TYPES OF FOUNDATIONALISM
John M. Fraiser
Presented February 2006
Q: Who knows what the word “deontology” means? It means something one must do. It comes from the greek word deon which is a noun from the verb dei. It essentially means what one must do.
I want to talk to you about deontological classical foundationalism. What does that mean? What is foundationalism? And what makes it classical? As complicated as all of this may sound it’s a rather simple concept, and whether you realize it or not, it is a belief that many of you probably hold.
Q: First, what is foundationalism?
Foundationalism is the belief that all of our beliefs are built upon a certain class of beliefs that are accepted without being based upon other beliefs. For example, my belief that I am allowed to teach this class today is based on my belief that your philosophy professor asked me to teach today. And my belief that it was, in fact, your philosophy professor who asked me to teach today is based on the belief that the e-mail I received bearing his name was in fact written by the person who is your philosophy professor. And that belief is based upon another belief, which is based on another belief.
And at some point my beliefs are based on something that for me has no other support behind it. Otherwise, I am caught in an infinite regress of always having a reason for each reason. In the end, there are some beliefs which we accept for reasons without the support of any other reasons.
Some of my beliefs enjoy a privilege that others do not—that of not needing any supporting evidence or reason.
This has been and still is the standard theory in epistemology since Plato and Aristotle, even though many coherentists have proclaimed its death.
But what is classical foundationalism? Calling anything classical implies that it has a history to it. That it is the long-standing popular view that goes way back, and how I’m using “classical” here is no different.
The best expression of classical foundationalism goes back to two men—Rene` Descartes and John Locke. Here are a couple of quotes which will help to capture the idea.
“I have observed in examining the natural ability of many people that there is hardly anyone so heavy and tardy in mind as to be unable to enter into the right disposition, and even to reach the heights of knowledge, provided he has conducted his thoughts in the right way. And this may be provided by reason; for, since the principles are clear in themselves, and nothing should be deduced from them save by evident reasoning, a man always has enough intelligence to understand what follows from these principles” (Descartes, Letter-Preface to the ‘Principles of Philosophy’).
“Faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything, but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite [opposed] to it. He that believes, without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due his maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error” (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding).
Both Descartes and Locke state that we each have a duty to hold beliefs for which we have “good reason” (Locke) or beliefs which are “clear and distinct” (Descartes). Anyone who does not form her beliefs on this basis or foundation is flouting her epistemic duty or forming ungrounded beliefs or not keeping her obligation with respect to belief.
This is, in a nutshell, what I mean by deontological classical foundationalism. It is deontological because we have epistemic duty to form our beliefs on the basis of good reasons. It is classical because it has a long standing philosophical tradition, and it is foundationalism because all beliefs must be formed on the basis of reason or clear and distinct ideas, or as Locke says elsewhere “we must proportion our beliefs in accord with the evidence.”
So let’s make it simple. Let’s say that, according to the classical picture of foundationalism, there are only two cases in which a belief is justified:
It must be self-evident or incorrigible.
It must be evident to the senses.
But it is not enough to just have beliefs that are based on these two foundations; something else is needed. We must recognize that we believe it on one of these two bases.
Q: Does anyone see a problem with these criteria for justification?
There are multiple problems with the classical picture but I will mention three:
1. Classical foundationalism does not hold up under the weight of its own criteria.
Q: Does anyone have an idea what I mean by this? What I mean by this is that it classical foundationalism says that all beliefs must be either self-evident, evident to the senses or based on beliefs that are self-evident or evident to the senses. However, our belief in classical foundationalism cannot possibly meet this same criteria. Classical foundationalism is itself neither self-evident, evident to the senses nor based on beliefs that are self-evident or evident to the senses. If as Locke says, we must proportion our beliefs in accord with the evidence, we must ask what is the evidence for the belief that we must always proportion our beliefs in accord with the evidence?
2. There are all kinds of beliefs which it is quite rational to believe which are neither self-evident nor evident to the senses.
Q: Who slept in a bed last night?
Q: How do you know you slept in a bed?
Q: Can you prove that you slept in a bed last night?
Q: Do you need to prove that you slept in a bed last night in order to rationally hold that you slept in a bed last night?
It is rational to hold your belief that you slept in a bed on the basis of your memory alone. You do not need to go back home and look at your bed, or produce your spouse as testimonial evidence, or look at the alarm setting on your clock . We quite often believe all kinds of things on the basis of memory alone, and it is quite rational to do so. But according to the classical picture, we are shirking our epistemic duty. We are being irresponsible in forming beliefs that are neither self-evident nor evident to the senses.
Memory beliefs are only one of many types of rational beliefs which can be held without any evidence at all.
These kinds of beliefs are called properly basic beliefs.
Q: Can anyone think of other types of beliefs which are properly basic?
3. It is possible that we could have beliefs that are self-evident or evident to the senses and still not be warranted in holding them.
Imagine I am captured by a team of unscrupulous mad scientists who are conducting an experiment on ways to cause self-evident beliefs in people which are anything but self-evident. They manipulate my cognitive equipment so that I will take the following proposition as self-evident: All married men are bachelors. If Jake is an unmarried man, then Jake is a bachelor. Even though my conclusion is self-evident and even though it is true, it was formed by some extremely faulty logic and so will have little by way of warrant for me.
The same can be said for beliefs that are evident to the senses. Suppose there is some malevolent Cartesian demon who has tricked me to think that every time I hear a doorbell that Ed McMahon is at the door with $10 million to congratulate me for winning the publishers clearing house sweepstakes. While sitting at home reading on classical foundationalism, I hear the doorbell ring. Even though it is my neighbor with a package in his hand telling me that my package was delivered to his door by mistake, I get wildly excited, start jumping up and down exclaiming, “I can’t believe it! I won! I’m rich! I’m filthy rich!” It is perfectly evident to my senses that my neighbor is Ed McMahon and that the package is the giant check for $10 million. I have done my absolute best to be true to the classical foundationalist criteria, nevertheless I cannot help but form the belief that Ed McMahon is at my door.
Of course, these are only a couple of the millions of examples we could use.
There are other critiques of classical foundationalism, but these are the simplest and some of the best.
Classical foundationalism has fallen on hard times. Presently, it is in the epistemic poor house. Very few real scholars hold to it any longer.
So if this was the standard view, and it is no longer considered adequate what has taken its place as the explanation by which people can be said to know something.
There are three things that can take classical foundationalism’s place.
Coherentism
Skepticism
More responsible forms of foundationalism
There are several varieties of coherentism, but each of them says that none of our beliefs are privileged, and while some beliefs are based on others, none of them are foundational. None of our beliefs are built upon a set of foundational beliefs. Ultimately, according to coherentism, it is acceptable to argue in a circle, so long as the circle is wide enough.
All that is needed for our beliefs to be justified, is for them to cohere with the rest of our beliefs.
There are three easy criticisms of coherentism.
As with classical foundationalism, coherentism cannot meet its own criteria.
What happens if the system of coherentism doesn’t fit with the rest of my beliefs.
There are foundationalist elements in coherentism.
Laws of logic. Epistemic duty. Still deontological.
Coherence is neither sufficient nor necessary for a warranted belief.
Plantinga's Epistemically Inflexible Climber
If one were able to negate all of his beliefs he would still be just as coherent as before even though he contradicts every one of his previous
beliefs.
Broadly defined skepticism states that certainty is not possible.
Fallibilist foundationalism differs from classical foundationalism primarily in three respects:
Fallibilist foundationalism is similar to classical foundationalism in two respects:
Examples fallible foundationalist epistemologies: