



2024 Outreach Debate Winter Camp Prep File

**Resolved: The African Union should grant
diplomatic recognition to the Republic of
Somaliland as an independent state.**

A2 AFF

A2 Houthis

1 — The Houthis will just move elsewhere and disrupt other chokepoints --- the point of their attacks is visibility.

2 — If the US has a vested interest in combating pirates, then a base isn't key — they can always send missile systems via ships and troops through other countries like Yemen and in ports like Djibouti.

3 — The Houthis retaliate. US militarization increases the risk of regional war that turns case.

Gambrell '24 [Jon Gambrell, 1-12-2024, "Houthi rebels vow fierce retaliation after American and British strikes, ships are warned to avoid Red Sea," PBS News, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/houthi-rebels-vow-fierce-retaliation-after-american-and-british-strikes>, accessed 11-24-2024] //Rae

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — The U.S. Navy on Friday warned American-flagged vessels to stay out of areas around Yemen in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden for the next 72 hours after the U.S. and Britain launched multiple airstrikes targeting Houthi rebels. The warning in a notice to shippers came as **Yemen's Houthis vowed fierce retaliation for the U.S.-led strikes, further raising the prospect of a wider conflict** in a region already beset by Israel's war in Gaza. The White House said **the U.S. expects the Houthis to try to strike back**. "Nobody was Pollyannaish about the possibility that they might conduct some sort of retaliation," National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said. He added, "This wasn't some signaling exercise. This was designed to disrupt and degrade Houthi military capabilities." The **U.S.-led bombardment** — launched in response to a recent campaign of drone and missile attacks on commercial ships in the vital Red Sea — **killed at least five people and wounded six, the Houthis said**. The U.S. said the strikes took aim at more than 60 targets in 16 different locations across Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. As the bombing lit the predawn sky over multiple sites held by the Iranian-backed rebels, it forced the world to again focus on Yemen's yearslong war, which began when the Houthis seized the country's capital. Since November, the rebels have repeatedly targeted ships in the Red Sea, saying they were avenging Israel's offensive in Gaza against Hamas. But they have frequently targeted vessels with tenuous or no clear links to Israel, imperiling shipping in a key route for global trade and energy shipments. **The Houthis' military spokesman, Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, said in a recorded address that the strikes would "not go unanswered or unpunished."**

4 - Houthi Attacks are uncoordinated and literally no one is scared

Raydan 24 (Noam Raydan is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute., "The Ship Operators Shrugging Off Houthi Attacks", Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ship-operators-shrugging-houthi-attacks>, 10-16-2024, DOA: 1-12-2025) //Bellaire MC

While major operators will continue to avoid the Red Sea in 2025, others are launching new services in the high-risk waterway, including some that manage China-linked vessels. On July 20, the Houthis attempted to attack the container ship Pumba (IMO 9302566) with an unmanned surface vehicle, claiming that the vessel was American. Security personnel on board were able to destroy the sea drone, and the ship, which was sailing from Jeddah,

Saudi Arabia, continued its journey to Port Klang in Malaysia. In the following months, Pumba continued trading in the Red Sea, and data from MarineTraffic shows that on September 27 it crossed the Bab al-Mandab Strait on its way to China. This time, however, there was no Houthi attack. The Liberia-flagged Pumba is managed by SeaLead Shipping, a Singapore-headquartered company, and does not have links to a U.S. company. In fact, SeaLead said in two separate statements earlier this year that the ships it operates in the Red Sea have no links to the United States, Britain, or Israel. SeaLead is also connected to another container ship, the Liberia-flagged Pinocchio (IMO 9400112), which the Houthis also wrongly labeled as an American ship when they launched two antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) toward it on March 11 without causing damage or injuries to the crew (see The Washington Institute maritime incident tracker). The vessel had past links to U.S.-based Oaktree Capital Management, one shipping database shows. On October 5, the Pinocchio, like the Pumba before it, safely crossed the Bab al-Mandab Strait coming from Jeddah on its way to Port Klang. The Houthis have targeted several vessels based on inaccurate or outdated information. Maritime Spotlight tracking shows that some ships that were attacked based on incorrect ownership data have returned to trade in the region. These include vessels that carry Russian oil or are linked to Chinese companies (see this Maritime Spotlight). In September, Lloyd's List Intelligence's maritime risk analyst Bridget Diakun wrote that "growing certainty in vessel safety combined with the commercial incentive of a shorter and cheaper route" have incentivized some operators to profit from the Red Sea crisis. Among the main operators that appear to be confident the Houthis will not target them are those managing China-associated ships. This data has been confirmed by Lloyd's List Intelligence, and past tracking by Maritime Spotlight indicates the same. Although in March the Houthis targeted a China-linked crude oil tanker, Freda (IMO 9402469), the action was based on inaccurate information (see this Maritime Spotlight for more details). SeaLead is among the companies that have continued to charter vessels to trade in the Red Sea despite attacks on at least two of its ships. Given that the Pumba and Pinocchio have recently sailed safely in the southern Red Sea with their automatic identification system (AIS) switched on, it appears likely the Houthis no longer believe the ships have a connection to the United States. Not only has SeaLead continued existing shipping services, it has launched new ones. In late 2023, as the Houthis started attacking commercial vessels, SeaLead announced a shipping service connecting Red Sea ports in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Djibouti. Just last month, the company, which is active in the Middle East with an office in Dubai, also launched a new service connecting China, India, and Djibouti (see map below). Among the other vessels that SeaLead has operated in the Red Sea is the Liberia-flagged container ship Hakuna Matata (IMO 9354167), which is owned by a China-based company, according to two shipping databases and TradeWinds.

5 - Solved by Ships just Avoiding the Red Sea

Raydan 24 (Noam Raydan is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute., "The Ship Operators Shrugging Off Houthi Attacks", Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ship-operators-shrugging-houthi-attacks>, 10-16-2024, DOA: 1-12-2025) //Bellaire MC

Transit through the Bab al-Mandab Strait last week was still down by more than 60 percent year-over-year, data from Lloyd's List Intelligence shows. As the Houthis stepped up their attacks in the summer, particularly against crude oil tankers linked to Greek companies (see this Maritime Spotlight), several other companies were forced to avoid the region. Meanwhile, giant liner operators are still taking the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd recently announced a new long-term operational collaboration, Gemini Cooperation, which is expected to kick off in February 2025. The shipping network, however, will avoid the Red Sea, and the fleet will continue to sail around southern Africa.

6 - Unilateral strikes alienate allies — a tradeoff forces the US to cooperate which is more effective.

Junyent '24 [Marc Martorell Junyent, 1-24-2024, "Why Some US Allies Aren't Joining the Anti-Houthi Mission in the Red Sea • Stimson Center," Stimson Center, <https://www.stimson.org/2024/us-allies-not-joining-anti-houthi-mission-red-sea/>, accessed 11-24-2024] //Rae + YALE CO-CHAMPION JASON ZHAO

The Italian government explained that it preferred a “calming” policy in the Red Sea. The **French and Spanish governments were among eight EU countries** that **voted in favor of a ceasefire in the Gaza war, which the Houthis have cited as a rationale for their attacks.** Both France and Spain have been **advocating a diplomatic response** to the conflict and **calling for a general de-escalation** in the Middle East. France, the former colonial power in Lebanon, has been particularly concerned about preventing a wider war between Hezbollah and Israel. **The French government, in cooperation with Qatar, recently mediated a deal for the delivery of medicines to Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. Considering their emphasis on diplomacy, France and Spain could hardly subscribe to the U.S.-U.K. strikes.**

If France and Spain feared becoming embroiled in a military confrontation, the strikes against the Houthis must have reassured them that they took the right decision. France and Spain are also not comfortable with the U.S.-U.K. framing, which presents the operation as merely focused on protecting freedom of navigation and trade.

The Houthis' attacks against ships in the southern Red Sea started in mid-November 2023, more than a month after the Hamas attacks on Israel triggered a massive Israeli retaliation that has now killed more than 25,000 people, according to Gaza health authorities. The Houthi leadership has declared that the group's objective is to force an end to the war in Gaza and secure humanitarian aid deliveries to the Palestinians living there. There is no certainty that the Houthis would stop their attacks in the Red Sea if the war in Gaza came to an end. The Houthis could seek to leverage their disruptive potential in the Red Sea in negotiations with Saudi Arabia, for instance. However, **countries such as France, Italy, and Spain would likely be far more predisposed to support strikes against the Houthis if a ceasefire had been reached in Gaza and the Yemeni group nonetheless continued its attacks.**

The Houthi ballistic missile attack on Jan. 15, 2024 against an American-owned cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden showed that Houthi capabilities remain strong, and the geographical scope of their threat might even expand. Attacks until now had largely occurred in the Red Sea, not in the Gulf of Aden.

The U.S. and U.K. conducted another round of strikes against Houthi targets on Jan. 22, reportedly hitting eight sites. However, the continuation of this approach will not bring security to the Red Sea. U.S. President Joe Biden has openly acknowledged that the strikes against the Houthis are not stopping them, and yet the Biden administration appears to be planning a sustained campaign. **The continuation of the strikes will further alienate Washington's partners in the Persian Gulf as well as some of its NATO partners. The U.S. is increasingly seen by some of its traditional allies as acting both counter-productively and unilaterally.** These partners cannot understand why Washington is not instead compelling Israel to accept a ceasefire in Gaza.

7 - Alt causes to cable damage – shipwrecks, sharks, and fishing nets

Rajeswari Pillai **Rajagopalan**, 03-26-20**24**, Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Resident Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra, Australia. Dr. Rajagopalan was previously the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy & Technology (CSST)

at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi; also previously the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr. Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union. "Undersea Cables are Increasingly Critical and Vulnerable", No Publication, <https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/undersea-cables-are-increasingly-critical-and-vulnerable/>

Undersea Cables are Increasingly Critical and Vulnerable **Undersea cables must be understood as critical infrastructure, and their vulnerability – to intentional tampering and accidental damage** – acknowledged. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan March 26, 2024 Undersea Cables are Increasingly Critical and Vulnerable Credit: Depositphotos Subscribe for ads-free reading Recent events in the Red Sea have brought to the fore another security vulnerability, that of the security of undersea telecommunications cables. **UAE officials in early March said that three cables running through the Red Sea had been possibly attacked by Yemen's Houthi rebels, although the Houthis themselves denied it** The cables provide connectivity for both internet and telecommunications across different regions. The media report noted that the alleged attack tampered with many communication cable lines, including Asia-Africa-Europe 1, the Europe India Gateway, Seacom and TGN (Tata Global Network)-Gulf, and Hong Kong-based HGC Global Communications. Reportedly, the cuts impacted 25 percent of the communications passing through Red Sea from Asia to Europe. Many companies have had to take immediate remedial steps, including re-routing, in order to limit the effect of the cable cuts. Tata Communications for instance said that they are "keeping a close watch on the situation and [had] initiated immediate and appropriate remedial actions." Tata Communications added that they "invest in various cable consortiums to increase our diversity and hence in such situations of a cable cut or snag we are able to automatically reroute our services, thereby ensuring our customers have a stable, reliable and scalable connectivity." **The Red Sea has long been considered a maritime shipping choke point but it is also "an internet and telecommunications bottleneck," according to experts at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS). With around 90 percent of communications between Europe and Asia, as well as 17 percent of global internet traffic** passing through cables under the narrow Bab al-Mandab Strait, it is a major chokepoint for the communication sector. Undersea cables are critical infrastructure with important implications for the global economy and communication system connecting different regions. According to a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, **"commercial undersea telecommunication cables carry about 99% of transoceanic digital communications (e.g., voice, data, internet), including financial transactions."** The report added that there are more than 500 commercial undersea cables owned and operated by individual private companies as well as consortia of companies; these cables have become the mainstay of the global internet. The importance of these cables, covering over 1.4 million kilometers connecting literally every country in the world, cannot be ignored. With more big companies entering the fray, this number will likely go up in the coming years. Already, big global firms such as Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft dominate the scene, owning or leasing around half of all undersea bandwidth. But such heavy dependence can mean a significant vulnerability and in turn calls for greater protection. There have been intentional and unintentional attacks on undersea cable infrastructure. **The Nord Stream pipeline attack in September 2022 highlighted the vulnerability faced by such cables and led to calls for ensuring better protective measures for undersea telecommunication cables** In terms of intentional attacks on telecommunication cables, two incidents in April and October 2022 are noteworthy, when multiple cables were cut in southern France. This appeared to have been a coordinated and targeted attack. **A cloud security company, Zscaler, in a blog post said that the attack "impacted major cables with connectivity to Asia, Europe, [the] U.S. and potentially other parts of the world."** There have been also many natural events that have cut or damaged cables, resulting in interference and disruptions in communication. Undersea cable damage in Tonga, a South Pacific archipelago nation, after a volcanic eruption in January 2022 is a case in point. Cloudflare said in a blog post that internet connections had been restored after 38 days, following the successful completion of repairs to the undersea cable. Equally critical to note is that cable repair is extremely challenging and expensive. In the Tonga case, it was estimated that the daily costs for the ship responsible for repairing the cable, the CS Reliance, was between \$35,000 and \$50,000. **It is, however, an increasing challenge to identify if damage to undersea cables is intentional or the result of natural events or accidents. Analysts have noted that damage can be caused by fishing nets, weather, ship anchors, sharks, or even sinking cargo ships, as was seen in the recent Red Sea incident. Inability to make a distinction between intentional attacks and accidents can be problematic for a couple of different reasons** First, potential saboteurs can benefit from the difficulty in determining specific causes of damage. And second, **this ambiguity generates challenges in terms of governance and regulatory measures** aiming to better undersea cable security. There are no easy answers to dealing with undersea cable security. First and foremost, along with cybersecurity and protection of other vital infrastructure, undersea cables need to be treated as critical infrastructure. The need to acknowledge the vulnerability this poses to global communication systems is the first step. A second step may be for firms to invest in diverse cable consortiums so that it is possible to re-route and thereby create redundancy in order to mitigate the effects of undersea cable disruptions. **Also, the protection of undersea cables can be pursued through minilateral groupings such as the Quad.** The Quad in May 2023 announced a new initiative for undersea cable protection in the Indo-Pacific, called the "Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience" as part of its broader efforts to develop better

and more resilient infrastructure. Considering that the potential damage to undersea cables can affect all countries, a larger global multilateral effort should also be undertaken, despite the fact that multilateral efforts are increasingly threatened by rising great power competition.

8 - US counterterror fails and plays into the Houthi's plans

Lackner 24 (Helen Lackner, Yemen Scholar and author of Yemen: Poverty and Conflict (2022). She worked in rural development and lived in the three Yemeni states for fifteen years., "What Yemen's Houthis Want", Jacobin, <https://jacobin.com/2024/02/yemen-houthis-gaza-civil-war>, 2-3-2024, DOA: 1-12-2025) //Bellaire MC *brackets OG to text

So, I think the reason the Americans delayed, which is similar to the reasons why the Saudis are responding with such modesty to Huthi actions, is that both the Americans and the Saudis were hoping to have the Yemeni peace deal achieved. They were still hoping that this was going to happen. And there were rumors that it would happen in the first few days of this year. So, they were hoping that they would be able to achieve this before the situation deteriorated. Clearly, they haven't. The situation has now deteriorated. The quote you mentioned I've also seen and don't understand. I mean, [the US] is doing this because they feel they have to do something. I think they claim that, in the long run, it will [constrain] the Huthis. I mean, assuming that they were able to destroy every single Huthi drone, missile, and every other kind of projectile the Huthis might have, then presumably that would put an end to the Huthi actions in the Red Sea. But I don't see that this is likely to happen. I have no idea of the figures of anything, or even the different types of items that they have. I'm not at all a military-inclined person. But it's very clear to me that the **Huthis are definitely not going to stop, unless they have no alternative.** And if you look at the history of **US intervention** in the region or even beyond the region in the last few decades, one is led to seriously wonder on what criteria and on what grounds the United States is doing what it is doing. Look at the record. Afghanistan is the most obvious and stunning case of twenty years of intervention, and twenty years of killing people, and twenty years of bombing, and twenty years of training Afghans in military affairs and providing them with weapons. And it's those weapons that the Taliban were pointing at them in August 2021 when [the United States] finally left. And so you have a history of these interventions having exactly the opposite effect of the effect that is stated. There is no reason to believe that attacking the Huthis will be any different. So it is somewhat puzzling, and maybe people who are more expert on US policy are in a better position than I am to explain this. But I think when you're looking at the Huthis, and you're talking about them being happy about the war and the expansion of the war, the **Huthi fundamental slogan** has three negative items, which are: **death to America**, death to Israel, and curse on the Jews. So, I mean, being anti-American comes even before being anti-Israeli. So having the **Americans attack** them is a **highly ideologically desirable situation** from their point of view. It also has the impact [of] helping them keep together and retain support, or gain more support, from the Yemeni population. Yemenis are extremely pro-Palestinian and they also do not like to be attacked or invaded by any foreigners of any description. The Huthis kept people together under their control for the last nine years largely in response to the Saudi attack, and what they perceived as a Saudi attack, and what they presented as a Saudi attack: i.e., the foreigners are attacking us, and we must defend ourselves. And unlike the United States and Israel, who claim self-defense while they're attacking others, [the Huthis actually] have every right to talk about self-defense. I mean, the US missiles aren't attacking the Democratic Republic of Congo, you know, they're attacking Yemeni territory, which is definitely part of where they live. So that fits into a much more reasonable definition of self-defense than the Americans saying they're in self-defense when they're attacking a place that's thousands of miles away.

9 - It's Israeli propaganda

Yemen Youth Net 24 (Yemen Youth Net, "Why is Israel exaggerating the Houthis' military capabilities in Yemen?", **يمن شباب نت**,

<https://en.yemenshabab.net/sections/NEWS/Reports%20/why-is-israel-exaggerating-the-houthis--military-capabilities-in-yemen>, 12-28-2024, DOA: 1-12-2025) //Bellaire MC
Inflating the capabilities of the Houthis

The Israeli occupation government is trying to exaggerate the Houthis' military capabilities in successive media statements, to obtain broad participation from Washington, and aims to attract the attention of the next US administration led by Trump, who will assume power next January. This was highlighted by what the Washington Post quoted from an Israeli official, "The Houthis are more technologically advanced than many people think" and should not be "underestimated." He said that with Iran's support, the Houthis have been able to take "practical steps" in pursuing their ideology that calls for the destruction of the United States and Israel. Experts say their drones, missiles and rockets have evaded Israel's once-vaunted air defense systems, bringing to the fore a perennial Israeli military dilemma: how to defeat an enemy armed with a relatively cheap and relatively abundant stockpile of weapons, The Washington Post reported.

A2 Investment

1. FDI increases inequality which drives unrest in Somaliland

Said '23 [Kadidja Said, 3-xx-2023, legal professional @ AQN International Law Firm based in Somaliland with a masters degree in international law from Aix-Marseille University, FDI in Somaliland: A Vehicle for Peacebuilding or a Source of Social Inequality?, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, <https://instituteforpeace.org/publications/ipcs-briefing/FDI-in-Somaliland-A-Vehicle-for-Peacebuilding-or-a-Source-of-Social-Inequality-1.pdf>] BZ recut Aaron

However, FDI can also have the opposite effect and create instability in a country. Certainly, foreign investments create new jobs and increase the living standards of the host country but they can also lead to the exploitation of the benefits from investment through corrupted networks⁴⁰. This issue is one of the most significant factors that can affect the development of post-conflict countries. Some suggest that investors in post-conflict countries should implement policies contributing to income equality and improving the living standards of the local population⁴¹. **However, most investors in postconflict countries are**

not concerned about corporate social responsibility and their main **goal is to make profits**. This suggests that the expectations of foreign investors to solve economic problems and contribute to the equal distribution of the benefits from the investment may not hold. In some host countries, FDI can be a source of destabilisation and disturb the existing balance, especially in the case of **Somaliland**. FDI

Destabilizing Factor FDI presents some challenges and risks that could destabilise a country by increasing inequalities. In the case of Somaliland, FDI can disturb the existing balance of the country and lead to more tension but these challenges can be surmounted. Challenges and Risks of FDI While the attraction of FDI allows

a country to improve its economic conditions, **some studies show that FDI inflows can increase social inequality and trigger domestic conflicts** ⁴². Such disturbance may happen if FDI is going to **benefit only a small number of people**. The benefits of foreign investment can be **captured easily by the government with a minimal spill-over to the region these investments are made**. For example, foreign investment in natural resources does not

need support from the locals by way of human capital, and the infrastructure they bring can be easily transferred out of the region. Moreover the workers in these types of industries are usually low-skilled and poorly paid but also poorly treated. This is one of the reasons why investments in non-resource sectors should be encouraged. As mentioned before, foreign investment in sectors other than resources draws a lot of support from the region these investments are made. For instance, manufacturing, infrastructure, and services are some of the sectors that boost the region by investing in human resources and training potential

workers⁴³. **Another risk associated with FDI is that it always creates winners and losers, and conflicts may emerge through this situation. Indeed, new conflicts arise due to the increasing inequality between the poor population and the elites that are supporting and participating in foreign investment**. This can lead to the decrease of the legitimacy of the political elites since they are not working to find a way to resolve the inequalities created by these investments nor put in place

social justice policies⁴⁴ Another problem connected with FDI is inequalities between regions in the same country. **Foreign investment may alleviate the inequalities in the local economy but it is important to note that the majority of investment is concentrated in industrial and urban areas mainly in big cities**. Usually, because these places have

the necessary infrastructure and skills to support the development of the businesses⁴⁵. This can lead to strong inequalities between regions, feed conflicts and **create insurgencies**. Some regions may **even ask for more autonomy or independence** through armed conflict. In addition, **developing countries experience large regional inequalities**. Since peripheral regions are less populated than urban cities, they do not usually benefit from the improvement of living standards and incomes. **Therefore, insurgencies tend to occur in these areas and mobilisation takes place within local networks**. Regional inequalities are more likely to

be related to violent conflict than general social inequalities that affect disconnected individuals. **These regional inequalities affect the same people, from the same place, so it is easier for them to unite and fight back. Usually, they are from the same ethnic background too which can make them feel like these inequalities are based on discrimination**⁴⁶. Some states tend to favour regions that are populated by their supporters or kin which can result in marked geographical differences.

Regional income and economic inequalities are more likely to foster conflict than absolute poverty. **According to various theories of relative deprivation, comparisons with those who have more wealth may inspire violent political mobilisation and radical action, especially in cases of discrimination and exploitation**⁴⁷. This kind of situation can be

exploited by certain group leaders and conflicts entrepreneurs who can exaggerate and exploit these inequalities to achieve their own economic or political goals⁴⁸. Foreign investment can also cause a political reaction from the local business community as it can put local entrepreneurs in a disadvantaged position. For a long time, **local businesses** did not have to share the market with foreign companies and investors, opening the country for foreign investment will make them **lose profit in the short term and that could lead to some tensions**. For example, this could be the case for Somaliland because most local businesses are not in favour of welcoming foreign companies.

Turns case - can't economically develop with internal conflict and unrest

2. NL. Lack of information makes investment too risky AND human capital is insufficient.

Mal 17 [Abdisamad Omar Mal, Solicitor General of Somaliland, September 2017, Challenges to Somaliland Economic Governance: Private Sector Investment Perspective, International Journal of Science and Research, <https://www.ijsr.net/archive/v6i9/ART20176619.pdf>, Willie T.]

This makes inland handling and transportation cumbersome, driving costs up which contributes the **problems and challenges faced by the private sector investment in Somaliland**. Investors and entrepreneurs **have little access to reliable information about** domestic and international **markets**. Information about business performance is **far from ideal** and investors have **difficulties to understand** the real potential of the **business opportunities in the country**. The common practice is to replicate a successful entrepreneur rather than look for a business opportunity that has not been explored yet. This problem relating the market information that encountered mainly by new investments resulted many small and medium industries unsustainable and closed down. According to assessment report conducted by the Somaliland National Industry Association (SNIA), **39 of the 54 small and medium industries registered by this association were closed in between 2001 and 2012** [Somaliland National Industry Association assessment report, 2012. un published]. According to this report, most of these industries that failed belonged to Diaspora **investors** who **didn't have basic market information, including cost of energy, availability of raw materials and skilled labor** force as well as business plan when investing in the country. Furthermore, Private sector **Firms face challenges in employing a large variety of workers which reflects the low human capital within Somaliland**. This is apparent from the Somaliland Enterprise Survey conducted by the World Bank. According to this survey many firms employed skilled foreigners to address technical skill gaps and Diaspora **investors identified that the lack of basic skills and sector specific technical skills are the major deterrent for investing in Somaliland comparing to other counties** [World bank ES 2013 p 6]. The Diaspora interviewees also confirmed that turnover tends to be high for most locally hired employees [ibid].

3. NL. Informal governance makes business unpredictable and thus impossible for outside investors --- World Bank agrees.

World Bank 16 [The World Bank, 1-1-2016, Somaliland's Private Sector at a Crossroads, World Bank, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e959012b-e1e9-5c94-a653-dee74116d9ec/content>, Willie T.]

Given its current regional status, recent history, and deep and long-standing **clan-based and political culture**, Somaliland has a unique set of factors at play that impact the current status and potential evolutionary path of its **economic governance arrangements**. These **need to be understood** in order **to** more effectively **identify the challenges and opportunities** to economic governance appearing on the horizon. The limits of informal governance: Earlier in this report, the strengths of the Somaliland economy were noted and in particular the capacity of Somaliland to establish economic exchange through a trust based on social and cultural mores. But **as the economy progresses and strives to meet the more complex demands of a maturing and growing population, the negotiated, informal arrangements that have served Somaliland well in earlier postwar years are increasingly shown to be insufficient**

for its next stage of economic growth and investment. The signs of this changing reality are revealed in the analytical work undertaken for this report. **Somaliland ranks among the most difficult places to do business in the world** (World Bank 2012, 1). The ESs identify a range of factors that impede or discourage private sector investment. These obstacles are further **confirmed by the diaspora dialogues and the consultations that accompanied the analytical effort.** Looking more deeply at the leading constraints such as finance, land, and water, of note is the differential impact that these constraints have on different strata of the private sector. For instance, small businesses reported different experiences of investment constraints than larger businesses; female-headed firms face additional constraints to their productivity; and diaspora expressed concerns that their capacity to invest is hindered by perceived uneven treatment in some areas, such as access to land and dispute resolution. A general finding is that large enterprises are in a much stronger position to address and resolve impediments to doing business in Somaliland than are small firms and microenterprises. Large businesses can gain access to credit abroad, procure their own power, import skilled labor, and use their money and social capital to ensure land disputes are resolved in their favor. Large firms enjoy certain advantages in all economies but are arguably in an even more privileged position to benefit from the current system of negotiated arrangements with the government. Smaller firms have weaker bargaining positions with the government and complain of inconsistent and costly administration (for example, in customs), which breeds distrust of the government and animosity toward what is perceived to be the potential for collusion between large firms and the government. **In several sectors** (for instance, import–export, telecommunications, and remittances), the potential exists for more **powerful businesses to shape public policies** in ways that can **discourage or prevent new competition in those sectors.** As has been portrayed in the foregoing chapters, **the government currently has a limited legal, regulatory, and institutional capacity available to deal with this dynamic.** This leaves the government ill-equipped to properly manage the issues and maintain its accountability to the wider population. The worst-case scenario is one where there is policy capture, which can severely reduce government legitimacy as steward of the public interest. This is not an issue easy to address in Somaliland, given the current lacuna of objective data and the ever-present concern not to diminish the track record and huge strides that have been taken— by both public and private sectors—since 1991. However, interviews and focus group feedback consistently voiced this concern. Somaliland does not want for engaged political discourse among its citizens, so it is not surprising—given the size of top private sector firms in Somaliland in contrast to the modest capacity of the government—that concerns about government autonomy on critical matters of economic governance are being raised. If these concerns are not objectively addressed with evidence and transparency, there is a risk of eroding public confidence in the otherwise impressive democratic system in Somaliland. An imperative for institutional development: **To take advantage of current and future economic opportunities,** especially non-remittance external sources of investment, **Somaliland must accelerate its transition to greater reliance on formal economic governance tools and uniform application of laws and policies.** If not, Somaliland risks becoming trapped in economic governance arrangements that will produce a low-level equilibrium and missed opportunities, as well as declining political legitimacy. **Informal, negotiated arrangements between the government and private sector actors or between private sector firms pose too many risks for investors.** These **arrangements work against new investors with little or no social capital in Somaliland** which, in turn, is currently the primary source of the trust relations at the heart of Somaliland’s current political economy

4. NL. Alt causes for lack of investment.

Smith ND [Adam Smith International, ND, "Improving investment flows to Somaliland – Adam Smith International", Adam Smith International, <https://adamsmithinternational.com/projects/improving-investment-flows-to-somaliland/#>, Accessed 1-3-2025] //ALuo

The structure of the economy does not, however, necessarily favour new investment and entrants. Monopolies intertwined with Somaliland’s **business and social structures are prevalent, and access to credit is limited.** The level of **skills and information necessary to sustain growth is also insufficient, and transport and power costs are exorbitantly high. The legal framework** for investment exists but **is poorly implemented and enforced, compounded by an ineffective judiciary.** Lastly, Somaliland’s lack of international recognition and volatile environment constrain growth and investment. To address these challenges and unlock potential, the Department for International Development asked us in 2012 to undertake a study, entitled “Improving investment flows to Somaliland”, to identify options for them to consider as they endeavour to promote investment in the region. We made five main recommendations. **These were the establishment of a Somaliland Business Solutions Centre, a Matching Grant Facility, reform of the Foreign Investment Law, support for the establishment of the Foreign Investment Promotion Office, and support for the establishment of the Commercial Arbitration Panel.** These recommendations look to promote future investment into Somaliland, stabilising the region’s economy, and leading to a reduction in poverty for its population.

5. LT. International institutions drive up inequality.

Paul 24 [Rohit Paul, Senior News Editor 4-15-2024, "Income Inequality Up In 60% Of Nations With IMF, World Bank Loans: Report", NDTV, <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/income-inequality-up-in-60-of-nations-with-imf-world-bank-loans-report-5443605>, Accessed 1-3-2025] //ALuo

A massive 60 per cent of all countries receiving grants or loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are witnessing high or increasing income inequality, an analysis by Oxfam International has revealed. The non-profit organisation said that of **106 such countries, income inequality is either high or rising in 64**. The level is considered high when the Gini coefficient - a measure where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality - is above 0.4, the warning mark set by the United Nations. The Oxfam analysis revealed that income **inequality is high in 42 countries, including Ghana, Honduras and Mozambique, and has risen in 37 countries over the past decade, including Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia and Zambia**. "The IMF and World Bank **say that tackling inequality is a priority but, in the same breath, back policies that drive up the divide between the rich and the rest. Ordinary people struggle more and more every day to make up for cuts to the public funding of healthcare, education and transportation**. This high-stakes hypocrisy has to end," said Kate Donald, head of Oxfam International's Washington DC Office. Terming an agreement by the World Bank to target cuts in inequality for the first time since its formation in 1944 a "landmark move", she added, "But **if the Bank is serious about tackling inequality, the first test will be making it a headline priority for its lending to the world's poorest countries, being discussed now at the Spring Meetings**." The Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank will be held in Washington DC between Monday and Saturday (April 15-20), with the main events beginning on Wednesday.

6. NL. International institutions fail – don't consider complex domestic factors.

Gordon **Peake**, 3-17-**21**, "Doing better without aid: the case of Somaliland," Devpolicy Blog from the Development Policy Centre, <https://devpolicy.org/doing-better-without-aid-the-case-of-somaliland-20210317/> //RG

International attention on Somaliland was particularly slight in the 1990s, during which time the region started to break away. In that decade, the United Nations and United States spent US \$4 billion on fruitless military operations and lavish peace conferences on Somalia while the equivalent of 0.0025% of that sum was spent on similar (and more fruitful) peacebuilding efforts in Somaliland. **This was a splendid isolation**, argues Phillips, an associate professor of international security and development at Sydney University. **It gave Somalilanders the freedom to cherry-pick from local and international institutional governance models and to experiment with what was seen as likely to work given the local context. In not having irksome advisers, donor roundtables or heads of mission hawking programs developed far away, Somalilanders had the time and space to shape unencumbered their own** political settlement and governmental **arrangements**. Phillips is clear-eyed that there is nothing particularly inclusive and right-on in either the manner in which this process unfolded or its result. Somaliland is far from the idealised Weberian state as imagined in documents from the OECD DAC or development donors. **It has many elements of a pact made between the entity's political and business elites, such as elements of co-option, tax concessions, clan politics, patronage, monopolistic commercial practices, looking the other way, and various leadership manoeuvres that might euphemistically be termed 'savvy'**. But **the result is that Somaliland is peaceful and self-sufficient**. There are other intriguing ingredients behind Somaliland's relative success, none of which fit within a technocratic frame. Firstly, the elite all went to the one secondary school, forging trusted personal relationships with each other through the old school tie. As Phillips writes, that's not unusual in itself – look at how many British Prime Ministers went to Eton. But it indicates the finely threaded personal connections that animate politics. Secondly, apprehension of conflict returning helps keep the peace. Coming from Northern Ireland originally, this observation resonated deeply

with me. We may harrumph about our politicians, but few people wish to go back to the time before our peace agreement. Similar sentiments are expressed in Bougainville and Timor-Leste too, mitigating apprehensions about government performance.

A2 Democracy

1. [Contradicts 3rd, 4th, and 5th responses]: Somaliland's democracy isn't good now. Staging 24

Staging A, 11-13-2024, "Somaliland's Peaceful Handover Withstands Neighbourhood Strains", No Publication,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/somalilands-peaceful-handover-withstands-n-eighbourhood-strains>

The last few years have been difficult for Somaliland, sullyng its reputation as a relative beacon of stability and democratic progress in the Horn of Africa. First, presidential and local council elections

had been delayed for several years due to domestic political tensions. When the licenses for Somaliland's three permitted parties [expired](#) in late 2022, there was also little clarity on how or when the next slate of parties would be chosen. Presidential polls were due in November 2022, but confusion over the elections for licensed parties delayed the timetable: the government insisted on holding the party polls before the presidential contest, while the opposition argued the reverse should be the case. A compromise was hammered out in August 2023, paving the way for a joint presidential and party election in November 2024 after a two-year delay. **The agreement came**

after violent clashes between government forces and protesters in major cities in August 2022 as well

as a short-lived clan-based rebellion Near the town of Burco, the region's second-largest city, in mid-2023. Secondly, the conflict in Sool between the Somaliland government and Dhulbahante clan militias dented Somaliland's reputation for internal stability. Members of Somaliland's Isaaq clan led the agitation for independence from Somalia following years of insurgency against the country's strongman ruler Siad Barre, who held power in Mogadishu from 1969 to 1991. But the majority of Sool's population are Dhulbahante, a community that belongs to a non-Isaaq family, the Darod. The desire for independence is not shared by all communities in the territory claimed by Somaliland, and the outbreak of violence demonstrated this. In early 2023, Dhulbahante elders and elites formed the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo (SSC-K) administration in Sool region, representing the clan, along with Fiqishine and Madiban clans in the area. The administration led the campaign to expel Somaliland forces in August 2023, and has since declared itself part of Somalia rather than Somaliland. The immediate inception of the conflict in Sool can be traced to the assassination of a Dhulbahante opposition member in Las Anod, the region's administrative capital, in December 2022. **Protesters gathered in the town** after the assassination, complaining that the Somaliland authorities had not made enough effort to stop the repeated killings of civic leaders. **Police moved in to disperse the demonstrators, using excessive**

force. A full-fledged insurgency ensued. The Somaliland military and Dhulbahante clan militias, backed up by other related clans, fought a fierce war between February and August 2023 in which [more](#) than 150,000 civilians were displaced, many of them fleeing to Ethiopia.

Somaliland forces fell back to the town of Oog in August 2023, where they remain. Fighting has not restarted since, although troops remain deployed on the front lines. Coupled with the lack of engagement between Sool, Sanaag and Cayn-Khatumo and the Somaliland government, the risk of the conflict reigniting remains. Thirdly, outgoing President Bihi's moves to achieve the first-ever foreign recognition of Somaliland also helped shape the outcome of the election. In January 2024, he hastily signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed which reportedly stated that Ethiopia could lease land on the Somaliland coast to build a naval base, in exchange for Addis Ababa providing official recognition of the administration as a sovereign state. The agreement sparked a regional uproar: Somalia condemned it as a violation of its sovereignty and subsequently demanded that all Ethiopian forces deployed in the country depart. (Ethiopia has troops there as part of the African Union mission and on a bilateral basis in support of Mogadishu's fight against Al-Shabaab militants.)

2. Democracy will never thrive in East Africa – shortcircuits the spillover link, Keijzer 23

Aline Burni Niels Keijzer, xx-xx-xxxx, "The state of democracy in the Horn of Africa", 27.08.2023 No Publication,

<https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/many-state-systems-horn-africa-contain-terms-federal-or-democratic-their-name-these-terms>

is the director of Bread for the World's regional office for the Horn of Africa based in Addis Ababa. Bread for the World is a Protestant non-governmental organisation and a member of the ACT Alliance.

Democracy is defined, among other things, by free and fair **elections**. Yet they are held infrequently, if ever, in the Horn of Africa. They also seem to be aimed at satisfying Western donors rather than at serving as an instrument to balance power. When they are **held**, they **are prone to manipulation, often include post-election violence, and rarely lead to a change of government**. Civil society is vibrant, but its room for action is shrinking. In most countries **in the Horn of Africa, state actors do not trust citizen participation to form part of a dynamic, society-building process. This manifests itself in draconian laws that restrict the space for civil society**. Even where laws are more moderate, they tend to restrict rather than empower citizens when they are interpreted and enacted. Governance in a democracy should aim to promote transparency, accountability and citizen participation in decision-making. However, in most countries in the region, **governments are dominated by a particular group, clan or party**. Typically, they use their power to influence the executive, legislative and judicial branches, as well as independent institutions such as electoral boards, the media and other regulatory bodies. This leads to a lack of checks and balances. The interplay of corruption, inflation and kleptocracy can pose major challenges to societies and contribute to conflict too. Widespread corruption undermines economic stability and adds to inflationary pressures. High inflation is often the result of conflicts and wars, as well as financial mismanagement and economic sanctions. Kleptocracy is rarely mentioned as the price of seizing power, but in reality, **most ruling elites use their power to control and exploit national resources and extract economic assets for personal gain**. In his recent article on the war in Sudan, Omar Shahabudin McDoom, a professor at the London School of Economics, points out that "the impunity of kleptocracy must end if the transition to stable, rule-based government is to succeed."

3. [Contradicts the 1st response]: Somaliland's democracy is strong because of a lack of recognition. Eubank 11

Nicholas Eubank; PhD student @ Stanford University; 3-1-2011; Taylor & Francis; "Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland," <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510>; accessible at: <https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510>; accessed: 12-15-2024

In addition to forcing the development of these institutions, revenue bargaining also provided Somaliland citizens with an ongoing mechanism for enforcing these arrangements. While deviations from constitutional constraints are common in sub-Saharan Africa, **in Somaliland the persistent dependency of the central government on local tax revenues helps keep occasional attempts to exceed constitutional limits by the executive in check**. Indeed, as a 2009 Human Rights Watch report points out: **Somaliland's government remains fundamentally a product of political compromise, negotiation, and consensus and the presidency is often not strong enough to defy the diverse coalition of clan and other interests that support it**. This reality imposes **informal limits on presidential power which have worked well enough to partially offset the dysfunction of legal and constitutional constraints**. [...] The result, as another analyst put it, is that 'Some in **the government don't believe in our democratic process, but no one has enough power to destroy it**' (Human Rights Watch 2009: 22).

4. [Contradicts the 1st response]: The only reason democracy is good in Somaliland is because they DON'T have recognition. Kampeni 21

Mphatso Kampeni (Diplomacy and International Relations, Malawian scholar based in Kingdom of Eswatini. He is regular contributor to The Nation, Daily Times newspapers in Malawi, Times of Eswatini and CAFB blog in RSA. He writes on International Relations and Women empowerment issues. Malawi.) January 4, 2021. "Let the African Union and UN Recognize Somaliland"

<https://lansinginstitute.org/2021/01/04/let-the-african-union-and-un-recognize-somaliland/> DOA 12/17/24 IR

Many African countries such as South Sudan which is a new country have a lot to learn from Somaliland and its youthful population. The job creation, education and technology. Somaliland has success stories ranging from start-ups in technology and its education system to economic management that many people do not know. **The lack of international recognition in Somaliland has proven to build the state at a bottom up level. By comparing Somaliland to Somalia we are able to identify that no international intervention has proven to be pivotal to Somaliland's success.** There are large foreign troop interventions in Somalia including USA, in addition to regional and international conferences. Yet none of these conferences has led to stability or at the very least control of more than a small fraction of Somalia. The question remains why is international community failing to recognise Somaliland, the same way South Sudan was recognised? Yet peacebuilding in Somaliland is for the most part been in the hands of the people because they do not have the ability to request international aid. Thus, "If the Somalilanders did not achieve peace among themselves, nobody would do it for them. This notion of self-reliance has fuelled nationality within the de-facto state ultimately solidifying internal legitimacy. **Somaliland has been forced to rely upon themselves and this has only strengthened their persistence of independence and stability.** At this point in time Somaliland has two strong arguments for independence the first being its substantial support and legitimacy within the state. Secondly, its previous status of once being a former British colony prior to the unification of Somalia

process. Democracy is often championed, hailed as a solution to social and political issues, around the world and that's what Multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and other western countries preach, because it removes cliques and entrenched political institutions. Although, cliques did not function as an effective political institution in pre-colonial times it can succeed with the inclusion of democracy. Societies such as Somaliland where knowledge are a general aspect of social life, and will not be changed any time in the near future. Thus, rather than attempt to abolish it or degrade it (such as the case of the Borneo region) accommodating it will prove to be much more effective to the current set-up.)).

5. [Contradicts the 1st response]: Democracy promotion turns countries into U.S.-proxies. Denison 21

Benjamin **Denison**. "The Folly of a Democracy Based Grand Strategy." Defense Priorities. December 2021.

<https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-folly-of-democracy-based-grand-strategy>

A grand **strategy emphasizing democracy promotion creates a final paradox where actions taken that, in principle, are supposed to aid civil society organizations (CSOs), democracy activists, and promote local democracy can end up harming them.** The states most concerned about maintaining regime security are least likely to permit external support for activists and civil society organizations. They will take direct actions to prevent external influence, targeting those they think will work to reduce their regime's power. **When democracy promotion is made a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy, activists can become regarded as proxies for pro-U.S. regime change policies, ultimately harming CSOs working in these countries. Regimes then crack down on NGOs, repress civil society, and restrict popular protests, which U.S. policymakers see as clear evidence of regime nefariousness to which the United States must then respond, furthering the spiral.**

6. DL - Democratic peace is statistically disproven---it's conflict driving. Chiba 21

Dr. Daina Chiba 21, 2/19/2021, Associate professor of political science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace, <https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf> // JZ

The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states—is one of the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace,

disagreement remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically (e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001). **At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy** (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, and Wolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore 1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevhouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch

2002b), and natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. **Each of these putative causes of democracy is also**

associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly they are not. We seek to contribute to this literature, not by proposing yet another theory to

explain how democracy vanquishes war, but by estimating the causal effect of joint democracy on the probability of militarized disputes using a quasi-experimental research design. We begin

by noting that **some of the common causes of democracy and peace may be unobservable, generating an endogenous relationship between the two.** Theories of democracy and explanations for peace are at a **formative state; it is not possible to utilize detailed, validated and widely accepted models of each of these processes to assess their interaction.** Indeed, to a remarkable degree democracy and peace **each remain poorly understood and weakly accounted for empirically, despite their central roles in international politics. We address the risk of spurious correlation by applying an instrumental variables approach.** Having taken into account possible endogeneity between democracy and peace, **we find that joint democracy does not have an independent pacifying effect on interstate conflict.**

Instead, our findings show that democratic countries are more likely to attack other democracies than are non-democracies. Our results call into question the large body of theory that has been proposed to account for the apparent pacifism of democratic dyads.

