vol. 4: Prose and Poetry from Sir Thomas North to Michael Drayton***, Chap 12: *The English Pulpit from Fisher to Donne*, Part 6: *The second generation of Reformation Preachers: Lever, Bradford, and Gilpin* at:

<http://www.bartleby.com/214/>

or

The Lives of the Puritans, Vol. 1, by Benjamin Brook (1813) (p. 213-223) at

<https://archive.org/details/livespuritansco00broogoog>

¹³ Peter Ramsey ***Tudor Economic Problems*** (Victor Gollanz, 1963). “Some 250 statutes of the Tudor period deal directly with economic matters.” (p.146). Unfortunately, Ramsey doesn’t list the individual pieces of legislation.

¹⁴ ***Statutes of the Realm*** (Vol. 4, Pt. 1), 5 Elizabeth ch 4, p. 414-422. An Acte towching dyvers Orders for Artificers Laborers Servantes of Husbandry and Apprentises. These pages are missing from the Google Books version. They are available electronically, for those who have subscription access, via HeinOnline (William S. Hein and Co.) at:

<http://home.heinonline.org/content/list-of-libraries/?c=9&t=7261>

It is also available in print in ***Tudor Economic Documents Vol. 1***, edited by R.H. Tawney and Eileen Power (Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), p. 338-350, selections. Section VII of ***TED*** covers relevant documents related to the statute from 1559-1615 (p. 325-383). There is some information about it in a Wikipedia article, including a reference to an ***Economic History Review*** article by Donald Woodward available through <http://www.jstor.org>. The Wikipedia article is at:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_Artificers_1562

More analysis of the statute can be found in George Unwin, ***Industrial Organization in the 16th and 17th Centuries***, p. 137-141. For a different view, see Maurice Dobb, ***Studies in the Development of Capitalism***, p. 232-3. For a more current view, see: ***Law, Politics, and Society in Early Modern England***, by C.W. Brooks (Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 376-8). More on Unwin and Dobb in footnotes below.

Now you know from your reading of Maurice Dobb¹⁵ who takes so much of his information from that very classic book of Professor George Unwin called ***Industrial Organization in the 16th and 17th Centuries***,¹⁶ a book 75 years old, and still deservedly a classic. That we know from Dobb or Unwin and others that the real development of capitalist labor relations, and of capitalist modes of production, came outside the cities and came in the countryside. In the villages and in the small towns, where the regulations of the cities could be easily escaped. And consequently it was against that that the state would legislate. Now you understand that in England, as in every continental country, the cities are corporation cities, are regulated cities. That the industrial production in the cities is regulated, systematically organized into the Guild System. And that the guilds—after all—take it as their function to restrict production, to guard against adulteration and keep quality up. To make sure that the training in the craft is traditional and to the standard of that craft. But you know that the guilds in the 16th Century were no models of democracy. That the guilds—after all—were highly stratified institutions, in which little groups of ogopolistic [sic] masters controlled those guilds, and kept the Journeymen and the Apprentices at their levels. So that to be Journeyman and Apprentice was rarely to accede to the level of Master. And we know also that the guilds were jealous, monopolistic institutions. They were just like the American Medical Association (laughter). They kept production down to keep the prices up. And the society be damned. And consequently they're hardly models of social organization. But you can see that the State likes them because the guilds are predictable. Because the State then knows how much is produced. Knows what the workers are getting within their ranks. Is visible, predictable. It fits into that society of ranks and that society of orders.

