NEW MEXICO 2008 – County by County - Part III
An analysis of the democratic pick-up counties in New Mexico:
First, here a map of the Democratic retentions 2004 to 2008 (light blue, not an indicator of margin strength):
Here the Democratic retentions plus the Democratic pick-ups integrated, by margin 2004 to 2008 (again, for now, the colors do not indicate margin strength):
Here the Democratic retentions plus the Democratic pick-ups integrated, by margin 2004 to 2008:
As of the above map, the colors indicate margin strength:
darkest blue = +40% or above
dark blue = +20% to 40%
blue = +10% to +20%
light blue = +4% to +10%
lightest blue = +0% to 4%
Here the DEM counties, plus the GOP counties up to +10%:
darkest blue = +20% or above
dark blue = +15% to +20%
blue = +10% to +15%
light blue = +4% to +10%
lightest blue = +0% to 4%
light red = +1% to +4%
lightest red = under +1%
Here we can clearly see that the GOP counties with margins up to +10% are all geographically connected to core Democratic territory.
Then with the GOP counties up to +20%:
Then with the GOP counties up to +30%:
Then with the GOP counties up to +40%:
Here the complete map for 2008:
darkest red/blue = +40% or above
dark /redblue = +30% to +40%
red/blue = +20% to +30%
light red/blue = +10% to +20%
lightest red/blue = +0% to 9%
Here we can easily see the geographic difference in power bases: the core democratic counties are in the central portion of the state, along the I-25/I-40 corridor. The deepest red GOP core is mostly in the east of the state, at the border to Texas, and also in the upper NW corner of the state, on the four corners border to Colorado, Utah and Arizona.
Here map of all counties, with asterisks in gold for the counties with one or more US-military installations:
Here is a trend/swing map for the state. All 33 counties trended/swung Democratic:
Dark, dark blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +15% or more
Dark blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +10% to +15%
blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +5% to +10%
light blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +0% to +5%
Here is a map of New Mexico, showing the population density of the state, by region:
Here we can see the majority of large population centers going through the middle of the state. Here is an interstate map of New Mexico:
Here a review of those pick-up counties, first by descending partisan shift:
|
County |
Region |
G Rate |
% of PV'08 |
% of PV'04 |
Diff. |
Margin |
Partisan shift |
|
C |
11.10% |
3.48% |
3.44% |
+0.04% |
+7.72% |
+20.03% |
|
|
SW-Tip |
9.84% |
1.00% |
1.00% |
0.00 |
+5.29% |
+16.14% |
|
|
NC-NW |
31.61% |
7.06% |
5.89% |
+1.17% |
+12.75% |
+15.46% |
|
|
NE |
6.97% |
0.77% |
0.79% |
-0.02% |
+10.73% |
+15.05% |
|
|
SW-Tip |
-0.66% |
0.24% |
0.26% |
-0.02% |
+2.92% |
+14.12% |
|
|
C-NC |
-1.14% |
1.33% |
1.48% |
-0.15% |
+6.87% |
+12.26% |
|
|
Total |
-- |
18.49% |
13.88% |
12.06% |
+1.02% |
+10.11% |
+16.60% |
Here a review of those pick-up counties, descending, by margin:
|
County |
Region |
G Rate |
% of PV'08 |
% of PV'04 |
Diff. |
Margin |
Partisan shift |
|
NC-NW |
31.61% |
7.06% |
5.89% |
+1.17% |
+12.75% |
+15.46% |
|
|
NE |
6.97% |
0.77% |
0.79% |
-0.02% |
+10.73% |
+15.05% |
|
|
C |
11.10% |
3.48% |
3.44% |
+0.04% |
+7.72% |
+20.03% |
|
|
C-NC |
-1.14% |
1.33% |
