Short answer: 4 questions, 1 paragraph each [7 points each]:
(1) Explain the morality theory of political obligation and criticism of that theory.

The morality theory explores the placement of morals within the political obligation of an individual to the state. Two main figures the text introduces are Robert Nozick and Joseph Raz. Essentially, what the theory debates is to what extent morals are determinative of positive law in a society. Nozick argues that morals ultimately demand primacy, being that no law may be legitimate if it is found to be immoral. He also argues that redistributive taxation falls outside the legitimate scope of the state with this view of morality in mind. Another thinker, Raz, reminds us that the state is most effective when it places structure where it is needed, as opposed to dictate morals. For example, morally, it does not matter on which side of the road we drive, but the state’s purpose is served by defining a norm for the society, and in this case should be obeyed despite the law having no immediate moral implications. Some may argue that the state has no place in determining morals, but only regulating behavior between members of the society. Especially groups like the Anabaptists (Amish, etc.), who insist on a strict separation of church (a moral body) and state (a legal body) may insist that the state must have absolutely no influence on the moral spectrum and should avoid at all weighing in on moral matters.

(2) Explain the argument that there is a link between nation and democracy and what the criticisms of this argument.

At least two reasons exist to explain the conceptual mutuality of both nationhood and democracy. First among these justifications is a common language and culture. Democracies are thought to be dependent upon people being able to communicate openly and accurately with one another. A shared identity facilitates the idea of a collective voice that is expressed through the electoral process. Secondly, and related to that last statement, is the suggestion that democracies require a shared sense of unity, of being one people bound together in one place. Criticisms of these correlations include the idea that many nations containing several people groups have fared quite well in local democratic institutions, suggesting that democracy is not dependent upon being one nation, or even upon one language (i.e. Canada with French and English ethnicities, Spain with the Basque nationalists, and I would even add the US with the Hawai’ian and Native American nations).

(3) Explain the argument that democracy is of intrinsic value and criticism of this argument.

To have intrinsic value, a concept must in some way have a moral dimension, that is to say it must insist on the propriety or ‘rightness’ of an idea or practice, beyond merely being of utilitarian value. Those that believe that democracy has intrinsic value may describe the worth of distributive power; that people themselves should be in control of where the rely society is directed. Proponents of democracy often imagine that suffrage increases the quality of legislation it produced as well as improving the character of those who participated in civic duties. Critics of this argument claim that democracy is not necessarily desirable, like Hobbes, who felt strongly that popular suffrage ultimately only awarded those people who had talent at getting elected, not those who had training in political systems. Furthermore, he felt that democracy was divisive, inciting dissension among people.

(4) Explain: John Stuart Mill’s idea of self-regarding conduct and his argument why our liberty in this realm should be absolute.

Mills has proven to be a critical figure in liberal philosophy because he combines Hobbes’ descriptive view of liberty with a kind of moderation, thru advancing constitutional democracy, that Hobbes seemed to lack. Mill describes self-regarding acts those that have no direct or immediate affect on others. However, he clearly reminds us that such acts actually should affect the feelings of others without causing harm or benefit. Self regarding acts should enjoy free exercise within his constitutional democracy for a few reasons, not the least of which is that the state is considered to have no legitimate authority over acts if they do not threaten the safety or stability of the society. It was interesting to note that self harm, as long as the person can be shown to fully comprehend the nature of the damage they may cause to themselves, is acceptable to Mill. In a topical sense, this includes things like smoking, drug use, and other means of self-destruction, but also, theoretically, suicide. Another reason self regarding acts should not be restricted are that people should be free (in Mill’s liberal utilitarianism) to shape their own destiny, to be their own masters.


Long answer: 4 question sets, several paragraphs each [18 points each]:
(5) Since there are few citizens of states that expressly consent to political authority, it can rarely be said that we actually consent.
a. Summarize the various arguments that we do consent, even if not expressly; these include: residence as consent, voting as consent, and hypothetical consent.
b. What are the criticisms of each, and which one most closely resembles the utilitarian of political obligation?

Residence as consent is a theory of consent that suggests one’s presence within a given boundary implies (being a tacit form of consent) that that person has agreed to abide by the rules and norms of that particular area. A very strong case against this theory is the observation that people are not free to actually remove themselves from their inherited area of residence, either because they would have to learn a new language and culture, expend money to relocate, etc. From a liberal perspective, the state does not have the authority to effectively eject persons from their region who may have been born into citizenship but who may not render explicit consent. More importantly, however, is the fact that residence as consent is implicitly coercive, it suggests that one has only the option to “love or leave” a given location, which robs one of ones liberty instead of granting it.