But then comes the temptation. And the temptation is to produce more. And the temptation is to make money. Now look. That the cloth trade of England, the woolen cloth trade, was something of a fever in

¹⁵ Marxist economist (1900-1976). Here Goldberg could have been referring to any number of things Dobb had written. Dobb wrote chapters on the decline of feudalism, the beginnings of the bourgeoisie, and the rise of industrial capital in his seminal ***Studies in the Development of Capitalism*** (rev. ed. 1963, International Publishers, p. 33-177). There are several references to Unwin's ***Industrial Organization in the 16th and 17th Centuries*** (see below) in these pages. For more on ***Studies in the Development of Capitalism***, see the review "Dobb as Historian," by Rodney Hilton (***Labor Monthly***, January 1947, p. 29-30), transcribed at:

https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/britain/periodicals/labour_monthly/1947/01/1947-01-dobb.htm

For an exhaustive study of Dobb, see ***The Political Economy of Maurice Dobb: History, Theory, and the Economics of Reproduction, Crisis, and Transformation***, by Hans. G. Despain (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utah Dept. of Economics, May 2011, .pdf format, 576p.).

<http://content.lib.utah.edu/utis/getfile/collection/etd3/id/468/filename/4.pdf>

I have not read the thesis. I have looked at the bibliography. It is phenomenal.

Note that if this address doesn't work out of Word, simply cut and paste directly to browser or search Google on the title. I haven't figured out why this address doesn't consistently work directly. It is the correct address.

¹⁶ George Unwin: ***Industrial Organization in the 16th and 17th Centuries*** (Frank Cass and Co., London, 1904). There is little to be found on Unwin online. The best place I have found to start for Unwin is the Introductory memoir by R.H. Tawney in ***Studies on Economic History: The Collected Papers of George Unwin*** (Frank Cass and Co, London, 1927, p. xi-lxxiv).

the 16th Century. That everywhere in Europe there were markets for English woolens. That you could sell them at inflationary prices and make a real killing. That that English overseas cloth trade is the basis for the fortunes of a quasi-monopolistic corporation of London merchants known as the Merchant Adventurers,¹⁷ who traded those English cloths in the great commercial entrepot of Antwerp in Northern Europe. And there, in the first half of the 16th Century, brought back annually, profits of 25% on their export trade. So there was this burgeoning market, and surely there will be entrepreneurs who will want to cash in on it. And the way to cash in, if the guilds are restrictive, is to escape the city. To go into the countryside. And there to exploit a cheap and abundant labor supply. And also to escape all rules and regulation of production. And so from the 15th Century on, but especially in the 16th Century is this flow of the English cloth industry out into the countryside. And the primary mover is that merchant manufacturer known in the cloth trade as the clothier. And the clothier goes out and establishes in that most important industry what we call the domestic or the putting out system. In which the relationships of production, in which the relationship of classes begins already to foreshadow the capitalist relationship of a factory. Because this merchant manufacturer owns the raw material, and not infrequently owns the instrument of production. And gives it out to the weaver, living in his or her own cottage. And there picks up the finished goods and pays piece rate for it. And so the relationship becomes really a capitalist wage earner relationship. Except for the fact, and the important one, that the worker still lives in his or her own domicile. Is not crowded into the factory, for the most part, of the 18th and the 19th Centuries. But what you get out of that that is so advantageous is that burgeoning labor supply. We're talking about rural craftsmen who are into the weaving trade full time. We're talking about cotters, or agricultural workers, who part time, buttress their incomes by taking in weaving. We're talking about their wives, who become spinners, and we're talking most certainly about unmarried women who have no other alternative if they are to survive in that society, but to spin. Hence from 16th Century England the word spinster. That unmarried woman who lives—after all—by the spinning of that cloth. And note also that it is not only an abundant labor supply but a cheap one. Because it hasn't gone through the apprenticeship rules. It learns things quickly. Granted that the quality will be lower. Granted that there will not be that sense of standard that there is in the city. But what difference? The market is burgeoning and it can all be sold. And without those town regulations can't (?) the merchant manufacturer then introduce, if he chooses to do so, machinery, all kinds of things unheard of in the cities?

¹⁷ For more on the Merchant Adventurers see:

A. *The Internal Organization of the Merchant Adventurers of England*, by William E. Lingelbach (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1902, 56p.). Referenced by Dobb in *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*. Available at:

<https://archive.org/details/internalorganisa00ling>

B. *Tudor Economic Problems*, by Peter Ramsey (p. 61-67).

C. For a more modern treatment see: *The Merchant Adventurers of England: the Company and the Crown: 1474-1564*, by Douglas R. Bisson (University of Delaware Press, 1993, 136p.).

