APPLICATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL TO UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT

LISA D. CRESCENZO

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
MERCYHURST COLLEGE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER'S OF SCIENCE

IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

MERCYHURST COLLEGE

ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA

CONVOCATION MAY, 2007

APPLICATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL TO UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN

APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

Submitted By:

LISA D. CRESCENZO

Certificate of Approval:

________________________________

James G. Breckenridge

Chair/Assistant Professor

Department of Intelligence Studies

________________________________

Kristan J. Wheaton

Assistant Professor

Department of Intelligence Studies

MAY 2007

Copyright © 2007 by Lisa Crescenzo
All rights reserved.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the law enforcement officers and analysts who devote their minds, bodies and souls to the protection of others.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Mr. Robert J. Heibel, Mr. James G. Breckenridge, Mrs. Dawn Wozneak and Mr. David Grabelski for their advice and assistance throughout this project. My appreciation also goes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for providing me with this incredible opportunity.

I am extremely grateful for the contributions of Mr. R. Mark Evans, Director of Analytical Services, Police Service of Northern Ireland, Mr. Robert Fahlman, Acting Director General, CISC, Ms. Deborah Osborne, Crime Analyst, Buffalo Police Department and Dr. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Temple University.

My most heartfelt thanks go to Special Agent Darin C. Werking whose constant encouragement and friendship was my guiding light throughout this long and difficult journey.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

APPLICATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S MATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL TO UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT

By
Lisa D. Crescenzo

Master of Science in Applied Intelligence
Mercyhurst College, 2007
Professor James G. Breckenridge, Chair

With the implementation of its National Intelligence Model (NIM) in 2002, the United Kingdom (UK) officially recognized that the future of effective law enforcement in the UK would depend upon a nation-wide system of Intelligence-led policing (ILP).

Though state and local law enforcement throughout the United States (US) are implementing Intelligence-led and Community-oriented policing initiatives, a national, standardized system is not in place.

This thesis will examine NIM “best practices” and evaluate whether such a model, in whole or in part, could be applied across all levels of US law enforcement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model (NIM) has changed the face of the country’s police agencies by making “intelligence” a law enforcement mantra. After 9-11, the United States also made intelligence practices a priority for all federal law enforcement agencies but there are still many differences in the structure of lower-level law enforcement between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). A major difference lies in the fact that the US does not have a standard, centralized business model for local and state level law enforcement agencies, though the government requires they adhere to Homeland Security requirements on terrorism-related information sharing.

Since its implementation, there has been an abundance of information about the NIM, however, most of it originates from the UK and likely contains some amount of bias regarding the NIM’s success. In addition, due to the NIM being so new, there have not been any long-term evaluations of crime statistics or studies showing a direct or indirect correlation indicating whether the NIM has had a positive or negative impact on criminal activities countrywide.

In 2004, Cardiff University (UK) summarized a preliminary evaluation of three UK police forces; however, it did not present a “big picture” of the NIM’s national status. According to articles published by Dr. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Professor of Criminal Justice at Temple University and eleven-year veteran of London’s Metropolitan Police Department, some more recent studies have uncovered cultural barriers as well as technical and structural problems that are affecting full transition of police forces into the NIM. Due to these issues, changes are being made to the NIM to more fully incorporate intelligence-led and community policing into NIM-related policies.

Need:

Would the United Kingdom’s NIM work in the US? An answer lies in the examination of the history, structure and procedures of the UK’s law enforcement agencies, their successful or unsuccessful implementation of the NIM and comparing these topics to law enforcement within the US.

State and local level law enforcement managers and analysts alike spend much of their time finding ways to incorporate intelligence analysis into their agencies; however, many departments are suffering due to budget cuts, shortages of manpower and recent surges of violent crime throughout the US. US Federal government agencies remain hyper-focused on combating terrorism and intelligence sharing, however, many state and local departments still lack the ability or resources to implement successful intelligence units.

A description of a proven framework that could provide an opportunity for police agencies to access centralized resources and uniform intelligence-related training would likely represent a productive and valuable asset to police personnel and be readily accepted by the American law enforcement community.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

“Nations can be overcome from within, just as they can be overcome by war. The strength, character and purpose of the police systems they develop is crucial to their well-being, even to their continuance.” – John Philip Stead, The Police of Britain¹

The research for this thesis began with a substantial review of existing literature which included professional and academic policing journals, intelligence analyst publications, news articles, criminal justice and Intelligence-led policing (ILP) books, United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) government documents, case studies, white papers and information posted to law enforcement websites.

A review of American and English literature that captures the essence of historical and current policing systems will be used to illustrate how police services evolved in the US and the UK. Though there are many legal and organizational differences, there are fundamental similarities that have enhanced policing efforts and positively impacted law enforcement in both countries.