1.48% |
-0.15% |
+6.87% |
+12.26% |
|
|
SW-Tip |
9.84% |
1.00% |
1.00% |
0.00 |
+5.29% |
+16.14% |
|
|
SW-Tip |
-0.66% |
0.24% |
0.26% |
-0.02% |
+2.92% |
+14.12% |
|
|
Total |
-- |
18.49% |
13.88% |
12.06% |
+1.02% |
+10.11% |
+16.60% |
|
County |
Region |
G Rate |
% of PV'08 |
% of PV'04 |
Diff. |
Margin |
Partisan shift |
And finally, a review of those pick-up counties, descending, % of the 2008 PV:
|
County |
Region |
G Rate |
% of PV'08 |
% of PV'04 |
Diff. |
Margin |
Partisan shift |
|
NC-NW |
31.61% |
7.06% |
5.89% |
+1.17% |
+12.75% |
+15.46% |
|
|
C |
11.10% |
3.48% |
3.44% |
+0.04% |
+7.72% |
+20.03% |
|
|
C-NC |
-1.14% |
1.33% |
1.48% |
-0.15% |
+6.87% |
+12.26% |
|
|
SW-Tip |
9.84% |
1.00% |
1.00% |
0.00 |
+5.29% |
+16.14% |
|
|
NE |
6.97% |
0.77% |
0.79% |
-0.02% |
+10.73% |
+15.05% |
|
|
SW-Tip |
-0.66% |
0.24% |
0.26% |
-0.02% |
+2.92% |
+14.12% |
|
|
Total |
-- |
18.49% |
13.88% |
12.06% |
+1.02% |
+10.11% |
+16.60% |
|
County |
Region |
G Rate |
% of PV'08 |
% of PV'04 |
Diff. |
Margin |
Partisan shift |
2 of these 6 pick-ups have a partisan shift larger than the statewide partisan shift, and 4 of them have a partisan shift larger than the national partisan shift. These 4 pick-ups together accounted for 13.88% of the statewide PV and had a composite partisan shift of +16.60%..
Now, let's go back to the top 3 counties in the state (53.21% of the PV in 2008)- here colored in green:
You can look at the map and visualize for yourself that the other 30 counties, the ones with a white background, represent the MINORITY of the PV from 2008.
I have done a special analysis of the six largest counties in NM, 5 of the 6 pick-ups + Taos and Lea Counties, for comparison purposes. Including overlap in categories, that makes for 12 counties out of 33, or 1/3 of the state.. The results are very englightening, especially concerning the growth rate of the current 5 largest counties. Here is the the study, as an excel document, with all the raw numbers.
And a table of those five mega-counties, with their percent of the statewide PV, per year (the color indicates for which party the county went):
|
Year |
Bernalillo |
Santa Fe |
Doña Ana |
Sandoval |
San Juan |
Valencia |
Total: |
|
1960 |
27.66% |
5.75% |
5.39% |
1.32% |
4.24% |
3.85% |
48.21% |
|
1964 |
30.01% |
5.65% |
5.52% |
1.35% |
4.24% |
3.59% |
50.36% |
|
1968 |
31.26% |
5.94% |
6.11% |
1.44% |
4.33% |
3.65% |
52.73% |
|
1972 |
34.09% |
6.02% |
6.31% |
1.81% |
4.14% |
3.81% |
56.18% |
|
1976 |
34.07% |
6.24% |
6.28% |
2.22% |
4.72% |
3.97% |
57.50% |
|
1980 |
34.43% |
6.32% |
6.32% |
2.76% |
5.15% |
4.20% |
59.18% |
|
1984 |
33.88% |
6.72% |
7.08% |
3.16% |
5.43% |
2.73% |
59.00% |
|
1988 |
33.21% |
7.08% |
7.99% |
3.65% |
5.32% |
2.92% |
60.17% |
|
1992 |
35.21% |
7.53% |
7.76% |
4.13% |
5.31% |
3.94% |
63.88% |
|
1996 |
32.74% |
7.63% |
7.83% |
4.76% |
5.85% |
3.33% |
62.14% |
|
2000 |
34.13% |
8.26% |
7.79% |
5.30% |
5.79% |
3.57% |
64.84% |
|
2004 |
33.96% |
8.75% |
8.19% |
5.89% |
5.95% |
3.44% |
66.18% |
|
2008 |
34.42% |
8.70% |
8.35% |
7.06% |
5.60% |
3.48% |
67.61% |
|
2012* |
34.88% |
8.65% |
8.51% |
8.23% |
5.25% |
3.52% |
69.04% |
|
2012** |
34.71% |
9.14% |
8.58% |
7.94% |
5.41% |
3.39% |
69.17% |
We see sic individual patterns of growth here:
Bernalillo – double sinus curve, currently on the rise, has been around 24% for 8 years.
