John Holloway writes that the state is just “one node in a web of social relations.” The state therefore has no “autonomy of action.” It is constantly reproduced as a social relationship that channels social struggles.

 

“[The use of force] is exercised not by the individual owner of the done, for that would be     incompatible with the free nature of the relation between capitalist and worker, but by a separate instance responsible for protecting the property of the done, the state. The separation of the economic and the political (and the constitution of the 'economic' and the 'political' by this separation) is therefore central to the exercise of domination under capitalism.”

 

Holloway criticizes the assumption that the state merely represents an instrument of the ruling class and the traditional Marxist idea that the state must only be taken over for it to then be wielded for socialist purposes. Instead, just as the state is not a neutral means that can be used just as one wants, it is inseparably interwoven into the social relationships that produce it. Because these relations are capitalist, the state is oriented towards the promotion of capital accumulation – from which it ultimately finances itself. It also exists in international competition. According to Holloway, the state’s measures for capital are part of this competitive struggle, i.e. the development of infrastructure, maintaining law and order, as well as the provision of appropriately trained workers.

 

However, Holloway writes that one cannot simply argue that everything that the state undertakes also in fact promotes capital accumulation, but that the relationship between capital and the state is one of “trial and error.” According to Holloway, a functionalist approach is unable to explain why the state could emerge from a capitalist society. Capitalist society requires an (apparently) external force because in it exploitation functions through the free purchase of labor power. Therefore, state power cannot be exercised by the capitalists themselves. The task of the state is to secure private property so that not the “doers,” but the owners of the means of production and buyers of labor power possess the products of labor. It thus creates for the workers, who lack any source of income apart from the sale of his or her labor powe, the need to always work. At the same time, the state preserves the freedom to sell labor power because the direct rule of the capitalists would force them to directly hand it over.

Holloway’s state concept is not logical in itself. If the state is necessary for the continuous reproduction of capitalist social relations, it cannot be explained how it could ever generally originate from these social relations. It lacks a condition for its existence prior to its existence. Likewise, it remains unexplained how without “autonomy of action” it can channel struggles or is able to perform the above-mentioned services in capitalist society. Ultimately, Holloway’s is nevertheless a functionalist account: because capitalism needs the state for the free sale of labor, it produces it. Holloway constructs functionalism as a straw man in order to then differentiate his theory from it when he asserts that this only consists in the fact that every state activity must also be successful for capital accumulation. In this way, he tries to retreat from functionalism, despite his functionalistic approach, free of argument.

Holloway can't identify any significant social change in “globalization”:

 

“The current discussions of 'globalisation' merely highlight what has always been true: capitalist social relations, by their nature, have always gone beyond territorial limitations.”

 

Since capitalist social relations are never tied to national boundaries “it has always been mistaken to think of the capitalist world as being the sum of different national societies.” Consequently, he bases his thoughts about an emancipation movement on his general state criticism – nothing has been fundamentally changed by “globalization” and the novelty value of his considerations are therefore not due to changes in capitalism, but to demarcation from traditional Marxism as a revolutionary concept.

 

However, it is worth noting that his criticism is not quite true, at least of the former really existing socialist states. He accuses traditional Marxism of wanting to take over the state as a means for socialism, even though it is inextricably connected with capitalism. However, the real socialist states did not separate the workers from the means of production and from access to their labor products in order to make them available for private capital, but used them in state-owned enterprises for the fulfillment of plans. Holloway’s analysis of the necessity of a rule in capitalism existing apart from economic exploitation therefore does not apply to the states of really existing socialism at all. They also did not compete for investments by private capital to then take part in their profits via taxes. So it cannot be maintained that it is impossible to separate the state from capitalism and thus the state is no means for socialism.

 

Holloway’s criticism of Marxism Leninism, from which he differentiates himself in order to legitimize the novelty of his project, runs into the ditch. His reproach at most applies to social democracy, which wanted to take over the power of the bourgeois state for socialism. (It is possible that Holloway assumes that “real existing socialism” had to fail because it was statist yet didn’t have capitalism as a basis. Inasmuch as he assumes this, however, his theory that capitalism is a necessary social basis for the emergence of a state is refuted. On the other hand, he needs to show the necessary evidence for a connection between the state not having a capitalist basis and the failure of real socialist states.)

Instead of theoretically demonstrating why Marxism-Leninism could not lead to socialism because it misjudged the alleged bondage of the state to capitalism, Holloway simply reproaches it for having failed:

 

“What has failed is the notion that revolution means capturing power in order to abolish power. What is now on the agenda is the much more demanding notion of a direct attack on power relations. The only way in which revolution can now be imagined is not as the conquest of power but as the dissolution of power.”

 

This success argument, instead of an argument about its substance, should show that now an emancipatory movement, in accord with Holloway's advice, does not get involved in power instead of pursuing the takeover of state power as a program. The success argument is also used to change the subject. It is now no longer a question of the relation between the state and capitalism, but between the state and power. Marxism-Leninism and social democracy are therefore no longer criticized for an erroneous definition of the relation between the state and capitalism, so that the takeover of the state could not lead to socialism, but for having involved themselves with “power.” The struggle for the takeover of the state leads, for Holloway, to getting involved in its categories, namely those of “power,” and so transforms the movement against power into a form of power itself:

 

“What was initially negative (the rejection of capitalism) is converted into something positive (institution-building, power-building). The induction into the conquest of power inevitably becomes an induction into power itself.”

