darkest blue = +20% or above

dark blue = +15% to +20%

blue = +10% to +15%

light blue = +4% to +10%

lightest blue = +0% to 4%

light red = +1% to +4%

lightest red = under +1%

Here we can see clearly that the current GOP tipping counties are all geographically connected to long-term Democratic core territory.

Here the DEM counties, plus the GOP counties up to +10%:

 

This is the same story as with the GOP tipping point counties: the GOP counties with margins up to +10% are all geographically connected to core Democratic territory.

Then with the GOP counties up to +20%:

 

Then with the GOP counties up to +30%:

 

Then with the GOP counties up to +40%:

 

Here the complete map for 2008:

 

darkest red/blue = +40% or above

dark /redblue = +30% to +40%

red/blue = +20% to +30%

light red/blue = +10% to +20%

lightest red/blue = +0% to 9%

Here we can easily see the geographic difference in power bases: the core democratic counties are in the central portion of the state, along the I-25/I-70 corridor. The deepest red GOP core is mostly in the east of the state, at the border to Kansas and Nebraska, and also in the upper NW corner of the state, on the border to Utah and Wyoming, but also, most importantly, in El Paso county, the richest county in CO.

Here map of all counties, with asterisks in gold for the counties with one or more US-military installations:

 

Here is a trend/swing map for the state. All 64 counties trended/swung Democratic:

 

Dark, dark blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +15% or more

Dark blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +10% to +15%

blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +5% to +10%

light blue = DEM trend (partisan-shift) +0% to +5%

Here is a map of Colorado, showing the population density of the state, by region:

 

Here we can see the majority of large population centers going through the middle of the state. Here is an interstate map of Colorado:

 

Here a review of those pick-up counties, first by descending partisan shift:

County	Region	G Rate	% of PV'08	% of PV'04	Diff.	Margin	Partisan shift
Arapahoe	C-NE	14.54%	11.08%	10.91%	+0.18%	+12.91%	+16.87%
Alamosa	SC-SW	0.11%	0.26%	0.29%	-0.03%	+14.09%	+16.67%
Broomfield	C-NC	26.76%	1.23%	1.09%	+0.14%	+11.58%	+16.19%
Larimer	NC	13.61%	6.93%	6.87%	+0.05%	+9.73%	+14.93%
Jefferson	C	8.65%	12.29%	12.75%	-0.46%	+8.99%	+14.18%
Ouray	SW	12.46%	0.13%	0.13%	0.00	+8.79%	+13.35%
Huerfano	SC	7.08%	0.15%	0.16%	-0.01%	+11.23%	+12.31%
TOT/AVG:	--	12.25%	32.07%	32.20%	-0.07%	+10.65%	+15.36%

Here a review of those pick-up counties, descending, by margin:

County	Region	G Rate	% of PV'08	% of PV'04	Diff.	Margin	Partisan shift
Alamosa	SC-SW	0.11%	0.26%	0.29%	-0.03%	+14.09%	+16.67%
Arapahoe	C-NE	14.54%	11.08%	10.91%	+0.18%	+12.91%	+16.87%
Broomfield	C-NC	26.76%	1.23%	1.09%	+0.14%	+11.58%	+16.19%
Huerfano	SC	7.08%	0.15%	0.16%	-0.01%	+11.23%	+12.31%
Larimer	NC	13.61%	6.93%	6.87%	+0.05%	+9.73%	+14.93%
Jefferson	C	8.65%	12.29%	12.75%	-0.46%	+8.99%	+14.18%
Ouray	SW	12.46%	0.13%	0.13%	0.00	+8.79%	+13.35%
TOT/AVG:	--	12.25%	32.07%	32.20%	-0.07%	+10.65%	+15.36%

And finally, a review of those pick-up counties, descending, % of the 2008 PV:

County	Region	G Rate	% of PV'08	% of PV'04	Diff.	Margin	Partisan shift
Jefferson	C	8.65%	12.29%	12.75%	-0.46%	+8.99%	+14.18%
Arapahoe	C-NE	14.54%	11.08%	10.91%	+0.18%	+12.91%	+16.87%
Larimer	NC	13.61%	6.93%	6.87%	+0.05%	+9.73%	+14.93%
Broomfield	C-NC	26.76%	1.23%	1.09%	+0.14%	+11.58%	+16.19%
Alamosa	SC-SW	0.11%	0.26%	0.29%	-0.03%	+14.09%	+16.67%
Huerfano	SC	7.08%	0.15%	0.16%	-0.01%	+11.23%	+12.31%
Ouray	SW	12.46%	0.13%	0.13%	0.00	+8.79%	+13.35%
TOT/AVG:	--	12.25%	32.07%	32.20%	-0.07%	+10.65%	+15.36%

5 of these 7 pick-ups have a partisan shift larger than the statewide partisan shift, and all 5 of them have a partisan shift larger than the national partisan shift. 4 of those 7 were landslide winning margins, the other three were near-landslides. Not one single of these pick-ups was a close race. These 7 pick-ups together accounted for 32.07% of the statewide PV and had a partisan-shift average just barely under the statewide average.