Voting as consent suggests that our votes (if we live in a democracy) count as express consent. As we vote, we also enter into a type of social contract with the state, wherein we grant our consent to abide by its laws if we are given suffrage. It is a less shaky theoretical form of consent, as it has a tangible act by which we might indicate our approval. It is important to remember that only free elections may be considered acts of explicit consent, not forced or corrupted elections. However, to assume that voting is our primary act of consent is to suggest that to elect not to vote is to withhold that consent. If that is the case, may those who refuse to vote in a free election similarly refuse to obey a state’s laws? Furthermore, voting is deterministic if it is our only form of rendering consent. If we do not like any of the candidates, what is to compel us to vote (and subsequently offer our consent)? What if we desire to consent but wish not to vote for the candidates provided?
Finally, hypothetical consent attempts to fill the void left between tacit and express consent. Hypothetical consent theorists try to imagine what consent we would give within a hypothetical state. It assumes that we would desire to construct and obey a state, and therefore are compelled to obey that which already exists. A very simple and necessary critique of this claim asks why what we might do should matter at all in the face of what we have already done.

Utilitarian theory of consent is likely most closely related to voting as consent. In the negative sense, with residence and hypothetical consent, neither of these theories at all addresses how the greatest good is being secured for the greatest number. In the positive sense, voting as consent very closely adheres to act utilitarianism because the individual act of voting ensures that the greatest number have access to determining the greatest good. However, it is equally important to recognize that rule utilitarianism also is inline with voting as consent, as the rules themselves, which guarantee maximum pleasure and minimal pain, are chosen by rational adults consenting to their incorporation into the state by their act of voting them into law. Consent as residence and hypothetical consent offer utilitarianism no such credence.

(6) According to the author of chapter 2:
a. what are the various objective criteria offered for nationhood and what is wrong with each?
b. how are (any of) these criticisms relevant to the problems with the “right of national self-determination” (pp. 45-46)?

There are three criteria listed as identifying nationhood, they to be states, linguistic communities, and ethnic communities. Nationhood as state claims that nations are defined by their geographical boundaries, formalized structure including positive laws and governmental institutions, and a recognition by other states or an international body such as the UN. However, numerous nations defy this description, including our own. American nationals live and thrive abroad, outside US territories. In other cases, states contain more than one nation, like Spain (Basque), Canada (Quebecois), the United Kingdom (Scotland, Britain, Wales, and Northern Ireland), and the US (Native American tribes and the formerly independent nation of Hawai’i). Or a nation might transcend state boundaries, like the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

Nations as linguistic communities identifies the understanding that many nations also have one language by which to identify them. Good examples are France (French), England (English), or Spain (Spanish), as the state even shares a common root etymology of the language spoken there. This has a significant import for a nation, as laws are drafted in language, institutions publish in specific languages, etc. It is not beyond consideration to have a unified linguistic system to simplify and unify a populace. However, the holes in this theory are readily apparent, as languages very often transcend national boundaries, and nations also more often than not have more than one linguistic community present within its borders. Such is the case in just one state of our own union, where I grew up; California has almost an innumerable number of individual languages spoken within its state lines. At a national level, the US does not even have an official language, as other nations occasionally do, though many other nations share our proclivity for spoken languages, such as Canada, or Brazil, in which the dominant language comes from overseas (Portugal).

States as ethnic communities is another theory that is similarly plagued with inconsistencies. The theory posits that a state shares a singular ethnic background. This is the case for a very small group of states, as many nation-states contain within their jurisdictions a great number of ethnicities. The value of such a theory is essential to consider, as a singular culture allows for a greater unification of a population and allows for many social norms and expectations to be instituted more fluidly within a state. Unfortunately, even many of the original colonial states such as Britain, Spain, Portugal, and France have experienced a kind of reverse colonialism, wherein people groups from a number of external nations (and states) have populated those states and been absorbed into the ethnic diversity there. Currently, there are very few states with but one ethnic background, and therefore we cannot define states exclusively by their ethnic make up.

The principles of nationhood are very relevant to the concept of self-determination. Essential to national autonomy is the idea that each nation must be free to determine their fate and political direction. Without a sovereign border to differentiate between states, self-determination is a pipe dream for many nations. In some cases, being a nation-within-a-nation has worked relatively well (such as the case with Native American tribes in the US), but borders by which to distinguish the end of one and the beginning of another self-determined state is essential to nationhood. This is important in that begins to define a nation’s scope. Secondly, and perhaps of less import, is the issue of a single identifying language and culture (or ethnicity) present within a nation. These two elements play equally into the questions of which groups should be awarded self-determination and the justification for such autonomy. An example I think of is the struggle for Hawai’ian self-determination here in Hawai’i. The questions these criticisms ask are “Do Kanaka Maoli possess a sufficient amount of cultural and linguistic difference to justify granting that nation some degree of political autonomy?” If they can in fact be shown to possess an adequate degree of cultural/linguistic distinctiveness from the surrounding population, and that such an identity is dependent upon a political self-determination in order to ensure its survival, then the inherent cultural value itself merits such autonomy.