“Power” is also not defined by its content and criticized, but is simply the negative that “we” reject:

 

“They [who seek power] do not see that if we revolt against capitalism, it is not because we want a different system of power, it is because we want a society in which power relations are dissolved.”

 

Therefore power is not suitable, according to Holloway, as a guide for “we” the movement:

 

“You cannot build a society of non-power relations by conquering power. Once the logic of power is adopted, the struggle against power is already lost.”

 

Holloway presumes that “we” are always against power. This is quite appropriate because the opposition to power arises from a pre-conceptual anger about that experience – “the scream” as Holloway calls it. Therefore, he urges “we,” on the one hand, not be enticed by power as in traditional Marxism – be it social democracy or Leninism – and instrumentalize the struggle, but remain in a state of pre-reflective innocence of a quasi-instinctive rejection of power.

In the execution of this thought, Holloway already contradicts himself. Thus he writes, e.g.:

 

“we feel that these things that anger us are not isolated phenomena, that there is a connection between them, that they are all part of a world that is flawed, a world that is wrong in some fundamental way.”

 

However, anger exists by no means prior to all reflection, but arises from it. To denounce a “wrong” one must first have made clear to oneself an ideal of what is right. Thus, the comparison of an ideal of justice and everyday experience, from which then follows the judgment “wrong,” involves reflection. In addition to this self-contradiction, it is a matter of still noticing that the comparison of experience and the justice ideal must by no means necessarily end negatively, as one can infer, for example, the idea that everybody has to blame themselves for everything. And even if the comparison precipitates negatively, it is by no means certain that a refusal of “power,” uncorrupted by the influence of power, inevitably follows. Ultimately, a reflective effort must first be carried out in order to find “power” a cause for a “wrong.”

Because for Holloway the point is that struggle exists, he also evaluates key elements of the “Marxist worldview,” such as historical materialism, by what they contributed to the struggle. Quite apart from its content, he appreciates one thing about historical materialism:

 

“The attraction of the conception of Marxism as a scientifically objective theory of revolution for those who were dedicating their lives to struggle against capitalism is obvious. It provided not just a coherent conception of historical movement, but also enormous moral support: whatever reverses might be suffered, history was on our side.”

 

Without referring to its content, Holloway thus praises Marxist historical determinism precisely for its function of agitating for the struggle, apart from the arguments this has in traditional Marxism. It is therefore also not surprising that he criticizes it without regard to its content, but for not sufficiently motivating the struggle:

 

“At the same time, however, both aspects of the concept of scientific socialism (objective knowledge, objective process) pose enormous problems for the development of Marxism as a theory of struggle. […] If there is an objective movement of history which is independent of human volition, then what is the role of struggle?”

 

And Holloway knows yet another argument against the traditional worldview of Marxism, including objections to “historical materialism” – “the failure of those attempts to change the world through gaining control of the state has led very many people to the conclusion that revolution is impossible” and so not offering “hope.” Holloway’s very instrumental assessment of historical materialism is appropriate to his point of view of usefulness for activating struggles. Not only because an alleged pre-conceptual anger is sufficient reason for the struggle, but because its contents do not matter – just as long as they are not spoiled by a focus on “power.” Ultimately, because there are struggles united by opposition to “power,” “the power to create” should emerge from them.

 

“The experience of shared struggle already involves the development of relations between people that are different in quality from the social relations in capitalism. There is much evidence that for people involved in strikes or similar struggles, the most important outcome of the struggles is often not the realization of the immediate demands, but the development of a community of struggle, a collective doing characterized by its opposition to capitalist forms of social relations.”

Because Holloway estimates the really existing struggles to be this positive aspect, which as an experimental ground for a new society necessarily complements the negative aspect of the destruction of capitalism, he not only advises the movement to strengthen the aspect of self-organization in their struggles, but also orients his theory towards hope so that these struggles arise. His theory targets not an object, but tries to stir up struggles to bring about “changing the world without taking power,” again put very concisely when he writes in summary:

 

“If this book has done anything to weaken or dull the scream or to conceptualize it out of existence, it has failed. The aim has been to strengthen it, to make it more strident.”

 

Holloway wants to give hope for the struggles, not by claiming that “we” are the executors of a historical necessity, but because “we” are strong while the opponent is weak. They unite for him because “we” are strong because the opponent is weak and vice versa: the opponent is weak because we are strong. In order to emphasize its strength, Holloway falls back on the fact that there is already a really existing movement. This proves that the revolt can exist without the party, the working class, etc.

 

“The first point is that anti-power is ubiquitous [...] Look at the world around us … and you see a world of struggle.”

 

This claim is not very difficult, if one, like Holloway, defines more or less every struggle as an expression of an emancipatory “we,” for the simple fact that the struggles bring out “the power to create.” However, capitalism as an opponent is weak because it is in crisis. This is not just simply due to the dynamics of capitalism, but is produced by “we” and is thus a sign of strength. In this respect it makes them hopeful because it indicates that capitalism depends on them. At the same time, the crisis reactions of capital show that “we” quasi-automatically push it to more and qualitatively higher levels of action. Because one always wants to be actively creative (something that is simply asserted), wage labor is ever less suitable for it because of its increasing precariousness, and this leads to struggles against wage labor as abstract labor itself and thus against capitalism.