In his book, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis, David Bayley suggests that England’s “specialized police” services started as far back as the Middle Ages.² However, it took 700 years for the idea of a public police agency to become the foundation of English policing.³ By comparison, the US had “specialized, public police” during the 17^th century, but the police services were not “professionalized” until the 20^th century.⁴

Formal policing efforts in America drew upon those successfully implemented in England. In 1838, the Boston Police Department was directly modeled after London’s Metropolitan Police Department, which was built upon the principles of Sir Robert Peel, the “founder of modern policing”.⁵ Current policing scholars are beginning to realize that going ‘back to the basics’ may be a way to avoid the mistakes that have led police agencies into a state of crisis that harmed the very public they were sworn to protect. Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles⁶ include:

• The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder.

• The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.

• Police must secure the willing co-operation of the public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the public.

• The degree of co-operation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force.

• Police seek and preserve public favour not by catering to public opinion but by constantly demonstrating absolute impartial service to the law.

• Police use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient.

• Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.

• Police should always direct their action strictly towards their functions and never appear to usurp the powers of the judiciary.

• The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.

Modern police agencies have faced, and will continue to face many social, political and national dilemmas. In hindsight, US police departments could have avoided some of their early problems involving corruption, abuse and mismanagement by following Sir Robert Peel’s policies more closely. Similarly, there is a need for the US to draw from, or emulate, the UK’s National Intelligence Model (NIM) to meet the challenges of today’s changing law enforcement climate.

Since its implementation, there has been an abundance of information about the United Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model (NIM), published by the Home Office and individual police services. However, most of it originates directly from the UK and likely contains some amount of bias concerning the NIM’s success. In addition, due to the NIM being so new, there have not been any long-term evaluations of crime statistics or studies showing a direct or indirect correlation indicating whether the NIM has had a positive or negative impact on criminal activities countrywide.

In 2004, Tim John and Professor Mike Maguire, Cardiff University, were awarded a grant from the UK’s Home Office⁷ to conduct research evaluating the initial National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) implementation of the National Intelligence Model (NIM).⁸ Three local police forces, Lancashire, West Midlands and Surrey were surveyed⁹; however, the study did not provide a “big picture” of the NIM’s overall national status.

According to articles published by Dr. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Professor of Criminal Justice at Temple University and eleven-year veteran of London’s Metropolitan Police Department, some more recent studies have uncovered cultural barriers as well as technical and structural problems that are affecting full transition of police forces into the NIM.¹⁰ Due to these issues, changes are being made to the NIM to more fully incorporate intelligence-led and community policing into NIM-related policies.¹¹

An issue that presents itself when applying a national model to local level police forces is how to address local demands while meeting national goals and adhering to national standards. In 2000, the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) incorporated key NIM principles and analytical functions into local policing efforts by providing forces with the training and the strategic targeting of resources to overtly and covertly pinpoint offenders; manage crime “hotspots”; link crimes and incidents through analytical techniques and utilize preventative measures that focus on community partnerships.¹²

According to the book Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives, a compilation of essays by prominent police scholars, new homeland security responsibilities resulting from the tragedy of September 11, 2001 are placing additional burdens on the crime prevention resources and community outreach efforts of US police departments.¹³ In an attempt to alleviate these concerns, the US Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services Office is sponsoring working groups and conferences focusing on ways to use “community policing strategies” to meet homeland security objectives.¹⁴

The book Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives, also points out that the federal government’s push to have local police involved in intelligence collection and terrorism investigations can lead to a reduction of federal funding for community policing programs and distance police departments from their local communities.¹⁵ The book does present a hopeful outlook if the right steps are taken to assure that homeland security demands do not retract from initiatives to combat violent crime, organized crime, illegal drugs, robberies and other local crime problems.

The idea of combating crime on a national level is not a new concept. In a book published by the Office of International Criminal Justice in 1993, entitled Community Policing and Crime Prevention in America and England, the authors, Robert Wadman, Chief of Police, Wilmington Police Department, Wilmington, North Carolina (US) and Sir Stanley Bailey, Chief Constable, Northumbria Police, Northumbria, (England), stress that the entire responsibility of combating crime should not rest in the hands of a small department of officers.¹⁶ Instead, a “comprehensive and coordinated strategy” must be applied to the crime problems impacting every community across the country.¹⁷

There is no shortage of US-based documents related to information and intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies. The 9-11 commission made several recommendations regarding this topic but focused mainly on the revamping of federal agencies.¹⁸ In 2003, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) released the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) as part of the US Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, which was the collaborative effort of law enforcement executives and personnel representing federal and local agencies across the US. This report set forth a “model intelligence sharing plan” that would build upon current intelligence-led and community policing initiatives and improve intelligence policies, analytical functions, technology and training standards.¹⁹

Findings contained in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) report entitled, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels (2002), were reviewed and incorporated into the 28 recommendations set forth in the NCISP. The following summarizes a list of major obstacles limiting multi-agency intelligence sharing, outlined in the IACP report, and reiterated by the NCISP:

1. Limited or lack of communication, centralized analysis and systematic dissemination, lack of direct intelligence from federal agencies and local agency hesitancy to share information due to criminal law statutory requirements.