7. Turn: Recognition forces terrorist attacks and instills resurgence. Walldorf 23

Walldorf 23, Will Walldorf is a Non-Resident Fellow at Defense Priorities and Professor in the Department of Politics and International Affairs as well as Shively Family Faculty Fellow at Wake Forest University. “OVERREACH IN AFRICA: RETHINKING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY”, AUGUST 31, 2023, <https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa>, accessed 12/14/23, //MA **bracketed for Islamophobic language**

Finally, as **U.S. troops** have become more engaged in ground operations in Africa since 2006, **U.S. drone and air strikes against terrorist groups have naturally expanded in kind to support those operations. Most of this activity has come in Somalia and Libya.**

In Somalia, a recent report notes that since 2007 the United States has conducted “278 declared actions.”¹² According to New America, the United States conducted 550 strikes on ISIS targets in Libya between 2011 and 2020.¹³ Strikes are typically directed by special operations on the ground engaged in search and destroy missions.¹⁴ In sum, the United States is deeply engaged in many wars (largely beyond the view of the U.S. public) against Islamist organizations across the African continent today. TWO PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY: **There are two main problems with contemporary U.S. counterterrorism in Africa. First, threat assessments are inflated, leading to an overcommitment of resources to counterterrorism in Africa.** Second, the current strategy is not only ineffective but also counterproductive and risks increased strategic overreach among other dangers. **THREAT INFLATION AND EXCESSIVE FORCE** The 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the main priority of U.S. counterterrorism policy is to “disrupt and degrade terrorist groups that are plotting attacks against the United States, our people, or our diplomatic and military facilities abroad.”¹⁵ This global reach standard for measuring threat is, by and large, the right one. One reason it fits with public opinion. Research demonstrates that the U.S. public cares most—if not exclusively—about terrorist strikes against the United States and its closest democratic allies, especially in Europe.¹⁶ Applying the global reach standard would also prevent overreaction, where too much force is applied against too little threat. Today’s threat inflation stems from the conventional definition in U.S. policy circles of “global intent” for terrorist groups in Africa and other parts of the world. Specifically, most define “intent” based exclusively upon a group’s affiliation to ISIS central in Syria or Al Qaeda central in Afghanistan. From Al Shabaab (Al Qaeda) and Boko Haram (ISIS) to ISIS K and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, affiliation by local groups to ISIS central or Al Qaeda central is commonly interpreted to mean that an outright bond exists between the core and the periphery. In reality, groups affiliate for myriad reasons, many of which are not indicative of a commitment to global jihad. Affiliation determines intent, according to the conventional wisdom. This leads to two false assumptions. First, since ISIS and Al Qaeda central want to attack the United States, so do its regional affiliates.¹⁷ Second, the danger of Islamic terrorism today remains elevated even though ISIS central and Al Qaeda central are relatively weak compared to the 2000s and 2010s. Why? Because the affiliates of both ISIS and Al Qaeda (who again are thought to share an outright commitment to global strikes with the core) are all active and thriving. For example, in testimony before Congress in December 2021, the acting principal deputy coordinator at the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism testified that “foreign terrorist groups remain a persistent threat,” continuing, “ISIS and al-Qaeda remain resilient and determined. Despite significant losses in leadership and territorial control, both groups are leveraging their branches and networks across the Middle East, Asia, and Africa to advance their agendas.”¹⁸ A recent American Enterprise Institute report demonstrated the same assumptions, opening with the statement, “Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are not dead. They remain a significant threat to the United States and its interests.”¹⁹ This conventional logic also helps explain and justify today’s expansive counterterrorism operations in Africa. **When local terrorist groups are understood primarily as carbon copies of ISIS or Al Qaeda central, the threat of Islamic terrorism is massive—everywhere, in fact.** ²⁰ the United States has been on the ground fighting terrorists in places like Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, and Tunisia today. A BETTER MEASURE OF GLOBAL INTENT: WHERE TERRORISTS STRIKE

affiliation to ISIS or Al Qaeda central is a poor measure of a terrorist group’s global intent and, by extension, a poor way to determine whether a group threatens U.S. national security. History shows that local terrorist organizations typically affiliate to ISIS or Al Qaeda not because they want to pursue global jihad but to increase their profile, recruit, and raise funds. Many groups targeted by U.S. counterterrorism today chose to affiliate with ISIS and Al Qaeda at points of desperation when their organizations were struggling to survive. ²¹ 20 While affiliation has brought some overnight input from ISIS and Al Qaeda cores at times in the past, this is much reduced today due to the decimation of the central organizations. In fact, we know that the targeting of ISIS and Al Qaeda cores has disincentivized many affiliates—some publicly—from endorsing global jihad out of fear of facing similar retribution from the United States and its allies. ²² 22 A better way to measure the global intent of Islamist terrorist organizations is to look not at how group labels themselves but instead at where they target their operations. ²³ 23 If a group attacks or attempts to attack the United States and its closest democratic allies, then that group has “global intent” and poses a threat to the United States. By contrast, if a group focuses solely on local targets, it has “local intent” and poses little to no threat to U.S. security. This more discriminating approach recognizes that groups like Boko Haram or Al Shabaab are brutal and even highly ideological. Yet, it also recognizes that these and many other affiliates are also exclusively local, rooted in and centered around local insurgencies with exclusively local—not global—interests. Groups like Jamaat al-Islami wal Muslimin (JAM), Ansaru, and Al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) solely attack targets, for instance, in West and North Africa, not Europe or the United States. That makes them “local reach” terrorist organizations. Some in the U.S. government rightly think about global intent in this more discriminating, strike-based way. A former AFRICOM commander labeled Boko Haram an exclusively “local effort” based primarily on where the group targets its operations (i.e., Africa only). ²⁴ 24 Likewise, the U.S. director of national intelligence (DNI) recently concluded that “most of...[Al Shabaab’s] fighters are predominantly interested in the national battle against the Somali government,” not attacking the United States and its allies. ²⁵ 25 In these assessments, intent (and thus to U.S. national security) is determined not by affiliation but by where groups target their activity. This kind of thinking needs to move from the margins to the center of U.S. counterterrorism threat assessments. TABLE 1. DATA FOUNDED AND GLOBAL REACH OF TERRORIST GROUPS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST VERY FEW ARE GLOBAL REACH

Column 1 of table 2 denotes the global reach of the Al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates targeted by U.S. counterterrorism operations today across the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. ²⁶ 26 Using the above standard of targeting, “intent” is measured by where groups have carried out attacks since September 11 (i.e., United States or European/Asian democracies for “global”). In short, of the 20 terrorist organizations in table 2, AQAP in Yemen and ISIS-Lybia are the only two affiliates of Al Qaeda central and ISIS central that demonstrate global intent. All others are exclusively local, non-global reach terrorist groups. ²⁷ 27 Al Shabaab attempted to strike the United States in 2011 (a failed airline hijacking).

While the attack is an indicator of potential global reach elements within the group, I code Al Shabaab a “mixed reach” terrorist organization because experts (like the DNI above) tend to consider Al Shabaab predominantly—if not exclusively—locally focused. **Leading Somali specialists argue that, if U.S. troops**

had not been in Somalia, the attempted 2017 strike would not have happened. ²⁸ 28 Experts agree that **all of Al-Shabaab’s strikes beyond Somalia’s borders come only against states standing in the way of its local,**

insurgency-based objectives. ²⁹ 29 While its potential global nature should not be entirely ignored, the 2017 hijacking attempt falls into this category—tied to Al Shabaab’s local objectives, not Al Qaeda central’s ideological goals. Hence, the label “mixed reach,” rather than “global reach,” for Al Shabaab. LIMITED MEANS

SUPPRESS GLOBAL REACH The lack of global intent for most groups currently targeted by U.S. counterterrorism is reinforced by a lack of means to carry out global strikes for virtually all these groups, as well. Leading counterterrorism/regional experts note that the affiliates of ISIS and Al Qaeda central in table 2 possess very limited organizational and financial capacity to plan and/or conduct global strikes today. ³⁰ 30 To consider the two affiliates—ISIS-Lybia and AQAP—that possess global intent, for example, Today, ISIS-Lybia is “a shadow of its former self” at most due to pressure from international and Libyan military activity. ³¹ 31 Following years of civil war in Yemen, AQAP finds itself in the same position. A 2022 assessment notes that “major defeats” at the hands of local security forces have left AQAP “in shambles.” ³² 32 Given these constraints, it is little surprise that attacks by both ISIS-Lybia and AQAP have been exclusively local over the last five or so years. This, in all these groups, can matter given their weakness. ³³ 33 Resource constraints suppress global intent and reinforce staying local. It is reasonable to expect it to ever move in this direction! While the majority of terrorist groups discussed here, Al Qaeda central and ISIS central were both founded from global ambitions from the beginning and each launched strikes against Western targets soon after their founding (four years for Al Qaeda, one for ISIS). Likewise, ISIS-Lybia’s first (and only) global strike came first over a year after its founding. ³⁴ 34 In short, if global intent has not shown up by now for most groups in table 2, it likely never will. That means continuing U.S. counterterrorism for “better safe than sorry” remains a waste of U.S. taxpayer money and military assets at a time when the United States faces other pressing global challenges. Second, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the ineffective nature of contemporary U.S. counterterrorism. Leading counterterrorism experts at a 2022 conference hosted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point used terms like “hollowed out,” “unsustainable,” and “ineffective” to describe current U.S. counterterrorism in Africa. ³⁵ 35 The numbers bear these assessments out. Since the U.S. started military operations against African jihadists in the mid-2000s, the amount of local terrorist activity and the number of jihadist groups on the continent have exploded. Attacks by Islamic terrorists increased by 22 percent continent-wide last year alone. ³⁶ 36 The trend has been especially bad in West Africa, which saw a seven-fold increase in terrorist attacks between 2017 and 2020. ³⁷ 37 Third, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the impact of U.S. assistance on coups and violence by local regimes that, in turn, aids terrorist recruitment. According to most experts, the reason for terrorist growth in Africa over the past two decades lies in the failure of autocratic regimes in the region to address the basic needs of their citizens. Recruitment by Islamist groups is “fueled more by hunger, desperation, governance failures, and repressive crackdowns than by fantasies of global jihad,” notes Herman Cohen, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs. ³⁸ 38 Right of the governments in West Africa—most of whom partner with the U.S. on counterterrorism operations—rank near the bottom in recent worldwide governance indexes. ³⁹ 39 This has made these states fertile ground for jihadists, who recruit on “predatory state actions” and “instill themselves as security providers and defenders of vulnerable populations,” according to regional experts. ⁴⁰ 40 With its focus predominantly on direct force, U.S. counterterrorism in Africa inadvertently makes the regime-led violence that fuels terrorist recruitment like this worse, not better. Specifically, U.S. military training and assistance for counterterrorism has had the unintended consequence of enhancing authoritarian rule and repression against civilian populations in parts of Africa. A recent study found that when foreign military leaders receive training from the United States, the probability of those leaders later carrying out military coups increases significantly. ⁴¹ 41 We see evidence of this across Africa’s U.S. counterterrorism partners. In the last two years, U.S.-trained military leaders in West Africa have carried out or attempted at least eight coup attempts. Included here are U.S. counterterrorism partner states Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania in West Africa. One of the leaders (Brigadier General Massou Salouma Barmou) of the July 2023 coup in Niger trained at Brevard, Georgia and the National Defense University in Washington, DC. ⁴² 42 This tendency toward coups and repression is unsurprising. A large body of work points to the ineffective and counterproductive outcomes of training for counterterrorism and other purposes. “Despite committing vast amounts of resources toward foreign military training—including almost \$15 billion to train over 2.3 million military students around the world between 1999 and 2016—the United States,” according to Renahar Miles Joyce, a professor at Brandeis University and former analyst at the Department of Defense, “has struggled to produce results that are either competent or liberal-minded, especially in weak and unstable states.” ⁴³ 43 A core problem here is that interests favored by the United States (i.e., liberal norms, respect for civilian control) are often misaligned with the interests of the militaries that the U.S. trains (i.e., a population control, institutional power). U.S.-trained militaries often absorb the skills training well but ignore the values training. Coups like those recently in West Africa sometimes follow ⁴⁴ 44 in the aftermath of these coups, violence against civilians often soars and terrorist recruitment increases. Mali is a leading example in West Africa. U.S.-trained military leaders took power there in 2020 and more civilians were killed in Mali in every quarter of 2022 than in any previous calendar year. Indeed, fatalities from violence against civilians were even times higher in 2022 than in 2021. Admitted by Russian Wagner forces, much of this violence has come at the hands of the regime. ⁴⁵ 45 Terrorist groups have benefited from the increased violence. Fueled by new recruitment around regime violence against civilians, militant Islamist attacks have increased a staggering seventy percent in Mali since the 2020 coup. ⁴⁶ 46 In short, U.S. military training has arguably (and, again, inadvertently)

exacerbated the problem of Islamic terrorism in Mali and other places across Africa. Fourth, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the extent to which the misuse of U.S. security assistance by local partners fuels terrorist recruitment. Authoritarian regimes in Africa sometimes siphon U.S. security assistance away from counterterrorism to civilian control and repression.⁴⁸ A 2023 study found that in Somalia, U.S.-armed and trained contingents of Somali soldiers are regularly diverted from counterterrorism operations by the Somali government to domestic “law enforcement” objectives, like personal protection of political elites, roadblock policing, and attacks on political opponents.⁴⁹ These kinds of activities aid terrorist recruitment. The fact that African partners misuse U.S. security assistance for domestic repression is not surprising given what the academic literature shows about client-patron relationships around counterterrorism assistance in Africa (and other places). In short, clients (i.e., U.S. aid recipients) typically resist patron (i.e., U.S.) demands to use aid for patron-designated goals (i.e., fighting terrorists). For reasons of pride, protecting their sovereignty, the socio-cultural structure of militaries, and/or the immediate needs of the regime, clients often deflect aid toward things like regime stability operations that can be especially inhumane.⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, several studies have shown that U.S. security assistance worldwide in the post-Cold War period has been at best ineffective (thus, wasteful) and, at worst, has inadvertently fueled conflict and repression.⁵¹ West Africa offers good examples of this problem. Chad is “an important U.S. partner in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region,” according to the State Department. In recent years, Chad has received sizable amounts of U.S. military assistance and arms (over \$2 million in arms sales and about \$4 million in security assistance in 2021/2022).⁵² In October 2022, the Chadian government massacred 128 pro-democracy protesters. Though not known definitively, U.S. weapons may very well have been used in the massacre. According to regional expert Alex Thurston, U.S. policymakers tend to look the other way when it comes to incidents such as the massacre in Chad out of fear that the United States could lose influence to other great powers.⁵³ U.S. General Stephen Townsend recently said that U.S. security assistance to West Africa allows the United States to “exploit relationship gaps” in its competition with Russia and China.⁵⁴ Regardless, past and present U.S. security assistance might be making matters worse when it comes to terrorism in Chad. Burkina Faso offers another example. In the name of “fighting terrorism,” the authoritarian government there used past U.S. military assistance to repress the Fulani minority to shore up regime strength. In December 2022, for instance, a Burkina Faso militia went house to house in one village and massacred 80 Fulani civilians.⁵⁵ The Fulani have no natural ties to Islamist terrorist organizations. Regardless, security forces have “a green light to kill anyone they want, without any consequences,” according to one expert.⁵⁶ This violence (inadvertently aided again by U.S. arms) against the Fulani has backfired. Many Fulani are joining ranks with Islamist groups like MNJ to oppose the Burkina Faso regime. Terrorism has soared in Burkina Faso in recent years. In 2022, Burkina Faso and Mali accounted for seventy-three percent of terrorism deaths in West Africa. In Burkina Faso alone, that number had increased by fifty percent from the prior year.⁵⁷ Overall, while U.S. military assistance is not the main cause of terrorism in Burkina Faso and other places, it is an unintended contributing factor that is making matters worse, not better.⁵⁸ Fifth, “better safe than sorry” thinking misses the extent to which current U.S. policy aids the growth of anti-Americanism in Africa. Direct U.S. military action in Africa generates anti-Americanism that aids recruitment by Islamist groups and might someday lead to direct attacks on the United States. Drone strikes can be an effective tactic for disrupting terrorist organizations and operations.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, U.S.

airpower has produced extensive collateral damage over the past decade and a half in Africa. The vast majority of U.S. drone and air strikes in Africa have been in Libya and Somalia. The numbers of civilian deaths from drones in these two countries are murky because of poor reporting by AFRICOM, but reliable estimates put deaths in the thousands.⁶⁰ Whether this type of collateral damage aids terrorist recruitment is a debatable topic, but it certainly can’t help the U.S. cause.⁶¹ REPORTED CIVILIAN DEATHS FROM U.S. STRIKES IN SOMALIA Drones aside, the general presence of U.S. forces in Africa has created popular frustration and anger at the United States that, again, inadvertently helps terrorist recruitment. In West Africa, local governments (many of whom ironically partner with the U.S. on counterterrorism) often intentionally fuel this resentment. The Malian government tries, for example, to tap into popular discontentment with France and the United States to deflect blame from itself for the poor living conditions faced by everyday Malians. According to Denis Tull, the regime draws upon “a discourse of international tutelage” to communicate to “skeptical voters that its responsibility for the continuing crisis [in Mali] is limited given the persistence of intrusive foreign [i.e., U.S. and French] intervention.”⁶² Though anti-French sentiment runs much deeper in West Africa than anti-Americanism, the latter is still there.⁶³ The largest deployment of U.S. forces in West Africa—roughly 800 special operators—is in Niger.⁶⁴ Leading public figures in Niger claim that the U.S. presence makes things worse, not better. “Are they really here to help our soldiers?” asked Boulama Hamadou Tchernon, a civil society leader in Niger in 2020. “Terrorism has increased since the arrival of U.S. soldiers; in fact, their presence on the ground does not make any changes.”⁶⁵ On a similar note, Mariama Bayard, leader of the opposition in Niger asserted, “U.S. soldiers are creating a perfect condition for the Sahel to blow up.”⁶⁶ The U.S. military presence in Somalia has unintentionally helped Al-Shabaab too. Tricia Bacon, a professor at American University and former foreign affairs officer on counterterrorism at the State Department, argues that Al-Shabaab recruitment is aided significantly by foreign intervention, including U.S. forces being on the ground in Somalia. Drawing on a collective Somali identity, the group has made the departure of foreign forces a central component of its messaging and overall agenda.⁶⁷ This has been the case from the very earliest days of the U.S. effort to counter jihadists in Somalia. After the United States supported the 2006 intervention of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, Roland Marchal found, for instance, that “anti-American sentiment brought the local population together along with its hostility to a series of assassinations and kidnappings of religious figures that were thought to be ordered by the Americans and Ethiopians and carried out by the factions.”⁶⁸ Bacon also highlights that Al-Shabaab’s enemy image of (and messaging around) the United States intensified dramatically after direct U.S. military intervention in the mid-2010s.⁶⁹ Sixth, “better safe than sorry” thinking misses the extent to which U.S. military engagement might fuel the next generation of 9/11 terrorists. Coupled with association with repressive African regimes, the U.S. military presence gives “credence to the anti-imperial narratives of African jihadist groups associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,” according to experts at the 2022 terrorism conference at West Point.⁷⁰ Some at the conference rightly warned that current U.S. military activity might encourage the growth of the next generation of 9/11-style attackers.⁷¹ As noted above, all but one of Africa’s major terrorist organizations is locally focused today. That will likely change if the United States continues to hang around and bomb these groups. Again, Al-Shabaab offers a classic example. It is a local insurgency that attempted a global strike against the United States because U.S. forces were attacking it. The same scenario could become more widespread, involving not just Al-Shabaab but other African terrorist groups in the future, if U.S. counterterrorism remains on its current course. Like 9/11, the U.S. homeland could easily become a target once more.

A2 Water

1] NQ - Water infrastructure possible w/o recognition and solving now

ADB 23 [African Development Bank Group, 06-Apr-2023, "Bank-funded water and sanitation project improving livelihood in Somaliland", <https://www.afdb.org/en/success-stories/bank-funded-water-and-sanitation-project-improving-livelihood-somaliland-60296>]

On March 22 as the global community marked World Water Day, residents of a small town in Somaliland also had reason to celebrate. With a population of about 24,500, Arabsiyo is about 35 km west of the capital, Hargeisa. **The town previously had 75% of its**

inhabitants relying on unsafe water delivered by donkey carts and truck operators who often drew from unprotected and poorly maintained water sources like shallow hand-dug wells around seasonal riverbeds. Only about 20% of the population had access to potable water from a borehole through a household connection managed by Arabsiyo Water Agency (AWA), the public water utility. The remaining 5% got their water from water kiosks at high costs. According to AWA, the water volume was insufficient to meet the minimum WHO-recommended per capita urban consumption of 35 liters per capita per day. It fell short by almost 67% of this recommendation. During that period, Khadra Mohamed, 62, spent about a third of her daily income to purchase potable water. "I bought water four times a week from a donkey-drawn cart private operator who travelled about six km round trip for each supply. Still, this was not enough for my sanitation and hygiene needs," says the mother of seven, a resident of Arabsiyo. She recalls that her daughter walked the same distance each time to call out and direct a donkey cart operator to their house to supply water, and therefore missed school regularly. **This inability to meet the growing water needs**

of communities in Arabsiyo was widespread, especially in Somaliland's informal settlements. But the story has changed since 2022, thanks to the Water Infrastructure Development Programme for Resilience in Somaliland (WIDPR), funded by the African Development Bank and implemented by the Ministry of Water Resources Development in collaboration with CARE International. The program, implemented over six years (2016-2022) in several rural and peri-urban communities across Somaliland, established resilient and sustainable water and sanitation infrastructure in Somaliland. **It entailed the construction of an 83,000-cubic meter Haffir dam**

in Farawayne, close to the border with Ethiopia; construction of 5 earth dams, rehabilitation and building of five strategic boreholes and 11 shallow wells. Another 18 shallow wells were constructed to serve as village mini-water-supply facilities. They are solar-powered and serve rural and peri-urban communities. Some 23 public sanitation amenities were also built in schools, health facilities and markets. The project had a capacity-building component comprising establishing and training 27 community water management and 23 community sanitation and hygiene promotion committees.

These community-level management structures will ensure systematic and sustainable water supply and sanitation access for the beneficiaries. In addition, the program **made available a borehole drilling and maintenance rig to increase water production** in Arabsiyo Town. This helped AWA to **improve water supply through house connections and enabled the construction of more water kiosks.**

Khadra's family is among several households that benefitted from the new water supply system. Her daughter, who previously had to abandon school to enable her to walk 6 km to draw water for the household, now attends classes regularly. Khadra says: "Providing me access to piped water means a lot. My daughter is now fully back in school, and the amount of money I spend on water has significantly reduced. I can now save money for small trading to support my family." For example, **before the project, families like Khadra's paid \$7.5 per m3** to private water vendors;

now, they pay as little as \$1.5 per m3 through a water connection. It's not only the inhabitants of Arabsiyo town that have benefitted from the WIDPR. **The program also extended water to internally displaced persons' camp in the north-western port city of Berbera and other new settlements, serving hundreds of displaced persons with clean water.** Implemented as **the Augmenting Berbera Urban Water Supply Scheme (ABUWSS), the program increased the number of house connections from 1,200 to 6,750, serving an additional 38,800 people in the township and another 8,500 displaced persons having access to affordable potable water.**

Fardusa Osman, 30, who fled conflict in Ceel Afweyn in the north-eastern Sanaag Region, to the Berbera camp with her three children and husband, now boasts of affordable clean water supply. **"Initially, we got limited quantities of water from a well-wisher, and we would spend about \$2 to \$3 per 200-liter barrel supplied by water tankers, which was more than ten times the approved water tariff of \$1 per 1,000 liters,"** she says.

Fardusa adds: "As a result of the high cost of water, what we could afford was not enough to meet basic hygiene and sanitation needs. I am happy and thankful to the African Development Bank and the Government for making water available in the camp. I now get enough water from the

water kiosk for drinking, cooking and cleaning, and it does not cost me much.” **Completion of the ABUWSS initiative saw water production capacity increase by 2,400 m3 daily following the development of four new high-yielding boreholes.** This was in addition to upgrading the existing transmission and distribution network with 10.5 km of pipeline and constructing seven water kiosks, which improved supply to the targeted areas, including the camp. Berbera City Mayor, H.E. Abdishakur Cidin, lauded the Program and the partnership with the Bank, saying: “An urban water system that provides reliable water to the urban poor is essential for maintaining public health.” The Program contributed to the Ministry of Water Resource Development’s vision of becoming a water-secured nation where every citizen has easy access to clean, adequate, affordable water, sanitation and hygiene.

2] DL - No investment—lack of info, low human capital, and lack of skills

Mal 17 [Abdisamad Omar Mal, September 2017 “Challenges to Somaliland Economic Governance: Private Sector Investment Perspective”, International Journal of Science and Research, <https://www.ijsr.net/archive/v6i9/ART20176619.pdf>]

This makes inland handling and transportation cumbersome, driving costs up which contributes the **problems and challenges faced by the private sector investment in Somaliland. Investors and entrepreneurs have little access to reliable information about domestic and international markets. Information about business performance is far from ideal and investors have difficulties to understand the real potential of the business opportunities in the country.** The common practice is to replicate a successful entrepreneur rather than look for a business opportunity that has not been explored yet. This problem relating the market information that encountered mainly by new investments resulted many small and medium industries unsustainable and closed down. According to assessment report conducted by the Somaliland National Industry Association (SNIA), **39 of the 54 small and medium industries registered by this association were closed in between 2001 and 2012** [Somaliland National Industry Association assessment report, 2012. un published].

According to this report, most of these industries that failed belonged to Diaspora **investors who didn’t have basic market information, including cost of energy, availability of raw materials and skilled labor force as well as business plan when investing in the country. Furthermore, Private sector Firms face challenges in employing a large variety of workers which reflects the low human capital within Somaliland.** This is apparent from the Somaliland Enterprise Survey conducted by the World Bank. According to this survey many firms employed skilled foreigners to address technical skill gaps and Diaspora **investors identified that the lack of basic skills and sector specific technical skills are the major deterrent for investing in Somaliland comparing to other counties** [World bank ES 2013 p 6]. The Diaspora interviewees also confirmed that turnover tends to be high for most locally hired employees [ibid].

3] DL;T - Aid doesn’t go to the people—corrupt leaders siphon it, delinking case and causing instability

Izobo 20 [Mary Izobo is a Nigerian International Human Rights Lawyer, xx-xx-2020, "", No Publication, <https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/prolaw/documents/volume-5/2020%20PROLAW%20Journal%20Mary%20Izobo.pdf>]

Easterly argues that aid has done more harm than good as there is substantial evidence that showed that foreign aid programs hold back countries and make them dependent. The author of this research paper believes that Easterly’s argument is logical as undoubtedly, **foreign aid has made a lot of African countries dependent. Several African countries are unable to carry out any of its fundamental functions**, such as the institution of newly established structures, the maintenance of basic systems and services or the provision of necessary public services and infrastructures, without foreign aid, administered in the form of projects or technical assistance. 13 **Half of these countries’ annual budgetary commitments go unfulfilled because donor countries have enabled a “cozy accommodation with dependency”.**14 Even though all aid-dependent countries in Africa are low-income countries, some low-income countries are not as dependent on aid as others, indicating that aid dependence is not a result of poverty as many believe. 15 High levels of dependency on foreign aid by most African countries has led to a lot of antagonism against foreign aid. These antagonists contend that foreign aid, whether in the form of conditional loans or Official Development Assistance (ODA), is supposed to be mainly beneficial to the recipient countries, but oftentimes, foreign aid has done more harm than good despite the donors’ good intentions. This is because foreign aid is often misused by bureaucratic and corrupt governments. Research shows that corrupt governments receive as much financial assistance as governments with lower levels of corruption. 16 This should not be the case as foreign aid should be used as a tool to threaten or halt an undemocratic and/or corrupt regime and reward those that show improvements or good will in improving governance and the rule of law. Foreign aid has often led to dependency by numerous African countries because the aid given does not operate in a vacuum. Extraneous political and institutional factors must be taken into consideration when examining the effects of aid as these can hinder any positive impacts. 17 The impact of foreign aid on African countries Foreign aid enables governments to strengthen

their institutions by providing educational and technical support aimed at building strong legislative, executive, and judicial systems to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of governance.¹⁸ Foreign aid can further improve governance and respect for the rule of law by reducing corruption through the management of a country's expenditure and revenue creation in a legitimate manner.¹⁹ Although the original motive behind foreign aid is institutional reform including rule of law reform, the promotion of democratic governance and fostering economic development, on the other hand, foreign aid can also pose a challenge to rule of law and democratic reforms. This is because when foreign aid is provided to autocratic governments, it creates a larger pool of resources for government officials and political elites to fight over for their selfish and personal gains, which may be detrimental as it may hinder the adoption of policy reforms and stable policies.²⁰ Therefore, it is believed that the conflicts, political instability, ballooning debt, civil wars, and coup d'états that have occurred in Africa over the past five decades may have been as a result of foreign aid, which has afforded these countries the financial means to carry out the aforementioned atrocities.²¹ In addition, higher levels of foreign **aid destroy the quality of governance**, as calculated by rule of law indicators and **corruption because foreign aid is viewed by corrupt leaders as a tool for power**.²² Therefore, **Individuals, lacking sincere intent to use the funds for reform or development**, will aim to remain in power to gain control of the funds. **Knack stipulated that aid bolsters coup attempts and political instability because receiving aids and controlling the government is profitable**, thus reducing the likelihood of the promotion of rule of law and democratic governance.²³ Political elites of these countries in Africa have little or no motivation for reform as huge amount of money in the form of foreign aid provides numerous fringe benefits to them such as salary increments, luxurious vehicles and houses that would ordinarily be unavailable or scarce.²⁴ As a result, rule of law reforms are shunned because of the afore-mentioned benefits so as to remain on the status quo.

And, instability destroys safe water—empirics prove

Michel 24 [David Michel, 11-8-2024, "What Causes Water Conflict?", No Publication, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-causes-water-conflict>]

International water conflict in particular has surged. For most of the twentieth century, water collaboration between states substantially outweighed discord. Scholars at Oregon State University, combing through the archives of international relations, identified over 2,500 interstate events concerning water between 1948 and 2008. Cooperative international interactions, they discovered, outnumbered conflicts two to one. But this trend no longer seems to hold. A new dataset carrying the analysis up to 2019 reveals the conflict-cooperation balance has shifted over the past two decades. Since 2017, transboundary water clashes have overtaken acts of international collaboration. Much of this rising tide of violence reflects the grim toll of twenty-first-century warfare. All too often, **wars make water a deliberate tool or a collateral casualty of conflict**. **From** the grinding civil strife in **Iraq and Syria to Russia's** assault on **Ukraine, combatants** have purposely **targeted water resources, seizing or destroying water systems as leverage against their adversaries**. Similarly, **Israel's** prosecution of the war on Hamas and **Russia's** brutal invasion have severely compromised **water sources, degraded ecosystems, and decimated water infrastructure, imperiling public health and welfare in Gaza and Ukraine**.

4] DL - Aid gets stolen—Somalia proves

Bryld 23 [Erik Bryld, 9-28-2023, Aid theft in Somalia is not what you think, New Humanitarian, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/09/28/aid-theft-somalia-extortion-not-what-you-think>]

The UN has blown the whistle on “widespread and systematic” food aid diversion in Somalia, triggering the suspension of EU funding to the World Food Programme, and generating lurid headlines about the theft of aid meant for the starving. The donor reaction is understandable – yet counter-productive. We all condemn corruption and waste in the aid system. But until we recognise and understand Somalia's political economy, an aid freeze is unlikely to result in any significant improvement to the lives of the 3.8 million displaced people sheltering in the thousands of informal camps across the country. And we have also been here before. Food diversion “revelations” emerge every few years in Somalia. A decision to shut down aid delivery usually follows, but then a few months later a U-turn is performed, with a re-engagement on roughly the same terms as before. In this latest episode, **the development news service Devex reported that a confidential UN investigation – commissioned by Secretary-General António Guterres – concluded that Somali landowners, local authorities, members of the security forces, and humanitarian workers are all involved in stealing aid intended for vulnerable internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the capital, Mogadishu.** At the forefront of the diversion are the so-called “gatekeepers” – influential **private individuals**, linked to local clans, who run Mogadishu's

IDP camps. They deal directly with the aid agencies and, according to the UN, leverage their control over food beneficiary lists to extort payments from the displaced.

5] DL - Al-Shabaab and Western laws blocks aid

Burke 17 [Jason Burke, Africa Correspondent @ The Guardian, 7-27-2017, Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/al-shabaab-militants-ban-starving-somalis-from-accessing-aid>]

Islamist militants in Somalia have imposed a ban on humanitarian assistance in areas they control, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to choose between death from starvation and disease or brutal punishment.

In some towns, hungry and weak people have been ordered by extremist leaders to remain where they are to act as human shields against US airstrikes. Somalia is suffering its worst drought in 40 years, with the effects of climatic catastrophe compounded by war and poor governance. Interviews with villagers in the swaths of land controlled by al-Qaida-affiliate al-Shabaab, in the centre and south of the east African state, reveal a population on the brink of catastrophe, with children and older people already dying in significant numbers.

Al-Shabaab has told people they will be punished – possibly executed as spies – if they have any contact with humanitarian agencies. Strict British and US counter-terrorism laws are also discouraging humanitarian organisations from delivering vital emergency assistance, aid agencies have said.

Although aid officials say a huge international effort and donations by Somalia's vast diaspora have so far averted a repeat of the 2011 famine, when 250,000 people died, conditions in much of the country have continued to deteriorate in recent months. An additional 500,000 people now need humanitarian assistance, bringing the total to 6.7 million. Almost half of these people face starvation if they do not receive help. **One reason for the high death toll six years ago was a blockade imposed by al-Shabaab on humanitarian assistance by international and local NGOs that did not meet its strict criteria.**

6] Droughts in Somaliland now, but no water wars, make them define the brightline

Concern 22 [Concern USA, 12-9-2022, "The Horn of Africa crisis, explained", No Publication, <https://concernusa.org/news/horn-of-africa-crisis-explained/>]

In the Horn of Africa, **drought has increasingly become the rule** rather than the exception: **Somalia has faced more than a decade of drought** **Ethiopia has faced back-to-back droughts over the last six years. Kenya has experienced a cycle of drought dating back to 1975.** However, the region is now facing its worst drought since 1981, with **four consecutive failed rainy seasons**. These shortages have destroyed crops, caused widespread livestock deaths, and dried up water sources across the three countries — as well as in parts of Sudan and South Sudan. For context, a 2011 drought that hit the region left 13 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. In Somalia, a famine that resulted from the drought killed over 260,000 people — half of them were children under the age of 5. Even if Somalia does not declare famine this time, UNOCHA writes that, “given the large number of people affected and the likely duration of the crisis, excess mortality during this **drought could be as high as in 2011.**”

A2 Taiwan

1) [NUQ] Somaliland-Taiwan relations are in the dumps right now

Suudi 23 [Hassan Suudi, "An In-Depth Analysis of the Somaliland-Taiwan Diplomatic Ties", 9/2023, Institute for Strategic Insights and Research, <https://isirthinktank.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/An-In-Depth-Analysis-of-the-Somaliland-Taiwan-Diplomatic-Ties.pdf>, Accessed 01/16/2025] //toga JT

Naming of the Taiwan overseas missions is particularly overseen by China. In 2021, China protested the Lithuania mission due to the latter hosting it with the same name as the mission in Somaliland. It remains unclear whether Somaliland officials are aware of the naming procedures and the implications thereof, and whether they knowingly consented to the naming of the Taiwan Mission in Somaliland. Taiwan has so far refrained from declaring independence from the People's Republic of China. Upon the arrival of the Taiwanese representatives in 2020, it was reported that Somaliland President Muse Bihi was looking for possibilities of "mutual recognition between Taiwan and Somaliland".¹⁷ Since then, **it is not clear whether Somaliland and Taiwan recognized each other as independent states, or whether Somaliland particularly recognized Taiwan. Somaliland's goal of gaining international recognition is different from Taiwan's goal which is to maintain its current status quo; keep it**

separate from China. While the two have challenges with respect to sovereignty, each one has its own cause and circumstances. In the case of Taiwan, its top ally, the US, is the world's first economic powerhouse today, while its top enemy, China, is the second global economic powerhouse. That is different from the Somaliland case, whose competitor, Somalia, has no apparent power, and worse still, Somaliland is provoking one of those two power houses without being sponsored by any other superpower, making it more vulnerable. **Other than the**

bilateral accord, which is just protocol, there is no known partnership agreement between the two sides that has ever been presented to the Somaliland parliament or released publicly. **Therefore, the benefits that Somaliland**

expected to reap from this relations are unknown. However, the nature of the relations can be assessed from their practices and cooperation approach. **Somaliland and Taiwan have neither established trade relations nor recorded**

meaningful trade volume data between the two. In fact, the Somaliland business community has a stronger business presence in China than in Taiwan. ¹⁸ Initially, Somaliland and Taiwan had the goal of cooperating in the fields of medicine, agriculture, energy, education, and maritime security. The details of the cooperation could not be accessed due to lack of transparency and documentation. So far, Taiwan has been engaged in basic aid diplomacy by providing some basic donations including food distribution and trauma kits in Somaliland. Close sources revealed that Taiwan has provided a number of scholarship opportunities, but after about four years in Somaliland, no major results in any of the areas of potential cooperation could be substantiated. Consequently, nothing of public value could be delivered. On the bilateral cooperations announced several times in the past, there wasn't enough information made available to the parliament or transparently made accessible to the public, yet the government announced that Taiwan was considering oil explorations or drilling. **The government officials kept referring to Taiwan's cooperation in major national issues as an investor, with the objective of attracting popular support, yet nothing materialized.** Understandably, Taiwan may be purposely postponing engaging in any significant partnership with Somaliland for two reasons. Firstly, Taiwan has had encounters with similar opportunistic countries who later discarded it after it had made significant investments in those countries, and secondly, Taiwan may be assessing whether the authorities in Somaliland or the Somaliland public will tire of the pressure and renounce the relations with Taiwan. **Since 2016, Taiwan**

has had broken diplomatic ties every year, and may be facing a trust deficit with smaller countries. Honduras was the last to break ties with Taiwan in March 2023.¹⁹ Notably, some of the smaller countries who forged ties with Taiwan are grossly underdeveloped and governed by leaders who hope to selfishly benefit from the competition between China and Taiwan. Some therefore shift their allegiance in case China presents better financial offers, so Taiwan may be skeptical about Somaliland behaving in the same way.

However, the wait-and-see approach may be placing Somaliland at potential risk without equitable benefit, as discussed in the next section. Public view is varied with respect to Somaliland making

ties with Taiwan. Some of the views expressed echoed the Somaliland's Foreign Affairs minister, who said that "China cannot dictate"²⁰, during a visit to Taipei. Other people expressed skepticism over the move, some going as far as terming it as 'madness' from Somaliland.²¹ A third group of people do not necessarily object to the relations with Taiwan but are concerned about the provocation of China and the lack of strategy by the Somaliland side. They opined that **Somaliland rushed into the relations without considerations and unnecessarily antagonized China.**

Critics suggest that, apart from the potential external risks posed by the Taiwan ties, its engagement with the ruling government has, to some extent, raised suspicion within the opposition. In October 2020, the Taiwanese diplomatic mission leader, Allen Chenhwa Lou, was spotted attending an assembly of the ruling party." However, he did not attend the assembly of the major

opposition party held the following year, **November 2021, which led the presidential candidate of the opposition party to question the "value of Somaliland's bilateral ties to the quest for international recognition". The candidate called for improved ties with the People's Republic of China instead.**²³ Currently, Somaliland is going through a prolonged electoral dispute between the political parties, and Taiwan never justified their attendance of such a domestic political assembly of the ruling party, and not the opposition congress. Foreign diplomatic missions have a "duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that [host] State".²⁴ A retaliatory risk factor could be "that senior government officials could be easily targeted by the Chinese government"²⁵ using Chinese technology which is popular in Somaliland. This could possibly explain why Taiwan, faced with that dilemma, cooperated with the Ministry of Telecommunications on ICT, in 2021, although details of the cooperation have not yet been made public. However, Somaliland may not be adequately prepared to cope in case of cyber-attacks. Case in point, the Ministry of Telecommunication lost, and could not regain control of its verified Facebook page.

2) [LT] Recognition decks relations that rely on mutual de-facto independence

Kao 23 [Anthony Kao, "'Shared status' fuels closer Taiwan and Somaliland partnership", 07/06/2023, Al Jazeera,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/6/shared-status-fuels-closer-taiwan-and-somaliland-partnership>, Accessed 01/16/2025] //toga JT

After losing multiple formal allies to China in the past few years, Taiwan surprised observers by announcing "highly official relations" with Somaliland in 2020. Since then, Taipei has established a modest presence in the territory – with several dozen individuals spread across the Representative Office, Technical Mission, Medical Mission, and a recently established outpost of Taiwan's state-owned oil company CPC. In Lou's view, Somaliland's unique electoral system (which mandates three national parties as a check on clan rivalries), and inability to properly register voters around Las Anod, create practical challenges that Somaliland needs time to tackle. Lou also cites an article from the American Enterprise Institute to suggest that China is meddling in Las Anod – although researchers with extensive experience in the region doubt such claims. These sentiments align closely with the Somaliland government's position. "In Somaliland, we elect our presidents. But we also elect our parties [beforehand]. It's not easy to have so many elections. Elections are expensive, and we also have to spend money protecting our country from external threats," said Somaliland's Representative to Taiwan, Mohammed Hagi. "While it's a weakness we don't have elections on time, the reasons are technical and financial, not because our politicians don't want to. Other than Taiwan [which has provided equipment like iris scanners], we also don't receive anything from other countries to help with elections." **It is not surprising that Taiwan's stance matches so closely with Somaliland's, given Taipei's diplomatic presence relies on Somaliland's de facto independence.** "Compared to other countries with diplomatic offices in Somaliland – like the [United Kingdom], Denmark or [United Arab Emirates] – **Taiwan has far more specific and politically important bilateral relations, premised on a shared status as de facto states,**" Jethro Norman, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies focused on conflict and humanitarianism in East Africa, told Al Jazeera. **"Relations between the two are both an act of solidarity and a way to enact sovereignty in the absence of international recognition."** According to Norman, the Las Anod **conflict threatens to unravel Somaliland's narrative as an independent state.** The eastern regions of Somaliland, including Las Anod, contain clans who prefer to be part of Somalia and not Somaliland. **Resolving the conflict may require the Somaliland government to compromise on its sovereignty – something that might also jeopardise ties with Taiwan given that Somalia recognises China.**

3) [DL] The African Union currently supports One-China Policy

[African Union; press release; 11-16-2011; Chairperson receives Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce; AU; https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/24625-pr-chairperson_receives_chinas_vice_minister_of_commerce_-_nov2011.pdf; Accessed 1-9-2025; Your DJ]

Dr. Ping further renewed the expression of his gratitude to the Chinese Government and People for donating and constructing the nearly completed AUC Office Complex and Conference Centre in Addis Ababa, and announced that for the first time and thanks to Chinese assistance, the African Union will host its Summit at AUC Headquarters next January. **On the issue of Taiwan, the Chairperson reiterated AU support for the Chinese Government's "One China" policy,** adding that the African Union is working

with China to promote global governance and human rights, particularly within the framework of the United Nations.

