

1986 NATIONAL CEDA TOURNAMENT FINAL DEBATE:
IS MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS NO LONGER
BENEFICIAL TO THE UNITED STATES?

Edited by James R. Brey¹

The first National CEDA Debate Tournament, sponsored by the Cross-Examination Debate Association, was held at Wichita State University on April 5-7, 1986. Professor Robert Vartabedian of Wichita State University hosted the tournament. Professor Michael Bartanen of Pacific Lutheran University served as tournament director.

Eight preliminary rounds and six elimination rounds resulted in a final round between Florida State University and Macalester College. Carrie Crenshaw and Miguel Delao, coached by Curtis Austin represented Florida State on the affirmative. Molly McGinnis and Paul Benson, coached by Dick Lesicko, Tim Baker, John Jackson, and Scott Nobles represented Macalester on the negative.

The final round was judged by David Frank from the University of Oregon, Dale Herbeck from Boston College, Gina Lane from William Jewell College, Suzanne Larson from Southern Utah State College, Jeffery Philpott from Gustavus Adolphus, Jon Ritter from Wichita State University, and Kevin M. Twohy from Carroll College. The decision was 5-2 for Macalester.

The debate was transcribed from a cassette tape recording. Except for the correction of obvious unintended errors this is as close to a verbatim transcript as was possible to obtain from the recording. Evidence used in the debate was supplied to the editor immediately following the round. Sources of the evidence have been verified as indicated in the Works Cited. Footnotes supply the exact quotation and other information when necessary. When the source was not available to the editor or was not located after a reasonable search, the term "source indicated" is used in the footnote together with any additional information provided by the debaters. Quotation marks surround statements from unverified sources only when the debater has provided the editor with a photocopy of the original.

First Affirmative Constructive:
Carrie Crenshaw, Florida State University

¹ Mr. Brey is an instructor of Speech Communication and the Assistant Debate Coach at Vanderbilt University.

Miguel and I stand resolved: That membership in the United Nations is no longer beneficial to the United States.

In beginning our affirmation of the resolution we wish first to note one observation. Observation number one. Criteria for evaluation of the resolution. (A) subpoint, definitions. Initially, we'd like to note that the affirmative has the right to reasonably define terms because otherwise the negative could always define the affirmative as falling outside the scope of the resolution.

The term United Nations implies only the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat. Thomas Franck, Director of Research for UNITAR, the UN's think tank, explains what the UN is, in 1985:

This impression [of disillusionment and disappointment with the UN] cannot be rebutted by reference to public opinion polls demonstrating continued support for selected UN activities such as help to developing countries, the eradication of malaria, or the useful activities of the World Bank and the International Postal Union. The American public is sophisticated enough to know that these praiseworthy activities are carried out by agencies that are largely independent of the principal institutions of the UN. When the laity think of the United Nations, they have in mind the organs which deal with highly visible political disputes: the Security Council, the Secretariat, and especially the General assembly. [These three organs] which deal with the big political disputes ... are essential core of the system. (6-7).

In fact, Mr. Franck argues that membership to the UN is only really confined to those three areas when he writes:

Between World Wars I and II the United States belonged to some specialized agencies, such as the International Labour Organization, even while refusing to join the League of Nations. Even now, we could continue to belong to the best of the functional bodies such as the World Health Organization and the World Food Programme, even if we decided to withdraw from the UN itself because of the initiatives of the core political organs no longer coincided with the US national interests. (7).

The final term needing definition, of course, is beneficial. According to *Webster's New World Dictionary* in 1979, beneficial means: For one's own interest.² Thus, we support the

² Source Indicated.

contention that beneficiality should be evaluated according to the United State's national interests.

Additionally we'd like to note subpoint (B). The US national interest defined. George Keenan, noted International Relations expert and Professor at Princeton, quoted in the December 16th 1985 issue of *Newsweek* gives guidelines by which to determine the US national interest: "[T]he United States should be guided by three basic concerns - military security, the integrity of its political life, and the well being of the American people." (47). Thus if we succeed in proving that the UN no longer acts to serve the interests set forth by Professor Keenan, the resolution can be affirmed.

The grounds for our claim are offered in contention one. United States military security is endangered by conflict. Subpoint (A) conflict control ensures military security. If we wish military security then we must limit conflict. Michael Klare, analyst at the Institute for Policy Studies notes in 1984: "Looking at the world as it is, and wishing to avert a global catastrophe, our goal must be more expedient: the deterrence, containment, and control of military conflict." (247).

Subpoint (B) small conflicts pose the greatest threat of global disaster. Former President Nixon points out this first in his 1984 book *Real Peace*: "The greatest threat to peace comes not from the possibility of a direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, but from the chance that a small war in the Third World will drag in the two super powers and escalate into a world war." (73).

While it may seem obvious that conflict control is in everyone's interest, the UN only exacerbates conflict. Note contention two, the UN heightens conflict. The reason stems from how the UN functions. Please note subpoint (A), the UN is used to blow off steam. The original purpose of the UN was to provide the countries of the world a place where they could vent their frustrations in the hope that the pressures which build up due to unsettled disputes would be relieved without the necessity of blood and agony. Mr. Tugwell, of the Center for Crisis Studies establishes this in 1984: "[A]s Winston Churchill expressed it, 'better jaw, jaw than war war'.... The UN is the one place in the world where representatives of nearly all countries - regardless of size, wealth or power - are freely heard on a broad range of world issues. In this regard ... the General Assembly is the principal forum for blowing off steam." (158).

However, things haven't turned out quite as Mr. Churchill expected. Subpoint (B), venting sows the seeds for war. The General Assembly is used to mobilize emotions, which cause conflicts. Mr. Tugwell continues in 1984:

It cannot be said that this beneficial outcome has never occurred. It must also be said that in today's General Assembly, such occurrences are very rare. All evidence points to the safety valve theory being turned on its head. The venting of steam is for the most part hypocritical, stage-managed and conflict-oriented. Far from cooling passions, the techniques of name-calling and lying are intended to mobilize the Assembly on the side of the speaker, to discredit and isolate adversaries, and to cultivate climates of opinion inhospitable to national argument. (163).

UN involvement in every problem only causes conflict to become extended. Jeane Kirkpatrick, former US ambassador to the UN, examines this reality in 1983:

In the process of being transformed from actual problems outside the United Nations to United Nations issues, the number of parties to a conflict is dramatically extended. A great many countries who would never be involved at all in the issue of the Golan Heights, for example, become involved in that issue as the conflict is extended inside the United Nations to become a matter of concern to all the world. The United Nations is an arena in which many countries are brought into conflicts they might not otherwise become involved in. (96-7).

As the conflict becomes extended, everyone must choose sides in the issue and this causes more conflict. Professors Yeselson and Gaglione of Rutgers University explain in 1974:

If a particular black African state wishes to maintain a neutral and helpful position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli dispute, it must consider the risk of alienating other Afro-Asian states in respect to issues on which it seeks their support. Politics at the UN, by constantly forcing states to choose up sides, progressively destroys neutral havens, which may mean the difference between war and peace. (175).

This conflict extension precludes the UN from peaceful settlement of conflict. Subpoint (C), venting precludes peacemaking. Mr. Tugwell continues in 1984:

Nor is the UN's record in controlling regional conflict very impressive. In the Middle East, for example, fluttering blue and white UN flags and contingents of UN observers or peacekeepers never once prevented an Arab military or terrorist attack on Israel.... In recent years, undisguised UN hostility toward Israel has effectively disqualified that organization from its supposed specific role in the Middle East. Significantly, the latest peacekeeping force in the region was sponsored outside the UN. (160).

We note subpoint (D), the UN is used to mobilize for war. The UN may be intended to cool emotions, and plenty of lip service may be given by its supporters to that goal, but the actual participants of the UN use it for mobilizing war efforts. Professor Yeselson and Gaglione of Rutgers explain:

[The UN] is a weapon in international relations and should be recognized as such. As part of the armory of nations in conflict, the United Nations contributes about as much to peace as a battleship or an atomic bomb. Disputes are brought into the UN in order to weaken an opponent, strengthen one's own side, prepare for war, and support a war effort. (x).

While the UN would be a good forum for discussing the solution to real problems, it is instead exploited for the mobilization of war efforts. Mr. Tugwell agrees: "The plight of Palestine Arabs is real the UN ought to be a good forum for reconciliation, compromise and settlement. However, instead of venting steam one day and returning the next to contribute to rational debate, the supposedly injured parties in these disputes vent steam to mobilize for war." (165).

While the past has been more successful than portrayed here, that is only the past. Please note finally subpoint (E), the UN has had successes but is now an enemy of peace. Kurt Waldheim notes in 1984: "The system on paper is impressive. It has frequently helped to avoid or contain international violence. Yet in recent years it has seemed to cope less and less effectively with international conflicts of various kinds, and its capabilities in other areas of international cooperation have also seemed to dwindle." (93).

In addition, any past success cannot be taken as indicating of any future trend. Mr. Tugwell explains:

The UN has enjoyed some success in peace-maintenance, particularly in the prevention of escalation and in helping parties in a dispute to disengage. Although nuclear war has been avoided, this is more to NATO's deterrence policy than efforts in the UN. Moreover, a reluctance on the UN's part to recognize or address the reality of Soviet expansionist policy, coupled with disarmament proposals that may undermine deterrence, could diminish rather than strengthen the preservation of peace in the future. (157).

The only conclusion Miguel and I can reach is that peace can be better assured by not employing the UN in conflicts. Yeselson and Gaglione note: The overwhelming majority of

quarrels among allies are settled secretly or bilaterally. Even states basically at odds with each other forego the UN when they are unwilling to exacerbate tensions. (165).³

We now ask you to stand resolved that membership in the United Nations is no longer beneficial to the United States.

Cross-Examination:

Paul Benson questioning Crenshaw.

