Previous Speeches to Flow/Assume

1AC

1AC — Leadership Advantage

Advantage one is Leadership.

First, vaccines are crucial to Russia and China's global standing. They expand strategic relationships and secure favors against the interests of the US and its allies.

The Economist 21. "Vaccine diplomacy boosts Russia's and China's global standing." The Economist. Published 4/29/21. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/04/29/vaccine-diplomacy-boosts-russias-and-chinas-global-standing

IN JANUARY, AS many rich countries were rolling out covid-19 vaccine programmes, others were being left behind. "Today it's **harder to get the vaccines than nuclear weapons**," complained Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia's president. Mr Vucic compared the situation to the sinking of the Titanic, where everyone wanted a lifeboat **only for themselves**. Serbia has now surged ahead of many of its European neighbours in the vaccination race—mostly because it gained easier access to Chinese and Russian jabs and signed deals to produce them. But many countries are still scrambling to get their hands on jabs. This is especially true in poor parts of the world. According to a recent tally by Agence France-Presse, a news agency, of the more than 1bn doses of vaccines that have been administered worldwide, just 0.2% have gone to people in low-income countries. Many have turned to China and Russia for help. A report published on April 28th by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a sister company of The Economist, shows how the two countries are filling a "**vaccine vacuum**" by helping poor economies secure doses. They have **shipped millions** of jabs to developing countries stuck at the back of the global queue. Such vaccine diplomacy is designed to **bolster** the two countries' **global standing**, **improve bilateral relations** and **gain strategic influence**. The EIU estimates that the Russian government intends to send shots to around **70** countries, mostly in Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America. By April 22nd China had distributed or planned to export vaccines to around **90** countries (see map). In comparison, the rich world—notably, America and the EU—are **providing little**, and COVAX, a global vaccine-sharing initiative, is hampered by India's recent restrictions on vaccine exports. To ensure they gain a foothold in places where Western influence is declining, both China and Russia are setting up vaccine-production facilities abroad and training local workers. The two countries are **playing a long game**. But, besides enhancing their global prestige, they may also be using vaccines to reward loyal friends or **secure particular favours**. The EIU report points out that Russian officials began talks with the Bolivian government about access to mines producing rare-earth minerals and nuclear projects shortly after Russia had delivered a batch of its domestically produced Sputnik V vaccine. And China's generosity to Cambodia and Laos may be partly explained by gratitude for their **backing for China's position on the South China Sea**.

Second, vaccine diplomacy is bolstering Russian and Chinese soft power within NATO's spheres of influence.

Michael **Leigh 21**. Senior Fellow, Academic Director of the Masters in European Public Policy Programme at Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies. "Vaccine diplomacy: soft power lessons from China and Russia?" Bruegel. Published 4/27/21. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.bruegel.org/2021/04/vaccine-diplomacy-soft-power-lessons-from-china-and-russia/

As COVID-19 continues to rage throughout Europe, **China and Russia** seem to be **giving the European Union lessons in soft power on its home ground**. Several EU members and countries nearby are turning to Beijing and Moscow for additional supplies of COVID-19 vaccines, faced with discontent at the slowness of the EU's own vaccination rollout, supply shortages, delivery bottlenecks, poor communication and concerns about vaccine safety. China's vaccine deliveries come with soft-power messages. Beijing is providing its vaccine free to Chinese citizens and to 53 countries while, in parallel, seeking to counter critical views, following harsh Chinese repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, by vaunting its economic success, scientific and medical achievements, culture and language. Beijing is completing Europe's largest Confucius Institute in Serbia, an early recipient of Chinese vaccines. The institute is located on the site in Belgrade where the Chinese embassy once stood before being bombed by NATO in 1999. Heavy symbolism

Meanwhile, Russia's Sputnik V vaccine is gaining increasing acceptance in Europe. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) is reviewing its efficacy and it has won plaudits from the head of Germany's standing commission on vaccination. Germany's health minister has discussed overcoming supply shortages in the EU with Chinese and Russian vaccines, once they have been approved. Bavarian Prime Minister Markus Söder has announced a preliminary purchase order for 2.5 million doses of Sputnik V, to be produced in Bavaria. Chancellor Merkel said in March there were "good data" on Sputnik V and that all vaccines were welcome once they receive the green light. Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron have discussed joint production of Sputnik V with Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is despite heightened tensions with Moscow following the imprisonment of opposition leader Alexey Navalny and Russia's recent troop build-up near Ukraine. Russia misses no chance to accompany offers of vaccine or joint production to Eastern Europe and the Balkans with soft-power messages, **dwelling** on European failures and **highlighting** Russian support for countries covered by the EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policies. Over fifty countries have ordered the Sputnik V vaccine. Russia has made a show of vaccine deliveries to Serbia and Montenegro, while Croatia has begun talks with Russia about acquiring the Sputnik V vaccine. Croatia's health minister is reported to have asked its health regulator to authorise the vaccine without waiting for EMA approval. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have also turned to Russia for supplies of Sputnik V. But Slovak Prime Minister Igor Matovic resigned in March after failing to obtain the governing coalition's agreement for his personal decision to purchase 2 million doses of the Russian vaccine. Hungary became the first European country to administer Sputnik V in February 2021, after issuing emergency authorization, and plans are afoot to produce the vaccine in Italy. Austria has held talks with Moscow about acquiring the Russian vaccine once it has been evaluated by EMA. Austria's Chancellor Sebastian Kurz accused EMA of being too slow to approve the vaccine. Beijing meanwhile is targeting low and medium-income countries for early vaccine deliveries. It has supplied vaccines to EU member Hungary and EU candidate countries Serbia and Turkey. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban posted a photo of himself being inoculated with a vaccine from Chinese manufacturer Sinopharm. China had shipped 115 million doses worldwide while the EU had exported 58 million by the end of March. Recently, however, concerns have grown about the relatively low protection rates given by Chinese vaccines and about their availability. Trust in the reliability of Russian data and the comparability of its tests is still wavering. EU countries are entitled to acquire vaccines approved by their regulatory authorities from suppliers not involved in the EU's centralised scheme. But a senior EMA official condemned this as "somewhat comparable to Russian roulette," a remark that prompted calls for an apology from the Sputnik V manufacturer and criticism from the Kremlin. Alarmed at member countries breaking ranks, European Council President Charles Michel launched a fierce defence of the EU's response to COVID-19. He wrote in his newsletter: "We should not let ourselves be misled by China and Russia, both regimes with less desirable values than ours, as they organise highly limited but widely publicised operations to supply vaccines to others." A geopolitical open door Nonetheless, the late rollout of the EU's vaccine purchase and delivery scheme **handed Beijing and Moscow a** commercial and **diplomatic opportunity** that fitted their strategic narratives. For China, supplying vaccines to Europe forms part of its 'Health Silk Road', a rhetorical extension of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), intended to showcase the prowess of China's medical sciences and its devotion to global public goods. China promotes the BRI in Central and Eastern Europe through 17+1, a loose network launched in Warsaw in 2012. At the start of the epidemic, China and Russia stepped in to provide masks and personal protective equipment to European countries amid severe supply shortages. Moscow, too, seeks to convey the impression that its medical science is prevailing over the West's, despite low vaccination rates in Russia itself. The name Sputnik V mirrors that of the world's first artificial satellite, launched by the Soviet Union in 1957. Russia rushed to become, on 11 August 2020, the first country whose COVID-19 vaccine was approved by national authorities.

Scenario One is Russia:

Ukraine war won't escalate, but it erodes the nuclear taboo, which magnifies the risk of future conflicts with the US.

The Economist 22. "Russia's invasion of Ukraine has eroded the nuclear taboo." The Economist. Published 6/2/22. Accessed 7/9/22. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/06/02/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-has-eroded-the-nuclear-taboo

[TITLE] Russia's invasion of Ukraine has eroded the nuclear taboo [SUBTITLE] This war is unlikely to go nuclear. **But it is increasing the risk that future conflicts will** In 1999 Nina Tannenwald, a political scientist at Brown University, wrote a paper analysing something she had observed among generals, politicians and strategists: the "nuclear taboo". This was not, she argued, simply a matter of general queasiness or personal moral qualms; it had important consequences. The lack of nuclear wars in the years since America's destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, she argued, was not simply a matter of deterrence. It had also relied on a growing sense of the innate wrongness of nuclear weapons putting their use beyond the pale. Threats of nuclear attack like those made in the 1940s and 1950s had become vanishingly rare. As the taboo had strengthened, seeking to acquire nuclear weapons had come to be seen as the mark of a barbarian. Avoiding any explicit mention of actually using the ones you already had was the mark of a gentleman. If there was a certain hypocrisy about all this—which there was—it was one that exemplified the French aphorist La Rochefoucauld's definition of the term: the tribute that vice pays to virtue. To see such nicety stripped away, **tune in to** the state-owned television channel **Russia-1**. "Just one launch, Boris," warned Dmitry Kiselev, the station's main news presenter, on May 1st, "and England is gone." In case this message proved too subtle for the British prime minister, or the audience at home, Mr Kiselev laid out the launch options he had in mind. One was a Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (icbm) shown streaking towards Britain. Another

was a Poseidon thermonuclear torpedo, designed to whip up an isotope-laced tsunami. “Having passed over the British Isles, it will turn whatever might be left of them into a radioactive desert,” enthused Mr Kiselev, “unfit for anything for a long time.” This was not a one-off. “The Russians are really brandishing this,” says Dr Tannenwald. “Every few days, some Russian official is making explicit **nuclear threats**.” And such thinking runs deeper than broadcast bombast. Boris Bondarev, a diplomat at Russia’s mission to the un in Geneva, resigned his post on May 23rd in disgust at his country’s invasion of Ukraine. He told the New York Times that what had disturbed him most was the glib fashion in which his colleagues—arms-control specialists, no less—revelled in talk of nuclear war. “They think that if you hit some village in America with a nuclear strike, then the Americans will immediately get scared and run to beg for mercy on their knees,” said Mr Bondarev. “That’s how many of our people think, and I fear that this is the line that they are passing along to Moscow.” The mixture of norms, treaties, mutual assurances, blandishments, suasion, technical mechanisms, fear and taboo which has kept the world from seeing nuclear weapons used against armies or cities since 1945 was looking pretty ragged even before Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, warned on February 24th that third parties standing in Russia’s way risked “consequences…such as you have never seen in your entire history”. In terms of **arms control**, pacts between America and Russia had almost all **lapsed**; Russia was developing new weapons, such as Poseidon, not covered by the agreements that remain; China’s nuclear arsenal was expanding rapidly. As to stopping the weapons’ spread, decades of international pressure had failed to prevent North Korea first from acquiring nuclear weapons and then from increasing both their sophistication and the range of targets against which they could be used.

Russian expansionism goes nuclear.

Brands 20 — Dr. Hal Brands, global affairs professor at John Hopkins, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and Yale PhD, 4/20/2020, “Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World: Spheres of Influence Are Unnecessary and Dangerous,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-20/dont-let-great-powers-carve-world, pacc

Allison’s argument is alluring but wrong. In truth, the United States has resisted the creation of rival spheres of influence for most of its history, even as it has worked assiduously to build its own. **Ceding ground** to China and Russia today would be not a recipe for stability but a blueprint for **coercion** and **conflict**, and it would weaken the United States’ geopolitical hand vis-à-vis its rivals. Nor is a return to spheres of influence foreordained—Washington still has the power to prevent Beijing and Moscow from dominating their regions, so long as it rejects Allison’s advice to cut loose its vulnerable frontline allies. A tougher, more competitive world is unavoidable. A far more dangerous world, divided into competing superpower fiefdoms, is not. AN AMERICAN TRADITION Spheres of influence have been common throughout history, but Americans have never been quite comfortable with them. In fact, much of U.S. foreign policy dating back to independence has consisted of efforts to prevent rival powers from establishing such domains. In the nineteenth century, U.S. leaders rejected the idea that any European power should have a sphere of influence in North America or the Western Hemisphere at large. They maneuvered—often quite ruthlessly—to evict European powers from these areas. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States took this regional policy global. The so-called Open Door policy aimed to dissuade foreign powers from carving up China, and later all of East Asia, into exclusive spheres. Washington joined World War I in part to prevent Germany from becoming the dominant European power. A generation later, the United States fought to deny Japan a sphere of influence in the Pacific and prevent Hitler from establishing primacy over the entire Old World. During and after World War II, Washington also engaged in quieter diplomatic and economic efforts to accelerate the dissolution of the British Empire. Opposition to spheres of influence is a part of U.S. diplomatic DNA. Even during the Cold War, Americans never fully accepted Soviet control over eastern Europe. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to roll back the Iron Curtain through ideological warfare and covert action; later administrations expanded trade and diplomatic ties with Warsaw Pact states as a subtler way of undermining Kremlin control. The Reagan administration overtly and covertly supported political movements that were challenging the Kremlin’s authority from within. And when Washington had a chance to peacefully destroy the Soviet sphere of influence after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it did, supporting German unification and the expansion of NATO. Opposition to **spheres of influence**, in other words, is a part of **U.S. diplomatic DNA**. The reason for this, Charles Edel and I argued in 2018, is that spheres of influence clash with **fundamental tenets** of U.S. foreign policy. Among them is the United States’ approach to security, which holds that safeguarding the country’s vital interests and physical well-being requires preventing rival powers from establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere or dominating strategically important regions overseas. Likewise, the United States’ emphasis on promoting liberty and free trade translates to a concern that spheres of influence—particularly those dominated by authoritarian powers—would impede the spread of U.S. values and allow hostile powers to block American trade and investment. Finally, spheres of influence do not mesh well with American exceptionalism—the notion that the United States should transcend the old, corrupt ways of balance-of-power diplomacy and establish a more humane, democratic system of international relations. Of course, that intellectual tradition did not stop the United States from building its own sphere of influence in Latin America from the early nineteenth century onward, nor did it prevent it from drawing large chunks of Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East into a global sphere of influence after World War II. Yet the same tradition has led the United States to run its sphere of influence far more progressively than past great powers, which is why far more countries have sought to join that sphere than to leave it. And since hypocrisy is another venerable tradition in global affairs, it is not surprising that Americans would establish their own, relatively enlightened sphere of influence while denying the legitimacy of everyone else’s. That endeavor reached its zenith in the post–Cold War era, when the collapse of the Soviet bloc made it possible to envision a world in which Washington’s sphere of influence—also known as the liberal international order—was the only game in town. The United States maintained a world-beating military that could intervene around the globe; preserved and expanded a global alliance structure as a check on aggression; and sought to integrate potential challengers, namely Beijing and Moscow, into a U.S.-led system. It was a remarkably ambitious project, as Allison rightly notes, but it was the culmination of, rather than a departure from, a diplomatic tradition reaching back two centuries. GIVE THEM AN INCH… The post–Cold War moment is over, and the prospect of a divided world has returned. **Russia** is projecting power in the Middle East and staking a claim to dominance in its “near abroad.” **China** is seeking **primacy** in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia and using its diplomatic and **economic influence** to draw countries around the world more tightly into its orbit. Both have developed the tools needed to coerce their neighbors and keep U.S. forces at bay. Allison is one of several analysts who have recently advanced the argument that the United States should make a virtue of necessity—that it should accept Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, encompassing some portion of eastern Europe and the western Pacific, as the price of stability and peace. The logic is twofold: first, to create a cleaner separation between contending parties by clearly marking where one’s influence ends and the other’s begins; and second, to reduce the chances of conflict by giving

rising or resurgent powers a safe zone along their borders. In theory, this seems like a reasonable way of preventing competition from turning into outright conflict, especially given that countries such as Taiwan and the Baltic states lie thousands of miles from the United States but on the doorsteps of its rivals. Yet in reality, a spheres-of-influence world would bring **more peril than safety**. Russia's and China's **spheres of influence** would **inevitably** be domains of **coercion** and **authoritarianism**. Both countries are run by illiberal, autocratic regimes; their leaders see democratic values as profoundly threatening to their political survival. If Moscow and Beijing dominated their respective neighborhoods, they would naturally seek to undermine democratic governments that resist their control—as China is already doing in Taiwan and as Russia is doing in Ukraine—or that challenge, through their very existence, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The practical consequence of acceding to authoritarian spheres of influence would be to intensify the crisis of democracy that afflicts the world today. The United States would suffer economically, too. China, in particular, is a mercantilist power already working to turn Asian economies toward Beijing and could one day put the United States at a severe disadvantage on the world's most economically dynamic continent. Washington should not concede a Chinese sphere of influence unless it is also willing to compromise the "Open Door" principles that have animated its statecraft for over a century. Such costs might be acceptable in exchange for peace and security. But **spheres of influence** during the **Cold War** did not prevent the Soviets from repeatedly testing American redlines in Berlin, causing high-stakes crises in which **nuclear war** was **a real possibility**. Nor did those spheres prevent the two sides from competing sharply, and sometimes violently, throughout the "Third World." **Throughout history**, spheres-of-influence settlements, from the Thirty Years' Peace between **Athens** and **Sparta** to the Peace of Amiens between the **U**nited **K**ingdom and **Napoleonic France** have often ended, sooner or later, in **war**. The idea that spheres of influence are a formula for peace rests on assumptions that often go unexamined: that revisionist powers are driven primarily by insecurity, that their grievances are limited and can be easily satisfied, that the truly vital interests of competing powers do not conflict, and that creative statecraft can therefore fashion an enduring, mutually acceptable equilibrium. The trouble is that these premises don't always hold. **Ideology** and the **quest for greatness**—not simply insecurity—often drive **great powers**. **Rising states** are continually tempted to renegotiate previous bargains once they have the power to do so. **Offering concessions** to a revisionist state may simply convince it that **the existing order is fragile** and can be **tested further**. Conceding a sphere of influence to a great-power challenger might not produce stability but simply give that challenger a **better position** from which to realize its ambitions.

Scenario two is China:

Chinese vaccine diplomacy is a strategic tool to expand spheres of influence, specifically in Africa and the Middle East.

El Kadi & Zinser 21 — Tin Hinane El Kadi & Sophie Zinser 21. Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme. Academy Associate, Middle East North Africa Programme and Asia-Pacific Programme. "Beijing's vaccine diplomacy goes beyond political rivalry." Chatham House. Published 2/22/21. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/02/beijings-vaccine-diplomacy-goes-beyond-political-rivalry

Vaccine distribution is becoming a **key strategic feature** of China's foreign relations. But critics have suggested that China's so-called '**vaccine diplomacy**' is merely a way to further entrench its presence in countries where it seeks **diplomatic and economic influence** and supplant its Western rivals. Against the backdrop of rising Western scepticism about China's presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, media now portrays Beijing vaccine diplomacy as highly politicized. While undeniable that Beijing's vaccine diplomacy bolsters its soft power and consolidates its influence, these narratives stifle positive responses from MENA countries towards China's vaccine cooperation. China's vaccine diplomacy in MENA aligns with its broader strategy to cast itself as a global health leader. In improving its tarnished image as a non-transparent state accused of hiding the virus' spread, China hopes to be seen as a responsible, scientific leader capable of fighting the pandemic both domestically and globally. At the same time, MENA governments, see the Chinese vaccine as their pathway to much-needed jabs for their own populations. The UAE was the first country outside China to approve Sinopharm after clinical trials placed the vaccine's effectiveness at 86 per cent, with Bahrain to approve it a few days later. Egypt joined them after clinical trials involving thousands of Egyptians, and Morocco has also announced Sinopharm would be used to meet its ambitious aim to vaccinate 80 per cent of adults. **In the eyes of many** MENA countries, especially those facing severe economic crises, **Western states have selfishly hoarded vaccines** at the expense of developing countries. COVAX the global initiative which aims to make the vaccine available to developing countries appears likely to cover only 20 per cent of those in need. In this context, Sinopharm's two vaccines provide an attractive solution to MENA countries seeking to curb COVID-19. Unlike the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, which have high storage costs, Sinopharm's vaccines are traditional, inactivated vaccines, making them much cheaper to deploy. Beyond receiving finished Sinopharm vaccines, some MENA countries may become manufacturing and distribution hubs for the vaccine. The UAE has struck a deal to

manufacture the Sinopharm vaccine and is set to start production later in 2021 for both domestic and global demand. Morocco signed a convention to make Sinopharm's vaccine and distribute it to other African countries on behalf of the Chinese pharmaceutical group. Such partnerships present an opportunity for countries in the region to upgrade production capabilities and benefit from technology transfers. In return, China is **strengthening its diplomatic ties with** Belt and Road Initiative (**BRI**) **countries**, while boosting its financial returns. This health diplomacy in MENA by China is nothing new. In 1963, just one year after Algeria's independence China sent a medical assistance team to the country, its engagement rooted in ideological solidarity with the anti-imperialist Front de Libération Nation (FLN). China has since deepened its health cooperation in the region by dispatching government-paid medical personnel across several countries. Vaccine diplomacy is thus not merely another facet of a China-West rivalry, but a continuation of Beijing's self-projection as a responsible power in the global South. But China is also not alone in this approach as many MENA countries are embracing Russia's Sputnik V vaccine – Palestine was the first Arab nation to sign on for it and Iran, the most severely-affected country by the pandemic in the region, is also using it. Moscow has lauded the high effectiveness of Sputnik V and its relatively low cost, clearly hoping its vaccine can contribute to deepening relations with its allies in the region. However, Beijing's health cooperation strategy does appear the most comprehensive, represented by the so-called 'Health Silk Road'. Health has been on the BRI agenda since 2015 with official documents highlighting the ambition to implement training programmes for medical staff and provide emergency medical relief for crises. Since the pandemic began, the Chinese leadership has been actively promoting the Health Silk Road with masks, equipment, and expertise being sent to several BRI countries. COVID-19 has opened new avenues for engagement outside of traditional infrastructure and energy projects which characterize China's BRI in MENA. While Western governments compete for vaccines to serve their own populations, China has consolidated its relationship with MENA countries through its vaccine diplomacy and its broader health diplomacy. Although the pandemic represents the death knell for many of the BRI's infrastructure projects, as Chinese capital is **increasingly mobilised** to meet domestic needs, Sino-MENA relations are emerging stronger from this crisis and could be **set to rise to the next level in** a post-pandemic world.