4) [LT] African aid is dependent on recognizing One-China; upsetting China via voting aff would undermine

[Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 9-5-2024; Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)_Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China; No Publication; https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485719.html; Accessed 1-9-2025; DJ]

1.7 The two sides see Africa as an important partner in Belt and Road cooperation. Inspired by the Silk Road and AU's 2063 Agenda spirit of peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit as well as the principle of planning, building and benefiting together, the two sides undertake to strengthen synergy between the Belt and Road cooperation and the Agenda 2063 of the African Union, especially the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations and the respective development strategies of African countries, and make greater contribution to international cooperation, global economic growth and the accelerated implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 1.8 China commends Africa's efforts to seek strength through unity, and accelerate integration in response to various risks and challenges. The two sides are convinced that the development of China and Africa will present more opportunities to human development, collective security and respect for each other's civilization. The two sides pledge to strengthen cooperation on the abovementioned initiatives and speak with one voice on issues of common interest to developing countries, and jointly call for an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization. 1.9 The two sides share the view that the world is experiencing unprecedented and historical changes. The robust growth of the Global South represented by China and Africa is shaping the trajectory of the world history in a profound way. The two sides always stand in solidarity with other developing countries, uphold independence, actively promote South-South and triangular cooperation, oppose ideology-based bloc confrontation, and safeguard the common interests of the Global South in the ongoing reform of global governance system. The two sides support each other in safeguarding their sovereignty, security and development interests. The African side adheres to the one-China principle and is ready to provide firm support to China on issues relating to its core interests and major concerns. 1.10 The two sides take the view that China, the biggest developing country, is committed to pursuing higher-standard opening up to advance high-quality development, and is endeavoring to build itself into a stronger country and rejuvenate the Chinese nation in all respects by pursuing Chinese modernization. The African side speaks highly of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in July this year, and believes that the systematic plans drawn up at the session for further deepening reform comprehensively to advance Chinese modernization will bring more opportunities for countries around the world, including African countries. Africa, the continent with the largest number of developing countries, has launched the Second 10-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063 of the African Union and accelerated the building of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa. The two sides will seek together, on the basis of their respective development and revitalization, to pursue modernization that will enhance peaceful development, mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity, and forge a China-Africa partnership characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, mutual assistance and mutual understanding, to the greater benefit of the people of both sides.

A2 Invasion

1) [ID] China is a defensive realist – it will be aggressive if and only if it feels threatened Heer ‘19 (Paul Heer, 1-8-2019, "Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972>, accessed 10-25-2024 //GFS AL)

American policy in the Western Pacific has long been framed in terms of preventing the emergence of an exclusive, hostile hegemon that could threaten vital U.S. interests and deny American access there. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy respectively assert that “China seeks to displace the United States” in East Asia and thus achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony.” Avoiding this possibility has required Washington, also as a matter of policy, to maintain its own hegemony in the region (although we prefer to call it “primacy” or “preeminence”) as the best and only guarantee against such a danger. This mantra was central to the Obama administration’s “rebalance” in East Asia, and remains central to the Trump administration’s advocacy of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” But this policy mantra has two fundamental problems: it mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the region, and it is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest. China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chin[a]ese almost certainly recognize[s] that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. so what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail[s] and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to

China's economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, **Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement** in East Asia. A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China's strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China's external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of **China's "assertiveness"** within East Asia **over the past decade**—when Beijing probably would prefer to **focus on domestic priorities**—**has been a reaction to such perceived challenges**. Accordingly, **Beijing's** willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, **peaceable** version of regional preeminence will **depend[s]** heavily **on whether it perceives other countries**—especially the United States—as **trying to deny China this option and** instead **obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region**.

A2 Heg Shift

1) [ID] - Transition wars are empirically disproven

Richard Ned **Lebow** and Benjamin Valentino, 10-7-20**09**, "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory," SAGE Journals, <https://journals-sagepub-com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/doi/10.1177/0047117809340481//WWU>

Third, **almost all major power transitions appear to be the result of war, not a cause of it. This pattern is most evident in transitions associated with rapidly declining powers. The Spanish Empire was far and away the strongest power in Europe until it all but dissolved following a series of wars** in the early 1700s. Likewise, **the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire following the First World War wiped two major powers from the map of Europe.** These powerful empires collapsed as a result of wars waged primarily with states for which there was no possibility of imminent transition. Rising powers owe much to war, but it is only a partial explanation for their ascent. The rapid rise in the power of Germany and Italy in the latter half of the nineteenth century was primarily a result of wars of unification. The rise of the United States may again be an exception, although only if one excludes the wars against Indian tribes and nations. Implication 5: Rising powers attack dominant powers or vice versa. **Power transition theory focuses on war between the two most powerful states in the international system.** These wars are inherently risky so leaders must be highly motivated to start them. **Rising powers must feel excluded from the system and** denied its rewards and **convinced that military challenges are likely met with success[ful]. Dominant powers must believe that a rising challenger threatens** not only their standing in the system but **their security and material interests. Leaders must be confident of mobilizing domestic support** for a war. **They must [and] exploit existing rivalries to ensure that they can face the dominant power with the support,** or at least the neutrality, **of major third parties. None of these conditions are easy to achieve** and collectively require political skill and fortuitous conditions. Moreover, these conditions must be met during the window when the rising power perceives itself, or is perceived by the dominant power, to be pulling abreast in military capability. **Perceptions [are] of the changing balance of power may be a necessary, but far from sufficient condition, for the kind of wars predicted by power transition theories.** Strategically, it makes more sense for rising powers to attack smaller powers or former great powers in serious decline – although such wars are not the subject of power transition theory. Elsewhere Lebow finds strong evidence for this pattern.⁴⁰ For the same reason it usually makes more sense for leading powers to attack targets of opportunity (i.e. lesser and declining powers) as a means of augmenting their power. They may then be in a stronger position to deter or buy off a challenger. The most recent manifestation of this pattern may be the American attack on Iraq, urged on the Bush administration by many neoconservatives as a way of 'locking in' American hegemony in the expectation of a possible future challenge from China.⁴¹ **By far the most sensible policy for leading powers in dealing with rising powers ought to be efforts to moderate their challenge by incorporating them into the system if they are outside it, or, if they are inside, to provide more symbolic and material benefits to reconcile them to the status quo.** Historically, **this is how European great powers responded to the rise of Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Germany, Japan and Italy.** From the 1960s on it was a key component of the Western response to the Soviet Union. **We should accordingly expect to find relatively few wars between dominant and rising powers.** What **wars that occur should result from motives unrelated to power transitions or** from **miscalculation**: a dominant or rising power initiating what it thinks will be an isolated war against a third party that escalates into a wider struggle involving rising and dominant powers on opposing sides. Louis XIV's Dutch War (1672–9), the Nine Years War (1688–97), the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14) and World War I all arguably fit this pattern. In each instance, a dominant power thought incorrectly that it could extend its power at relatively low cost.

2) [ID] - No impact to heg-transition doesn't cause war and their ev is exaggerated

Christopher J. Fettweis, 5-8-2017, "Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace", Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394//WWU>

In the end, what can be said about the relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington's spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the most peaceful period in its history. The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if many of them do not always believe it.

3) [ID] - Even during “transition periods” rivals don’t have the capability to claim heg

William C. Wohlforth, 9-5-2014, "Hegemonic decline and hegemonic war revisited (Chapter 4)", Cambridge Core, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/power-order-and-change-in-world-politics/hegemonic-decline-and-hegemonic-war-revisited/A3243F7EF725449A7BFA3B6071F494CA/WWU>

The rise and decline of hegemonic states remains a central concern of scholars and policy makers. To be sure, most international relations scholars long ago abandoned the quest for a simple causal relationship between the distribution of power and major political phenomena like war and cooperation. But as Robert Gilpin wrote three decades ago, one need not “accept a structural or systems theory approach to international relations such as Waltz’s in order to agree that the distribution of power among the states in a system has a profound impact on state behavior.” Witness the outpouring of commentary and analysis following the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent great recession debating the extent and possible effects of American decline. For many, the world seemed to stand before a “Gilpinian moment,” when the basic material underpinnings of the American-led global order were rapidly shifting toward some new as-yet undefined equilibrium. Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics posited a conditional but nonetheless general relationship between the distribution of capabilities among major states and the stability of any given interstate order. States, Gilpin argued, use their material capabilities to foster a strategic environment congenial to their interests. If conditions permit, especially capable states thus may seek to create and sustain rough forms of political order[s] over an international system. Gilpin identified a tendency for such hegemonic states to do just that, but, he stressed, no state can expect to lock in a favorable position in the distribution of capabilities. Indeed, tendencies intrinsic to being a hegemonic state will cause the distribution of capabilities to shift away to other actors. As a result, the expected net benefits to rising states of challenging the existing order will increase, causing system instability and potentially a major war reestablishing equilibrium between underlying power and the political order.

A2 REMs

1. [NU] – The US is increasing REM mining now, Subin 20 finds

Subin 21 (Samantha, April 17, 2021 “The new U.S. plan to rival China and end cornering of market in rare earth metals,”

<https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/17/the-new-us-plan-to-rival-chinas-dominance-in-rare-earth-metals.html> //LY

In 2019, China was responsible for 80% of rare earths imports, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although exports fell last year in part due to Covid-19. President Biden's sweeping \$2 trillion infrastructure legislation seeks to remake the power and transportation markets in the U.S. and rebuild the country's semiconductor industry. It follows Biden signing an executive order in February designed to review gaps in the domestic supply chains for rare earths, medical devices, chips and other key resources, and in March the Department of Energy announcing a \$30 million initiative that will tap into researching and securing the U.S. domestic supply chain for rare earths and other important minerals in battery-making such as cobalt and lithium. ‘Cornering of the market’ “It’s absolutely correct there is a cornering of the market with lithium and other rare earths,” Biden climate envoy John Kerry recently said at a CNBC Evolve summit on the future of energy innovation.

2. [NU] Greenland solves.

McGinnis 12 (Paul E. McGinnis is a contributing writer to EcoWatch. He has interviewed a stellar array of change makers including Sylvia Earle, Dean Kamen, Ray Kurzweil, Fabien Cousteau and Josh Fox. Paul is also a New York based real estate broker, and green building and renovation consultant. He is a member of the U.S. Green Building Council, the Northeast Sustainable Energy Association, and the New York State Association of Realtors. McGinnis, P. E. “Greenland’s Ice Melt Ignites Race for Rare Earth Metals,” 11/12/2012, <http://ecowatch.com/2012/11/12/greenlands-rare-earth-metals>)

Greenland’s vast, pristine, virtually-untouched terrain is becoming a hotbed for resource extraction. The Arctic is melting at an unprecedented rate, making Greenland’s natural resources, including high demand commodities such as oil, gas, gold, iron, copper and rare earth metals, more accessible. Insatiable international oil, gas and mining conglomerates are now aggressively vying to control access to the riches glaciers once denied. “This is not just a region of ice and polar bears,” Prime Minister of Greenland, Kuupik Kleist, told Reuters in the capital Nuuk, formerly known by its Danish name Godthab. “Developing countries are interested in a more political role in opening up of the Arctic. Greenland could serve as a stepping stone.” Greenland has less than 60,000 people living in an 836,109 square mile area. Comparatively, Greenland is almost a quarter the size of the continental U.S. Until recently, the country was regarded by strategists as barren wasteland with little political or economic import. But now this once overlooked arctic island is being targeted by government and politically connected entities, anxious to extract what lies beneath the glacier ice sheet. The powerful and deep-pocketed interests include China, the U.S., Russia and the European Union. Many in Greenland are excited about the attention the remote island nation is attracting and are happy to have world powers courting Greenland looking to strike it rich. Greenlanders are hoping they too will get rich along with the foreign investors. Henrik Stendal, head of the geology department at Greenland’s Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, a Dane who has worked in Greenland since 1970, told the U.K. Guardian in July: “We have shown that we have huge potential—it has been an eye-opener for the mining industry. The EU has shown a lot of interest and that’s been very good—we believe this could be very valuable for Greenland. There could be benefits for everyone—at present most of our income is from fishing and a little bit of tourism, so the government really wants another income.” In addition to oil and gas, and perhaps even more attractive to industry, are rare earth metals that lie beneath the ground in Greenland that are essential components in new technologies, including computer hard drives, cell phones and flat screen devices. The world is consuming these rare earth metals at a voracious rate. For instance, in the first weekend of sales, the 4G iPad mini sold four

million units. Our appetite for these devices and the rare metals required seems unending. **Rare earth metals are also essential elements to military guidance systems and other defense related technology.** Most of the rare earth metals are currently sourced in China. Now, the world's nations are considering Greenland's resources not just from an economic point of view, but, perhaps more importantly, a strategic perspective. **There is a national security imperative when looking at availability of these resources and who controls them.** The New York Times reported in September: "Western nations have been particularly anxious about Chinese overtures to this poor and sparsely populated island, a self-governing state within the Kingdom of Denmark, because **the retreat of its ice cap has unveiled** coveted mineral deposits, including **rare earth metals that are crucial for new technologies like cellphones and military guidance systems.**" A European Union vice president, Antonio Tajani, rushed here to Greenland's capital in June, offering hundreds of millions in development aid in exchange for guarantees that Greenland would not give China exclusive access to its rare earth metals, calling his trip 'raw mineral diplomacy.'" "In the past 18 months, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea have made debut visits here, and Greenland's prime minister, Kuupik Kleist, was welcomed by President José Manuel Barroso of the European Commission in Brussels."

3. [T] – Mining is terrible for the environment

Walter 23 (Mariana, No Date, 2023, "Mapping the Impacts and Conflicts of Rare Earth Elements", <https://odg.cat/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Mapping-Impacts-Conflicts-Rare-Earth-Elements.pdf>) //LY
Pressures to extract and process REEs are accelerating globally. **However, REE mining has been linked to larger environmental impacts than other minerals and metals.** REEs are usually present in very low concentrations and are combined; **this means that their extraction and separation are expensive, require large amounts of energy and water, and generate large quantities of waste.** Moreover, **they are often mixed with different radioactive and hazardous elements** such as uranium, thorium, arsenic and other heavy metals which pose high health and environmental pollution risks. **Extraction methods include open-pit mining (generally involving intense water usage), underground and in-situ leaching.** While there are high expectations regarding REE recycling, this remains a marginal source (less than 1%). **There are many obstacles to REE recycling, such as the low concentration of end-products and the difficulty inherent in separating individual REEs from each other.** Recycling is also far from being a clean industry, as it requires large amounts of energy and generates hazardous waste.

4. [T] Disease and water pollution risk

Serpell et al 21 (Oscar Serpell is a research associate at the Kleinman Center for Energy Policy. Benjamin Paren is a Ph.D. student in the department of Materials Science and Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania. Wan-Yi "Amy" Chu is an assistant professor at Mills College in Oakland, California and a former postdoctoral researcher in the Goldberg Group, located in the Department of Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania. May 2021, "RARE EARTH ELEMENTS A RESOURCE CONSTRAINT OF THE ENERGY TRANSITION," Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, <https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/KCEP-Rare-Earth-Elements.pdf>) //recut LY

Regional **ecosystems** can be **significantly altered** by the presence of **mines**, both physically and chemically. **Site preparation, access roads, and ancillary facilities lead to direct—and often absolute—destruction of the proximate environment,** while pollution from mine processes and storage of residual tailings can lead to widespread **chemical imbalances and toxic contamination** (Filho 2016; Xiang 2016; Ganguli 2018). **REE mine tailings contain processing chemicals, salts, and radioactive materials.** Tailings are

particularly problematic in REE mining, because of the significant waste-to-yield ration. (Filho 2016; Xiang 2016). For every ton of REEs that are produced, there are 2,000 tons of mine tailings, including 1 to 1.4 tons of radioactive waste (Filho 2016). Tailings are most commonly stored in isolated impoundment areas called tailing ponds. These ponds require complex management, especially if the tailings contain high concentrations of uranium or thorium. Poor construction or catastrophic failure can lead to long-term and widespread environmental damage and contamination of surface or groundwater (Filho 2016). Other significant sources of pollution include aerosols and fugitive dust from tailing impoundments, which are created from cutting, drilling, and blasting rock. This pollution can accumulate in surrounding areas (Filho 2016). causing respiratory issues and also contaminating food sources—as plants absorb the airborne pollutants. An example of this is the tailing pond for the Bayan Obo mine in China. Villages in the surrounding area have experienced elevated rates of both cancer and respiratory illness, indicating that the tailings are not being properly stored (Xiang 2016). While many of these issues exist for other types of mining, they are particularly problematic for REEs, because of the large volume and radioactivity of tailings.

5. [DL] – Chinese Coal emissions moots all aff solvency

Erickson 21 [Andrew S. Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institut; and Gabriel Collins, Baker Botts Fellow in Energy and Environmental Regulatory Affairs at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy and a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "Competition With China Can Save the Planet," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2021, accessed 6-23-21] //recut LY

But this rhetorical posturing masks a very different reality: China remains addicted to coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel. It burns over four billion metric tons per year and accounts for half of the world's total consumption. Roughly 65 percent of China's electricity supply comes from coal, a proportion far greater than that of the United States (24 percent) or Europe (18 percent). Finnish and U.S. researchers revealed in February that China dramatically expanded its use of coal-fired power plants in 2020. China's net coal-fired power generation capacity grew by about 30 gigawatts over the course of the year, as opposed to a net decline of 17 gigawatts elsewhere in the world. China also has nearly 200 gigawatts' worth of coal power projects under construction, approved for construction, or seeking permits, a sum that on its own could power all of Germany—the world's fourth-largest industrial economy. Given that coal power plants often operate for 40 years or more, these ongoing investments suggest the strong possibility that China will remain reliant on coal for decades to come. Here's the inconvenient truth: the social contract that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has forged with the Chinese people—growth and stability in exchange for curtailed liberties and one-party rule— has incentivized overinvestment across the board, including in the coal that powers most of China's economy. China may be shuttering some coal plants and investing in renewable energy, but serious decarbonization remains a distant prospect. Xi's bullish talk of combating climate change is a smokescreen for a more calculated agenda. Chinese policymakers know their country is critical to any comprehensive international effort to curb greenhouse gas emissions, and they are trying to use that leverage to advance Chinese interests in other areas. Policymakers in the United States have hoped to compartmentalize climate change as a challenge on which Beijing and Washington can meaningfully cooperate, even as the two countries compete elsewhere. John Kerry, the United States' senior climate diplomat, has insisted that climate change is a "standalone issue" in U.S.-Chinese relations. Yet Beijing does not see it that way.

That's why Lempriere 24 finds that

Molly **Lempriere**, April 11, 20**24**, "China responsible for 95% of new coal power construction in 2023, report says", Carbon Brief,<https://www.carbonbrief.org/china-responsible-for-95-of-new-coal-power-construction-in-2023-report-says//SL>

China accounted for 95% of the world's new coal power construction activity in 2023 according to the latest annual report from Global

Energy Monitor (GEM). Construction began on 70 gigawatts (GW) **new capacity in China, up four-fold since 2019**, says GEM's annual report on the global coal power industry. This compares with less than 4GW of new coal power construction starting in the rest of the world – the lowest since 2014. Outside China, only 32 countries have new coal projects at pre-construction phases of development and just seven have plants under construction. While global coal power capacity – both overall and outside China – grew in 2023, GEM says this is likely to be a "blip" that will be offset by accelerating coal retirements in the next few years in the US and Europe. Other key findings of the report include that construction of coal-fired power plants globally – excluding

China – declined for the second year in a row. However, **coal power plant retirements were also at the lowest level since 2011** 'Pivotal juncture' for China In China, 47.4GW of coal power capacity came online in 2023, GEM says. This increase accounted for two-thirds of the global rise in operating coal power capacity, which climbed 2% to 2,130GW. China's 70.2GW of new construction getting underway in 2023 represents 19-times more than the rest of the world's 3.7GW. As the figure below highlights, the country's trajectory (red line) is diverging significantly from the rest of the world (orange line). The level of new construction starting in China is nearly quadruple what it was in 2019, when the country hit a nine-year annual

low of entirely new coal power stations starting. **This is the fourth year in a row that the amount of new coal construction starting has increased in China.** This is out of line with President Xi Jinping's 2021 pledge to "strictly control" new coal power capacity, GEM states. In early 2022, China's National Energy Administration's 14th five-year plan for a "modern energy system" stated that

30GW of coal power would be retired by 2025. However, when counting larger coal units with capacity of at least 30 megawatts, less than 9GW of power plants have been shut down in the last three years, and few others have plans to retire, GEM notes. If China is to meet this 30GW retirement target, it "needs to take immediate action", GEM adds. In a statement, Qi Qin, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, said: Collectively, China, India, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Laos, Turkey, Russia, Pakistan and Vietnam account for 95% of global pre-construction capacity, according to the GEM report. The 5% remaining is distributed among 21 countries, the tracker finds. Of these, 11 have one project and are on the brink of achieving the "no new coal" milestone, it adds. The tracker identifies 20.9GW of entirely new coal power proposals outside of China in 2023. This was led by India, which saw 11.4GW of new coal capacity proposed, more than any year since 2016. This was in part due to the revival of several stalled projects in the country, GEM explains. Kazakhstan also saw 4.6GW of new proposals and Indonesia saw 2.5GW. Some 4.1GW of previously shelved or cancelled capacity is now considered "proposed" again. Another handful of countries – Russia, the Philippines, Botswana and Nigeria – also saw revived proposals and construction restarting in 2023. Retirements slow Globally, a total of 69.5GW of coal power came online in 2023, while 21.1GW was retired, GEM finds. This led to the highest net increase in global operating coal capacity since 2016, with a 48.4GW jump. New capacity also came online in Indonesia (5.9GW), India (5.5GW), Vietnam (2.6GW), Japan (2.5GW), Bangladesh (1.9GW), Pakistan (1.7GW), South Korea (1GW), Greece (0.7GW) and Zimbabwe (0.3GW). In total during 2023, the tracker found 22.1GW came online and 17.4GW was retired outside of China. This resulted in a 4.7GW net increase in the world's coal fleet operating outside China. Globally, coal power capacity reached 2,130GW in 2023, up from 2% a year earlier. The US contributed nearly half of coal power retirements, GEM says, with 9.7GW shuttering in 2023. However, this is a drop in retirements from 14.7GW in 2022, and a peak of 21.7GW in 2015. Elsewhere, the EU and UK represented nearly a quarter of retirements, with 3.1GW closing in the UK, 0.6GW in Italy and 0.5GW in Poland. There is now just one operating coal-fired power plant in the UK, with the Ratcliffe-on-Soar set to close in September 2024. Overall, global coal power plant retirements were at their lowest level since 2011, as the figure below shows. Outside of China, the number of coal-fired power plants starting construction declined for the second consecutive year, hitting its lowest level since data collection began in 2015, GEM notes. Less than 4GW of new projects began construction outside of China in 2023, far below the average of 16GW between 2015 and 2022. Just seven countries started construction, with one plant each in India, Laos, Nigeria, Pakistan and Russia, as well as three plants in Indonesia. Construction has not started on any coal plants in Latin America since 2016, and none has started in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European or Middle Eastern countries since 2019, GEM says. Nigeria's Ugboha power station, located at the mine-mouth of the Idowa Falola Coal Mines in the Aniocha North local government area of Delta state, is the first known construction of a coal power plant in Africa since 2019, the report says. The G7 – which accounts for 15% (310GW) of the world's operating coal capacity, down from 32% (443GW) in 2015 – has no new coal capacity under construction. However, there is still one proposed coal power plant in Japan and two in the US. Both of the proposed sites in the US, the 0.4GW CONSOL Project in Pennsylvania and the newly announced 0.4GW Susitna power station in Alaska, are expected to use carbon capture and storage technologies (CCS). GEM says that these technologies are "effectively uncertain and expensive distractions from the urgent need to phase out coal". The G20 is home to 92% of the world's operating coal capacity (1,968GW) and 88% of pre-construction coal capacity (336GW). Brazil, the current G20 chair, saw its pipeline of pre-construction capacity fall in 2023, but still has two prospective projects remaining – the last pre-construction coal power plants in Latin America. No new coal nations Overall, coal capacity reached an all time high in 2023, GEM's tracker says. Operating coal capacity outside China grew for the first time since 2019, as less coal capacity retired than in any other single year in more than a decade, as the figure below shows. The world's operating coal power capacity is up 11% since 2015, when governments agreed to keep the global average temperature to well below 2C above pre-industrial levels and aim to limit warming to 1.5C under the Paris Agreement. Outside of China, there are still 113GW of coal power projects under construction. While this is only slightly up from the previous year's level of 110GW, it still highlights that the coal sector is not in line with the International Energy Agency's (IEA) 1.5C scenario, GEM says. Across all IEA scenarios that meet international climate goals there is a rapid decline in global coal emissions. Globally, pre-construction capacity rose 6% in 2023, "crystallising the importance of calls to stop proposing and breaking ground on new coal plants", GEM's report says. Only 15% (317GW) of currently operating coal power capacity has a commitment to retire in line with Paris Agreement goals, it adds. Phasing out unabated coal generation by 2040 – in line with the IEA's 1.5C pathway – would require an average of 126GW of retirements every year for the next 17 years, GEM notes. This is the equivalent of two coal power plants per week. Even steeper cuts would be needed to account for the 578GW of coal power plants also under construction and in pre-construction phases of development, GEM says. There were 12 new countries that committed to developing no new coal generation in 2023, by joining the Powering Past Coal Alliance. This brings the total number of countries up to 101 that have either formally declared they will have no new coal or have abandoned any coal plants they have had over the last decade, GEM notes. Since 2015, there has been a 68% reduction in global pre-construction capacity, GEM found. New construction starts are now at their lowest level outside of China, since data collection began. GEM's report suggests that coal power projects that utilise CCS and those used to power industrial activities may be "a last frontier" for new coal proposals. For example, Zimbabwe's 1.9GW of new coal capacity proposed in 2023 is made up of two projects, the Prestige power station and the Gweru power station, designed to power smelters for extracting chromium from ore. Zimbabwe is one of one six countries, beyond China and India, to have increased its total planned capacity over the past year, along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Zimbabwe, the US and the Philippines. At COP28, 130 countries signalled their intent to phase out unabated coal power and stop investing in new unabated coal-fired power plants within this decade, by signing the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge. In addition, the final global stocktake agreement at COP28 reiterated the pledge from COP26 to phase down unabated coal power, but still does not define what "unabated" means. Additionally, wording from earlier drafts on ending permitting of new coal power was omitted in the final text. "Coal power is at the edge of a precipice, facing political and civil opposition and increasingly uncompetitive economics," GEM's report states. In a statement, Flora Champenois, coal programme director for GEM said:

Break the clash here:

1] China has empirically been releasing more emissions even though they are on a “green transition”

2] Climate change solvency only happens when everyone in the world cooperates on it — one country can't solve it all

A2 Regional Stability

1. Recognition affirms authoritarianism---that becomes a perceptual model that's reflected elsewhere.

Osman **Hassan 21**, 12/25/2021, Senior Vice President of Professional Services at NWN Carousel, Why the USA Should Not Recognize Somaliland, https://store.hiiraan.com/op4/2021/dec/184920/why_the_usa_should_not_recognize_somaliland.aspx) // JZ recut AP

Commitment to democracy is the key justification Meservy gives for rewarding the enclave with recognition. Admittedly, elections of some sorts have taken place albeit at long intervals and often at the behest of foreign donors. After 16 years, elections took place recently for the Peoples Chamber and only after persistent prodding from donors, No election took place for the Upper House for the same period. If members were to have their way, they would want to remain. **Like a lot of façades put-up in the enclave, elections are not held as a prerequisite of democracy but as a show to win favourable international impression to win recognition**. And on the whole they have been successful. A good convert is Mr. Meservy. Once the facades are out of the way, the reality is something completely different. **A more fitting analogy to the enclave would be the white minority-ruled former Rhodesia. Just as all power was monopolized by the whites, so all power is exclusive to the clan. The three political parties permitted in Somaliland are in the hands of the ruling clan.** No other party is allowed to compete with them which closes the doors on other clans and regions. **The clan's control permeates also both houses of Parliament, the civil service, the police and the armed forces.** If one-clan power monopoly is unacceptable, what makes it intolerable is what it does with its power. **Its militia**, the SNM, have committed massacres against innocent civilians in unionist regions, the first taking place in Borama in the Awdal region when hundreds were brutally massacred as reprisal for allegedly being supporters of the ousted military regime. A similar massacre was committed at Kalshaale in the Buuhoodle district in 2012, also for resisting the secession. **Both amount to crimes against humanity. These massacres remind many observers the Sharpeville massacre of Africans in March 1960 who were resisting Apartheid and white minority rule.** No less shocking are the wider appalling rule of law and human rights situation under the one-clan authoritarian rule. **Daily human rights abuses are pervasive** wherever the writ of the authority reaches but worse in the parts of the unionists regions it occupies. **Freedom of speech, thought, assembly and movement (to Mogadishu) are proscribed. Arbitrary detentions, long periods in jail without trial, and languishing in jail long after sentences have expired are widespread. Extra-judicial killings are common in occupied Lascanod, the capital of Sool region, and used as a tool to suppress the rising opposition to the occupation and secession. Access to justice and non-discriminatory application of the law underpin the rule of law. Yet those who do not have the means to defend themselves, or not connected to those who wield power, or belong to minority clans, are likely to be the victims of the abuse of power..** Extra-judicial killings, common in occupied Lascanod, the capital of Sool region, are used as a tool to suppress the rising opposition to the occupation and secession. Th United Nations Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Somalia has been following some of these cases which speaks for itself. **What recently shocked the rest of Somalia and the international community was the deportation of thousands of Somali citizens lawfully resident in Lascanod and carted back like cattle to southern Somalia. Many Children were in the process separated from their parents. It all amounts to crimes against humanity.** And yet, Mr. Meservy calls their ways as devotion to democracy, an Orwellian doublespeak if there was one.

2. NI- Democracy in Somaliland fails.

Elder 21 [Claire Elder, IR lecturer @ the University of Melbourne and a research associate @ the University of Oxford, 11-1-2021, Somaliland's authoritarian turn: oligarchic–corporate power and the political economy of de facto states, OUP Academic,

<https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/6/1749/6412453>] tristan// recut AP

The oligopolistic state, in turn, also created a 'peaceocracy' that was necessary for business and external legitimacy. Holding frequent, peaceful elections adheres to certain minimal requirements for international legitimacy but also inherently restricts core tenets of democratization linked to freedoms and civil liberties.²¹ The concept of peaceocracy has been used in other post-conflict contexts to refer to the formation of limited electoral democracies and access orders,²² where peaceful elections are secured through the use of 'peace-at-all-costs' narratives, the stifling and criminalizing of dissenting views and open political debate, and a heavy security presence, but are nonetheless greeted internationally as legitimate and secure favourable aid relations.²³ **Somaliland's** peaceocracy, which has been in existence since its transition to multiparty democracy in 2002, **has recorded some of the highest rates of election turnout** on the continent (80 per cent of registered voters turned out for the presidential elections of 2016).²⁴ **Yet every election** since 2002 **has** also **seen high rates of state interference, intimidation, rigging, and the stifling of opposition activity and media freedom** which often **go under-reported** where **public criticism of corrupt officials and authorities is** also **criminalized**.²⁵ **Elites** have for decades **used the restrictive three-party system** (effectively frozen since 2002),²⁶ **along with constitutional provisions and electoral laws, to stay in power and prevent any genuine oppositional pole from emerging**. The recent municipal and parliamentary **elections of 2021** were no exception: at least **seven candidates were detained to pre-empt any challenge to the ruling Kulmiye party**.²⁷ These heavy-handed tactics just proved less effective this time around. As such, rather than serving the population as a whole, **Somaliland's peaceocracy has protected the interests of a select group of financial and political elites for decades**. These **interests have deliberately kept civil society organizations and formal offices and ministries weak**,²⁸ and repeatedly **postponed important parliamentary elections**,²⁹ in turn restricting the space for alternative political projects to emerge.³⁰ For decades, **high rates of electoral participation, relative peace and stability, and economic self-sufficiency have been mistakenly construed as markers of democratization**. A political economy perspective, by contrast, reveals weak elite commitments to democratization and the technologies of power that have been used to undermine genuine democratic reform and weaken popular mobilization. The following section examines the origins of Somaliland's oligopolistic state within the liberation movement as these structures of power and ideologies of privatized governance continue to shape contemporary politics and power struggles.

3 NL - Somalia is not a model

Somaliland is not legally justified, decks chance of it being a model Osman Hassan 21, 12/25/2021, Senior Vice President of Professional Services at NWN Carousel, Why the USA Should Not Recognize Somaliland,

https://store.hiiraan.com/op4/2021/dec/184920/why_the_usa_should_not_recognize_somaliland.aspx) // JZ recut AP

Another referendum Meservy cites in support of recognition is one held in the secessionist enclave in 2001. Those who voted were those in favour of the secession. Unionist regions refused to participate in what they saw as treason. The outcome of a referendum organized by the ruling SNM rebels among its clan supporters was a foregone conclusion. **Suffice to say, one clan's self-serving referendum does not bind the rest of Somalia nor justify its recognition.**

Mr. Meservy also invokes **the Montevideo Convention** as supporting Somaliland demand for recognition. Article 1 of the convention **sets out the four criteria for statehood that have been recognized by international organizations as an accurate statement of customary international law:**

The state as a person of international law, **should possess** the following qualifications:

- 1. a permanent population;**
- 2. a defined territory;**
- 3. government;**
- 4. capacity to enter into relations with the other states.**

Since the four unionist clans in northern Somaliland (aka Somaliland) do not want to secede from Somalia nor consider themselves as part of what the secessionist call "Somaliland", the invocation of the Convention can only apply to the rebel clan. On this understanding, **the enclave does have a government** but one that mainly controls the clan's traditional area. **It has no permanent population since its** mainly **nomadic** population are all the time on the move, crossing to other clans' traditional areas in search of grazing and water. **It has no defined territory since it has no demarcated border** with unionist clans. **It is not contiguous with the southern Somalia, Djibouti and only Ethiopia** and hence cannot claim any borders with these neighbouring countries. Finally, **it has no capacity to enter into relations with other states** as a renegade entity. Altogether, **it fails to meet the requirements for a State set by the Montevideo Convention**

4. NL- Recognition would hurt stability, countries don't look to model

Zahran 12-10 [Motaz Zahran is an ambassador of Egypt to the US, 12-10-2024, "Stability in the Horn of Africa Is Vital to Global Trade", Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/stability-horn-africa-vital-global-trade-security-opinion-1998578>] DOA: 01-16-2024 //AP

Any recognition of Somaliland as an independent state will result in dangerous repercussions, including exacerbating internal divisions between the various clans of Somaliland that support independence and others that seek to remain within the Somali federal state. This is a staggering reminder of the danger of further fragmenting the country through reckless recognition agreements. Beyond Somalia, this recognition is a slippery slope entailing a domino effect of separatist movements across the region igniting conflicts in pursuit of independence, leading to unimaginable chaos. Cairo has longstanding ties with Mogadishu that date to before its independence in 1960. In this context, Egypt heeded Somalia's request to participate in the new peacekeeping mission AUSSOM, which was wholeheartedly welcomed by the African Union Peace and Security Council. **Egypt's extended experience in peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere provides crucial support to the counterterrorism capabilities of the Somali armed forces and the concerted efforts of the Somali government and people to rebuild their country. In the broader regional context, and in addition to its destabilizing actions in Somalia, Ethiopia has not shown any fraction of a genuine political will to reach a deal on its dam on the River Nile. It refuses to address Egypt and Sudan's legitimate concerns and has blocked efforts to reach a compromise over 13 years of arduous negotiations. Ethiopia should commit to reaching a legally binding agreement based in international law that preserves all parties' water security while supporting Ethiopia's development goals. In Sudan, political stability is a prerequisite for lasting stability in the region. As such, Egypt continues to play a crucial role through its persistent efforts, along with the U.S., to shepherd the warring parties toward an immediate cease-fire that paves the way for full humanitarian access.** Since fighting broke out in April 2023, more than one million Sudanese refugees have crossed into Egypt, fleeing the war and dire humanitarian crisis. We are proud to support refugees, and with sustained international support, we can continue to play a key role in delivering humanitarian aid and building concert over a political solution. **There is clear alignment between U.S. and Egyptian interests in the Horn of Africa. These include**

counterterrorism, maritime security, and anti-piracy. Both strategic partners converge on the necessity of deploying diplomacy to promote peace, security, and stability. The Bright Star and Eagle Defender joint exercises between the U.S. and Egypt embody the security dimension of the bilateral relationship, while efforts to promote a political pathway in Sudan exemplify our joint and relentless diplomatic endeavors.

A2 India

NQ. Tensions down now

Simone McCarthy, 10-23-2024, "India and China have struck a deal that could ease border tensions ahead of expected leader meeting," (Simone McCarthy is a Senior News Desk Reporter for CNN), CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/22/asia/india-china-border-agreement-intl-hnk>, accessed 1/16/2025 //anika

China and India agreed on Wednesday to work on easing their long-running border dispute, as the two Asian giants resumed a formal high-level dialogue for the first time in five years. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and India's National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met in Beijing on Wednesday, the first time they held formal talks as their countries' special representatives on border issues since late 2019. The meeting follows an agreement the two countries reached in October on military disengagement and patrolling arrangements along parts of their contested border, where the two nuclear-armed rivals have engaged in a tense standoff since a deadly clash in 2020. A statement from China's Foreign Ministry said Wang and Doval reaffirmed their commitment to seek a package of solutions to the border dispute that were "fair, reasonable and acceptable to both sides." They vowed to continue to implement the disengagement agreement and emphasized that the dispute should be handled properly, to "avoid impacting the development of bilateral ties." Both sides agreed to continue taking measures to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas and to promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations, the Chinese statement said. The two officials also agreed to strengthen cross-border exchanges, including the resumption of trips by Indian pilgrims to Tibet, cross-border river cooperation and border trade at Nathula, a mountain pass in the Indian state of Sikkim, according to the statement. A statement from India's Foreign Ministry confirmed the broad details of the meeting, adding that the ministers "emphasised the need to ensure peaceful conditions on the ground so that issues on the border do not hold back the normal development of bilateral relations." "Drawing on the learnings from the events of 2020, they discussed various measures to maintain peace and tranquility on the border and advance effective border management," the Indian statement added. The latest effort to ease tensions between the two neighbors comes amid China's diplomatic charm offensive to mend ties with several American allies and partners, including Japan and Australia, in the lead-up to US President-elect Donald Trump's return to the White House. Ties between China and India have been strained severely since June 2020, when a bloody hand-to-hand battle in the Galwan Valley killed at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers. Both India and China maintain a significant military presence along their 2,100-mile (3,379-kilometer) de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which has never been clearly defined and has remained a source of friction since a bloody war between the two countries in 1962. The clash four years ago along the disputed border between Indian Ladakh and Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin caused the conflict's first known fatalities in more than four decades. Since then, the two sides have held rounds of border talks to defuse tensions, but friction points have remained, including in areas that both sides previously patrolled but which have since become so-called buffer zones. The border patrol agreement reached in October is seen by experts as a positive development. It was struck just days before Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in Kazan, Russia, on the sidelines of a BRICS summit. During their meeting on Wednesday, Wang told Doval that the "hard-won" resumption of their dialogue was a "timely and powerful measure" to implement the consensus reached by Xi and Modi in October. The two leaders of the two countries emphasized viewing China-India relations from a strategic and long-term perspective. At a critical moment, they recalibrated the course and clarified the direction for the recovery and development of China-India relations." Wang was quoted as saying in a separate statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

NQ. India-China dispute is chilling out

Marsi 24 (Federica Marsi: writer and contributor for Al Jazeera. 10/22/24, "How India and China pulled back from a border war — and why now", Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/22/how-india-and-china-pulled-back-from-a-border-war-and-why> // DOA: 12/22/24)JDE + anika recut

India and China have reached a deal to end a military standoff at their disputed frontier, four years after a deadly clash along their border in the western Himalayas plunged ties to their lowest point in decades. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar told an Indian TV channel on Monday that the agreement on border patrols signalled that "the disengagement process with China has been completed." While the larger border dispute remains unresolved, the deal allows for the resumption of patrols along the border in the Ladakh region by soldiers of both countries — allowing

them to underscore their respective territorial claims while ensuring that the other side is following the agreement arrived at on Monday. The announcement was made on the eve of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the

Russian city Kazan for the **BRICS summit**, in which China is also participating. The pact paves the way for improved political and business ties between the Asian giants, analysts say. It could also clear the path for a potential meeting between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which would be the first since 2020. How did we get here? India and China have disputed their border for the past seven decades. The two countries fought a brief and bloody war over the demarcation of the border in 1962. India suffered a humiliating defeat and lost a chunk of territory in Aksai Chin, in the extreme northeast of Ladakh, which has remained a point of contention between the two countries. Diplomatic relations recovered after a series of border agreements in the 1990s. While the 1993 and 1996 agreements are often regarded as milestones, the border arrangement between India and China — which allowed them to avoid any casualties along the border for more than half a century after 1962 — has increasingly come under stress in recent years. Their troops faced off in local incidents in 2013, 2014 — when Xi was visiting India — and 2017. In 2019, India repealed Article 370 of its constitution, which guaranteed a measure of autonomy to Indian-administered Kashmir, which also included the disputed areas of Ladakh. China saw India's move as unilaterally affecting its territory and denounced the move at the United Nations Security Council. But the 2020 clash — and the resulting deaths — took the relationship to a breaking point. Michael Kugelman, director of the Washington, DC-based Wilson Center think tank's South Asia Institute, said this week's deal is significant but its importance should not be overstated. "It does not end the border dispute," Kugelman told Al Jazeera. "This is an agreement that will allow things to return to how they were in Ladakh before that crisis." "It does not appear to call for troop disengagement in the areas where mobilisations had taken place during the Ladakh crisis," Kugelman said. "That's why we need to be cautious about this new agreement." What have been key moments in the India-China relationship since 2020? June 2020: Twenty Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand fighting with clubs and staves in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh in the first deadly clashes in nearly 60 years. The deaths triggered outrage and street protests in India. The heightened tensions between the two nuclear-armed countries drew international concerns with the UN urging both sides "to exercise maximum restraint". New Delhi restricted investments from China, banned dozens of popular Chinese mobile apps, including TikTok, and severed direct flights. The number of banned Chinese apps eventually rose to 321. January 2021: Indian and Chinese soldiers engaged in what the Indian army described as a "minor face-off" along their frontier in the northeast Indian state of Sikkim. December 2022: Minor border scuffles broke out in the Tawang sector of India's northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, parts of which are also claimed by China. Beijing accused Indian forces of obstructing a routine patrol while New Delhi said Chinese soldiers encroached upon Indian territory and tried to "change the status quo". August 2023: **Modi and Xi agreed to intensify efforts to disengage and**

de-escalate when they met briefly on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg. June: Jaishankar met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kazakhstan, where they agreed to step up talks to resolve issues along their border. September: **Jaishankar said about 75 percent of the "disengagement" problems at India's border with China had been resolved.** What is the broader context of the deal? A definitive resolution

of the China-India border dispute remains elusive, but **both countries are signalling an interest in turning a new page.** Kugelman said the two nuclear powers have been engaged in talks on the border issue since the clash in 2020. "The question is: Why announce the agreement now?" Kugelman said. "The BRICS summit looms large here." The deal's agreement before the BRICS summit began on Tuesday gives India "the diplomatic space to have a meeting between Modi and Xi on the sidelines of the summit," the analyst said. "Politically, it is easier for New Delhi to agree to that type of encounter given that there is a border agreement." Business relations were likely a key incentive. China has long been one of India's top two trading partners along with the United States. In 2023 and 2024, it was India's biggest trading partner, with \$118.4bn in bilateral commerce. **Beijing remains India's biggest source of goods and its largest supplier of industrial products** from telecommunications hardware to raw materials for the Indian

pharmaceutical industry. Easing tensions is also **convenient for China** as it pushes to expand its global influence through multilateral forums, including BRICS. **Many Chinese companies that struggled to do business in India** after 2020 when it tightened investment norms and banned popular Chinese apps have

been hoping for a resumption of ties. Joshi, of the Observer Research Foundation and author of Understanding the India-China Border, said pressure from the Indian business community played a role in reaching the border deal. "After the 2020 events, India placed severe restrictions on Chinese investments and visas," he said. "From the Indian side, there was pressure for a reset of the relations." The analyst added that while relations had been characterised by low levels of mutual trust, the deal signalled that the "policy of diplomatic engagement with China has been successful." "Trust had been broken in 2020. ... This is a new beginning that provides an opportunity to go back to the good old days when the relationship was stable," he said. Kugelman, however, struck a more cautious note. "I don't think this deal is the prelude to a broader detente, and that's because of many tensions [due to] geopolitical competition," he said, adding that among the friction points are China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, its deep relations with Pakistan and India's strong ties with the US. "[The agreement is] a confidence-building measure, and that's a good thing for relations that sunk to low levels in recent years," Kugelman said, "but I don't think we should see it as the opening salvo of broader efforts to get the relationship in a normalised position."