Benson: The UN then consists only of the three major organs, correct? Crenshaw: Yes. Benson: OK, now, do the other areas of the UN contribute to the beneficiality of the UN? Crenshaw: Well, we're talking about membership in the United Nations according to the resolution. And membership in the United Nations only includes those three. Benson: So only those three. But do the other organizations contribute to our beneficiality of being in that particular organization. Crenshaw: I really don't know, and I would contend that is irrelevant, because it is not - Benson: That is irrelevant? Crenshaw: Yes, it does not fit under the topic in anyway. It is not a resolutional discussion.

Benson: OK. Now the CIA was established by Congress, correct? Crenshaw: That's correct. Benson: OK, and when we discuss the beneficiality of Congress would we not look at the actions of the CIA as part of that? Crenshaw: No, you wouldn't. In fact that's the analogy that Miguel uses most of the time. He says-- Benson: Yeah, I know. Crenshaw: Oh, good. Benson: Miguel is a nice guy. Crenshaw: If you're a member of the CIA that does not mean you are a representative or a senator. Benson: That's irrelevant. I mean, doesn't, when you're evaluating beneficiality of Congress, would you not consider then -- Crenshaw: But, see you-- Benson: The actions of the CIA in that, you know, on balance calculus? Crenshaw: No, you must take the resolution as a whole. Benson: Resolution as a whole? Wouldn't we be taking the resolution as a whole if we did this? Crenshaw: No, you wouldn't because you have to deal only with membership in the United Nations. That is the only way you determine the benefits. That is the only thing that you are determining the beneficiality of.

Benson: O K. I need the national interest (A) subpoint. And all of contention one.

Benson : Now, the UN escalates these conflicts? Right? How many has it empirically escalated? Crenshaw: I think there is one example of the Arab-Israeli. Benson: The Arab Israeli

³ "The overwhelming majority of quarrels among allies are settled secretly and bilaterally or within the confines of an alliance setting. Even states basically at odds with each other forego opportunities to utilize the UN when they are unwilling to exacerbate tensions."

dispute? Which one? (laughter). Crenshaw: The conflict in that area. Benson: In that area. I mean there are all kinds of conflict. Are we talking, like-- Crenshaw: Israel and the PLO is what I believe Mr. Tugwell is. Benson: Israel and the PLO? Is that like UNIFIL? Is that what you're going to defend? Crenshaw: That was a peacekeeping operation. We're talking about venting. The blowing off of steam in the general assembly debate. Benson: OK. So blowing off steam is the impact then? Crenshaw: That is the link. Benson: That is the link to the impact. And the impact is what? Crenshaw: The fact that the UN exacerbates conflict and it contributes to-- Benson: Well, what's the impact of exacerbating the conflicts? Are we talking war here or what? Crenshaw: The nations use the UN to mobilize their war efforts, in fact Professors Yeselson and Gaglione say that. Benson: Yeselson and Gaglione in '74, right? That's '74 evidence, correct? Crenshaw: Yes it is. Benson: Now you argue that, you know, we have to talk about current examples. OK. Now if that's true, how does this Yeselson and Gaglione even matter. It's twelve years old. Crenshaw: Well, you know, if you want to press the evidence. Benson: Why, I am. Will you answer my question please? Crenshaw: Well, it is 1974. Yes, it is.

Benson: OK, the Tugwell evidence. Tugwell's Heritage Foundation, correct? Crenshaw: No, he is not. He's from the Center for Crisis Studies. Benson: Isn't he published in *The World Without a UN*? Crenshaw: Yes, he is, but that does not-- Benson: And isn't that where you got the cite? Crenshaw: Yes, but that does not mean that is where he is from.

First Negative Constructive:
Molly McGinnis, Macalester College

We were told we would get time for thank yous, so I'd like to do that first. Macalester College is very proud to be in the first final round of the National CEDA Debate Tournament. We would like to thank the members of the team that are here with us: Grant, Barb, Peter, Brenda, Steve, and Chris⁴, and our coaches Dick Lesicko, Tim Baker, John Jackson, and Dr. Scott Nobles.

Overview number one is that membership is inherently beneficial. (A) subpoint is that on balance, membership is beneficial and I'll cross-apply to their criteria on case side. Richard Gardner, Professor of Law at Columbia, 1982: "[W]hen we look at the activities of the United Nations *as a whole*, the evidence leads us to the unavoidable conclusion that the advantages of the U.N. to our national interest outweigh the disadvantages." (50-1).

(B) subpoint is that no US means no UN. *Harpers* in January of '84 cites an anonymous high official of the administration who says: "With us out, our Western allies would soon follow

⁴ Grant Killoran, Barb Birr, Peter Richardson, Brenda Smith, Steve Appelget, and Chris Cloutier.

... along with many pro-Western countries in the third world ... and the UN would soon collapse.” (29).

(C) subpoint is that specialized agencies go too. Thomas Frank, who they cite, says in ‘85: As for wider withdrawal from the entire UN, the State Department has pointed out, that financial loss would constrain UN organization drastically and force them to cutback programs, including many regarded as especially important; refugee, health, and technical programs, for example.⁵ (264-5).

Over view number two is that they suffer from lofty expectations. And lofty expectations says that they expect too much out of the peacekeeping forces and it’s not surprising that they conclude that they fail. (A) subpoint is the purpose of peacekeeping mission. Donald J. Puchala, professor of government, University of South Carolina, in 1983: The primary purpose of these UN missions has been to deter the renewed fighting, to gain time for diplomacy, and to discourage external and especially superpower intervention that could lead to ... escalate to larger wars.⁶ (578).

(B) subpoint is that they are not supposed to shift parties. Alan James, Professor of International Relations in ‘83: “But if the parties refuse to move, it is not the peacekeepers job to shift them.” (633).

(C) subpoint is failure is the fault of outside diplomacy. Indar Rikhye, professor of political science at Yale in ‘84: (Which takes out their final argument on Yeselson and Gaglione which indicates they are becoming other than the UN). “The lack of peaceful resolution of conflict has more often been due to the failure of diplomacy outside.” (224).

OK, overview number two or over view number three, excuse me, is that the UN slows proliferation of nuclear weapons. (A) subpoint is that US is key to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. Dr. Scheinman announced in ‘85 that: to insure an effective agency, a leadership role by the United States is needed.⁷ (67).

⁵ “As for wider US withdrawal from the entire UN system, the State Department has pointed out, that the financial loss would constrain UN organizations drastically to cutback programs, including many regarded as especially important; refugee, health , and technical programs, for example.”

⁶ “The primary purposes of these UN missions have been to deter renewed fighting, to gain time for diplomacy, and to discourage external, and especially superpower, intervention that could escalate into larger wars.”

⁷ “One of the most important measures to assure an effective and credible agency enjoying the broad -based confidence so necessary to its effectiveness is a strong and continuing leadership role by the United States both within the agency and among its principal members.”

(B) IAEA benefits the US. Robert Keohane, government professor at Harvard in Fall of '85: "[A]n international regime discouraging proliferation has greatly aided American policy ..." (152).

(C) subpoint, key to the regime. Joseph Nye, professor of government at Harvard in summer of '85: The main norms and practices of this anti-proliferation regime are found in the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and the IAEA.⁸

Debra Miller, a political science professor at Columbia says in 1983 that: The UN itself has also contributed to the articulation of norms against the use of nuclear weapons. The reluctance of weaker states to use nuclear weapons in local disputes may derive in part from the UN's norm against such an action from the perception that sanctions would be employed. (136).⁹

(D) subpoint is that the regime is effective. Leonard Spector from Carnegie Endowment for Peace in 1985: Safeguards probably detect most illegal uses of these plants and therefore pose a significant deterrent to proliferation. (55).¹⁰

(E) subpoint it slows the proliferate rate. Lewis Dunn is from the ACDA in October of 84: "Without the NPT, political constraint to the bomb's spread would be undermined ..." (15).

Finally, subpoint (F) and it says that proliferation is disastrous. Scheinman says in '85 : "The proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries would increase prospects for their use, risk involving the super powers, and raise the possibility of cataclysmic nuclear war." (1).

⁸ "The main norms and practices of this regime are found in the NPT and in regional counterparts such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which aims to keep Latin America non-nuclear; in the safeguards, rules, and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and in various UN resolutions."

⁹ "The UN has also contributed to the articulation of norms against the use of nuclear weapons. While the restraint of the superpowers in this area is due more to their perception of self-interest than to UN norms, the reluctance of weaker states to use nuclear weapons in local disputes may derive in part from the UN's norm against such an action and from the perception that sanctions (e.g., the cutting off of military assistance by one's allies) will be applied within the UN context against countries that violate the norm."

¹⁰ "Despite certain shortcomings, these safeguards can probably detect most illegal uses of these plants and therefore pose a significant deterrent to proliferation."

I'm on their observation number one now. (A) subpoint says definitions, that they have the right to be reasonable. First argument here is we will argue that they need to realistically define. And when the overview argues, you know that there is a link between the United Nations and the specialized agencies in terms of funding that is realistic.

They argue only General Assembly. First argument is parallel to Congress. Now when Congress debates and decides that something needs to be done they delegate that to an agency which they set up, or a commission which they set up, and that's a delegation of responsibility. And we argue that there's the same delegation within the United Nations.

They argue from Franck in '85 that talks about political disputes. First argument is why is the affirmative definition distinct? Why is that the only definition? Why is the analysis I give above inappropriate?

They argue that between World War One and World War Two we still belonged to these things. First argument is that a poor analogy between the League of Nations and the United Nations, because we argue now that the funding of both is inextricably tied.

They argue that beneficial means to be in one's own interest. And that's on observation two, the (A) point, where they talk about the definition of benefit. First argument is who is 'one's own interest?' I mean is that your interest, or my interest, and how do you weigh those things?

Second argument is we will maintain on balance. That you divvy up the costs and benefits of the United States membership in the United Nations and we will conclude that we win. Third argument is how do you weigh? If they prove a benefit and we prove a cost, or vice versa I guess would be the case, you know, how would we decide who wins? Who is the individual cited in their definition?