Chinese expansion in Africa and the Middle East displaces Western influence and guarantees confrontation.

Sidlo 20 — Katarzyna W. Sidlo 20. Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department, Center for Social and Economic Research. "The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests?" European Institute of the Mediterranean. Published 7/20/20. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-role-of-china-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-mena-beyond-economic-interests/

As already mentioned, the MENA region is **crucial for the** development of the BRI because its location between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf is important along the land route as well as the sea lanes and because the MENA connects East Asia with Eurasia and Europe (even though many countries in the region have initially been excluded from the project and joined the BRI later by virtue of signing Memorandums of Understanding [MoUs]). In 2017, China became the world's largest importer of oil and in 2018 of gas, and is currently the biggest buyer of energy resources from the Persian Gulf. In the past decade, China's trade volume with the Middle East has increased tenfold and China's economic interests in the region match the Gulf countries' efforts to diversify foreign economic relations and restructure their economies away from a reliance on oil (for more on the economic relationship between China and the MENA region, see Chapter 2). China and the national governments in the region have expressed intentions of cooperation between the BRI and the latter's national development plans, such as Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 and Qatar's National Vision 2030. While, as already mentioned, the BRI is a strategy for China to increase its position vis-à-vis the US "Pivot to Asia" strategy, China acknowledges the US security hegemony in the region and thus far has no intention to challenge it. However, with increased dependence on energy and investments in megaprojects, trade and connectivity, as well as interest in critical infrastructure investments – and deploying vast numbers of Chinese nationals in conjunction with the activities – a security dimension is **unavoidable** and will challenge China in the coming years, as will the many conflicts in the region. Following its traditional policy of neutrality and **non-interference is**, in the long run, **impossible**: remaining equally close to Iran and Saudi Arabia, for instance, will become increasingly challenging for Beijing. Continently for China, its efforts to cement influence in the MENA region came at a time of a decline of American influence in the region (or the perception thereof). After the September 2001 terror attacks against the US, a series of American military interventions followed that led many regional leaders to question whether Washington is a force for good. In addition, the years following the 2003 Iraqi intervention have seen much hesitancy and uncertainty in America's overall approach towards the MENA region (including the already mentioned pivot to Asia by Obama and the very selective relationship with a very few in the region by the Trump administration), leading to the perception that Washington is no longer a solid security provider whose key objective is regional peace and stability (Quero & Dessi, 2019). Today, **Washington continues to suffer** from low approval ratings in the MENA countries, all the **while China is** seen globally to be **on the rise** (although admittedly this is not seen equally favourably across the region, see next section of this Chapter) (Wike et al., 2018). The fact that US soft power had been on the decline in the Middle East renders the region particularly exposed to a new great power rivalry, and the

Chinese regime is interested in taking advantage of the growing vacuum left by the US. This is complemented by the generally acknowledged lack of political conditioning by China. The objective is to **further displace** American and **Western influence** by tying the region to Beijing primarily **through** grand-scale **economic initiatives** like the BRI. At the same time, China is neither willing nor ready to take over the role played by Washington as the primary security provider of the region (Fulton, 2019b).

Unchecked Chinese expansion causes nuclear war.

Allison 17 — Graham T. Allison 17. Professor and director of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. "How America and China Could Stumble to War." The National Interest. 4/12/2017. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-could-stumble-war-20150?page=0%2C6

In the years ahead, could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the South China Sea, a drive toward national independence in **Taiwan** or jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live **spark a war** between China and the United States that neither wants? It may seem hard to imagine—the consequences would be so obviously disproportionate to any gains either side could hope to achieve. Even a **non-nuclear war** conducted mostly at sea and in the air could kill **thousands** of combatants on both sides. Moreover, the **economic impact** of such a war would be **massive**. A 2016 RAND study found that, after just one year, American GDP could decline by up to **10 percent** and Chinese GDP by as much as **35 percent**—setbacks on par with the Great Depression. And if a war did go **nuclear**, both nations would be **utterly destroyed**. Chinese and American leaders know they cannot let that happen. Unwise or undesirable, however, **does not** mean impossible. Wars occur even when leaders are determined to avoid them. Events or actions of others narrow their options, forcing them to make choices that risk war rather than acquiesce to unacceptable alternatives. Athens did not want war with Sparta. Kaiser Wilhelm did not seek war with Britain. Mao initially opposed Kim Il-sung's attack on South Korea in 1950 for fear of blowback. But events often require leaders to choose between bad and worse risks. And once the military machines are in motion, misunderstandings, **miscalculations** and entanglements can escalate to a conflict **far beyond anyone's original intent**. To better understand these dangers, Washington and Beijing have developed scenarios, simulations and war games. These often begin with an unexpected incident or accident. Individuals assigned to play the hand of China or the United States take it from there. Participants in these exercises are repeatedly surprised to find how often and easily small sparks lead to large wars. Today, there are at least three plausible paths to war between the world's two greatest powers. IN WAR scenarios, analysts use basic concepts made familiar by the U.S. Forest Service. Arsonists cause only a small fraction of fires. Discarded cigarettes, smoldering campfires, industrial accidents and bolts of lightning are much more common sources. Fortunately, in the forest as well as in relations among nations, most sparks do not ignite a blaze. Background conditions often determine which sparks become fires. While Smokey the Bear's warning that "only you can prevent forest fires" teaches campers and hikers about sparks, the Forest Service posts additional warnings after long dry spells or periods of extreme heat, occasionally closing high-risk areas. Moreover, it regulates the storage of flammable chemicals, propane tanks and gas depots, becoming increasingly stringent as conditions worsen. In relations between China and the United States today, relevant background conditions include geography, culture and history. "History," Henry Kissinger observed in his first book, "is the memory of states." China's memory is longer than most, with the century of humiliation forming a core part of the country's identity. Recent military engagements are also part of each state's living memory. The Korean War and **Sino-Soviet border conflict** taught Chinese strategists **not to back down** from more powerful adversaries. Moreover, both the American and Chinese militaries acknowledge that the United States has lost, or at least failed to win, four of the five major wars it has entered since World War II. The most pertinent background conditions, however, are **Thucydides's Trap** and the syndromes of rising and ruling powers that China and the United States display in full. Thucydides's Trap is the **severe structural stress** caused when a **rising power** threatens to displace a ruling one. Most contests that fit this pattern have **ended badly**. Over the past five hundred years, a major rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power sixteen times. In twelve of those, the result was war. The rising power syndrome highlights the upstart's enhanced sense of itself, its interests, and its entitlement to recognition and respect. The ruling power syndrome is essentially the mirror image: the established power exhibiting an enlarged sense of fear and insecurity as it faces intimations of "decline." As in sibling rivalries, so too in diplomacy one finds a predictable progression reflected both at the dinner table and at the international conference table. A growing sense of self-importance ("my voice counts") leads to an expectation of recognition and respect ("listen to what I have to say") and a demand for increased impact ("I insist"). Understandably, the established power views the rising country's assertiveness as disrespectful, ungrateful and even provocative or dangerous. Exaggerated self-importance becomes hubris; unreasonable fear, paranoia. LIKE GASOLINE to a match, accelerants can turn an accidental collision or third-party provocation into war. One cluster of accelerants is captured by what Carl von Clausewitz called the "fog of war." Extending Thucydides's insight about war as "an affair of chances," Clausewitz observed that "war is the realm of uncertainty. Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty." This profound uncertainty can lead a commander or policymaker to act aggressively when a fuller set of facts would advise caution, and vice versa. The advent of disruptive weapons that promise "shock and awe" makes the fog and uncertainty even worse. With attacks on command-and-control systems, enemies can paralyze a nation's military command. In Desert Storm, U.S. forces demonstrated version 1.0 of this option. They destroyed Saddam Hussein's intelligence and cut communication links to his commanders in the field. Isolated, his forces hunkered down; it was like "shooting fish in a barrel," U.S. pilots remarked. Antisatellite weapons are one accelerant that military planners expect to play a big role in any U.S.-China conflict. Long a subject of science fiction, such weapons are today a fact of life, running the gamut from kinetic ones that physically destroy their targets to quieter systems that use lasers to jam or "dazzle" satellites, rendering them inoperable. In 2007, China successfully destroyed a weather satellite, and it regularly tests its antisatellite capabilities in low earth orbit. Satellites provide a crucial link in almost every U.S. military endeavor, from early warning of ballistic-missile launches and providing imagery and weather forecasts to planning operations. Global positioning satellites put the "precision" in almost all the military's precision-guided munitions and allow ships, planes and ground units to know where they are on the battlefield. The United States depends on this technology more than any of its competitors, making it a perfect target for Chinese military planners. Cyberspace provides even more opportunities for disruptive technological transformations that could provide a decisive advantage, on the one hand, but might also risk uncontrolled escalation, on the other. The details of offensive cyberweapons remain heavily classified and are constantly evolving. But the public has seen glimpses of them in some cases, such as America's cyberattack against Iran's nuclear program or its "left-of-launch" attacks on North Korea's missile tests. America's primary cyberspace organizations, the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, as well as their Chinese counterparts, can now use cyberweapons to silently shut down military networks and critical civilian infrastructure like power grids. Moreover, by employing proxies and assembling an international web of compromised computers, they can disguise the origins of a cyber-operation, slowing the victim's ability to identify the attacker. Like antisatellite measures, cyberweapons could create a decisive advantage in battle by disrupting the command-and-control and targeting information on which modern militaries depend—and without bloodshed. This presents a dangerous paradox: the very action that attackers believe will tamp down conflict can appear reckless and provocative to the victims. Similarly, cyberattacks that disrupt communication would intensify the fog of war, creating confusion that multiplies the chances of miscalculation. While both the United States and China now have nuclear arsenals that could survive the other's first strike and still allow for retaliation, neither can be sure its cyber arsenals could withstand a serious cyber assault. For example, a large-scale Chinese cyberattack against the U.S. military's networks could temporarily cripple Washington's ability to respond in kind, or even to operate some of its critical command-and-control and surveillance systems. This creates a dangerous use-it-or-lose-it dynamic in which each side has an incentive to attack key links in the other's computer networks before their capabilities are disabled. Compared with the bluntest instruments of war, especially nuclear bombs, cyberweapons seem to offer the promise of subtlety and precision. But this promise is illusory. Increased connectivity among systems and devices creates a domino effect. Unable to determine how the hacking of one system may affect others, attackers would find it difficult to narrowly tailor the effects of their operation and avoid unintended escalation. In 2016, 100,000 Internet-connected industrial control systems were operating around the world. Along with the proliferation of the "Internet of Things," which encompasses some ten billion devices worldwide, the number of enticing targets is growing rapidly. Another accelerant might involve compromising the confidentiality of sensitive networks. Some are obvious, such as those that operate nuclear command and control. Each side, however, may perceive other actions quite differently. Take China's "Great Firewall," a collection of hardware and software that enables Beijing to monitor and block vast segments of online content. Washington could disable a system essential to the Great Firewall, intending it as a modest, private warning. But for Chinese leaders who regard the ability to control citizens' access to information as vital, the operation could be misconstrued as the tip of a spear aimed at regime change. Given these background conditions, potential sparks can be frighteningly mundane. Escalation can occur rapidly. The following three scenarios show just how easily the United States and China can stumble into a war that each side hopes to avoid. CURRENTLY, AMERICAN and allied warships and aircraft are operating in greater proximity to their Chinese counterparts than ever before. U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers periodically conduct freedom-of-navigation operations near Chinese-controlled islands in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Suppose that during routine operations an American destroyer passes near Mischief Reef, one of the newly constructed islands where China has built runways for aircraft and installed air and missile defenses. As the ship nears the contested site, Chinese coast-guard vessels harass the destroyer, just as they did during the USS Cowpens incident in 2013. Unlike that encounter, however, the U.S. destroyer is unable to reserve in turns. It collides with a Chinese ship and sinks it, killing all on board. The Chinese government now has three options. The dovish course would be to avoid escalation by allowing the American destroyer to leave the area and to protest its actions through diplomatic channels. At the other end of the spectrum, it could adopt an eye-for-an-eye approach and sink the destroyer using aircraft or missiles stationed on Mischief Reef. By refusing to be the "chicken," while also not wanting to escalate, Beijing could opt for what it believes is a middle course. As the U.S. destroyer attempts to leave the area, a PLA Navy cruiser blocks its way, insisting that the destroyer entered Chinese territorial waters and demanding that its crew surrender and face justice for the deaths of the coast-guard personnel. China believes it is deescalating the situation by allowing for a diplomatic solution, akin to the deal that permitted an American crew to go free after a crash landing near Hainan Island sixteen years ago. The background conditions have changed since that incident. From a U.S. perspective, China's reckless harassment of the destroyer caused the collision in the first place. China's attempt to arrest American sailors in international waters would undermine the principles of the law of the sea. Surrendering would have far-reaching repercussions: if the U.S. military will not stand up to China to defend operations conducted by its own navy, what message does that send to America's allies, including Japan and the Philippines? Not willing to undermine its credibility by surrendering, the destroyer could simply sink the Chinese cruiser blocking its path. Alternatively, to avoid further bloodshed and to show a degree of sensitivity to the nationalistic pressures Chinese leaders face at home, the United States could use a show of force to get the cruiser to back down peacefully. U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, in consultation with leaders in Washington, could order nearby aircraft to fly to the area, send an aircraft carrier stationed in Japan toward the South China Sea, and forward-deploy B-2 bombers to Guam. American officials believe these actions will signal their seriousness without risking any further escalation. Events look different to Beijing, especially amid the fog of war. As China sees it, the United States has already sunk a Chinese vessel. Now scores of American aircraft are aloft, threatening attacks on the Chinese cruiser, other naval vessels, or military installations on nearby islands. Mindful of public opinion, Chinese leaders are especially conscious that any further bloodshed inflicted by the United States would force them to retaliate aggressively. But events are running beyond Beijing's control. As U.S. fighter jets rush to the scene to assist the stranded destroyer, a Chinese nationalist hurls planes and fires on the oncoming aircraft. The U.S. aircraft take desperate evasive action, and the destroyer begins firing on Chinese antiaircraft sites on the island. Under attack, the Chinese commander on the island bombards the destroyer with antiship missiles. The missiles hit their intended target, killing hundreds of American sailors and sinking the ship. Those who escape are now stranded in small lifeboats. Chinese leaders are desperate to avoid a full-scale war with the United States, but also cannot admit that their chain of command broke down. They claim their actions were a proportionate and defensive response because the American destroyer was the aggressor. Officials in Washington are stunned that China has sunk a $3 billion vessel and killed hundreds of American sailors. Though wary of going to war with China, those in the Situation Room cannot back down: video of the ship's wreckage and stranded U.S. sailors on cable news and social media has made that impossible. Many in Congress are calling on the administration to authorize war plans based on the doctrine formally named Air-Sea Battle, which calls for massive air strikes against missile and radar systems on the Chinese mainland. Realizing that attacks on China's mainland would trigger war, the president authorizes Pacific Command to instead destroy China's military bases on disputed islands in the South China Sea. The president reasons that this is a proportionate response, since these islands were directly responsible for the sinking of the destroyer. Furthermore, eliminating these military bases will allow U.S. ships to rescue the sailors stranded nearby. Most important, such an action would target only China's artificial islands, leaving its mainland untouched. President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials do not make this distinction. For years they have told the public that China has undisputed sovereignty over these islands. They are an integral part of China proper, and America has just attacked them. (Americans who scoff should recall that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor struck neither the mainland nor even a U.S. state, yet still rallied a nation to war.) Many in China are demanding that Xi order the PLA to destroy U.S. military bases in Guam, Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific. Some want China to attack the United States itself. No one is calling for China to exercise restraint. As millions of its citizens' social-media postings are reminding the government, after its century of humiliation at the hands of sovereign powers, the ruling Communist Party has promised: "never again." Still, President Xi clings to the hope that war can be avoided, an impossibility if China begins attacking U.S. military bases in Guam or Japan, killing soldiers and civilians and triggering retaliatory attacks on the Chinese mainland. Seeking a proportionate response to the U.S. attack on China's island bases, Xi instead approves an alternative plan: using lasers, electronic and kinetic weapons to destroy or disable all U.S. military satellites in orbit above the crisis area, and using cyberattacks to cripple American command-and-control systems throughout the Asia-Pacific. The goal is to deescalate: Xi hopes that the United States will be shocked into backing down. But from the American perspective, these "blinding" attacks are indistinguishable from the first stage of a coordinated attack on the U.S. aircraft carrier and its strike group sailing from Japan—an event for which the PLA has spent decades developing its "carrier-killer" antiship ballistic missiles. The ninety-thousand-ton carrier, a floating city of 5,500 sailors that the United States describes as sovereign American territory, is simply too big to lose. The president is not willing to take the risk. On the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president reluctantly approves the only plan ready on short notice that has a chance of saving the carrier: a war plan based on Air-Sea Battle. Using those assets still operational after the Chinese attack, the United States military begins destroying China's "kill chains," the various satellite and surveillance systems that allow Beijing to accurately target American carriers with its antiship missiles. It also launches massive cruise missile and stealth bomber attacks on PLA missile sites and air bases on the Chinese mainland, which could at any moment be used to sink U.S. vessels anywhere within the first island chain. The attacks provoke exactly what they intended to avoid. Its mainland now under attack, and the targeting systems needed to operate China's antiship weapons about to be lost, China must use them or lose them. Xi authorizes attacks on all U.S. warships within range, including the carrier group. American aircraft and naval escorts intercept Chinese bombers and fighter jets flying to the carrier, but a swarm of DF-21D ballistic missiles—the so-called carrier killers—prove too much to handle. Enough reach their target to sink the carrier, killing most of the 5,500 sailors on board—far more than died during Pearl Harbor. The dynamics of playing chicken with cyber and space weapons over the South China Sea has transformed a tiny spark into a roaring fire. IF TAIWAN were an independent nation, it would be among the most successful countries in the world. Its hardworking population of twenty-three million has developed a market economy twice the size of the Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam. Although many in Taiwan want independence, China views it as a province. Beijing is prepared to do whatever it takes to keep Taipei from asserting its sovereignty. No other country has been prepared to fight China over the matter. Suppose, however, that the Chinese government were to substantially increase repression at home, including in Hong Kong, where China promised to maintain considerable autonomy and freedom when Britain returned control of the city in 1997. Enraged that the Chinese government is backtracking on its promises, residents of Hong Kong take to the streets to demand that Beijing uphold its commitment to "One Country, Two Systems." As the protests drag on for weeks with no resolution in sight, Xi orders the military to do what it did in Tiananmen Square in 1989: crush the protests. The ensuing violence shocks the Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation. Pro-independence and anti-Beijing sentiment soars. In this atmosphere, the Taiwanese president is emboldened to ramp up rhetoric emphasizing her people's hard-won rights and democracy. Her political allies go further, insisting that what has occurred in Hong Kong proves that Taiwan can never guarantee its citizens' freedom without becoming a sovereign, independent country. To signal disapproval of Chinese repression in Hong Kong, the American president pointedly announces his respect for the Taiwanese president's strong stance and declares that the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act fully commits the United States to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. This is a major break from the long-standing U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" on the issue, and the Taiwanese president interprets it as tacit endorsement of a move toward independence. In an interview with the New York Times , she announces that Taiwan will apply for full membership to the UN (a move that China has long opposed) and rejects the so-called 1992 Consensus, under which both parties had agreed to the One-China concept while allowing for differing interpretations of what it actually meant. To punish Taiwan's insubordination and scare it into backing down, China conducts an enhanced version of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis by barraging Taiwanese waters with "tests" of ballistic and cruise missiles, severely interrupting the commercial shipping that constitutes the island's lifeline to the world. When Taipei still refuses to withdraw its membership application, China uses other weapons, including mine-laying drones, to further disrupt shipping into and out of Taiwan. As a small island nation, Taiwan imports 70 percent of its food and most of its natural resources, including energy. A sustained blockade would grind its economy to a halt and cause large-scale food shortages. Despite opposition to Taiwan's application to join the United Nations, the United States feels obliged to prevent its strangulation. Many pro-Taiwan members of Congress are demanding that the White House send aircraft carriers to Taiwan's aid, just as Bill Clinton did during the 1995–96 crisis. But the administration knows that China's antiship ballistic missiles would now pose a serious threat to any U.S. carriers moving into the area, and the American public has little stomach for another war. Instead, U.S. Pacific Command offers to escort commercial shipping through the affected seas, a gesture of support but not of willingness to fight. The escort campaign puts U.S. warships at risk of being sunk by the Chinese missile barrage, either deliberately or accidentally—an event that could instantly kill more than one thousand Americans and spark calls for retaliation. In this scenario, a Chinese antiship missile—ostensibly fired as part of ongoing test barrages—sinks the USS John P. Murtha , an amphibious transport dock ship acting as an escort to civilian shipping. All of the nearly eight hundred sailors and marines aboard are killed—more than the United States lost in the first year of the Iraq War. China insists that the sinking was accidental; the Murtha merely got in the way of a missile fired at a random patch of ocean. It reminds Washington that America accidentally bombed China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999. But in Washington, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs urge the president not to be deceived by this explanation. Instead they urge him to authorize the Air-Sea Battle plan to strike PLA antiship missile-launch sites on the mainland. Confronted with the sinking of the Murtha, the president accedes to pressure from military and political advisers, and agrees to preemptively strike antiship and other ballistic-missile systems on the Chinese mainland. Because China's conventional and