And so the legislation. And the Crown legislates for a number of reasons. It legislates because the increase of that woolen trade in the countryside means an increase in the need for wool. And that encourages the enclosure movement. But more than that, the state is the pious mercantilist. It must preserve all in their ranks. And consequently it cannot accept this undue competition to the master craftsmen of the cities. Or even to the Journeymen and the Apprentices. It cannot countenance this attack upon apprenticeship, this attack upon skill, this attack upon standard, which is the pride of the worker in that guild system.

And so the law of 1551 which legislates against the jig mill.¹⁸ Now the jig mill was a little, very simple machine. And its history is fascinating. And tells us so much about what goes on in this social history. What the jig mill was was a simple device which, instead of having a very specialized artisan who was called a cropper, lift or fluff up the nap on this cloth, this was a device in which the cloth was passed through cylinders fitted out with teasels that mechanically then raised the nap on the cloth. Which effectively eliminated that artisan function of the cropper. And that, protested by the state, prevented. Now this is anti-mechanization. It is anti-machinery. But it is also pro-skill. And the cropper, of course, fully approved in the cities, for he was concerned—after all—to make the very best out of that particular task. And he insisted that this machine could never do the task. And think of it. The struggle over the jig mill goes on for two centuries. That you get to the 18th Century and you find that the jig mill is being introduced in the West Riding country,¹⁹ the big cloth making country in northern England. And there these croppers are organizing to prevent that machine from coming into the great city of Leeds. And for most of the 18th Century they keep it out. And then it penetrates. That inexorable force of Capitalism. That inexorable force of expanding these productive techniques. And finally, in those early years of the 19th Century, when you get that great explosion of Luddism, or machine wrecking, we will find that the croppers are right in there in the front, going into the mills and smashing these jig mills, against which there had been legislation all the way back in this Tudor period.

¹⁸ *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 4, Part 1, 5&6 Edward VI, c22, section 16, 1551, p. 156. An acte for the puttinge downe of Gygg Milles. Available at Google Books: at the address click on "Front Cover" then Sec. 16.

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R7CZMMbcOx4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=on&f=false

¹⁹ Part of Yorkshire. For more information see:

http://www.yorkshire-england.co.uk/About_Yorkshire.html

Or the law of 1558 [sic]²⁰ that really tried to cripple the expansion of the cloth industry into the countryside. Listen to the preamble of that law of 1558. “The weavers of the realm complain that the rich and wealthy clothiers do in many ways oppress them. Some by setting up and keeping in their houses looms. And keeping and maintaining them by journeymen and persons unskillful to the decay of a great number of urban craftsmen who have been brought up in the science of weaving.” And so the law of 1558 proclaimed that no one could establish the cloth industry in any locality of England where it had not existed for ten years previous to that. And that no master—uh merchant manufacturer, no clothier, could own more than one loom.

And all of that culminated with the great Statute of Apprentices in 1563. For there the Tudor monarchy tried to generalize the seven year apprenticeship law. That everybody who worked in any craft that existed as of 1563 had to have gone through seven years of apprenticeship training at least. And more than that, that in the cloth industry per se, no one could enter as an Apprentice, except the son of a gentryman, or the son of a yeoman who possessed land that was taxed at at least three pounds. All of which would have eliminated three fourths of the workers in the cloth trade, effectively cripple that capitalistic enterprise out in the countryside.