NL. China vetoes UN recognition.

CS '20 [Somaliland Current Staff; News Source about Somaliland; 09-24-2020; "With an eye on Taiwan, China arms Somalia against Somaliland"; Somaliland Current; <https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/with-an-eye-on-taiwan-china-arms-somalia-against-somaliland/>; accessed 11-28-2024] leon

According to reports dated September 19, almost a week after Somaliland opened its representative office in Taiwan, China delivered 'large-scale' military aid to Somalia. The gesture came with a message impelling Somalia to retaliate against Somaliland, which refused to kneel to China's command and established commercial ties with Taiwan.

As per a Somali-language news report, the addition of Chinese muscle to Somalia has rung major warning bells for Somaliland, with its diplomats fearing possible conflicts between the two nations on the behest of imperialist China.

LT. Indian Ocean militarization causes nuke war

SVI 19 (Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan research institution based in Pakistan, "Nuclearization of the Indian Ocean and its Implications on Strategic Stability on 20th November 2019", Strategic Vision Institute, December 20, 2019
,<https://thesvi.org/svi-in-house-roundtable-discussion-report-20thnovember-2019-nuclearization-of-the-indian-ocean-and-its-implications-on-strategic-stability/>, DOA 12/18/24) KC + anika recut

Another missile from K series, the K-4 is also undergoing testing. This is an intermediaterange submarine-launched ballistic missile, capable of carrying a 1 tonne payload up to a range of 3,500 km. The INS Arihant, which is the first of the Arihant Class Submarines will be able to carry four K-4 missiles. The K-4 missile was successfully tested on 24 March 2014 from an underwater pontoon submerged 30 meter deep. Once armed, the fleet of Indian nuclear submarines will soon be able to cover the entire Pakistani territory with their ballistic missiles fired from either the Eastern or Western quadrant of the Indian Ocean. These 'K' missiles are intrinsically important for India's nuclear deterrence arsenal because they provide India with a much needed ideal and invulnerable second-strike capability stated in India's Nuclear Doctrine and thus shift the balance of power in India's favor in the South Asian region. Speaking on the 'Implications of Indian Second-Strike Capability on IOR Security', Capt (R) Syed Aqeel Akhtar Naqvi expanded on the finer points of the impact these developments have had on the region's strategic deterrence framework. He explained how the security landscape of the region was characterized primarily by deeprooted hostilities and mistrust between India and Pakistan spanning almost seven decades. Despite continued threats from India, Pakistan made sincere efforts to keep this region free from nuclear weapons. In 1974 Pakistan sponsored a resolution at the UNGA to declare South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone and continued to push for its case for decades more to come. Pakistan also offered several bilateral proposals to India to prevent the nuclearization of the region such as jointly renouncing the production and manufacture of nuclear weapons in 1978, simultaneous accession to the NPT and simultaneous acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards in 1979 and a bilateral nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1987. Ironically all these proposals were rejected by India. In 1998, Pakistan reluctantly responded to Indian nuclear explosions, but did not relent in its efforts to maintain stability in the region. Pakistan proposed a strategic restraint regime, anti-ballistic missile treaty in South Asia and most recently in 2016 offered India to consider a bilateral agreement for a moratorium on nuclear testing, only to receive an unfavorable response from India. Capt. Naqvi stated that the above historical context has a direct bearing on some of the most recent developments being witnessed regarding nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region and the subsequent de-stabilization of the region. The shifting of nuclear deterrence from land to sea not only hinders the just and equitable access to the Indian Ocean but also stokes a dangerous nuclear arms race in the region. Hence, while relations between India and Pakistan, the two nuclear-weapons states in South Asia, have long been characterized by a lack of trust and adequate communication, the introduction of nuclear weapons at sea by India has the potential to upset the fragile balance of Indian Ocean security. Especially considering the close proximity within which such weapons are likely to be deployed on some of the most advanced surface and sub-surface platforms by both countries, the likelihood of a conflict escalating to the nuclear realm becomes dangerously likely.

LT. Indian power triggers Pakistani escalation

Menon 22 (Prakash Menon, 8-24-2022, "The China–India–Pakistan Nuclear Trilemma and Accidental War", Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2022.2134726>, DOA: 12/22/2024)ET

India-Pakistan strategic instability is rooted in the historical and unresolved political disputes that animate their relationship. Developments in military capabilities are the downstream products of their strained relations. Being the smaller power, Pakistan perceives the Indian threat as one that requires balancing by development of its conventional and nuclear capability. The threat is also one that is blown out of proportion by its military to sustain its influence in its domestic power politics. Pakistan believes that nuclear weapons ensure its survival. In reality, Pakistan's conventional military capability continues to be strengthened by assistance from China. When viewed within the framework of the simultaneous threat posed to India by China on the northern borders and the Indian Ocean, India's conventional capability as a reason for expansion of its nuclear capability is overblown. The linkage of the potential for nuclear and conventional force application is deepened by Pakistan's continued use of terrorism as a tool of policy. Sporadic terrorist attacks carried out by Pakistan against targets in Jammu & Kashmir and the Indian hinterland hold the potential for a reaction scenario that can spiral speedily out of control and bring nuclear weapons into play. Two of the major military confrontations, Kargil in 1999 and the military mobilization that followed the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 were contained through political rationality. Even after these major crises, attacks continue to occur. The attacks in Pathankot in January 2016, Uri in September 2016, and Pulwama in February 2019 being of recent vintage. However, despite force exchange, beyond the political rhetoric, leaders on both sides have exercised caution and stopped short of deliberate escalation. However, this should not be a cause for complacency. Instead, with the churn in the domestic politics of both countries, there is cause for growing concern. Thus far, Pakistan has utilised the Indian nuclear and conventional threat to draw international attention and seek political intervention by the international community, especially the United States, to rein in India's reaction to terrorist attacks. Painting the India–Pakistan conflict scenario as a dangerous one is part of Pakistan's game plan to carry out terrorist attacks as part of its strategy of "bleeding India with a thousand cuts". This strategy is likely to be continued and could be perceived to gain momentum with the ascent to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan. China can be expected to continue to pin down India's scarce resources by keeping its sword poised on the northern borders. India's attempts to overcome its precarious economic condition will require greater global engagement in terms of trade. China would leverage this requirement to influence India's posture in the global and regional geopolitical power play. An orchestrated upsurge in the northern border tensions can be combined with a terrorist attack by Pakistan. India's reaction will be driven by a popular emotional upsurge that demands revenge against Pakistan. The reaction and its potential for escalation into the nuclear realm will then traverse the terrain that is best illustrated by Clausewitzian concept of the Trinity. Each state has its own trinity that is in tension with itself as well as with of the opposing side. Escalation and de-escalation are determined by the strength of three elements that generate forces that exert themselves on the magnet suspended between them. Pulls or pushes correspond to either escalation or de-escalation. The strongest force in the Trinity that could prevail in the aftermath of terrorist strikes would be the elements of hatred and enmity between the societies of India and Pakistan. The danger lies in the possibility that the forces of enmity and hatred could overcome the element of political rationality that has so far helped deescalate all previous India-Pakistan crises. However, what is of major concern is the combination of hatred and enmity and the uncontrollable elements of friction, play of chance and probability which can at its extreme, bring nuclear weapons into alert. Once on alert, the probability of accidental and inadvertent nuclear exchange increases. The focus of confidence-building measures in the Indo-Pakistan context must therefore be on reducing the risks of accidental nuclear war and curbing the impulse for a limited war.

LT. China feels threatened by Somaliland --- recognition could embolden Taiwan

Mishra 20 [Abhishek Mishra, "Taiwan's Africa outreach irks China", 08/29/2020, Observer Research Foundation, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/taiwans-africa-outreach-irks-china>, Accessed 01/12/2025] || ED

Based on an agreement reached on 26 February this year, Republic of China (Taiwan) recently opened a representative office on 17 August in Hargeisa, the capital of Republic of Somaliland, a self-declared autonomous region within Somalia that is not recognised internationally as a separate political entity. Reciprocally, Somaliland will also establish a "Somaliland Representative Office" in Taipei in September. This development highlights a reversal in trend of Taiwan's dwindling formal diplomatic relations since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016. Notwithstanding their different histories and status in international politics, Taiwan and Somaliland are two political entities aspiring to gain international recognition. Unsurprisingly, the development has sparked a diplomatic brawl and has attracted the ire of both China, which sees the Taiwan region as an inalienable part of China's territory, and Somalia, which has a similar view of Somaliland. For over fifty years, the Chinese government has consistently adhered to the 'One China' principle and has resolutely opposed any attempt to separate Taiwan from China. China's foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian expressed firm opposition to any form of official or political contact between Taiwan region and Somaliland. He cautioned that: "Don't make the mistake of seeking wiggle room where there is none. Those going against the trend to challenge the one-China principle will get burned and swallow the bitter fruit." Similarly, Somalia also cautioned Taiwan against interfering with Somalia's unity, integrity, and bypassing official channels. If need be, the Somalia Federal government will resort to necessary measures under international law to protect the nation's unity. On its part, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Beijing and has defended the move to establish representative office in Hargeisa by insisting that the Taiwanese people and government have sought to develop relationship with every country that values democracy and peace, and that the Taiwan-Somaliland

partnership is bound together by shared ideals and values of freedom, democracy, justice, and rule of law. The series of tweets and press releases from both sides have been carefully crafted in a manner that reflects ambiguity. It

is worth noting that although some form of an implicit ‘recognition’ of each other’s territories is certainly implied, the fact that ‘recognition’ is not directly stated suggests a careful approach being followed by Taiwan and Somaliland. Both are planning to develop their relationship in an incremental manner, starting with a less-structured relationship. By taking a slower approach, both are deliberately taking steps to ensure their actions do not antagonize China.

Taiwan and Somaliland are yet to establish formal diplomatic relations. Recognition and diplomatic relations do not go hand in hand and are separate process given the considerations of political sensitivities. Representative offices are not embassies per se but are a diplomatic mechanism to enhance bilateral cooperation. Exchanging representative offices does not constitute diplomatic recognition. It is a common practice for Taipei to have trade offices and commercial representatives even in countries where it has no diplomatic relationship. It has five trade offices in Africa that does not recognise Taipei, notably in South Africa and Nigeria, Africa’s two-largest economies. In 2019, Taiwan had 93 representative offices in countries with whom it did not have any formal diplomatic relations. Therefore, if Somaliland and Taiwan’s move to establish representative offices is restricted to purely commercial ties, as opposed to any form of political or diplomatic recognition, then there is a slight possibility of Beijing accommodating Taiwan’s commercial presence in Somaliland, and the wider Horn of Africa region. Since 2000, African countries have overwhelmingly recognised China as opposed to Taiwan primarily through the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) platform. One after another, countries such as Liberia, Chad, Senegal, Malawi, Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Burkina Faso have switched alliances by choosing China over Taiwan. From an African perspective, the decision to side with China is pragmatic and driven purely by economic considerations. Developing relations with the world’s second largest economy, China, provides African countries with an alternative to the erstwhile colonial powers in West. Beijing’s credentials as a prominent member of the ‘Global South’ helps its case. Beijing has flexed its economic heft by offering economic aid to a host of developing African countries with the aim of reducing Taipei’s diplomatic ties, diminish its status as a nation-state, isolate Taiwan from the international community, and compel the Taiwanese government to negotiate with China for the island’s reunification. Due to this continuous pressure and onslaught, only 15 countries currently maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, with the Kingdom of Eswatini being Taipei’s only partner in the African continent. In early 1960s, as African nations gained independence, both Beijing and Taipei sought to establish diplomatic ties across the continent and actively court African political movements to garner African recognition. Taiwan’s initial focus was on agricultural aid programmes to help African farmers grow rice by incorporating knowledge and technical sharing and offering large-scale training programs. Taiwan funded the programs, while African countries hosted delegations. However, its relationship frayed over time. Development aid did not translate into political support, cumulating in Taiwan’s ejection from the United Nations in 1971. At the time, 27 African countries voted in support of the resolution, thereby effectively denying

Taiwan’s legitimacy as an independent nation. Since then, People’s Republic of China has the advantage and has successfully strengthened its political, diplomatic, and economic presence in the African continent. Time

and again, African stakeholders have stated that they do not want to get caught in-between a Cold War scenario where they are forced to pick sides between US and China. Their principle purpose is to safeguard and promote African national interests. However, for China, there are certain issues that are extremely sensitive. These issues can be clubbed together under the acronym of “4THKXJ” as expounded by Eric Oleander, co-founder of the China-Africa Project. T #1: Tiananmen Square T #2: The Communist Party T #3: Taiwan T #4: Tibet Hong Kong Xinjiang These six sensitive issues are China’s “proverbial “red lines” that if crossed will prompt immediate retribution and effectively bring bilateral relations to a grinding halt.” The quicker African stakeholders understand these priorities of their Chinese counterparts across the negotiating table, the better it will bode for the China-Africa partnership. Within Africa,

various contrasting perceptions of the Taiwan-Somaliland agreement have begun to emerge. While some commentators suggest that Somaliland will become a hotspot for the emerging tensions between US and China, attract more foreign forces in the Gulf of Aden, and further complicate the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa, others appreciate Somaliland’s determination to forge ahead on a path of its own choosing, despite the looming fear of attracting

retribution for defying China. It goes without saying that both Taiwan and Somaliland would certainly welcome greater recognition from the international community. However, neither are in a position to deliver recognition the other wants or shape wider international views of the other. Creating unnecessary tensions over recognition is ill-advised.

However, the benefits that the agreement offers is purely economic. Taiwan remains an important economic actor and through this agreement, Taiwan can help develop Somaliland’s economy by investing in sectors such as agriculture, energy, fisheries, mining, public health, education, and information and communication technology. Similarly, Somaliland’s strategic location on the Red Sea and its natural resources has the potential to enable Taiwan to venture into the African continent. While the idea of recognition is alluring especially for people living in areas that are unrecognised, it is not as important as many believe. Ultimately, the exact nature of the relationship is more significant than the formal terms that are used to describe the relationship. What matters is the spirit of cooperation that underpins the relationship and the tangible steps they will take to cooperate in the future. Taiwan’s investment in Somaliland and Somaliland’s ability to give Taiwan an economic foothold in Africa makes the agreement potentially beneficial for both. At this stage, this is more important and urgent than any formal mutual recognition for Taiwan and Somaliland.

And recognition impedes on Taiwan and causes China to attack India --- they empirically do so when internationally threatened

Morris 22 [Amanda Morris, "Chinese incursions into India are increasing, strategically planned", 11/10/2022, Northwestern Now, <https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2022/11/chinese-incursions-into-india-are-increasing-strategically-planned/>, Accessed 01/12/2025] | | ED

"Knowing there are more incursions in the western sector is not a surprise," he said. "Aksai Chin is a strategic area that China wants to develop, so it's very critical to them. It's a vital passageway between China and the Chinese autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang." Finding solutions In a previous paper (published by Nature Humanities and Social Sciences Communications in 2021), Subrahmanian and his collaborators studied when incursions are most

likely to occur. They found that China attacks when it feels most vulnerable. “We found an uptick in incursions when China is experiencing economic stress, such as low consumer confidence,” Subrahmanian said. “We also see upticks when India gets closer to the United States.”

Now that Subrahmanian and his team understand when and where these incursions occur, they next plan to explore how to address them. The study authors believe military interventions should be a last resort. Instead, they suggest bilateral negotiations, developing early warning systems to predict when incursions might occur or bolstering India’s economy in order to challenge China’s economic dominance. “China’s robust economy results in increased aggression around the world,” Subrahmanian said. “No one wants a war — not just in terms of lives — but in terms of economic ripple effects. It would be an economic tsunami.”

NIL. No risk of war - China is too economically reliant on India.

Mishra 24 (Abhinandan Mishra, 10-27-2024, The Sunday Guardian, "China’s economic struggles prompt rapprochement with India", <https://sundayguardianlive.com/top-five/chinas-economic-struggles-prompt-rapprochement-with-india>)

In March 2024, **China's exports declined by 7.5% from the previous year, a larger drop than expected**; the decline was greater than the 2.3% drop that economists had predicted. Exports, which have been a key driver of China's economic growth, are facing pressures from weak domestic consumer spending and a struggling real estate sector. **Heightened trade tensions, particularly with the United States and the European Union, are making it difficult for Chinese exports to maintain strong growth heading into the next year.** Increased tariffs being levied on Chinese goods, including electric cars, are negatively impacting export dynamics. The growth in overall exports of autos has slowed significantly, and many consumer goods like shoes, toys, and smartphones have declined. Sources also pointed to weak domestic demand, which led to a notable drop in crude oil imports (a 10.7% decline compared to September 2023), suggesting reduced industrial activity. For the past few years, **China has relied heavily on exports to compensate for weaknesses in domestic demand.** However, the current decline in prices and reduced profit margins is making it harder for manufacturers to sustain this reliance. **With deflation impacting the economy, it has become increasingly difficult for domestic Chinese companies to maintain profitability and for consumers to make purchases;** hence, **accessibility to international markets is very much necessary right now. This brings the burgeoning Indian market and its aspirational lower middle class, along with the rapidly increasing middle class, into the picture. Policymakers in China have realised,** officials in New Delhi said, that **they needed unhindered access to the Indian market.** In July this year, Chief Economic Adviser V. Anantha Nageswaran, in the country's annual Economic Survey, proposed promoting foreign direct investments from China, thereby indicating that the government was ready to be flexible and shed its rigidity on Chinese investments into India.

N!. China-India war doesn't escalate

Smith 14 Jeff M. Smith is the Director of South Asia Programs and Kraemer Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington DC, The National Interest, February 10, 2014, "India and China: The End of Cold Peace?", <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/india-china-the-end-cold-peace-9853?page=show>

The China-India rivalry has not garnered the same attention as the China-Japan rivalry because their **disputed Himalayan border**—the longest disputed border in the world—**has been virtually free of violence** since the first major conflict in their history, the 1962 border war. **Compared with the volatile confrontations playing out in the East and South China Seas, the de facto China-India border,** the Line of Actual Control (LAC), has been relatively tame. It's also because since the 1980s, **Beijing and Delhi have crafted a durable framework to manage their border dispute** and cooperate in areas of mutual interest within the confines of a cold peace. **Today China and India are more politically and economically engaged than at any time in recent history. Bilateral trade expanded sixty-seven-fold from 1998 to 2012, and the Chinese and Indian armies held their first-ever joint military exercise in 2007, followed by two more in 2008 and 2013.** They have periodically found common agendas on global issues of mutual interest like world trade talks, climate-change negotiations, the primacy of state sovereignty, and the need to reform global-governance institutions. Most important, both **capitals** have shown a **commitment to mitigating recurring tensions** in the relationship. When crises do arise—as was the case when a Chinese border patrol intruded across the LAC for three weeks in April 2013—**they've responded with calm and patience to dissolve the crisis diplomatically.** At the government-to-government level relations are, in a word, civil.

A2 FDI

1. T - FDI creatures internal tensions - self sufficiency is key to Somaliland success

Norman 23' [Jethro Norman, Postdoctoral Researcher @ Danish Institute for International Studies, 3/3/2023, "Conflict in Las Anod and Crisis in Somaliland: External Investment, Intensifying Internal Competition, and the Struggle for Narrative", African Arguments, <https://africanarguments.org/2023/03/conflict-in-las-anod-and-crisis-in-somaliland-external-investment-intensifying-internal-competition-and-the-struggle-for-narrative/> //KG

The de facto state of Somaliland has earned the reputation of an island of peace, democracy and stability in an otherwise tumultuous Horn of Africa region. Yet this narrative, carefully curated over more than three decades, threatens to come crashing down with every shell that lands in the town of Las Anod. The recent conflict in the northern Somali city has been defined by increasingly polarised and irreconcilable narratives about the causes of the fighting. The Somaliland administration blames 'terror groups' for instigating the violence, whilst traditional authorities in Las Anod claim they are defending their community from rising insecurity and fighting for self-determination, legitimated by a widespread desire to reunite with Somalia. Yet if we want to understand the structural causes that undergird the current conflict, we need to first look to the evolving character of the Somaliland state and the consequences of greater international political and economic investment. **An influx of international support in the last five years has had destabilising consequences for the unrecognised state. It has raised the stakes, intensifying internal competition amongst political elites in the centre, whilst heightening perceptions of marginalisation in peripheral regions.** From this perspective, the

asymmetrical violence unfolding in Las Anod is not an exercise in counterterrorism (or defence against covertly deployed forces from Somalia) as the government in Hargeisa claims, but state suppression at least partially fuelled by international support. At the core of this conflict, therefore, is the changing relationship between clan and state in the context of a recent flurry of international investment. This insight is crucial not only for ending the conflict in Las Anod, but also for reflecting on the kind of political institutions that are currently being created across the Somali territories. The article draws on fieldwork in Somaliland, including in Las Anod in summer 2021, and conversations with residents in Las Anod and across many of Somaliland's regions during the course of the conflict.

On the evening of 26 December 2022, Abdifatah Abdullahi Abdi 'Hadravi', a popular young politician in Somaliland's opposition party, was killed by armed gunmen as he left a mosque in the town of Las Anod. Spontaneous protests erupted, directed mostly at Somaliland officials and forces stationed in the town. As tensions grew, Somaliland forces responded to Las Anod youth throwing stones by firing live ammunition, reportedly killing as many as 20 demonstrators.

Then, on 3 January 2023, the anti-government demonstrations escalated into armed conflict following the police killing of Mohamud Ali Saadle, the bodyguard of an influential local businessman. The Somaliland forces withdrew from Las Anod to defuse the situation, whilst a committee composed of town leaders and traditional elders was appointed to deliberate on the political future of the region. On 6 February, the committee attempted to publicly announce the intention to reject Somaliland and form a federal state under Somalia, to be called SSC-Khaatumo. However, the Somaliland forces, which had taken up positions outside of Las Anod, disrupted the announcement by shelling the town.

Despite promises of a ceasefire, indiscriminate shelling has continued, damaging key infrastructure including hospitals, electricity and water supply. By some estimates, the ongoing conflict has resulted in at least 150 dead, approximately 600 wounded, and 185,000 displaced from the Dhuubahante population alone (data concerning Somaliland casualties is pending). The fighting in Las Anod has drawn widespread international condemnation and raised fears that the conflict may escalate into a regional war.

The public killing of Hadravi was not an isolated incident, but the latest in a string of unresolved assassinations in Las Anod that are linked to decades of simmering tensions. Las Anod is the capital of Sool, a region caught between two colliding state building projects: Somaliland to the west and Puntland to the east (Hoehne 2015). Somaliland was borne out of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a predominantly Isaaq clan guerrilla resistance that fought, in coalition with other rebel movements, against the Somali dictatorship under President Mohamed Siad Barre. In 1988 the indiscriminate bombing of major Isaaq inhabited cities of Hargeisa and Burco under Siad Barre resulted in the systematic massacre of tens of thousands of civilians. This brutal episode of violence, and the notion of a state-sponsored Isaaq genocide, is central to the narrative of Somaliland independence, which was declared in 1991 following the collapse of the Somali state (Bradbury 2008).

Over 30 years later, Somaliland remains strongly associated with the Isaaq clan. Whilst the Isaaq mostly inhabit the central regions of Somaliland, Somaliland claims the territorial border of the former British Somaliland protectorate, that also includes other clans. This is the basis for Puntland's claim to Sool, which rests on a genealogical logic: the region is predominantly inhabited by the Dhuubahante clan, who are part of the larger Harti clan family that are the majority in Puntland. Whilst being suspended between two colliding state building trajectories can confer advantages to certain Dhuubahante elites (Hoehne 2015) it has also led to an enduring perception of political and economic marginalisation and insecurity. As fighting between Somaliland forces and clan militias on the outskirts of Las Anod continue, a contested and intensely polarised struggle around the dominant narrative has emerged. Fought largely through social media, this parallel war has drawn in participants from across the world, including diasporas, journalists, academics, and even rival US lobbying firms. This maelstrom of competing discourses tends towards explaining the drivers of the conflict in radically different and largely irreconcilable ways.

To make sense of this, we need to understand that the success of Somaliland rests in no small part on the efforts of an influential Hargeisa-centred elite and Somali-landers in the diaspora who have successfully produced and sustained a powerful narrative of statehood, inclusivity and peace in juxtaposition to (and in part because of) prevailing international understandings of chaos and violence in Somalia. Somaliland has – quite rightly – been lauded for its (relatively) democratic elections and largely successful attempts to keep the peace. For example, as Somaliland celebrated its 30 year anniversary two years ago, a steady stream of journalistic and academic pieces heaped praise upon the de facto state, describing it as 'a miracle on the Horn of Africa', and 'a beacon of democracy'.

Clearly Somaliland's shelling of its own citizens in Las Anod fits uneasily with this carefully curated image of peace and stability. That this narrative crisis for Somaliland might now be existential is reflected in the increasingly strained attempts to explain the conflict to the wider world. The Somaliland administration has consistently sought to frame itself as engaged in a counterterror operation. The President, Muse Bihi, repeatedly called the protesters terrorists, strongly implying Al-Shabaab was behind the unrest and downplaying the scale of popular support. Then, forces from Somalia and Puntland were alleged to be involved. Recently, a new bogeyman has been evoked: China, we are told, might be fomenting the unrest. This discourse has found some purchase within the international media. For example, one widely shared analysis oscillates between baseless allegations of Chinese involvement, and a highly reductionist claim that the current fighting can be explained by Darood/Dhuubahante power loss in 1991. These confused narratives disregard legitimate Dhuubahante grievances and obscure the underlying issues around resource sharing and decades of perceived marginalisation.

To be clear: there is no doubt that some Dhuubahante figures are playing on these tensions and inciting violence. There is also a real threat that, in the future, Al-Shabaab, who have operatives across the Somali territories and thrive in contexts of instability, might try to exploit the situation. Yet none of this means that there are not legitimate grievances in Sool that remain unaddressed and often unacknowledged. Nor does it mean that the solution is to shell the city into submission.

If we want to actually understand the Dhuubahante position, we could do worse than to look at the Las Anod declaration released on 6 February by the 33-member committee and 13 traditional elders appointed to represent the different Dhuubahante subclans.[1] The Las Anod declaration rejected Somaliland's claim to independence and announced the intention to form a federal state under Somalia, to be called SSC-Khaatumo. The document appeals to principles of self-determination and international law, and effectively announces Dhuubahante self-government. Thus far, most of the discussion of these demands has focused on this political desire to reunite with Somalia, and debate over the right to self-determination in the context of the legal status of

Somaliland's breakaway from Somalia in 1991. However, the declaration also highlights two very specific grievances related to the position of Las Anod within the Somaliland state building project: insecurity and economic underdevelopment.

The first concerns a string of unresolved assassinations that have targeted prominent intellectuals, businessmen and high-ranking officials. By some accounts, the killing of Hadravi was the latest in over 100 killings which began in 2009 but have increased in recent years. A lot of rumour surrounds these killings, and it is unclear whether one group or multiple groups are involved. However, there is a widespread perception within the Dhuubahante community that the Somaliland administration is either directly behind or implicitly enabling the killings. They argue that Somaliland has a large military and police presence in Las Anod, yet there have been no meaningful arrests for the assassinations. The second grievance concerns what the declaration calls an 'economic embargo' imposed by Somaliland designed to restrict the presence of international development agencies in the east and concentrate resources in Somaliland's central, Isaaq inhabited regions. This has led some to argue that the assassinations were part of the strategy to divide the Dhuubahante and maintain a perception of insecurity in the east. It is important to stress these are only rumours. There have been long-standing divisions within the Dhuubahante, and a significant number of those assassinated were from a largely pro-Somaliland subclan. Yet whilst the veracity of these claims remains unclear, what ultimately matters for understanding the present crisis is the narrative. Economic underdevelopment and insecurity are inherently interlinked issues that are the key to understanding the current conflict, and its resolution. These twin issues have intensified in recent years in tandem with an influx of international economic and political assistance to Somaliland.

In its three-decade search for international recognition, Somaliland has long lamented a lack of

international funding. Indeed, a lack of international investment is central to Somaliland's narrative as a standout example of self-governance that has succeeded against the odds. Academics have also suggested that, contra the conventional wisdom of the World Bank, the absence of international aid at the crucial moment of Somaliland's political formation may paradoxically be a key reason for its success. Whilst this may have been true for Somaliland's early years, it is no longer the case. Buoyed by promises of peace and stability, international partners including the US, the United Kingdom, the EU, the UAE and Taiwan have all announced various infrastructure, trade and military cooperation initiatives and increased their diplomatic presence in Hargeisa.

2. Econ high now

Shirwa 19'

Awale Shirwa, October 1 2019, MSc. Trade and Investment Analyst and Former Minister of Planning for Somaliland, "Somaliland fulfilled many of the basic requirements to attract foreign direct investment and winning investor confidence", *Horn Diplomat*, <https://www.horndiplomat.com/2019/10/01/somaliland-fulfilled-many-of-the-basic-requirements-to-attract-foreign-direct-investment-and-winning-investor-confidence/>, //DS

Stability, strategic location, government pro- Investments policies are good Ingredients to attract foreign investors. Horn of African Country (Somaliland, separated from the Former Somali Republic after the collapse of the union in 1991). In the three past decades, it made notable progress in many fronts. Stability, Democratic Process, Rule of Law and Economic dev't. Twenty years ago Somaliland was a country emerging from a civil war, there were hardly good schools, hospitals and parts of the country was not easily accessible. Access to clean water, health and education were difficult. Today, Somaliland is a stable, democratic and prosperous country, its economy is growing very fast thanks to a booming private sector. The private sector in Somaliland is the fastest-growing private sector in the region. Nearly more than a quarter-century on from the collapse of the "Somali Republic and The Re-Birth of Somaliland Republic", Somaliland has more going for it than any of its neighbouring countries i.e Yemen, Somalia. The future of this young country is bright and foreign investors are beginning to see that Somaliland is a potential destination for their investments.

The fundamentals (to attract FDI) are certainly in place in Somaliland. Somaliland is a country with a population of 3.5 million people, half of whom are working age and two-thirds are under 35 years old. The young generation is relatively well educated and ambitious. Country's GDP is growing at 3% a year¹ and is expected to continue doing so for the coming few years. In large the growth is driven by the unregulated economy (private sector) and increasing inflow of foreign direct investment, notably the heavy investment from Dubai for their operation in Berbera Port, Corridor and Berbera Airport. The return of the diaspora population is also having a positive impact on the local economy. Diaspora population not only brought back capital but they are creating new opportunities and transferring of the much-needed skills that were missing in the country in the past. The recently restored livestock export can boost the economy significantly.

3. T - FDI creates instability and corruption, empirically proven in Somaliland – 3 warrants

Jethro Norman, 6-20-2023, "Foreign aid and conflict in Somaliland", ROAPE, <https://roape.net/2023/06/20/foreign-aid-and-conflict-in-somaliland/> //Michi Synn's Partner
Foreign aid fostering conflict

In its three-decade search for international recognition, Somaliland has long lamented a lack of international funding. Academics have suggested that, contrary to the conventional wisdom of the World Bank, the absence of international aid at the crucial moment of Somaliland's political formation may be a key reason for its success. Whilst this may have been true for Somaliland's early years, it is no longer the case. Emboldened by promises of peace and stability, international partners including the US, the United Kingdom, the EU, the UAE and Taiwan have all announced various infrastructure, trade and military cooperation initiatives and increased their diplomatic presence in the capital, Hargeisa. The multi-million-dollar investment by UAE's DP World is transforming Berbera port into a 1 million container trade hub that is anticipated to reshape the regional economy. There has also been deepening security ties. The United Kingdom has funded and trained a controversial elite police unit, whilst Washington has been interested in establishing a new military base in Berbera.

This dizzying gush of international engagement intended to stabilise Somaliland has however had destabilising consequences for the whole region. Firstly, it has renewed hopes of Somaliland becoming internationally recognised as an independent state, dramatically raising the stakes, and intensifying competition amongst political elites over control.

The political crisis that emerged in summer of 2022 over delayed elections highlighted this increasingly fractious internal competition. In anti-government demonstrations in Hargeisa in August 2022, five civilians were killed in clashes with security forces, a grim harbinger of

what was to come in Las Anod.

If the increased stakes of statehood have resulted in competition in the centre of the region, then **it has done the opposite in the peripheries: uniting peripheral communities against Somaliland.** Much of the recent **infrastructural development is concentrated in the centre.** The Berbera corridor for example, cuts a neat line of economic opportunity from Berbera, through Hargeisa, and into Ethiopia. **This is an important dimension of the conflict in Las Anod.** The declaration to re-join Somalia made by traditional leaders in Las Anod decried an ‘economic embargo’ imposed by Somaliland designed to restrict the presence of international development agencies in the eastern regions. It is not only in Las Anod that resistance to the Somaliland state has grown. **Over the last decade, movements to establish counter-administrations have emerged in three out of Somaliland’s six districts, including in the otherwise peaceful western region of Awdal.**

The future of aid

This crisis highlights the need to re-design and refocus foreign aid and investment strategies. **A skilful Somalilander elite, including a sizeable diaspora, successfully courted international partners and sold them a vision they desperately wanted to hear: of a fledgling state striving for peace and democracy.** Aid and development **has been** criticised for becoming **increasingly ‘bunkerised’** and securitised **with international staff living in fortified compounds often sealed off from wider society** and reliant on specific local partners for information. This situation **makes it difficult** for many international staff **to** travel outside of the central regions of Somaliland, and **engage with the plurality of voices and political feelings within the territory.**

The answer is not to cut aid. Rather, there is a need for a more careful and equitable distribution of aid. This requires aid and development agencies to be more flexible and mobile. Another consideration is to engage diaspora organisations instead of international humanitarian agencies. Whilst this comes with its own set of risks, diasporic aid is less bureaucratic and can access areas that international practitioners cannot.

4. FDI leads to an over focus on non-critical economic sectors

Noah **Smith** (professor of finance at Stony Brook University; writer for the Sydney Morning Herald) “Financialisation debate: Does foreign investment starve the real economy?” October 28, **2015**,
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/financialisation-debate-does-foreign-investment-starve-the-real-economy-20151027-gkjstd.html#ixzz3wnQRHI39>

Interestingly, though, a team of economists may have just found that third factor. Gianluca Benigno, Nathan Converse, and Luca Fornaro have a new paper in which they propose something called **the “financial resource curse.”** This theory **says that the real culprit behind slow growth might not be finance itself, but rather large influxes of financial investment from foreign countries.** To understand the financial version of the so-called resource curse, it helps to remember what the original version was. The resource curse is the name economists give to the bizarre fact that countries with more natural resources tend to grow slower than countries without such endowments. A lot of the reason is political, but some is due simply to the math of exchange rates. The more oil or copper that a country exports, the more expensive its currency gets, and the more difficult it then becomes to export anything other than oil or copper. That’s called the Dutch disease. Benigno et al. postulate that capital inflows cause a sort of Dutch disease variant. **When foreign money flows into a country, it redirects the country’s resources toward things like construction, or other non-tradeable goods like finance. Manufacturing is starved for resources, and contributes less to the economy.** Capital inflows in particular tend to lead to a burgeoning finance sector, since banks and other financial businesses are necessary to direct and manage the incoming cash. **In the short term that causes a boom. But in the long term it’s deadly.** Manufacturing is the sector that has seen the highest productivity gains in recent decades. **That means that by depriving manufacturing, foreign capital inflows have the capacity to reduce productivity.** Benigno et al. use Spain as their prime example. Starting in the late 1990s, Spain began to experience a huge influx of capital from outside its borders. Much of this capital went to the housing sector. About this same time, productivity took a dive – Spain actually became less efficient. A bounty of foreign money seemed to leave the economy spinning its wheels.

5. Remittances solve the link

Schipani 21’

Andres Schipani (New Delhi correspondent of the Financial Times covering business, economics, politics and society in India, and the broader South Asia region, previously East and Central Africa bureau chief, Brazil correspondent out of São Paulo, Andes and Caribbean correspondent based between Bogotá and Caracas, and in the newspaper’s New York bureau as a markets reporter), Dec 16 2021, “Cultural connections and digital channels underpin growth of money transfer services led by ethnic Somalis”, *The Financial Times*.

<https://www.ft.com/content/0dbcc28b-aa6b-49fc-b386-f49c21dc0c3e>, //DS

Thirty years ago, Ismail Ahmed snuck from then war-ravaged Somaliland into neighbouring Djibouti, hidden on the back of a tipper truck. His brother, who was working in Saudi Arabia, sent him money to pay for a flight to London to take on a scholarship to study economics. “That’s when I really realised remittances were a key source of migrant money,” he says. Today, Ahmed is the founder and chair of the London-based Zepz, formerly WorldRemit Group: a cross-border digital payments service that has more than 11m users in 150 countries, and was valued at \$5bn in an August fundraising. “We are one of the largest independent digital money transfer businesses globally,” he explains over tea in Hargeisa, his hometown and the capital of the self-declared state of Somaliland. “Our first corridor of remittances was from the United Kingdom to Somaliland — that’s how we started. Then, we went global and, today we are among the top in Colombia and the Philippines, for example.” Ahmed established the company a decade ago. He funded it with around \$100,000 in compensation that he received after blowing the whistle on corruption in a remittance programme while working for the UN in Nairobi. At that point, he was already researching more efficient ways to transfer money across borders after having to pay fees to high street banks to send cash back to Somaliland when he was studying in the UK.

“Hargeisa was actually built with remittance money, so I grew up seeing remittances everywhere.”

Ahmed explains — noting that Somalis used an honour-based underground money-transfer system called hawala, which was then developed into a way to let expatriates send money back to Somaliland at close to zero cost.

Somalis working in other countries — they are strongly represented in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, for example — would hand their spare cash to traders there who were in need of money to buy stock. Those traders would, in turn, sell their goods in the country for which the Somalis’ money was destined, handing over the proceeds of their sales to a specific recipient. The close-knit and clan-based communities of Somalis provided enough trust that these transfers would be carried out in good faith. Remittances have also been sent to Somaliland via transfer shops and kiosks over the years. However, with the development of mobile money — which is booming in parts of Africa — the remittance market has entered a new phase. That was illustrated in August, when Zepz raised \$292m in new financing from equity investors including Farallon Capital, as well as existing shareholders LeapFrog, TCV, and Accel. Zepz was adopted as the company name earlier this year, after WorldRemit snapped up the remittance app Sendwave, which is focused on African and Asian markets, for \$500m. Fast-growing digital money transfer businesses have enabled migrants to send smaller emergency remittances that would not be possible at cash-based agent locations, “because of the minimum send amounts and higher minimum fees,” points out Ahmed. And they have proved crucial during the Covid-19 pandemic. “The phenomenal success of mobile money and digitisation, particularly in Africa, meant that, when physical locations were closed during lockdowns, people were often able to get their funds on their mobile money accounts or bank accounts,” he adds. In Somaliland, which has an economy worth \$3.5bn, remittances rose to more than \$1.3bn in 2020, up from \$1.1bn in 2019, according to the central bank.

Wherever Somalis go, they need to send money back, and for sending money you need trustworthy remittance companies” Saad Ali Shire, Somaliland’s finance minister “We have a community culture that mutually supports each other, a support system,” says Saad Ali Shire, Somaliland’s finance minister. “People who have it give it to their relatives, who don’t have it, for that you need to move money. Wherever Somalis go, they need to send money back, and for sending money you need trustworthy remittance companies.” Shire has experience in the sector, having been managing director in the UK for Dahabshiil, the biggest Africa-based remittances provider. Dahabshiil once won an injunction against Barclays, after the British bank tried to shut its account, prompting a campaign led by Somalia-born British athlete Mo Farah. For Somaliland, remittances are a big part of the unrecognised country’s economy, enabling a small state to become a thriving private enterprise. “Our community trusts each other a lot, due to family connections, cultural connections, clan connections — and Dahabshiil respects this,” says Abdirashid Duale, chief executive of Dahabshiil. His father, Mohamed Duale, is the “founding father” of Somali remittances, having started Dahabshiil — meaning “goldsmith” — in 1970, in the town of Burao. In the early 1990s, however, the Duale family had to flee the Somali civil war, when “all of a sudden, planes dropped bombs left and right.” Walking with nomadic communities, they crossed into Ethiopia. They finally ended up in the UK, before coming back to Somaliland to boost their business.