nuclear missiles are kept in the same locations, and their command-and-control systems are intertwined, Beijing mistakenly believes the United States is trying to eliminate its nuclear arsenal in a surprise first strike. In a desperate attempt to "deescalate by escalating"—an Orwellian doctrine that is nevertheless a pillar of Russian military strategy—China fires one of its land-based, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles into an empty tract of ocean south of Okinawa. The nuclear threshold has been crossed. And while no lives have been lost in the strike, it is but a short step from here to all-out nuclear war. THE SPARK to a Sino-American clash need not initially involve American or Chinese military forces. Instead, it might result from a confrontation with or between third-party allies. Such a scenario nearly became reality in 2010, when North Korea sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing forty-six South Korean sailors. China supported North Korea's denial of involvement. Seoul, meanwhile, insisted that Pyongyang be held accountable. Ultimately, the two Koreas and their allies stepped back from the brink. But with a new set of background conditions and accelerants today, it is not clear that it would be so easy to avoid war, especially if the third parties involved were less inured to the sort of slow, grinding tensions that the Korean Peninsula has endured for decades. Besides South Korea, the other major U.S. ally in China's immediate vicinity is Japan, a country with a post–World War II history of pacifism, but whose politics have become increasingly militaristic in recent years. Conservative Japanese politicians have spoken ever more stridently about revising the pacifist constitution imposed on their country by the United States. They have also been chafing against Chinese claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In a crisis involving its historical rival Beijing, any steps Tokyo takes would certainly be shaped by these memories, and by the Japanese government's shifting attitude toward military force. A likely flashpoint is the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), located near valuable fishing grounds, trade routes and potential oil reserves in the East China Sea. The United States controlled the islands after World War II, before returning them to Japan in the early 1970s. That same decade, China began claiming sovereignty over the islands. Chinese ships regularly pass through these waters, raising tensions between Beijing and Tokyo and raising a collision that could set off a chain reaction. Consider a scenario that provided the story line for a recent war game designed by the RAND Corporation. A group of Japanese ultranationalists set sail for the Senkakus in small civilian watercraft. On social media, they explain that they are headed for Kuba Jima, one of the smaller islands, which they intend to claim and occupy on behalf of Japan. They land and begin building unidentified structures. Taking a page out of the Chinese playbook, they live stream their activities for the world to see. China reacts swiftly, its coast guard arriving within hours with officers who arrest the Japanese dissidents and take them back to the Chinese mainland for trial. Does Japan allow them to face justice in a Chinese court? It could. Instead, rather than lose face, Japan dispatches some of its own coast-guard vessels to intercept the ship carrying the ultranationalists and prevent them from being taken to China. A pileup ensues as both the PLA Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deploy warships and fighter planes to the area. Neither side backs down. To make matters worse, some of the Japanese vessels land amphibious troops to occupy Kuba Jima, doubling down on the nationalists' actions. A skirmish has become a military confrontation. In an urgent call, the Japanese prime minister reminds the U.S. president that Tokyo expects Washington to uphold the seven-decade-old mutual defense treaty, noting that senior officials have repeatedly confirmed that America's commitment applies to the Senkakus. As the standoff enters its third day, the president and his National Security Council must decide: Does the United States wholeheartedly respond to Japan's appeal, putting air power over the disputed island to protect the Japanese troops now on the ground there? Or is there a more restrained course that will satisfy the Japanese without antagonizing China and further escalating the tense naval standoff? The president opts for the latter, directing the Japan-based carrier strike group to patrol outside the range of the PLA's land-based carrier-killer missiles, but keeping aircraft and submarines close enough to aid Japanese vessels and territory if things get ugly. They do. The next morning, a Chinese destroyer collides with a Japanese fishing boat in the crowded waters off the Senkakus, and soon fighter jets from both sides are provocatively buzzing their opponent's warships. The standoff erupts into a brief, bloody naval battle as a Japanese captain, fearing for his ship's safety, downs one of the low-flying Chinese fighters, and the PLA Navy warships, in return, sink his vessel. Both sides are at the edge of war at this point, and so is the United States, which is in a position to sink Chinese vessels with its hidden attack submarines or to send its carrier's air wing into action. At this juncture, however, before the next decision has been made, something unexpected happens. All communications between Japanese forces on and around the Senkakus and their headquarters go dark. A cyberattack has severely disrupted one of the Japanese military's command-and-control systems. The United States and Japan immediately blame China. The attacker has even left the telltale signs of the PLA's offensive hacking unit. There is little hesitation in Washington or at U.S. Pacific Command about what to do next. To prevent the Japanese naval force from being annihilated while it is incommunicado, U.S. submarines sink three PLA Navy warships off the Senkakus with torpedoes. China, Japan and the United States have now fired their opening shots in a three-nation war. But what if it was not the PLA that launched the cyberattack after all? What if it was a carefully timed false-flag operation by Russia, seeking to draw the United States and China into a conflict in order to distract Washington from its wrestling match with Moscow over Ukraine? By the time intelligence agencies around the world learn the truth, it will be too late. The Kremlin has played its hand brilliantly. From the Senkakus, the war zone spreads as China attacks more Japanese vessels elsewhere in the East China Sea. Tokyo is desperate for the United States to commit its carrier strike group to the fight. If Washington makes that call, the same point of no return may well be crossed as in the collision-at-sea scenario: the destruction of one of the crown jewels of the U.S. Navy and the loss of life of all aboard could be the tragedy that the U.S. administration is forced to avenge with widening attacks on Chinese forces in a full-scale Pacific war. WAR BETWEEN the United States and China is not inevitable, but it is certainly possible. Indeed, as these scenarios illustrate, the underlying stress created by China's disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict. That outcome is not preordained: out of the sixteen cases of Thucydides's Trap over the last five hundred years, war was averted four times. But avoiding war will require statecraft as subtle as that of the British in dealing with a rising America a century ago, or the wise men that crafted a Cold War strategy to meet the Soviet Union's surge without bombs or bullets. Whether Chinese and American leaders can rise to this challenge is an open question. What is certain is that the fate of the world rests upon the answer.

1AC — Democracy Advantage

Advantage two is Democracy.

First, Russian and Chinese vaccine diplomacy is critical to disinformation campaigns aimed at destabilizing NATO.

Emmott 21 — Robin Emmott 21. Reporter. "Russia, China sow disinformation to undermine trust in Western vaccines: EU." Reuters. Published 4/28/21. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-china-sow-disinformation-undermine-trust-western-vaccines-eu-report-says-2021-04-28/

BRUSSELS, April 28 (Reuters) - Russian and Chinese media are **systematically seeking to sow mistrust in Western COVID-19 vaccines** in their latest disinformation campaigns aimed at **dividing the West**, a European report said on Wednesday. From December to April, the two countries' state media outlets pushed fake news online in multiple languages sensationalising vaccine safety concerns, making unfounded links between jabs and deaths in Europe and promoting Russian and Chinese vaccines as superior, the EU study said. The Kremlin and Beijing deny all disinformation allegations by the EU, which produces regular reports and seeks to work with Google (GOOGL.O), Facebook (FB.O), Twitter (TWTR.N) and Microsoft (MSFT.O) to limit the spread of fake news. **Russian and Chinese vaccine diplomacy** "**follows a zero-sum game logic** and is combined with disinformation and manipulation efforts to undermine trust in Western-made vaccines," said the EU study released by the bloc's disinformation unit, part of its EEAS foreign policy arm. "Both Russia and China are using state-controlled media, networks of proxy media outlets and social media, including official diplomatic social media accounts, to achieve these goals," the report said, citing 100 Russian examples this year. The EU and **NATO regularly accuse Russia of** covert action, including **disinformation**, to try **to destabilise the West** by exploiting divisions in society.

Second, China is conditioning aid on defense of government stances.

Lin et al. 21 — Bonny Lin et. al 21. Director, China Power Project and Senior Fellow, Asian Security. Matthew P. Funaiole, Vice President, iDeas Lab, Andreas C. Dracopoulos Chair in Innovation and Senior Fellow, China Power Project. Brian Hart, Fellow, China Power Project. Hannah Price, Program Manager, China Power Project. "China Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Published 9/30/21. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-advance-its-interests-mixed-results

The Covid-19 pandemic has offered China an **unprecedented opportunity to shore up its international influence** by providing the world with much-needed public health goods. The CSIS China Power Project published a detailed study of China's "Covid-19 diplomacy," which assesses the scope and impact of China's efforts to supply countries with medical aid and vaccines. The study developed a unique Chinese Covid-19 Diplomacy Index (CCDI), which brings together **thousands of data points** to score countries based on the extent to which China engaged them in medical diplomacy and vaccine diplomacy and how receptive they were to Chinese activities. The study and the index generate important insights into the strengths and weaknesses of China's approach to Covid-19 diplomacy and the implications for the United States and its partners. Q1: How has China engaged in Covid-19 diplomacy? A1: Based on the study's analysis of Chinese activities from January 2020 to the present, there are six main features of Beijing's Covid-19 diplomacy: China's Covid-19 diplomacy is not primarily based on need or reciprocity. **Political and strategic calculations**—including the desire to strengthen existing relationships and forge new ones—**figure prominently** in Beijing's decisions to provide medical aid or vaccines. China's provision of medical aid and vaccines has frequently come **with strings attached**. For example, where possible, Chinese embassies abroad requested that officials in recipient countries provide **public displays of gratitude** by participating in handover ceremonies to welcome Chinese medical supplies and vaccines. There is also evidence that **Beijing paired its provision of vaccines with requests** that recipient country governments **defend Chinese stances** on issues.

Third, disinformation erodes global democracy.

Colomina et al. 21 — Carme Colomina et. al 21. Research Fellow, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Héctor Sanchez Margalef, Researcher, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Richard Youngs, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kate Jones, Associate Fellow, Chatham House and Faculty of Law, University of Oxford. "The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world." Published by the European Parliament, April 2021. Accessed July 2022. Page 13. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf

Disinformation has an impact on the basic health and credibility of **democratic processes**. This has become the core of recent positions taken by international organisations, such as Resolution 2326 (2020) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) expressing concern 'about the scale of information pollution in a digitally connected and increasingly polarised world, the spread of disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping public opinion, trends of foreign electoral interference and manipulation' 59. Information and shared narratives are a precondition for good quality democratic public discourse. In this context, the European Parliament views disinformation as an 'increasing systematic pressure' on European societies and their electoral stability60. The European Commission's strategy Shaping Europe's Digital Future61 considers that 'disinformation erodes trust in institutions along with digital and traditional media and harms our democracies by hampering the ability of citizens to take informed decisions'. It also warns that disinformation is set to **polarise democratic societies** by creating or deepening tensions and undermining democratic pillars such as electoral systems. There are a number of ways in which disinformation weakens democratic institutions. These include the use of social media to channel disinformation in coordinated ways so as to undermine institutions' credibility. As trust in mainstream media has plummeted62, alternative news ecosystems have flourished. Online platforms' business model pushes content that generates clicks and this has increased polarisation. This favours the creation of more homogeneous audiences, undercuts tolerance for alternative views63. Figure 2 below suggests that around 80 % of people believe that disinformation has negative impacts in their own countries' politics, in other countries' politics and in political discussions among families and friends, which increases polarisation. Surveys also show that disinformation can sow distrust in different pillars of democratic institutions, including **public institutions** such as governments, parliaments and courts or their processes, public **figures**, as well as journalists **and free media**64. For example, a survey undertaken by Ipsos Public Affairs and Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) reports that, due to the spread of disinformation, many citizens have less trust in media (40 %) and government (22 %)65.

Fourth, democratic decline causes great power war.

Diamond 19 — Larry_Diamond 19. PhD in Sociology, professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University. "Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition and American Complacency," Kindle Edition

In such a near future, my fellow experts would no longer talk of "democratic erosion." We would be spiraling downward into a time of democratic despair, recalling Daniel Patrick Moynihan's grim observation from the 1970s that liberal democracy "is where the world was, not where it is going." 5 The world pulled out of that downward spiral—but it took new, more purposeful American leadership. The planet was not so lucky in the 1930s, when the **global implosion of democracy** led to a **catastrophic world war**, between a rising axis of emboldened dictatorships and a shaken and economically depressed collection of selfdoubting democracies. These are the stakes. Expanding democracy—with its liberal norms and constitutional commitments—is a **crucial foundation** for **world peace and security**. Knock that away, and our most basic hopes and assumptions will be imperiled. The problem is not just that the ground is slipping. It is that we are **perched on a global precipice**. That ledge has been gradually giving way for a decade. If the **erosion** continues, we **may** well reach a **tipping point** where **democracy goes bankrupt** suddenly—plunging the world into **depths of oppression** and **aggression** that we have **not seen since** the end of **World War II**. As a political scientist, I know that our theories and tools are not nearly good enough to tell us just how close we are getting to that point—until it happens.

Finally, NATO allies' diplomatic failures validate disinformation campaigns and decrease faith in democracy. Only renewed efforts can solve.

Rajah et al. 22 — Roland Rajah et. al 22. Lead Economist and Director, International Economics Program. Alyssa Leng, Research Officer at the Development Policy Centre within the Australian National University and former Research Fellow and Economist in the Power and Diplomacy program. Herve Lemahieu, Director of Research. "Towards a Better Vaccine Diplomacy." Lowy Institute. Published 3/1/22. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/vaccine-diplomacy-asia

Despite significant strides in the right direction, the United States and its partners have a **long way to go** to make a success of their vaccine diplomacy. China may have proven itself unable to step up in the manner expected of a superpower and aspiring alternate hegemon. However, the task for the United States and its partners is not simply to outdo China – it is to convince emerging powers in the Indo-Pacific, and the world, that the liberal international order for which they stand is worthy of its name. Western claims to be principled global actors are **discredited** when governments **hoard vaccines**, **belatedly donate** the excess, and **allow multilateralism to fall short** at a crucial global moment. Global vaccination efforts have more recently begun to move more forcefully in the right direction. But the race to inoculate the world has only just begun. Further challenges, setbacks, and **plot twists** no doubt still **lie ahead**. Vaccine diplomacy, as practiced, leaves much to be desired. The answer, however, is not less vaccine diplomacy but doing more and better to bring the global pandemic to heel.

1AC — Plan

The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of biotechnology by increasing vaccine diplomacy and distribution.

1AC — Solvency

First, NATO needs revamped pandemic preparedness and response to make the international system effective.

Bricknell et al. 22 — Martin Bricknell et. al 22. Rosa Castro. Michela Ceccorulli. Fabrizio Coticchia. Andrea Goldstein. Zenobia Homan. Guillaume Lasconjarias. Chiu-Yi Lin. Sonia Lucarelli. Alessandro Marrone. Francesco N. Moro. Torben Schütz. Edouard Simon. James Sperling. Mark Webber. Published as a result of the academic conference entitled "Pandemics and International Security: The Outlook for NATO", held in Bertinoro on October 21-22, 2021 and organized by the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali. Published February 2022. Accessed July 2022. Pg. 26-27. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/pandemics-and-international-security-outlook-nato

Shortcomings on meaningful cooperation and solidarity Pandemic preparedness and response are core functions that should be supported by **all sectors** rather than by the health sector alone. Such multi-sectorial cooperation is needed at all levels, including nationally, regionally, and locally (The Independent Panel, 2021). In addition to this, consistent cooperation and solidarity among countries has also been lacking. While bilateral, regional, and even global cooperation, for instance for the provision of protective material, sharing of data, and procurement of other medical countermeasures, has occurred, there is still a clear need to ensure that future health threats are addressed in a **coordinated manner**, with **solidarity between countries**, rather than left to the good will of countries and sectors, and emergence of ad hoc cooperation mechanisms to address problems. A key example of this gap has been the development of new vaccines for Covid-19, which have represented a triumph for science and scientific collaborations and at the same time **a failure** for global solidarity and cooperation **in terms of equitable access** to vaccines (Stephenson, 2021). The development of vaccines and therapies has occurred in a collaboratively and efficient manner, with global collaborations supporting rapid data sharing and exchanges. However, vaccines, therapies and diagnostic tests **remain inaccessible** for most people in low- and middle-income countries. The WHO Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and its COVAX facility were developed to anticipate these risks. However, in the absence of a coordinated framework to accelerate global R&D and ensure access to final products (Lurie, Keusch and Dzau, 2021), COVAX and the ACT have had a very **limited impact** (Sachs et al., 2021). Solving this problem will require an **adequate framework** plus a thorough financing system involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, multilateral development banks, and others to ensure that medical countermeasures reach the global population (Sachs et al., 2021). This is not only important as a matter of global solidarity and cooperation but also for an effective global response; a slow vaccination pace across the world could facilitate the emergence of new virus variants, which would further delay the end of the pandemic. One lesson emerging from Covid-19 and previous crises is that **sustained action** and **financing** are key to prepare for **future threats**. After reviewing evidence about the response to Covid-19, the Independent Panel concluded that "**system-level change is needed** to overcome the manifest failure **of the international system to prevent**, **contain**, **and mitigate** the impact of a pandemic". The negotiation of a Global Treaty on Pandemics (WHO, 2021) and the development of similar institutional frameworks and agencies at regional and national levels could facilitate this. The following aspects have been deemed crucial for an improved system incorporating the lessons from Covid-19.

Second, now is key. Only immediate vaccine diplomacy efforts can restore faith in democratic institutions.

Rajah et al. 22 — Roland Rajah et. al 22. Lead Economist and Director, International Economics Program. Alyssa Leng, Research Officer at the Development Policy Centre within the Australian National University and former Research Fellow and Economist in the Power and Diplomacy program. Herve Lemahieu, Director of Research. "Towards a Better Vaccine Diplomacy." Lowy Institute. Published 3/1/22. Accessed 7/8/22. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/vaccine-diplomacy-asia

Leapfrogging China in vaccine diplomacy, however, does not mean that the United States and its partners will emerge from this global health crisis triumphant. China may have proven itself unable to step up in the way required, but the world does not expect as much of China to begin with. The task for the **U**nited **S**tates **and** its like-minded **partners**, by contrast, is to **convince the rest of the world** that they are the principled global actors they claim to be and that the much-fabled **l**iberal **i**nternational **o**rder for which they stand is **worthy of its status**. The billions of doses committed still fall well short of global demand for vaccines, especially once the need for booster shots in response to Omicron and possible future variants are factored in. Moreover, aside from the U.S., many of the biggest donors have made relatively **small donation pledges** on a per capita basis. Only the United States,

Germany, and Australia have promised to donate a full course overseas for every person in their domestic population. Concerns are also rising around the practice by many rich countries of donating excess doses close to their expiry dates, leaving poor countries little time to get jabs into arms and forcing them to reject or destroy the donated vaccines instead. Timing is **crucial**. From both an epidemiological and economic standpoint, jabs in arms today are **far more valuable than vaccines delivered tomorrow**, let alone years in the future. Yet just a fifth of total doses promised by donors have to date been delivered. Of the 10 largest donors, only the U.S., Australia, Italy, and Japan have delivered more than a quarter of their commitments.