The (B) subpoint is from Mr. Kennan in 1985. He says that we should be guided by military security, the integrity of political life and the well being of American people. First argument is what are sub-definitions? That is, what is the integrity of the American people? What is military security? And those things are not defined, and if you're not certain whether or not the UN hurts those or helps those, then there can be no assertion of whether or not the UN is beneficial or not.

Second argument is why only this? Why are these only three elements to talk about? Why can't we talk about health, welfare, and all that? Then they would argue that's within their third definition, which only, which illustrates my point that they need sub-definitions before you

can argue it. Third argument is how do you weigh? And that goes back to the on balance criterion above.

I am on contention number one, (A) point. They talk about how conflict control; the need for conflict control. First argument is they do not identify third world conflict. Second argument is they do not identify UN fostered conflict, in fact there is no mention of the UN at all in the card. Which would indicate that Klare is not really concerned about the UN conflict in particular, but, just about conflict.

Fourth argument is not only peacekeeping. Which would indicate that we will argue that peacekeeping is not the only [unintelligible] to peace, nor should peace be the only thing that is discussed because that's not what Kennan discusses only.

On the (B) point they talk about how small conflicts are the greatest risk. First argument is what are the scenarios? I mean, what does this author assume about what would be the greatest risk? Second argument is how large of a conflict is needed before this harm arose? And third, is this fostered by the UN? Does this piece of evidence indicate that such things are fostered by the United Nations?

Their contention number two. (A) subpoint says that the UN is used to blow off steam. Tugwell in '84. First argument is he's from the Heritage Foundation, and we would indict him in particular. *Atlantic Monthly* says in January of '86: "We're not here to be some kind of Ph.D. committee giving equal time, says Berton Pines, a vice president of the Heritage [Foundation]. Our role is to provide conservative public-policy makers with arguments to bolster our side." (Easterbrook, 72). They reach their conclusion first.

Second argument is that debate is a substitute for war. Elliot Richardson is the Representative to the Law of the Sea in 1985: "[T]he long-winded debates are often surrogate for war ..." (Fasulo, vi). Third argument is the war is over arms. C. Maxwell Stanley, from the Stanley Foundation in '82: "In the area of peace and security, the General Assembly provides a neutral forum where parties to a dispute can fight with words rather than weapons." (105).

Third argument, excuse me; fourth argument is that third world gets to vent their aggressions. Seymour Finger says in '85 that: "Sometimes, too, fiery statements at the UN by Third World countries are a substitute for redeeming their pride by going to war when they know going to war would be disastrous." (Fasulo 65). OK?

Final argument is that there are no empirical examples. No indication of where the UN has fostered this sort of thing.

On the (B) point they state it equals the seeds for war. First argument is that they have a good track record. A. LeRoy Bennett, of the University of Delaware in 1984: “[T]he record of the UN in conflict resolution is surprisingly encouraging. Of more than 150 disputes considered by the Council and the Assembly, not more than a dozen remain.” (130). Second argument, nope that’s enough there.

On the next argument from Kirkpatrick, they talk about how (unintelligible) is extended. First argument is, even if it is prolonged it’s better than no peacekeeping. K. Venkata Raman, professor of law at Queens, in 1983 says that: “It is true that in some situations ... indefinitely extended peacekeeping operations have not served to produce a settlement. But the absence of peacekeeping would have aggravated the situation much further.” (376).

Next card is from Yeselson and Gaglione. They argue that they choose sides. First argument is 1974 evidence, and they better show some empiricals since then in the twelve intervening years. Second argument is that the empirical needs to be the standard. We argue that the empirically peacekeeping is good. Third argument is that does not talk about the superpowers which means they don’t win the Nixon argument above. Fourth argument is that they do not show a snowball. That is Yeselson and Gaglione do not say that these conflicts escalate into the types of things the impacts come off.

(C) subpoint they talk about how peacekeeping does not prevent. First argument is this is only talking about Israel. OK? And that’s the Tugwell evidence again, the indicts cross-apply here.

They argue that outside the United Nations work. First argument is the MNF was not peacekeeping it was war. Indar Rikhye, in ‘84: “The President thus categorically stated that MNF was helping to train and organize the Lebanese army and was needed to back it in maintaining order because Lebanon lacked the forces do so.” (235). Meaning we had to put a peacekeeping troop back in order to get these things to work.

Second argument is failure justifies UN. Dr. Cannon, from the Board of Governors of the UN in 1984: “ In the fall of 1982 the US organized . . . a MNF, outside of the UN, for Lebanon. It failed. ... The US should have learned that the UN peacekeeping forces are truly international and relatively impartial -- a major advantage in seeking to resolve peacefully.” (30).

On the lip service argument next from Yeselson and Gaglione. Again 1974 and they need to indicate that the present would be truly the same. Raimo Vayrynen, professor of political science, from the University of Helsinki, in 1985: Peacekeeping forces are advocated both

within and outside the UN. Peacekeeping will in the next decade and likely beyond be applied more frequently and with greater variety and complexity. (193).¹¹

On the (E) subpoint they talk about how there have been success, but its not enough. J. G. Ruggie, he's a professor of political science at Columbia 1985: "On the whole, peacekeeping has been a success story for the United Nations as even some of the fiercest critics of the organization are obliged to concede." (347).

Cross-Examination:

Carrie Crenshaw questioning McGinnis

Crenshaw: You argue that the UN causes a proliferation of nuclear weapons, is that correct? McGinnis: No. We argue that the United Nations' norms and the United Nations' agencies help to slow the rate of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. Crenshaw: So that's (D) subpoint that says it slows the proliferation rate? McGinnis: Right.

Crenshaw: Does the impact evidence deal with the rate of proliferation or does it deal with just whether or not proliferation is bad? McGinnis: It talks about whether or not proliferation is bad. Though we would indicate from the (E) point that, the (E) point is also impact, which says that a fast rate of proliferation is not appropriate for a safe world.

Crenshaw: Can I see that piece of evidence? McGinnis: Well, I just gave it all back. Hang on a second. Crenshaw: Because I believe on your next subpoint the only piece of evidence that you read was that proliferation in general is bad . McGinnis: Right. That's the (F) subpoint from Schienman. Right. Crenshaw: Could I see the (E) subpoint? McGinnis: Yeah, (E) subpoint is right here.

Crenshaw : Why is it that a rate of fast proliferation is worse than a rate of slow proliferation? McGinnis: It is the making of the INC argument about prolif that more nuclear weapons are not a good thing. And that the move toward that has been halted or slowed by the UN.

¹¹ "It is a sign of the times that. Peacekeeping forces are advocated both within and outside the UN framework. For instance, ASEAN has called for peacekeeping forces for Kampuchea, OAU even sent such forces to Chad although they later had to be withdrawn and the Carter Administration proposed the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force to pacify the border areas of Iran and Iraq. Obviously, Wiseman is right in observing that peacekeeping will in the next decade, and likely beyond be applied more frequently and with greater variety and complexity than heretofore."

Crenshaw: Could you read this piece of evidence for me again please? McGinnis: Any one in particular? Oh, the (E) subpoint. Lewis Dunn in '84 says that without the NPT, political constraint to the bomb's spread would be undermined. That's all the card says.

Crenshaw: What does that say about the rate of the spread? McGinnis: We argue that were it not for this organization, more people would have the bomb. That's all we argue.

Crenshaw: But, you just argued that the rate of proliferation has something to do with this argument.

McGinnis: Maybe the words I used were in appropriate then, all I'm saying on this subpoint is that, were it not for the UN, more people would have the bomb then do now. That's all I'm claiming.

Crenshaw: OK. So the rate or the-- McGinnis: No,-- Crenshaw: The rate of the McGinnis: All I need, -- All I need by, not that it's irrelevant, all I'm arguing on this subpoint is that fewer people have the bomb. That's all I'm arguing.

Crenshaw: OK. Why is it that the United Nations spreads nuclear weapons? McGinnis:

Why is it that they spread nuclear weapons? Crenshaw: 'Cause your link said that-- McGinnis: I

don't argue that they do spread nuclear weapons. Crenshaw: Wait now. OK. Correct me if I'm

wrong, but didn't you just say that if it were not for the United Nations, then less people

would have the bomb? McGinnis: No. Were it not for the United Nations, more people would

have the bomb than do now. I argue that--Crenshaw: OK, I'm sorry. Correct. OK.

Crenshaw: So the United Nations promotes the spread of nuclear weapons? McGinnis:

No. Crenshaw: It decreases the spread of nuclear weapons? McGinnis: Yes. Crenshaw: OK. I'm

getting sleepy, obviously. Why is that? Through which agency? The International Atomic

Energy Agency? McGinnis: Two ways. First is the United Nations itself sets the norms against

such use. Crenshaw: What, the General Assembly? McGinnis: Right. The norms generated in

the UN. And then I also argued that they delegate their responsibilities to enforce that sort of

pledge, that norm, to the IAEA and through the UN treaty-- Crenshaw: So, the norms evidence

talks about the limited use of the nuclear weapons, does it not? McGinnis: It argues--stops the

move toward that-- Crenshaw: It's not obtaining the technology; it's talking about the use of.

Second Affirmative Constructive:

Miguel Delao, Florida State University

Their first overview is on empiricals. (A) subpoint is on balance. I would first argue that this is agencies. The evidence says when you look at the UN as a whole, as they argued in cross-examination, it should be wholistic.

Second argument is vague word. It is not something you can vote for, it does not say exactly what is beneficial and certainly you cannot weight exactly what they are talking about. You do not even know what was considered. They consider our arguments.

She says (B) subpoint, no US equals no UN. She is correct.

(C) subpoint says agencies would go. That is not true. That evidence only indicates that we actually left the agencies also. We could still fund the agencies by still being in them. We do not necessarily have to cut off funding to the agencies, and I think the Franck evidence at the top of the case indicates that.

Overview two, lofty expectations. First argument is, I don't think it's very unreasonable to expect the United Nations to not cause conflict. Certainly we can't expect them to stop every conflict, but you don't want them to create any of them. Second argument is that peacekeeping has worked in the past, but we are claiming that it has changed because of venting as I will argue on case specifically.