(7) Democracy as a political principle must be reconciled with actual political process in modern states.
a. Summarize the author’s discussion of the division of labor in modern democracy states, which involves citizens, experts, politicians, and administrators.
b. With this division of political labor in mind, discuss the different views of the following those who advocate the idea of deliberative democracy, elite democracy, and interest group democracy.

The author does not expend a massive amount of energy on the idea itself of the division of labor. For the most part, the concept is implied before it is named outright. Looking upon the reality that rarely citizens are as informed as they should be in political concepts, the role of the division of labor allows for citizens themselves to dictate the end goals of a society while allowing experts to devise the means while administrators are charged with managing the process itself. Politicians themselves largely play an incidental role, being as they only occupy an office for a limited amount of time, though they do create the laws that effect the ends sought by the society. By divvying up labor in a political system, citizens may be as informed or uninformed about the intricacies of political dealings as long as they clearly articulate in some fashion the goals they deem important. The work of affecting those goals then falls upon the administrators, experts, and politicians.

Deliberative democracy insists that laws must be openly justifiable to citizens of the state. Deliberation, as its name suggests, relies upon public and rational debate between citizens, as well as, of course, politicians, experts, and administrators. The insight of experts, response from politicians, and work of administrators is a necessary part of this deliberative process. However, because there will never be perfect consensus, deliberative democracy depends upon overlapping consensus; certain subsets of laws and policies are agreed upon while allowing for disagreement on more minor parts of the legislation.

In an elitist political theory, it is thought that such public consensus is not only impossible, but also undesirable. The fundamental reason for this is a pessimistic human outlook, that groupthink produces poor legislation based on primarily on emotion. The elite theory of democracy vests the power of setting goals and pursuing them upon a smaller group of more heavily informed individuals. The basis for this thought is that complacency in a citizenry is good, since motivation and passion without informed reasoning actually threatens the stability of a society. Essentially, the citizenry plays purely a ceremonial role in voting, while intellectual elites, such as experts, are given much more credence in informing politicians and advising administrators.

The division of labor in an interest group pluralism theory is similar to that of the elite political theory in that minorities are primarily (or should be) the controlling force of within a society. Instead of intellectual elites, in this theory we have minority focus groups. This amounts at least to a coalition of minorities, with perhaps a few elites in touch with a few members of the ‘ordinary’ class of citizen of which they represent. This theory allows for deliberation, but maintains that any such discourse is (or should be) done between interest groups, and not publicly between citizens of a state. Experts and administrators seem to take a central role in this theory, with politicians perhaps in a figurehead position of public appeasement. The difference between elite theory and interest group is the basic unit of rule; for elites it is individuals of attained intellectual worth, for interest group theory it is a small group of representatives (administrators perhaps) of a given special interest.

(8) Conceptions of liberty:
a. Discuss the similarities and differences between Thomas Hobbes’ and John Locke’s conceptions of liberty.
b. Discuss which one is purely descriptive and which is compatible with the political ideology of liberalism (based on a normative theory of civil liberty).

Both Hobbes and Locke were liberals in the sense that they both upheld the primacy of the individual within a social context. To deny an individual freedom of intellect, movement, or expression was thought of as an illegitimate exercise of dominance over the individual. Additionally, each held that self-preservation was an ingrained instinct that would govern (both reward and punish) the human animal and would therefore manage one’s interactions with others. However, Hobbes only ever fully endorsed a concept of liberty with no moral substance, while Locke held that for a social order to exist and thrive, there should be a civil structure honoring the individual’s liberty.

To this end, Hobbes insisted that the individual has no claim against a sovereign (a monarch or any other state structure) that was in place to ensure security for the society. A strict Hobbesian view would perhaps claim that one might violate the sovereignty of the state, but that the resultant actions (including execution) would be consequently doled out. Hobbes would not say that the sovereign is in the right or wrong, but that the consequences, being known to the person, should inform the choices made by citizens. Locke would argue that there is not authority granted abstractedly from the citizens governed and that it is the right of each to hold their sovereign to account, as it was their own security the state was charged with protecting (even from the malignant actions of the sovereign itself). Locke’s social contract went both ways, binding both the citizen and the sovereign to one another. Hobbes would have held that no such contract existed, or that if it did, it only bound the citizen to the sovereign.

For a concept to be purely descriptive it must have no moral substance, nothing obliging it to what is right or wrong. Descriptive concepts merely describe what is, as opposed to normative concepts, which instead prescribe what should be. Hobbes’ view never concretely supported any idea of what a person should or should not be entitled to, but instead offered what he felt liberty was able to achieve when practiced. Locke, on the other hand, was very clear that he felt a proper liberal ideology, which values the individual and their inherent worth and value, aligned more with a human or natural set of laws. Such laws, which in turn insisted upon a degree of social/civil liberty, were guaranteed by a basic morality attainable to all. Such a view is clearly normative, as Locke believes that such human rights and dignity should and must be a part of any formal civil structure. To insist that each person is born with, and must continue to have access to, these such human rights based on the laws of nature is in itself the basis for a normative understanding of civil liberty.