Today, the business has a presence in 126 countries and interests spanning from banking to energy to telecoms — as well as e-Dahab, a mobile money service. “Remittances are critical for the Somali communities worldwide,” says Duale. “Business is in our DNA. People here are very innovative in doing business, making investments and sending money.” Dahabshiil handles a large proportion of Somalia’s remittances, says Duale, in addition to remittances from and to other parts of Africa. “People always think of money coming from Western countries which is vital, but they forget about regional transactions, people buying goods in different parts of Africa and remitting money between countries on the continent and the Middle East,” Duale adds

A2 Counter-Terror

Non Unique: Al-Shabab is weak right now

Garamone 16 [Jim Garamone is a reporter @ the US DOD], 1-5-2016, "Africom Campaign Plan Targets Terror Groups", U.S. Department of Defense, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/639919/africom-campaign-plan-targets-terror-groups/> [DOA 12/16/24 YRM]

In the face of growing threats from the African continent, U.S. Africa Command has spelled out its theater campaign plan, officials said here yesterday. The plan is built upon the foundation of the strategy promulgated last year by Africom commander Army Gen. David M. Rodriguez, officials speaking on background told reporters traveling with Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yesterday, the chairman visited Africom's headquarters at Kelly Barracks here. Officials said Africom's campaign blueprint is a five-year plan with five lines of effort. The first is **neutralizing the terror group al-Shabab in Somalia, officials said, and transitioning this effort from a mission led by the African Union Mission in Somalia to one in which the Somali government secures its own territory. The second line of effort centers around the failed state of Libya, officials said, adding that the effort focuses on containing the instability in the country. Officials said the third line of effort is to contain Boko Haram in West Africa.** Fourth, officials said, Africom will focus on **disrupting illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and in Central Africa. Fifth, the command looks to build African partners' peacekeeping and disaster assistance capabilities, officials said.** This is a large job for a small command, an Africom official said. "The only permanent location we have is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti," he said. "Everything else is a very light footprint." The command does have cooperative security and contingency locations across the continent, officials said, noting these are essentially "cold bases" that would only be used in the event of an emergency. In West Africa, Dakar, Senegal, is one of the cooperative security locations and U.S. forces used it during the Ebola crisis last year, officials said. Officials said the bases also allow the command to protect American lives and property in the high-risk, high-threat posts. There are 15 of those posts in Africa, officials said. The theater campaign plan starts with neutralizing al-Shabab, officials said. U.S. forces have helped to train, equip and supply AMISOM forces that have played a central role in bringing stability to Somalia, officials said. **Al-Shabab has been pushed out of most of the major population centers and is only a power in the Juba River Valley,** an official said. However, the official added, al-Shabab "is not a spent force" and it remains a threat -- particularly in terms of targeted attacks against neighboring AMISOM contributors. Africom continues to monitor the al-Shabab threats to Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda in particular, officials said. "The emerging issue we've seen in al-Shabab over the past six months is the movement at the lower levels of individuals toward [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]," an official said. "Pro-ISIL sentiment is increasing in Somalia and we've seen some efforts by al-Shabab leaders to strike down these efforts. Al-Shabab leaders remain firmly allied to al-Qaida." Officials said this is an indication of the power of the ISIL "brand" in the extremist world. ISIL, especially after its success in Iraq and Syria, is viewed by extremists as a winning team, while al-Qaida is viewed as having waning operational capabilities. Al-Shabab has been manhandled by the AMISOM troops and the mid-level and lower extremists see ISIL as its savior, officials said. Core-ISIL has not accepted the al-Shabab splinters as members of the caliphate, officials said. "From our viewpoint, ISIL probably has very strict criteria for what groups they want to let into the fold," the official said. "[They] want to make sure the groups coming in can sustain themselves, that they have a plan and have an ability to move." The Islamic State affiliates in Libya and Boko Haram in Nigeria have been connected with the extremists in Syria and Iraq for a number of years, the officials said. Boko Haram "officially" joined the terror network last year, officials said. "Since then, what we've seen is an enhancement of Boko Haram's propaganda and messaging efforts," an official said. "That has been the most apparent result of the ISIL-Boko Haram ties. Their videos are more professional and tighter."

Link turn:

- 1) Recognition of Somaliland creates a successful model of governance and stability, directly challenging Al-Shabab's narrative that governance in the region is inherently corrupt or ineffective. By showcasing an alternative to extremism, it weakens Al-Shabab's ideological appeal and recruitment efforts
- 2) Recognition allows Somaliland to formally join regional and international counterterrorism efforts, facilitating intelligence sharing and coordinated military action. This significantly disrupts Al-Shabab's ability to operate across borders and weakens its overall influence in the region.

No scenario for miscalc with terror groups:

- 1) Technological requirements-producing weapons requires extremely sophisticated procedures
- 2) Multiple barriers-empirically proven by Damascus
- 3) Logistically impossible-detonating thousands in a short period of time only produces a small effect

Risk of accidents is overstated.

Eken '17 Eken, Mattias (PhD Candidate in Modern History, University of St Andrews). "The understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn't match reality." The Conversation, 14

March 2017, <https://theconversation.com/the-understandable-fear-of-nuclear-weapons-doesnt-match-reality-73563> // SC

But **whenever we talk about nuclear weapons, it's easy to get carried away with doomsday scenarios and apocalyptic language.** As the historian Spencer Weart once argued: "You say 'nuclear bomb' and everybody immediately thinks of the end of the world: **Yet the means necessary to produce a nuclear bomb, let alone set one off, remain incredibly complex--and while the damage that would be done if someone did in fact detonate one might be very serious indeed, the chances that it would mean "the end of the world" are vanishingly small.**" In his 2013 book *Command and Control*, the author Eric Schlosser tried to

scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 Damascus incident, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn't detonate, Schlosser claims that "if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone". But that's not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the Titan II missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon would have caused destruction across 0.2% of the state. That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes. Overdoing it. Claims exaggerating the effects of nuclear weapons have become commonplace, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the early War on Terror years, Richard Lugar, a former US senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the Western way of life. What he failed to explain is how. It is by no means certain that a single nuclear detonation (or even several) would do away with our current way of life. Indeed, we're still here despite having nuked our own planet more than 2,000 times—a tally expressed beautifully in this video by Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto). While the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty forced nuclear tests underground, around 500 of all the nuclear weapons detonated were unleashed in the Earth's Atmosphere. This includes the world's largest ever nuclear detonation, the 57-megaton bomb known as Tsar Bomba, detonated by the Soviet Union on October 30 1961. Tsar Bomba was more than 3,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. That is immense destructive power—but as one physicist explained, it's only "one-thousandth the force of an earthquake, one-thousandth the force of a hurricane." The Damascus incident proved how incredibly hard it is to set off a nuclear bomb and the limited effect that would have come from just one warhead detonation. Despite this, some scientists have controversially argued that an even limited all-out nuclear war might lead to a so-called nuclear winter, since the smoke and debris created by very large bombs could block out the sun's rays for a considerable amount of time. To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, 2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy less than 5% of the territory of the US. Of course, if the effects of nuclear weapons have been greatly exaggerated, there is a very good reason: since these weapons are indeed extremely dangerous, any posturing and exaggerating which intensifies our fear of them makes us less likely to use them. But it's important, however, to understand why people have come to fear these weapons the way we do. After all, nuclear weapons are here to stay; they can't be "uninvented." If we want to live with them and mitigate the very real risks they pose, we must be honest about what those risks really are. Over Egging them to frighten ourselves more than we need to keeps nobody safe.

A2 China

1. New Somaliland president is pro-China

Paravinci and Ross 11-19

Giula Paravinci and Aarnon Ross, 11-19-24, "Somaliland opposition leader Cirro wins election", *Business Day*,

<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2024-11-19-somaliland-opposition-leader-cirro-wins-election/> //DS

"While I think there are concerns that [Cirro] may opt for a radical departure from his predecessor, jettison the MOU [deal with Ethiopia], embrace dialogue with Somalia, there's a big difference between campaigning and governing," said Matt Bryden, a strategic adviser with the Sahan think-tank.

Cirro's victory could also signal closer ties with China, a major investor in the Horn of Africa.

According to Somali media reports, Cirro has in the past questioned the value of Somaliland's ties with Taiwan, which China sees as part of its territory, in its quest for recognition.

1. DL - East Africa already knows China is exploitative, they aren't allowing expansionism. Dok 19

Akol Nyok Akol, international policy consultant from South Sudan specializing in addressing critical policy issues facing the social, economic, and political development of Africa, and Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., "Why China Is Taking over Africa's Resources One Country at a Time," 31 July 2019, DOA: 1-31-2020) //Snowball //strikethrough of rhetoric

China's activities in the African continent have yet to receive the attention they deserve in the West. China's behavior in Africa is important for three major reasons. First, China is the source of significant investment capital twinned with a prodigious ability to create infrastructure, both of which are needed by many African states. Second, China's behavior in Africa provides the rest of the world with insight into how it will behave towards other states, particularly the states of the Global South, as it becomes equal in power with the United States. Third, what China is doing in Africa does not augur well for the rest of the world. China's activities and behavior in Africa may only be described as neo-colonial and exploitative of African peoples and the environment.

The Chinese influence in South Sudan also results from road construction and infrastructure development. South Sudan will provide thirty thousand barrels per day of crude to the Export-Import Bank of China to fund the construction of roads and infrastructure development. This includes the construction of a 392-kilometer (244-mile) road from Juba to Rumbek and from Juba to Nadapal on the Kenyan border, which is being built by a Chinese firm using Chinese technology and manpower.

South Sudan's neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, received loans for infrastructure projects from the Chinese. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has introduced dynamic infrastructure projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway. The railway connects Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The railway was Ethiopia's first railway in over a century and Africa's first fully electrified line. The railways cuts travel time from the capital Addis Ababa to Djibouti from two days by road to twelve hours.

The Standard Gauge Railway appears to be providing revolutionary infrastructure to stimulate economic growth, but the details demand scrutiny. The project cost nearly \$4.5 billion, partly financed by the China Export-Import Bank. The railway uses Chinese trains, Chinese construction companies, Chinese standards and specifications, and operated by the China Railway Group Limited (CREC) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation.

As might be expected from this Sino-imperialist project, the railway has been plagued with technical and financial challenges, which calls into question Ethiopia's dependence on Chinese technology and debt-finance. The African country is struggling to repay its loan to China and reap the benefits of this dynamic infrastructure project. In 2018, Addis Ababa negotiated with China and structured its loan terms from fifteen to thirty years. In next door Kenya, as a result of heavy borrowing by the government, China may seize the port of Mombasa. According to Kenya's Daily Nation newspaper, the terms are Draconian and state "neither the borrower [Kenya] nor any of its assets is entitled to any right of immunity on the grounds of sovereignty, with respect to its obligations."

In addition to these abuses, the Chinese presence in Africa is defined by a purposeful isolation from the indigenous population. Chinese firms bring in their own drivers, construction workers, and support staff, denying these employment opportunities to Africans, and often live apart from the African societies in which they reside.

2. China's surveillance can never go global Pei 24

Minxin Pei, 2-6-2024, "Why China Can't Export Its Model of Surveillance," archive.is, <https://archive.is/TtuyC>, accessed 1-12-2025 //savgdharia

Over the past two decades, Chinese leaders have built a high-tech surveillance system of seemingly extraordinary sophistication. Facial recognition software, Internet monitoring, and ubiquitous video cameras give the impression that the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has finally accomplished the dictator's dream of building a surveillance state like the one imagined in George Orwell's 1984. A high-tech surveillance network now blankets the entire country, and the potency of this system was on full display in November 2022, when nationwide protests

against China's COVID lockdown shocked the party. Although the protesters were careful to conceal their faces with masks and hats, the police used mobile-phone location data to track them down. Mass arrests followed. **Beijing's surveillance state is not only a technological feat. It also relies on a highly labor-intensive organization.** Over the past eight decades, the CCP has constructed a vast network of millions of informers and spies whose often unpaid work has been critical to the regime's survival. It is these men and women, more than cameras or artificial intelligence, that have allowed Beijing to suppress dissent. Without a network of this size, the system could not function. This means that, **despite the party's best efforts, the Chinese security apparatus is impossible to export.** The CCP's state security system has worked well for China. But as **the country faces unprecedented economic headwinds, the apparatus will become subject to new pressures and strains.** The party-state may find it harder not only to maintain its technological stranglehold but **also to rely on the involvement of civilian informants** who act as the lifeblood of its surveillance regime. STRONG, BUT NOT TOO STRONG China has two main domestic security agencies. There is the Ministry of State Security, which is responsible for external espionage and domestic counterintelligence.

T: China better since they prioritize Economics over Ideology; solves more problems

Sun 2017(Degang Sun, July 2017, "China and the Middle East security governance in the new era on JSTOR," Contemporary Arab Affairs, https://www-jstor-org.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/stable/48599927?searchText=China%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20security%20governance%20in%20the%20new%20era&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DChina%2Band%2Bthe%2BMiddle%2BEast%2Bsecurity%2Bgovernance%2Bin%2Bthe%2Bnew%2Bera&ab_segments=0%2FSYC-6744_basic_search%2Ftest-2&refreqid=fastly-default%3A3bc16c42b53ef3f571ee37db95f915f0, DOA: 12-15-2022)ET

First, **the West emphasizes 'democratic governance', while China values 'people's livelihood governance'.** **China and the West have different understandings of the causes of regional conflicts: the West believes that the root cause is the lack of democracy, i.e., the so-called 'Middle East democracy deficit'** (Elbadawi and Makdisi 2010). Therefore, the key fundamentally to solving conflicts is democracy, the rule of law and the improvement of human rights. However, **China believes that the root causes of Middle Eastern conflicts are economic and social contradictions, and thus the key to good governance is to promote economic and social development.** The Chinese believe that the West's regional governance reflects the Western style of focusing on the 'symptoms'. **Therefore, China's position in conflict areas reflects the idea of 'cure the disease by keeping the body fit'. The West, on the contrary, emphasizes the establishment of pluralist democracy instead of promoting economic and social development.**

Solves poverty and protests

Sildo 2020(Katarzyna W. Sidlo, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department. CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research, 20 July 2020, "The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests?," European Institute of the Mediterranean, <https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-role-of-china-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-mena-beyond-economic-interests/>, DOA: 12-15-2022)ET

China has emerged over the past decade as a major development provider in the MENA region, but also in the close neighbourhood of the region such as in the Horn of Africa, Sahel and Pakistan. This takes the form of direct investments, development aid and loans. **Over the past ten years, China has made investments and contracts in the region for around USD 140 billion (American Enterprise Institute, 2020), and in 2016 it eclipsed the UAE to become the leading investor in the region** (Han & Rossi, 2018). In its "Visions and Actions" paper (2015) that frames the objective of the BRI, **China promotes the concept of "developmental peace", in opposition**

to the Western notion of “democratic peace”. For China, economic development is a major source of stability and peace. Disputes and conflicts are as China sees it less likely in regions that benefit from economic development, and the BRI is the embodiment of this foreign policy stance (Andersen & Jiang, 2018). Chinese investments have the potential to play a critical role in the post-conflict reconstruction of countries like Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen, or in the development of much-needed infrastructures across the region, with long-term impact on the development of these countries. Many of the region’s crises and conflicts have been rooted in economic causes, such as the lack of public services and job prospects. In 2018-19, waves of popular protests shook the regimes and state structures in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, Egypt and Sudan, calling for greater economic development and reduction of inequalities (“Protests are making a comeback”, 2019). Even stable countries like those of the GCC consider the Chinese BRI as playing an important role in advancing their much-needed economic reform and diversification agendas (Dongmei & Wenke, 2019).

1. T: China better due to conflict mediation

Balasubramanian 2021(Poornima Balasubramanian, Poornima Balasubramanian is a Dr TMA Pai Fellow and Doctoral candidate at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India. Her research interests include Geopolitics of MENA, India- MENA relations, International Negotiation, Peace & Conflict studies, 16 October 2021, "China’s Approach to Mediating Middle Eastern Conflicts," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinas-approach-to-mediating-middle-eastern-conflicts/>, DOA: 12-15-2022)ET

On October 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed the formation of a forum in the Middle East to foster multilateral engagements with “equal participation of all stakeholders.” The forum seeks to “enhance mutual understanding through dialogue and explore political and diplomatic solutions to security issues in the Middle East.” At the same time, states would have to express their support for the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal as a “precondition to get membership in the forum.” Iran has been involved in a web of rancorous political dynamics as part of its rivalry with Saudi Arabia, as seen in Tehran’s support to the Houthis in Yemen, its objective to maintain influence over Iraq’s politics, and its proxies active in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. Iran’s tensions with Israel have also largely been responsible for the latter’s increasing engagement with the Arab states in recent times. Relations between Iran and Turkey also seem to be teetering as a result of layers of divergences (the Syrian conflict and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) laid over their limited convergences of interests (questioning the status quo in Middle Eastern order). Against such an unstable backdrop, it is questionable whether the states in the Middle East will come forward to participate in the China-led forum by backing the nuclear deal. There seem to be only lean prospects of even neutral states like Oman getting on board right now. With a very low probability of the forum acting as a platform to accommodate diverse views or act as a mediating framework, this initiative might well reach a dead end. Having said that, the proposal is indicative of China’s deepening interest in conflict management in the Middle East. As the definition goes, conflict resolution generally seeks to resolve incompatibilities of interests and behaviors that drive conflict by recognizing and addressing the underlying issue. Conflict management, by contrast, is very much restricted to those actions that prevent further escalation of the conflict by controlling its intensity through negotiations and interventions, among other mechanisms. China seems to be playing the peace-broker card out of its broader Middle Eastern security imperatives. First, and most prominently, China, as the largest importer of oil from the region, has to ensure that its energy security remains unhindered. Second, as the rift between the United States and China grows, the Middle East presents itself as an attractive ground for China to challenge the U.S. position with its economic might and its subtly penetrating political involvement. Finally, sudden spurts in tensions near the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf have alarmed China into tightening the security of its stakes in the Middle East. This concern has become more salient after the roll out of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Therefore, it is important for China to ensure some degree of stability in a region that been constantly vulnerable to conflicts. Unlike the United States, and like Russia, China has managed to maintain a working relationship with the major powers of the region – Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey alike – as well as the middle powers and weak states. China, with the help of Russia, has effectively resisted the United States’ push for U.N. sanctions on Iran. More significantly, it has bought the silence of these Middle Eastern states on issues related to its treatment of

Uyghurs and on the Hong Kong issue. However, to what level can China afford to extend itself to cater to the wish lists of these states? The United States still prevails as the most powerful extra-regional actor in the Middle East, with a strong alliance system that has Israel and Saudi Arabia as its two pillars. Washington's reach and persuasiveness were demonstrated through its ability to mobilize support for Israel's normalization of relations with some of the major Arab states. The superpower has so far been very much successful in winning the support of the regional powers to take actions against Iran, but that seems to have been hindered by the lack of endorsement from Europe. Nevertheless, this cannot totally shake the United States' position in the Middle East. **For China, however, mediation diplomacy can help cultivate a public image of its intentions to broker peace in the Middle East.** Such gestures can possibly fetch Beijing a conducive environment to widen its sphere of influence to make sure its core interests and security are not at risk. While Iran and some other Middle Eastern states seem to be looking up to China to play a stabilizing force that can resolve conflicts in the region, Beijing has restricted its focus to conflict management measures such as conducting negotiations, offering mediation, and providing economic support and other prudent diplomatic maneuvers. **China's mediation efforts have long stuck to its so-called principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of these states.** At the same time, alongside its rise in the world order, China has been channeling resources toward managing conflicts in the Middle East, as part of its grand mission to project itself as a responsible great power. **Over the years China's footprints in the Middle East has proliferated, and it has gone from leaving the burden of conflict management to the other extra-regional powers in the region to playing a notable role in some of the peace efforts. This includes its role in management of the Syrian and Yemeni crises and of the Sudanese negotiation process in the larger Middle East and North Africa region.** Irrespective of whether practical results were yielded or not, the Asian giant's actions have been suggesting its aspirations in the Middle East, in consonance with its interests and capability. It is tilted more toward conflict management, enough to secure its stakes and dividends, instead of dipping its feet into the puddle of military and political interventions.

1. DL - China's influence is failing in Djibouti

Sébastien SEIBT, 9-4-2021, "Djibouti-China marriage 'slowly unravelling' as investment project disappoints", France 24, <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210409-djibouti-china-marriage-slowly-unravelling-as-investment-project-disappoints>

Djibouti-China marriage 'slowly unravelling' as investment project disappoints Africa Djibouti, a major geopolitical crossroads in the Horn of Africa, goes to the polls in a presidential election on Friday. Much of the international discourse about the country focuses on China bringing it into its economic orbit through the Belt and Road Initiative. But experts say that **Djibouti illustrates the limitations of China's vast investment and loans project. China might not have played a major role in Djibouti for as long as President Ismail Omar Guelleh, who is running for a fifth term, has held office** but it is expected to maintain its economic grip on the east African state after the election.

In many ways the relationship between Djibouti and China is a [case study](#) in how Beijing is using its global infrastructure investment strategy, the [Belt and Road Initiative](#), to aggrandise its economic influence and strengthen its position as the top investor in Africa – a major geopolitical priority, with its booming economies and populations.

But it is also the story of how a small African country, devoid of natural resources, has opened itself to international powers in order to profit from its strategic location at the entrance to the Red Sea.

In accepting vast inflows of Chinese capital and loans, Djibouti now finds itself in a situation of such economic dependence that it "risks threatening its autonomy", Sonia Le Gouriellec, a Horn of Africa specialist at the Catholic University of Lille, wrote in the [Revue de Défense Nationale](#) (National Defence Review).

1. DL - China can't become a military hegemon AND it's structurally constrained.

Latham 23, Professor of International Relations, Macalester College, Senior Fellow, Defense Priorities, Washington D.C.-based think tank (Andrew Latham, April 6, 2023, "China: A great power but not a superpower," The Hill, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3936751-china-a-great-power-but-not-a-superpower/>)

But **China today falls far short of superpower standing**. To be sure, China dominates its home region economically and exercises considerable influence farther afield. But **it lacks the ability to project military power beyond its immediate hinterland, is facing a concerted effort to balance it diplomatically and militarily across the Indo-Pacific region, has almost no soft power resources to exploit, is not the hub of a globe-spanning alliance system and remains more a rule-taker than rule-maker in the global institutional space.**

All this being the case, the conclusion is **undeniable: While China is unquestionably both a regional power and a great power, when it comes to superpower status, it simply doesn't make the cut.**

Nor, it must be said, **is it likely to ascend to the status of superpower any time soon.** China's **population is both getting old and shrinking; its economy looks increasingly like those of other countries that have come to be mired in the so-called "middle income trap"; and its once bright geopolitical star has begun to fade as countries around the world begin to take steps to balance against what they see as an increasingly belligerent great power.**

1. NU: Absent containment, China will naturally reform itself

Mueller 21 (John Mueller, John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University, 5-18-2021, "China: Rise or Demise?," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/china-rise-or-demise>, DOA: 3-23-2022)ET

Interestingly, current policy prescriptions for dealing with the China problem mostly array rather mild, even pablum-like, measures. They include working with allies and with other countries in Asia, strengthening the capacity to understand China, applying diplomatic pressure, bargaining carefully, compromising, and cooperating on common interests such as pollution, climate change, and North Korea. Proposals additionally recommend avoiding effectively collaborating with China's repressive policies, countering China's efforts potentially to control communication networks, encouraging transparency, maximizing positive interactions with the Chinese people and with the Chinese diaspora, maintaining competitiveness and our values, abandoning domestic discord, and indulging in postures of balancing.²⁰² **None of these proposals seem very radical, although balancing, as discussed**

earlier, is problematic and very likely unnecessary. One useful measure might be to increase the number of Chinese students accepted in the West. There already is a considerable brain drain from China ranging well into hundreds of thousands of people.²⁰³ Facilitating that process seems a winner for host countries, and those students who go back are likely to have a broader perspective. However, it is important to stress that, as former Ambassador Freeman puts it crisply, **"there is no military answer**

to a grand strategy built on a non-violent expansion of commerce and navigation."²⁰⁴ In a 2007 book, **Susan Shirk noted that "although China looks like a powerhouse from the outside, to its leaders it looks fragile, poor, and overwhelmed by internal problems."**²⁰⁵ **That condition does not seem to have changed.** The subtitle of Shirk's provocative and informed book is *Fragile Superpower*, but those two words may not be the best descriptors of China. It is not clear that the word "superpower" is all that helpful, but insofar as it conveys much meaning, it suggests the possession of a large nuclear arsenal and the military capacity to intervene anywhere on the globe—although interventions by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by the United States in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya proved to be costly fiascos for the intervening superpowers.

China doesn't appear to be in that class. It does have some border issues, wants to have a presence on the seas (aka the global commons), and lusts after Taiwan. But **it does not seem to have much interest in military intervention more broadly beyond being a major contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions.**²⁰⁶ **And its nuclear arsenal has been capped for decades at a few hundred warheads, a full order of magnitude below that of the United States, which continues to spend billions to upgrade its vast arsenal.** The word "fragile" might also be at least a bit off-kilter because it implies susceptibility to abrupt shattering. China

does not seem to be in that condition—even if it goes into economic decline, it could hang around in its present form for decades. A more appropriate adjective might be "insecure," a word Shirk uses multiple times in her text. Similarly, McMaster was impressed when he visited China by the "profound insecurity" he found there.²⁰⁷ And David Shambaugh points to a "deep insecurity" in a "profoundly paranoid Chinese party-state" in which the country's "rulers fundamentally fear political subversion by outside actors."²⁰⁸ Some of that quality can be seen in China's excessive fear that layoffs from failed state enterprises will result in social unrest, in its massive efforts to wall itself off by policing the internet and criminalizing suspicious contact with foreigners, and in its bizarre program to shield private firms from risk by inserting Communist Party controllers into their management. It can also be seen in its desperate, even draconian, policies to counter terrorism in Xinjiang and mainly peaceful demonstrations in Hong Kong—even to the point of grandly promulgating a national security law in which it preposterously puts everyone on the planet on notice that any comments that are offensive to China are subject to punishment by life imprisonment. And its criminalization of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" is not only an instance of self-parody, but it also strongly suggests deep insecurity. There is insecurity as well in regime practices that appear to be designed to create a zombie citizenry to accompany its zombie enterprises. Westad characterizes the educational system as one in which "conformist mediocrity is rewarded above unsettling brilliance."²⁰⁹ And, as Shambaugh discusses, the population is routinely bombarded with repetitive slogans that the recipients are supposed to repeat back verbatim while bewildered (or beguiled) foreigners who do so are deemed to be "friends of China." He also notes that "Chinese officials tend to reflexively parrot whatever the slogan of the week or month is, and they regularly denounce foreign parties for

‘hurting the feelings of the Chinese people.’” **Practices like that, he suggests, “do not reflect a mature, confident, and secure power.”** Nor does “Chinese officialdom’s zero tolerance for criticism and inability to apologize for—or even explicitly recognize—mistakes.”²¹⁰ An example of that robotic insensitivity is in its response in 2021 to a BBC report asserting that guards had committed rape in Xinjiang re-education camps. Rather than seeking to investigate the validity and scope of the allegations and to discipline any perpetrators, officials instantly proclaimed that the report was “wholly without factual basis” and that the women interviewed were “actors disseminating false information.”²¹¹ The insecurity is scarcely new. Even before the rise of Xi Jinping, China was assiduously working worldwide to counter the subversive threat presented by Falun Gong, a tiny religious sect rooted in a Buddhist tradition that advocates self-improvement, gentle exercises, and meditation. The violent suppression of protest at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square took place in 1989 during the reign of the great reformer, Deng Xiaoping, while the importance of combatting the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism was first declared in 1998.²¹² This brings to mind Broadway star Carol Channing’s quip about Al Jolson’s practice of turning up his dressing room radio to drown out the applause for other acts: “Now that’s insecurity!” **From a policy perspective, the problem with China is not that it is so much of a direct threat but that it is deeply insecure. Policies of threat, balance, sanction, boycott, and critique are more likely to reinforce that condition than to change it. The alternative is to wait, and to profit from China’s economic size to the degree possible, until someday it feels secure enough to reform itself.**²¹³

Taiwan collab

Recognition weakens Somaliland-Taiwan relations

Kao ’23 (Anthony Kao [Anthony Kao is a writer who focuses on East Asian geopolitics and locales with a contested sense of nationhood], 7-6-2023, “‘Shared status’ fuels closer Taiwan and Somaliland partnership,” Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/6/shared-status-fuels-closer-taiwan-and-somaliland-partnership>)//Shwillett

In Lou’s view, Somaliland’s unique electoral system (which mandates three national parties as a check on clan rivalries), and inability to properly register voters around Las Anod, create practical challenges that Somaliland needs time to tackle. Lou also cites an article from the American Enterprise Institute to suggest that China is meddling in Las Anod – although researchers with extensive experience in the region doubt such claims. These sentiments align closely with the Somaliland government’s position. “In Somaliland, we elect our presidents. But we also elect our parties [beforehand]. It’s not easy to have so many elections. Elections are expensive, and we also have to spend money protecting our country from external threats,” said Somaliland’s Representative to Taiwan, Mohammed Hagi. “While it’s a weakness we don’t have elections on time, the reasons are technical and financial, not because our politicians don’t want to. Other than Taiwan [which has provided equipment like iris scanners], we also don’t receive anything from other countries to help with elections.” It is not surprising that **Taiwan’s stance matches so closely with Somaliland’s, given Taipei’s diplomatic presence relies on Somaliland’s de facto independence.** “Compared to other countries with diplomatic offices in Somaliland – like the [United Kingdom], Denmark or [United Arab Emirates] – **Taiwan has far more specific and politically important bilateral relations, premised on a shared status as de facto states.**” Jethro Norman, a researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies focused on conflict and humanitarianism in East Africa, told Al Jazeera. **“Relations between the two are both an act of solidarity and a way to enact sovereignty in the absence of international recognition.”** According to Norman, the Las Anod conflict threatens to unravel Somaliland’s narrative as an independent state. The eastern regions of Somaliland, including Las Anod, contain clans who prefer to be part of Somalia and not Somaliland. Resolving the conflict may require the Somaliland government to compromise on its sovereignty – something that might also jeopardise ties with Taiwan given that Somalia recognises China.

The partnership is key to protecting the Red Sea

Kagwanja 11-21 (Peter Kagwanja, 11-21-2024, “What Somaliland's 2024 elections mean for the China-Taiwan rivalry in the Horn,” Pan African Review, <https://panafricanreview.com/what-somalilands-2024-elections-mean-for-the-china-taiwan-rivalry-in-the-horn/>)//Shwillett

Internally, these strategies have left Somaliland badly divided (amid debilitating inter-clan violence in Las Anod), stoked Somali nationalism and fuelled tensions across the region and beyond, shattering Somaliland’s image as an “oasis of stability” in the Horn of Africa. As Somaliland’s democracy lost its shine, its drive for international recognition has also become a steep climb. The convergence of these scenarios contributed to the electoral defeat of President Abdi and the Kulmiye Party. In a word, the opposition candidate, Abdirahman (“Irro”) Mohamed Abdullahi

and his Waddani party, rode to power on the crest wave of popular discontent over the ties with Taiwan, deadly conflict in the Eastern part of the region, the port-for-recognition deal with Ethiopia and a growing appeal of reunification with Somalia, especially among minority clans in Somaliland. The post-election agenda is to heal Somaliland, end clan-based conflict and restore its democracy. But the return of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States is a black swan in the geopolitics of the Horn. The region should brace for heightened geopolitical competition as the United States and its allies—including Taiwan—move to counter China's growing influence in Africa after the 2024 FOCAC summit in Beijing. This article examines the impact of major strategies and counter-strategies on Somaliland's election and the future of power in the region. The first of these pre-election strategies is President Muse Bihi Abdi's 'Taiwan Strategy'. After three decades of unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, without a single international recognition of Somaliland's statehood, recognition was a major election issue in 2024. Upon coming to power in 2017, President Muse Bihi Abdi became attracted to Taiwan's strategy of establishing unofficial ties across the world, which enabled countries to regularly cooperate and support the island. He set out to secure for Somaliland the same "unofficial legitimacy" that Taiwan had enjoyed worldwide for decades. On July 1, 2020, he signed a partnership deal with Taiwan, which stepped up its partnership with Somaliland. This enabled Somaliland to open a "Representative Office" in Taipei, and, in turn, Taiwan established one in Hargeisa as one of its 110 embassies and representative offices worldwide by 2021. The primary aim of the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership, according to Taiwan's Representative to Somaliland Allen C Lou, was to "prevent the Red Sea from becoming China's" and secure the Red Sea route. In the 2023-2024 period, partnership with Taiwan injected momentum into Somaliland's efforts to gain US recognition. By hedging against Chinese influence in the region and maintaining close relations with Taiwan, President Abdi hoped to deepen Somaliland's informal ties with the US, where it set up a representative office in Washington. Riding on Taiwan's diplomatic access, Bihi was able to visit Washington in March 2022. Ahead of the November election, Taipei gave US\$2 million in support Somaliland's election and President Abdi's re-election bid. This exacerbated tensions with Somaliland's opposition, which campaigned for Somaliland to break ties with Taiwan. In February 2024, Taiwan declared that it would establish more representative offices in Africa in the coming years. This will be an uphill climb after the exit of President Abdi in Hargeisa and the rise of China's influence in the aftermath of the 2024 Beijing FOCAC Summit, which was attended by 54 out of 55 African Union member States that recognise the 'One-China Principle', with the exception of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Taiwan's lone ally in Africa. Arguably, President Abdi lost to his partnership with Taiwan. After the election, Taipei's African diplomacy is on the backfoot.

Somaliland is geographically key to global trade---the partnership creates a foothold against China

Feldman 11-27 (Nadan Feldman [Nadan Feldman is a Ph.D. candidate at the History Department of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research deals with the ties between Nazi Germany and American Corporations from the rise of Hitler to the end of WWII, and focuses on the ideological-political stands of American Tycoons, CEOs and other senior figures in a group of powerful, influential US corporations.], 11-27-2024, "All Eyes on Somaliland: The Tiny African State That's Key to Israel's War on Houthi Terror," [//Shwillett](https://archive.ph/mSDjD)

In recent years, Somaliland allowed the UAE to use the port of Berbera and its airport as a base for its military activity in Yemen, in return for a \$440 million UAE investment in Berbera port, according to foreign media. The UAE mediation follows its military cooperation with Israel, the two having reportedly established a joint military-intelligence base on the Socotra archipelago, one of the world's remotest, most ecologically diverse islands, situated in the Gulf of Aden near Yemen. "There are numerous advantages for Israel in recognizing Somaliland as an independent state," points out Ahmet Vefa Rende, a researcher at the Middle East Institute at Turkey's Sakarya University, who first reported the contacts between Israel and Somaliland. "These include enhancing its national security, countering regional threats, creating new economic opportunities, improving diplomatic relations and supporting democratic governance in the region. In a region where many powers are competing for a share due to its strategic location and resources, Israel is expected to enter the race through local partner Somaliland, which is excluded by many countries." For local regional powers, the location of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa lends it strategic importance along with economic appeal. It is situated at the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb straits, through which a third of the world's maritime cargo is shipped, and its long coastline along the bay provides it with diverse maritime accessibility – to East Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Sea and from there to the Indian Ocean. The most important element in this maritime tapestry is the Red Sea sphere, which over the last year has become a focal point for international tension due to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping routes that affect the entire global trade. Last December, several firms had to halt shipping near the Red Sea. Maersk was the first, after the Houthis attacked two of its ships. It was followed by China's OOCL, Germany's Hapag-Lloyd, France's CMA CGM and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), the world's biggest shipping firm. On December 14, 2023, the Houthis announced the blocking of the Bab al-Mandeb straits, and exactly one

month later they fired a missile from the Yemeni port of Hudeidah at an American ship. The missile was shot down. The firing of the Houthi missile came after American forces attacked the port to enable the resumption of regular maritime traffic. The Houthis continued their terrorist activities along with their efforts to hit targets in Israel using drones and ballistic missiles.

Control of the regional waterways is key to hegemony

Qiao '24 (Jun Qiao, "The Geopolitical Importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait: A Strategic Gateway to Global Trade – MEPEI," 2024, Middle East Economic and Political Institute, <https://mepei.com/the-geopolitical-importance-of-bab-el-mandeb-strait-a-strategic-gateway-to-global-trade/>)/Shwillett

A strait with great geopolitical importance, the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, also known as Bab el-Mandeb, commonly known as the “Strait of Bab el-Mandeb” or “the Mandab Strait” (the Mandab Strait) is a strait that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, between Yemen and Djibouti at the southern end of the Red Sea. It is located between the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula in Asia and the African continent, thus linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The strait is about 26-32 kilometers wide, with an average depth of 150 meters, between which some volcanic islands are scattered. At its narrowest point, of only 26 kilometers, it limits tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide entry and exit lanes. With the increasing global economic integration and energy demand, the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become increasingly prominent. The importance of the Bab el-Mandeb also lies in its geographical location and geopolitical value as a shipping lane. It not only affects global trade activities, but also has a direct impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Due to the recent dire situation in this “Gate of Tears” region, on February 19, 2024, the Council of the European Union issued a statement indicating that the year-long EU Red Sea convoy operation would be officially launched from that day onwards. As such, the operation would be carried out along the main sea lines of communication in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as international waters in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf. Since the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, is a vital maritime channel connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe, this paper will thoroughly examine the geopolitical and geographic position's significance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, including its strategic role in global trade, energy transportation, geopolitical competition, and maritime security. It will also discuss the policy trends of the strait's neighboring countries and China's strategic interests and countermeasures in this region. The Strategic Position of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Geopolitical Competition and Maritime Security The political stability of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is crucial for the security of neighboring countries and the world at large. Recently, the region has been troubled by political turmoil, posing serious risks to regional security. Safeguarding the political stability of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait area is essential for the security of global trade and energy transportation. Moreover, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is strategically located at a key point of the Belt and Road Initiative, making it a focal point of competition among major powers, such as US, China, Japan, and Europe. In this context, the geopolitical importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait continues to grow. Countries are vying for influence in the region through political, economic, and military means. As for the maritime security, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region faces a significant threat from piracy, which severely endangers the security of global trade and energy transportation. In recent years, Somalia-based pirates have targeted passing vessels, causing substantial losses. Combating piracy and ensuring maritime security is a challenge that requires international cooperation. The marine environmental protection in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is becoming increasingly prominent and should not be disregarded. Overfishing, marine pollution, and ecological destruction are serious issues that threaten the region's marine ecosystems and fishery resources. Strengthening marine environmental protection is essential for maintaining the ecological balance and sustainable development of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait area.

Hegemonic decline immediately causes great power war and collapses existential response

Zachary **Keck 14.** Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, “America's Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, 1-24, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/>

It's difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most

destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on International Relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War. The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.

Taiwan independence

Affirming delegitimizes the AU and emboldens secessionism

Idaan 7-4 (Gulaid Yusuf Idaan, 7-4-2024, "A Legal and Diplomatic Analysis of Somaliland’s Quest for International Recognition," Modern Diplomacy, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/04/a-legal-and-diplomatic-analysis-of-somalilands-quest-for-international-recognition/>)/Shwillett

African Union: Security fears. The need to adhere to the AU’s policy of maintaining all borders of countries is one of the primary factors in denying recognition to Somaliland. Indeed, the far-reaching policy of the AU, in spirit, and practice through the adopted charter, is to maintain peace by avoiding conflicts and preventing instability through secession. Consequently, in the case of the recognition of the secession of Somaliland, other parts may also want to secede and resultantly lead the whole region to be unstable and fragmented. In all this, however, the AU has engaged with Somaliland at varying levels by acknowledging its stability and success in governance. The understanding here is that the AU takes cognizance of Somaliland’s exercise of democratic governance, its relative peace, and even its feat of economic development even though the regional body has not shown such congenial attributes towards its quest for official recognition from the organization. At times, the stand taken by the AU is an implementation of subsidiary commitments to general issues of post-colonial state borders and

regional stability. United Nations: Democracy versus the Rule of Law. The United Nations (UN) has not been that keen to work closely with Somaliland but has rather based its recognition on the territorial integrity of Somalia. This UN position is a reflection of the general international policy not to tamper with independent borders to avoid a potential domino effect that may result in chaos and anarchy around the globe. However, the UN has worked with Somaliland in some development projects as a result of the recognition of the capacity and stability of Somaliland.. This limited engagement by the UN with Somaliland signifies, though, a recognition of the de facto statehood of Somaliland and its contribution to regional stability. Therefore, this pragmatic approach can allow the UN to support developmental and humanitarian efforts in Somaliland, respecting the international legal norms over issues of state recognition. In this sense, it means that the UN's careful dealings with Somaliland are a reflection of how hard it will be for the country to get full recognition under the current international legal framework. The main factor in the non-recognition of Somaliland has indeed been political considerations. Many do see its recognition as legitimizing the cause of other separatist movements. States fear recognizing the state of Somaliland since it might be a precedent that will threaten their territorial integrity. It is common among those nations with strong separatist movements or great regionalism caused by a large ethnic or cultural identity. For instance, Spain with Catalonia and the Basque Country, China with Taiwan and Tibet, and Russia with several of its ethnic regions, the interests at stake for any strong state require a hard line against an acknowledgment of new entities emerging from secessionist efforts. The international political environment creates a condition where states are cautious and reluctant to encourage the support of secession efforts in nearly any form, no matter how reasonable the appeal might be.

The DPP is closely tied to Somaliland's secessionist ambitions

Mohamed '22 (H.E. Amb. Mohamed A. Awil, 2-22-2022, "Why we all must say no to secessionist's visit to Taiwan," Global Times, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202202/1252859.shtml>)/Shwillett

The historical relationships between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Somalia are traced way back to ancient time. This has enabled Somalia to hold China in high regard both as a partner and friend in its developmental agenda. Somalia also respects China's sovereignty, especially its one-China principle which has been held by the PRC for decades and implies that there is only one sovereign state of China; thus, by extension Taiwan is part of China and not a separate state. On February 9, the spokesperson of the Chinese foreign ministry elaborated the position of the Chinese government on a visit by Somaliland's officials to Taiwan. The spokesperson is quoted as saying "There is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The one-China principle is a widely recognized norm governing international relations and the common consensus of the international community. The DPP authorities are not only seeking secession but also fanning the flames to undermine the independence and unification of other countries, harming others without benefiting themselves. They will only end up shooting themselves in the foot." It is all too obvious that the recent visit by a Northwestern Somalia (Somaliland) secessionist Kulmiye political party to Taiwan with intentions of selling Somaliland's secessionism ideology is an effort in futility since the one-China principle is universally recognized within international relationships. As a country, Somalia has gone through a lot and it is not ready to engage with highly corrupt institutions like Taiwan's ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which is dealing with selfish money-hungry individuals in Somaliland who have no regard for their citizens' interests. Taiwan's DPP has just made another blunder by engaging with a Somalia region that is similarly seeking recognition. It is like committing suicide since Somaliland is a part of Somalia that used to be under the British Protectorate and does not support secession. In their response to Elham Garaad, a letter dated February 15, 2022, the United Kingdom (UK) advised Somaliland to reach an agreement with the rest of Somalia and be acceptable to the regional states and the rest of the African Union. This is a clear implication that the UK recognizes the UN's Charter on Sovereignty, Independence and Unification of States. It should therefore be noted that the engagement of the Taiwan Ruling Party, i.e., the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with proponents of Somaliland secession will simply lead to: Bringing Instability and Insecurity in Somalia. Undermining Peace and Stability of Somalia. Taiwan interfering with Somalia's internal affairs, independence and unification against the UN Charter and relevant international agreements. Unfortunately, this could be good news for only a few in Somaliland with deep pockets, which could be a curse on the welfare and development of the common people. That's why we must say NO to secessionists and their absurd actions.