Finally, vaccine diplomacy checks revisionist powers and reasserts US global leadership.

Iancu et al. 21 — Andrei Iancu et. al 21. Senior Adviser and Co-Founder, Renewing American Innovation Project. Gary Locke, Interim President of Bellevue College, Former Secretary of Commerce, and Former Governor of Washington. David J. Kappos, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and Former U.S. Under Secretary for Intellectual Property. "The Shot Heard around the World." Center for Strategic and International Studies. Published 11/17/21. Accessed 7/9/22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/shot-heard-around-world

In 2020, the United States won the global race to develop a Covid-19 vaccine. But that historic victory could become a **historical footnote** if the United States **loses the race to deliver** its vaccines to the rest of the globe. Vaccine diplomacy has **never been more important**. **Every nation** on earth **will be watching to see who will** rise to the challenge and **reap the rewards of global leadership**. The United States now has an opportunity to deploy its scientific and economic preeminence in the service of all humanity. The United States has the ability to shield developing nations not only from the virus, but from the **designs of competing powers**. Yet, to date, the United States has been slow to seize this opportunity, and international rivals—especially China—are **eagerly filling the gap** created by its inaction. Vaccines have been widely available throughout the United States for many months and to vulnerable groups for almost a year. Yet elsewhere in the world, billions of people are still without access to any shots and are desperate for help. Vaccine-rich nations such as the United States have a **humanitarian responsibility** to help bring everyone else out of the pandemic as well; inoculating the world is a moral duty. In addition to a humanitarian obligation to deliver vaccines around the world, the United States has sound strategic and competitive reasons to do so. In the absence of U.S. leadership, desperate nations are turning to Beijing, which is offering inferior **vaccines in exchange for foreign-policy concessions**. Meanwhile, at the World Trade Organization (WTO), a group of nations is proposing that countries agree to strip vaccine makers of their patents, copyrights, and trade secrets—the intellectual property (IP) underlying the products and processes they invented, including the vaccines themselves and the technology that produces them. Unfortunately, the Biden-Harris administration has endorsed this idea, which would surrender national competitive advantages to rival nations without adding a single dose to the global vaccine arsenal. The real barriers to vaccinating the developing world are not IP protections. Forcing vaccine makers to give up intellectual property will not lower barriers; it will only create new ones, both for today's global vaccination project and in future pandemics. Rather, a combination of logistical, regulatory, and infrastructure challenges is slowing global vaccination efforts. Fortunately, these are problems U.S. economic resources and technological innovation can readily solve. The present challenge provides a **perfect opportunity** for the United States **to reassert its leadership** role in international affairs **and check its rivals' cynical opportunism**.

1NC

1NC- Topicality “Security Cooperation”

The [first/next] off-case is the T- Security Cooperation

A. Interpretation — “security cooperation” refers exclusively to military to military cooperation authorized explicitly by US Code — diplomatic and economic activities are “security assistance.”

Tankel ’20 [Stephen and Tommy; October 28; associate professor at American University, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for security cooperation and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid; War on the Rocks, “Retooling U.S. Security Sector Assistance,” https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-competition]

The United **S**tates **provides security** sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, **supports the infrastructure** and operations of multilateral organizations such as **NATO**, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations **responsible for defense**, **law enforcement**, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The **D**epartment **o**f **D**efense has a **narrower mandate**, and **provides assistance** to **partner militaries** under the **umbrella** of **security cooperation**. The Pentagon also engages in a **range** of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items. Over the last several years, the national security enterprise has, with a great many fits and starts, endeavored to shift its broader focus — from weapons systems to diplomacy — away from counter-terrorism and toward strategic competition with state actors. As part of this shift, policymakers have attempted to realign security assistance to contribute more directly to strategic competition, primarily by creating new resources for security assistance in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The European Deterrence Initiative, launched in 2014, has allocated around $6 billion annually to enhance America’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia. It has been supplemented by the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, authorized by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 to provide $250 million in security assistance to bolster Ukraine’s security. Congress also created the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative in 2014, later re-designated as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, and funded it as a five-year, $425 million security assistance effort, which it has since extended through FY2025. This program is intended to improve the ability of Southeast and East Asian nations to address growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. In the FY2021 defense bill currently being finalized, Congress is set to authorize a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, modeled on the European Deterrence Initiative, with as much as $6 billion annually to improve U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific region, reportedly with a significant security assistance component. These efforts have been laudable, but far from sufficient. The European Deterrence Initiative has largely been used to shift enduring costs for U.S. military presence in Europe into the Overseas Contingency Operations portion of the defense budget. It has also dedicated the vast majority of funds to posture and equipment pre-positioning, with little attention to security assistance beyond combined exercises — a significant missed opportunity. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has been managed insularly by the U.S. Europe Command, which has bypassed synchronization with other Defense Department and U.S. government stakeholders, leading to a focus on the provision of “training and equipment at the expense of developing a long-term strategic vision and implementation of meaningful defense reform.” In the Asia-Pacific, the Maritime Security Initiative has shown promise, but its relatively limited funding has failed to significantly contribute to a rebalance of assistance toward the region, and it has largely funded projects with little deterrent value. Incoming U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Philip Davidson declared, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Moreover, none of these initiatives have prioritized partner security sector governance — a vital element of any strategy that seeks to shape the behavior of U.S. allies and partners. As Congress considers the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, it is essential that these mistakes — failure to integrate security assistance with other instruments of national power, overemphasis on posture at the expense of cooperation, and too little ambition for assistance initiatives — are not repeated. Even avoiding them, however, will go only so far in terms of optimizing security sector assistance for the challenges ahead. The U.S. government should also address broader challenges with the way security sector assistance is prioritized and executed. Still an Outmoded Instrument To increase the effectiveness of security sector assistance for strategic competition, the United States should address deficiencies related to where and how it uses this assistance. Currently, assistance is focused on the wrong countries and being used to build the wrong capabilities. Assistance remains over-directed toward countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia, rather than to those in Europe and Southeast Asia where the main competition with Russia and China occurs. There are several reasons for this disparity. First, annual commitments to Israel and Egypt — totaling $3.3 billion and $1.3 billion, respectively — eat up a large portion of the Foreign Military Financing budget. The origins of U.S. munificence to both countries is linked to the “payoff for peace,” that is, the U.S. commitment to Israel and Egypt after they signed the 1979 Camp David Accords. Distinct from the Foreign Military Sales program, through which the State Department brokers purchases of U.S.-made defense articles and defense services by foreign partners, the Foreign Military Financing program provides grants and loans to help partners, generally lower-income countries, purchase those articles and services. It is intended to be the premier program for building the capabilities of frontline allies and partners. Given its purpose, one would think that the United States would be steering more Foreign Military Financing toward Europe and Asia. Second, the 9/11 attacks brought new requirements: promoting counter-terrorism cooperation and rapidly building the capacity of local partner forces, especially the creation or enhancement of tactical units, to address “urgent and emergent threats.” This naturally led to a focus on countries where terrorists operated or might take root, which reinforced the geographic focus on the Middle East, and expanded it to include countries in Central and South Asia. This focus was especially marked at the Defense Department. The amount of assistance it administers climbed significantly since 9/11, and totaled just over $7.5 billion in the FY2021 budget request. Approximately $6.5 billion comes from contingency funds for capacity building in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones. Supporting these conflicts created additional security assistance cost centers among partners that played critical

roles supporting counter-terrorism operations and U.S. logistics footprints. For example, Pakistan received over $23 billion in security assistance and military reimbursements as a result of its importance to the United States as a counter-terrorism partner after 9/11. Jordan has also experienced a marked increase in assistance over the same period, receiving close to $10 billion. Overall, the United States spends about $20 billion annually on security sector assistance, of which only approximately 8 percent is allotted to Europe, East Asia, and the Pacific, according to Security Assistance Monitor. Addressing this imbalance will require the departments of State and Defense to reprioritize their budget requests, and Congress to cease earmarking security sector assistance dollars based on outmoded objectives. The overriding focus on counter-terrorism in U.S. security sector assistance programs and national security strategy more broadly over the past two decades has not only contributed to its orientation toward the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia. It also compounded challenges related to how the United States uses assistance, specifically America's emphasis on countering urgent threats and on capacity building for counter-terrorism or special operations units. Where the State Department provides assistance to civilian security sector forces and institutions in other countries, it overemphasizes building tactical capabilities for law enforcement (that is, training small operational units on narrow capabilities like interdicting narcotraffickers or conducting counterterrorism raids) at the expense of the administrative capacity and professionalism of these forces and institutions. Defense Department assistance has similarly focused on building the tactical capabilities of partner militaries. Such tactical assistance — which often includes status-signaling weapons systems and resources to supplement partner personnel training budgets — is often prioritized by partners as well, particularly in the absence of effective U.S. messaging on the importance of broader reforms. The U.S. emphasis on counter-terrorism led to a buildup of Special Operations Command and the services' special operations forces components as well, and a commensurate focus on building the capacity of their special operations counterparts in other countries. Although the services dispense assistance, they don't invest much in terms of the planning necessary to tie the execution of this assistance to either specific objectives or longer-term engagements. Other than the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigades, the services don't organize for the security sector assistance mission. Even in the Asia-Pacific, the main focus of assistance prior to the Maritime Security Initiative was the special operations forces capacity-building mission in the Philippines. This focus on special operations force has left the services, and U.S. partners' conventional forces, out of the equation in many places. Iraq and Afghanistan are a notable exception, but even in these countries the United States has focused on building specific types of military units with a heavy emphasis on partner special operations capacity. While the United States has directed security sector assistance toward the Middle East and South and Central Asia, and focused more on building partners' tactical capacity for counter-terrorism, Russia and China are using aggressive military pressure to coerce neighbors and compete in new domains, such as cyber and space. They are also using instruments of statecraft outside the traditional security arena, such as economic pressure, lawfare, and even technical standards-setting. For example, China has used commercially flagged fishing vessels to perform militia-like functions in support of its activities around South China Sea features. Russia has used its cyber capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure, interfere in elections, undermine political leaders, and spread disinformation throughout NATO-aligned Eastern Europe. The United States has failed to keep pace — either on its own in terms of its use of all instruments of national power, or in terms of the security assistance it provides partners to enhance their capabilities to mount effective responses and build resilience. Optimizing Security Sector Assistance If security assistance is to be an effective tool in strategic competition, then the U.S. government needs to step up its game. Washington should develop a sophisticated, integrated planning process at the State Department and Department of Defense for security assistance; significantly increase the Foreign Military Financing budget, or redirect spending from the Middle East and North Africa to Asia and Eastern Europe; use security assistance to convey strategic messages to both rivals and partners; and feature human rights considerations more prominently when engaging in arms sales. This would require the United States to address underlying deficiencies in planning, prioritization, and execution in ways that account for the unique challenges that Russian and Chinese approaches to competition bring: the use of disinformation, private security contractors, cyber tools, and civilian and commercial actors such as commercial fishing fleets. This is not to suggest that Washington should look to security sector assistance as the solution to all of its national security challenges — far from it. Rather, assistance should be better integrated with other instruments of national power. The following recommendations are intended to close the gap between where the United States currently is regarding its use of security sector assistance and where it needs to be to compete effectively. Some of these recommendations are focused more squarely on China and Russia, whereas others relate to broader reforms to the security sector assistance enterprise. First, it is essential to create coordinated, department-wide planning processes at the departments of State and Defense. The U.S. government is hamstrung by inefficient and incoherent planning and coordination processes that do not allocate assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities, country prioritization, availability of resources, and regional and country-specific assumptions. Congressional earmarks make prioritization more difficult, but getting rid of them won't solve the problem. Policymakers should recognize the fundamentally interdisciplinary nature of many aspects of strategic competition and begin to break down stovepipes both within and between key agencies involved in the planning and execution of security assistance. Interagency coordination should move beyond mere deconfliction and concurrence toward a truly collaborative real-time planning and response. Lack of coordination also exists within departments, which should reform their assistance planning processes. Of equal importance, security sector assistance planning and prioritization should account for the fact that China and Russia are mounting sustained challenges to governance and rule of law at the regional, national, and multinational levels. Advancing governance and rule of law therefore should be a key aim of assistance. **The State Department has a wider mandate for security assistance**, encompassing both **military** aid **and** assistance for **civilians**. It is also supposed to use security assistance to advance broader, more long-term objectives like trade and investment, efforts to help allies and partners develop an innovation base, and major diplomatic initiatives. To fulfill this mission, the State Department should develop a planning process that elevates common interagency objectives for assistance, deconflicts competing objectives where necessary, identifies security assistance resources projected to be available for the period of time necessary to achieve such objectives, and recommends the allocation of assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities. Those priorities should be derived from the next administration's national security strategy and informed by the availability of resources, and regional and country-specific assumptions. State also needs to create a framework to guide the use of assistance as dictated by the above planning process in alignment with other instruments of national power, and a framework for factoring in how arms sales — both Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales — might affect U.S. security assistance planning and broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. Last year, the House of Representatives passed a State Authorization Act that required these and other reforms, but it has languished in the Senate since then. Defense Department assistance should focus narrowly on four inherently military objectives: supporting State Department-coordinated efforts to build long-term capacity so that an ally or partner can manage its own security challenges; achieving a fundamental improvement in U.S. posture to prevail (including via coalitions) in a potential contingency, for example by assisting a partner to build a deep-water port or develop the capability to contribute in a specific role to potential coalition operations; generating short-term capacity when deemed necessary to achieve strategic objectives or improving interoperability for a specific goal; and responding to real-time developments, such as deterrent signaling, personnel recovery, or humanitarian response. Defense Department planners should be required to identify the objective(s) they're serving and justify their plans on that basis. They also should be conducting a rigorous analysis to identify gaps in Pentagon plans for contingency scenarios involving near-peer competitors or other real-time developments that could impact U.S. interests, and basing priorities for security assistance on those gaps. Stronger links between contingency planning and security cooperation will help focus Defense Department security assistance and advance strategic competition. Second, a more sophisticated and coordinated planning process should lead the United States to redirect security assistance to U.S. allies and partners in Asia and Eastern Europe, and expand the nature of assistance provided. The U.S. government has begun shifting some assistance, such as Section 333 capacity building administered by the Pentagon, away from U.S. Central Command countries to countries in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command regions. The State and Defense departments need to accelerate this shift to compete more effectively with Russia and China. The United States should be using Foreign Military Financing, as well as Maritime Security Initiative funding and other programs, to help regional states in Asia develop anti-access/area denial systems to challenge Chinese power-projection operations. The departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security should also be coordinating to increase support for U.S. Coast Guard cooperation with allies and partners to challenge China's white hull strategy. Realizing a significant reallocation of security assistance in support of strategic competition will require increasing the overall budget for Foreign Military Financing. These budgets have declined from a peak of $9.4 billion in FY2015 to the current year's $7.5 billion, while the importance placed on security cooperation with allies and partners and the variety of threats they face have increased. The amount of such an increase will depend on the needs of key allies and partners, and whether Congress is willing to

reduce Foreign Military Financing to Israel and Egypt, which in some years accounts for nearly two-thirds of the program's budget. Unquestionably, the State Department can improve its prioritization of the remaining amount, which is spread across more than 100 partners globally, but those limited resources go only so far. In our experience, selling Congress on an injection of resources or on reductions to Israel and Egypt will require considerable effort. The State Department would need not only to provide a compelling strategy for how resources that can be freed up by reducing commitments to Israel and Egypt will be used to improve America's national security posture. It also will need to provide a convincing assessment that such reductions will not infringe on Israel's qualitative military edge in the region or lead to a breakdown in the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt. We believe these crucial U.S. interests — Israel's security and regional stability — can be maintained at lower aid levels. However, we are also realistic about the political challenges that make such a shift so difficult regardless of what any policy analysis suggests. For this reason, although we typically would recommend starting with a reallocation of existing resources before increasing the overall budget, in this instance we recognize that directing more money to the problem might be the least-worst option. A compelling case can be made for new resources and authorities to expand the types of aid provided under Foreign Military Financing — including to address the gaps identified above, **such as cyber security and law enforcement**. The argument will be strongest if it is articulated within broader strategies for competing with China and Russia. In addition to Foreign Military Financing, there are a mix of other programs the United States could use to increase the capacity and capabilities of key Eastern European NATO allies. As Max Bergmann observed on these pages a few years ago, Congress is likely to be unwilling to provide much assistance funding through traditional grant methods, especially as Eastern European countries are wealthier than typical grant assistance recipients. This approach is deeply flawed: Many of Eastern Europe's governments lack the economic wherewithal to engage in the types of military development necessary to compete with Russia. Moreover, the United States has clear and urgent goals in the region that should not be left dependent on the vicissitudes of partners' budget politics. At the same time, we agree with Bergmann that the United States cannot and should not shoulder too much of the responsibility for these countries, which should demonstrate a commitment to acquisitions. One of the problems with Foreign Military Sales, though, is that U.S. weapons systems that Eastern European militaries would need to compete with Russia are top-of-the-line and likely unaffordable for midtier countries. Providing excess defense articles is one workaround, but this puts recipients at the mercy of what is available. Bergmann's recommendation that the United States provide a mix of grants and loans to help NATO countries make acquisitions themselves is a fine one, and we would offer complementary or alternative approaches as well. The U.S. government could consider a lend-lease program in which equipment itself is provided via a loan or low-cost lease for a period of time to be used in an agreed-upon manner, after which the recipient could purchase the equipment at a reduced cost. Pooled sales and multilateral cooperative platforms modeled on the Movement Coordination Center Europe are other promising solutions. Any one of these models would be an improvement on the current approach. As China, Russia, and others compete across a range of domains stretching beyond traditional military strength — cyber security, law enforcement, and disinformation — the U.S. government should enhance its ability to provide timely, relevant assistance in these areas. In our experience in government, American allies and partners routinely ask for this assistance. Yet, U.S. capacity building in each of these areas is immature. Cyber security assistance is meagerly resourced and often ad hoc, with limited assistance programs spread incoherently across government agencies. Likewise, intelligence and law enforcement capacity **building are limited** and often plagued by turf battles. Enabling allies and partners to counter disinformation represents an emerging area of focus, and Washington should rise to the occasion. In many of these areas, effective governance is often one of the most crucial gaps America's allies and partners confront. To meet these challenges, the United States should reimagine security sector assistance, factor in its impact on governance and rule of law, and increase the involvement of the departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury.

B. Violation — the aff does vaccine diplomacy to civilians. That's security assistance, not security cooperation.

C. Prefer Our Interpretation —

1. Limits — including "security assistance" expands the topic to include arms sales, infrastructure, and any civilian aid. That overstretches the research burden and undermines preparedness for all debates.

2. Ground — allowing civilian assistance skirts DoD and other military disads. That's core neg ground on a large topic.

D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness and education.

1NC- DOD Trade Off DA

The [first/next] off-case is the DoD Tradeoff DA

A. Uniqueness — the upcoming budget is a major win for tech R&D, BUT it requires avoiding competition and tradeoffs with other priorities.