Now, let's go back to the top 5 counties in the state (53.21% of the PV in 2008)- here colored in green:

 

You can look at the map and visualize for yourself that the other 59 counties, the ones with a white background, represent the MINORITY of the PV from 2008.

I have done a special analysis of these five mega-counties + the three new GOP tipping point counties + Ouray county, a 9 county study of their voting history since 1960. The results are very englightening, especially concerning the growth rate of the current 5 largest counties. Here is the the study, as an excel document, with all the raw numbers.

And a table of those five mega-counties, with their percent of the statewide PV, per year (the color indicates for which party the county went):

Year	Jefferson	El Paso	Denver	Arapahoe	Boulder	Total
1960	7.77%	6.62%	29.98%	6.01%	4.37%	54.75%
1964	9.89%	6.67%	28.09%	6.61%	5.19%	56.42%
1968	11.02%	7.35%	26.05%	6.97%	6.97%	58.36%
1972	12.01%	8.18%	23.62%	7.59%	7.52%	58.92%
1976	13.33%	7.97%	20.97%	9.21%	7.52%	58.94%
1980	13.73%	8.80%	17.69%	10.81%	7.35%	58.38%
1984	13.94%	9.09%	16.96%	11.55%	7.51%	59.05%
1988	14.32%	10.09%	15.30%	11.60%	7.81%	59.12%
1992	14.22%	10.65%	13.89%	11.72%	8.08%	58.56%
1996	14.88%	11.48%	12.90%	10.79%	8.03%	58.08%
2000	13.52%	11.59%	11.39%	10.90%	8.02%	55.42%
2004	12.75%	11.35%	11.21%	10.91%	7.48%	53.70%
2008	12.29%	11.38%	11.31%	11.08%	7.15%	53.21%
2012*	11.83%	11.41%	11.41%	11.26%	6.83%	52.74%
2012**	12.07%	11.45%	11.47%	11.23%	6.95%	53.17%

We see five individual patterns of growth here:

Denver - descending since 1960

Arapahoe - ascending since 1960

Jefferson - waxing and waning with the 5 county trend

Boulder with a similar development to Jefferson, but peaking out four years later, in 1992

El Paso also with a similar development to Jefferson, but peaking out in 2000

However the general trend for all 5 combined been a sinus curve: in 1960, the five largest counties in Colorado represented 54.75% of the PV, in 2008, it was 53.21%. The growth cycle peaked at 59.12% in 1998 and from that point on has gone downhill.

For 2012* I am projecting a possible county % of the PV, based only on the change between 2004 and 2008.

For 2012** I am projecting a possible county % of the PV, based on an progressive average of the change from 2000 to 2004 and then from 2004 to 2008. These values are theoretical values and it will be interesting to see how close I come in 2012.

Why the decline in these 5 counties? The answer is most likely the huge flood of hispanic immigration into the state starting in the 1990s and continuing today. This is changing the balance of electoral power in the state and the statistical weight of the counties among themselves. Right after the 2000 census, Colorado had the 9^th largest hispanic population in the USA. It now has the 7^th largest population, tendency: growing.

For instance, Weld County (pop. approximately 243,800, county seat: Greeley), which accounted for 4.16% of the PV in 2004 and now 4.41% in 2008, a +0.26% jump, has had a latino population growth rate of 30% since 2000. In Weld County, the Republican margin of victory was reduced from +26.76% in 2004 to +8.72% in 2008, a partisan shift of -18.04%, the HIGHEST partisan-shift in Colorado. According to state exit polls, the hispanic vote went 61-38 for Obama and represented 9% of the electorate, and nationally, it was even higher: 67-31 for Obama. With such a massive increase in the hispanic population in a county like Weld County and with such exit polling statistics, we must assume, and quite logically so, that the hispanic vote in Weld County was a major factor in moving the county from a GOP blowout county to a single digit win county and at the same time significantly increased the county's share of the PV. But be careful: according to exit polling from 2004, the hispanic vote went 68-30 for Kerry and represented 8% of the electorate. If the statistic is correct, then the path for the hispanic vote for Obama in 2008 was prepared very well by Kerry in 2004 and it must also mean that the black vote in Colorado must have spiked in extreme, in order to make up the difference.