Taiwanese moves toward independence guarantee nuke war---the US gets drawn in.

Tan 17 (Andrew Tan [Associate Professor with the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University.], "Could China and America Go to War over Taiwan?" National Review, August 3 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-china-america-go-war-over-taiwan-21769?page=show>)/Shwillett

Recent developments have revived the so-called 'Taiwan problem' in regional and global security. These developments point to a coming crisis over Taiwan that would present a grave security challenge to the United States and its allies, including Australia. While attention is currently focused on the Korean peninsula on account of North Korea's development of ballistic missiles capable of hitting the United States, the crisis over Taiwan is quietly brewing in the background. Indeed, it is over Taiwan that the United States and China could potentially come into direct conflict. For China, Taiwan represents unfinished business from the Chinese civil war and an emotionally charged nationalist issue that far outranks tensions in North Korea, the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. For a rising great power that is increasingly confident, assertive and nationalistic, the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland is its top, non-negotiable national priority. The sweeping electoral victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the January 2016 elections in Taiwan, winning both the presidency and a majority in the legislature, has set Taiwan on a collision course with a Chinese administration that is increasingly impatient for reunification to occur. The result set off shock-waves in China, as it represented the failure of its strategy of winning over the Taiwanese people through economic integration: a policy it pursued in cooperation with the previous Kuomintang (KMT) government. In choosing the DPP, the Taiwanese electorate has sent a strong message of repudiation to China. The increasing economic integration with China as a result of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 2010, and the prospect of even closer integration through the subsequent signing of a services agreement, alarmed many Taiwanese, who fear being dominated economically by China and do not want large numbers of mainland Chinese in Taiwan. Greater contact with mainland Chinese in recent years has accentuated the different identities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese society, which is civil, polite, considerate and democratic (a mirror image of its former colonial power, Japan), has been shocked at the uncivil attitudes of some Chinese visitors. The Taiwanese have also watched the failure of 'one country, two systems' in Hong Kong, where a sense of alienation from China led to the Occupy Movement in 2014 and the emergence of a nascent independence movement. The new DPP government under Tsai Ing-wen has signalled it will not push for independence. But it is undertaking various initiatives that strengthen Taiwan's de facto independence from China: diversifying its economy to reduce dependence on China, increasing military spending and developing its own weapons systems, such as submarines. The strategic context of intensifying US-China rivalry due to China's rise and its challenge to US hegemony over East Asia has meant that Taiwan has increasingly assumed greater strategic significance to the United States. Although the new US president, Donald Trump, initially attempted to woo China in the hope that it would help the United States deal with North Korea, the most recent developments suggest that the Trump administration will eventually harden its position on China. In June 2017, the US Senate voted to allow US warships to visit Taiwan, and a US\$1.4 billion arms sales package was also approved. Given the strong anti-China sentiments in the US Congress, it is unlikely that the United States would fail to respond to any use of force by China over Taiwan. The United States is also aware that a takeover of Taiwan by China would significantly alter the regional status quo, with immense consequences for regional and global security. Unlike the previous Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s and 1995-96, another Taiwan Strait crisis today would be fraught with immense risks. The huge asymmetry in military force in favour of China provides China with a military option it did not previously have. The US strategy drawn up to counter China, known as Air Sea Battle (subsequently renamed as the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons or JAM-GC), envisages direct attacks on the Chinese mainland, targeting command centres and critical military nodes — surely a recipe for rapid escalation into a nuclear exchange. Any precipitous move by China in the near future could result in a series of uncertain and unwanted outcomes.

1. Outweigh on timeframe – china won't overtake the US until 2080

Szu Ping Chan, 1-31-2024, "Weakened China won't overtake US economy 'until 2080'", Telegraph, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/01/31/china-never-overtake-usa-worlds-biggest-economy-citi/> //michi synn's partner + ms

China's crushing debt levels, ageing population and an ongoing property crisis means it may never surpass the US to become the world's largest economy, according to a leading investment bank. Nathan Sheets, global chief economist at Citi and a former US Treasury official in the Obama administration, said it was no longer "inevitable" that the size of the Chinese economy would surpass the US after Beijing lost major ground over the past two years. Mr Sheets pointed out that China had in

fact shrunk in comparison to the US. **China's economy is now equivalent to 65pc of America's GDP, down from 75pc in 2021.**

A2 Hegemony

No hedge lashout – we acquiesce.

Emma **Ashford**, xx/10/2021, Strategies of Restraint, Foreign Affairs,
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/strategies-restraint> recut JZ

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus: that as the world's "indispensable nation" and with no competitor, the United States had little choice but to pursue a transformational agenda on the world stage. Over the last few years, however, that consensus has collapsed. **A growing chorus of voices are advocating a strategy of restraint—a less activist approach that focuses on diplomatic and economic engagement over military intervention. And they have found a receptive audience.** In that, they have undoubtedly been helped by circumstance: the United States' failed "war on terror," the rise of China, and growing partisan polarization at home have all made it clear that U.S. foreign policy cannot simply remain on autopilot. Even those who continue to argue for an interventionist approach to the world typically acknowledge that their strategy must be shorn of its worst excesses. Where restraint was once excluded from the halls of power and confined largely to academic journals, now some of its positions have become official policy. Although President Donald Trump's record was defined by dysfunction more than any coherent strategy, he did wind down the war in Afghanistan, raise doubts about the value of U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and question the wisdom of military intervention and democracy promotion. President Joe Biden, for his part, has begun withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, has initiated a review of the United States' global military posture, and has taken steps to stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship. In 2019, Jake Sullivan, now Biden's **national security adviser, wrote, "The U.S. must get better at seeing both the possibilities and the limits of American power." That this sentiment is now openly embraced at the highest levels of government** is nothing short of a win for those who have long called for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy. Yet victory also raises a question: Where do restrainers go from here? With Washington having dialed down the war on terrorism, the most politically popular of their demands has been achieved. Now, they are liable to face an uphill battle over the rest of U.S. foreign policy, such as how to treat allies or what to do about China—issues that have little public salience or on which the restrainers are divided. Although often bundled together by Washington's foreign policy elites and derided as isolationists, the members of **the restraint community include a diversity of voices, running the gamut from left-wing antiwar activists to hard-nosed conservative realists.** It should not be surprising that they disagree on much. If the restraint camp focuses on what divides them rather than what unites them, then it will find itself consumed with internecine battles and excluded from decision-making at the very moment its influence could be at its height. But **there is a viable consensus, a path forward for restraint that can achieve the most important goals, alienate the fewest members of the coalition, and win new converts. This more pragmatic strategy, which would entail the gradual lessening of U.S. military commitments,** would not achieve the most ambitious of the restrainers' goals. But it has the best chance of moving U.S. foreign policy in a more secure and more popular direction. A DEBATE REBORN. The idea that the United States is uniquely qualified to reshape the world has manifested itself in different ways in the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of a bipolar world. Humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, and counterterrorism—all were attempts to mold the world according to American preferences. Yet **the unipolar moment** has largely **failed** to live up to expectations. Today, **democracy is in decline, there are more state-level conflicts than at any time since 1990, the war on terrorism has largely failed, and China's rise has given the lie to the notion that the United States can prevent the emergence of peer competitors.**

Somaliland is geographically key to global trade---the partnership creates a foothold against China

Feldman 11-27 (Nadan Feldman [Nadan Feldman is a Ph.D. candidate at the History Department of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research deals with the ties between Nazi Germany and American Corporations from the rise of Hitler to the end of WWII, and focuses on the ideological-political stands of American Tycoons, CEOs and other senior figures in a group of powerful, influential US corporations.], 11-27-2024, "All Eyes on Somaliland: The Tiny African State That's Key to Israel's War on Houthi Terror," [//Shwillett](https://archive.ph/mSDjD)

In recent years, Somaliland allowed the UAE to use the port of Berbera and its airport as a base for its military activity in Yemen, in return for a \$440 million UAE investment in Berbera port, according to foreign media. The UAE mediation follows its military cooperation with Israel, the two having reportedly established a joint military-intelligence base on the Socotra archipelago, one of the world's remotest, most ecologically diverse islands, situated in the Gulf of Aden near Yemen. "There are numerous advantages for Israel in recognizing Somaliland as an independent state," points out Ahmet Vefa Rende, a researcher at the Middle East Institute at Turkey's Sakarya University, who first reported the contacts between Israel and Somaliland. "These include enhancing its national security, countering regional threats, creating new economic opportunities, improving diplomatic relations and supporting democratic governance in the region. In a region where many powers are competing for a share due to its strategic location and resources, Israel is expected to enter the race through local partner Somaliland, which is excluded by many countries." For local regional powers, the location of Somaliland in the Horn of Africa lends it strategic importance along with economic appeal. It is situated at the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb straits, through which a third of the world's maritime cargo is shipped, and its long coastline along the bay provides it with diverse maritime accessibility – to East Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Sea and from there to the Indian Ocean. The most important element in this maritime tapestry is the Red Sea sphere, which over the last year has become a focal point for international tension due to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping routes that affect the entire global trade. Last December, several firms had to halt shipping near the Red Sea. Maersk was the first, after the Houthis attacked two of its ships. It was followed by China's OOCL, Germany's Hapag-Lloyd, France's CMA CGM and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), the world's biggest shipping firm. On December 14, 2023, the Houthis announced the blocking of the Bab al-Mandeb straits, and exactly one month later they fired a missile from the Yemeni port of Hudeidah at an American ship. The missile was shot down. The firing of the Houthi missile came after American forces attacked the port to enable the resumption of regular maritime traffic. The Houthis continued their terrorist activities along with their efforts to hit targets in Israel using drones and ballistic missiles.

Control of the regional waterways is key to hegemony

Qiao '24 (Jun Qiao, "The Geopolitical Importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait: A Strategic Gateway to Global Trade – MEPEI," 2024, Middle East Economic and Political Institute, <https://mepei.com/the-geopolitical-importance-of-bab-el-mandeb-strait-a-strategic-gateway-to-global-trade/>)//Shwillett

A strait with great geopolitical importance, the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, also known as Bab el-Mandeb, commonly known as the "Strait of Bab el-Mandeb" or "the Mandab Strait" (the Mandab Strait) is a strait that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, between Yemen and Djibouti at the southern end of the Red Sea. It is located between the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula in Asia and the African continent, thus linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The strait is about 26-32 kilometers wide, with an average depth of 150 meters, between which some volcanic islands are scattered. At its narrowest point, of only 26 kilometers, it limits tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide entry and exit lanes. With the increasing global economic integration and energy demand, the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has become increasingly prominent. The importance of the Bab el-Mandeb also lies in its geographical location and geopolitical value as a shipping lane. It not only affects global trade activities, but also has a direct impact on the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Due to the recent dire situation in this "Gate of Tears" region, on February 19, 2024, the Council of the European Union issued a statement indicating that the year-long EU Red Sea convoy operation would be officially launched from that day onwards. As such, the operation would be carried out along the main sea lines of communication in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as international waters in the Red Sea, the

Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Persian Gulf. Since the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, located at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, is **a vital maritime channel connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe**, this paper will thoroughly examine the geopolitical and geographic position's significance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, including its **strategic role in global trade, energy transportation, geopolitical competition, and maritime security**. It will also discuss the policy trends of the **strait's neighboring countries and China's strategic interests and countermeasures in this region**. The Strategic Position of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Geopolitical Competition and Maritime Security The political stability of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is crucial for the security of neighboring countries and the world at large. Recently, the region has been troubled by political turmoil, posing serious risks to regional security. Safeguarding the political stability of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait area is essential for the security of global trade and energy transportation. Moreover, the Bab el-Mandeb **Strait** region **is** strategically **located at a key point of the Belt and Road Initiative**, **making it a focal point of competition among major powers**, such as US, China, Japan, and **Europe**. In this context, the geopolitical **importance of the** Bab el-Mandeb **Strait continues to grow**. **Countries are vying for influence** in the region through political, economic, and military means. As for the maritime security, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region faces a significant threat from piracy, which severely endangers the security of global trade and energy transportation. In recent years, Somalia-based pirates have targeted passing vessels, causing substantial losses. Combating piracy and ensuring maritime security is a challenge that requires international cooperation. The marine environmental protection in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait region is becoming increasingly prominent and should not be disregarded. Overfishing, marine pollution, and ecological destruction are serious issues that threaten the region's marine ecosystems and fishery resources. Strengthening marine environmental protection is essential for maintaining the ecological balance and sustainable development of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait area.

Decline is inevitable – attempts to maintain hegemony disrupts the peace

John **Rapley**, 9/04/2023, America Is an Empire in Decline. That Doesn't Mean It Has to Fall,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/04/opinion/america-rome-empire.html> // JZ

America likes to think of itself in garlanded terms. The shining city on a hill. The indispensable nation. The land of the free. There's something to each sobriquet, to be sure. But there's another phrase, not always so flattering, that also applies to the United States: global empire. Unlike the other notions, which originated in the birth struggles of the Republic, this one dates to the final stages of World War II. At the famous Bretton Woods Conference, the United States developed an international trading and financial system that functioned in practice as an imperial economy, disproportionately steering the fruits of global growth to the citizens of the West. Alongside, **America** created NATO to provide a security umbrella for its allies and organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to forge common policies. Over the second half of the century, this system attained a degree of world domination no previous empire had ever known. **In the past two decades, however, it has sunk into decline**. At the turn of the millennium, the **Western world accounted for four-fifths of global economic output. Today, that share is down to three-fifths and falling**. While Western countries struggle to restore their dynamism, developing countries now have the world's fastest-growing economies. Through institutions like BRICS and OPEC and encouraged by China, they are converting their growing economic heft into political power. From this view, it can seem that **the United States is following the course of all empires: doomed to decline and eventual fall. America**, it's true, **will never again enjoy the degree of global economic and political domination it exercised in the decades after the war**. But it can, with the right choices, look forward to a future in which it remains the world's pre-eminent nation. To call America an empire is admittedly to court controversy or at least confusion. After all, the United States claims dominion over no countries and even prodded its allies to renounce their colonies. But there's an illuminating precedent for the kind of imperial project the United States forged after the war: the Roman Empire. By the fourth century, that empire had evolved from a conquest state into one where the Eternal City remained a spiritual center but actual power was shared across the provinces, with two centers of imperial authority: one in the east and another in the west. In return for collecting taxes, provincial landholding elites enjoyed the protection of the legions, their loyalty to the empire cemented by a real share in its benefits and what the historian Peter Heather calls a unifying culture of Latin, towns and togas. Like modern

America, Rome attained a degree of supremacy unprecedented in its day. But the paradox of great imperial systems is that they often sow the seeds of their own downfall. As Rome grew rich and powerful from the economic exploitation of its peripheries, it inadvertently spurred the development of territories beyond its European frontiers. In time, the larger and politically more coherent confederations that emerged acquired the ability to parry — and eventually roll back — imperial domination. In the same way, **America's decline is a product of its success.** Although **developing countries** grew more slowly in the postwar period than their Western counterparts, they still **grew.** By the end of the century, **they had started to convert that expanding economic clout into political and diplomatic power.** Not only had they begun to acquire the capacity to negotiate better trade and financial agreements, but **they also had a crucial bargaining chip in the form of two resources Western businesses now needed: growing markets and abundant supplies of labor.** One of the earliest signs of this more assertive periphery came at the 1999 World Trade Organization conference in Seattle. A group of developing countries joined forces to halt the proceedings, ending the longstanding practice of a handful of Western allies hammering out a draft agreement for presentation to delegates. Since then, **developing countries have gradually reduced their dependence on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, formed lending institutions and begun experimenting with trading arrangements that lessen their dependence on the dollar.** Rome, the story goes, was toppled by so-called barbarian invasions. The truth is more complex. Within a single chaotic generation on either side of the year 400, several confederations crossed into the western half of the empire. On Roman soil, these immigrants then formed themselves into still larger alliances — like the Visigoths and Vandals — that were too powerful for the empire to defeat. Some commentators have been quick to see modern migration into the West as an equally destructive force. But that's the wrong lesson to take from Roman history. Its economy was primarily agricultural and steady. If one power rose, another had to fall, since you could not simply expand the resource base to support both. When Rome proved unable to defeat the new contenders, it lost a source of taxes from which it could not recover. Today's situation is completely different. **Thanks to technological change, economic growth is no longer a zero-sum game, possible in one place but not another.** Although **Western countries no longer dominate manufacturing and services, they still retain an edge** in knowledge-intensive industries like artificial intelligence and pharmaceuticals or where they've built brand value, such as in luxury goods, sports and entertainment. Economic growth — even if more slowly than in the periphery — can continue in the West. But it will require workers. Given that Western societies, with declining birthrates and aging populations, aren't producing enough workers, they will have to come from the global periphery — both those who immigrate to the West and the many more who stay at home to work in businesses serving Western supply chains. Migration may have eroded the Roman Empire's wealth. Now it's what stands between the West and absolute economic decline. Other parallels with Roman history are more direct. The eastern half of the Roman Empire rode out the collapse of the west in the fifth century and was even able to establish a hegemonic position over the new kingdoms in its lost western territories. This situation could have survived indefinitely had the empire not expended vital resources, starting in the late sixth century, in an unnecessary conflict with its bitter Persian rival. Imperial hubris drove it into a series of wars that, after two generations of conflict, left both empires vulnerable to a challenge that would overwhelm them both in just a few decades: a newly united Arab world. For America, it's a cautionary tale. **In responding to the inevitability of China's rise, the United States needs to ask itself which threats are existential and which are merely uncomfortable.** There are **pressing dangers facing both the West and China, such as disease and climate change, that will devastate all humanity unless nations tackle them together. As for China's growing militarization and belligerence, the United States must consider whether it's really facing Thucydides' trap of a rising power or simply a country defending its widening interests.** If the United States must confront China, whether militarily or — one hopes — just diplomatically, it will inherit big advantages from its imperial legacy. The country still has sources of power that nobody can seriously rival: a currency that faces no serious threat as the world's medium of exchange, the deep pools of capital managed on Wall Street, the world's most powerful military, the soft power wielded by its universities and the vast appeal of its culture. And America can still call upon its friends across the globe. All told, it should be able to marshal its abundant resources to remain the world's leading power. To do so, though, **America will need to give up trying to restore its past glory through a go-it-alone, America First approach.** It was the same impulse that pushed the Roman Empire into the military adventurism that brought about its eventual destruction. The world economy has changed, and the United States will never again be able to dominate the planet as it once did. But the possibility of building a new world out of a coalition of the like-minded is a luxury Rome never had. America, whatever it calls itself, should seize the opportunity.

A2 NEG

A2 Djibouti

1. They have no ev that US wants to intervene in Djibouti

Bluth 18 - Professor of International Relations and Security – University of Bradford; London [Bluth C (2018) Nuclear Security – Transcending the Policy Objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. In: Esfahani MK and Mohammadi A (Eds) Nuclear Politics in Asia. The Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series. Routledge: Abingdon, Oxon. 30-47]

International terrorism is clearly a significant threat to international security. In terms of state-sponsored terrorism, it is mostly a regional threat in the Middle East. There remains a risk of attacks on the US homeland and Europe as jihadist networks continue to harbour ambitions to mount such operations. The emergence of ISIS has exacerbated the threat. But this threat has to be seen in its proper perspective. The **defensive measures** that have been put in place **to prevent major terrorist attacks have been mostly successful**. In the United Kingdom, of the 20 odd major terrorist plots which resulted in major arrests **since 2001, only three came to** some level of **fruition and only one resulted in the deaths** of people other than the terrorists themselves (MI5, n.d.). **International terrorists do not have the capacity** to destroy a country, or even to destroy a city, **and they have little chance of achieving their political objectives. At best they can achieve minor disruptions**, which are tragic for the people who suffer, but from the long experience of terrorist threats that Western states have face it is clear that they are not a significant threat to resilient liberal democracies. As for **the possibility of terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons**, this still **remains a purely hypothetical risk**. As Peter Bergen has demonstrated, **Al Qaeda's efforts in this regard were rather amateurish and fanciful**. The **historical experience shows that constructing a nuclear device is very hard even for states that can devote massive resources to the problem (e.g. Libya) and 16 put in place a major infrastructure for such a purpose**. The only realistic prospect for terrorists to acquire nuclear devices would be from a state (Frost 05). **The only "rogue" state that currently has nuclear devices is North Korea and it has no connection to Islamic terrorist networks nor is there any reason to believe that Pyongyang will give nuclear devices to terrorists**, despite its nuclear collaboration with other states such as Syria and Pakistan. **Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapons capability, but there is no reason to believe that it would risk giving nuclear devices to third parties whose actions it would be unable to control, especially given the scale of US and Israeli nuclear capabilities**. In any event, the Iran nuclear deal now has forestalled the emergence of Iran as a nuclear weapons power for the medium term at least.

2. Turn: Recognizing Somaliland boosts maritime trade because it improves economy AND their diplomatic and military connections. Robly 24

Mariam Robly (An independent journalist and political analyst based out of the MENA region), 12-20-2024, "The Strategic Implications of Somaliland's Recognition: A Comprehensive Analysis", Somaliland Chronicle, <https://somalilandchronicle.com/2024/12/20/the-strategic-implications-of-somalilands-recognition-a-comprehensive-analysis/> // DOA 12/21/24 IA

Somaliland's strategic location along critical maritime corridors presents significant opportunities for international security cooperation. The territory's position near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea makes it an invaluable partner in securing vital international trade routes.

Recognition would enhance maritime security operations, strengthening anti-piracy efforts and

providing stable ports for naval operations. This would contribute to the safety and **efficiency of international maritime trade, benefiting the global economy** while advancing regional security interests. In an era of increasing great power competition, Somaliland's strategic alignment with democratic values and its relationship with Taiwan present unique opportunities for the international community. Recognition would strengthen democratic partnerships in the Horn of Africa, helping to counter growing authoritarian influence in the region. This would support independent foreign policy choices by African nations while promoting multilateral cooperation among democratic states. The resulting network of relationships would contribute to a more balanced and stable regional order. The economic potential unlocked by **recognition would transform Somaliland into a significant regional economic hub**. Development of energy and mineral resources would accelerate, while **expanded port facilities would enhance maritime trade capabilities**. Investment in regional transportation infrastructure would improve connectivity, facilitating economic integration and growth. Integration into global financial systems would provide access to international markets and investment opportunities, creating a foundation for sustained economic development. Policy Implications Recognition of Somaliland would require a carefully coordinated international approach. This should begin with increased diplomatic engagement, gradually building toward formal recognition while addressing potential regional concerns. The process should include the development of comprehensive security cooperation agreements focusing on counter-terrorism, maritime security, and regional stability. Economic assistance programs would support Somaliland's

3. China is already present in Djibouti

Other bases should thump - empirics

Africa Times 20, 1-10-2020, "In Djibouti, China vows to back BRI projects including Doraleh," Africa Times,

<https://africatimes.com/2020/01/10/in-djibouti-china-vows-to-back-bri-projects-including-doraleh/>

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi was in Djibouti on Thursday as he continues a five-nation tour of the continent, with a stop **to meet President Ismail Omar Guelleh in what is the home of one of China's most strategic investments in Africa**. Guelleh said **China confirmed a commitment to back Djibouti in seeking** "greater visibility and presence" in the international community, including **a seat on the United Nations Security Council**. China said **the two nations discussed their commitment to** China's **Belt and Road Initiative**, with an emphasis on developing the coastal "blue economy," communications and digital investments, and projects to boost its capacities for trade and logistics, including the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and the Doraleh port. The Doraleh site has been a point of contention with the United States, where officials feared that Djibouti's 2018 seizure of the port from former operator DP World created an opening for China to expand its footprint along a vital Horn of Africa maritime route. **China also opened its first military base in Africa in August 2017, with an agreement for up to 10,000 Chinese troops to be stationed there. That base is close to Camp Lemonnier, home to 4,000 U.S. troops. The U.S. military continues to train with Djibouti's military and last month delivered 54 Humvees as part of a US\$31 million deal.** Wang also held talks with Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, his Djiboutian counterpart, during his visit. He previously met with Egyptian officials and plans a visit in Eritrea, as well as Burundi and Zimbabwe.

A2 Draw-In

1. Draw in is only ONE AT A TIME

Zachary C. **Shirkey 17**, Professor and Department Chair in the Department of Political Science, Hunter College, City University of New York, 2017, "MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERSTATE AND CIVIL WARS: A UNIFIED INTERPRETATION," /jpb

Why great powers themselves are more likely to intervene in ongoing civil and interstate wars has already been covered. However, this is not the only way in which **great powers influence the likelihood of military intervention. Their presence in both interstate and civil wars impacts the odds that other states will join those wars** though the effect is different for civil and interstate wars. **The presence and especially prior intervention of great powers in interstate wars likely alters the scope of the issues over which the war is being fought and the overall stakes of the war for regional systems and for the international system as a whole** (Kim, 1991; Yamamoto and Bremer, 1980). Evidence of this effect is clearest and strongest for the prior intervention of great powers in comparison to their presence in an interstate war from the outset (Shirkey, 2009). **This effect of great powers increasing the odds of further intervention does not appear to translate to civil wars.** There is some evidence that the presence of a great power in a civil war **actually reduces the odds that other states will intervene.** Shirkey (forthcoming) finds that the presence of a great power in a civil war reduces the odds that another state will intervene for civil wars in the Correlates of War dataset but not for civil wars in the PRIO dataset where the presence of a great power in a civil war has no effect. The finding in the Correlates of War dataset that **great powers can dissuade further intervention into civil wars** is likely the result of the fact that **great powers are usually strong enough to discourage other states from intervening in civil wars** which occur within the great power itself and perhaps also from intervening in the civil wars **of states which are located within the great power's sphere of influence.** The null effect for the PRIO dataset is likely the result of PRIO covering only the post-1945 period, a time when the United States has often intervened in civil wars in conjunction with its many allies. This "democratic posse" effect is limited to the post-1945 era (McDonald, 2015) and may obscure great powers' ability to dissuade intervention in their own civil wars and those of their allies. Still, the exact nature of the relationship between military intervention in civil wars and the presence of great powers is underdeveloped and warrants further study.

2. Been going on for decades in Somalia / Somaliland

Sally **Healey**, xx-xx-xxxx, "Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict", No Publication,

<https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict> //ms

Over the past two decades the nature of the Somali crisis and the international context within which it is occurring have been constantly changing. It has mutated from **a civil war in the 1980s, through state collapse, clan factionalism and warlordism in the 1990s, to a globalised ideological conflict in the first decade of the new millennium.** In this time the international environment has also changed, from the end of the Cold War to the 'global war on terror', which impacts directly on the crisis and international responses to it. This poses a problem for Somalis and international actors working to build peace. Initiatives that may have appeared to offer a solution in earlier years may no longer be applicable and there is a risk of fighting yesterday's war or building yesterday's peace. This article traces the evolution of the Somali conflict and some of the continuities that run through it.

3. Horn of Africa is never existential – nuclear armed states don't want war and regional orgs mediate

Straus 13

Scott Straus is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, The Guardian, January 30, 2013, "Africa is becoming more peaceful, despite the war in Mali", <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/30/africa-peaceful-mali-war>

What explains the recent decline in warfare across Africa? I don't know for certain, but would point to geo-political changes since the end of the cold war.

First, the end of the cold war meant that the opportunities for rebels to receive substantial weaponry and training from big external states declined. To be sure, states across Africa still meddle in the affairs of their neighbors, but insurgent funding from neighbouring states is usually enough to be a nuisance to, but not actually overthrow, existing governments.

Second, the rise of multi-party politics has sapped the anti-government funding, energy, and talent away from the bush and into the domestic political arena.

Third, China is a rising external force in sub-Saharan Africa. China's goals are mainly economic, but their foreign relations follow a principle of non-interference. To my knowledge, China supports states, not insurgencies.

Finally, conflict reduction mechanisms, in particular international peacekeeping and regional diplomacy, have substantially increased on the continent. Peacekeeping is more prevalent and especially more robust than in the 1990s. Regional bodies such as the African Union, Eccowas, Eccas, IGAD, and SADC are quite active in most conflict situations. They have exhibited greater resolves in conflicts as diverse as Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Madagascar.

The four posited mechanisms are hypotheses, each of which deserves greater scrutiny and empirical testing. But taken together, they suggest plausible ways in which the incentives of insurgents and even state leaders to fight have been altered in recent years. They give reason to expect that while war is clearly not over in sub-Saharan Africa, we should continue to observe a decline in its frequency and intensity in coming decades.

4. Great powers co-op to keep the peace – South Sudan proves – even if they draw they aren't drawn in to FIGHT EACH OTHER

Burbach 16

(David T. Burbach is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, received a Ph.D in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has expertise in African security, defense planning, and U.S. foreign policy. , 9-22-2016, "The Coming Peace: Africa's Declining Conflicts," Sustainable Security,), <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/the-coming-peace-africas-declining-conflicts>

Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent, but this depiction is becoming outdated. In the 21st century, the amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. "Africa" and "conflict" are words all too often linked in Western minds. From Cold War proxy wars, to what Robert Kaplan saw as "the coming anarchy" in the 1990s, to Boko Haram massacres today, news from Africa may seem dominated by never-ending conflict. That image is out of date. In 2002 Tony Blair was justified in describing the state of Africa as a "scar on the conscience of humanity", but in the years since there has been an underappreciated success story in Africa. The amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. Troubled areas remain, unfortunately, but the larger picture of receding conflict has implications for how we think about African security needs. Outside actors can help reinforce positive external and internal trends that mitigate conflict, can avoid creating new conflict zones like Libya or South Sudan, and should recognize emerging human security needs that are becoming relatively more important as armed conflict declines. Africa's waning wars Quietly over the last 15 years, many African wars did end, to paraphrase Scott Strauss. Lingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. West African nations including Liberia and Sierra Leone ceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained their status as functional, if weak, states. Eastern Congo is still violent, but far less so than during the 1990s "African World War". Overall, 21st century Africa has seen more wars end or abate than ignite. The trend towards peace in Africa can be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict (for more on data sources, tabulation, and trend analysis, see Burbach and Fettweis 2014). The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), for example, tracks conflicts from 1946 to the present, scoring each for the intensity of its societal impact. Figure 1 shows the yearly sum of conflict intensity assessed by CSP, for both Africa and the rest of the world. The end of the

Cold War brought peace to much of the world, but African conflicts increased in the 1990s. States like Somalia and Sierra Leone collapsed into warlordism, for example. Central Africa was hit by the Rwanda genocide and bloody chaos in Eastern Congo, killing one to five million people. At least three-fourths of the world's total war deaths in the late 1990s took place in Africa (Burbach and Fettweis 2014, Figure 4). After the year 2000, the tide of war receded. Africa's total conflict intensity as measured by CSP fell by approximately half. A similar pattern is shown by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. Using somewhat different definitions, the Uppsala data shows that the number of conflicts in Africa resulting in 1,000 or more "battle deaths" per year declined from an average of 12 in the late 1990s to an average of 3.5 from 2010-2013. Some decades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola in 2002; elsewhere, states gradually gained the upper hand on armed disorder. Given the unfortunate rise of warfare in the Middle East, Africa is no longer the most violent region of the world. The decline of warfare in Africa is even more dramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa's population is growing rapidly, up 150% since 1980. Declining conflict despite a much larger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially. An average of 32 people per 100,000 population were killed per year in the 1980s and 45 per 100,000 in the 1990s. In 2013, though the rate was only 8 per 100,000 (Burbach & Fettweis 2014, Figure 5). World Health Organization data shows an astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths from 2000 to 2012. In the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today, perhaps three to six times as many Africans die in road crashes than from conflict. Many more Africans are harmed by crime or domestic violence than by warfare. Africa is still afflicted by more conflict than most of the world and the suffering of those involved is very real. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever in the post-independence period. Celebrating African peace may seem premature given the civil war in South Sudan or the ravages of Boko Haram. Conflict has increased since 2011, but the level of armed conflict still remains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000. The most tragic development is the civil war in South Sudan, which the U.N. estimated had killed 50,000 as of spring 2016. Fortunately, South Sudan's case is nearly unique: a newly created nation, devoid of physical or administrative infrastructure, with ethnically divided, soon-to-be-unemployed armed factions eyeing the lucrative oil revenues awaiting whomever could seize power. As academic panelists noted in 2011 – two years before the civil war – predictors of conflict were flashing red in South Sudan. Few African countries contain such a combustible mix of problems anymore. Accounting for the decline there are several factors behind the ebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed and funded rival factions in civil wars, allowing bloody wars to fester for decades in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Then, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed. A disinterested world mostly left Africa to its fate, but continued trade in weapons and resources with warlords. In the last decade, however, the U.S., Europe, and China have all become more active in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing the South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides. The world has become somewhat less willing to sell arms or purchase minerals that directly fuel conflicts, admittedly with a long way to go. Africans themselves deserve great credit for ending the wars that plagued their continent. Economic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation have all made state failure and internal conflict less likely. As Paul Collier among others has noted, civil wars tend to create vicious cycles that spread insecurity to whole regions. Many regions of Africa have climbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other. The nations of Africa increasingly work together through the institutions of the African Union to head off or resolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones. Needs still outpace available resources, but that cooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa. A peaceful future? Whether the trend towards peace continues depends foremost on Africa's leaders, but external actors can encourage positive trends in African security. Most directly, partners can help the AU and its member nations improve peacekeeping and conflict resolution capabilities. Likewise, the world should continue arms embargoes against combatants and regulating trade in valuable resources where exploitation appears to be a key ingredient of protracted conflict. Ongoing encouragement and incentives for democratization and governmental reform are helpful. Western countries should consider, however, that broad efforts like anticorruption programs are probably more helpful than International Criminal Court indictments of individual leaders, which can generate nationalist backlash. The world should especially try not to create new ground for conflict. Libya and South Sudan are Africa's worst conflict zones today. Both were birthed through Western action – the removal by force of the Qaddafi regime, and diplomatically sponsoring South Sudan's independence from Khartoum. While the moral cases were sound, both countries were left with non-existent governments, antagonistic armed factions, and grossly inadequate provision for disarming, demobilizing, and re-integrating fighters. American and European governments focused more on freeing people from hated regimes than on answering – let alone resourcing – the "what next?" question. Chaos followed, just as many African governments had warned at the time. From a humanitarian perspective, advocates should consider whether other challenges in Africa deserve relatively more attention. For example, Fearon and Hoeffler suggest that domestic violence against women and children now imposes larger human costs than warfare, and also that domestic violence can be reduced more cost-effectively than armed conflict. The ballooning toll of vehicle accident deaths in Africa may represent an opportunity for international technical or educational assistance to pay off with many saved lives. Beyond road safety, Africa is rapidly urbanizing. Western visions of menacing rebels waving AK-47s in the bush privilege the exotic, but most Africans confront more prosaic threats to health and safety. The human security challenges Africans confront are increasingly those of city-dwellers: crime, sanitation and utilities, safe and reliable transport, etc. Better policing, regularized urban housing, and expansion of infrastructure in megacities like Lagos and Kinshasa ought to be top priorities. Conclusion Sixteen years ago The Economist magazine suggested Africa was a "hopeless continent". Lately The Economist has been bullish on Africa, citing the decline in warfare as a key reason for the continent's improving business prospects. With remarkable speed, in the 21st century African conflict declined and safety improved, a hugely positive change in the welfare of Africans.

A2 Legitimacy

1. T - Non-intervention is eroding AU authority and prevents effective conflict prevention, affirming reinstates credibility off AU values and of the AU is an active organization

Félicité Djilo and [Paul-Simon Handy](#), 3-17-2022, Paul-Simon Handy, ISS Regional Director for the Horn of Africa and Representative to the AU and Félicité Djilo, Independent Analyst "Redefining the African Union's utility", ISS Africa, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/redefining-the-african-unions-utility>

Redefining the African Union's utility **As it turns 20, hard questions are being asked about the AU's authority to resolve security challenges in Africa.** February's African Union (AU) summit was symbolic in several ways. It was held in person in Addis Ababa after nearly two years of online meetings due to COVID-19, signalling a growing confidence in the management of the pandemic. **For Ethiopian authorities, the summit was an opportunity to show the government's control over the fragile security situation in the country. AU Commission** Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat's opening speech was another positive surprise of the summit. He was uncharacteristically confrontational with heads of state, **using lucid and courageous words to describe what he called the 'immensity of African paralysis with regard to neighbouring homes** that are going up in flames.' Faki was referring to the **AU's uneven peace and security record in 2021**, one year after its Commission was reformed and restructured. But he was **also raising fundamental questions around the continental body's authority to weigh in on challenges to state stability.** What does the AU need to exert more profound impacts on conflict situations? The time is right to ask this question. **As the body turns 20, protracted and emerging conflicts are testing the coherence of the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture and its goal of silencing the guns by 2030.** When facing crises, **African governments use various strategies to limit the AU's involvement** Based on philosopher Hannah Arendt's definition, authority is generally understood as the **ability to obtain consent without coercion.** As a continental organisation, **the AU draws its influence from the voluntary adherence of member states to the pan-African project.** But **governments often don't back the AU when it tries to enforce its authority, especially on early action and conflict prevention.** When facing crises, African governments often resort to various strategies to limit the AU's role. **They politely reject its involvement in their internal affairs** (Cameroon), **contest its action when it's already deployed** (Somalia), **sideline it in favour of regional bodies** (Central African Republic and Mozambique), or just **prefer working with better-resourced international actors** (Libya and Sudan). **In inter-state disputes, such as those between Morocco-Algeria, Egypt-Ethiopia, Kenya-Somalia and Rwanda-Uganda, for example, the AU struggles to mediate due to the uneven interest from the states involved.** **If we add the AU Peace and Security Council's inconsistent handling of unconstitutional changes of government in Mali and Chad, it could be argued that the AU faces a decline of authority.** However **the trend could be reversed if several structural and cyclical fragilities were addressed.** One systemic fragility is that most African states oppose any **interference in their internal affairs.** While the AU has normatively shifted from the non-interference position of its predecessor (the Organisation of African Unity) to non-indifference, **the gap between a pro-active AU Commission and reluctant member states is huge.** This causes inconsistencies in how the AU applies its rules and frameworks, which weakens the body. Unlike the EU, joining the AU is not subject to anything other than geography Another serious fragility is the relationship between member states and the AU. Unlike the European Union (EU), whose members must qualify to be included, **joining the AU is subject only to geography.** Despite strong rhetoric about how integrated the body is, **the AU comprises highly heterogeneous types of governments with varied commitments to human rights.** **Most member states favour a traditional view of sovereignty that prevents any11 interference** to boost governance and human rights. The AU's role as an entrepreneur of shared values is complicated because it doesn't encourage the democratic convergence it needs from members, even though it has the power to issue sanctions in situations of unconstitutional government changes. As the AU doesn't provide subsidies or significant funds for economic modernisation, its value-add in the daily functioning of member states is limited. **This means that**

African governments' dependency on the AU is relatively minimal. The exception has been its significant role in fighting pandemics and epidemics, although this is more reactive than proactive. The AU is an international organisation with as much authority and influence as its member states want to give it. Beyond fierce rhetoric, **it remains unclear how much appetite African leaders have for effective continental integration that goes beyond pan-Africanist slogans.** It's unclear how much appetite African leaders have for real continental integration. It could be argued that the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement (AfCFTA) illustrates a commitment to regional integration. **But would the AU be able to settle, for example, trade disputes between Kenya and Somalia if it isn't trusted as an impartial broker for political and security matters?** The success of any trade agreement depends on the independence and impartiality of dispute settlement mechanisms and the upholding of their decisions by signatory states. Over the years, African states have been uncomfortable with the decisions of regional legal bodies. Tanzania for example recently denied its people direct access to the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, which is ironically headquartered in Arusha. It remains to be seen how AU member states respond to the AfCFTA dispute mechanism's decisions. As the AU marks its 20th anniversary, it is coming to the end of a cycle where member states intuitively respected its authority without needing to call on its binding instruments. **To remain relevant, key AU member states must find a way to bridge the expectations-capabilities gap.** Should African states see integration and a limited degree of supranationalism as going against their interests, **the focus will need to shift to greater regional cooperation that provides better added value. This would already be an impressive step on Africa's road to integration.**

Specifically, in Somaliland:

Kahin 24 Nassir Hussein Kahin: a Somali scholar specializing in international politics, 12-12-2024, "The African Union's Contradictions: Why Its Charter Fails Somaliland's Unique Case", SomalilandCurrent, <https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/the-african-unions-contradictions-why-its-charter-fails-somalilands-unique-case/> //doi: 12/12/24 sr

The African Union (AU) Charter is often cited as a barrier to recognizing Somaliland's independence with its emphasis on territorial integrity as a guiding principle. **Yet, Somaliland's historical, political, and legal realities expose contradictions within this principle when applied to its unique case.** Compounding this inconsistency is the **AU's failure to act on its own fact-finding mission's 2005 recommendations, which concluded that Somaliland meets the criteria for recognition. Somaliland's situation cannot be classified as secession because it was a sovereign entity before its voluntary union with Somalia in 1960.** Gaining independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a separate state with defined borders. **Its decision to merge with Somalia on July 1, 1960, was a political arrangement, not the result of colonial boundary adjustments.** This union was never formalized through a binding treaty and dissolved in 1991 after decades of marginalization and oppression. **By reclaiming its sovereignty, Somaliland reverted to its original borders, adhering to the very principle of territorial integrity the AU claims to uphold.** The AU's stance becomes even more contradictory when considering its own fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005. **The mission concluded that Somaliland satisfied the legal and political requirements for statehood, recommending recognition. However, nearly two decades later, the AU has taken no steps to act on these findings, undermining its credibility as a proponent of African self-determination and stability.** Somalia's claims over Somaliland's Red Sea coastline further distort the historical reality. These claims rest on a narrative that Somaliland is a secessionist region of Somalia, an assertion that disregards Somaliland's separate colonial history and its recognized independence prior to the union. Somalia's insistence on this point is part of a broader effort to create a false narrative of Somali unity and sovereignty—concepts rendered obsolete by decades of fragmentation and conflict. Since the collapse of its central government in 1991, **Somalia has been under United Nations trusteeship, surviving on international aid and the support of African Union forces.** Confined largely to Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity, Somalia's sovereignty is, at best, symbolic. Its accusations of foreign interference, particularly against Ethiopia, contrast sharply with its reliance on Ethiopian troops and other African forces to maintain order. At the same time, **Somalia has entered into defense agreements with nations like Egypt, Eritrea, and Turkiya, which are more interested in curbing Ethiopia's regional influence than promoting stability. These actions have destabilized the region, creating tensions that threaten to**

engulf the Horn of Africa in further conflict. In stark contrast, **Somaliland has built a functioning state with all the hallmarks of sovereignty:** its own flag, police, army, currency, and passport. It engages diplomatically, hosting offices from countries like Ethiopia and signing international commercial and military agreements, including partnerships with the UAE and a recent Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has demonstrated its ability to govern, maintain peace, and foster democratic principles. **Somaliland's political maturity is evident in its democratic elections, which have been lauded by international observers for their fairness and transparency.** Opposition victories in both presidential and parliamentary elections have led to peaceful transfers of power, a rarity in a region where despots often cling to power. These achievements align Somaliland more closely with established democracies than many recognized states in Africa. The African Union's contradictions in handling Somaliland's case go beyond ignoring its fact-finding mission. **Precedents such as Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan's secession from Sudan in 2011 show that the AU has supported the redefinition of borders when justified by historical and political realities. Somaliland's case, grounded in legal precedent, historical legitimacy, and its proven capacity for governance, is equally compelling.** As in the case of Senegambia, officially the Senegambia Confederation or Confederation of Senegambia, was a loose confederation in the late 20th century between the West African countries of Senegal and its neighbour The Gambia, which is almost completely surrounded by Senegal. The confederation was founded on 1 February 1982 following an agreement between the two countries signed on 12 December 1981. It was intended to promote cooperation between the two countries, but was dissolved by Senegal on 30 September 1989 after The Gambia refused to move closer toward union. Somaliland's achievements, from maintaining peace and stability to contributing to regional security efforts, make it a model for governance in the Horn of Africa. **Its recognition would align with the AU's principles of promoting peace, human rights, and self-determination. Conversely, Somalia's fixation on a false narrative of Somali unity serves only to distract from its inability to govern or address its internal challenges. The time has come for the AU and the international community to rectify these contradictions, honor Somaliland's accomplishments, and grant it the recognition it rightfully deserves. Doing so would not only reinforce the principles of justice and self-determination but also promote stability and progress in a volatile region.**

Affirming would align AU words and actions, adhering to established precedents.