2. Absence of equipment needed for a national database and absence of uniform computer systems or a compatible infrastructure connecting state and federal agencies.

3. Agencies do not have common standards for the collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence or uniform training regarding the laws surrounding intelligence collection. No mandated, uniform system for disseminating data from state to federal agencies.

4. Limited or no analytical functions, to include personnel, equipment, analytical products and training.

5. Poor working relationships between agencies due to a historical lack of trust and a territorial unwillingness to share case information.

The authors of the NCISP, as well as the attendees of the 2002 IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit, concluded that ILP must permeate through the policies, standards, strategic decisions and the very culture of all US law enforcement.²⁰ An emphasis was also placed on successful community policing initiatives and the relationships they have fostered as a means to prevent both terrorism and local criminal activities.²¹ Once again, this “locally driven” solution is viewed as vital to the success of a national intelligence model.²² Another recurring theme under discussion in the law enforcement community is the need to “institutionalize” the intelligence process and the standards set forth by the NCISP.²³ The questions that remain center around how long it will take before “actionable” suggestions are fully implemented and whether or not the federal government will provide an adequate and continuous financial response.

The United Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model (NIM):

According to the Home Office Official Police website, the NIM is a business model “that provides intelligence senior managers can use to help them formulate strategic direction, make tactical resource decisions and manage risk.”²⁴

The NIM, which was introduced by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and adopted by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2000, integrates intelligence across “ALL forces and law enforcement agencies” as part of the UK’s 2005-2008 National Policing Plan. According to Home Office Operational Policing, “all forces have now reached the Minimum Standards for compliance with the model, as approved by ACPO."²⁵

To completely and continuously engage all of its police forces, the UK government issued a “Code of Practice” that mandates all forces comply with the principles and standards for NIM implementation and continue to update their “agreed NIM force development plans.” The following is a condensed list of NIM strategic capabilities provided by the Home Office²⁶:

• Provides operational focus

• Gives more officers the ability to focus on major crime problems and the targeting of “active offenders”

• Assists with human rights legislation and the Regulation of Investigation Powers Act (RIPA) compliance

• Identifies “risks” for decision-makers

• Provides business planning that incorporates operational policing issues

• Facilitates greater “direction and briefing” for patrols in the field

• Reduces “persistent offender rates”

• Facilitates partnerships

Though many of the intelligence practices that make up the NIM are widely used by US law enforcement, the NIM turns these practices into a common language and provides step by step “actionable” procedures for achieving a successful intelligence cycle useful at all levels of law enforcement. Many of the intelligence functions incorporated into the NIM more closely resemble Business Intelligence (BI) techniques and products, such as benchmarking and company profiles. A “tasking and coordinating group” ensures priorities are met and all forces are meeting minimum standards and are given sufficient feedback throughout the intelligence process.²⁷

The NIM is broken up into three levels: Level 1 - Local/Basic Command Unit (BCU); Level 2 - Force and/or regional; and Level 3 - Serious and organized crime (usually national or international)²⁸. The steps for creating an efficient intelligence function are laid out as follows:

• All levels must possess “Key Assets” (training/technology capabilities, community sources and informants, effective staff) and a sufficiently flexible 'Tactical Capability to avoid intelligence overload.

• The production of common “Intelligence Products”:

1) The Strategic Assessment - Provides the “big picture” of crime in a BCU, force or region via predictive analysis

2) The Tactical Assessment - Provides tactical recommendations regarding intelligence, crime prevention and enforcement

3) The Problem Profile - Determines the scale of a crime problem in a BCU, force or region, identifies “potential suspects” and makes tactical intelligence, prevention and enforcement recommendations

4) The Target Profile - Profiles suspects and offenders to identify weaknesses in their criminal activities and recommend tactical options.

• All levels are involved in the “Tasking and Coordinating Process”: Strategic and tactic intelligence is shared amongst neighboring police forces and all levels of law enforcement.