And indeed, it was so: in 2004, the black vote represented just 4% of the electorate in Colorado and Kerry won the black vote 87-13. In 2008, the black vote soared to represent 13% of the electorate in Colorado and Obama win the black vote 95-4. Such a huge spike in the black vote must have played a major role in the election, but not necessarily in counties with the highest hispanic immigration rates. It certainly contributed to hitherto unheard of margins for Obama in Denver and Boulder, but not necessarily smaller counties like Conejos or Costilla, counties where hispanic immigration is high. And such a reduction in margins in places like Colorado Springs can only mean that the military vote moved at least somewhat for Obama. In this supplemental document: DEMOGRAPHIC and ECONOMIC profile of Colorado (RUPRI), you can see the proof of this in two maps, on page 4.

How to predict as 2012 nears? Here is a table of the closest county by county races (margin: under +4%), the so-called „tipping point“ counties (winning margin: less than 4%):

Alphabetically:

County	Region	Obama %	McCain %	Margin	O-shift	M-shift	Partisan Shift
USA	--	52.88%	45.61%	+7.27%	+4.62%	-5.12%	+9.73%
Colorado	--	53.66%	44.71%	+8.95%	+6.64%	-6.99%	+13.62%
----	--	------	------	------	-----	-----
Grand	C-NW	48.59%	49.69%	+1.10%	+5.97%	-6.30%	-12.27%
Chaffee	C-WC	49.00	49.12%	+0.12%	+6.06%	-6.46%	-12.52%
Garfield	NW	49.20%	49.21%	+0.01%	+4.51%	-4.66%	-9.17%

Of the 3 „tipping-point“ counties, all 3 were barely won by McCain . McCain lost slightly more on percent than Obama gained in all 3 counties . The largest prize of these tipping-point counties is Garfield county, which was analyzed in Part II. Garfield County has moved from a 17% hispanic population in 2000 to a 24% hispanic population in 2007.

The direction of THESE counties in 2012 will give us a very good early indication of who will win the state: Obama or his GOP opponent. All eyes will be on the two huge pick-ups from 2008: Jefferson and Arahapoe counties, but polling in areas like Ouray and also in Garfield county will also give us a strong indication of who will win the state. The other important detail to watch will be the amount of money put into the Colorado Springs media-market. If Obama is in good condition and begins an agressive campaign in El Paso county, then the GOP will be forced to do the same. If it does not, then this means that the GOP already knows that Colorado is lost for them. If however, the hispanic community sours on Obama and the GOP goes on the offensive to reclaim the pick-up counties from 2008, then this means that the GOP has a good chance of re-taking the state.

Conclusion:

In INDIANA, every single county trended more or less democratic, without exception – there was a blue shift that moved the entire state and those overwhelmingly white, rural counties contributed greatly to Obama's narrow win here – yes, the counties that he still lost to McCain. This shows a large level of GOP defection to Obama in 2008. Here, Obama gained 405,028 raw votes over Kerry from 2004, while McCain lost 133,790 raw votes over Bush from 2004, an uneven shift. Indiana's PV growth rate over 2004 was 11.47%. And Obama won by +1.03%.

In OHIO, not every county trended democratic (11 trended GOP), but there were no GOP county pick-ups. Also, in Ohio, the largest cities, all five of them, played the crucial role in moving the state into the democratic column and those overwhelmingly white, rural counties contributed very little to Obama's narrow win, in contrast to Indiana. Surely there were some moderate GOP defections, but there were also a moderate amount of newly registered voters. Here, Obama gained 198,877 raw votes over Kerry's total from 2004, while McCain lost 181,948 raw votes over Bush's total from 2004, a moderate mirror image shift. Ohio's PV growth rate over 2004 was a nominal 1.36%, way under the national PV growth rate of 7.46%. And Obama won by +4.58%.