Kahin 24 Nassir Hussein Kahin: a Somali scholar specializing in international politics, 12-12-2024, "The African Union's Contradictions: Why Its Charter Fails Somaliland's Unique Case", SomalilandCurrent, <https://www.somalilandcurrent.com/the-african-unions-contradictions-why-its-charter-fails-somalilands-unique-case/> //doa: 12/12/24 sr

The African Union (AU) Charter is often cited as a barrier to recognizing Somaliland's independence with its emphasis on territorial integrity as a guiding principle. **Yet, Somaliland's historical, political, and legal realities expose contradictions within this principle when applied to its unique case.** Compounding this inconsistency is the **AU's failure to act on its own fact-finding mission's 2005 recommendations, which concluded that Somaliland meets the criteria for recognition. Somaliland's situation cannot be classified as secession because it was a sovereign entity before its voluntary union with Somalia in 1960.** Gaining independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a separate state with defined borders. **Its decision to merge with Somalia on July 1, 1960, was a political arrangement, not the result of colonial boundary adjustments.** This union was never formalized through a binding treaty and dissolved in 1991 after decades of marginalization and oppression. **By reclaiming its sovereignty, Somaliland reverted to its original borders, adhering to the very principle of territorial integrity the AU claims to uphold.** The AU's stance becomes even more contradictory when considering its own fact-finding mission to Somaliland in 2005. **The mission concluded that Somaliland satisfied the legal and political requirements for statehood, recommending recognition. However, nearly two decades later, the AU has taken no steps to act on these findings, undermining its credibility as a proponent of African self-determination and stability.** Somalia's claims over Somaliland's Red Sea coastline further distort the historical reality. These claims rest on a narrative that Somaliland is a secessionist region of Somalia, an assertion that disregards Somaliland's separate colonial history and its recognized independence prior to the union. Somalia's insistence on this point is part of a broader effort to create a false

narrative of Somali unity and sovereignty—concepts rendered obsolete by decades of fragmentation and conflict. Since the collapse of its central government in 1991, **Somalia has been under United Nations trusteeship, surviving on international aid and the support of African Union forces.** Confined largely to Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity, Somalia's sovereignty is, at best, symbolic. Its accusations of foreign interference, particularly against Ethiopia, contrast sharply with its reliance on Ethiopian troops and other African forces to maintain order. At the same time, **Somalia has entered into defense agreements with nations like Egypt, Eritrea, and Turkiya, which are more interested in curbing Ethiopia's regional influence than promoting stability. These actions have destabilized the region, creating tensions that threaten to engulf the Horn of Africa in further conflict.** In stark contrast, **Somaliland has built a functioning state with all the hallmarks of sovereignty:** its own flag, police, army, currency, and passport. It engages diplomatically, hosting offices from countries like Ethiopia and signing international commercial and military agreements, including partnerships with the UAE and a recent Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia. Unlike Somalia, Somaliland has demonstrated its ability to govern, maintain peace, and foster democratic principles. **Somaliland's political maturity is evident in its democratic elections, which have been lauded by international observers for their fairness and transparency.** Opposition victories in both presidential and parliamentary elections have led to peaceful transfers of power, a rarity in a region where despots often cling to power. These achievements align Somaliland more closely with established democracies than many recognized states in Africa. The African Union's contradictions in handling Somaliland's case go beyond ignoring its fact-finding mission. **Precedents such as Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan's secession from Sudan in 2011 show that the AU has supported the redefinition of borders when justified by historical and political realities. Somaliland's case, grounded in legal precedent, historical legitimacy, and its proven capacity for governance, is equally compelling.** As in the case of Senegambia, officially the Senegambia Confederation or Confederation of Senegambia, was a loose confederation in the late 20th century between the West African countries of Senegal and its neighbour The Gambia, which is almost completely surrounded by Senegal. The confederation was founded on 1 February 1982 following an agreement between the two countries signed on 12 December 1981. It was intended to promote cooperation between the two countries, but was dissolved by Senegal on 30 September 1989 after The Gambia refused to move closer toward union. Somaliland's achievements, from maintaining peace and stability to contributing to regional security efforts, make it a model for governance in the Horn of Africa. **Its recognition would align with the AU's principles of promoting peace, human rights, and self-determination. Conversely, Somalia's fixation on a false narrative of Somali unity serves only to distract from its inability to govern or address its internal challenges. The time has come for the AU and the international community to rectify these contradictions, honor Somaliland's accomplishments, and grant it the recognition it rightfully deserves. Doing so would not only reinforce the principles of justice and self-determination but also promote stability and progress in a volatile region.**

2. T - The AU acknowledges colonial era borders in its charter. The negative world violates this principal eroding AU credibility. Colonial Era borders are older than the principal the Neg talks about, outweighs on long term credibility

Mariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, 1-25-2024, "Somaliland: The Horn of Africa's Breakaway State", Council on Foreign Relations,

Mariel Ferragamo previous experience includes roles at the Energy for Growth Hub and in the U.S.

Congress. Mariel holds a bachelor's degree in environmental policy from Colby College and a certification in journalism from New York

University. <https://www.cfr.org/background/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state>

What is its political status? Somaliland broke ties with Somalia's government in Mogadishu after declaring independence in 1991, and has sought international recognition as an independent state since then. No foreign government recognizes its sovereignty, but many effectively acknowledge the region as separate from Somalia. It has held its own democratic elections since 2003, and in 2010 it saw a largely peaceful transfer of power to the opposition Peace, Unity, and Development Party. The United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (EU) sent delegations to observe Somaliland's 2017 presidential election. Somaliland postponed its 2022 election and extended President Muse Bihi Abdi's term by two years, citing financial constraints; its next vote is currently set for November 13, 2024. How did it get here? Somaliland's history as a distinct region of Somalia dates back to the late nineteenth century. The territory was a British protectorate until 1960, when it unified with the rest of present-day Somalia, which had been under Italian rule. The merger faced challenges early on, with many in Somaliland rejecting the centralization of power in the country's south. A rebel group, the Somali National Movement (SNM), emerged in Somaliland in the 1980s opposing the military junta of President Siad Barre, which seized power in 1969. In January 1991, SNM and other insurgent groups ousted Barre, whose forces had killed tens of thousands of Somalilanders and destroyed much of the region's infrastructure. SNM refused to recognize an interim government led by another militia group, and in May it declared Somaliland's independence, with the city of Hargeisa as its capital. Delegates took a decade to thrash out a new constitution for Somaliland, which voters overwhelmingly approved in 2001. The referendum saw a transition from a power-sharing agreement among leading clans to a multiparty democracy. Although some international observers applauded the peaceful vote, no government recognized the process. What is Somaliland's case for independence?

The Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a sovereign democratic state: it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and security forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its independence claim is consistent with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that colonial-era borders should be maintained. Some analysts also note that Somalilanders are predominantly from the Isaaq clan, and thus ethnically distinctive from other Somalis. The territory has widely been seen as an "oasis" for stability in a turbulent region. "From the Somalilanders' perspective, they have a completely reasonable argument," Bronwyn Bruton, democracy and governance expert, said in 2018. "Somaliland is trying to break off from Somalia, which hasn't been a functioning country in decades." Democracy and civil liberties watchdog Freedom House rates Somaliland's freedom index at "partly free," scoring a forty-four out of one hundred in 2023, while Somalia got only eight in the same year—an unequivocally "not free" status, and the fourteenth-lowest worldwide. However, Somaliland's score has declined in recent years following crackdowns on opposition protestors when its parliament postponed the 2022 presidential election.

3. DL The resolution uses "should" if affirming violates the African Union's constitution that means they technically can't recognize Somaliland, the inability to actually do so doesn't change whether the AU should or should not recognize Somaliland

4. DL - In a world where the AU actually recognized Somaliland, they would change the principles and constitution on correspondence.

A2 Secessions

1. Non-Unique – Secession happens regardless. Marche '21

Stephen Marche, 12-31-2021, "Perspective," Washington Post,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/12/31/secession-civil-war-stephen-marche/>

It's not that secession can't work. The rest of the world is busily at it all the time. Separatism is a global political trend. The number of nations in the world has tripled since 1945. And there will soon be more. "Right now, there are about 60 secessionist movements worldwide. Sixty independence movements is a pretty large number by historical standards," says Ryan Griffiths, a professor at Syracuse University who focuses on the dynamics of secession and the study of sovereignty. "In the long run, there will be another secessionist movement in the United States. It will just happen. No country is permanent. It will change. It will break apart in some way."

2. Turn – Recognizing Somaliland solves for secession. Meservey '21

Joshua Meservey, 10-19-2021, "The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-us-should-recognize-somaliland>

A common objection to recognizing Somaliland's statehood is that it would set off a brushfire of secession in Africa. Yet Eritrean and South Sudanese independence did not. Somaliland is also unique in Africa because it has successfully operated autonomously for 30 years, has a critical mass of the attributes of statehood, was once independent, and wishes to revert to that status within colonial-era borders, the standard the African Union uses to determine statehood.¹ Recognition of its independence would delegitimize other secessionist movements' claims by establishing a difficult standard for achieving sovereignty.

3. Delink - It won't escalate into conflict. Kingsbury '17

Damien Kingsbury, 10-4-2017, "Passion and pain: why secessionist movements rarely succeed," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/passion-and-pain-why-secessionist-movements-rarely-succeed-85097>

There are currently well over 100 secessionist movements, including four in the Philippines, dozens in India, around eight in Myanmar, and several dozen in Africa. Many of these have produced bloodshed and trauma well in excess of possible practical gains. Yet, despite their numbers, very few secessionist movements are ultimately successful, while the costs for governments imposing a nominal unity can be high for all involved. With high risks and limited chances of success, secessionist movements are rarely about pragmatism and more about fervour. Even with popular support, these movements rarely have the political or military capacity to impose their will on the state from which they intend to secede.

A2 Somalia War

NQ. Conflict is inevitable---new deals or the MOU---like Somaliland is pursuing, will push us over the brink.

Webb 24 [Maxwell; Independent Horn of Africa & Middle East Analyst, Coordinator of Leadership Initiatives @ the Israel Policy Forum's IPF Atid Program; Month Date; Atlantic Council; "Nine months later: The regional implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU," <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/nine-months-later-the-regional-implications-of-the-ethiopia-somaliland-mou/>] tristan

Today, the Horn of Africa is still reeling from the impacts of Ethiopia's January memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Somaliland (the unrecognized breakaway republic in northern Somalia), which granted Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland's coastline. In return, according to claims by the government in Hargeisa, Ethiopia agreed to begin a process considering the recognition of Somaliland's independence. Nine months later, the situation has been exacerbated by decisions made by countries outside of the Horn, such as Egypt's signing of a security agreement with Somalia. The agreement includes the delivery of weapons, troops, and military hardware, the first tranche of which was sent to Somalia on August 27. The involvement of other players in the Horn of Africa's security landscape is a prime example of how middle-power politics and diplomacy in one region could, over time, create a tinderbox of conditions: one in which even a small mistake could cause a rapid escalation. A nine-month downward spiral In 2018, Ethiopia and Somalia had seen a détente in relations thanks to Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed's attempt to reshape regional alliances and exert Ethiopian influence. But the MOU—which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in an address days after the signing, said is a denial of his country's territorial sovereignty—has set back nearly all progress made. Somalia has reacted in various ways: In his address, Mohamud declared Ethiopia one of the greatest enemies of the state, on par with Al-Shabaab. He also signed a law that he said nullified the MOU. In the nine months that followed, negative rhetoric against Somaliland worsened, and Mohamud began a diplomatic blitz to rally support against the MOU. Nevertheless, the MOU lives on, with Somaliland and Ethiopia strengthening their relations, exchanging ambassadors, training security forces, and regularly setting up meetings between leaders. Over the past nine months, other countries have made moves that have had implications for the already inflamed turmoil in the region. In February, Turkey and Somalia, reaffirming their long-standing security partnership, signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The agreement is formally aimed at helping "Somalia develop its capacity and capabilities to combat illegal and irregular activities in its territorial waters," but no doubt also serves as a counterweight to any growth in Ethiopian naval capabilities. Upon signing this deal, Somaliland warned Turkey against any form of naval deployment in its territorial waters; but in July, Turkey's parliament approved a deployment of the Turkish military to Somalia (including Somalia's territorial waters). Beyond hard power, the Turks have been flexing their political muscles in the Horn, not only offering vocal support to Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU but also hosting negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia at Abiy's request. The negotiations in Ankara amounted to little success.

LT. Recognition refocuses Somalia on internal issues.

Meservey 21 [Joshua Meservey (Former Research Fellow, Africa, studied African geopolitics, counterterrorism, and refugee policy), 10-19-2021, "The U.S. Should Recognize Somaliland", Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-us-should-recognize-somaliland> (accessed 12-19-2024)] ME

Formalizing Somaliland independence might also focus the Mogadishu elites' minds on the task of governing. Power struggles within southern Somalia's political class have plunged the country into one crisis after another. The ongoing electoral process in the south is a dramatic regression from the previous (also deeply flawed) electoral process,²⁸ in large part because of the elites' inability to mediate their disputes. The specter of other federal states seeking greater autonomy could jolt Mogadishu's elites from their absorption with political battles.

NL. Somalia doesn't have the capability for war and is focused on Al-Shabab.

Barnett 24 [Caleb; Research Fellow @ Hudson Institute, Research Fellow @ the Centre for Democracy and Development, Fullbright Research Fellow @ the University of Lagos, former analyst @ the American Enterprise Institute, BA from the University of Texas, MA from King's College London; 1-1-2024; War on the Rocks; "A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink," <https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink/>; accessed: 12-18-2024] tristan

Conventional War Is Unlikely Neither Somalia nor Somaliland has much in the way of conventional militaries with which to fight a protracted conflict. The broad failure of internationally assisted state-building and military capacity-building in Somalia is well documented: The vast majority of what could be construed as "security forces" in Somalia are clan militias or warlord armies of questionable loyalty to the central government (which is itself perennially divided). Within the nominal Somali National Army, the only consistently effective units are small special forces groups trained by the United States and Turkey to combat al-Shabaab. No Somali government since 1991 has had the conventional military capacity to challenge the authority of the Somaliland administration in the latter's territory, and no degree of bellicose rhetoric from Mogadishu will change that. Somalia's inability to wage a conventional war with Somaliland applies as well to the case of Ethiopia, which has traditionally had one of the largest and best equipped militaries in Africa and presently maintains several thousand troops in Somalia as contingents in the African Union peace enforcement mission and as unilateral deployments. Egypt, which has its own acrimonious dispute with Ethiopia and has a close relationship with Somali President Hassan Sheikh, has staunchly backed Mogadishu in the dispute. But setting tough rhetoric aside, Cairo has struggled to effectively support its principal ally within Sudan's ongoing civil war despite sharing a border with the country. It is therefore unclear how significantly Egypt could become involved in any proxy conflict with Ethiopia.

NL. The AU can compel Somalia to agree.

Schwartz 21 [Stephen M. Schwartz; served as the first U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-17) since 1991. He retired in 2017 as a member of the Senior Foreign Service and the rank of Minister Counsellor. During his Foreign Service career, Mr. Schwartz served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Zambia and in Mauritius, and mid-level or junior officer in Ethiopia, South Africa, Burundi, and Cuba; The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland's Status, 11-8-2021; Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/11/the-african-union-should-resolve-somalilands-status/>; accessed, 12-18-2024] Aaron

The African Union has the mandate to mediate peace and make determinations on sovereignty. It can compel Somalia to negotiate or decide itself whether to accept Somaliland's demand for its sovereignty to be restored. Persuading African governments and the AU to take on this responsibility should be a focus of U.S. diplomacy. Somaliland enjoyed four days as an independent state dating from June 26, 1960, before it chose to unite with the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. On the day of its independence, then-U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter wrote to Somaliland's governing Council of Ministers, "I extend my best wishes and congratulations on the achievement of your independence. This is a noteworthy milestone in your history, and it is with pleasure that I send my warmest regards on this happy occasion." Should Somalia fail to negotiate in good faith to resolve Somaliland's status, Secretary of State Tony Blinken should consider Josh Meserve's proposal and write a similar letter to the authorities in Hargeisa.

NL. The aff forces diplomatic engagement.

Stephen M. **Schwartz 21**, Former US Ambassador to Somalia, "The African Union Should Resolve Somaliland's Status," 11/8/21, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/11/the-african-union-should-resolve-somalilands-status/>, tristan
brackets r og

Somalia and Somaliland have met at the ministerial or head of state level as many as ten times in the past decade to discuss Somaliland's status. Unfortunately, talks never advanced past agreements on procedural issues. Strong sustained mediation will be required to overcome the preconditions, obstinance, delays, and lack of preparation by one or both of the parties. Negotiations will also have to await the outcome of Somalia's protracted electoral process. Somalia's inability or unwillingness to negotiate a resolution of Somaliland's status undermines its efforts to promote reconciliation at home and perpetrates an unjust burden on the people of Somaliland. Without a clear legal status—whether independence or some sort of association—Somaliland is deprived of foreign investment, cooperation assistance, access to international lending markets, payments due it for use of its airspace, etc. The authorities in Somalia should not be permitted to deny them these benefits simply by ignoring or delaying negotiations. Getting Somalia to negotiate seriously is the crux of the issue at play. The world generally abides by the losing state's position on applicants for UN recognition. In the last few decades, all countries that have seceded from one state and gained a seat in the United Nations have done so only with the assent of the losing state. Ethiopia agreed to Eritrea's independence in 1993, Indonesia acceded to Timor Leste's sovereignty in 2002, Serbia assented to Montenegro seceding from their Union in 2006, and Sudan agreed to South Sudan's independence in 2011. By contrast, Serbia has not recognized the independence of its former province of Kosovo, so, despite being recognized by about 100 countries, Kosovo has not been granted a seat at the United Nations. Given a choice, the type of independence should be up to the authorities and people of Somaliland, but I would think that they would prefer the benefits of full UN membership and an end to a decades-long struggle for acceptance. One could argue that with the civil war in Ethiopia putting that country at risk of dissolution, this is not the time for the African Union to entertain Somaliland's secession. However, the opposite is true. Growing instability in Ethiopia calls for greater stability in the region, which clarity in the Somalia-Somaliland relationship would achieve. Whether the outcome be independence, association, or a hybrid, Somaliland and Somalia would emerge stronger. For example, if the parties agreed to an association, Mogadishu would attain some degree of actual authority over Somaliland that it currently lacks. Alternatively, if Somaliland achieved independence, it would then be able to assist Somalia with its security challenges in a way that it cannot or will not at present. Talks would assist with two other regional issues, one actual and one potential. Negotiations to resolve Somaliland's status and relationship to Somalia would need to address the festering jurisdictional and security issues in Somaliland's eastern region and its unsettled relationship with Puntland. Finally, should Ethiopia dissolve into its component parts, the talks would provide a forum for Ethiopia's ethnic Somali Ogaden region to negotiate its own association with Somalia, Somaliland, or both. The African Union has the mandate to mediate peace and make determinations on sovereignty. It can compel Somalia to negotiate or decide itself whether to accept Somaliland's demand for its sovereignty to be restored. Persuading African governments and the AU to take on this responsibility should be a focus of U.S. diplomacy. Somaliland enjoyed four days as an independent state dating from June 26, 1960, before it chose to unite with the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. On the day of its independence, then-U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter wrote to Somaliland's governing Council of Ministers, "I extend my best wishes and congratulations on the achievement of your independence. This is a noteworthy milestone in your history, and it is with pleasure that I send my warmest regards on this happy occasion." Should Somalia fail to negotiate in good faith to resolve Somaliland's status, Secretary of State Tony Blinken should consider Josh Meserve's proposal and write a similar letter to the authorities in Hargeisa.

A2 Terrorism

1] NU: ATMIS is being replaced with another force --- there's no instability.

Dessu et al 24 (Meressa K Dessu is a Senior Researcher and Training Coordinator, Dawit Yohannes is a Project Manager and Senior Researcher, Tsion Belay Alene is a Researcher. 8-29-2024, "New AU mission for Somalia: old problems, fresh solutions?", ISS Today, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/new-au-mission-for-somalia-old-problems-fresh-solutions>, DOA: 12/9/24) Seventeen years after the first African Union (AU) mission was deployed in Somalia to degrade the violent extremist group al-Shabaab, the country is set to have a third peace support operation starting on 1 January 2025. This month, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a proposal to form the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It will take over from the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which replaced the country's first mission (AMISOM) in April 2022. The new deployment still requires approval from the United Nations Security Council, which ultimately authorises peace missions based on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The council's Resolution 2748 (2024) indicated the possibility of the new mission, pending a report on its design by 15 November. Launching AUSSOM raises several questions – mainly how it differs from its predecessors, if it can do better against al-Shabaab, and successfully hand over security responsibility to the Somali Security Forces. Considering the al-Shabaab threat, Somalia needs a follow-on mission to avoid a security vacuum. AUSSOM will be deployed in a changed geopolitical environment, marked by escalating tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, which contributes troops to ATMIS. The two are at loggerheads over the January memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-declared independent state. The details of the agreement haven't been made public, but it allegedly grants Ethiopia sea access and a military base in return for political recognition of Somaliland. Questions about AUSSOM are valid. While the mission may help renew continental and international support for counter-terrorism in Somalia, protecting it from regional tensions will be essential. Previous missions enabled Somalia to achieve vital security and state-building gains, including consolidating a federal governance system and conducting elections. Somalia became an East African Community member in 2023 and joins the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for 2025-26. AMISOM and ATMIS, alongside international partners, also helped launch offensive operations against al-Shabaab and develop the Somali Security Forces' capacity – as a result, liberating several territories and strategic towns. Unlike ATMIS, AUSSOM will have a more realistic, longer time frame and strong international support. The new mission differs from its predecessors in its mandate and operational modalities. Due to Ethiopia-Somalia tensions, Ethiopia probably won't contribute troops, while Egypt likely will. Previous missions have struggled with multiple, sometimes conflicting, roles and expectations. Unlike them, AUSSOM will have a more defined supportive role, with more pronounced functions for the Somali Security Forces. In contrast to ATMIS, AUSSOM should have a more realistic, longer time frame. ATMIS was given under three years to degrade al-Shabaab by supporting offensive military operations and building capacity in the Somali Security Forces. AUSSOM's priority will be to bolster operations of the Somali Security Forces and carry out capacity building. Unlike earlier missions, it has an explicit mandate to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence. AUSSOM will have five years to complete its work (2025-29).

2] NU: Counter terror always fails, DW 24.

DW 24 (defenceWeb is Africa's largest and most trusted online source of news, information, research and insight on aerospace, defence and security matters, "AUSSOM planning ahead of November UN deadline", 4th October 2024, defence Web, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/aussom-planning-ahead-of-november-un-deadline/>, DOA 12/10/24)

Work is underway in Mogadishu on mission design and funding for the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) that will replace ATMIS (AU Transition Mission in Somalia) three months from now. "Engagements", an ATMIS statement has it, started on 24 September when a joint AU/UN (African Union/United Nations) delegation arrived in the Somali capital. **Assisted and supported by delegates from the Somali Federal Government, troop contributing countries (TCCs) and international partners, they are preparing a comprehensive report on overall mission design and financing options. This is in line with UN Security Council resolution 2748 (2024). To meet the November 2024 deadline for reporting back to the UN Security Council, the joint delegation organised its work into streams, with representation from the AU, Somali government and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) logistic support partner for ATMIS and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF).** "Engagements have been productive

and provided clarity and a sense of ownership for the successor mission. We have been discussing the details for the follow-on mission because the FGS, AMISOM, and ATMIS have achieved tremendous success and we need to reduce the ATMIS footprint to fit the requirements of the new mission,” General Cheick Dembele, AU Peace Support Operations Head, said. The involvement of international partners, according to him, underscores the global commitment to Somalia’s stability and security, with their input on transition strategies and potential financing models key to AUSSOM’s successful implementation. **As the AU commendably strives to enhance its response, available funds have yet to be commensurate with the immensity of Africa’s peace and security challenges, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) said last month. For instance, the ATMIS annual running cost was estimated at \$1.5 billion in 2023. Should the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) become a reality with a similar cost, based on the UN Resolution 2719 75%:25% burden share, the AU will have to contribute \$375 million — 61.5% of the fund’s current capacity. The remaining \$235 million of the \$610 million will barely cover other missions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force and conflict prevention activities, the ISS noted.**

3] T: Aff boils more terror.

Shillinger 21 (Kurt Shillinger is a research fellow specializing in security and terrorism in Africa at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg. 8/28/2021, “Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step In Countering Terrorism”, Saxafi Media, <https://saxafimedia.com/recognizing-somaliland-step-countering-terrorism/>, DOA: 12/9/2024)

The new administration of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is the product of more than two years of complex negotiations among rival groups hosted by neighboring Kenya. **Although the African Union (AU) has pledged thousands of regional peacekeepers to help the new government settle, prospects for its success are slim.** Conceived and constituted in exile, the Ahmed government was met with varying degrees of praise and violent protest during its first foray into Somalia in early March 2005. This followed the killing of BBC producer Kate Peyton, who traveled to Mogadishu in February to prepare stories on the new government’s arrival. Those with vested interests in the status quo, including neighboring Ethiopia, remain powerful and exercised. Tellingly, Ahmed and his prime minister did not venture into the strife-torn capital. At the same time, with much less fanfare, the secessionist province of Somaliland in the northwest was preparing for bicameral parliamentary elections to be held on 29 March 2005. While the south has festered, Somaliland has quietly and persistently demobilized its rival militias and erected the structures of statehood without external assistance. It has an elected president and a constitution that survived the death and succession of a head of state and has drawn substantial inflows of aid and remittances to help rebuild its infrastructure devastated by a decade of civil war with the Siyad Barre government prior to 1991. It now boasts reconstructed airports, ports, hotels, power plants, and universities—but it remains unrecognized by the international community.

Recognition, as the varying fortunes of both Somalia and Somaliland demonstrate, is not a prerequisite for statehood but, in the case of the latter, may well consolidate the process of nation-building at a crucial time both for Somaliland and a world fighting global terrorism. As the preeminent British anthropologist, I M Lewis noted in 2004, “the overall achievement so far is truly remarkable, and all the more so in that, it has been accomplished by the people of Somaliland themselves with very little external help or intervention. The contrast with the fate of southern Somalia hardly needs to be underlined.”¹ Prior to the 11 September, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, diplomatic attempts to restore order in Somalia were driven by desires to limit the potential for drug trafficking and regional destabilization caused by outflows of arms, banditry, and refugees into neighboring states. The events of 9/11 added a new, more urgent dimension to international engagement in a region that had already experienced the devastation of terrorism. The key question since then, set against the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was whether the absence of state security structures would enable terrorist organizations to set up bases inside Somalia. For reasons that will be explored below, it has not quite worked out that way, but the 2002 hotel bombing in Mombasa on the Kenya coast illustrated Somalia’s potential as a staging ground for terrorist activity and punctuated the region’s overall vulnerability. **Given Somalia’s location at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, its susceptibility to conflicting destabilizing interests from Ethiopia and the Arab Peninsula, and the Muslim identity of its people, it is time to rethink how to solve the country’s enduring crisis in the context of global terrorism.** Despite the exhaustive debate, the Westgate Mall siege in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013. In recent weeks, they have carried out a spate of attacks in Kenya peace

talks on Somalia failed to convincingly resolve the key question of whether to pursue a federal or unitarian solution in a patch-quilt political landscape of rival clan-based factions. A better solution is partition. Although it runs contrary to the AU's commitment to territorial integrity, **recognizing Somaliland is consistent with the imperatives driving global counterterrorism**. Emotively, **the international community would be supporting the democratic aspirations of a Muslim state**—a central pillar of the Bush anti-terror “Liberty Doctrine.” **Strategically, recognition would give the West expanded influence over 900 additional kilometers of coastline in a key transit zone of the Arab Peninsula and enable the international community to bolster regional security** at a time when, according to the accumulated evidence of the different risks posed by failed and weak states, Somaliland is arguably becoming more vulnerable to exploitation by radical Islamist organizations the more it develops.

4] NU/ID - Al-Shabaab lacks the incentive for nukes.

Saenz 22 [Lisa Saenz, Executive Vice President, CFO, and COO @ WestStar Bank, 3-14-2022, WMD TERRORISM AND THE AL QAEDA NETWORK: AN ANALYSIS OF AQIM AND AL SHABAAB, The University of Texas at El Paso, https://www.utep.edu/liberalarts/nssi/_files/docs/capstone%20projects1/lisa-saenz-capstone.pdf]

Conclusion In assessing the AQIM terrorist incidents in the region, it can be concluded that incidents surrounding facilities and research reactors were only found to be in Algeria. There were a greater amount of incidents surrounding reactors in 2007 than in 2012. Most of the incidents occurring within 50 km of a research reactor occurred at the Nur research reactor site. For the incidents occurring in 2007 and 2012, there have been a total of 12 incidents occurring within 50 km of this site, and two incidents occurring within 10 km of the site. The terrorist incidents occurring for Al Shabaab in 2008 and 2012 demonstrate significant growth of this group. They seem to be spreading in numbers, and are more capable of carrying out activity. There were **no Al Shabaab terrorist incidents within 50 km of a research reactor or facility**. However, while the data presented an increase in terrorist activity for Al Shabaab along the East African coast, but not around nuclear reactors or facilities, there was a decrease in terrorist activity by AQIM (Exhibit 10). This group may **not have a large interest in trafficking illicit material**. I can assess with moderate confidence that this group has a smaller potential of trafficking nuclear material than Al Shabaab. This study reveals that AQIM and Al Shabaab do not present a significant threat of nuclear terrorism to the U.S. homeland, or a significant threat for carrying out the potential of trafficking nuclear material. Neither group presents a threat of obtaining nuclear material from facilities in this region. I can assess with medium confidence that AQIM and Al Shabaab present a threat to U.S. interests in North Africa due to the past incidents and current motivations. Al Shabaab presents a greater threat to U.S. interests abroad than AQIM. They are unlikely to attack a nuclear reactor or facility because the cities in this region are made up of a combination of allied groups and adversary groups. They would not risk conducting an act of **nuclear terrorism** that may **hurt their allied groups** because these **sympathizers** are a type of support system that **provides financial support**. Nuclear trafficking is more probable than nuclear terrorism because trafficking in general is a way of life in this area. A majority of the countries in Africa live in extreme poverty. Participation in trafficking provides a source of income. The areas that have been revealed to be likely nuclear trafficking routes are those areas along the coast. This region contains the majority of plotted terrorist incidents in North Africa amongst both groups. Maritime security must be amplified to diminish the likelihood of nuclear material smuggling through cargo ships. The potential for nuclear trafficking in this region will continue to grow within the next 10 to 15 years due to the advent of dual-use technology and the rising popularity in nuclear peace programs. The closer this region becomes to implementing nuclear power plants to produce electricity, the greater the threat of nuclear trafficking.

4] NL/T - US forces are corrupt and exacerbate instability.

Soyemi 23 [Eniola Anuoluwapo Soyemi, 4-27-2023, "Making Crisis Inevitable: The Effects of U.S. Counterterrorism Training and Spending in Somalia", Watson Institute @ Brown University,

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2023/Soyemi_Costs%20of%20War_CTSomalia.pdf

There is ample evidence that specialist contingents of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. — in particular, Danab, the Puntland Security Forces (PSF), Waran, and Gaashaan — have regularly been misused by sections of the Somali political elite and the Somali Federal Government. According to interviews with a former Somali military commander, these special SNA contingents are modelled on U.S. Light Ranger Regiments specifically intended for military missions on terrorist targets. Since U.S. counterterrorism activity has been focused on Somalia, the training of these contingents has been provided by U.S. Special Forces, for whom the U.S. government does not disclose the financial cost. Since at least 2010, training has taken place on known U.S. military bases inside Somalia in Mogadishu and Baledogle, but also on secret ones like the one currently in Kismaayo. These U.S.-trained special contingents have regularly been deployed against their counterterrorism mandate for domestic "law enforcement" purposes — for instance, as close personal protection for political elites or as roadblock policing. In the most troubling cases, they have been used to attack and enforce orders on non-terrorist targets including political opponents.

A2 Global Economy

[ID] “Interests” aren’t enough for great power draw-in

Kepe '23 [Marta, Elina Treyger, Christian Curriden, Raphael Cohen, Kurt Klein, Ashley Rhoades, Erik Scuhuh, and Nathan Vest; July 13th; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; JD Harvard, PhD Harvard, George Mason University Professor of Economics; M.A. in social science, University of Chicago; B.A. in history, Brigham Young University; Ph.D. in government, Georgetown University; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University; B.A. in government, Harvard University; M.Phil. in policy analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School; M.P.P., University of California, Los Angeles; B.S. in physics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University; B.A. in political science, Stanford University; Exchange Program in international security, University of Oxford.; MA International Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies MS International Relations and National Security Studies at Troy University, MS operations research from US Air Force Institute of Technology, BA Economics from US Air Force Academy; MA Security Studies at Georgetown University, BA History and Arabic at UT Austin; RAND Corporation, “Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Africa,” Full Report:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR969-2/RAND_RRA969-2.pdf Publish Date: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR969-2.html //recut AG

Although all three great powers have considerable interests in Africa and competition for influence there is becoming more significant, the nature of great-power interests is not likely to provide a sufficiently strong motivation for any of the powers to become involved in African conflicts—even in some of the countries where the potential for competition and opportunities for conflict are relatively high. For the United States, none of the interests that it has in Nigeria or Mozambique warrants substantial involvement in a conflict. The most-plausible motivations for involvement are connected to counterterrorism. **Washington also has economic interests and humanitarian concerns. Yet all of these interests are unlikely to motivate a significant expenditure of resources to support a proxy in the scenarios that we considered. At least in our two scenario countries—Nigeria and Mozambique—China and Russia also lack the kind of significant interests in Africa that might motivate them to expend resources on substantial support to parties in local conflicts. Like the United States, the two competitors are not at high risk of direct impact from violent extremist networks present in these countries, even if all three powers are concerned about international terrorism generally—and especially closer to their homelands. For China, its greatest motivation to become involved in a conflict would stem from its economic interests, particularly in maintaining stability around the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia’s most-plausible motivations to engage in a conflict would be based on a combination of its strategic and economic interests—to maintain influence, ensure access to local political leadership, and support its interests in Africa’s markets and natural resources. Because of the relatively low willingness to engage substantially, the most-plausible forms of intervention in our scenario analyses entail indirect forms of support.** The most-plausible conflict scenarios that we identified in Nigeria and Mozambique would entail counter-VEO engagements, training, non-combatant evacuations, support through PMSCs, or simply humanitarian assistance. Military engagements are most likely to involve small, specialized units or training teams. **In the future, if U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations deteriorate further and increasingly become zero-sum, the powers’ relations in Africa may follow the same trajectory. However, it is unlikely that, even then, the countries would engage in larger-scale military interventions; rather, they would focus on non-military competition, support for local actors, and small-scale engagements.** The involvement of competing powers in the same conflict could, however, increase the likelihood that Chinese or Russian forces would harass U.S., partner, or allied forces and civilian personnel.

[NL] Great powers empirically are drawn in for peacekeeping, not conflict

Burbach 16, (David T. Burbach is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, received a Ph.D in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has expertise in African security, defense planning, and U.S. foreign policy. , 9-22-2016, "The Coming Peace: Africa’s Declining Conflicts," Sustainable Security,), <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/Blog/the-coming-peace-africas-declining-conflicts>

Africa is often presented as a war-ridden continent, but this depiction is becoming outdated. In the 21st century, the amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. “Africa” and “conflict” are words all too often linked in Western minds. From Cold War proxy wars, to what Robert Kaplan saw as “the coming anarchy” in the 1990s, to Boko Haram massacres today, news from Africa may seem

dominated by never-ending conflict. That image is out of date. In 2002 Tony Blair was justified in describing the state of Africa as a “scar on the conscience of humanity”, but in the years since there has been an underappreciated success story in Africa. The amount of warfare in Africa has declined dramatically, and today most Africans are more secure than ever. Troubled areas remain, unfortunately, but the larger picture of receding conflict has implications for how we think about African security needs. Outside actors can help reinforce positive external and internal trends that mitigate conflict, can avoid creating new conflict zones like Libya or South Sudan, and should recognize emerging human security needs that are becoming relatively more important as armed conflict declines. Africa’s waning wars **Quietly over the last 15 years, many African wars did end**, to paraphrase Scott Strauss. Lingering Cold War struggles like the Angolan civil war burned out. **West African nations including Liberia and Sierra Leone ceased being playgrounds for warlords and regained their status as functional, if weak, states. Eastern Congo is still violent, but far less so than during the 1990s “African World War”. Overall, 21st century Africa has seen more wars end or abate than ignite.**

The trend towards peace in Africa can be seen by using various datasets on armed conflict (for more on data sources, tabulation, and trend analysis, see Burbach and Fettweis 2014). The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), for example, tracks conflicts from 1946 to the present, scoring each for the intensity of its societal impact. Figure 1 shows the yearly sum of conflict intensity assessed by CSP, for both Africa and the rest of the world. The end of the Cold War brought peace to much of the world, but African conflicts increased in the 1990s. States like Somalia and Sierra Leone collapsed into warlordism, for example. Central Africa was hit by the Rwanda genocide and bloody chaos in Eastern Congo, killing one to five million people. At least three-fourths of the world’s total war deaths in the late 1990s took place in Africa (Burbach and Fettweis 2014, Figure 4). After the year 2000, the tide of war receded. Africa’s total conflict intensity as measured by CSP fell by approximately half. A similar pattern is shown by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. Using somewhat different definitions, the Uppsala data shows that the number of conflicts in Africa resulting in 1,000 or more “battle deaths” per year declined from an average of 12 in the late 1990s to an average of 3.5 from 2010-2013. Some decades-long wars ended with formal peace accords, as with Angola in 2002; elsewhere, states gradually gained the upper hand on armed disorder. Given the unfortunate rise of warfare in the Middle East, Africa is no longer the most violent region of the world. The decline of warfare in Africa is even more dramatic in terms of individual risks. Africa’s population is growing rapidly, up 150% since 1980. Declining conflict despite a much larger population means the mortality risk from war has fallen substantially. An average of 32 people per 100,000 population were killed per year in the 1980s and 45 per 100,000 in the 1990s. In 2013, though the rate was only 8 per 100,000 (Burbach & Fettweis 2014, Figure 5). World Health Organization data shows an astonishing 95% decline in African conflict deaths from 2000 to 2012. In the 1980s, warfare killed more Africans than vehicle accidents. Today, perhaps three to six times as many Africans die in road crashes than from conflict. Many more Africans are harmed by crime or domestic violence than by warfare. Africa is still afflicted by more conflict than most of the world and the suffering of those involved is very real. Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Africans live free of war today than ever in the post-independence period. Celebrating African peace may seem premature given the civil war in South Sudan or the ravages of Boko Haram. Conflict has increased since 2011, but the level of armed conflict still remains lower than any time from 1970 – 2000. The most tragic development is the civil war in South Sudan, which the U.N. estimated had killed 50,000 as of spring 2016. Fortunately, South Sudan’s case is nearly unique: a newly created nation, devoid of physical or administrative infrastructure, with ethnically divided, soon-to-be-unemployed armed factions eyeing the lucrative oil revenues awaiting whomever could seize power. As academic panelists noted in 2011 – two years before the civil war – predictors of conflict were flashing red in South Sudan. Few African countries contain such a combustible mix of problems anymore. Accounting for the decline There are several factors behind the ebbing of conflict in Africa. One important change is the geopolitical environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviets armed and funded rival factions in civil wars, allowing bloody wars to fester for decades in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Then, 1990s Africa fell into turmoil as superpower-sponsored regimes collapsed. A disinterested world mostly left Africa to its fate, but continued trade in weapons and resources with warlords. **In the last decade, however, the U.S., Europe, and China have all become more active in diplomacy, security assistance, and peacekeeping. The US and China are together pressing the South Sudanese factions to stop fighting, rather than choosing sides.** The world has become somewhat less willing to sell arms or purchase minerals that directly fuel conflicts, admittedly with a long way to go. Africans themselves deserve great credit for ending the wars that plagued their continent. Economic growth, improvements in governance, and greater space for peaceful political participation have all made state failure and internal conflict less likely. As Paul Collier among others has noted, civil wars tend to create vicious cycles that spread insecurity to whole regions.