Santa Fe - ascending since 1960 until 2004, very, very slight drop-off in 2008.
Doña Ana - ascending since 1960 until 1988, dropped off in 1992 and ascended again through 2008.
Sandoval – ascending steadily since 1960, massive growth. Overtook San Juan county in 2008.
San Juan – zig-zag growth, peaking in 2004. 0.35% drop-off in 2008.
Valencia – complete zig-zag over 48 years, average around 3.5%
However the general trend for all 6 combined been a straight ascending line, with a very slight blip between 1980 and 1984: in 1960, the five largest counties in New Mexico represented 48.29% of the PV (minority), in 2008, it was 67.61% (2/3 majority). The growth cycle has currently peaked in 2008. This is a MASSIVE growth in political influence of 6 out of 33 counties. Remember this current total when the NEVADA study is released, for Clark County alone in the state of Nevada accounted for 67.28% of that state's electoral power in 2008!!!
For 2012* I am projecting a possible county % of the PV, based only on the change between 2004 and 2008. This is a straight line projection.
For 2012** I am projecting a possible county % of the PV, based on an progressive average of the change from 2000 to 2004 and then from 2004 to 2008. These values are theoretical values and it will be interesting to see how close I come in 2012.
Aside from San Juan county, the other five large counties have very large hispanic populations:
The above map:
dark brown: hispanic population 75% or more
brown: hispanic population 50%-75%
light brown: hispanic population 25%-50%
white: hispanic population under 35%
red: Indian majority population
gold asterisk: military installation(s)
How did the exit polls for New Mexico look for Obama vs Kerry?:
|
Year |
White % of |
Black % of |
Hispanic % of |
Asian % of |
Other % of |
TOTAL: |
|
42% of 50% |
--- of 1% |
69% of 41% |
--- of 0% |
79% of 8% |
|
|
|
Actual total |
21,00% |
1,00% |
28,29% |
|
6,32% |
56,61% |
|
2008 Extrap: |
White % of tot |
|
Non white % of tot: |
|
|
|
|
|
21,00% |
|
35,61% |
|
|
56,61% |
|
---- |
---- |
---- |
---- |
--- |
--- |
--- |
|
White male % of |
White female % of |
Non-White male% of |
Non-white female % of |
--- |
|
|
|
|
40% of 26% |
44% of 31% |
57% of 20% |
58% of 24% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Actual total |
10,40% |
13,64% |
11,40% |
13,92% |
|
49,36% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2004 Extrap: |
White % of tot |
|
Non white % of tot: |
|
|
|
|
|
24.04% |
|
25.32% |
|
|
49,36% |
If the exit polls are correct (and they add up very, very closely to the actual percentages), then Obama actually did worse in the white vote than Kerry did. The exit polls were worded differently in 2004 than 2008 for New Mexico, so an exact 1:1 correspondence for the hispanic vote is impossible, but a 1:1 correspondence to the non-white vote it. And in the overall non-white vote, Obama did more than 10% better than Kerry. This is the kind of statistic that is needed for a win in a minority-majority state.
How to predict as 2012 nears? Here is a table of the closest county by county races (margin: under +4%), the so-called „tipping point“ counties (winning margin: less than 4%):
|
County |
Region |
Obama % |
McCain % |
Margin |
O-shift |
M-shift |
Partisan Shift |
|
USA |
-- |
52.88% |
45.61% |
+7.27% |
+4.62% |
-5.12% |
+9.73% |
|
New Mexico |
-- |
56.91% |
41.78% |
+15.13% |
+7.86% |
-8.06% |
+15.92% |
|
---- |
-- |
------ |
------ |
------ |
----- |
----- |
|
|
SW-Tip |
50.90% |
47.98% |
+2.92% |
+7.06% |
-7.07% |
+14.12% |
The lone tipping point county, Hidalgo county, has already been analysed in Part II. Obama picked the county up, it is a reliable bellwether for the state and will be watched in 2012.