Third argument is that we are not dealing with failure. We're not saying that they fail at all peace efforts, but that fact that they create conflicts means we do not need the United Nations because we will argue that it is not unique to the United Nations.

Prolif. First argument is that the IAEA is an agency. Evidence is from Ameri in '82: "Although not a specialized agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous intergovernmental agency under the aegis of the United Nations." (26).

Second argument is that we must obviously have the bomb out there because the evidence that they read that says that the UN has these norms to stop the use --you only stop the use of nukes after someone has nukes. Which indicates that the UN has not stopped proliferation, otherwise, the norms would not matter.

Third argument is that the debates actually lead to prolifer. Becker writes in 1985: "Nuclear nonproliferation is not tackled as a security issue but rather as another source of 'discrimination' between 'haves' and 'have nots'... The net result is that the United Nations debates undermine the status of the NPT and become instrumental in legitimizing nuclear weapons proliferation." (175).

Fourth argument is that the NPT spreads nuclear weapons capabilities. Becker in '85: "The NPT will in effect become a treaty for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and as such may

be instrumental in promoting the very spread of nuclear weapon capability that it was intended to inhibit.” (134).

Fifth answer is that the IAEA promotes nuclear proliferation. Becker in '85:

These deficiencies are particularly alarming because of the ‘abrogation risk’ inherent in the NPT system.... In other words, the IAEA system, and particularly its promotional role, allows a state to proceed under the guise of the NPT as far as possible with all its plans for making nuclear weapons and, when ready, merely notify the IAEA and the United Nation Security Council that it is withdrawing from the treaty. (126).

Sixth argument is that the experts agree that the IAEA cannot stop prolifer. Becker in '85, quoting Epstein: “Experts agree, and the IAEA itself admits, that there are limits to the extent to which the agency is able to detect diversions and to guarantee an effective international response to a non-proliferation violation, even when it is detected.” (126).

Criteria of our case. She says you need a realistic standard, and they have a funding link but she never indicates that funding would actually be stopped, i. e. this is the same argument she makes as her overview.

She says number two, Congress equals delegates, and it is the same in the U.N. But, if I’m a member of the CIA, I am not a member of Congress. And therefore, the US could still belong to the IAEA, still stop proliferation, and not have to be in the United Nations and stop this venting.

She then extends that, I can’t read my own handwriting. Oh, I’m sorry, she says why is Franck correct? And I would argue that this. You can belong in these agencies and this is empirically true. You can belong in these agencies and this is empirically true. Bennett in '84: “Membership in the specialized agencies affiliated with the UN is independent of UN membership. Several of the specialized agencies have a membership larger than that of the UN.” (75). Switzerland belongs to a lot of these specialized agencies and they are not members of the United Nations.

She extends that the League is a poor example because there was no funding link. But she never indicates that there was no funding link between the League of Nations and these agencies, she merely asserts it. And Mr. Franck indicates, that even if we leave the UN, you can still belong to these agencies. And that part of the evidence is granted.

Beneficial. She says, for whose benefit? Should balance. Of course, I would agree. She says, number three, how do you weigh? I would say you give articulate eloquent reasons why your argument outweighs.

(B) subpoint, US national interests. Kennan in '85. She says what are the subdefinitions? I think we provide the subdefinitions on contention one, when we indicate that military security is in our benefit. Number two, I would argue, is that it outweighs everything else, because if we are not militarily secure and our country's involved in a war, or should have a nuclear catastrophe, then surely we cannot have political integrity or well-being.

She says number two, why not the others? As I argued above this outweighs. She says number three how do you weigh? Not to be cynical or anything but you use scales and when you weigh me, I'm a bit heavy. (Laughter) Pudgy.

Contention one. (A) subpoint, you need conflict control. She says this does not say UN fosters. Of course not. But it is true that if the UN leads to conflict, this evidence indicates you don't want that, because that would lead to catastrophe.

She says number two, peacekeeping is not the only thing. Fine. She says (B) sub. On our (B) subpoint we argue small wars are the greatest threat. She says what are the scenarios? I think Mr. Nixon gives you excellent scenarios. He says we'll get sucked in; we'll get dragged in.

She says number two, how large do they have to be? Clearly, the evidence indicates when you have these small wars you have this political for escalation and we would ask you to vote for that, at least the evidence at top says you don't want all this conflict out there. That is the Klare evidence.

She says number three, does not say UN. You know, so what? We are arguing by links here. And this contention is merely establishing the criteria by which you weight contention number two. And that is where the links are.

Contention number two. Tugwell evidence there in '84 says the safety valve theory has been turned on its head. She says Heritage Foundation. First argument is, who the hell, who the heck, is the *Atlantic Monthly*? How come that beats the Heritage Foundation? She doesn't even read a source.

Second argument is that evidence does not say they reach their opinions first. She merely asserts that. Third argument is she should just prove them wrong. If he is so incorrect then just say why they are wrong.

She says, number two, that they empirically prevented wars . Obviously not true. It is empirically false because we have wars all the time. And you have all this debate out there and they still go to war. Means at least venting does not lead to peace. Not that it necessarily leads to war, but it does not lead to peace.

She says that they get to vent. But, I want to extend the evidence there in the case that the safety valve has been turned on its head. So that venting is actually bad. Her last argument is no empirics. But the evidence down there that we read later on in the case, that the Arab-Israeli conflict is fueled by the United Nations.

(B) subpoint, venting sow the seeds of war. She says that they have conflict resolution, but I would argue that they still cause conflicts, and that is not what you want. Kirkpatrick. She says it is better than nothing . But the UN is not going to get peacekeeping as I will argue below.

‘74. She says show empirical example. I would argue that the problem is still a round. *World Press Review* in December of ‘85: “Never before has the UN been so divorced from its functions of preserving peace, settling international disputes, protecting human rights, and creating an atmosphere of dialogue instead of vituperation.” (Sethi 39).

Second argument, she says you need empirical standard. I got that above. She says three, no superpowers, do not show snowball. And this is the Nixon evidence that indicates when you have these conflicts; you have this potential for getting sucked in.

(C) subpoint, venting precludes. She says that it is only Israel, and that it is Tugwell. No, the evidence indicates in the whole Middle East, not just Israel. She says MNF equals war and this is all her peacekeeping stuff. Please group.

First argument is the UN would not have done better. Nelson in ‘85: “To assert that the MNF role had been transformed from peacekeeping to enforcement is not to say that it failed per se, not emphatically, that a UN force would have been more successful in the same circumstance...” (82).

Number two, they don’t want the UN there. Cuellar in ‘84: “But the difficulty is that some of these concerned don’t want to have the United Nations involved in the Middle East problem. They object to the United Nations presence.” (Gauhar 18).

Number three, they will not go to the Middle East. That is the evidence from Tugwell there, indicating only the US can do it.

Number four is, that there will be no more peacekeeping in the future because we've had the non-UN peacekeeping. Cuellar in '84: "On two occasions Multinational forces were set up by the US which is really tantamount to telling the UN that we don't trust you to handle difficult matters. With that background, it seems that the major powers might be unwilling to support UN peacekeeping operations." (Gauhar 17).

Number five, thank you, soldiers are dying and therefore, no one will contribute soldiers to it. Cuellar in '84: "The growing reluctance of members countries to provide troops unless they have some guarantee that the troops will be protected. It is not developing countries who ask for such guarantees, it is the developed countries who insist on it. For instance, the Netherlands and Norway are hesitant to continue providing troops to the United Nation's UNIFL. The Netherlands have told me very frankly that they are prepared to extend their presence in Lebanon for three more months but not beyond." (Gauhar 16). You need the U.S. in there because heck we're really, you know ready to shoot at them.

(E) subpoint is granted which means you have no reason to. This peacekeeping stuff will come down to uniqueness. If the US can go in there, and at least shoot back and guarantee that people want them to be soldiers, and you can get all this conflict resolution outside the United Nations, that Yeselson card in '74 is granted, that says you go bilateral because you don't want to increase tensions, then the UN is not unique to get the peace.

Cross- Examination:

Molly McGinnis questioning Delao

McGinnis: Are there any peacekeeping forces in operation right now? Delao: Yes, there are. McGinnis: Yes, there are. How many? Delao: Two. McGinnis: Two? Delao: That's a guess. McGinnis: No, I'm asking you a question. Delao: Well, you seem to know the answer. McGinnis: Oh. Actually, not, that's Paul. Delao: Well, we'll take two. McGinnis: Any idea where these unnumbered peacekeeping missions might be? Delao: UNIFL is one of them. McGinnis: UNIFL is one of them. OK. And it's not working? Is conflict there? Delao: I don't remember making that argument. McGinnis: Now wait a minute. Delao: I'd love to make that argument. I probably will. McGinnis: You argue they extend the conflict, they institutionalize the conflict, they still cause conflict, all that. Delao: Now that's the venting in the General Assembly.

McGinnis: Now wait a minute, the Kirkpatrick evidence says that UN involvement equals extension of the conflict. Delao: In the General Assembly. McGinnis: In the General Assembly only, right? So there's no extension of the conflict on the battlefield? Delao: Not at. Right, not in that evidence. McGinnis: Not in that evidence. Anywhere in 2AC? Delao: Nope. McGinnis: No where in 2AC? Delao: We're not saying peacekeeping is bad, were just going to, we are going to argue we're going to get it more effectively.

McGinnis: Oh. OK, sounds good. McGinnis: Is there conflict right now? Delao: That's a vague question. McGinnis: OK, in terms of the definition of conflict used in IAC, is there conflict now? Delao: In the world, yes, there is. McGinnis: OK. So, why haven't the super powers been sucked into the horrors of Richard Nixon's scenario's? Delao: Luckily, we don't all get sucked into every single conflict. McGinnis: Oh, so only a few conflicts do they get sucked into? Any possibility of where that might be? Delao: That just shows that it is not in our interest. And it doesn't have to happen every time, but since there is a potential, certainly it is not in our interest. And it doesn't have to happen every time, but since there is a potential, certainly it is not in our interest to want to risk that.