Continuous Support and Monitoring of NIM Progress

The Strategic Tasking and Coordinating Group (Strategic T&CG) holds bi-annual meetings with law enforcement agencies at each level. Strategic Assessments allow the group to create a “Control Strategy”, which identifies strategic policing priorities that fit specific areas of command.²⁹ Police personnel are given guidance for intelligence collection via a specific “Intelligence Requirement” approved by the Strategic T&CG.³⁰ Intelligence Requirements provide strategic intelligence collection guidelines to analytical personnel and front-line officers by identifying the risks and trends that impact criminal investigative priorities and general public safety.³¹

The Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group (Tactical T&CG) meets every two weeks at Basic Command Unit (BCU) and force levels, and three times a month at the regional level.³² The chairman of this group is either a BCU commander or administrator in control of BCU resources and attendees include senior managers that are involved in resource allocation.³³ “Tactical Assessments” are reviewed along with available resources to develop tactical BCU, force or regional activities for the next period and ensure these activities mesh with “Control Strategy” priorities.³⁴ The Tactical T&CG also decides when a Problem Profile or Target Profile is needed.³⁵

NIM Minimum Standards, which are used to increase the quality of NIM compliance and use, were accepted by ACPO Council in April 2003.³⁶ These standards were provided to all police forces and “will form the benchmark” for future Home Office inspections.³⁷

Current Issues Impacting US Law Enforcement:

In a recent article published by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, which discusses the Bush administration's post 9-11, large-scale reorganization of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the lack of support for criminal matters not related to terrorism is leading to an upsurge of illegal activities, especially white collar crimes.³⁸ According to the article, the White House and Department of Justice transferred approximately 1,143 Special Agents from criminal to counterterrorism squads and failed to replace them.³⁹

A September 2005 Justice Department inspector general's audit concluded that the FBI had an additional 1,279 agents, officially assigned to criminal programs, working counterterrorism matters full-time.⁴⁰ Due to this, the number of FBI criminal investigations and case referrals involving fraud and embezzlement schemes and civil rights violations has dramatically decreased.⁴¹

Over a period of 6 months, investigative reporters from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reviewed over 1 million FBI cases which were prosecuted before and after September 11, 2001 and determined that the FBI presented approximately 31,000 cases to federal prosecutors in the year 2000 and the number dropped to just over 20,000 in 2005.⁴² Other statistics included in the article involved the number of FBI white collar investigations assigned to Special Agents which dropped from over 10,000 in 2000 to 3,454 in 2005.⁴³

A spokesperson for the Office of Management and Budget contested the article’s claims stating that "The administration strongly disagrees that the FBI has been anything less than effective in the years since 9/11 in combating domestic crime issues. We have worked to achieve a balance between the FBI's homeland security and criminal investigative missions."⁴⁴

Increasing Violent Crime Rates:

Violent crime rates have increased drastically in the US over the past few years and in 2005, the US reported 16,000 homicides.⁴⁵ The US has the highest firearms homicide rate worldwide with an average of 250 people wounded from gunshots daily and approximately 30,000 killed each year due to gun violence.⁴⁶

A recent study by the Police Executive Research Forum entitled, Chief Concerns: A Gathering Storm - Violent Crime in America, examined 2004 -2006 crime statistics from 56 US cities and concluded that increasing violent crime rates are a “national trend” in need of immediate attention.⁴⁷ The study criticized the federal government for devoting too much time and money to counterterrorism and ignoring the signs that local crime problems are getting out of hand. One saving grace is that President Bush’s 2008 Budget (if approved) will include USD 200 million for a new Violent Crime Reduction Partnership Initiative to assisted specific local communities that are experiencing increases in violent crime.⁴⁸ The President’s Budget plans to replace a “fragmented, duplicative system of Justice grants with four common-sense programs that address violent crime, juvenile justice, and enhance public safety and protection”; provide USD 2.8 billion to combat illegal drugs; upgrade Federal detention and incarceration programs, including USD 169 million for increasing prison capacity; and provide USD 420 million towards school safety and child exploitation.⁴⁹

The above noted budgetary figures pale in comparison to the administration’s request that Congress fund another USD 93 billion in 2007 to support the Pentagon's counterterrorism programs alone and provide another USD 142 billion in 2008.⁵⁰ Since 9-11, the US has spent an estimated 502 billion towards the “War on Terror”.⁵¹

Fusion Centers:

According to the US DOJ’s Fusion Center Guidelines, the purpose of US-based fusion centers is to facilitate information and intelligence sharing, consolidate resources, “streamline” operational activities and improve technological capabilities to combat crime and terrorism.⁵² Automated information available at fusion centers includes locations of critical infrastructures, resources available at area hospitals and emergency facilities, state 911 call data, and databases containing investigative information such as the “terrorism watch lists”.