Carberry 22 — Sean Carberry, 5-31-2022 [Managing Editor at National Defense. "Budget Matters: 2023 Science, Technology Budget a Mixed Bag," National Defense || https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/5/31/2023-science-technology-budget-a-mixed-bag]

The fiscal year 2023 Defense Department **budget** proposal **is a big win for research, development**, test and evaluation — particularly the **science and technology** portion of the **funding** — according to senior officials. However, a closer analysis of the request and the impact of inflation indicates the proposal is less than the fiscal year 2022 enacted budget. The 2023 budget proposal includes $130 billion for RDT&E, a 16 percent increase above the 2022 proposed defense budget. The portion for science and technology — budget activity codes 6.1 through 6.3 — includes $16.5 billion, a 12 percent increase, said Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Heidi Shyu during a National Defense Industry Association-hosted webinar April 20. Shyu's office would receive $1.6 billion in science-and-technology funding, a 21 percent increase. "So, **it's a huge jump**," said Shyu. Basic research for the entire Defense Department is nearly $2.4 billion, a 4 percent increase, and Shyu's office would receive $244 million, a 23 percent increase, under the proposed 2023 budget. In terms of investment priorities, funding for Shyu's office aligns with the 14 "critical technology areas" she outlined in a Feb 1 memo. Microelectronics — particularly onshoring — 5G, hypersonics, directed energy and integrated sensing and cyber top the list based on funding. Rear Adm. Lorin Selby, chief of naval research in the Office of Naval Research stated in the webinar that one-third of the Navy's science-and-technology priorities align with the research and engineering office's critical technology areas, and the rest are Navy-centric. Some of the Navy's science-and-technology priorities for its proposed $2.6 billion funding include unmanned systems, sonar buoys, electric laser systems and tools to collect and fuse live and virtual training data. "We need tools that help us prioritize and focus on what the humans should focus on and let the machines do the things the machines can do," said Selby. "This is one I'm doubling down on." The Air Force's $3.15 billion science-and-technology budget is split with 25 percent for enduring Air Force priorities — such as munitions, engines, aircraft power, nuclear systems and low observable technologies — and 75 percent for the critical technology areas. Space Force priorities include combat power projection, information mobility and space security. For 2023, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is seeking $896 million for microelectronics — which is largely driven by the next phase of the agency's Electronics Resurgence Initiative to promote onshoring — $414 million for biotechnology, $412 million for artificial intelligence, $184 million for cyber, and $90 million for hypersonics. The Army's $2.7 billion science-and-technology budget focuses on six longstanding modernization priorities — such as long-range precision fires, future vertical lift and soldier lethality. Within that are priority research areas, including disruptive energetics, hypersonic flight, autonomy, additive manufacturing and synthetic biology. "There is a world beyond 2030, and so we have to really start swinging the pendulum back just a little bit and focusing on those enabling technologies … to look and mature technologies for what's next," said Jeffrey Singleton, director for technology in the office of the assistant secretary of the Army. Panelists stressed efforts to expand the pool of technology partners and invest in future workforce. The research and engineering office's budget for Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs climbs to $191 million in the 2023 proposal. The officials also noted increased funding for science, technology, engineering and mathematics education and for historically Black colleges and universities. Selby argued money is important, but there are structural problems that need to be addressed to ensure programs are achieving objectives and moving technology forward. "Part of this has to do with the fact that we have got many, many people that get a say in what happens to these different pots of money … there's no single conductor," he said. "So, you have **multiple conductors** that **are trying to compete with each other** … because we're **all operating under** different incentives, **different priorities**, different budget timelines, different acquisition timelines, **we have** these **missed opportunities** left and right," he added.

B. Link — the plan's security cooperation trades off — info asymmetry and related cooperation magnify the link.

O'Mahony et al. 18 — Angela O'Mahony et al., 2018 [Angela (Angel) O'Mahony is associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND. "Assessing, Monitoring, and Evaluating Army Security Cooperation" RAND || https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2100/RR2165/RAND_RR2165.pdf]

AM&E for Army security cooperation activities is key to understanding and maximizing impact. The framework for assessing, monitoring, and evaluating Army security cooperation presented in Chapter Six develops an AM&E process for understanding individual security cooperation activities. However, Army security cooperation planners are faced

with the **challenging task of prioritizing security cooperation activities across strategic objectives**—that is, of how to craft effective security cooperation portfolios. In particular, there are three main factors that make security cooperation portfolio planning difficult. There is the problem of determining the relative priority of theater objectives while seeking also to balance the requirements of the short-term against the long-term interest. This problem often results not from lax practice but rather **genuine trade-offs difficult to resolve** definitively across government departments, across services and among DoD civilian leadership. Further, it is difficult to ascribe direct causal relationships between security cooperation activities and the outcomes they produce. Finally, there is the problem of uncertainty itself. Planners neither possess full information of sufficiently consistent quality on all relevant factors nor can they fully anticipate future trends and occurrences that could profoundly affect security cooperation outcomes. The problem becomes even more complicated if we recognize that any single security cooperation activity is rarely pursued in isolation from other activities within a partner country. Even within the Army's security cooperation plan for a partner there will usually be a number of activities being conducted simultaneously. As a result, Army security cooperation activities are better thought of as components within an integrated security cooperation portfolio designed to achieve broader strategic objectives.

C. Internal Link — defense R&D is the most significant driver of innovation.

Moretti et al. 19 — Enrico Moretti et al., 12-18-2019 [Michael Peevey and Donald Vial Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, "How government spending on defence research benefits the private sector," Vox EU || https://voxeu.org/article/how-government-spending-defence-research-benefits-private-sector]

Government funding for **innovation related to military uses** represents a key channel through which governments all over the world **shape innovation**. In the US, for example, annual government defence-related research and development (R&D) expenditures were $78 billion in 2016, accounting for over 57% of all government-funded R&D (Congressional Research Service 2018). While defence-related R&D is motivated by goals that are not mainly economic, it is often **the most important de facto industrial policy** used by central governments **to affect the speed and direction of innovation** in the economy. The amount of public money flowing into defence R&D dwarfs the amount spent on other prominent innovation policy tools in the US. For example, the total budget of the National Science Foundation or the overall value of the federal R&D tax credit in a typical year are less than one tenth of federal outlays for defence-related R&D (NSF 2006). Defence R&D is the **single most important component of government-funded R&D** in the UK and France as well, and a major component of government-sponsored R&D in many other developed economies. The effect of defence R&D expenditures on private sector innovation and economic growth has been a hotly debated topic for many years (see surveys by Mowery 2010 and Lichtenberg 1995, for example). Proponents of the benefits of defence R&D point to the commercial success of major innovations such as jet engines, computers, radar, nuclear power, semiconductors, GPS, and the internet as evidence that **military R&D has been a crucial source of tech**nological **development** with civilian applications (Lichtenberg 1984, 1988, Ruttan 2006, Mazzucato 2013). Some even argue that the Pentagon's role as the world's most generous investor in technological innovation during the Cold War – ultimately resulting in superior technologies for US companies and enduring gains in their competitiveness (Braddon, 1999) – was an important reason that US manufacturing became so dominant after WWII. More recently, defence R&D has been viewed as an important contributor to national economic growth through private sector spinoffs and agglomeration economies. Proponents of this view often point to Israel as an example of how defence spending has spawned a multitude of commercially successful high-tech startups (e.g. Senor and Singer 2009). On the other hand, critics argue that there are the benefits of defence R&D are meagre, primarily because military secrecy inhibits the scope of spillovers to civilian firms. Even more fundamentally, critics argue that defence-related R&D might displace private R&D and therefore could even have a negative impact on the total amount of innovation. Overall, there is much anecdotal evidence of some of the positive and negative effects that defence R&D might have on growth, but little systematic econometric evidence. In a recent paper (Moretti et al. 2019) we study the effect of government-funded R&D on private R&D – i.e. R&D conducted and financed by private businesses. We **use a unique dataset** on government-funded and private R&D **in multiple industries in every OECD country over 23 years**. There was a lot of variation over time across countries (and across industries) in the degree of defence spending over this period (see Figure 1). We complement the international industry data with a sample of all R&D performing firms in France together with their R&D subsidies – broken down into defence and other ministries. This longitudinal data allow us to compare the same firm before and after the public R&D award. The effect of government-funded R&D on privately funded R&D could be positive or negative, depending on whether there is 'crowding out' or 'crowding in'. Crowding out may occur if the supply of inputs to the R&D process (specialised engineers, for example) is in short supply within an industry and country (Goolsbee 1998). In this case, the only effect of an increase in government-funded R&D is to displace private R&D with no net gains for total R&D. On the other hand, crowding in may occur if (1) R&D activity involves large fixed costs and, by covering some of the fixed costs, government-funded R&D makes some marginal private sector projects profitable; (2) government-funded R&D in an industry generates technological spillovers that benefit other private firms in the same industry; and/or (3) firms face

credit constraints. **Empirically**, **we find strong evidence of crowding in** in both the OECD and French datasets. **Increases in** government-funded R&D generated by variation in predicted **defence R&D translate into significant increases in privately funded R&D expenditures**

D. Impact — innovation solves every existential threat.

Matthews 18 — Dylan Matthews 18. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox.
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

The most **literal** thing it could mean is preventing human **extinction**, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity's continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that's certainly **part** of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address **specific threats** to humanity (which he calls "**targeted**" approaches to the far future) have to **complement** "**broad**" approaches, where instead of trying to **predict** what's going to kill us all, you just **generally try to keep civilization running as best it can**, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with **potential** extinction events in the **future**, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future **doesn't mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation**; it also means **acting on pressing needs now**. For example: We're going to be **better prepared** to prevent extinction from **AI** or a **supervirus** or **global warming** if society as a whole makes **a lot of scientific progress**. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn't get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the **best things** we can do for the **far future** is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls "lost Einsteins" (**potential innovators** who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world.

1NC- Vaccine Cooperation DA

The [first/next] off-case is the Vaccine Cooperation DA.

Uniqueness – Covid under control now, but ONLY if vaccines are equitably distributed

Mendez 21 Rich Mendez 21, News Associate @ CNBC, "WHO officials say we could have Covid under control next year 'if we're really lucky'," 7/19/21, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/19/who-officials-say-we-could-have-covid-under-control-next-year-if-were-really-lucky.html

The world could have control over Covid-19 by next year **"if we're really lucky**," World Health Organization officials said Monday. Even as the delta variant rapidly spreads across the globe, WHO officials are **still optimistic** world leaders could get the pandemic under control next year. "I'd love to say it will end this year but I really don't think so," Dr. Mike Ryan, executive director of WHO's health emergencies program. "If we're really lucky, we'll have it under control next year." The pandemic could end sooner if countries ensure the **vaccines are distributed equitably** to poorer nations, practice social distancing and adequately fund hospitals, according to Ryan, who was answering a question from the son of one of his colleagues, Covid technical lead Maria Van Kerkhove. Countries with high vaccination rates **could see the pandemic end sooner for them**, he said, criticizing world leaders for not sharing their vaccine stockpiles as much as they could with poorer nations. "Kids should be asking their governments ... **so why aren't we sharing**," he said in answering Cole Van Kerkhove's question. "That for me is the big problem we have right now, we're not sharing enough, we're not being fair and we know we learned that one in school." Many parts of the world are still seeing increases in cases, Van Kerkhove said. "In the last seven days, at the global level, there has been an 11.5% *increase in cases and there was a 1% increase in deaths." In the last week, many regions of the world saw increases in cases. Europe saw an almost 21% increase, Southeast Asia saw a 16.5% increase, the Western Pacific region saw a roughly 30% increase and the Eastern Mediterranean region logged a 15% increase in cases. Covid deaths have also increased in four out of six WHO regions in the last seven days. The Western Pacific saw a 10% increase in deaths, Southeast Asia saw a 12% increase, the Eastern Mediterranean saw a 4% increase, and the African region is still suffering from a recent spike in transmission.

Link — vaccine diplomacy makes solving Covid impossible.

AFP 21, Quotes Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus who is a WHO chief, "WHO chief slams 'vaccine diplomacy' in Covid fight," 3/11/21, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/who-chief-slams-vaccine-diplomacy-in-covid-fight/articleshow/82542370.cms

GENEVA: The WHO chief took on so-called "**vaccine diplomacy**" on Monday, slamming countries for using Covid-19 jabs **to gain competitive advantage** rather than engaging in true cooperation to end the pandemic. "**Vaccine diplomacy is not cooperation**," Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus told reporters from the World Health Organization's headquarters in Geneva. The UN health agency chief's was responding to a question about allegations that countries such as Russia and China, which have donated large quantities of their home-grown Covid vaccines to nations desperate for the jabs, were doing so in exchange for market access and influence. Tedros decried "geopolitical manoeuvring" at a time when only "**clear and clean cooperation**... can help". "We cannot defeat this pandemic **through competition**," he said. "If you compete for resources, or if you compete for geopolitical advantages, then the virus gets advantage." The pandemic has killed close to 3.3 million people since the new coronavirus first emerged in late 2019, upending normal life and causing global economic havoc. Tedros said the world was now seeing the number of new Covid cases levelling off, but stressed "it is an unacceptably high plateau". He pointed out that there were more than 5.4 million new cases and nearly 90,000 deaths reported globally last week alone, with numbers still soaring in India especially. And while rapid vaccination programmes have allowed a number of wealthy nations to start taking steps towards normality, the virus is still surging in many countries and concerns are growing about global vaccine inequality. Tedros noted "low- and lower-middle-income countries account for **47 percent of the world's population**, but have received **just 17 percent** of the world's vaccines."

1NC- DoS CP vs Biotech Vaccines

The United States federal government should:

• abolish its security cooperation activities, transferring all relevant resources and responsibilities to the State Department,

• expand and train the security assistance workforce at the State Department,

• review and optimize the State Department's security assistance structure for interagency prioritization, planning, and dispute resolution, and

• substantially increase security assistance within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of biotechnology by increasing vaccine diplomacy and distribution.

The Counterplan Solves — shifting responsibility for aid and reforming the State Department creates more coherent and effective policy.

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22] [Modified for ableist langage.]

To change this, there is a straightforward solution: **give the State Department the money**. A new administration and new Congress should redirect almost all of the **DOD's security assistance resources to the State Department** and **build up the State Department's capacity to administer assistance**. Clearly, such a transfer must be accompanied by **swift** and **far-reaching internal reforms** at the State Department to ~~enable~~ [allow] this expanded role, but such reforms are long overdue and should not deter this bold step. This proposal would help to fix many of the challenges of a duplicative, bifurcated security assistance system that spans multiple U.S. agencies and involves thousands of personnel. It would **~~enable~~ [create] more coherent overall policy** on American security assistance, allowing aid decisions to be guided by **general foreign policy concerns** and **current priorities**. It would better allow for ensuring that U.S. assistance comports with American values, including working closely with democratic states and prioritizing respect for human rights.

The plan's militarized approach sparks miscalculation and war

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

As a result, as the United States sought to provide more security assistance to partners, it did so through the DOD. This has created a bifurcated bureaucratic structure for administering security assistance that marginalizes the State Department. The current system is both **inefficient** and **ill-suited for the present foreign policy environment.** The new era of great power competition and today's threats of **climate change, pandemics**, and other nontraditional challenges demand a **new** and **more integrated, agile, and wholistic approach to U.S. assistance efforts.** The foreign policy environment has shifted greatly over the last decade. Today's security assistance system emerged in the 9/11 era and was built for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, with a focus on confronting threats from nonstate actors.5 This was encapsulated in the "building partnership capacity" strategy, outlined by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2010, which called for increasing the capabilities of developing states to better police and patrol their neighborhoods and to close off space for insurgent groups.6 U.S. aid was often provided to nondemocratic states or partners that violated human rights but were considered critical partners in the "war on terror." Decisions were viewed as primarily operational, and aid was provided as needed to help partners tackle imminent terrorist or insurgent threats. Almost all U.S. security aid provided year over year is driven by a strategic rationale that is centered on building better counterterrorism partners. Today, U.S. aid to build up a partner's military should be viewed through the lens of **competition between states**, in addition to the ongoing counterterrorism concerns and state fragility challenges, with much higher stakes for U.S. foreign policy and national interests. This renewed geopolitical competition is at its core an ideological competition between states. China's rise and Russia's resurgence require the United States to realign its foreign policy toward strengthening relations and bolstering democratic states. Security assistance is a tool to do so: It strengthens America's closest partners and fosters closer relationships with

other states. When a country accepts U.S. military equipment or enters into a long-term procurement or acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, they are tying their country to the United States. The U.S. decision, for instance, to provide military aid to the United Kingdom through the lend-lease program in the 1940s was not a simple military consideration but a foreign policy consideration with enormous consequences.7 Today, U.S. decisions to provide weapons or support tie American officials to how that support is used—whether they like it or not—as the case of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen demonstrates. Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf; they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance, and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular provider. Similarly, when a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S. equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S. assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.8 There are several reasons that today's security assistance system must change: • Current security policy decision-making perpetuates the status quo. The current system perpetuates an ineffective status quo, whereby the United States often fails to effectively exert significant diplomatic leverage that it has through security assistance because the bureaucratic structure to administer it—both within the State Department and between the State Department and the DOD—is not designed to advance diplomatic efforts but merely to administer appropriated funds.9 This makes it challenging to change security assistance programs given shifting foreign policy dynamics or changes in a partner's behavior that may make them a less suitable recipient of U.S. security aid, such as democratic backsliding or a pattern of human rights abuses. • U.S. engagement with partners could be **dominated by military issues** if **foreign officials** turn to **DOD counterparts instead of diplomats** for assistance resources. Because the DOD controls its own security assistance accounts, other foreign policy concerns may get trumped if partners go around the State Department to get aid from the Pentagon. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) worried at a 2017 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the shift to increasing DOD authorities could "send a fundamental message that the United States considers security relationships over all other U.S. foreign policy objectives or concerns, including human rights or good governance."10 Under the current framework, the State Department's ability to put the brakes on security assistance or military cooperation under DOD authorities is highly limited because the State Department does not control implementation and can often only approve or disapprove of DOD proposals. While State Department officials and ambassadors can and sometimes do halt or temper problematic efforts, doing so requires exerting significant political capital that is in short supply.11 Centralizing control at the State Department would help to fix this bureaucratic imbalance between diplomacy and the Pentagon. . Defense priorities often **undervalue democratic** and human rights **concerns.** Compared with the State Department, the DOD is less equipped to effectively weigh human rights concerns in its decision-making. This makes it harder to leverage U.S. military cooperation for economic or political concessions or changes that might bolster democratic goals. For example, U.S. military objectives to counter terrorist groups in Somalia called for continuously supplying Uganda with U.S. assistance despite growing human rights and democracy concerns.12 Putting the State Department in charge would make it easier to realign U.S. security assistance toward democratic states and effectively consider human rights issues in every security assistance decision. • Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is **extremely sensitive** and can **increase tension** and **lead to miscalculation.** The risk in today's geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will **not receive** the same **scrutiny from policymakers** and will become the **norm** for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, **security assistance** often **stoked tension** between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to **spiraling commitments**. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement. As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a **political** and **diplomatic concern** that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken. • A military-led response can **overprioritize military engagement** and could **unintentionally steer American engagements into high-risk confrontations.** Without careful calibration and understanding of broader political context, there is real concern that the DOD could get ahead of U.S. policy or **drive it in a more military-centric direction**. For example, China could interpret the DOD's provision of some security assistance through the agency's Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as an act of aggression if it is not carefully and

effectively calibrated against broader political concerns in the region.[15] Given the political sensitivities of great power competition, responsibility and oversight for security assistance decisions should **rest with** the agency most in tune with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns and diplomatic developments: **the State Department**. Reforming security assistance by centralizing it at the State Department would help to elevate the diplomatic considerations of this policy area, while reducing the military-first priorities of the current system that are ill-suited to today's geopolitical challenges.

Internal Link — failing to control Covid causes economic disruption.

Rajah 22, Roland Rajah, Alyssa Leng, Herve Lemahieu, Lead Economist and Director, International Economics Program @ Lowy Institute, Research Officer @ Development Policy Centre, Director of Research @ Lowy Institute, "TOWARDS A BETTER VACCINE DIPLOMACY," 3/1/22, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/vaccine-diplomacy-asia

The possibility of more dangerous future variants could prove especially **dangerous for China**, given its reliance on less effective homegrown vaccines and its consequent reliance on a costly zero-COVID strategy. But Western powers are hardly immune. While the hope may be that widespread immunity, due to vaccination or previous infection, can prevent a renewed health crisis, there is no guarantee that some future variant will not evade this immunity and existing treatments in dangerous ways. Furthermore, even an endemic COVID-19 could still imply a **high disease burden** and repeated waves of infection capable of putting intense pressure on hospital systems and creating substantial **economic disruption**.

Impact — long-term economic disruption turns the case and causes extinction.

Zoë **Baird 20**, A.B. Phi Beta Kappa and J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, Member of the Aspen Strategy Group, CEO and President of the Markle Foundation, Former Trustee at the Council on Foreign Relations and Partner in the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers, "Equitable Economic Recovery Is a National Security Imperative", in Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response, Ed. Bitounis and King, October 2020, p. 89-90

Broadly shared economic prosperity is a **bedrock** of America's **economic** and **political strength**—both **domestically** and in the **international** arena. A **strong** and **equitable** recovery from the economic crisis created by COVID-19 would be a **powerful testament** to the **resilience** of the American system and its **ability to create prosperity** at a time of **seismic change** and persistent **global crisis**. Such a recovery could attack the profound economic inequities that have developed over the past several decades. Without **bold action** to help all workers access good jobs as the economy returns, the **U**nited **S**tates risks **undermining** the **legitimacy of its institutions** and its **international standing**. The **outcome** will be a **key determinant** of America's **national security** for years to come. An equitable recovery requires a national commitment to help all workers obtain good jobs—particularly the two-thirds of adults without a bachelor's degree and people of color who have been most affected by the crisis and were denied opportunity before it. As the nation engages in a historic debate about how to accelerate economic recovery, ambitious public investment is necessary to put Americans back to work with dignity and opportunity. We need an intentional effort to make sure that the jobs that come back are good jobs with decent wages, benefits, and mobility and to empower workers to access these opportunities in a profoundly changed labor market. To achieve these goals, **American** policy makers need to establish **job growth strategies** that address **urgent public needs** through **major programs** in green energy, **infrastructure**, and health. Alongside these job growth strategies, we need to recognize and develop the talents of workers by creating an adult learning system that meets workers' needs and develops skills for the digital economy. The national security community must lend its support to this cause. And as it does so, it can bring home the lessons from the advances made in these areas in other countries, particularly our European allies, and consider this a realm of international cooperation and international engagement. Shared Economic Prosperity Is a National Security Asset **A strong economy** is **essential** to America's **security and diplomatic strategy**. Economic strength increases our **influence** on the global stage, **expands markets**, and **funds** a **strong and agile military** and **national defense**. Yet it is not enough for America's economy to be strong for **some**—prosperity must be **broadly shared**. Widespread belief in the ability of the American economic system to create economic security and mobility for all—the American Dream—creates **credibility** and **legitimacy** for America's **values**, **governance**, and **alliances** around the world.