McGinnis: OK. If it is in our interest to have MNF, or non-U.S. peacekeeping forces, why haven't we sent them everywhere in the world where there is conflict? Delao: The last few times peacekeeping forces were used were outside the UN. The last time they were. McGinnis: OK. In areas where there are no UN peacekeeping forces or no non-UN peacekeeping forces, why hasn't the US, like, gotten up and done something about it? Delao: Peacekeeping forces are not used all of the time. The only time that they have generally been used is when you had a more serious conflict. It's not like everyone uses them. McGinnis: A more serious conflict? Delao: Not using then is not necessarily a failure. It only means that.

McGinnis: Excuse me, what's the difference between a more serious conflict where there would be peacekeeping forces and a small conflict which is the greatest risk that Nixon talks about? Delao: Oh, OK. The one Nixon is talking about is when you have allies, like superpowers and therefore you have to get involved. I mean when Israel fights somebody, like in the '73 war. McGinnis: OK, so now Israel is something that Nixon would talk about, right? Delao: That is certainly something.

McGinnis: Are there peacekeeping forces from the UN now in the area of Israel? Delao: Not in Israel. McGinnis: In the area of Israel? Delao: There is UNIFL. McGinnis: There is UNIFL? Would Mr. Nixon says that that peacekeeping, or that conflict, that area of conflict, would be enough to worry about sucking us in? Delao: Yup. McGinnis: Why haven't we been sucked in? Delao: Because there is a peacekeeping force there. McGinnis: That works? Delao: Well when you make that argument, I assure you we will have lots of responses. McGinnis: Now

wait a minute, your criterion is that we shouldn't get sucked in and you just said that peacekeeping forces- - Delao: I didn't say it works, I said there is one there. McGinnis: But they aren't sucking us in, right? Delao: Not the peacekeeping forces, peacekeeping forces -- McGinnis: Has the area sucked us in superpower? Delao: Obviously, not. McGinnis: OK.

Second Negative Constructive:

Paul Benson, Macalester College

Lofty expectations, it gets big, contention two. Lofty expectations is overview number two. The criteria set up by the 2AC is if you can do it outside the U.N better, then you vote affirmative. And what we will argue is, he will have to prove i.e. solvency for this indicating that outside the UN is better. We will contend that UN is the best thing that you've got and it's the only empirical examples of solving for peace.

Please go to his first argument on lofty expectations. He says it's not unreasonable to say that they don't, you know, for them not to cause it. Of course, number one, I will argue they do not cause the wars. I mean the wars happen with or without the United Nations. And no where does he indicate that a war would happen because the UN existed.

Second argument is it prevents wars. This is from the *World Press Review* in '85: It would be unjust to consider only the organization's failures. How can we count the number of wars that, thanks to the UN did not break out because of the Security Council. (Balk, 4).¹²

Next argument is that they decrease tension. Ronald Falkner who's a professor of political science at Tennessee Tech in '83: Its record in view of the tremendous tension reductions in the world has been a good one. The United Nations has served with remarkable effectiveness as a mechanism for reducing friction arising out of the process of change. (490).¹³

Next argument is it controls violence. Indar Rikhye professor of political science at Yale in '74: No one who has carefully studied the performance of these peacekeeping forces in a role closely dictated and controlled by the General Assembly and Security Council lightly dismisses

¹² "Indeed, the prestigious *Le Monde* of Paris, ruminating on the UN four decades after the signing of its charter, observes [June 26], 'it would be unjust to consider only the organization's failures ... How can we count the wars that, thanks to the U.N., did not break out? Security Council meetings, however virulent, have the effect of a safety valve.'"

¹³ "Its record, in view of the tremendous tensions in the world has been a good one.... In 1981, [Secretary General Kurt Waldheim] observed that the United Nations had 'served with remarkable effectiveness as a mechanism for reducing friction arising out of the process of change.'"

that any of them has made a contribution to the overall control of violence.¹⁴ I will indicate that these peacekeeping forces are good.

His second argument is that, you know, it has worked, but it has changed now. And I'll indicate below that, you know, even today it's doing some neat stuff.

His third argument is it does not deal with failure. Of course, number one on balance we would indicate that they are beneficial. And you will answer yes to the resolution. And what we are arguing here is, and the evidence above talks about from the *World Press Review*, is that, you know you can't even count the number of wars that have been prevented because of the UN.

Second argument is he drops that the failures are the fault of outside forces. Indicating that the failures are not the fault of the UN, it's because of outside areas.

I want to extend here on lofty expectations. Argument number one is, you should not blame them for no conflict resolution. Raman, who was previously qualified in '83: "There is, consequently, little justification in blaming peacekeeping for a failure to reach a solution in a conflict." (376). It was never their responsibility.

Next argument is if they want to fight, they will. This is from Connor O'Brian who is a UN secretary in 1985: "In cases where both parties are prepared to go to the bitter end - as, for example, in the Falklands - there is no real role for the UN." (19). Indicating, you know, if Iran and Iraq hate each other that much nobody is going to stop them from shooting each other.

Next argument is if the UN wants, you know if they want peace, the UN provides it, indicating beneficiality. Abba Eban the Foreign Minister from Israel in '85: When the belligerents desire to formalize a measure of stability and mutual restraint, the availability of UN symbols and myth helps them to create periods and areas of restraint and then stop the conflict. (45).¹⁵

¹⁴ "No one who has carefully studied the performance of these international peacekeeping forces in a role closely dictated and controlled by the mandate that they have been given by the Security Council or General Assembly can lightly dismiss the contribution that any of them has made to the control of violence."

¹⁵ "But it remains true when the belligerents desired to formalize a measure of stability and mutual restraint, the availability of suitable UN symbols and myths helps them to create periods and areas of restraints in what would otherwise have been an uncontrolled conflict."

Final argument here is you cannot expect them to solve all conflicts. Edward Luck in '85: "The United Nations obviously cannot manage all conflicts and resolve all disputes successfully." (149). Impact of this argument indicates, you know that you can't expect them to do everything great, but man in the stuff they do, it's fantastic.

I want examples here, and I'm going to give you a ton of them. (A) subpoint are past examples. And he's going to say well these are in the past and they don't apply. But I will give you examples where the superpowers have been prevented from getting involved in conflict. And I'll contend that if these things hadn't happened, you may not even have a today.

First example is the Congo. And this is from Indar Rikhye, professor of political science in '84. He argues: International peacekeeping not only survived the challenge but established beyond any doubt that, without its involvement, the Congo would have ceased to survive as a unified nation and could easily have become a battle-ground of superpower warfare. (89).¹⁶

Next argument is it justifies overall peacekeeping. Rikhye again, this time in '74: The part of the UN in the Congo played deserves its rightful recognition and can clearly be defined as justification for the UN 's overall conflict resolution policy. (91).¹⁷ Indicates justification on a big basis.

Next argument is it prevented superpower confrontation, and I mean that's the evidence that's above. I'll give you the next empirical example of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Connor O'Brian continues: The Cuban missile crisis suggests that the world might have been more unsafe if it weren't for the UN's repertoire of tricks. (18).¹⁸

Next argument is essential role by the UN. Brian Urquhart, Social and Political Affairs in '81: The UN played an essential role in the Cuban Missile Crisis in '62, not only providing a

¹⁶ "International peacekeeping not only survived the challenge but established beyond any doubt that, without its involvement, the Congo would have ceased to survive as a unified nation and could easily have become a battleground of economic and ideological warfare."

¹⁷ "The part that ONUC (United Nations Congo Operation) played in this deserves its rightful recognition -and can clearly be regarded as a justification for the United Nations overall conflict control policy of combining military operations with political and conciliatory efforts."

¹⁸ "More than any other episode in the U.N.'s history, the Cuban missile crisis suggests that the world might have been more unsafe if it weren't for the UN's unimpressive repertoire of tricks."

forum where both sides could expound their positions publicly, but also in suggesting steps could be taken to deescalate the crisis. (9).¹⁹

Final argument is Yom Kippur War. Sir Anthony Parson in '83. He's a U. K. Ambassador: "At the end of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, there was a situation of the most appalling danger to global peace..... The world came close to a naked confrontation between the superpowers on a battlefield. Neither side could find a way to climb down. At the last moment, they used the Security Council of the United Nations as a ladder from which to dismount their high horses." (106-7). I'm telling you, in the Yom Kippur war, we might not even have today if it were not for the UN.

Please go now on to the (B) sub point, which will indicate, you know, current examples. Cyprus is the first one. *UN Chronicle* in '85: "The Secretary General said the continued presence of UNFICYP remained indispensable in helping to maintain the calm on the island..." (33).

Next argument is in terms of the Middle East, in UNTSO. This is from Indar Rikhye, professor of political science, previously qualified: "Similarly, UNTSO continues to perform an important role in the Middle East. It keeps the Security Council informed of incidents and other developments that threaten peace." (9).

Next argument is Pakistan. It keeps the peace today. Rikhye again. Uhm, this is, oh excuse me. Selig Harris, [Harrison], Carnegie Endowment in '83: The UN effort in Pakistan has come close to successful conclusion, and has been successful in regard to the Soviet withdrawal from Pakistan. (4).²⁰

Next argument is UNDOF, that's the Golan Heights Force. And this is from Rikhye again: The situation remained unchanged in the Golan Heights, where calm continues to prevail.

¹⁹ "The United Nations played an essential role in the Cuban Missile Crisis in '62, not only providing a forum where both sides could expound their positions publicly, but also in suggesting, through letters from Secretary-General U Thant to Chairman Krushchev and President Kennedy, steps that might be taken simultaneously by both sides to deescalate the crisis."