In 2003, Maryland was the first state to open a “Coordination and Analysis Center” or “fusion center”, to facilitate investigative information sharing amongst federal, state, and local agencies.⁵³ There was a push from 2004-2005 to get state-run fusion centers up and running after the federal government required all states to comply with homeland security and information-sharing initiatives.⁵⁴

At present, 42 states, along with the District of Colombia, have opened fusion centers, though many are still in the beginning phases of development.⁵⁵ Even with a clear set of guidelines, states face many obstacles such as a slow supply of federal funding, staffing and local support. To date, there is no congressional mandate for states to open fusion centers and no guarantee of continuous federal grants or funding for them.⁵⁶ Obtaining funding for fusion centers is a full-time endeavor. DHS grants, for example, prohibit the use of grant money to hire intelligence analysts.⁵⁷ Maryland’s Coordination and Analysis Center receives no state funding and less restrictive DOJ grants pay for some of its operating costs (about USD 500,000), the FBI foots the bill for its office space (USD 300,000/year) and the salary of personnel assigned to the center is paid by their respective agencies.⁵⁸ In addition, fusion centers are operating with a minimal amount of federal guidance or official training, which worries civil rights activists and is raising privacy concerns amongst local citizens.⁵⁹

Each center depends on varying levels of participation from state and local agencies and the public sector. The FBI has 200 agents and analysts assigned to 33 fusion centers around the country.⁶⁰ According to Charles Allen (Assistant Secretary for the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis), DHS plans to deploy personnel to 20 fusion centers by the end of 2007 and to another 15 centers by 2008.⁶¹

In 2006, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produced a manual entitled, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels. The first “National Fusion Center Conference” was held in March, 2007 in Destin, Florida and was attended by high-level members of the law enforcement and intelligence community. The concept of nationwide fusion centers is widely embraced by law enforcement, however, as evidenced above, there are still many problems to iron out.

Though not all fusion centers have the same philosophy or resources to deal with more than just terrorism-related leads, New Jersey's fusion center Director Richard W. Kelly takes pride in the fact that his center investigates gang violence, shootings, drugs and other crimes threatening local citizens.⁶² He also stressed that ILP has effectively assisted with both criminal and counterterrorism investigations.⁶³

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis will combine an illustrative case study of the United Kingdom’s National Intelligence Model (NIM) and ILP with a qualitative approach to collection involving historical data and personal interviews.

The first phase of research will involve a comparative study of the history of policing in both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) via open-source collection and a review of historical law enforcement publications.

Upon completion of this early research, a review of data describing the organizational structure and analytical functions of police agencies within the UK and the US will be conducted. This task will be accomplished through the examination of existing literature, to include professional police and crime/intelligence analyst journals, news articles, books, official government publications, case studies and personal interviews with members of the law enforcement and intelligence community.

The above noted research will conclude with a detailed perspective into the commonalities and differences surrounding policing practices in the UK and US.

Subsequently, an in-depth study of the UK National Intelligence Model (NIM) will be completed to explain the inner workings of the model and illustrate “best practices” and implementation techniques.

This thesis will incorporate a qualitative study of a small group of intelligence and law enforcement community professionals with varying degrees of experience and involvement with the UK’s National Intelligence Model (NIM). In addition, open-source material, such as police officer ‘blog’ sites, discussion boards and current news articles, will be used as a means to peer into the lives of police professionals through their uncensored observations and thoughts about the top issues impacting police work today.

Personal interviews are also a highly effective means to gain ‘unofficial’ opinions and insight about a topic. To start, one must develop liaison contacts who are stakeholders or experts within the field of interest. Coordination with academic advisors, personal and professional contacts is a useful way to begin the process of identifying potential stakeholders.

Though direct personal contact is the most favorable way to solicit human intelligence, electronic communications also generate important contributions to research. Emails are extremely useful, especially when attempting to contact individuals residing overseas and when working within a short deadline. It is important to word such emails in a professional and respectful manner while also incorporating a sense of urgency and importance in receiving a prompt response. In addition, emails should be sent at the beginning phases of research since many people lead hectic lives which may delay their responses. It is appropriate to point out one is in the early stages of compiling interview questions and keep an open line of communication towards further discussion.

For the purposes of this paper, the following set of standardized questions will be presented to several members of the law enforcement, intelligence and academic community to facilitate discussion regarding the UK’s NIM:

• Do you feel that the opinion of the general public in the UK and elsewhere in Europe was positive, negative or indifferent regarding the implementation of the UK NIM? Are issues such as privacy and human rights causing any barriers?

• What is the current opinion of law enforcement professionals and policing scholars regarding the NIM? At present, what are the foremost topics under debate?

• Are there any NIM issues or practices that particularly stand out as most beneficial to policing and intelligence sharing efforts?
  
  

• What were the most difficult obstacles involved in NIM implementation?
  
  

• What future changes (social, economic, political, environmental etc.) do you feel will likely impact the UK NIM and ILP as a whole over the next 5-10 years?
  
  

• Do you think the NIM would be successful if applied to US law enforcement? What measures must be taken to assure its success?

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

In the UK, all levels of law enforcement personnel are provided with exceptional training and instructions for implementing and applying the country's National Intelligence Model (NIM).   However, the layers of bureaucracy and government-mandated requirements associated with the NIM are burying many police officers under new paperwork and some forces see this as preventing them from their true mission.  In a recent article concerning police reform published in the Telegraph, the author MP Nick Herbert (Arundel & South Downs Police) commented on the current state of policing in the UK⁶⁴:

“As with other public services, the police are be-devilled with national directives, interference and the bureaucracy created by central intervention.,,less than a tenth of officers are dedicated to neighborhood policing.”