The direction of the new pick-up counties in New Mexico, especially Hidalgo County, will tell us the direction of the state in 2012. But statistically, New Mexico is now so deep in „safe“ Democratic territory that the chances are very high that the state will never be in play.
Conclusion:
In INDIANA, every single county trended more or less democratic, without exception – there was a blue shift that moved the entire state and those overwhelmingly white, rural counties contributed greatly to Obama's narrow win here – yes, the counties that he still lost to McCain. This shows a large level of GOP defection to Obama in 2008. Here, Obama gained 405,028 raw votes over Kerry from 2004, while McCain lost 133,790 raw votes over Bush from 2004, an uneven shift. Indiana's PV growth rate over 2004 was 11.47%. And Obama won by +1.03%.
In OHIO, not every county trended democratic (11 trended GOP), but there were no GOP county pick-ups. Also, in Ohio, the largest cities, all five of them, played the crucial role in moving the state into the democratic column and those overwhelmingly white, rural counties contributed very little to Obama's narrow win, in contrast to Indiana. Surely there were some moderate GOP defections, but there were also a moderate amount of newly registered voters. Here, Obama gained 198,877 raw votes over Kerry's total from 2004, while McCain lost 181,948 raw votes over Bush's total from 2004, a moderate mirror image shift. Ohio's PV growth rate over 2004 was a nominal 1.36%, way under the national PV growth rate of 7.46%. And Obama won by +4.58%.
In VIRGINIA, there was real resistance to Obama, but in counties that are „emptying out“, so to speak. There was a large poli-demographic shift in VA, with the north and the SE gaining greatly in political strength for the Democratic party. Here there were obviously far fewer GOP defections, if at all (McCain scored more raw votes in VA than Bush from 2004), but far more newly registered and democratic dedicated voters. Most importantly, a +6.30% winning margin is hardly a battleground margin. It is a better margin than Obama scored in OHIO, INDIANA, NORTH CAROLINA and FLORIDA. It is a lean winning margin, but a comfortable one and will require a minimum 12.60% shift back to the GOP in order to regain the state, and I doubt that this shift will come from those 500,000 new voters. The worst case scenario for the GOP is that Obama cements Virginia into the democratic column in his first term, adding the state to core democratic territory and thus making the electoral math for the GOP more difficult. There were, however, 2 GOP pick-ups in this state, the only 2 pick-ups in all nine states Obama picked-up.
In NORTH CAROLINA, Obama achieved a democratic trend in 92 of 100 counties and there were no GOP pick-up counties (see: INDIANA; OHIO). However, there were no counties with partisan shifts above 21%. In Virginia, there were 8 such counties. In Indiana, there were 40 such counties. The densely populated areas pulled through for Obama and he held McCain's winning margins in the red counties low enough to squeak through a bare win.
In FLORIDA, Obama's GOTV effort and hard campaigning were enough to swing Tampa (Hillsborough county) and Clearwater (Pinellas county) back to the democratic party. But the trend was very uneven in Iowa and the GOP achieved a higher numeric percentage of GOP trending counties than in Indiana, Ohio, Virginia or North Carolina. It is indeed fascinating that the very counties that remained true to Jimmy Carter in his 1980 election defeat are now rock-solid republican counties or counties trending republican. There is no statistical indication that race is a factor in this, for most of those counties did not go for either Bill Clinton or Al Gore, both also southern democrats. The explanation is that as these counties are „empyting out“ and losing on electoral firepower, the population that is remaining is more conservatively oriented. Without a doubt, Florida will continue to be a bitter battleground for cycles to come.