²⁰ "Second, critical, interrelated issues remain to be settled, notably, the time frame for Soviet force withdrawals and for the phase out of Pakistani aid to the resistance, as well as, the precise orchestration of these two processes. Much to the surprise of the American officials, however, the UN effort is now moving tantalizingly close to a successful conclusion. Some of the more optimistic Pakistani and Soviet sources say that implementation of the agreement could conceivably begin in early 1984."

Thus UNDOF continues to play a useful role between Israel and its remaining, you know, Arab problem. (62).²¹

Next argument is UNIFL. *UN Chronicle* in '85: In spite of the difficult conditions in southern Lebanon, UNIFL's presence continues to be necessary and constitutes an important factor in the stability in the international commitment to upholding Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. (7).²² I think I take all of that out. Man, the empiricals are with the negative.

Please go to contention two. He argues who's the *Atlantic Monthly*? Well, I'll argue the *Atlantic Monthly* is not an unbiased source that reaches its conclusions beforehand. And I mean if you want to call for the evidence at the end of the round that is what the evidence does indicate. They reach their conclusions, then go off and research it.

I'll argue next argument is, that you know, the Heritage Foundation is basically a mindless organization. William Charles Maynes, Editor of *Foreign Policy* in '85: "[T]he Heritage Foundation ... has devoted so much of its budget to what seems to outsiders as a mindless assault on the United Nations." (237).

Next argument is, remember these guys? These are the guys who said fluoridation of water was a communist plot. (laughter) I mean empirically, give me a break here.

His second argument is, you know, empirically takes out debate, substitutes for war. Where are the empiricals? He doesn't indicate them. And he drops the Richman evi - I think its Richman evidence that indicates, you know debates do substitute.

The third argument he says safety is turned, but all he does is say, you know, extend. I mean our arguments from the Stanley Foundation in '85 beat this.

His next argument, you know, he drops the fourth subpoint that says the Third World gets to vent their aggression, that's the Finger evidence and he grants it. He says, you know, we say no empiricals, he says it fuels conflict. No. I mean we argue here that the empiricals rest with the negative. And I think that our evidence pulls through. He does no extension here, all he does

²¹ "The situation remains unchanged along the Golan Heights where calm continues to prevail. Thus UNDOF continues to play a useful role between Israel and its remaining serious Arab antagonists."

²² "In spite of the difficult conditions in southern Lebanon, UNIFL's presence continued to be necessary and constituted an important factor of stability in an international commitment to upholding Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity."

is repeat.

Please go now on to where he argues causes conflict. I will argue, no it stops. And I give empiricals. He says they do not keep the peace. That is wrong, he drops the Raman evidence that indicates even if it's prolonged it's better that you have the peacekeeping forces there.

Now on Yeselson and Gaglione. It's '74, the above evidence takes out anyway. On empirical standards, he says above. I'll say above. He says Nixon takes out superpowers and no snowball. But he drops the answers. Only Israel is the next argument Molly makes, and he says it's on the whole in the Middle East. Boloney. It's only Middle East, and I give other examples.

He then argues that there are these better ways to do it. Of course number one, only Middle East. Number two, drops Vayrynen evidence says we will use it in the future. Number three, drops the MNF evidence that says it wasn't even a peacekeeping force, it was a war.

Next argument is that bypassing the UN is bad. Houghton and Trinko, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs in '84: The UN has acquired a great deal of expertise in the field. To create a non-UN organization for the same purpose derogates the prestige of the UN and thus weakens the overall peacekeeping process of the world. (79).²³

Next argument is it prevents superpower confrontation. Houghton and Trinko again. "[T]he establishment of non-UN peacekeeping force, with US participation ... is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, even if it is done under the banner of a peacekeeping force. A response by the USSR can be expected, thus creating the risk of a new direct confrontation." (95). You know, those non-UN forces are nasty stuff.

Cross-Examination: Miguel Delao questioning Benson

Delao: Can I have the last two cards? Benson: Sure. Delao: That's a really interesting last card. Paul, I get crucified in cross-ex because I say, you know, when you have conflict and it will escalate and everybody will die. That last card says that when you go outside the UN, the Soviets will nuke us or something to that extent, and we've had two outside the UN, when did

²³ "The UN has acquired a great deal of expertise in the field. To create a non-UN organization for the same purpose derogates from the prestige of the UN and thus weakens an institution which the world looks upon as a major instrument for maintaining peace."

they nuke us? Benson: Well, no, no, no, see like the MNF and the MFO, I mean, we're not saying it definitely is going to happen-- Delao: Well, what's the potential for it? (laughter) Benson: Well, I mean you argue. If you're going to contend potential, I will contend that there is a greater possibility of this happening here. Delao: Why? Benson: Because UN forces do not include the superpowers or any members of the Security Council. Non-UN forces - Delao: They never do? Benson : Huh? Delao: They never do? Benson: Not currently. I mean, if you want to bring that up I've got the charter.

Delao: I thought the Cyprus forces had US people there. Benson: They did in the past, but they were withdrawn. Delao: They don't now? Benson: No. Delao: Can you prove it? Benson: Well, I mean the US is continuing to support it via funds, political stuff and that, but our troops aren't over there. And I mean we commit our troops to these non-UN peacekeeping forces . We have to, that's the only way they can function.

Delao: Can you name me the wars we stopped? Benson: The wars we stopped? Yom-- Delao: You want me to show you the wars we caused. Benson: Huh? Delao: You want me to show the wars we caused. Benson: Well, I'd say this is a little late-- Delao: I'm referring to the *World Press Review* card that just says don't just consider the failures-- Benson: OK. OK. Yom Kippur prevents superpower conflict. Delao: So you're going to refer to all the empirics then in 2NC, right? Benson: Oh no, I'll contend that all the empiricals that are going on now which I will claim as independent benefits to UN peacekeeping.

Delao: I think you have a really good argument here that--.. Benson: Well , thank you. Delao: Well, let me tell you which one. Benson: I think it's a good argument. Delao: You may be wrong. Well, I think they are all good.

Delao: You say it's reasonable that you should not have lofty expectations. Now all the evidence you read says that you should not expect them to stop every war, right? Benson: I agree with you. Delao: That's an unreasonable expectation. But, is it unreasonable for the affirmative to say that the UN should not contribute? Is that unreasonable?. Benson: Should not contribute to conflicts? Delao: Exactly. Benson: Well, I mean that depends like, what your, you know, what empiricals you bring up and whether or not I can turn them. (laughter).

Delao: Whether we win them or not, is that an unreasonable standard? Benson: Well, I mean I don't think, you know, I'm not going to grant you that premise at all because I would contend that the wars would with or without the UN and for you to hypothesize that some how the UN caused this to incrementally increase this much, I think that's boloney. Delao: That's if you win your argument. If the UN contributes. Benson: Even if I don't I think it makes sense.

Delao: If the UN contributes to it, why is it unreasonable to expect them to not contribute? Benson: You just lost me. Why is it unreasonable to expect them not to contribute? They don't-- Delao: See, you're assuming you win your argument. I am saying-- Benson: I don't plan on losing it. (laughter) Delao: I want to know if, I don't care who wins it, why is it unreasonable to not want them to contribute to it? This is your fourth chance to answer this. Benson: Oh, so you mean that the UN would actually like, cause more people to get involved. Is that what you're asking? Delao: Why is that unreasonable? Benson: You can bring up stuff that says like, it brings in like eight other countries getting involved, well then yeah, I would say that the UN isn't beneficial in that instance. Delao: OK.

First Negative Rebuttal

Molly McGinnis, Macalester

His first answer on the overview, says that my evidence talks about the UN as a whole, therefore it's obviously not talking about what the affirmative is talking about. First argument, they contradicted this definition. Now that means his definition is different from mine, but I'm arguing that that highlights that there is no definite definition of what is and what is not the UN.

Why is my author inappropriate when he says the words UN in his piece of evidence and concludes that on balance, it's beneficial to the United States? And he needs to show that the assumptions my author, why those are different than his. And he has to highlight those distinctions before there can be any concrete definitions of UN.

Second argument is that the money is inextricably tied. And this crossapp's back to the (C) point. Nicholas Platt, from the Bureau of International Affairs, DOS, 1982: "The subsidiary UN bodies and the specialized agencies are another component of the UN, and their activities in fact consume the major portion of UN moneys and personnel." (13). UNA Publication, *Financing the UN* says in March of '84: "Also included in the regular budget of the UN are the expenditures of the specialized agencies." (Formuth 2). We get to talk about all of them. OK.

Third subpoint is that, on balance the UN is good for us. Frank Church, who was a former congressional delegate to the UN in 1985. "[I]n our world and in these times, such an organization needs to function, and one would hope that it might grow more effective over the course of time. On balance, the UN is far more of a plus for the world than a minus." (Fasulo, 11 4). OK. Which would indicate that no matter what else happens in the round, this author says, you know, vote negative. And there is no same, on balance evidence by the affirmative.

I'm on observation number one on case now. He argues right to define. He argues there is no evidence that money can be cut. I talk about that on the overview. He argues that a

member of the CIA is not a member of Congress. First argument is that it does not indicate that we should not add those folks into our calculus. You know, and that's the same money argument I made on the overview side.

He argues that we belong to the agencies without. First argument is that is arbitrary. And that's a cross-application of the definitional muddle that we talk about on the top of overview number one.

On between World War One and World War Two, the League of Nations. He says I provide no evidence. You know he needs to indicate there is a distinction, because I argue now funding is inextricably linked.

He argues that beneficial is in ones own interest. This is observation number two. I argue, you know, he agrees that we need to argue on balance, which means I win the Church evidence I just read. And I don't know how you weight those sorts of things. He says eloquence. You know.

On observation number two, (B) point, he says national interest. OK, he says it outweighs anything, and this is only military security. OK, and so he indicates that its our military security, which we will win on case. But, he does not indicate that the other things are not as important. And certainly Kennan does not make those distinctions as well, and he's arbitrarily inserted those distinctions.

Underview on this contention. First argument is that we should not contribute to conflict. That is 2AC's question to Paul in cross-ex. Second argument is that there is no affirmative contention that peacekeeping is bad, merely that it doesn't work. And remember we talk about that after 2AC cross-ex.