Now we know perfectly well that that didn’t happen. And we know that all of this legislation against rural Capitalism was even less effective than the legislation against enclosures. And we know that the spirit and practice of Capitalism penetrated that countryside. In part of course, because of the problem simply of the law itself. That the law of 1563 said that there should be apprenticeship in all crafts that existed in that year. But what about all of those mining and metallurgical trades that would grow up in the latter part of the 16th and 17th Centuries that were new and that consequently weren’t covered by any kind of state legislation? But more than that, it’s a problem again of enforcement. How to enforce this law when the Justices of the Peace are entrepreneurs? When they are disinterested in operating against their own economic wellbeing. And the Parliament itself, that lower house, that House of Commons which has in it so many gentry, so many merchants. It—after all—serves as a negative check. It begins to amend pieces of legislation that the Crown sends down. Amends it in order to make that paternalism less astringent. All of the time, all of the time, simmering with resentment over the fact that there’s any regulation at all. A resentment that will boil over in the 1640s, as you will see.

²⁰ *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 4, Part 1, 2&3 Philip and Mary, c.11, 1555, section 27, p. 286-287. An Acte touching Weavers. Available at Google Books: at the address click on “Front Cover” then scroll to Sec. 27.

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R7CZMMbcOx4C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbp_ge_summary_r&cad=0%23v=on&f=false#v=onepage&q&f=false

Also available in *Tudor Economic Documents Vol 1*, edited by R.H. Tawney and Eileen Power (p, 185-6). Actual “preamble language” is: “Foreasmuche as the Weavers of this Realme have, as well at this presente Parliament as at divers other times, complained that the riche and welthie Clothiers doo many ways oppres them, somme by setting up and keeping in their houses divers Loomes, and kepying and maynteyning them by Journeymen and persons unskillful, to the decaye of a greate number of Artificers which were brought up in the said Seyence of Weaving...” The ten years and one loom provisions can be found on p. 286 of *Statutes*. (p.186 of *TED*).

And yet, despite the fact that it failed, before we go on to the victors, before we go on to those beer drinking and God fearing and hairy chested entrepreneurs (laughter) who really remade society, let's note in passing, as Edward Thompson does in a very brilliant passage in ***The Making of the English Working Class***, that productive values, even though they are tremendously important, even though they surely are, partially the explanation for this inexorable drive of Capitalism, that production values may not be the very epitome of civilization. And that the paternalistic legislation of the Tudor monarchs may not be the height of folly. Because what Thompson writes in ***The Making of the English Working Class***:

Luddism (machine wrecking—Goldberg's addition) must be seen as arising at the crisis point in the abrogation of paternalist legislation, and in the imposition of the political economy of *laissez faire* upon and against the will and conscience of the working people. It is the last chapter of a story which begins in the 14th and 15th centuries, and whose greater part has been told Tawney's ***Religion and the Rise of Capitalism***. True enough, much of this paternalist legislation had been in origin not only restrictive, but, for the working man, punitive. Nevertheless, there was within it the shadowy image of a benevolent corporate state, in which there were legislative as well as moral sanctions against the unscrupulous manufacturer or the unjust employer, and in which the journeymen were a recognized "estate", however low, in the realm. The J.P. at least in theory could be turned to in the last extremity for arbitration or protection, and even if practice taught working men to expect a dusty answer, it was still by this theory that the magistrate was judged. The function of industry was to provide a livelihood for those employed in it; and practices or inventions evidently destructive of the good of "the Trade" were reprehensible. The journeyman took pride in his craft, not merely because it increased his value in the labour market, but because he was a craftsman.

These ideals may never have been much more than ideals; by the end of the 18th Century they may have been threadbare. But they had a powerful reality, none the less, in the notion of what *ought* (emphasis in original) to be, to which artisans, journeymen, and many small masters appealed.²¹

And so the victors are the entrepreneurs. And they are not legislated and they are not regulated. And the cloth trade we certainly find them. And if you read the sources about the growth of that rural cloth industry in England, you get a kind of picture in mind of one of these clothiers and how he becomes richer all the time. And he has a warehouse. And he has teams of horses. And he goes round to an increasingly large circuit of weavers, of those craftsmen in cottages. And he gives out that raw material, and sometimes the machinery. And his bargaining power is terrific. Because—after all—those small craftsmen have to eat. And consequently they accept whatever terms he imposes. And then he goes into the raw material market. And he buys very frequently, very large supplies. Enough for a year. So that he