After World War II, the **U**nited **S**tates grew the middle class to historic size and strength. This achievement made America the **model** of the free world—**setting the stage** for decades of American political and economic **leadership**. Domestically, broad participation in the economy is **core** to the **legitimacy** of our democracy and the strength of our political institutions. A belief that the economic system works for millions is an important part of creating trust in a democratic government's ability to meet the needs of the people. The COVID-19 Crisis Puts Millions of American Workers at Risk For the last several decades, the American Dream has been on the wane. Opportunity has been increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small share of workers able to access the knowledge economy. Too many Americans, particularly those without four-year degrees, experienced stagnant wages, less stability, and fewer opportunities for advancement. Since COVID-19 hit, millions have lost their jobs or income and are struggling to meet their basic needs—including food, housing, and medical care.1 The crisis has impacted sectors like hospitality, leisure, and retail, which employ a large share of America's most economically vulnerable workers, resulting in alarming disparities in unemployment rates along education and racial lines. In August, the unemployment rate for those with a high school degree or less was more than double the rate for those with a bachelor's degree.2 Black and Hispanic Americans are experiencing disproportionately high unemployment, with the gulf widening as the crisis continues.3 The experience of the Great Recession shows that without intentional effort to drive an inclusive recovery, inequality may get worse: while workers with a high school education or less experienced the majority of job losses, nearly all new jobs went to workers with postsecondary education. Inequalities across racial lines also increased as workers of color worked in the hardest-hit sectors and were slower to recover earnings and income than White workers.4 The Case for an Inclusive Recovery A recovery that promotes broad economic participation, renewed opportunity, and equity will strengthen American moral and political authority **around the world**. It will **send a strong message** about the strength and resilience of democratic government and the American people's **ability to adapt** to a changing global economic landscape. An inclusive recovery will reaffirm American leadership as core to the success of our most critical international alliances, which are rooted in the notion of shared destiny and interdependence. For example, NATO, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and a force of global stability for decades, has suffered from American disengagement in recent years. A strong American recovery—coupled with a renewed openness to international collaboration—is core to NATO's ability to solve **shared geopolitical and security challenges**. A renewed partnership with our European allies from a **position of economic strength** will enable us to address **global crises** such as **climate change**, **global pandemics**, and **refugees**. Together, the United States and Europe can pursue a commitment to investing in workers for shared economic competitiveness, innovation, and long-term prosperity. The U.S. has **unique advantages** that give it the **tools** to emerge from the crisis with **tremendous economic strength**— including an entrepreneurial spirit and the technological and scientific infrastructure to lead global efforts in developing industries like green energy and biosciences that will shape the international economy for decades to come.

1NC- Leadership Advantage

Next on to the Leadership Advantage

1. Vaccine Diplomacy Fails — Russia and China can't deliver.

Ian **Hill 21**, senior career diplomat, "Russia and China's Vaccine Diplomacy: Not Quite the Geopolitical Slam Dunk," 9/14/21, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/russia-and-chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-not-quite-the-geopolitical-slam-dunk/

China's vaccine effort has, however, been **clouded by question marks** raised increasingly over the efficacy of both Sinovac and Sinopharm. While the WHO has authorised both vaccines, the agency has assessed Sinovac's efficacy at preventing symptomatic COVID-19 at only **51 percent**, and that of Sinopharm at 79 percent. With limited 60-plus age study participants, even this data might be **optimistic**. Concern over **limited efficacy** has led some recipients, like Thailand and Indonesia, to recommend **a mixed dose** of Chinese and Western vaccines to enhance immunity effectiveness. Malaysia plans to stop administering Sinovac completely. China has also drawn criticism for **attaching strings** to its vaccine deliveries. It pressed Honduras and Paraguay, for example, to **switch diplomatic recognition** from Taiwan to China. And it leaned on Ukraine to soft-pedal criticism of China's treatment of the minority Uighurs in Xinjiang. China's vaccine distribution has also inflamed existing geopolitical tensions, as the recent spat between Beijing and Canberra over pandemic assistance to Pacific Island countries shows. How successful, then, have Russia and China's respective vaccine diplomacy efforts been? Essentially – a mixed report card, but China has certainly fared better than Russia so far. With its successful rapid scaling up to commercial production of its vaccines and effective global marketing effort, China has made the most of its early mover advantage. And the prominence of key influential and populous states in South and South East Asia, notably Indonesia, Thailand, and Pakistan, and in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Mexico, among its leading customers shows the shrewd geopolitical framing of China's vaccine distribution efforts. Russia's vaccine deliveries globally have, by comparison, **failed pretty dismally** to live up to the accompanying hype. The problems underlying Russia's **slow and limited rate** of vaccine delivery and **still-delayed** approval by WHO and EMA are symptomatic of **wider weaknesses** in Russia's economy – notably difficulties in scaling up at speed scientific innovations for commercial production and a pervasive wariness of data transparency. Moscow, then, has **squandered** its first mover advantage. Far from Sputnik V enhancing its influence globally, Russia's flawed vaccine delivery performance has **tarnished its reputation.**

2. Russian Expansionism Inevitable — Ukraine proves.

Andrew **Michta 21**, dean of the College of International and Security Studies, "What Russia Wants From A Ukraine Crisis: A Sphere Of Influence In Eastern Europe," 12/13/21, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/12/what-russia-wants-from-a-ukraine-crisis-a-sphere-of-influence-in-eastern-europe/

Clearly, we are in the second, possibly decisive, chapter of the Ukrainian crisis that will determine that country's future and, by extension the balance of power in Europe. Putin no longer **bothers to equivocate** when it comes to relations with the West going forward. He is determined to **compel Europe** to revisit the **spheres of influence** formula, with Russia gaining in the process a key vote on the Continent's security and economic issues going forward. Russia's military buildup along Ukraine's borders, already about one hundred seventy-five thousand strong and counting, is Putin's **unequivocal message** to the United States and its European allies that Moscow is determined to use **all** political, economic, and military **means** at its disposal to **carve out** an undisputed sphere of influence reconstituted around the Eastern Slavic core of the former Russian empire. In this design, the Russian Federation – understood as the home of the Great Russians – will control and/or directly incorporate the White Russians (Belarusians) and the Little Russians (Ukrainians). For Putin, this **neo-imperial domain** will serve as the **unquestioned sphere** of Russian domination, with the rest of Europe transformed into a space where Moscow's interests and priorities must be always considered. In this design, the United States and its allies would have to accept that NATO would never enlarge further East. Putin seems certain that crosscurrents within NATO and differences among the allies when it comes to such fundamentals as energy policy and rearmament have created an opportunity for him to play hardball and succeed. He seems certain that geopolitics and geoeconomics, in Europe and worldwide, have presently aligned in Russia's favor.

3. No US-Russia War — both sides avoid escalation.

Andrei **Tsygankov 16**, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Francisco State University, PhD from USC, "5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated," Feb 19 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated

The contemporary discussion of security interactions among major powers is depressing to participants and observers alike. Experts and politicians are warning us of an increasingly **high likelihood of a military conflict – possibly** a **nuclear** one – between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. or NATO, on the other. In the West, many argue the dangers associated with a "resurgent" Russia and vow to defend themselves from Russian President Vladimir Putin's "aggressive" actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter accused Russia of threatening the world order and starkly warned: "Make no mistake, the United States will defend our interests, our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future it affords us all." The tensions have been growing and have become especially high since the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Russian military flights over the Baltic and Black Sea in response to NATO's active buildup on Russia's European borders has done little to calm these fears. The Turkish decision to shoot down a Russian warplane by claiming violation of its airspace in November 2015 revived the discussion of Moscow's possible military conflict with Istanbul and NATO, of which Turkey is a member. More recently, the hype has been over the Kremlin's **alleged preparations to invade** the Baltic States and the West's need to respond. In Russia, these threats and discussions are taken seriously, and the responsibility for these security tensions has been squarely placed on the Western powers. The frequently repeated charges are that the West and NATO have encircled Russia with military bases and refused to recognize Moscow's global interests. Russian media have actively discussed the U.S. National Security Archive's Cold War documents on a nuclear attack against Russia and China declassified on Dec. 22, 2015. Last week, while attending the Munich Security Conference, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev compared the contemporary security environment with the one that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and reminded the audience of U.S. President John F. Kennedy's words that "foreign policy can kill us." In the meantime, contradicting Medvedev, Russian experts often bemoan the fact that the Cold War was far more predictable and less dangerous than today's multipolar world. What many have initially viewed as a generally positive transition from the U.S. "diktat" is now presented as leading toward a great power war. This increasingly apocalyptic mood on both sides reflects a growing international instability and breakdown of important communication channels between Russia and the West. Since the beginning of Ukraine crisis and up until the G20 meeting in Antalya in December 2015, the two sides have barely interacted. Appalled by Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrainian separatists, Western leaders pursued policies of sanctions and isolation, whereas the indignant Kremlin has sought to demonstrate its indifference toward such policies. Only since Antalya have Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama resumed their attempts to regularly discuss issues of importance. Western and Russia military, too, severed their contacts although the two sides have recently begun to coordinate their actions in the Syrian airspace. The aforementioned alarmist views and arguments are **misplaced** because they underestimate the dangers of the Cold War and **overestimate those of today's world**. Despite some attempts to present the Cold War as generally stable, predictable, and peaceful, this is not the time to feel nostalgic about it. Multiple crises from Berlin to Cuba and Afghanistan extended across much of the Cold War era. State propaganda on both sides was reinforced by an intense ideological confrontation accompanied by drills and necessary preparations for a nuclear war. The Oscar-nominated film "Bridge of Spies" directed by Steven Spielberg reproduces some of that hysterical atmosphere in the United States where the public was mobilized for any actions in support of the government. In the Soviet Union it was no different. For the world outside the West and the U.S.S.R., this was not a peaceful, but rather an increasingly chaotic and violent time – the conclusion well documented by scholars of the Third World. Why today's world is less dangerous than the Cold War Today's world, while threatening and uncertain, is hardly more dangerous than the Cold War, for the following reasons. First, whatever the **rhetoric**, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn't work. So far, NATO has been **careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions**, whether it is by responding to Russia seizing the Pristina International Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia's side during the military conflict in August 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and **begin World War III**. Second, Russia **remains a defensive power** aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia's interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control. Third, the **U**nited **S**tates has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, the U.S. military and diplomatic in any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, proxy wars are possible and indeed are happening, but they are **unlikely to escalate**. Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis. Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called "traditional" and "Western" values by Russia or "democracy" to "autocracy" by the United States and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for. Despite the dangers of the world we live in, it contains a number of important, even **underappreciated**, **checks** on great powers' militarism. The threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to **pressure the opponent** into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides. **Then a dialogue begins.** Perhaps, the **increasing** frequency of **exchanges between Obama and Putin** since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has been mixed at best.

4. Vaccines Not Key — China's relationship with MENA already strong.

Najla M. **Shahwan 22**, Reporter @ Daily Sabah, "Where is China's role in the Middle East heading?" 3/15/22, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/where-is-chinas-role-in-the-middle-east-heading

In 2016, when China's President Xi Jinping visited the Middle East, the CCP released China's "**Arab Policy Paper**," which highlighted the **Chinese vision** for the region by introducing the "1+2+3 cooperation pattern" in which **energy security forms** the **core** of this pattern, **investment and trade** follows, and developing **nuclear energy** comes later. In 2018, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Oman "were Beijing's second, fourth and fifth-largest crude oil suppliers." As China needs Middle Eastern markets to **export its manufactured goods**, and in turn, the Middle Eastern states **need China for oil exports**, trade ties between them were growing steadily and in 2018, trade between China and the Arab states stood at $244.3 billion, as reported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. On the other hand, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced in 2013 forms a **strategically important crossroads** for trade routes and sea lanes linking Asia to Europe and Africa, which will place China at the center of global trade networks. Concerning China's BRI interests in the region, it has signed BRI agreements with 21 states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including 18 Arab states. The Chinese have begun to invest in several construction projects in this regard in these states. Beijing's push to fill some of the U.S.' abrogated economic leadership in the Middle East was reflected in the July 2018 **China-Arab States Cooperation Forum** in which Beijing elevated its relationship with the Arab world to a "strategic partnership" by emphasizing that it plans to leverage economic development to combat the security and humanitarian issues of the region. A financial consortium between Arab and Chinese banks, backed by a $3 billion fund, has been established to facilitate this development, with specific focuses on oil and gas, nuclear and clean energy. In 2018, the MENA region placed second in terms of the total investments received by any region from China and by 2019, the total Chinese investments in the region totaled $177 billion and the bulk of the money, i.e. $70 billion, flowed into the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Beijing signed a 25-year cooperation deal with Tehran in May and promised to invest $400 billion in the Iranian economy over the period of the deal, enabling Iran to be a part of the flagship BRI. China is emerging as a crucial development actor in the region, through both **direct investment and development** and its **economic importance** to the region has the potential to outweigh **that of the U.S. and Europe.**

5. No US-China War — high stability, low hostility, no public support.

Heath 17 ---- Timothy, senior international defense researcher (RAND Corporation), former senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group, M.A. in Asian studies (George Washington University), B.A. in philosophy (College of William and Mary), Ph.D. candidate in Political Science (George Mason University), written with William R. Thompson who is a Professor of Political Science (Indiana University), "U.S.-China Tensions Are Unlikely to Lead to War," National Interest, 4/30, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-tensions-are-unlikely-lead-war-20411?page=2

Graham Allison's April 12 article, "How America and China Could Stumble to War," explores how misperceptions and bureaucratic dysfunction could accelerate a militarized crisis involving the United States and China into an unwanted war. However, the article fails to persuade because it neglects the **key** political and geostrategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Without those conditions in place, the risk that a crisis could accidentally escalate into war **becomes far lower**. The U.S.-China relationship today may be trending towards greater tension, but the **relative stability** and overall **low level of hostility** make the prospect of an accidental escalation to war **extremely unlikely**. In a series of scenarios centered around the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea, Allison explored how well-established flashpoints involving China and the United States and its allies could spiral into unwanted war. Allison's article argues that given the context of strategic rivalry between a rising power and a status-quo power, organizational and bureaucratic misjudgments increase the likelihood of unintended escalation. According to Allison, "the underlying stress created by China's disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict." This argument appears persuasive on its surface, in no small part because it evokes insights from some of Allison's groundbreaking work on the organizational pathologies that made the Cuban Missile Crisis so dangerous. However, Allison ultimately fails to persuade because he fails to specify the political and strategic conditions that make war plausible in the first place. Allison's analysis implies that the United States and China are in a situation analogous to that of the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960s. In the Cold War example, the two countries faced each other on a near-war footing and engaged in a bitter geostrategic and ideological struggle for supremacy. The two countries experienced a series of militarized crises and fought each other repeatedly through proxy wars. It was this broader context that made issues of misjudgment so dangerous in a crisis. **By contrast**, the U.S.-China relationship today operates at a **much lower level of hostility and threat**. China and the United States may be experiencing an increase in tensions, **but** the two countries remain **far from the bitter, acrimonious rivalry** that defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship

in the early 1960s. Neither Washington nor Beijing regards the other as its principal enemy. Today's rivals may view each other warily as competitors and threats on some issues, but they also view each other as important **trade partners** and partners on some **shared concerns**, such as North Korea, as the recent summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping illustrated. The behavior of their respective militaries underscores the **relatively restrained** rivalry. The military competition between China and the United States may be growing, but it operates at a **far lower** level of intensity than the relentless arms racing that typified the U.S.-Soviet standoff. And unlike their Cold War counterparts, U.S. and Chinese militaries are not postured to fight each other in major wars. Moreover, polls show that the people of the two countries regard each other with mixed views—a **considerable contrast** from the hostile sentiment expressed by the U.S. and Soviet publics for each other. **Lacking** both preparations for major war and a constituency for conflict, leaders and bureaucracies in both countries have **less incentive** to **misjudge crisis situations** in favor of **unwarranted** escalation. **To the contrary**, political leaders and bureaucracies currently face a **strong incentive** to find ways of defusing crises in a manner that **avoids unwanted escalation**. This inclination manifested itself in the EP-3 airplane collision off Hainan Island in 2001, and in subsequent incidents involving U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft, such as the harassment of the USNS Impeccable in 2009. This does not mean that there is no risk, however. Indeed, the potential for a dangerous militarized crisis may be growing. Moreover, key political and geostrategic developments could shift the incentives for leaders in favor of more escalatory options in a crisis and thereby make Allison's scenarios more plausible. Past precedents offer some insight into the types of developments that would most likely propel the U.S.-China relationship into a hostile, competitive one featuring an elevated risk of conflict.

1NC- Democracy Advantage

Finally on the Democracy Advantage

1. Disinformation Inevitable — vaccines are just one example of many.

Elizabeth **Dwoskin 22**, Silicon Valley Correspondent, "China is Russia's most powerful weapon for information warfare," 4/8/22, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/08/russia-china-disinformation/

Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine cratered last month after Russian state news channels were blocked in Europe and restricted globally. But in recent weeks, China has emerged as a **potent outlet** for Kremlin disinformation, researchers say, portraying Ukraine and NATO as the aggressors and sharing false claims about neo-Nazi control of the Ukrainian government. With over a billion followers on Facebook alone, China's **state-controlled channels** offer Russian President Vladimir Putin **a powerful megaphone** for shaping global understanding of the war — often called a "special operation" in line with Kremlin rhetoric. Since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, researchers say, Chinese channels have touted the false claim that the United States **runs bioweapons labs** in Ukraine, have asserted that Ukrainian neo-Nazis **bombed a children's hospital** which was in fact bombed by Russian troops, and have suggested that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was being manipulated by U.S. billionaire George Soros. Chinese channels also have given **airtime and amplification** to high-ranking Russian government officials and to presenters from Russian government channels whose shows have been restricted or blocked. Last month, after a host on Sputnik, the Russian state news outlet, posted a video on his personal YouTube channel discussing how neo-Nazis were on the rise in Ukraine, the clip was tweeted by Frontline, a Chinese government outlet. "With governments and tech platforms moving to censor or limit the spread of Russian propaganda, pro-Kremlin talking points are now being laundered through influencers and proxies, including Chinese officials and state media outlets that obviously do not face the same restrictions that have been placed on Russian state media outlets," said Bret Schafer, senior fellow and head of the information manipulation team at the Alliance for Securing Democracy, a nonpartisan initiative housed at the U.S. German Marshall Fund that tracks Chinese and Russian state media. "This has allowed the Kremlin to effectively skirt bans meant to limit the spread of Russian propaganda." Putin's success in seeding some of these misleading narratives through **proxies and allies** is casting doubt on the ability of Western governments and the tech giants to effectively rein in the most pernicious forms of **authoritarian propaganda**. With China's help, experts say, Russia also is regaining its ability to cloud the narrative around Europe's biggest conflict since World War II.