He says that we will not contend that peacekeeping exacerbates the conflict. OK, only that the General Assembly exacerbates conflict. Third argument is only if GA debate spurred conflicts are uncontrolled is there a problem. And there is no indication that any of these are uncontrolled.

Contention number one, please group. First argument is that there are no empiricals, no indication why we need to fear this at all. Second argument is there is no reason for an increase in fear especially when we win that we use peacekeeping. Final argument is that Nixon has no scenario. I mean we talked about this in cross-ex and he can't indicate when Nixon would indeed be true.

I am on prolif. First argument on Atomic Agency. I win the funding link below. Second argument is equal to UN because I argue the UN deserves the credit for what they sponsored via the IAEA and NPT.

His second argument talks about the norms. Now he does not address the Miller evidence that I read that says that the norms themselves mean we don't have proliferation of nuclear weapons. That's independent of the specialized agencies and that's the UN in and of itself.

Second argument is that there is no harm given to a mere holding of the weapons. OK. They are not used.

Third argument is that norms against harm are increased by the United Nations. This comes from Daniel Poneman from the Center for Science in Harvard, 1983: "As more and more countries become technologically able to produce nuclear weapons, that norm will become the main obstacle to Nuclear weapons proliferation." (31).

He argues that Becker, and debate equals prolif. First argument is who is Mr. Becker? All his evidence comes from this man, and we argue from authorities, that I give the qualifications for, that conclude you should vote negative.

Second argument is that you can't have a treaty without this discrimination. Joseph Goldblatt from *S/PRI* says in 1985 that: "A non-proliferation treaty not containing a distinction between nuclear haves and have-nots would have had either to make allowances for a nuclear buildup in non-nuclear weapons states [which he says would contradict the very idea of arms control], or to provide for the elimination of all existing nuclear weapons, [which he says would be infeasible]." (21). This is the best thing we've got.

Third argument is that there are not more nuclear powers. Joseph Goldblatt continues in January of '86: There appears to be no imminent danger of an open expansion of the nuclear club. The incentives to acquire nuclear weapons are still considerably weaker than the disincentives, which means that the status quo will be maintained for some time. (30).²⁴ So when he argues that debate legitimize, that's not enough to outweigh the disincentives. OK.

²⁴ "There appears to be no imminent danger of an open expansion of the nuclear club. The balance of nuclear disincentives and incentives is not tipping in the direction of the latter, and the status quo will be maintained for sometime."

He argues next that it equals the spread of energy. First argument is that there is no evidence that energy equal the tech for prolif. He argues next that the IAEA is a guide. First argument is that there is no evidence here.

Second argument, no empiricals, and I cross-app from above that there are no more proliferation nations. Third argument is that safe guards prevent and that's evidence from INC.

He says [unintelligible] are limited. First argument is limits, but not inability, and all my evidence says we have an effective nonproliferation regime right now. OK. Scheinman says in '85 that: The IAEA has helped to avoid the further spread of nuclear weapons and deter the misuse of facilities and materials intended for civil nuclear purposes. (1).²⁵

And I think that's all we need here because we win that there is not enough, and let there be no new responses on this argument in rebuttals.

First Affirmative Rebuttal:
Carrie Crenshaw, Florida State

Starting with the observations and going straight case. Observation number one. Please group her extensions. Subpoint one; membership in the UN is not membership in the agencies. Her definition by her author is the definition of UN, it is not the definition of membership, and certainly that is the distinction in 2AC.

Subpoint two, Franck extends that you could pull out and still belong to the agencies and that evidence is dropped.

Subpoint three, her on balance evidence is blurry and does not necessarily address the issues that the affirmative team does. And she grants the criteria of military security so it is her burden to prove that that evidence addresses that.

Observation number two on lofty. Please extend Miguel's first answer not unreasonable, UN causes conflict. Please group his four answers. Subpoint one, they should not contribute to war or exacerbate conflict and certainly that means that we should indict them for that.

²⁵ "For more than a quarter-century, an inter-national organization -- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- has played a leading role in national and international efforts to avoid the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons and to deter the misuse of facilities and materials intended for civil nuclear purposes."

Subpoint two, [unintelligible] drops the case side evidence that indicates that these countries use the UN for mobilization for war. Three subpoint we are on the verge of new international anarchy now. vMr. Ruggie in '85: "With regard to peace and security, the UN Secretary General himself has remarked that the organization's machinery functions so poorly that the international community finds itself perilously near to a new international anarchy." (343).

Subpoint four, of course, all their extension evidence is in the past. Extend Miguel's second answer from 2AC, peacekeeping worked in the past but has changed. Of course, that Tugwell evidence has been dropped by both negative speakers throughout this round. That means that you have no more peacekeeping after his examples that he provides. And that evidence is dropped.

Extend Miguel's third answer that it creates conflict and please group his extensions with that. I would argue first of all venting is not the same thing as peacekeeping. So if we win that they contribute to the conflict off of venting, that means that we still win, even if he wins his peacekeeping stuff.

Subpoint two, UN should not contribute to the conflict, and therefore should be indicted. Subpoint three peacekeeping fails and I will extend those issues on case. Subpoint four, it is not unique benefit to the UN. It is only peacekeeping, and both countries agree. In other words, his Cyprus evidence admits that it could be NATO that could do it. And it's only when these countries agree that the UN is allowed to insert those forces. So certainly it is not a unique benefit.

Prolif. Please extend Miguel's first answer, the IAEA is an agency. The only thing that she has is all these links above. But first of all, she drops Miguel's specific evidence that says that the IAEA is affirmative. And that evidence is cold. Subpoint two she loses safeguards if she loses agency topicality. And I will. The others take out the NPT below. And those are the only two links.

Extend Miguel's second answer that they have bomb and the norms do not stop use. Please group her extensions. Subpoint one they do have the bomb, her evidence admits that and her impact evidence assumes an accident scenario. So certainly you could still have the problems from proliferation.

Subpoint two the norms are undermined and the NPT is undermined by the debate. The debates say that you actually legitimized proliferation by undermining the NPT. Extend the third answer, debates undermine proliferation by undermining the NPT. All the-- The only answer- -

The first answer she has here is who is Becker? But she doesn't read all of the qualifications of her sources. Subpoint two Becker is the former Israeli delegate to the UN, and he was one of the drafters of the NPT.

Extend her second and third extensions - those pieces of evidence. Subpoint one that third card is not linked to the UN. Subpoint two, if you actually legitimized proliferating by undermining the NPT, then that second answer becomes irrelevant. Extend Miguel's fourth answer NPT spreads weapons capability.

The only thing she says is there is no evidence and it says energy - energy is not technology. But if you read that evidence, or call for the evidence after the round, you will find that it says that it spreads the capability for nuclear weapons. And that evidence is dropped. She just misreads it. Now I think that's an independent turn.

As far as all the rest of it goes, the only link she has is the NPT because agencies, the IAEA is out of there and I would ask you to extend the fact that the NPT is undermined by debate.

Observation on criteria, case. The only thing she wants to extend is that, is dollars in terms of what membership is, whether or not it's agencies. Please group her extensions. Subpoint one she drops the evidence on the IAEA is autonomous of dollars. Subpoint two she also drops the Bennett card that's talking membership and not a definition of the UN. Please extend the definition of beneficial and that should certainly address military security on balance.

Extend the (B) subpoint, national interest. Certainly that should address military security.

On her overview on case, please group. Subpoint one, venting prevents peacekeeping and that Tugwell evidence has been dropped throughout case.

Subpoint two I'll extend venting on case because she did cursory coverage there.

Contention one. The only thing she has here is that there are no empirics and that Nixon gives no scenarios. But I'll ask you to extend the Nixon evidence and indicate that her partner faces the same problem. And certainly you should grant us the risk evidence there because her partner faces the same problem.

Contention two UN heightens conflict, (A) subpoint. The only thing he wants to extend is the Heritage Foundation indict. But I'd just like to point out, ladies and gentlemen, that we

have other sources. Subpoint two, Tugwell is not Pines, you know. If you want to apply this indict, it has to be specific.

Subpoint three, he drops Miguel's second answer that they assert it and his third answer is that you should just prove him wrong.

Please extend also specifically on the (A) subpoint the Arab Israeli conflict is an empirical example. Two subpoint the on balance evidence that says this is true. Three subpoint I'd like to point out that venting is different from peacekeeping. And four subpoint I would extend the evidence that says, it takes out her evidence on case, that says, it indicates the fact that, it indicates the fact that venting would stop peacekeeping. OK? And it also says that venting no longer occurs regardless of what evidence she read.

I would just like to get down to the peacekeeping issues and extend Miguel's 2AC answers which I don't think, you know, have been addressed really by the 2NC or 1NR .

Second Negative Rebuttal:
Paul Benson, Macalester

Far too much is dropped in 1AR. She again indicates membership not equal organizations. Of course drops all of Molly's funding evidence that indicates the funding is tied.

Now her second argument is Franck indicates you could pull out. But you know we would argue the real world Congressional analogy that you know, if you were talking about in the real world, whether Congress was beneficial, you would talk about the actions the CIA takes because Congress established the CIA. Indicating, you know that in the real world we are perfectly reasonable.

Third argument here is she says on balance, card is a blurb. No. She drops out Gardner evidence and also drops the Church evidence which is extended that indicates, on balance is beneficial. And when I talk about Heritage Foundation indicts, the scholars conclude negative.

Please go now on to lofty expectations. She drops off all kinds of things. She says, you know, extend number one. But drops my evidence that indicates it prevents wars it decreases tensions, and it controls violence. All of that is dropped and I do not want 2AR giving new answers. She says should not contribute to war. I argue that they do not, and she doesn't give any empiricals.

Her second argument is, you know, case evi takes all this out. Of course argue case, I spend lots of time on case. Third argument here she says we're on the verge of anarchy. Of course number one, he's not talking about peacekeeping. Number two, you know, it does not indicate what the impact of all of this would be. Why this would necessarily be that bad.