Assuring that all 43 police forces comply with the minimum standards set forth by the NIM is only a baby step. The UK NIM will not withstand the test of time unless all police personnel view it as a helpful tool and not a burden. Early NIM assessments have recognized that there must be a balance between “strategic planning” and the immediate need for officers to address local crime problems through common sense practices and a deep-rooted knowledge of their local communities.⁶⁵

A US NIM faces even more challenges arising from police cultural barriers based on the sheer number of police forces, which total over 18,000. Recent surges in violent crime across the US have led many front-line officers to question whether homeland security initiatives are undermining everyday community policing efforts.

In the US, there is also an abundance of resources concerning national standards regarding policing efforts and intelligence sharing available for all levels of law enforcement.  Though many aspects of these documents are extremely useful and their associated government-funded programs have led to successful results in select criminal and terrorism investigations, there are fundamental problems with this nationwide approach.  Post 9-11 recommendations stress the importance of street-level officers being the “front-line” protectors of homeland security, however, the calls for assistance in this battle from these same individuals are many times ignored. If these officers are so vital, any national intelligence model must work from the bottom up by focusing resources and training efforts on local and state-level police departments.

Over the last few years, so much attention and funding has gone to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to update its technology, hire more personnel to fight terrorism and “upgrade” its intelligence capabilities - what has that really accomplished?  The FBI’s new mission is only distancing it from the local and state-level police departments it once worked closely with and its computer system remains in disarray.  Though the US government is frantically making repairs to its federal law enforcement agencies, all the old cracks will eventually show through – no matter how many times they are spackled over.

Fusion centers are helping to facilitate communication and intelligence sharing, however, interactions only occur between a select number of employees from each agency. New priorities prohibit the FBI and other federal agencies from devoting many resources or personnel to local criminal matters.  Though counterterrorism efforts are vital to the protection of our country, there are still many more dangerous criminals walking our streets than there are terrorists. Senator Joseph Biden, a Democrat representing Delaware, recently made the following comment⁶⁶:

"There's no doubt that fighting terrorism should be a top priority for the FBI, but we can't forget about the risk to our neighborhoods from everyday crime."⁶⁷

An overriding theme within the IACP’s Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and the US DOJ’s National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, and a topic that is frequently discussed amongst scholars, the news media and law enforcement personnel, is the need for continuous congressional support and government backing to implement a national intelligence model powerful enough to efficiently combat all crimes impacting the safety of the American public.

The UK government has already recognized that NIM “best practices” need to be “institutionalized” and is working to ensure they are incorporated into future legislation. Long before NIM implementation, police officials and law enforcement analysts in the UK began to recognize intelligence analysis as the “central backbone of law enforcement.”⁶⁸ In a 1999 International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) article, Detective Inspector Howard N. Atkin of the West Yorkshire Police, pointed out that the most useful aspect of the UK NIM was that it would merge “key” governmental policies and legislation into a national business approach to policing services and intelligence priorities.⁶⁹ This in turn would benefit all police personnel and the communities they serve.

The National Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) is rallying Congress to reject budget cuts to critical law enforcement programs proposed in President Bush’s 2008 Budget.⁷⁰ NAPO’s concerns are that the President’s budget provides a mere USD 32.308 million for the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program with USD 4 million for “training and technical assistance” and USD 28.308 million for “program management and administration”, which is significantly less than the current funding level of USD 1.15 billion and does not set aside any money for the hiring or retention of police personnel.⁷¹ The President has indicated these programs are “excessive and not effective” and funding for federal law enforcement is of a higher priority. In February 2007, NAPO made the following statement in its monthly Washington Report⁷²:

“While NAPO fully supports our brothers and sisters in federal law enforcement, we feel that state and local law enforcement is no less important in protecting our neighborhoods from domestic crime and terrorist threats.”

A national intelligence model would alleviate the compartmentalized funding allocated for local, state and federal law enforcement initiatives. It would also incorporate a strategic and centralized system to support the mission of all agencies equally. President Bush has labeled vital community-oriented policing programs as “excessive” and “not effective” and replaced them with grant programs that require local law enforcement agencies to compete against each other for funding.⁷³ This is only further crippling the country’s “first line of defense against crime and terrorism”.⁷⁴

A US NIM would also provide the business practices and training necessary for law enforcement decision-makers, especially those on the state and local level, to efficiently allocate resources and funds where they are truly needed. Standardized processes, as exemplified in the UK NIM, will eliminate duplication of efforts and facilitate resource coordination amongst agencies to avoid “excessive responses” and government waste.⁷⁵