2. Democracy is Dead — US domestic turmoil.

Faiola 22 — Anthony, foreign affairs columnist; (January 4, 2022; "A year after the Capitol insurrection, the world still sees something broken in America's democracy"; *Washington Post*; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/05/capitol-insurrection-global-american-democrcay-broken/; //LFS—SR) **edited for ableist language, denoted by brackets

As the world watches a riven, fact-relative nation still at war with itself, **U.S. allies are delivering their own verdict**: That an erratic United States can **no longer be** seen as **the model democracy** or reliable partner that some once thought it to be. The globe is witnessing an America where those who are willing to look back at the insurrection perceive vastly different realities, along starkly partisan lines. A Washington Post-University of Maryland poll released Saturday found that 72 percent of Republicans believe President Trump bears "just some" responsibility or "none at all" for the events of Jan. 6, when, as my colleagues reported, "he claimed at a [Jan. 6] rally near the White House that the election had been rigged and urged his followers to 'fight like hell' to stop what he said was a stolen outcome." Compare that with 92 percent of Democrats who say he bears a "great deal" or "good amount" of the blame. Other Trump backers — such as Rep. Andrew S. Clyde (R-Ga.), who famously likened the insurrection to a "normal tourist visit" at the Capitol — have taken a "nothing-to-see-here" approach. As Trump and his supporters continue to push the false narrative that the election was stolen, 3 in 10 Americans, including a majority of Republicans, The Post's poll found, still believe Biden's presidency is illegitimate — a divide some observers call **a gift to America's adversaries** as President Biden tries to counter Russia's Vladimir Putin in Ukraine and China's President Xi Jinping in Taiwan. The widespread conclusion abroad is that one year after the attack on the Capitol, something remains broken in America's democracy. The legacy of Jan. 6 could be less as a singular event than as an inflection point in a broader narrative of the United States as a house divided, incapable of consensus and with its pillars of democracy and global reach **irrevocably weakened**. "Clearly, this is a year in which the crisis of American democracy has become incredibly visible to all," the Financial Times' Martin Wolf said in a podcast last month. "And that is a singularly disturbing fact for those of us who live in what we used to think of as the free world." The European Union is redoubling its determination to avoid the same pitfalls, even if that means reining in freedom of speech by getting ahead of Washington with legal curbs on the use of social media as a propagator of disinformation and hate. Especially in Europe and Asia, there are also lingering doubts over the strength and direction of U.S. democracy and the

solidity of the transatlantic and transpacific partnerships. At a recent global security conference in Canada, Politico noted, some of the deepest concern was reserved for the United States. "When you see the absolute essential foundations of the democracy being challenged from within, and where you see a political party, the Republican Party — not all of them, but many of them — actually challenging the constitutional institutions," Malcolm Turnbull, Australia's former prime minister, told Politico, "that's what really undermines **public international faith** in American democracy." Wrote Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Trudy Rubin: "European and Asian leaders wonder whether the partisan ~~madness~~ [frenzy] eating away at America's democratic institutions will undercut any **effective U.S. foreign policy**. This is a time when our country needs to be united against China's advances and Russia's aggression." Following Biden's victory, hope sprang in European capitals that a new administration would repair the damage done during the Trump years, when the former president dismissed NATO as a bad deal and drubbed the European Union. Biden has promoted democracy as a concept, hosting a virtual summit on the topic last month and rebuilding a measure of good will by extending a hand across the Atlantic. But experts say last year's rapid pullout from **Afghanistan**, and a **strategic defense deal** with Australia and Britain that infuriated France, seriously undermined attempts to mend fences and fed the image of Washington as a mercurial leader. Among the moments that encapsulated that sentiment: The day last September when French President Emmanuel Macron urged Europeans, as my colleagues reported, to "come out of their naivete" and assert their independence from the United States. A Pew Research Center survey released in November suggested that despite Biden's victory and Trump's ultimate willingness to step down, respondents in most countries no longer view the United States as a "good example" of democracy — a title only 8 percent of New Zealanders, 14 percent of Germans and 22 percent of Taiwanese felt America deserves. "I think it's not just the Capitol riots in themselves, but, on the whole, the turbulent domestic political landscape in the U.S. that raises question marks about the long-term strategic reliability of the United States," Peter Kreko, director of the Political Capital Institute, a Budapest-based think tank, told me. Critics also see a failure of accountability — both by America's leaders and the populace — for the events of Jan. 6, making it harder for Washington to hold itself up as a global champion for the **rule of law**. Republicans — who have sought to downplay the assault on the Capitol in which five people died — are nevertheless early favorites in this year's midterm elections, in part due to gerrymandering, potentially bringing more gridlock to Washington as well as the appearance of a vindication by the U.S. electorate. Federal prosecutors have charged more than 725 individuals with various crimes in connection with the deadly insurrection. But, as a recent Newsweek analysis showed, more than half of the 71 Capitol rioters sentenced in 2021 avoided jail time. Domestically, the United States is grappling with eroding faith in democratic norms, making it harder for Washington to call out backsliding abroad. The Post's poll found that the percentage of Americans who say violent action against the government is justified at times has reached **34 percent** — considerably higher than in past polls dating back more than two decades.

3. No Democracy Impact — new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutions.

Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is **that it's not democracy alone that matters**. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it's not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders' hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should. There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the "democratic advantage" at risk. **Militaries are less closely tied to voters** Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant's vision isn't what modern armies look like, and they're intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it. In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process. The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further **water down the link between society and soldiers**. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to **less caution** and **selectivity when engaging in conflicts**. **Adversaries are proliferating and changing** The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further **loosened constraints** on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges **accelerated the transition** from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the

challenge is harder when the **adversaries are less familiar**, the **engagements shorter**, and the issues **more complex**. **Technology is reducing constraint** New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but **there is less visibility and**, accordingly, **less accountability** associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties. **Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president** The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn't weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What's unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also **decreases constraint** and with it the foreign policy "advantages" we associate with democracy. While these advantages are real, they are also **fragile**. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly **minor changes** in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders' foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, **the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode**. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

2AC

2AC Leadership Advantage

2AC — Leadership Advantage Overview

Absent US leadership, China and Russia will use their vaccine diplomacy to reinforce expansionism. That results in US-Russia and US-China nuclear war. Outweighs and turns any DA impact — the US can't respond to any other issue if they're engaged in two great power conflicts. That's Brands and Allison.

AT: “Vaccine Diplomacy Fails”

They Say “Vaccine Diplomacy Fails,” but even if Russian and Chinese vaccine delivery isn’t perfect, it’s miles ahead of the US and NATO and sufficient to achieve their diplomatic interests. That’s Leigh and The Economist.

AT: “Russian Expansionism Inevitable”

They Say “Russian Expansionism Inevitable,” but Ukraine is our brink — it proves Russia desires to expand. Absent further US action, future conflicts will go nuclear, but vaccine diplomacy solves revisionism and restores US power. That’s Iancu.

AT: “No US-Russia War”

They Say “No US-Russia War,” but their evidence ignores coercion. Russia will use its new status to end the US — war is the inevitable result. That’s Brands.

AT: “Vaccines Not Key”

They Say “Vaccines Not Key,” but even if they have some other ties in the region, vaccines are essential to consolidate those relationships and get MENA approval for its initiatives. That’s El Kadi & Zinser.

And, <u>we solve alternate causes</u> — the plan <u>restores US standing</u> and <u>takes back ground</u> that China has developed in the region. That's Iancu.

AT: “No US-China War”

They Say “No US-China War,” but their evidence is pre-Covid. Recent drives to expansionism have raised hostility, lowered stability, and put us on a collision course.

That’s Sidlo and Allison.

2AC Democracy Advantage

2AC — Democracy Advantage Overview

Russian and Chinese vaccine diplomacy gives them the tools to spread disinformation which undermines democracy. Democratic institutions are essential to prevent great power war and solve global challenges. That's Diamond.

AT: “Disinformation Inevitable”

They Say “Disinformation Inevitable,” but it’s a question of effectiveness. Vaccine diplomacy gives the US and NATO a critical avenue to push back against disinformation. That’s Rajah.

AT: “Democracy is Dead”

They Say “Democracy is Dead,” but the plan gives the US an opportunity to revitalize its global image. Vaccines are highly visible and the world is waiting to see if the US and NATO will step up. That’s Rajah.

AT: “No Democracy Impact”

They Say “No Democracy Impact,” but democracy is essential to reinforce the liberal norms and constitutional commitments that constrain conflict — World War II and the seven decades since prove. That’s Diamond.

2AC Topicality

2AC — Topicality "Security Cooperation" vs. Biotech Vaccines

1. We Meet — Vaccine Diplomacy is a form of security cooperation — their evidence says it can be military, not that it has to be.

2. Counter Interpretation — "Security cooperation" includes humanitarian relief like vaccines.

JCS '17 [Joint Chiefs of Staff; May 23; publishing with the Army, Marine Corp, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard; Security Cooperation, Joint Publication 3-20, "Appendix A: Security Cooperation: Related Programs and Authorities," https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf]

Security Cooperation **Categories** with Related Programs and Authorities

Security Cooperation Category	Related Programs and Authorities
Military-to-Military Contacts	Title 10, USC, Section 312 African Partnership Station (Navy) Southern Partnership Station (Navy) African Partnership Flight (Air Force) American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies' Program (US Army)
Personnel Exchanges	Title 10, USC, Section 311 Military Personnel Exchange Program Defense Personnel Exchange Program
Combined Exercises and Training	Title 10, USC, Sections 321-322 Joint Combined Exchange Training Combatant Commanders Exercise and Engagement Training Transformation (OSD P&R)
Train-and-Equip/Provision of Defense Articles	Title 10, USC, Section 333 Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF; Title 22, USC, Sections 2763-4) Foreign Military Sales Peacekeeping Operations (Foreign Assistance Act, Section 2348)
Defense Institution Building	Title 10, USC, Section 332 Defense Institution Reform Initiative Wales Initiative Fund Ministry of Defense Advisors Defense Institute for International Legal Studies
Operational Support	Title 10, USC, Section 331 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Coalition Support Fund Coalition Readiness Support Program Personnel Recovery
Education	International Military Education and Training (IMET; Title 22, USC, Section 2347) Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (Title 10, USC, Section 345) Regional Centers for Security Studies Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
International Armaments Cooperation	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program

	Information Exchange Program Test and Evaluation Program
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (Title 10, USC, Section 401) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (Title 10, USC, Sections 401 and 2561) Continuing Promise Commanders Emergency Response Program (Title 10, USC, Section 2333) Defense Health Programs

Legend FMF foreign military financing OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense P&R Personnel and Readiness USC United States Code

Figure A-1. Security Cooperation **Categories** with Related Programs and Authorities

3. Prefer Our Interpretation —

a. Over-limiting — they limit out the majority of NATO actions including training, education, and humanitarian relief.

b. Precision — prefer 2AC evidence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and outlines categories of security cooperation.

4. Reasonability — if we didn't make the debate impossible, default to the affirmative because competing interpretations create a race to the bottom and crowd out substantive debates.

2AC Department of State CP

2AC — DoS CP (vs. Biotech Vaccines)

1. Permute: Do Both. State Department alone fails to accomplish security objectives.

Diaz & Sadler 21 [Janae Diaz and Brent Sadler, ** Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Heritage Foundation, "Don't Shift Security Cooperation To State Dept.," 06/28/21, *Breaking Defense*, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/dont-shift-security-cooperation-to-state-dept/]

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a **big mistake**, because it would minimize the Pentagon's role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program's **military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests**, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are **not** the **values** by which such security assistance programs should be **solely judged.** Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, **these programs should prioritize national security.** To this end, reforms should enhance **joint State and Defense authorities** so programs are evaluated in terms of America's national strategic goals. In the existing system, State consults with Defense on its security assistance designs. Defense then implements State programs, as well as its own security cooperation programs, such as multinational military exercises and military training and advising. The departments differ in the scope to which they apply security assistance. Defense programs target narrower national security objectives, such as the Maritime Security Initiative, launched in 2015 to expand maritime domain awareness. State's programs, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative, emphasize broader regional stability and humanitarian goals. Assistance programs can be better tailored to their objectives when State shares directive authority and decision-making power with the entity most relevant to each program's purpose. For example, **when the objective is military capacity-building, the Defense Department should be an equal partner**: when the goal is justice system reform, the Department of Justice should be a full partner. Consider how the Philippines used American-sourced coast guard cutters when responding to China's intrusions at Whitsun Reef earlier this year. Given President Biden's emphasis on strategic competition with China, strengthening partner nations to resist Beijing's maritime coercion should be a no-brainer. In this context, State should ensure it ties the objectives of its weapons sales program to Defense Department priorities, such as improving maritime domain awareness, by enabling the Philippines and, perhaps other countries, to increase patrols of exclusive economic zones. Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report's recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging — or compelling — State to design its programs **in closer coordination with the Pentagon** and **in support of Defense Department's operational needs**, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability. Congress should recognize and re-evaluate its role in these decision as well, as legislative earmarks can limit State's directive agility and responsiveness. But even the best-laid plans cannot succeed without follow-through. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), for example, tried to catalyze cooperation between State and Defense, but it neglected assessment processes. As a result, it fell short. This pilot program required concurrence from each department on any GSCF project and offered more flexibility in program funding. But two years after the first seven projects were announced, none had materialized. State and Defense failed to clearly define timeframes and track GSCF projects against those benchmarks, only starting to implement these standards years into the program. By 2016, execution still lagged expectations, and a frustrated Congress stopped paying for the program. Regular evaluation that prioritizes timely, tangible measures of success directly tied to U.S. strategic interests is crucial to ensuring that programs deliver on their objectives. But as the GSCF showed, implementing assessments only after problems arise is damage control, not effective program design. In devising reforms to ensure that U.S. funds, arms, and training are directed to viable projects that serve our national strategy, it's critical to keep the main thing the main thing. State Department priorities for security assistance should emphasize specific national security objectives that enable better Defense Department forward presence, resilience and interoperability with our security partners. Also critical is ongoing evaluation. Assessment processes should be implemented on the front end, not as an afterthought. Reforms must be carried out with the end in mind: **security assistance for security purposes.**

2. Permute: Do the Counterplan. The term "security cooperation" can mean State Department security assistance.

Serafino 16 [Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs at Congressional Research Service, "Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense," 05/26/16, *Congressional Research Service*, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf, Accessed 05/20/22]

Terminology The two terms most commonly used today for assistance to foreign military and security forces are “security assistance” and “security cooperation.” Security assistance is the term most frequently used, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. There is no State Department definition for security assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ), however, lists six budget accounts under the heading “International Security Assistance.” These accounts, with their underlying Title 22 authorities (the 1961 FAA and the AECA), are commonly regarded as the State Department’s security assistance portfolio. DOD **formally defines security assistance** as the group of State Department 1961 FAA and AECA programs that a DOD organization, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), administers. These include programs conducted under two of the State Department international security assistance accounts and attendant authorities, as well as programs conducted under four related 1961 FAA and AECA authorities. DOD uses the overarching term **“security cooperation” to denote** the **State Department security assistance** administered by DSCA through which the U.S. government furnishes defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, **as well as all other DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments**. The purposes of the interactions with foreign defense establishments defined as security cooperation are to “build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multilateral operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”8

3. Doesn’t Solve Leadership Advantage — diplomacy fails without hard power.

Nossel 22 [Suzanne Nossel, CEO of PEN America and a member of Facebook's oversight board; formerly deputy assistant secretary of state for international organizations at the U.S. State Department, “When Diplomacy Fails,” 02/28/22, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/28/russia-ukraine-biden-eu-when-diplomacy-fails/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

A deep antipathy to armed conflict is no doubt a good thing. But in saying on the eve of Russia’s incursion that “there is no alternative to diplomacy,” U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres spoke rhetorically. Those who are determined to avert war **don’t always get to decide whether war will happen.** That prerogative rests with those who are eager, or even reluctantly willing, to risk military conflagration. A government’s steadfast refusal to go to war doesn’t mean that war won’t ensue. Calm talk and delaying tactics may sometimes dissuade a violent intruder, but they don’t always work. While **diplomacy and** the use of **force** are sometimes juxtaposed as binary alternatives in the news media, they **are** often **intertwined**. **The threat of force can catalyze compromise.** Failed diplomacy can devolve into war. Once war begins, diplomacy doesn’t end but often escalates, with a focus on containing conflict, curbing civilian casualties, and achieving a cease-fire. Diplomats sometimes use the metaphor of a toolbox. As Putin’s troops encircled Ukraine, the Biden administration tried just about every hammer, vise, and scalpel within reach. It pursued high-level direct engagement between Biden and Putin; face-to-face negotiations with the Russians at varied levels and venues; written exchanges; packages of incentives; multilateral talks through the U.N. Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; an effort to resurrect four-party talks under the so-called Normandy Format; and diplomatic gambits by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The Biden administration spelled out the consequences of a Russian invasion explicitly in terms of punishing financial sanctions while leaving to the imagination what Biden called “swift and severe” reprisals that go well beyond that. U.S. officials worked assiduously to forge unity among Western nations, creating a remarkably united front. They made incisive use of intelligence, exposing Russia’s alleged schemes to manufacture Ukrainian provocations as justification for attack and to install a pro-Kremlin Russian leader. Normally low-key U.S. diplomats have summoned dramatic flair, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken making a last-ditch speech to the U.N. Security Council laying out Putin’s purported plans in minute, riveting detail. During a Security Council meeting late last week the Indian delegation cynically abstained from a resolution deploring Russia’s incursion saying, “it is a matter of regret that the path of diplomacy was given up.” But, of course, the only party to give up on diplomacy was Putin himself when he ordered troops to cross the border. A majority of the Council understood that well, forcing Russia to exercise its veto in order to escape condemnation. Timed just months after America’s agonizing withdrawal from Afghanistan, Putin’s march on Ukraine seemed premised on the conviction that neither Washington nor Western Europe would have the stomach to intervene militarily to defend Moscow’s onetime client state. Back in December, Biden announced unequivocally that troop deployments to Ukraine were off the table. Yet the United States continues to bulk up its military presence in Poland, Romania, and Germany, acknowledging that war isn’t always easily contained. The administration has repeatedly now avowed that should Putin enter NATO territory, he will meet with the full military force of the alliance. The Biden team rightly learned the lesson of former President Barack Obama’s breached red line over chemical weapons use in Syria that once an explicit threat of force is made, failure to follow through **invites adversaries** ready to push and provoke without fear of consequences. Whether greater ambiguity on the West’s part about the possibility of allied intervention to defend Ukraine’s borders might have deterred Putin’s designs—and perhaps pried open a diplomatic solution—is unknowable. War has erupted in Ukraine not because diplomacy wasn’t tried but because diplomacy couldn’t deter a leader such as Putin, who saw advantage in an all-out invasion and is willing to tolerate the fallout. Signs that Putin is becoming unhinged and distanced from even his closest advisors underscore a risk that has loomed all along: that the Russian leader is beyond appeals to reason or logic. Nonetheless, the Biden administration and its allies now hold the moral high ground of having exhausted preventive efforts, short of preemptively trading away Ukrainian sovereignty.

4. Delay DA — the counterplan is slow — even the neg authors agree. Our impact happens first because [explain.]

Bergmann & Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann and Alexandra Schmitt, * senior fellow at the Center for American Progress; served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance," 03/09/21, *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

• The State Department must be scaled up in order to gain the capacity to absorb the DOD's programs. Moving the DOD's vast assistance budget to the State Department would be one of the most significant realignments of the U.S. national security agencies since the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Such a bureaucratic change will require real reform and a significant expansion in the State Department's capacity to manage and administer the substantial increase in resources, as well as demand **significant internal reform** and **reorganization**. To be clear, **State Department bureaucracy has** often **been its own biggest enemy**; it is beset by **turf battles, inefficiency, lack of clear and timely decision-making**, and **tangled lines of authority**. As it currently stands, the State Department is **far from capable** of taking on the role this report suggests. However, these barriers should become the impetus for reform, not excuses to favor the status quo. Indeed, these efforts should be undertaken with other necessary reforms at the State Department to rebuild and improve U.S. diplomatic capacity.