In IOWA, Obama's win was a
sweeping one, reminiscent of Bill Clinton's win from 1992, or even
more accurately, of Michael Dukakis' win from 1988, and came closest
to the national partisan shift, or „swing“. It was also the most
likely pick-up, based on the state's performance in the 2004 GE. A
21 county pick-up and a 98 county trend for the Democratic party in
this state is a sign of serious political change and should be a
cause of genuine concern for Republican statisticians. Additionally,
the continuing trend toward larger urban areas and a slow „emptying“
of rural areas is generally advantageous to the Democratic party.
This makes a strong argument for the Democratic party for 2012 and
increases the chances that Iowa will be a Democratic retention in
the next cycle.
On the other hand, when 25% of all Iowa counties are tipping-point counties (practically all Democratic pick-ups plus some quirky outlier counties) looking forward to 2012, then the state is certainly not cemented into the Democratic column, not yet. Additionally, Iowa will probably be the first primary of 2012, and assuming that Obama runs unchallenged for re-election, then the GOP will have the greater opportunity to do massive voter registration and build excitement on the ground in the Hawkeye state as the Democratic party did in 2008. Most likely, Mitt Romney and Sarah Palin will be visiting Iowa often, starting in early 2010.
In COLORADO, a long-term structural problem has developed for the GOP and has probably already reached the point of no return: the large hispanic immigration into the state, coupled with far flung deep, deep red counties with no potential for large population growth due to the presence of military installations or nationally protected areas, coupled with the growth of new urban areas (and hence, liberal thought) like Broomfield county, has changed the electoral balance in this state. The hispanic population has not yet reached the levels it has in neighboring New Mexico, but the trend is strongly in that direction. And the hispanic community nationally, which was attracted to George W. Bush in 2004 and to some degree in 2000, has swung decidedly to the Democratic party in 2008. There is a strong possibility that the immigration debate from George W. Bush's 2nd term and the resultant rejection of his immigration reform proposals from conservative wing of the GOP may become the GOP equivalent of the horrible mess that happened to the Democratic party with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the way it was packaged. Just as there are millions of registered Democrats in the south (see: Oklahoma, Texas) who vote Republican, it is entirely possible that a large cadre of registered Republicans in New Mexico will switch sides. Some of them must have already done this in 2008, otherwise Obama could not have achieved such a sweeping partisan-shift. And the fact that the state already shifted strongly to the Democratic party in 2004 and then continued the shift in 2008 means that this is probably not a one-time phenomenon.
And if that is not enough: on the very day that I completed this analysis, the following article appeared in POLITICO: GOP sounds alarm on Latino voter gap.
In NEW MEXICO, the same structural problem for the GOP that is developing in Colorado is much more pronounced. The extremes in Colorado are even more extreme in New Mexico. There can be no doubt about it. New Mexico is currently 44% hispanic. The hispanic vote swung very, very strongly for the Democratic party, which was already running strong with the other two minorities of note in the state: the black population and the indian population. This makes New Mexico more of a minority-majority state than ever before, tendency: rising. More than that, there is even room for growth for President Obama in the largest county in the state: Bernalillo. Essentially, everything that applied to Colorado applies in New Mexico almost two-fold. Not to mention that the final results from this state exceeded the polling averages shortly before the election. New Mexico is currently a SAFE DEM state.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX
Dem counties: Bernalillo, Cibola, Colfax, Dona Ana, Grant, Guadalupe, Hildalgo, Los Alamos, Luna, McKinley, Mora, Rio Arriba, Sandoval, San Miguel, Santa Fe, Socorro, Taos, Valencia. (18: 12 retentions, 6 pick-ups)
GOP trending:
GOP, % gain: 0
DEM % loss:
Ind % loss: San Juan, Taos
GOP numeric GAIN: Sandoval,
DEM numeric loss:
IND numeric loss: Eddy Guadalupe, Harding, Hildalgo, Los Alamos, Mora, Quay, Roosevelt,
IND numeric 0: Hildalgo. Los Alamos,
Tipping point 2004 to solid DEM 2008: Bernalillo (+4.20%), Dona Ana, Sandoval, Socorro (+4.19%)
New Tipping point 2008: Hidalgo (+2.92)