Many regions of Africa have climbed out of the conflict trap; political, security, and economic improvements are reinforcing each other. The nations of Africa increasingly work together through the institutions of the African Union to head off or resolve conflict, and to deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones. Needs still outpace available resources, but that cooperation is a marked change from 20th century Africa. A peaceful future? Whether the trend towards peace continues depends foremost on Africa’s leaders, but external actors can encourage positive trends in African security. Most directly, partners can help the AU and its member nations improve peacekeeping and conflict resolution capabilities. Likewise, the world should continue arms embargoes against combatants and regulating trade in valuable resources where exploitation appears to be a key ingredient of protracted conflict. Ongoing encouragement and incentives for democratization and governmental reform are helpful. Western countries should consider, however, that broad efforts like anticorruption programs are probably more helpful than International Criminal Court indictments of individual leaders, which can generate nationalist backlash. The world should especially try not to create new ground for conflict. Libya and South Sudan are Africa’s worst conflict zones today. Both were birthed through Western action – the removal by force of the Qaddafi regime, and diplomatically sponsoring South Sudan’s independence from Khartoum. While the moral cases were sound, both countries were left

with non-existent governments, antagonistic armed factions, and grossly inadequate provision for disarming, demobilizing, and re-integrating fighters. American and European governments focused more on freeing people from hated regimes than on answering – let alone resourcing – the “what next?” question. Chaos followed, just as many African governments had warned at the time. From a humanitarian perspective, advocates should consider whether other challenges in Africa deserve relatively more attention. For example, Fearon and Hoeffler suggest that domestic violence against women and children now imposes larger human costs than warfare, and also that domestic violence can be reduced more cost-effectively than armed conflict. The ballooning toll of vehicle accident deaths in Africa may represent an opportunity for international technical or educational assistance to pay off with many saved lives. Beyond road safety, Africa is rapidly urbanizing. Western visions of menacing rebels waving AK-47s in the bush privilege the exotic, but most Africans confront more prosaic threats to health and safety. The human security challenges Africans confront are increasingly those of city-dwellers: crime, sanitation and utilities, safe and reliable transport, etc. Better policing, regularized urban housing, and expansion of infrastructure in megacities like Lagos and Kinshasa ought to be top priorities. Conclusion Sixteen years ago The Economist magazine suggested Africa was a “hopeless continent”. Lately The Economist has been bullish on Africa, citing the decline in warfare as a key reason for the continent’s improving business prospects. **With remarkable speed, in the 21st century African conflict declined and safety improved, a hugely positive change in the welfare of Africans.** Africa’s international friends should ensure their priorities respond to contemporary human security challenges, not ghosts of the past – and certainly they should avoid making things worse. Recognition of Africa’s progress itself would be a boon: the continent’s increasingly out-of-date image as an undifferentiated war-torn anarchy retards investment and engagement from overseas. The tragedies of the moment deserve action, but we should not overlook that there is also much good news out of Africa.

[ID] Peacekeeping solves back AND interests are economical at best

Straus 13 Scott Straus is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, The Guardian, January 30, 2013, “Africa is becoming more peaceful, despite the war in Mali”, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/30/africa-peaceful-mali-war> //

What explains the recent decline in warfare across Africa? I don’t know for certain, but would point to geo-political changes since the end of the cold war.

First, the end of the cold war meant that the opportunities for rebels to receive substantial weaponry and training from big external states declined. To be sure, states across Africa still meddle in the affairs of their neighbors, but insurgent funding from neighbouring states is usually enough to be a nuisance to, but not actually overthrow, existing governments. Second, the rise of multi-party politics has sapped the anti-government funding, energy, and talent away from the bush and into the domestic political arena. Third, China is a rising external force in sub-Saharan Africa. China’s goals are mainly economic, but their foreign relations follow a principle of non-interference. To my knowledge, China supports states, not insurgencies. Finally, conflict reduction mechanisms, in particular international peacekeeping and regional diplomacy, have substantially increased on the continent. Peacekeeping is more prevalent and especially more robust than in the 1990s. Regional bodies such as the African Union, Eccowas, Eccas, IGAD, and SADC are quite active in most conflict situations. They have exhibited greater resolves in conflicts as diverse as Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Madagascar. The four posited mechanisms are hypotheses, each of which deserves greater scrutiny and empirical testing. But taken together, they suggest plausible ways in which the incentives of insurgents and even state leaders to fight have been altered in recent years. They give reason to expect that while war is clearly not over in sub-Saharan Africa, we should continue to observe a decline in its frequency and intensity in coming decades.

[ID] Even if there is a war, it wouldn’t spillover.

Thrall 15, MA, Scholar in Residence at University of Colorado Boulder. (Lloyd, “China’s Expanding African Relations”, RAND, pg. 78-79, Accessible at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR905.html) recut Aaron AV

There is little credible potential for a Sino-American conflict over resources in Africa. Contrary to popular and perennial assumptions about resource wars, industry and energy analysis sources project adequate supply of conventional hydrocarbons beyond 2035.6 Given reservoir depletion curves, any tightening of supply would be gradual. The adequacy of supply is further augmented when tertiary production and unconventional sources are considered (such as shale and tar sands). U.S. strength in unconventional sources, and potential energy independence, further reduces the likelihood of a conflict. Even in a future with vastly inflated hydrocarbon prices, these costs pale in comparison to those associated with a Sino-American war, the economic costs of which likely fall more heavily on China than the United States.7 Global hydrocarbon

resources are distributed via a fungible global market, with many stakeholders and moderate diversity of supply. This enables importing states to buy a predictable supply of hydrocarbons at reasonable and competing prices over long contracts. African sources do not constitute a majority of this supply chain, and supposed victory in a theoretical great-power resource war would not guarantee security of resource supply. In sum, the potential for either China or the United States to be willing to enter war with a nuclear adversary over African oil, let alone other, less valuable resources, is extraordinarily small.⁸

Alt causes ensure African growth – and it varies wildly

Kuro 23'

Mayoworo Kuro et al, June 05 2023, "Reimagining economic growth in Africa: Turning diversity into opportunity", *McKinsey Global Institute*, <https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/reimagining-economic-growth-in-africa-turning-diversity-into-opportunity>, //DS

Africa is home to the world's youngest and fastest-growing population, burgeoning cities, and bold innovations in everything from fintech to clean energy. With its population expected to nearly double to 2.5 billion people by 2050, the continent presents myriad opportunities for robust, inclusive growth that harness its rich natural resources and abundant human potential to increase prosperity not only in Africa but around the world.

These strengths and assets present a chance for the continent to vastly improve its productivity and reverse the economic deceleration it endured from 2010 to 2019. GDP growth fell 35 percent over that period—and then the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, followed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Those events set off shifts that are still working their way through the global economy. Today, 60 percent of Africa's population lives in poverty, the result of per capita income growth that has averaged just 1.1 percent a year for the past several decades.

Yet the continent-wide statistics obscure successes in many of its constituent countries that can serve as models to establish productivity as the foundation of Africa's economic growth. Over the past decade, certain countries, cities, sectors, and companies have been beacons of innovation, productivity, and growth—there is no "one Africa." In those beacons lie lessons and innovations that can reinvigorate the African economy. Our new research indicates that abundant growth and development are still possible in Africa, still happening—and, more than ever, vital for the welfare of the world

AU is near useless on the economy

Agupusi 22'

Patricia C. Agupusi (Ph.D.) is an Assistant Professor of Social Science at the School of Social Science and Policy Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), Massachusetts, US. Her research interests include state capacity, political violence, and the political economy of development and inequality, August 19 2022, "The African Union Has Had a Shaky Two Decades but Problems Can be Solved", *American University*, <https://www.american.edu/sis/news/the-african-union-has-had-a-shaky-two-decades-but-problems-can-be-solved.cfm>, //DS

The regional peacekeeping process has not translated into regional economic integration and a socio-economic framework for development.

Economic development remains the AU's weakest area. The New Partnership for Africa's Development was supposed to develop a homegrown policy framework for sustainable economic development. Its goals include eradicating poverty, promoting growth and integrating Africa into the world economy. The AU has also been criticised for its lack of consultation with member states' civil society stakeholders. Consultation of civil society would contribute to accountability and provide a sense of ownership for the citizens of member states.

The AU's inability to implement its economic development framework remains an obstacle to achieving its goals. The importance of regional integration cannot be exaggerated given the low proportion of inter-African trade when compared with other regions. The volume of trade among

countries of the continent is around 15% of total trade, while in Europe, North America, and Latin America, rates are 68%, 37% and 20% respectively.

More trade among African countries would improve manufacturing, reduce dependency on natural resources and expand the African market.

A2 Egypt

1. Ethiopia and Somalia tensions are resolved, which is the root cause of Egypt being drawn in. Aguiar 24 reports

Paulo Aguiar, (Paulo Aguiar earned a master's degree in International Relations from NOVA University Lisbon, specializing in Realism, Classical Geopolitics, and Strategy. As an aspiring professional in geopolitical risk analysis and strategic foresight, Paulo regularly shares his insights on Geopolitical Monitor and his own Substack, which is available at: <https://horizontegeopolitico.substack.com/>) 12-19-2024, "Ethiopia-Somalia Agreement: Turkey's Rising Influence in the Horn of Africa", Geopolitical Monitor, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ethiopia-somalia-agreement-turkeys-rising-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa/>

Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip **Erdogan, played a pivotal role in resolving the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting three rounds of negotiations. The talks culminated in a breakthrough agreement that reaffirmed the territorial integrity of both nations while outlining a plan for Ethiopia to gain secure maritime access under Somalia's sovereign framework.** This compromise aims to address Ethiopia's need for trade routes without undermining Somalia's national unity. The agreement, slated for finalization by April 2025, is a crucial step toward reducing the immediate threat of military conflict between the two countries. For Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, it also provides much-needed breathing room to address pressing challenges at home. In Ethiopia, these include ongoing ethnic tensions, economic instability following a controversial currency devaluation, and efforts to rebuild trust after years of internal strife. In Somalia, the focus now shifts to consolidating central authority in a politically fragmented landscape and combating the persistent threat posed by Al Shabaab, whose insurgency remains a destabilizing force across the country. **For Turkey, this mediation effort marks a significant diplomatic achievement and a clear affirmation of its growing influence in the Horn of Africa.** Over the past decade, Ankara has steadily deepened its footprint in the region, blending economic investment, security cooperation, and humanitarian aid to build trust and partnerships. **Acting as a neutral mediator in the Ethiopia-Somalia talks has solidified Turkey's reputation as a reliable and pragmatic partner, capable of brokering solutions in some of the world's most challenging geopolitical hotspots. The agreement also positions Turkey to reap long-term benefits. Turkish companies are now poised to take part in major infrastructure projects tied to the deal, including the construction and upgrading of ports, transportation networks, and other trade-related facilities. This is not only a win for Turkish businesses but also a key part of Ankara's broader strategy to expand its economic and political influence in Africa.** By supporting development in the region, Turkey strengthens its ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia while advancing its ambitions as a global player. On a larger scale, Turkey's successful mediation reinforces its growing role as a power broker in global affairs. The Horn of Africa occupies a critical strategic position, connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, and stability in this region is vital for international trade and security.

2. Turn: Recognition is critical – Somaliland inevitably goes to war to stop unification with Somalia. Pijovic 14

Pijovic 14 (Nikola Pijovic: PhD candidate at Australian National University. He has published on local governance in Somalia and politics behind Somaliland's lacking statehood recognition. September 2014, "To Be or Not to Be: Rethinking the Possible Repercussions of Somaliland's International Statehood Recognition", African Studies Quarterly, <https://journals.flvc.org/ASQ/article/view/136172/140692> // DOA: 12/12/24)JDE

No Return To Union With Somalia For The Majority Of Somaliland's Population A third argument for Somaliland's international recognition is that **there is "no realistic way of persuading them [Somaliland] to rejoin Somalia short of launching a war."** **72** Considering that **the majority of Somaliland's population was born after 1991 and Somaliland's declaration of independence**, and that they do not have any memory or identity as citizens of a unified

Somalia, it is difficult to imagine an incentive for them to join a union with the south. Add to this the still very grave material and security conditions in the south of Somalia, and it is understandable why Somalilanders may not be interested in re-joining Somalia. Unfortunately, it has been over twenty years since northerners and especially Issaq were able to freely own property, hold political office, and conduct business in Somalia. A legitimate reason why most Issaq do not wish to rejoin the union with Somalia is **because “the opportunities for people in Somaliland to regain a financial and political foothold in the south are slim.”**⁷³ As Bradbury concluded: **Northerners have not only lost physical assets in the south from looting, but also rights to social protection, economic rights and rights of access and ownership. In a reconstituted Somalia, with Mogadishu as its capital, Isaacs and others who have fled or were chased out of the south are likely to feel more marginalised than they were before the war.**⁷⁴ Moreover, the political elites of Somaliland are firmly against reverting back to any unity with Somalia; a fact highlighted by several confidential US embassy cables. For example, in 2004 US embassy officials met with a prominent London based Somalilander who was a “premier advocate for recognition.” This person, Dr. Omar Duhod, in discussing the Somali Peace Talks in Nairobi stated that “if Somaliland is forced to go back to Somalia, there would be civil war” and added that the Somalis negotiating in Nairobi “are those that committed atrocities.”⁷⁵ Similar arguments were raised six months later in a meeting between Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Edna Ismail Aden and US Ambassador Ragsdale. When the US Ambassador asked Foreign Minister Aden if there was a way Somaliland could work with Abdullahi Yusuf, then president of the TFG, Foreign Minister Aden replied that this was not possible because Yusuf was an individual who had committed atrocities against Somaliland, and “will never have the support of Somaliland’s people.”⁷⁶ In 2007, at a meeting between US embassy officials and Somaliland citizens discussing Somaliland developments and recognition, US officials were told that **“Somalilanders will never go back to Somalia after what happened to them under Siyad Barre”** and that they would rather die fighting than become part of Somalia: **“with or without recognition, they will never agree to go back to Somalia.”**⁷⁷ During a subsequent meeting with Djibouti’s Minister of Communication an embassy official was told that while Somalilanders wish their southern neighbor well, “there is no going back, ever.”⁷⁸ **It appears that such views have not changed and Somaliland’s leadership is still adamant that the territory will not re-join Somalia.** In May 2012 Somaliland’s then Foreign Minister Mohamed A. Omar stated in front of an audience of UK members of parliament and diplomats that “while we will never allow Somaliland to return to unity with Somalia, we wish our neighbor well, and stand ready to offer her advice and discuss matters of mutual bilateral interest on a basis of mutual respect and from our vantage point as a sovereign, separate entity.”⁷⁹ Such sentiments have also been echoed in September 2013 by Somaliland’s new Foreign Minister Mohamed Behi Yonis.⁸⁰

3. The reason Egypt sent troops to Somalia is not so that Somalia can wage war on Somaliland- the troops are solely to help Somalia fight the terrorist group Al-shabaab. Levy 24

Ido Levy, (Ido Levy is an associate fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy focusing on counterterrorism and military operations, particularly relating to jihadist groups.) 11-6-2024, "Making the Best of Egypt’s Entrance into Somalia", Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/making-best-egypts-entrance-somalia>
In 1993-95, **Egypt contributed** around 1,600 **troops to support** the UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) peacekeeping mission after pledging a battalion to the preceding UNOSOM I. When a **new FGS administration** took office in 2022, however, Cairo assumed a greater role in assembling capable forces for **the** planned FGS **offensive against al-Shabab**, training up to 3,000 SNA members in Egypt since 2023. It also began providing specialized counterterrorism training for batches of fifty FGS security personnel each, and provided similar training for a program to develop a 3,500-4,500-strong **military police unit** funded by the United Arab Emirates.

4. Somalia doesn’t have the **capability** for war and is **focused** on Al-Shabab.

Barnett '24 [Caleb; Research Fellow @ Hudson Institute, Research Fellow @ the Centre for Democracy and Development, Fullbright Research Fellow @ the University of Lagos, former analyst @ the American Enterprise Institute, BA from the University of Texas, MA from King's College London; 1-1-2024; War on the Rocks; "A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink,"

<https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink/>; accessed: 12-18-2024] tristan

Conventional **War Is Unlikely**

Neither **Somalia** nor **Somaliland** has much in the way of conventional **militaries** with which to fight a protracted conflict. The broad failure of internationally assisted state-building and **military capacity-building** in **Somalia** is well **documented**: The vast majority of what could be construed as **"security forces"** in Somalia are clan militias or **warlord armies of questionable loyalty** to the central **government** (which is itself perennially divided). Within the nominal **Somali National Army**, the only consistently **effective units** are small special forces groups trained by the United States and Turkey to **combat al-Shabaab**. No **Somali government** since 1991 has had the conventional military capacity to challenge the authority of the **Somaliland administration** in the latter's territory, and **no degree of bellicose rhetoric from Mogadishu will change that**.

Somalia's inability to wage a conventional **war with Somaliland** applies as well to the case of **Ethiopia**, which has traditionally had one of the largest and best equipped militaries in Africa and presently maintains several thousand troops in Somalia as contingents in the African Union peace enforcement mission and as unilateral deployments. Egypt, which has its own acrimonious dispute with Ethiopia and has a close relationship with Somali President Hassan Sheikh, has staunchly backed Mogadishu in the dispute. But setting tough rhetoric aside, **Cairo has struggled to effectively support its principal ally within Sudan's ongoing civil war despite sharing a border with the country. It is therefore unclear how significantly Egypt could become involved in any proxy conflict with Ethiopia.**

A2 Trump

1. DL: Trump won't recognize Somaliland for many reasons - Webb 24 explains

Webb 12-17 [Maxwell Webb, independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives @ the Israel Policy Forum's IPF Atid program, 12-17-2024, There's a rare opportunity to deepen US-Somaliland ties. But several obstacles stand in the way., Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/theres-a-rare-opportunity-to-deepen-us-somaliland-ties-but-several-obstacles-stand-in-the-way/>]

Challenges ahead Nevertheless, it is the unpredictability of Trump's politics that directly challenges Somaliland's progress in its quest for recognition. Increasingly, isolationist foreign policy has become a trend within the Republican Party. On the one hand, questioning and challenging the institutions and precedents that hold back Somaliland's recognition prospects may help its cause. But completely withdrawing from those institutions, or being unwilling to cooperate with them, could leave Somaliland, and the entire African continent, behind. Engagement with Africa was not a pillar of the first Trump administration's "America first" foreign policy. But the Biden administration pushed for the African Union to be a permanent member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and advocated for African nations to be given permanent seats in the UN Security Council. Based on his first administration's foreign policy, Trump is very likely to deprioritize bolstering Africa's inclusion in international institutions, as he will be focusing on the wars raging in Europe and the Middle East, challenges around the US-Mexico border, and increasing tension with China. For Somaliland to play a role in global affairs, and sell itself as a partner worth investing in, it will have to garner attention from the Trump administration at a challenging time.¶ Additionally, Egypt may be another major roadblock to Somaliland's relationship with Trump. For several reasons—such as Ethiopia's building a dam on the Nile River and the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Somaliland and Ethiopia earlier this year—Egypt has become a major supporter of Somalia. Included in this support are weapons and training for Somalia's military. Trump and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi also have a close relationship, with the former calling the latter a "good man" and claiming the Egyptian leader has done "a fantastic job" with his country in 2019. With Egypt under pressure internally and externally, Trump looking to quickly end the war in Gaza, and both Sisi and Trump looking to expand and deepen relations between the United States and Egypt and its partners, these two leaders are almost certain to strengthen their ties. It is unlikely that Trump would want to squander relations with Sisi over Somaliland in the near future.¶ Relatedly, as of last week, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to begin working on resolving their tension over the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, which granted landlocked Ethiopia sea access. After talks on December 11, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to set up commercial arrangements that would allow Ethiopia "reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea." However, it is still unclear whether these new commitments—negotiated by Turkey, a key partner to Somalia and Egypt—will impact the MOU and Ethiopia-Somaliland relations. However, if relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are to improve, the Trump administration may step further away from greater engagement with Somaliland out of concern over adding to destabilization in the region. Longstanding US policy priorities—most importantly the fight against al-Shabaab—might also prevent the Trump administration from fully shifting course. Despite its many challenges, the Federal Government of Somalia still remains an active US partner in the fight against al-Shabaab and other militant groups in the Horn. Additionally, the recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Somalia, with the affiliate setting up base in Puntland, may cause the Trump administration to proceed with caution as it approaches Somalia policy. Moreover, at the end of this year, the African Union mission in Somalia is undergoing a transition, with new forces coming in and a new mandate taking place. This period of transition will be very fragile, and a new Trump administration may not be willing to make immediate moves that would jeopardize the success of any apparatus aimed at fighting Islamic militants in

the Horn. On top of all of this, Somalia is currently facing its own internal problems, with tensions rapidly rising between the federal government and the government of Jubaland. All of this is to say that, while the Trump administration has good reason to engage with Somaliland, the fear of further destabilizing an already precarious situation in Somalia may cause the White House to use caution around the issue of recognition. Finally, Somaliland's core supporters in the US government are Republican politicians and conservative analysts in mostly right-wing policy spaces. While this support is important, if Somaliland becomes a focal point of Trump's foreign policy, it risks its recognition becoming a partisan issue and could face backlash the next time the Democratic Party retakes the White House. If Somaliland works to bolster support for its cause only among the Republican Party, it could hurt its own quest for recognition.

2. Nonuq: Conflict is inevitable – the MOU already triggered their links

Hassan 24 (Abdillahi Hassan, journalist and social activist, “Somalia will go to war with Somaliland, not Ethiopia”, Somaliland, <https://www.somaliland.com/news/somalia-will-go-to-war-with-somaliland-not-ethiopia/>, DOA 12/14/2024) ESR

On the first day of 2024, Somaliland's President Muse **Bihi and** Ethiopia's Premier Abiy **Ahmed delivered a seismic announcement that resonated throughout the region.** In Addis Ababa, shortly after Muse Bihi's return from a conference in Djibouti, where he met Somalia's president, the two leaders announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between their nations. The complete text of the MoU remains undisclosed, but **Ethiopia's summary of the deal suggests an agreement allowing Ethiopia access to the sea in exchange for shares in Ethiopian Airlines and an assessment of Somaliland's pursuit of international recognition. Somaliland asserts that Ethiopia will formally recognize it,** making it the first sovereign country to do so. Unsurprisingly, this bold move has stirred a strong reaction from Somalia's government and its citizens. **The president of Somalia declared the agreement void,** prompting the swift passage of a resolution by the Parliament to “annul” it. **The government organized public demonstrations** in Mogadishu and other cities across Somalia. Moreover, **leaders from various sectors** in Somalia, spanning government, opposition, and civil society, have **resorted to populist rhetoric and publicly proclaiming readiness for war against Ethiopia.** Somalia Mourning Perceived Loss Opportunity To observers in Somaliland and beyond, it may seem like Somalia is throwing juvenile tantrums. However, it is crucial to understand that **Somalia's reaction is rooted in its perception of recent successes to “bring Somaliland back to the fold”.** **What infuriated Somalia** the most is in not the prospect of Ethiopia getting an access to the sea as President Mohamud himself **hinted at his openness to that possibility.** Rather **it is the sense of an opportunity to submit Somaliland to its will slipping away from their hands with the possibilities that this deal opens for Somaliland.** This sense of a historic opportunity, however, is not the result of progress in the Hargeisa-Mogadishu dialogue; rather, they stem from setbacks plaguing President Muse Bihi's administration in Somaliland and Mogadishu's steps to capitalize on them. The president's extended term in 2022 triggered a protracted political dispute, damaging his legitimacy and fostering deep polarization and mistrust in the country. That was compounded by losses in the eastern frontier conflict, where Somaliland's army was expelled from strongholds near Las Anod after seven months of clashes. This the Somali government abruptly capitalized on by **recognizing the administration of Las Anod** which claims three regions in Somaliland either wholly or partially. And finally, the neglect of economic development has finally caught up with the country and put considerable strain on its strength. **In contrast to Muse's setbacks, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's government achieved significant successes in the last quarter of the year,** securing **debt relief, East Africa Community membership,** and the lifting of a **long-standing weapons import ban.** These factors have **emboldened Mogadishu's administration to deliver what they see as the final blow to Somaliland's quest for independence on the negotiation table.** Bitter Confrontation in Djibouti Flushed with this perceived advantage, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Muse Bihi in Djibouti on December 28, 2023. Sources close to the negotiations describe a tense encounter, devoid of pleasantries, where Somalia asserted its perceived advantage. **Confronting Bihi on his “lack of legitimacy” and control over all of Somaliland's territory, Somalia further issued a clear threat of destabilization in Somaliland's western regions by exploiting clan cleavages.** Insult was added to injury when Mohamud demanded that president Bihi represent only his personal

interests and those of his immediate kin group as “there were no thing as Somaliland to speak off”. Later statements from Somalia’s Minister of the Interior Ahmed Fiqi confirm this confrontational picture. Fiqi, addressing a rally in Mogadishu, stated that President Bihi’s faced tremendous challenges and that his hope was that the President would have resolved them by “[surrender to](#)” Somalia and continuing negotiations for reunification. In fact, the Somali side was so smug about their advantage in Djibouti that Minister Fiqi announced that it was a “[historic milestone for the unification of the country](#)”. Indeed, **the over-reaction from Mogadishu was nothing more than frustration over the loss of perceived opportunity**. They see that the man whose back was to the wall had escaped their entrapment. And for that, they are willing to go to war, not against Ethiopia as Somali officials have repeatedly stated, but against Somaliland. Somalia is too weak to maintain confrontation with Ethiopia for prolonged time. For one, Somalia depends on a large contingent of Ethiopian forces to keep Al-Shabab at bay. There is great difference in the resources and capacities of the two nations at this juncture. Even a diplomatic feud with Ethiopia is a futile endeavor for Somalia in the long run as with the exception of the impotent Egypt, there is hardly any country that would pick Somalia over Ethiopia. Subterfuge and Subversion In contrast, Somaliland as the setbacks of the previous year demonstrate, has its flaws that could be exploited. Somalia knows these very well and was capitalizing on them before the MoU interrupted them. So, with all its bluster against Ethiopia, it’s Somaliland that will bear the brunt of Somalia’s attack on multiple fronts. Indeed, the first direct rebuttal of the MoU from Mogadishu was mobilizing “pro-union” politicians serving in Somalia’s parliament and government to condemn the deal. Apart from the rhetoric, the first concrete reaction was to turn back an Ethiopian plane from Hargeisa International Airport and claiming that a second plane, a Thai cargo carrier, was denied request to land in Hargeisa. These steps were quite the challenge to Somaliland’s claim of sovereignty over the land, air, and the representation of the people of the country. However, Somalia’s fury over Somaliland’s self-determination as manifested in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding does not end there. What follows the legalese arguments is concerted efforts to challenge Somaliland’s de facto sovereignty over the land. This takes the form of subversion, destabilization and attempts to break the consensus of Somaliland’s majority on the independence project. The first move in this regard sets the tone for Mogadishu’s approach to the Somaliland question from now onwards. Ahmed Fiqi, the face of the failed Djibouti meeting, conveyed a meeting with the “members of Awdal community” [to work with the federal government in opposition to the MoU](#) on January sixteenth. This was an obvious hint that Mogadishu would resort to stirring clan divisions to destabilize Somaliland. Another decision, not yet publicly disclosed but which parties privy to it reported, was the order to Federal officials hailing from Somaliland to start subversion activities with each official starting in their hometown. Sanaag region, where the Deputy Prime Minister comes from, is a prime target as per sources. However, a more willing partner for Mogadishu would be the rebel-led Las Anod administration. Reports indicate a high-level visit from Mogadishu leaders to Las Anod to coordinate to strengthen the Las Anod insurgency to export the disorder further west to Togdheer and Sanag regions. **As tensions escalate, the long-deferred confrontation between Somaliland and Somalia over self-determination becomes inevitable, risking wider regional involvement**. In this confrontation, Somaliland suffers from the obvious disadvantage of being led by a divisive and quite incompetent administration. However, **as resilience is synonymous with Somaliland’s narrative, this will not be the first time it triumphed in adverse conditions. It is not Somaliland who we should fear for in this battle of wills, but the 20-year international effort to reinstall a state in Somalia.**

3. DL: Other countries won’t follow the US because it’s no longer a model. Buckley 24 finds

Shear and Buckley 11/20 (Michael Shear and Chris Buckley: NYT journalists. 20 November 2024, “World Leaders Seek Stability With China as Biden Exits the Stage”, NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/us/politics/trump-world-leaders-china-xi-stability.html> .//. DOA: 11/22/24)

And for all the pomp and pleasantries as Mr. **Biden wraps up a half-century on the world stage, there is deep uncertainty about the role the United States might play in heading off those conflicts**. In his last speech at the United Nations in September, Mr. Biden said the world was at “another inflection point” and added: “The choices we make today will determine our future for decades to come.” When it comes to China, his counterparts are hoping that their choices prove to be the right ones. **“European leaders are going to be looking to Xi with this kind of, ‘Now you have got to step up,’”** said John Delury, a historian of modern China. **“Like, this is not just talk anymore. We really want to elevate this relationship so that we can count on you.”** For his part, **China’s president used the G20 summit to promote his country as a benign supporter of open trade and international stability**. **Chinese leaders have long offered reassuring themes in speeches to global audiences, but Mr. Xi and his advisers appear to hope that foreign leaders will be more receptive while they prepare for the strains and uncertainties of a second Trump term**. Countries should “view each other’s development as an opportunity, not a challenge, and treat each other as partners, not adversaries,” Mr. Xi told leaders

at the G20 summit on Monday, according to an official Chinese account of his remarks. But Mr. Xi also issued an implicit warning to the other leaders in attendance. While promising to abide by a commitment to “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and winning cooperation,” the Chinese leader also said that “our position of resolutely safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests remains unchanged.” That warning was underscored at the summit on Monday during an opening session featuring remarks by each leader. Television cameras were running when Mr. Starmer delivered his comments. But when he mentioned concerns about human rights in China and the treatment of Jimmy Lai, a Hong Kong businessman and pro-democracy dissident, Chinese representatives in the large conference room moved quickly to block the view of the cameras and push journalists out of the room. It was a reminder that diplomacy with China has often been rocky. In the United States, the appearance of a Chinese spy balloon in U.S. air space and Mr. Xi’s anger over Mr. Biden’s decision to shoot it down led to a surge in tensions for months. In Australia, tensions have flared over Chinese Communist Party influence activities in Australia and deepening concerns over China’s regional ambitions. On Monday, Mr. Xi said the two countries had “witnessed some twists and turns.” **But**

Australia and China have resumed high-level talks and eased some concerns about tariffs in recent months, a sign that Mr. Albanese, like other leaders, is eager to find ways to maintain a working relationship. After a meeting between the two men on Monday, Mr. Albanese posted pictures on social media of them shaking hands.

“Dialogue is critical, and we’ve made encouraging progress,” he wrote. **“Trade is flowing more freely. And that brings benefits to both countries, and to people and businesses on both sides.”** Washington and Beijing have also sought to ease tensions between them in the past two years. Top-level military communications have restarted between the two countries. And the meeting between Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi on Saturday, the second in a year, was intended to demonstrate that the leaders can work with each other. However, Mr. **Biden is a lame duck** soon to be replaced by Mr. Trump. Around the world, officials are bracing for a return to Mr.

Trump’s confrontational policies while eager to see if anything is different during a second term. **Mr. Trump promises to steeply increase tariffs.** If he acts on those promises, **he could hurt American standing abroad, even with a firm ally like Australia, by raising barriers to markets in the United States,** said Richard McGregor, a senior fellow for East Asia at the Lowy Institute, a foreign policy think tank in Sydney. “I think it has the potential for really damaging the image of the United States in Australia and, in turn, corroding some support for the alliance,” he said in an interview. “I don’t want to exaggerate that, **but it’s corrosive to the U.S. image.**” In the meantime, **Chinese policymakers are searching for diplomatic openings after Mr. Trump**

returns to the White House. China’s foreign policy “will not undergo a transformative shift just because Trump takes office,” Wang Wen, the dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China in Beijing, said in an interview. “On the other hand, **Trump’s return will force Chinese foreign policy to become more flexible toward a range of countries.**” Over the past few years, Beijing has already been seeking to reduce its isolation and blunt Washington’s influence by mending ties with governments in Europe and across the Asia-Pacific region. Mr. Xi has wooed President Emmanuel Macron of France and Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, nudging them to distance Europe from Washington. Last month, China and India announced an agreement on patrolling their shared Himalayan border, where deadly clashes broke out between their troops in 2020.

A2 Ethiopia Draw-In

1. NL. Ethiopia cannot wage war

Barnett '24 [Caleb; Research Fellow @ Hudson Institute, Research Fellow @ the Centre for Democracy and Development, Fullbright Research Fellow @ the University of Lagos, former analyst @ the American Enterprise Institute, BA from the University of Texas, MA from King's College London; 1-1-2024; War on the Rocks; "A Port Deal Puts the Horn of Africa on the Brink," <https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink/>; accessed: 12-18-2024] //prav

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Somalia's inability to wage a conventional war with Somaliland applies as well to the case of Ethiopia.

which **has** traditionally **had one of the largest and best equipped militaries in Africa** and presently **maintains several thousand troops in Somalia** as contingents in the African Union peace enforcement mission and as unilateral deployments. Egypt, which has its own acrimonious dispute with Ethiopia and has a close relationship with Somali President Hassan Sheikh, has staunchly backed Mogadishu in the dispute. But setting tough rhetoric aside, **Cairo has struggled to effectively support its principal ally within Sudan's ongoing civil war despite sharing a border with the country**. It is therefore **unclear how significantly Egypt could become involved in any proxy conflict with Ethiopia**.

2. NL: Ethiopia turns to diplomacy over conflict

Fraser 24 ([Suzan Fraser is an Associated Press Journalist](https://archive.ph/7yZ1o#selection-513.0-516.0), "Ethiopia and Somalia agree to hold 'technical talks' over breakaway Somaliland region", The Washington Post, December 11, 2024, <https://archive.ph/7yZ1o#selection-513.0-516.0>, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html, DOA 12/12/24)

Ethiopia and **Somalia agreed on Wednesday to hold "technical talks" to resolve a dispute sparked by Ethiopia's deal with Somalia's breakaway region of Somaliland** according to a statement following talks in Turkey.

Turkey has been mediating between the two east African countries as tensions between them have simmered since Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in January to lease land along its coastline to establish a marine force base. In return, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland's independence, which Somalia says infringes on its sovereignty and territory. **A joint declaration was reached after Turkish President**

Recep Tayyip Erdogan met separately with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on Wednesday. It says the sides agreed the talks, which would begin by February 2025 and conclude within four months, would respect Somalia's territorial integrity while recognizing "potential benefits" of Ethiopia's access to the sea. The declaration also says the sides would work to "finalize mutually advantageous commercial arrangements" to allow Ethiopia "to enjoy reliable, secure and sustainable access to and from the sea," under Somalia sovereignty. Somaliland seceded from Somalia more than 30 years ago, but is not recognized by the African Union or the United Nations as an independent state. Somalia still considers Somaliland part of its territory. Over the years, Somaliland has built a stable political environment, contrasting sharply with Somalia's ongoing struggles with insecurity amid deadly attacks by [al-Qaida-linked militant group al-Shabab](#). In November, Somaliland held a [presidential election that gave a boost for its push](#) for international recognition. With a population estimated at over 120 million, Ethiopia is the most populous landlocked country in the world. Turkey has previously hosted two rounds of talks between the African nations' foreign ministers but a third round, expected in September, was delayed, raising concerns of escalating tensions. **Erdogan, flanked by Mohamud and Abiy, told reporters at a late night news conference in the Turkish capital, Ankara, that the sides have reached an "important stage" in efforts to solve their dispute. The joint declaration, Erdogan said, focuses "on the future and not the past." "By overcoming some resentments and misunderstandings, we have taken the first step toward a new beginning based on peace and cooperation between Somalia and Ethiopia,"** Erdogan continued. He also said he hoped Somalia would take steps to give Ethiopia sea access. **Abiy, the Ethiopian prime minister, insisted that "Ethiopia's aspiration for secure access to the sea is a peaceful venture and one that would benefit all our neighbors." "I believe that today's constructive discussions will push us into a new year with this spirit of cooperation, friendship and the willingness to work together instead of against each other," he said. Somalia's president said the Horn of Africa is a "very fragile and very volatile region, which needs both Ethiopia and Somalia to work together" for the benefit of both. Turkey has forged close ties with Somalia, and recently also signed deals toward cooperation in defense and oil and gas exploration. It also has economic and trade ties with Ethiopia.**

3. T: Recognition resolves tensions over regional deals no Ethiopia draw in

Elleily 24 (Amel Elleily is a desk analyst for Sub-Saharan Africa at Global Weekly. She is a recent History & Politics graduate from the University of Cambridge. She is set to continue her studies by starting a MSc in International Relations at the LSE. Mar 18 24 "Beyond Recognition: Why is Somaliland not Sovereign?" Global Weekly, <https://www.global-weekly.com/post/beyond-recognition-why-is-somaliland-no-sovereign>, DOA: 12/9/24)

The new Red Sea port deal, signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland at the start of this year, has reignited tensions in the Horn of Africa over regional power dynamics, territorial disputes and, most importantly, concerns of sovereignty. The question of Somaliland's sovereignty and statehood has taken centre stage once again, and is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, seeking recognition as a sovereign state. Despite applying to the African Union (AU) in 2005, it has yet to gain formal international recognition after two decades. Rather, **the AU seems reluctant to grant Somaliland's sovereignty even though it is becoming a recurring cause of insecurity and instability in East Africa.** This article aims to suggest that **Somaliland's statehood remains unrecognised by the AU because it is a case which defies Eurocentric frameworks of statehood. Rather, Somaliland's struggle for sovereignty testifies to the necessity for more diverse theories of the state which take into account Africa's colonial history. The tensions that have arisen because of the new Red Sea port deal demonstrate this. International recognition for Somaliland is crucial to stabilising domestic and regional politics but, more pertinently, for reshaping**

understandings of statehood universally. Without international recognition access to multilateral aid and investment opportunities is limited, hindering the development of the state. Additionally, **without recognition, Somaliland struggles to resolve intra-state and inter-state disputes; the Red Sea port deal would not have exacerbated existing tensions and provoked intervention by Somalia if Somaliland's sovereignty was recognised.** This requires redefining statehood beyond the current normative criteria.

4. And Recognition allows US to bilaterally expand bases and checks regional stability With Ethiopia MOU

Webb 24 (Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum's IPF Atid program. 2-22-2024, "What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington's strategy in the Red Sea", Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/>, DOA: 12/2/24)

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth. The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland's Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somali government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia's approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues

A2 Turkey

1. Turkey and Somalia are collaborating now

Mohamed Sheikh Nor 12/18/24

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-18/turkey-begins-building-rocket-launching-facility-in-somalia>

Turkey is building a facility to launch rockets from Somalia, the Horn of Africa nation's president said, boosting Ankara's long-range rocket testing program. The project will help generate jobs and revenue for the nation, Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said at an event in Mogadishu. Somalia's location on the eastern tip of mainland Africa is ideal for firing toward the Indian Ocean without the risk of debris falling into residential areas and other countries, Bloomberg reported in September. The Somalia facility will advance Turkey's aspiration to join a space race traditionally dominated by global powers. The nation has had plans to launch a rocket for some years. Mohamud didn't disclose the location of the project. Turkey is one of the few foreign powers strengthening ties with Somalia as the African nation tries to rebuild after years of clan warfare.

For the arms race internal link – other factors determine how arms races factor into war

Rider et al, Texas Tech University political science professor, 2010

[Toby, Michael Findley, Brigham Young University political science professor, and Paul Diehl, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, "Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War"]

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574713_Just_Part_of_the_Game_Arms_Races_Rivalry_and_War, accessed 12-16-16, TAP]

In sum, arms races are a competitive behavior most likely found in rivalry, increase in likelihood after rivalry lock-in has occurred, and are associated with war during the mid-to-later stages of the most enduring of rivalries. Although our analysis provides answers to key questions in the conflict literature, there are still important puzzles yet to solve. In particular, more information is needed about the role arms races play in the rivalry process and the resolution of disagreements. Do arms races reveal information about relative power that might bring about quicker resolution (Kydd, 2000) or do arms races prolong competition and the duration of rivalry? Additionally, given the high costs of arms races, more understanding is needed regarding domestic processes in the decision to: engage in a military build-up, continue building as an arms race develops and terminate an arms competition.

2. Turkish influence is NUQ

Paulo Aguiar, 12-26-2024, "Ethiopia-Somalia Agreement: Turkey's Rising Influence in the Horn of Africa", Geopolitical Monitor,

<https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ethiopia-somalia-agreement-turkeys-rising-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa/> //ms

Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, played a pivotal role in resolving the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting three rounds of negotiations. The talks culminated in a breakthrough agreement that reaffirmed the territorial integrity of both nations while outlining a plan for Ethiopia to gain secure maritime access under Somalia's sovereign framework. This compromise aims to address Ethiopia's need for trade routes without undermining Somalia's national unity. The agreement, slated for finalization by April 2025, is a crucial step toward reducing the immediate threat of military conflict between the two countries. For Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, it also provides much-needed breathing room to address pressing challenges at home. In Ethiopia, these include ongoing ethnic tensions, economic instability following a controversial currency devaluation, and efforts to rebuild trust after years of internal strife. In Somalia, the focus now shifts to consolidating central authority in a politically fragmented landscape and combating the persistent threat posed by Al Shabaab, whose insurgency remains a destabilizing force across the country. **For Turkey, this mediation effort marks a significant diplomatic achievement and a clear affirmation of its growing influence in the Horn of Africa. Over the past decade, Ankara has steadily deepened its footprint in the region, blending economic investment, security cooperation, and humanitarian aid to build trust and partnerships. Acting as a neutral mediator in the Ethiopia-Somalia talks has solidified Turkey's reputation as a reliable and pragmatic partner,** capable of brokering solutions in some of the world's most challenging geopolitical hotspots.

3. Turkey has already formed military deals with Somalia

Federico Donelli, 10-16-2024, "Somalia and Turkey are becoming firm allies – what's behind this strategy", Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/somalia-and-turkey-are-becoming-firm-allies-whats-behind-this-strategy-240578> //ms

Turkey has ramped up its partnership with Somalia in recent months. It is helping Somalia defend its waters, and has signed a deal to explore for oil and gas off the east African nation's coast. There have also been reports of advanced discussions to have Turkey set up a missile and rocket testing site in Somalia. These agreements underscore Turkey's strategic and economic aspirations in the broader Horn of Africa region. **Over the past four years, there has been a[n] steady increase in Turkish partnerships and agreements for the export of defence-related products to the**

region. This has included the use of Turkish drones in conflict zones, such as Libya and Ethiopia. I have studied Turkey's historical and current involvement in Somalia to understand what's driving Ankara's policy in the Horn of Africa. In my view, Turkey's involvement is driven by multiple factors. These include international status-seeking, regional balance and strategic concerns. **The opening of a training facility in Mogadishu has increased Turkey's strategic depth in the Horn of Africa, projecting the country towards both sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean. And the use of Turkish drones in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict has shown Turkish defence arrangements have become a factor in local dynamics.**

4. T - Turkey good and increases aid

Kbaez, 6-18-2024, "Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them?", Atlantic Council,
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them/> //ms

In the years since Erdoğan's visit, **Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports.** According to Erdoğan, **Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022.** Though Turkey's presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—"Istanbul" is now a common girl's name in Somalia. Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of **Turkey's tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country,** and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.