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January 18, 2008 (Vo1 13)


08.1: Creating a college threat assessment program





IN BRIEF: The Iowa State "Critical Incident Response Team" established in 1994 provides guidance on how to design and create college threat assessment programs.


08.1 SAFETY AND SECURITY

Greetings! This is the first TPR issue after our winter break. Soon you will also receive by e-mail our latest annotated index, covering both Synfax Weekly Report and The Pavela Report.


Creating a college threat assessment program: An interview with Dr. Gene Deisinger

Our focus this week is on the development and management of threat assessment programs. State and national reports after the Virginia Tech shootings called for the prompt implementation of such programs at colleges nationwide. What's been difficult to find, however, are model programs with established records. For help in that regard we turned to Gene Deisinger, Ph.D.,
Commander of the Special Operations Unit with the Iowa State University Police Division and a founding member of the Iowa State Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT), created in 1994. Dr. Deisinger is licensed psychologist, a certified health service provider in psychology, and a certified peace officer. He has served as the primary threat manager for CIRT since the team’s inception. In addition to his duties at Iowa State, Dr. Deisinger provides operational support and training for several local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and serves as a Special Deputy United States Marshal with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. He can be reached at:erdeisin@iastate.edu 
 
   

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TPR: Your program started long before the Virginia Tech shootings. What prompted you to create it?


Deisinger: In the early 1990’s we experienced a set of crisis situations that illustrated the need for greater communication, collaboration and coordination among university departments. We identified situations where individual departments had (or were aware of) information that turned out to be relevant. However key decision makers in other departments, impacted upon by the person or situation, were not aware of that information. Therefore, they held an incomplete picture of the situation as it actually existed.


We also observed that individual departments brought to bear a wide range of expertise and resources, but typically implemented their approaches to crisis situations independent of other involved departments. On occasion, this resulted in an escalation of the crisis that was not anticipated (because no one was looking for it), and for which we were not adequately prepared to manage.


Finally, we noted that there was no agreed upon plan or authorization for decision-making in such complicated situations. Each department (based on their own training, views, resources and methods) controlled their responses, but no one entity had authority to coordinate a collaborative response to the crisis.


Based on those observations, representatives from university police and student affairs, developed a proposal for a multi-disciplinary group that would manage crises impacting upon the institution. This group would consistent of key decision-makers who were in roles already identified as key to effective sharing of information and incident management. The group includes representatives from campus police, human resources, employee relations, provost’s office, student counseling, dean of student’s office, residence, university relations, risk management and university counsel. Persons in these roles were regularly involved in dealing with crisis situations and already held authority for decision-making in their respective areas. The group, the Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) was authorized by the university president to manage campus crises.


The Team would be supported by a Threat Management Team consisting of a subset of CIRT members from police, student affairs and human resources. The Threat Management Team would conduct assessments of threatening situations and then develop & implement management strategies.



TPR: Please outline the core components of your program.


Deisinger: The core components of the Iowa State University crisis management approach include:











TPR: How does threat assessment differ from profiling?


Deisinger: Profiling is an investigative technique that utilizes observations about a crime scene (or pattern of crimes) to generate hypotheses about characteristics of an unknown suspect. These characteristics are presumed to be relatively stable over time. The purpose is to aid law enforcement in generating potential suspects when few (or none) have been previously identified; or to help reduce a suspect pool to a subset of people who more closely resemble those who are known to have previously committed similar crimes. In essence a profile is providing an indication of the degree of similarity between a suspect and characteristics of known offenders.


A threat assessment is a safety management tool that is based on information and observations about a specific situation. Threat assessment focuses on a subject’s behavior and information about the situation to determine the likelihood of escalation in behavior. A threat assessment is a dynamic process, recognizing that threat levels are affected by a number of variables, many of which change over time and as interventions or stressors are modified. The purpose of a threat assessment is to anticipate reasonably foreseeable actions of a specified person, or to anticipate likely changes in a specific situation. The assessment allows for early identification of situations that are likely to pose a risk, provides a baseline against which to measure changes in the situation, and facilitates development and implementation of interventions to increase likelihood of a safe resolution.



TPR: Does threat assessment involve predicting future behavior?


Deisinger: Threat assessment and management are much more about preparing for future behavior than they are about predicting behavior per se. Threat assessment and management are fundamental to our survival as human beings. Throughout our day we gather information, assess the risk to ourselves (and our projects, our jobs, our families, etc.) and we make changes in our lives to deal with those risks. While we are trying to look into the future we aren’t primarily interested in predicting. Instead, we are more interested in preparing for potential (and reasonably likely) threats, and decreasing our vulnerability – this is threat assessment and management.