In VIRGINIA, there was real resistance to Obama, but in counties that are „emptying out“, so to speak. There was a large poli-demographic shift in VA, with the north and the SE gaining greatly in political strength for the Democratic party. Here there were obviously far fewer GOP defections, if at all (McCain scored more raw votes in VA than Bush from 2004), but far more newly registered and democratic dedicated voters. Most importantly, a +6.30% winning margin is hardly a battleground margin. It is a better margin than Obama scored in OHIO, INDIANA, NORTH CAROLINA and FLORIDA. It is a lean winning margin, but a comfortable one and will require a minimum 12.60% shift back to the GOP in order to regain the state, and I doubt that this shift will come from those 500,000 new voters. The worst case scenario for the GOP is that Obama cements Virginia into the democratic column in his first term, adding the state to core democratic territory and thus making the electoral math for the GOP more difficult. There were, however, 2 GOP pick-ups in this state, the only 2 pick-ups in all nine states Obama picked-up.

In NORTH CAROLINA, Obama achieved a democratic trend in 92 of 100 counties and there were no GOP pick-up counties (see: INDIANA; OHIO). However, there were no counties with partisan shifts above 21%. In Virginia, there were 8 such counties. In Indiana, there were 40 such counties. The densely populated areas pulled through for Obama and he held McCain's winning margins in the red counties low enough to squeak through a bare win.

In FLORIDA, Obama's GOTV effort and hard campaigning were enough to swing Tampa (Hillsborough county) and Clearwater (Pinellas county) back to the democratic party. But the trend was very uneven in Iowa and the GOP achieved a higher numeric percentage of GOP trending counties than in Indiana, Ohio, Virginia or North Carolina. It is indeed fascinating that the very counties that remained true to Jimmy Carter in his 1980 election defeat are now rock-solid republican counties or counties trending republican. There is no statistical indication that race is a factor in this, for most of those counties did not go for either Bill Clinton or Al Gore, both also southern democrats. The explanation is that as these counties are „empyting out“ and losing on electoral firepower, the population that is remaining is more conservatively oriented. Without a doubt, Florida will continue to be a bitter battleground for cycles to come.

In IOWA, Obama's win was a sweeping one, reminiscent of Bill Clinton's win from 1992, or even more accurately, of Michael Dukakis' win from 1988, and came closest to the national partisan shift, or „swing“. It was also the most likely pick-up, based on the state's performance in the 2004 GE. A 21 county pick-up and a 98 county trend for the Democratic party in this state is a sign of serious political change and should be a cause of genuine concern for Republican statisticians. Additionally, the continuing trend toward larger urban areas and a slow „emptying“ of rural areas is generally advantageous to the Democratic party. This makes a strong argument for the Democratic party for 2012 and increases the chances that Iowa will be a Democratic retention in the next cycle.

On the other hand, when 25% of all Iowa counties are tipping-point counties (practically all Democratic pick-ups plus some quirky outlier counties) looking forward to 2012, then the state is certainly not cemented into the Democratic column, not yet. Additionally, Iowa will probably be the first primary of 2012, and assuming that Obama runs unchallenged for re-election, then the GOP will have the greater opportunity to do massive voter registration and build excitement on the ground in the Hawkeye state as the Democratic party did in 2008. Most likely, Mitt Romney and Sarah Palin will be visiting Iowa often, starting in early 2010.

In COLORADO, a long-term structural problem has developed for the GOP and has probably already reached the point of no return: the large hispanic immigration into the state, coupled with far flung deep, deep red counties with no potential for large population growth due to the presence of military installations or nationally protected areas, coupled with the growth of new urban areas (and hence, liberal thought) like Broomfield county, has changed the electoral balance in this state. The hispanic population has not yet reached the levels it has in neighboring New Mexico, but the trend is strongly in that direction. And the hispanic community nationally, which was attracted to George W. Bush in 2004 and to some degree in 2000, has swung decidedly to the Democratic party in 2008. There is a strong possibility that the immigration debate from George W. Bush's 2^nd term and the resultant rejection of his immigration reform proposals from conservative wing of the GOP may become the GOP equivalent of the horrible mess that happened to the Democratic party with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the way it was packaged. Just as there are millions of registered Democrats in the south (see: Oklahoma, Texas) who vote Republican, it is entirely possible that a large cadre of registered Republicans in Colorado will switch sides. Some of them must have already done this in 2008, otherwise Obama could not have achieved such a sweeping partisan-shift. And the fact that the state already shifted strongly to the Democratic party in 2004 and then continued the shift in 2008 means that this is probably not a one-time phenomenon.

And if that is not enough: on the very day that I completed this analysis, the following article appeared in POLITICO: GOP sounds alarm on Latino voter gap.

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