Third argument is does not indicate that, you know, the entire UN system will fall apart, you know. Fourthly, that this is brand new. I mean this thing should have been cut in. And I will argue the 2AC, because this is an entire position shift. If they're going to argue the UN is going to fall apart, by God they should have that in constructives.

She then argues extend the second answer that he gives. Of course, drops all my answers that indicate, you know, the failures are outside faults, and on balance. She says, you know, venting not equals peacekeeping. Of course, it stops wars and I indicate that that is good in and of itself. And if, you know, their national security criterion is number one, then that would, you know, make it relevant to the round.

She says they should not contribute. I argue that they don't. She argues peacekeeping forces fail. I say no, pull all the empiricals which she punts off. Fourthly, she says not unique to the UN. That would mean that she would have to indicate solvency for non-UN organizations. And she drops all my evidence that I read in the 2NC that indicates you can't do it outside the UN. And I'll talk about that when I get there.

Please go to prolif. On over view number one, she says money is linked directly to the UN. No. Number one, UN deserves credit for the safeguards. Second argument is safeguards take out impact on 2AC UN harm. She says, you know, countries have the bomb. Of course, number one, Goldblatt evidence January '86 says no new members. She drops it. Second argument no evidence about accidents which is what our evidence talks about. Third argument is INR Poneman evidence says you won't develop and/or use, and that's dropped.

On norms. Number one, must have discriminatory treaty. I mean that's dropped as well. Second argument that means the norms are upheld. And third argument is Goldblatt says disincentives outweigh legitimization. She says energy equals development. Of course, no evidence here. My second argument is norms say does not develop. I mean she cannot get that off of this. No prolif equals big time benefit. And I mean that is UN specific.

Please go to overview on criteria. Of course s he says only numbers, IAEA autonomous, and Bennett is dropped. Of course she drops why wouldn't we add this to the calculus, and I talk about this above.

She says definition of beneficial. Of course Molly argues it's arbitrary, and where's the distinction, and she grants that. She just says extend (B) point. Drops on balance criteria should be applied here and that our scholars conclude with us.

She argues on the underview venting does not equal peacekeeping. Of course, she applies the Tugwell evidence again, which is Heritage Foundation, and even if you don't buy the indict, I beat it. She says case takes out, well let's go to case.

On contention one, she says extend Nixon. Drops Molly's third argument that says Nixon gives no scenarios, indicating the Nixon evidence is awful. Drops her first response that says no empiricals are given which beats it at that level.

On contention two. She says we have other sources and Tugwell is not that bad. Of course drops basically our indict which indicates, you know, the Heritage Foundation, you know, reaches conclusions then does the study. I mean if we did that kind of stuff we'd probably be shot by our coach. (laughter).

You know, she says we dropped two and three. No. I grouped that together. And I argue that it beat it on that level and, you know, this is brand new. I don't understand how it takes any thing out anyway.

She says extend Arab - Israeli. I beat that out with all my empiricals. She then says extend another, you know, conflict. I think I beat that as well on balance.

She says on balance beats. Wrong. I read evidence that indicates on balance it works well and I have all the empiricals in the round. I mean if you're going to decide peacekeeping look at the empirical examples. And she drops when I talk about Yom Kippur, and all that type of stuff. We probably wouldn't even have a today if those conflicts had occurred.

She says venting does not equal peacekeeping. So what. It stops wars which they indicate is the number one priority. And if that is true, you know, that it's irrelevant because it's not peacekeeping, then go down to the very bottom where she argues, you know, these outside the UN peacekeeping forces.

They ain't peacekeeping forces. And so if my evidence gets kicked out, her evidence gets kicked out, and where's the only place you have peacekeeping? That is in the UN. OK. And I mean she drops the evidence that I read that indicates it prevents superpower conflict. I mean that evidence is cold.

All I want here is that the peacekeeping forces don't include the superpowers. This is from F. T. Lui, Assistant Secretary General of Political Affairs in '84: Peacekeeping forces presence in areas do not include the superpowers. (25).²⁶

I guess I'm supposed to say something nice at the end of this. And all I'd like to say is I've been involved with this activity for about seven years now and I've heard things about the fact that it's starting to die out in certain areas of the country. I don't think that should ever happen and I think that we as members of this type of a community should do our best to keep CEDA, NDT, and other forms of debate alive. Thank you very much. (Applause)

Second Affirmative Rebuttal:
Miguel Delao, Florida State

I said exactly what I was going to do in 2AC, and I said what I was going to do in 2AR. I said we're going to go for uniqueness. All right, and that is what I'm going to try to win, because even though he can take out Tugwell, Cuellar evidence indicates that because we went outside the UN, there will be no more peacekeeping in the UN. He can win all his past evidence. The UN was wonderful at it; they will not do it anymore.

Of course he raises a good issue, well now we have to show solvency. But last thing Carrie says, you know, in 1AR was (unintelligible) you have to extend all the evidence I read in the 2AC on peacekeeping. And my evidence says, they don't want the United Nations, they won't go there, and it says because they're getting shot at; and that is why I think I made the distinction why the US is good; that evidence says that the Netherlands is sick and tired of getting their people killed. The US fights back. And the evidence I read there said that the UN would not have been any more successful at Lebanon and therefore should not be taken out. That evidence was granted. He had arguments there, but still granted what, everything the evidence indicated.

I think that one card that said they are getting shot at and therefore don't want to contribute soldiers, indicates why the US is better. What it comes down to is, you are not going to get the US. The question is, is there a better solution? I mean in any sense is there a slightly more optimal solution? To the extent that we can defend ourselves, we at least guarantee that there is possibility for more peacekeeping. Because you're not going to get it from the UN.

²⁶ "Secondly, despite their weaknesses, UN peacekeeping forces have one important advantage. Their presence in an area of conflict serves to preclude direct intervention by third-party governments, including Super Powers in that area and thus to insulate the conflict from a potential East-West confrontation."

That Cuellar evidence is dropped. All he can win is that it used to be great, and you know, I have to agree with him on that.

Prolif. I'm not going to go for this agency on IAEA, because what I want is the legitimization. Right. He extends that there are no new members. That is true, but the evidence; my second; my third answer in the 2AC – debate would undermine the NPT. That is granted. That is the only evidence that Carrie really goes for in the 1AR.

She indicates that this takes out their links, because now the one thing that is bringing about these norms, the one thing that is deterring these people is NPT and it is being undermined.

He said they will not develop or use. But the evidence that was read there says they were legitimizing proliferation. Right. That is granted.

He says norms are upheld. But they're undermining the NPT, that one card I think is what takes out all these links. Because it indicates that even though this may have been true, what is going on now in these debates is hurting their links.

He says norms mean they will not develop. I simply refer you to the phenomenal evidence that was read in the 2AC. That evidence says that the NPT is instrumental in promoting proliferation. It says the IAEA is also in the same vein. They do the same thing, they lead to proliferation.

All he has here, he says, is that the norms mean they won't develop. I want you to weigh that, these norms they won't do it, versus evidence that indicates that it is instrumental. When he runs that, you know; we've always granted, of course, prolifer isn't bad; I think that gives us all the military security we need. Because they argue it leads to cataclysmic nuclear war. And if we win that evidence that indicates that it's being legitimized; which now means that people will prolifer; and that it is undermining the NPT, which undermines their norms, then I think we certainly outweigh all this peacekeeping stuff which was all in the past. At a minimum, I put a doubt in your mind. At the most, I think I win the turn on peacekeeping because you will not have any in the future. And that was because of the venting.

I'll go to the first observation. Now I granted agencies, so that will not matter. But the third answer, this is 1N overview. All they have is this on balance stuff. You know I think it's the same argument, 2AC's the same argument as 1AR. This is really blurry stuff. Does not say why it is good and you have to weigh this specifically against proliferation. And I think that is a perfect illustration why.

Because these authors may be assuming, well, you know, the UN stops prolif. They did not necessarily take into account Mr. Becker argument that it indeed leads to prolif. We are giving you specific examples versus, you know, evidence that just says, well you know, the negative would always win every round.

Lofty expectations. He starts off again by saying it prevents war. That is only when you get the peacekeeping and you will not have peacekeeping in the future. That means UN will not, no longer will stop war. The only thing you have to look at is, is there a chance outside the UN and I think we give you that because of the fact that we can shoot back.

My evidence on the verge of peace; of anarchy. He says that it is not peacekeeping. That may be true but it indicates that in general there is going to be war. He says number two, why is that bad? Certainly, I mean it has to be bad, there is no conflict control. We're going to have anarchy and Klare says you want to have conflict control. He says number three, does not mean UN falls apart. That is certainly not the argument we are trying to make.

And he says it is new, and the reason he says it is new is because he thinks I'm arguing the UN will fall apart. But he read a lot of evidence in the 2NC indicating that right now the UN is good. I don't see why it is illegitimate for Carrie to stand up and read evidence saying no that is not true, right now the UN is bad. That is not new. He thinks we made a different argument about the UN falling apart, which is not what we are claiming.

I think that's all I really want. But I will go to case and take a glance. US national interest. All they extend, on B subpoint of their first observation, must be on balance. I agree, I think the cataclysmic nuclear war on prolif wins it for us, and the fact that only we can get peacekeeping in the future.

Contention one. He says scenarios. Certainly we get a scenario off prolif and we get an empirical scenario off peacekeeping. That's the Cuellar evidence I read in 2AC, and it's empirical. It says because we went outside the UN, you will not get peacekeeping in the future. And the evidence says empirically the last two were outside the UN.

I want to thank several people and I'd like to start off with Curtis Austin our coach. At the beginning of this year I was not going to debate. And it is because of the fine human being that he is, that I decided to stay and I'm really glad that I did. I'd like to thank Carrie. Before this tournament she said the one thing she wanted was for us to get here to the final round. And she was going to work her butt off to see that I got here, and she did it for me and I can't thank her enough. And Caroline, who makes my everyday. I enjoyed it fully. Thank you. (Applause)

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