²¹ E.P. Thompson, ***The Making of the English Working Class***, (Victor Gollancz, 1963, p. 543-44, in Chap. XV—"An Army of Redressers", Part iv. "Croppers and Stockingers.") The quote is a direct quote from the text, and as can be heard, slightly different from the lecture transcript. The differences are, for all practical purposes, irrelevant. I have used the original as it was quicker and easier to transcribe.

For more information on E.P. Thompson and the book see ***The Guardian*** article on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of its publication: "E.P. Thompson: the unconventional historian," by Emma Griffin (Mar. 6, 2013), available at:

<http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/mar/06/ep-thompson-unconventional-historian>

can keep off from the market until such time as the price is right and he can get the greatest profit. And if you go one step further then you actually find, even in that primitive era of industrial Capitalism, that great and beneficent joy, the factory.

And so you find William Stumpe of Malmsbury.²² And William Stumpe, legendary in the 16th Century. The clothier who established the largest of those factories. In Malmsbury he found an old monastery, which gave up its buildings and lands to the Crown in 1539. And he bought those buildings and part of the land for 1500 pounds. And he had as many as 250 looms inside those buildings. And he had a weaving factory. And he sold direct into the London market. And he became very rich, and so in that kind of inevitable link between economic and political power, he became a Justice of the Peace, a magistrate, and a very rich land owner by the time he died in 1555.[sic]²³ And we know that three times he was dragged up before

²² For more on William Stumpe see the History of Parliament biography at:

<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1509-1558/member/stumpe-william-1498-1552>

For more detailed biographies of Stumpe see:

- a. G.W. Gough, *The Rise of the Entrepreneur* (B.T. Batsford, 1969, p. 39-42).
- b. G.D. Ramsay, *The Wiltshire Woollen Industry in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (2nd Edition, Frank Cass & Co., 1965, p. 31-37)
- c. Thomas Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England Vol. 3* (originally 1662, "new edition" Nuttall and Hodgson, 1840, p. 337.) Stumpe is called "T.Stump and is listed as a "benefactor to the public." Referenced by Gough). Available online in several formats at archive.org

<https://archive.org/details/historyofworthie03full>

Mouse across blue lined pages until you get near p. 337. Left click there and Then left drag pages forward or back until you get to p. 337.

- d. Canon F.H.Manley, "William Stumpe of Malmesbury, His Descendants and Relatives," in *Wiltshire Notes and Queries, No. VIII* (1914-1916), p. 385-395, 444-454,481-487, 531-537. Referenced by Gough and Ramsey.

Available online in several formats at archive.org and openlibrary.org

https://openlibrary.org/books/OL25502797M/Wiltshire_notes_and_queries

Click on "read online" and then follow the same instructions as above for Fuller.

For more information on Malmsbury, see the article at British History Online:

<http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=116149>

²³ 1552, according to the History of Parliament article referenced above.

Chancery Court by very aggrieved copy holders²⁴ who had been shoved off the land by him.²⁵ Which leads Professor Gough, his biographer to say of William Stumpe “He was typical of the new style landlords, who exploited their property simply as business investments and none other.”²⁶ And so you get those extravagant examples.

Money. But if you’re interested in money then you should go not—after all—into an old monastic building. You should go underground and get the ores that, presumably, were placed there for you (laughter). And consequently it is that in mining—after all—you get the greatest fortunes of the age. And coal mining, in the 16th Century in England is the great expansionist trade. For reasons not hard to discover. That timber is in short supply. It is needed for ship building. It is needed for housing of burgeoning cities. And consequently becomes too expensive for fuel. And more and more householders turn to coal as the substitute fuel. And that means that the entrepreneurs who can really invest—which takes money—invest in coal mining, there is a killing to be made.