Let me give an example to illustrate. Imagine that we are driving our car and come to an uncontrolled intersection at the same time as another driver. We want to make a turn through the intersection that would take us in front of the other vehicle. Clearly we want to do that without hitting the other car or being hit by it. Do we just predict whether the other driver is going to yield to us and then go (or not go) based on the prediction? If so, we would likely be the exception to the rule. More likely we will attempt to gather information about the threat posed by the other vehicle. How fast is it approaching the intersection? Is it likely to be able to stop in time to avoid striking us? Is the driver showing any indication of their intended behavior? Does the other driver show any awareness of our presence near the intersection? Based on these (and numerous other observations) we make a decision about whether to proceed through the intersection. If we proceed, we adjust our speed and our movement through the intersection in a manner that allows us to adjust to the other driver’s actions. Depending on our assessment of the risk, we may also set down our cell phone, put both hands on the steering wheel, reduce our focus on the song playing on our favorite CD and move our left foot closer to the brake – just in case!



TPR: Who should be on a threat assessment team?


Deisinger: This varies by the needs of the institution, the threats likely to be encountered, and the resources available. However, it is critical that no one entity is placed in a position of being solely responsible for assessing and managing threats. Threat assessment is best done through consultation and collaboration with other persons who are trained in assessment and management of volatile situations. Campus law enforcement or security officials should play a key role in threat management teams as they are mostly likely to have the resources and training to deal with imminent threats to the community. Student affairs and human resource professionals are also key given the range of legal and procedural issues that may come into play.



TPR: How can mental health professionals serve on a threat assessment team if they are obligated to protect confidentiality?


Deisinger: A licensed mental health professional is a key resource for a threat assessment and management program. Such a professional can offer significant insights that may aid threat assessors in understanding the behavior of mentally ill or emotionally disturbed persons and anticipating likely responses to interventions or further stressors. Most mental health professionals have extensive experience in dealing with emotional crises and can recommend interventions to help de-escalate a person in crisis. They are also likely aware of referral resources on campus and in the community that may be helpful support systems for the person of concern.


Confidentiality applies to situations where a person is a client/patient being served by the team’s mental health consultant (or the agency in which the professional is employed). Even in those circumstances, the mental health professional can still provide general consultation to the team about mental health issues, resources, intervention approaches, etc. –- so long as they do not provide personally identifiable information about the client or the client’s involvement in services.


It is also important to remember that confidentiality is governed by the wishes of the client, not the mental health provider. That is, a client can sign a release authorizing the mental health professional to disclose personal health information to the team. My experience (both as a clinician and as a threat assessor) has been that clients generally cooperate with such requests for releases -- when the client understands how beneficial it is to them to take advantage of a team approach to their care and safety.


Finally, mental health professionals are allowed to share information in circumstances where they reasonably believe the client poses an imminent danger of serious injury to themselves or to others. In those circumstances, a mental health professional cannot usually share the client’s entire mental health service history, but can and should share sufficient information to allow for warning and/or protection of any potential victims.



TPR: What does threat assessment training normally entail?


Deisinger: There are two aspects of training. First is training for those who will conduct the actual threat assessment. This training should involve understanding of:







Training is also critical for people who are in gatekeeper roles, i.e., those that are likely to become aware of a threatening situation. This includes all members of the community –- faculty, staff and students. Therefore there must be multiple methods of providing information and training about indicators of persons who may be at risk of:













TPR: Where is threat assessment training available?


Deisinger: There are a variety of outstanding training opportunities and resources available:








TPR: Do colleges and universities have something to learn from schools in creating and managing threat assessment procedures?


Deisinger: Yes, though we need to carefully consider the applicability of the lessons learned in other settings. All in all, a larger proportion of secondary school systems have been involved in threat management, for a longer time, than have many colleges and universities. Higher education can learn from some of the early mistakes made in school and workplace settings such as rigid implementation of zero tolerance policies and concerns about adverse labeling of youth. Many schools have developed very effective methods of early identification, intervention and management of threatening situations. Applied effectively, such approaches have resulted in de-escalations of the threats posed and often facilitated (formerly) threatening subjects to be more effective and positive members of their community.


However, I caution against a procrustean approach to program development that is driven by a “one size fits all” mentality. Each institution needs to examine and assess its system, needs and resources to determine the approach that will best improve safety. There are certainly core principles that all programs will include, but the procedural implementation of those principles may vary widely.




TPR: What common mistakes are made in creating and managing a threat assessment team?


Deisinger: The most common mistake that I see when working with colleges and universities in establishing and developing their teams is lack of clear authority to fully manage threatening situations and to make critical decisions. Threat management cases regularly involve volatile and rapidly-evolving situations that necessitate thoughtful, timely and coordinated interventions. The power of team collaboration is immense. A multi-disciplinary team provides an opportunity for maximizing information streams, facilitates consideration of multiple perspectives, and increases the range of strategies and resources that can be brought to bear. However, there must ultimately be an identified decision-maker who reviews the information available, considers a range of reasonable interventions, and then directs implementation of a specified strategy. The team must ultimately speak with one voice so that there is shared understanding, acceptance, engagement and coordination with the intervention.




RESOURCES

(Cut and paste to your browser as needed)



[1] The Iowa State "Violence Free Campus" statement can be found at:

 



[2] The State of Virginia "Report of the Virgina Tech Review Panel" contains an overview of the threat assessment process:


http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport-docs/28%20APPENDIX%20M%20-%20RED%20FLAGS%20WARNING%20SIGNS%20AND%20INDICATORS.pdf


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