Another possible solution to consider when implementing a US NIM is the consolidation of US police forces, especially in the wake of potential budget cuts to policing programs. The National Executive Institute Associates (NEIA), a non-profit public service foundation, whose members are graduates of the FBI's National Executive Institute, discussed this concept in a 2002 article.⁷⁶ According the article, the consolidation of police agencies would “professionalize” policing on a national scale by improving salaries, enhancing benefits, career paths, recruiting opportunities and providing higher levels of training.⁷⁷

In addition, regional police forces would have better resources, faster response times and the ability to provide a higher level of services to the public. Other police agencies have historically recognized the benefits of this practice. For example, in the 1940’s the UK started to consolidate its many nationwide constabularies eventually reducing them to only 43.⁷⁸ In Canada there are regional forces in several provinces not receiving local services by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.⁷⁹

A large number of smaller police forces, whose resources are already stretched thin, do not possess the manpower or sophisticated technology to combat complex white collar crimes and more sophisticated drug trafficking and organized crime groups and often reach out to federal agencies for support.⁸⁰ The NEIA stressed that:

“Asking, or allowing, the federal government to intervene in local matters only reduces the sovereign power of state and local governments.”⁸¹

In 2003, the IACP received a grant from the DOJ to evaluate the potential of consolidating police services and presented their findings regarding this matter in a document entitled, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach Executive Brief.⁸² Those who view jurisdictional consolidations as a positive notion suggest that police forces will likely experience increased police services, faster response time and more cost-effective operations.⁸³ Additional benefits would include more efficient use of personnel and available hours, better training and more qualified managers.⁸⁴ As with any period of organizational change, consolidations will likely produce numerous cultural and political issues. The UK NIM has taken such issues into account and provides its police forces with the professional business practices to manage the future needs of the communities they protect.

Interview Responses:

Part of the methodology used to conduct this research was to use emails and telephone conversations to facilitate discussion of the NIM within the law enforcement and intelligence community.  The following section will summarize key points resulting from these discussions.

Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe, a former UK police officer and distinguished member of the US academic community, provided an interesting perspective via email based upon his experiences in both countries. The first topic discussed was public attitudes. In the UK, where there is greater oversight of police departments, the word “intelligence” does not have the same connotations as in the US, where the public’s privacy concerns have been heightened over the recent exposure of NSA wiretapping and the FBI’s misuse of “National Security Letters”.

In regard to the opinion of law enforcement professionals and policing scholars regarding the UK's NIM, Dr. Ratcliffe advised that the NIM, which is battling some cultural and organizational obstacles, is viewed as a “work-in-progress”. One topic under debate is how the central government’s mandate appears to be supporting a “neighborhood reassurance model”, which undermines ILP.

Dr. Ratcliffe pointed out that the strength of the NIM lies in its structure as a “business model” that compels police personnel to “be more informed and intelligence-led”. In addition, “decision-makers” are required to base their decisions on the intelligence products and analysis they receive. Some of the most difficult obstacles involved in NIM implementation, according to Ratcliffe, were “police culture, analyst training levels, leadership expectations and skills.” As far as future challenges, any political push by the UK government towards neighborhood assurance and community policing may hinder the NIM and ILP.

Dr. Ratcliffe was asked what future changes (social, economic, political, environmental etc.) will likely impact the UK NIM and ILP as a whole over the next 5-10 years. He advised that

“Tackling fear of crime and crime itself are not the same thing. The direction this takes will be dictated in the UK by the media, and public perception. The social and environmental situation is thus a large predictor of the likely picture of ILP in the next few years.”

Dr. Ratcliffe was supportive that the principles of the UK NIM would work in the US. However, if the terms like ILP become loosely used “buzzwords” and their true meaning is not examined, the whole practice may not survive.  He compared it to the fate of the “ever shifting target, community policing.”  Another barrier in the US is that “information-influenced” policing managers are a “minority” within the law enforcement community.

Deborah Osborne, Crime Analyst, Buffalo Police Department stressed in her email that the UK has developed its model and applied it to a significantly fewer number of police forces compared to the numerous, fragmented agencies that exist in the US. In her opinion, it is unlikely a US NIM and ILP plan can be successfully applied. According to Osborne, US law enforcement focuses intelligence on “investigative policing” and “threats” rather than the “big picture”. Most importantly she advised that

“The perspectives of debate depend on the background, experience and interests of the particular debater. Local needs are not stressed. Local needs are stressed in the UK's ILP. We have no one to represent our local needs due to the fragmentation and lack of a political voice in local policing.”

Ms. Osborne mentioned civil rights issues and growing technology capacities, such as surveillance and Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTVs), as other topics that come up when discussing a US NIM or ILP implementation. She also stressed that

“Standard practices of assessing and understanding crime problems from the street to the boardroom using ILP would lead to the development of more effective strategies that would ultimately reduce crime significantly and make a safer society.”