²⁴ For more on this concept see 11th Edition Encyclopedia Britannica article:

http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/COM_COR/COPYHOLD.html

²⁵ Source: National Archives:

<http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/>

Ralph Porter v William Stumpe: sale of woollen cloths. London.

<http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9266136>

Richard Vaughn v William Stumpe: Detention of deeds relating to mills in Netherbarnefeld and Busheford of the demise of George Monoux. Gloucestershire, Wiltshire.

<http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C7491831>

John Byllyng v William Stumpe: Goods and debts of the said William Billyng, whose executors the said John and Thebalde are. Wiltshire, Oxfordshire

<http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C7486897>

More information on Courts of Chancery can be found at Encyclopedia Britannica

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/105336/Court-of-Chancery>

²⁶ J.W. Gough, *The Rise of the Entrepreneur*, (p. 41). Gough’s quote (which does not include “and none other”) is a paraphrase of a quote (referenced by Gough) from the account of Stumpe in G.D. Ramsay, *The Wiltshire Woollen Industry*, (I used the 2nd edition, Frank Cass & Co., 1965, p. 31-37, quote is on p. 32.) “...it may be surmised that he was one of the landlords of the new style whom immemorial custom did not restrain from exploiting their possessions as business investments.”

It is in the city of Newcastle, on the Tyne River, Newcastle-on-Tyne,²⁷ that you find the greatest export city of coal in 16th and 17th Century England. And if you look at the statistics, that in the year 1560 33,000 tons of coal passed through Newcastle and in 1609 260,000 tons²⁸ passed through Newcastle, you can see what that expansion is about. And so you get examples, once again, of great fortunes made. The example of Thomas Sutton.²⁹ Thomas Sutton wasn't even a resident of Derbyshire when he got a huge concession from the Crown, because of connections in the Court for a mining terrain. And there he got that concession on a 99 year lease for the payment of 90 pounds a year. Now you see you're all born three centuries too late (laughter). And consequently what Thomas Sutton did was to build up such vast fortunes in that coal mining and in landownership. By the time of his death he was netting about 65,000 pounds a year, which in 20th Century terms is astronomical—his status of multi-millionaire.

But a parenthesis. That it is exactly in mining that you come to understand something of the cost of all of this. Something of what it is about. Because you see we talk about the freedoms that Capitalism brings in labor relationships, in social status. And we talk about the un-freedom of the Middle Age. And I submit to you that in more occasions than frequently meets the eye, that the illusion of the new, that the freedom of the new was illusory. And that the un-freedom of the Medieval proved to be, in practice, sometimes more varied, sometimes even more free. And never more so than if you think—for example—about the tanners, the tin miners of Cornwall. Or about the lead miners of Derbyshire. Because those tanners, in the Middle Ages were like, let us say gold prospectors in California or Australia in the 19th Century. They really were independent adventurers. And they had by law and custom the right as independent adventurers to go and to mine ore, and to have access to the streams so that they could dig that ore out. And consequently what you get are really small companies of independent tin miners. By the 15th Century the whole process begins to change. You begin to get that division of labor. You begin to get that differentiation which really does mean, inevitably, the loss of independency. So the tanner—for example—cannot sell his tin, unless he has it stamped in a royal office... (Here the lecture is truncated. Everything else, unfortunately, is missing, except for the long ovation at the end of the lecture).

²⁷ For more information on the history of Newcastle upon Tyne and this region of Northern England, particularly in this period see:

<http://www.englandsnortheast.co.uk/coal16001800.html>

²⁸ Peter Ramsey, *Tudor Economic Problems*, p. 92. Ramsey says 252,000 tons in 1609.

²⁹ More information on Sutton can be found at Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Sutton

More on Sutton is available from: "Thomas Sutton: Moneylender," by Neal R. Shipley (*Business History Review*, Vol. 50, No. 4, Winter 1976, p. 456-476). Abstract is available at:

<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8315453&fileId=S0007680500020584>

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