5. The State Department is useless and antagonizes Russia.

Pavlich 22 [Katie Pavlich, editor for Townhall.com and a Fox News contributor, "Pavlich: Blinken's diplomatic failure," 03/02/22, *The Hill*, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/596428-pavlich-blinkens-diplomatic-failure/, Accessed: 05/17/22]

Those words served as a warning, and eight years later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has proven true McCain's assertions about his capabilities to launch America and its allies into a more dangerous world. With the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine marking Europe's first major land war in decades, just six months after the catastrophic and chaotic exit from Afghanistan, Blinken is **clearly incapable**. His **diplomatic efforts** have **repeatedly failed** in **spectacular fashion**. While Russian President Vladimir Putin's actions to invade a sovereign country are his own, a **failure to deter** the situation through aggressive diplomacy and proper, prioritized deployment of U.S. policy, is **Blinken's responsibility**. For weeks the State Department warned of a Russian invasion while claiming the door to diplomacy and lines of communication were still open. Out of caution, Blinken moved State Department personnel out of the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, insisting it wasn't a retreat and that talks were ongoing. On Feb. 22, 2022, Putin announced he was sending "peacekeepers" into eastern Ukraine. Shortly afterward, bombs started dropping over Ukraine, marking the failure of U.S. State Department diplomacy with Blinken at the helm. Making matters worse, Blinken **emboldened Putin** on his way into the crisis by focusing on the **wrong priorities**. For over a year the State Department has engaged in a large-scale campaign to hinder domestic U.S. energy production in order to appease largely worthless and expensive global climate pacts. "As Secretary of State, my job is to make sure our foreign policy delivers for the American people — by taking on the biggest challenges they face and seizing the biggest opportunities that can improve their lives. No challenge more clearly captures the two sides of this coin than climate," Blinken said during remarks in April 2021, just a few months into the new administration. "We'll put the climate crisis at the center of our foreign policy and national security, as President Biden instructed us to do in his first week in office. That means taking into account how every bilateral and multilateral engagement — every policy decision — will impact our goal of putting the world on a safer, more sustainable path." While the U.S. has cut its own domestic production and exports, it increased the amount of oil imported from Russia in 2021. The Europeans, who easily convinced President Biden and Secretary Blinken to rejoin the Paris climate agreement, furthered Russia's dominance over the continent by jumping on board with Nord Stream 2. The U.S. and Europe still need oil and gas, but to satisfy self-imposed virtue signaling emissions standards, they're buying it from hostile countries and funding war crimes. Putin is happy to sell oil that fuels his interests, especially to naive and academically driven Westerners willing to kneecap themselves along the way. A **lack of pressure on NATO countries** to pay their committed shares to the alliance, on top of engaging in climate change alarmism and self-inflicted energy outsourcing to hostile

actors, is **fueling Putin's war** against innocent Ukrainians. The European Union and U.N. are watching in horror as civilian hospitals and maternity wards are bombed. But now, it could be too late, and direct energy sanctions haven't been deployed. Blinken's decision to "put the climate crisis at the center of our foreign policy and national security," has proven to be major and historic mistake. With one year down and two foreign policy crises already on the board, **Americans should be concerned about the diplomatic "leadership" running the State Department.**

6. CP Links to the DoD DA — shifting resources to the State Department also cuts the funds for DoD innovation.

7. No Internal Net Benefit — miscalculation is theoretically and empirically denied.

Mueller 21 [John Mueller, Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of political science at The Ohio State University, "The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency," 2021, Cambridge University Press]

There were also concerns at the time that the two contestants might somehow get into a war by accident. However, the **historical record** suggests that **wars simply do not begin that way.** In his extensive survey of wars that have occurred since 1400, Luard concludes, "It is impossible to identify a **single case** in which it can be said that a war started accidentally; in which it was not, at the time the war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place." Geoffrey Blainey, after similar study, very much agrees: although many have discussed "accidental" or "unintentional" wars, "**it is difficult,**" he concludes, "**to find a war which on investigation fits this description**." Or, as Henry Kissinger has put it dryly, "Despite popular myths, **large military units do not fight by accident**." And, after investigating 40 crises with some sort of nuclear connection, analyst Bruno Tertrais concludes, "**solid command and control arrangements, sound procedures, constant vigilance, efficient training**, and **cool-headedness of leadership** have ensured – and can continue to ensure – that **nuclear weapons** will continue to **play only a deterrence role**." And then adds: "**'Luck' has very little to do with it.**" 70 Even if an accident takes place during a crisis, **it does not follow that escalation** or hasty response **is inevitable**, or even very likely. As Brodie points out, escalation scenarios essentially impute to both sides "a well-**nigh limitless concern with saving face**" and/or "**a great deal of** ground-in **automaticity of response and counterresponse**." 71 None of this was in evidence during the **Cuban missile crisis** when there were **accidents galore**. An American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, probably without authorization, and another accidentally went off course and flew threateningly over the Soviet Union**.** These events were duly evaluated and then ignored**.** Actually, the Americans had specifically decided that if a U-2 plane were shot down over Cuba, they would retaliate by destroying the antiaircraft site responsible.72 When the event came to pass, however, **the policy was simply not carried out.**73

Conditionality is a Voting Issue — the neg should get the status quo or an unconditional counterplan, not both. Conditionality creates an unproductive argument culture because it values coverage more than engagement. This discourages in-depth clash and argument resolution (because less time is spent on each position) and lowers the barrier of entry for low-quality arguments (because the neg is trying to distract the 2AC). Different advocacies should be debated in different debates, not crammed into this one. Vote for the theoretical position that best encourages high-quality debates.

2AC DOD DA

2AC — DoD Tradeoff DA

1. Non-Unique — inflation means defense spending is effectively way down, even if total dollar numbers are up.

Eaglen 22 — Mackenzie Eaglen, 3-28-2022 [Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She served as a staff member on the congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission. She also previously worked in both chambers of Congress, at the Pentagon, and on the Joint Staff., "Biden's FY23 budget request fails to fully tackle inflation," Defense News || https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/28/bidens-fy23-budget-request-fails-to-fully-tackle-inflation/]

Congress is busy taking in the president's budget request, released March 28, to fund the government for fiscal 2023. As members sift through the reams of documents and data, they should know that the higher **defense budget is** helpful but **simply not enough**. This is not a case of blindly calling for "more, more, more!" Rather it is a plea for meeting needs and persistently high inflation. The administration clearly got the memo from Congress' outspending of the inadequate FY22 request, but they are far from the starting line in our race to readiness. According to Wolfe Research analyst Mike Maugeri, Congress has increased the defense budget above the president's request every single year since fiscal 1998. This is an important signal of Congress' understanding that simply meeting inflation is not the same as growth. The military needs a budget at inflation levels every year just to tread water. President Joe Biden's 4% bump for the military is a useful down payment on tackling inflation and price increases across the board; however, **there are few items** or outcomes Americans and **the Defense Department** are **buying right now** that are **seeing cost growth as low as just 4 points**. While the American people have felt the tangible effects of high inflation this past year, "on average, **defense inflation was 20 basis points above** [the **consumer** price index]." This means that **the 2023 budget**, which tackles some inflation and nothing more, **results in even harsher declines of defense purchasing power** for the training, facilities, weapons and talent that keep us safe. The implications of these trends are highly consequential — especially on top of the deeply unhealthy ratios of building new equipment to researching next-generation technology. The Defense Department has again requested record funding for research, development, test and evaluation in 2023. But **without** the **procurement dollars** to take R&D efforts from the laboratories into the hands of warfighters, **these are roads to nowhere**. In the coming year, procurement would only realize 112% of total RDT&E investments. This is down 7% from FY22, and a decrease of more than 40% from the 1980s modernization-era average. In estimating future spending, the Pentagon, the White House and the Congressional Budget Office have, for years, assumed a 2% inflation rate for budget growth. This year, the **CBO** updated its 2021 inflation **forecast** to **5.4%**. A recent McKinsey & Company report estimated the Defense Department "could have $692 billion in buying power in 2026 [at FY23 spending levels]." Moreover, should 7% inflation continue, the purchasing power of $732 billion sinks to $578 billion. The **result of diminished buying power** for another year **means that the force will continue to get smaller and older** while waiting on the promise of future technologies to materialize at scale. Building just nine new ships while retiring 24 in a single year and buying fewer aircraft than the 150 the Air Force is proposing to retire in 2023 is too risky. If the money does not materialize to meet real growth for the U.S. military, oxymoronically, **the research projects the administration is funding** today **will not even be able to be fielded** to defend against the threats of the future. This will only deepen the trenches of the "**valley of death**," the phenomenon where **billions of research dollars go wasted** when capabilities are never actually bought because there are not enough procurement dollars to go around. **Insufficient funding** is not limited to this administration, but its continuation certainly is. There is a difference between recognition and response. As has been made clear by Biden's Pentagon, defense officials recognize that China increased its defense spending by at least 8% per year for a decade (and projects another 7 point growth next year to our 4% nominal growth). Meanwhile, China has the "world's largest standing army, navy, coast guard, maritime militia, and sub-strategic missile force." Nor are China's advantages only quantitative. The **FY23 defense budget request is a failed response**. The military should not have to skimp on its many priorities because of a falling budget, even as demand is high around the globe. Congress will surely recognize the clear need to meet inflation for the defense budget and spend more to buy back combat power capacity that cannot be recouped once equipment is permanently retired.

2. Vaccine diplomacy uses NATO resources more efficiently AND enables cost-sharing — reduces burden on the US.

Giovanna **De Maio**, October 20**20** [Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow at George Washington University, and a nonresident fellow and former visiting fellow at the Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institution. "NATO's Response to COVID-19: Lessons For Resilience and Readiness" Brookings || https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/FP_20201028_nato_covid_demaio-1.pdf]

COVID-19 has been a systemic wake-up call, exposing vulnerabilities in health, international cooperation, and the global economy. NATO showed reliability and solidarity under the initiative of its civil and military personnel amid COVID-19. Yet, **one could only imagine how easier and more efficient NATO's response would have been** if the alliance did not have to overcome tense political issues between member states and **if** NATO's stronger member, **the U**nited **S**tates, **had adopted a more cooperative approach**78 **to** the **virus response** both internationally and domestically, similarly to what had been done for Ebola in 2014.79 This could not only have helped the NATO Public Diplomacy Division's outreach in pushing back against disinformation, **but** also **used the resources of the organization** — constantly targeted in Trump's complaints because of its financial burden — **to share costs and responsibilities** and ultimately reassure partners and markets.

3. No Internal Link — DOD R&D doesn't matter — the private sector drives innovation.

Hass et al. 21 — Ryan Hass et al., 12-23-2021 [Ryan Hass is a senior fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, where he holds a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He was part of the inaugural class of David M. Rubenstein fellows at Brookings, and is a nonresident affiliated fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. "U.S.-China technology competition," Brookings || https://www.brookings.edu/essay/u-s-china-technology-competition/]

The United States is living through a paradigm shift in how technology is financed and developed. **The** U.S. Department of Defense (**DOD**) **no longer drives innovation** priorities **through** focused **research and development funding**. Now, many of the **breakthroughs are driven by the private sector** and shaped by consumer preferences. The U.S. government needs to build partnerships with the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to improve its ability to deliver technological solutions to key challenges. It should also work with international partners to coordinate on export control, standard-setting, and directing investments toward common strategic objectives.

4. No cuts to Innovation budget- it would trade off with something else

Gill 22 — Jaspreet Gill, 5-18-2022 [Jaspreet Gill was the senior technology reporter for Inside the Army until January 2022. She graduated from Syracuse University's S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications with a master's degree in magazine, newspaper and online journalism in 2019. "'Responsible speed': DoD emerging capabilities official on race for new tech," Breaking Defense || https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/responsible-speed-dods-emerging-capabilities-policy-director-on-race-for-new-tech/] [Horowitz = Michael Horowitz, director of emerging capabilities policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Richard Perry Professor and the Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, holds a PhD in government from Harvard, won the NDT for Emory]

Horowitz added he's **never been more confident about DoD's commitment to tech**nology **adoption** and thinks its giving AI an appropriate amount of attention. "I think that one of the challenges that the department has faced is… senior leaders have argued that the US military needs to be faster and better when it comes to emerging technology adoption and sometimes budgets haven't followed that, sometimes they have," Horowitz said. "And I think one of the **things that's really remarkable about this administration**… is **a really strong commitment** to… DoD walking the walk. And I think that commitment makes me **more confident than I've ever been**." He specifically pointed to the creation of the Chief Digital and AI Office. Breaking Defense last year broke the news of the new CDAO, which will be responsible for scaling up the department's AI and data efforts. The **Pentagon** also **requested its largest ever research**,

development, test and evaluation **budget** for fiscal 2023 — $130.1 billion — **reflecting** the department's increasing attention on AI.

5. No Impact — large-scale innovation impossible — political barriers and regulatory framework.

Pontin 12 — Jason Pontin 12, editor in chief and the publisher of MIT Technology Review, 10/24/12, "Why We Can't Solve Big Problems," http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/429690/why-we-cant-solve-big-problems/

The answer is that these things are complex, and that there is no one simple explanation. Sometimes we choose not to solve big technological problems. We could travel to Mars if we wished. NASA has the outline of a plan—or, in its bureaucratic jargon, a "design reference architecture." To a surprising degree, the agency knows how it might send humans to Mars and bring them home. "We know what the challenges are," says Bret Drake, the deputy chief architect for NASA's human spaceflight architecture team. "We know what technologies, what systems we need" (see "The Deferred Dreams of Mars"). As Drake explains, the mission would last about two years; the astronauts would spend 12 months in transit and 500 days on the surface, studying the geology of the planet and trying to understand whether it ever harbored life. Needless to say, there's much that NASA doesn't know: whether it could adequately protect the crew from cosmic rays, or how to land them safely, feed them, and house them. But if the agency received more money or reallocated its current spending and began working to solve those problems now, humans could walk on the Red Planet sometime in the 2030s. We won't, because there are, everyone feels, more useful things to do on Earth. Going to Mars, like going to the moon, would follow upon a political decision that inspired or was inspired by public support. But almost no one feels Buzz Aldrin's "imperative to explore" (see the astronaut's sidebar). Sometimes we fail to solve big problems because our institutions have failed. In 2010, less than 2 percent of the world's energy consumption was derived from advanced renewable sources such as wind, solar, and biofuels. (The most common renewable sources of energy are still hydroelectric power and the burning of biomass, which means wood and cow dung.) The reason is economic: coal and natural gas are cheaper than solar and wind, and petroleum is cheaper than biofuels. Because climate change is a real and urgent problem, and because the main cause of global warming is carbon dioxide released as a by-product of burning fossil fuels, we need renewable energy technologies that can compete on price with coal, natural gas, and petroleum. At the moment, they don't exist. Happily, economists, technologists, and business leaders agree on what national policies and international treaties would spur the development and broad use of such alternatives. There should be a significant increase in public investment for energy research and development, which has fallen in the United States from a height of 10 percent in 1979 to 2 percent of total R&D spending, or just $5 billion a year. (Two years ago, Bill Gates, Xerox chief executive Ursula Burns, GE chief executive Jeff Immelt, and John Doerr, the Silicon Valley venture capitalist, called for a threefold increase in public investments in energy research.) There should be some kind of price on carbon, now a negative externality, whether it is a transparent tax or some more opaque market mechanism. There should be a regulatory framework that treats carbon dioxide emissions as pollution, setting upper limits on how much pollution companies and nations can release. Finally, and least concretely, energy experts agree that even if there were more investment in research, a price on carbon, and some kind of regulatory framework, we would still lack one vital thing: sufficient facilities to demonstrate and test new energy technologies. Such facilities are typically too expensive for private companies to build. But without a practical way to collectively test and optimize innovative energy technologies, and without some means to share the risks of development, alternative energy sources will continue to have little impact on energy use, given that any new technology will be more expensive at first than fossil fuels. Less happily, there is no hope of any U.S. energy policy or international treaties that reflect this intellectual consensus, because one political party in the United States is reflexively opposed to industrial regulations and affects to doubt that human beings are causing climate change, and because the emerging markets of China and India will not reduce their emissions without offset benefits that the industrialized nations cannot provide. Without international treaties or U.S. policy, there will probably be no competitive alternative sources of energy in the near future, barring what is sometimes called an "energy miracle."

2AC Vaccine Leadership DA

2AC vs Vaccine Cooperation DA

1. Non-Unique — Covid is already endemic and controlled. CDC tracking proves.

Marc **Zarefsky 22**. Communications consultant. "How we will know when COVID-19 has become endemic." American Medical Association. April 1, 2022. https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/public-health/how-we-will-know-when-covid-19-has-become-endemic

How to know when COVID-19 is endemic There is not a set threshold that dictates when a pandemic becomes endemic, Dr. Parodi said. While the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 led to an enormous surge in positive cases across the U.S., Dr. Parodi said there were encouraging signs connected to endemicity. For the most part, people who were vaccinated and then tested positive had **mild symptoms** or were **asymptomatic**. The more people who are vaccinated, the better. "We can move this in a way that the disease is milder," he said. "At least so far, vaccine-based immunity appears to provide very broad-based immunity against multiples of variants." The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently updated its guidelines to **track COVID-19 risk in communities**, which is **another shift** toward endemicity. Dr. Parodi said. Rather than focus on the percent of test positivity and COVID-19 cases per 100,000 people, the new guidelines calculate the number of hospital admissions related to COVID-19 in the previous week, the percentage of staffed hospital beds occupied by COVID-19 patients, and the number of new COVID-19 cases per 100,000 people the previous week. Those calculations will determine whether the area's risk level is judged low, medium or high by the CDC. The difference is that instead of focusing on preventing transmission of the virus, the CDC guidelines aim to **minimize severe illness** and prevent overwhelming health care systems.

2. Link Turn — the aff fosters equitable vaccine distribution. That's 1AC Bricknell, Rajah, and Iancu.

3. Link Non-Unique — vaccine diplomacy is inevitable — it's just a question of whether China and Russia or US and allies control it. Inequitable distribution is the status quo.

John **Kampfner 21**. Executive Director, UK in the World Initiative. "Vaccine competition may now be the world's best bet." Chatham House. Published 6/30/21. Accessed 7/9/22. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/vaccine-competition-may-now-be-worlds-best-bet

From the start of the pandemic, in the provision of masks or personal protective equipment (PPE), nation states indulged their competitive instincts. **Vaccine diplomacy** and its alter ego vaccine nationalism **followed** this trend. Public relations battles were fought out not just between rivals, but also among supposed allies. The British government juxtaposed its mass purchase of vaccines with the early failures of the European Union (EU) as vindication of Brexit. For its part, the EU's definition of solidarity was largely confined to the bloc. On taking office in January 2021, Biden proclaimed that 'America is back' in the mainstream of global affairs. He reversed the US decision to leave the WHO and turned around the domestic response with an impressively fast vaccination programme. Yet the US rhetoric rarely matched the reality. Health policy was directed **inwards**: over-order on an industrial scale and vaccinate until the last person is done. Americans went from near panic to enjoying an oversupply of life-saving medicine, **while death rates in poorer countries were growing sharply** with vaccines desperately hard to come by. The West failed **egregiously** in the competition for goodwill, **leaving a gaping vacuum for others to fill**.

4. Impact Non-Unique — recession is inevitable.

Nouriel **Roubini 20**. Professor of economics at New York University Stern School of Business, co-founder of the RGE Monitor, former senior adviser to the White House council of economic advisers and the US Treasury, member of the Council for the Future of Europe. "Ten reasons why a 'Greater Depression' for the 2020s is inevitable." The Guardian. Published 4/29/20. Accessed 6/16/21. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/29/ten-reasons-why-greater-depression-for-the-2020s-is-inevitable-covid

After the 2007-09 financial crisis, the imbalances and risks pervading the global economy were exacerbated by policy mistakes. So, rather than address the structural problems that the financial collapse and ensuing recession revealed, governments mostly kicked the can down the road, creating major downside risks that made another crisis inevitable. And now that it has arrived, the risks are growing **even more acute.** Unfortunately, even if the Greater Recession leads to a lacklustre U-shaped recovery this year, an L-shaped **"Greater Depression" will follow** later in **this decade**, owing to 10 ominous and risky trends. The first trend concerns deficits and their corollary risks: **debts and defaults.** The policy response to the Covid-19 crisis entails a massive increase in fiscal deficits – on the order of 10% of GDP or more – at a time when public debt levels in many countries were already high, if not unsustainable. Worse, the loss of income for many households and firms means that private-sector debt levels will become unsustainable, too, potentially leading to mass defaults and bankruptcies. Together with soaring levels of public debt, this all but ensures a more **anaemic recovery** than the one that followed the Great Recession a decade ago. A second factor is the demographic timebomb in advanced economies. The Covid-19 crisis shows that much more public spending must be allocated to health systems, and that universal healthcare and other relevant public goods are necessities, not luxuries. Yet, because most developed countries have ageing societies, funding such outlays in the future will make the implicit debts from today's unfunded healthcare and social security systems even larger. A third issue is the growing **risk of deflation**. In addition to causing a deep recession, the crisis is also creating a massive slack in goods (unused machines and capacity) and labour markets (mass unemployment), as well as driving a price collapse in commodities such as oil and industrial metals. That makes debt deflation likely, increasing the risk of insolvency. A fourth (related) factor will be **currency debasement**. As central banks try to fight deflation and head off the risk of surging interest rates (following from the massive debt build-up), monetary policies will become even more unconventional and far-reaching. In the short run, governments will need to run monetised fiscal deficits to avoid depression and deflation. Yet, over time, the permanent negative supply shocks from accelerated de-globalisation and renewed protectionism will make stagflation all but inevitable.

5. No Impact — Covid economic decline doesn't cause war.

Walt 20 -- Stephen Walt, International Relations Professor at Harvard University. [Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War? 5-13-20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on **the likelihood of war**. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be **a lot more of the latter**. To take one example, the United States has suffered **40 or more recessions** since the country was founded, yet it has fought **perhaps 20 interstate wars**, most of them **unrelated** to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson's famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted "nine out of the last five (or fewer)." Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders **avoid** war when they are convinced it will be **long**, **bloody**, **costly**, and **uncertain**. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country's economic condition might be, its leaders will **not** go to war unless they think they can do so **quickly**, **cheaply**, and with **a reasonable probability of success**. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for **security, not economic gain**. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that "every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as **a preventive war**, not as **a war of conquest**,"

and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are **only one** factor among **many** and **rarely the most significant**. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is **not likely** to affect **the probability of war very much**, especially in the short term.