In regards to the implementation of a US NIM, Osborne focused on the numerous US law enforcement agencies that have political connections to local governments. Additional obstacles pointed out by Osborne were the varying roles and missions of local, state, and federal agencies and the absence of a common definition of “intelligence”. There is also the issue of data collection standards, inadequate technology and a lack of training. Over the next 5-10 years, widespread technology upgrades, to include better software and a “computer-savvy law enforcement workforce”, will be a deciding factor in the success of a US NIM.

The following is a summary of a telephone conversation with R. Mark Evans, Director of Analytical Services, Police Service of Northern Ireland:

When questioned about the major obstacles involved in the UK’s NIM implementation, Mr. Evans advised that culturally, it is difficult to introduce NIM problem-solving theories when dealing with police officers who are quickly running from incident to incident and do not see the long-term relevance of these practices. Tension is created when reactive officers are forced to reflect and report upon a collection of incidents.

Mr. Evans was also asked to describe items that are necessary when implementing an NIM. In addition to support from a major law enforcement entity, such as the IACP, he advised that accountability is a major driver towards NIM acceptance. Annual federal and state-level inspections – not just of intelligence functions- but every aspect of policing is vital. A National Implementation Team should be in place to not only ensure minimum standards are met but also provide clear guidance to all police forces. A US NIM can work, but it must have proper funding and legislation behind it. It must also be backed by a solid American Intelligence doctrine.

Evans echoed Ms. Osborne’s point that US law enforcement is more “fractured”, with its smaller locally-focused units and does not have the same “national structures” that are in place in the UK. He concluded that this would make the implementation of a US NIM even more difficult.

In an additional email, Evans stated that

“NIM is a ‘whole of force approach’. Its value is that it sets out a common language, common structures and common processes for intelligence – and its application to every area of policing. NIM requires officers to be more intelligent in their approach, to think ahead, to decide which problems to solve and to think of a range of solutions. For this reason it has been challenging to the culture. This, coupled with the fact that it contains new jargon, has made it difficult to accept in many places. We are 7 years through a 20 year journey…”

Evans agrees that the UK is leaning towards a more “citizen focused approach to policing” and a larger focus on investing in public protection. The future will involve “workforce modernization” and a revamping of local level forces. He added that

“The NIM is central to making future decision-making choices…‘NIM US’ would significantly raise the quality of intelligence work across American law enforcement – and help make the link between local, regional and national work.” 

 The following summarizes a telephone discussion with Robert Fahlman, Acting Director General, CISC, on 17 April 2007:

Mr. Fahlman believes that the business philosophies and concepts of the UK NIM are invaluable and provide a “portable framework” for law enforcement in other countries. The incorporation of ILP into the NIM leads to better decisions, whether they apply to strategic or tactical law enforcement. He advised that to succeed in the US, the entire business process must involve approval of “best practices” at all levels. Finally, he recommended that a consistently applied plan is the way to get local and state level officers to see the value of these processes in action. Mr. Fahlman added that Canada, whose policing structure more closely resembles the US, is currently examining UK “best practices” involving ILP along with plans for its own NIM.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Policing in the United Kingdom and the United States has gone through many changes, both drastic and subtle. As society continues to change and new criminal activities emerge, the public depends on law enforcement agencies to be one step ahead in their policing efforts. In order for a US NIM to work on a national scale, uniform standards across all levels of law enforcement must be in place, strictly followed and consistently supported by the government.

As with any successful business model, training and guidance is vital to its implementation and continuance. Personnel, especially those working closely with the community, must be viewed as an invaluable asset. The most important qualities of a good police officer or analyst are attitude, compassion, territorial awareness, ingenuity, foresight and the wisdom to collect, share and act upon the right information. Government ‘red tape’ should not keep these individuals from the necessary resources and funding they need to do their jobs. The UK NIM provides a flexible framework for the US government to use towards professionalizing all US law enforcement – without reinventing the wheel.

Further Research:

As previously mentioned, historical lessons show us that the face of policing will continue change and adapt to the needs of the public. Private security firms, intelligence contractors and privately-owned, high-tech ‘fusion centers’ will likely emerge to join community driven law enforcement. Consolidation of police forces also stands as an untapped possibility. Canada’s recent move towards the implementation of its own NIM and focus on ILP should be closely examined as it more closely resembles the US.

The main question that remains is whether the US government will devote the necessary resources, political backing, technology and training to adequately support state and local policing efforts or continue to pour billions into revamping federal agencies and its “War on Terror.”

"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man." - George Bernard Shaw

APPENDIX

The UK NIM In Action

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Source: The Integration of Neighbourhood Policing & Partnerships into the
National Intelligence Model. A Presentation by Detective Superintendent

Steve Bungay, NCPE

Source: 7th July 2005 NIM & Neibourhood Policing Presentation,

Chief Superintendent Andy Ward

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