ACCOUNT FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN MAY AND JUNE 1940

INTRODUCTION

In 1919, after its victory over Germany with other Allies, France had the 1^st army in the World. Only twenty years later, after May 10^th 1940 the western allies (Westmächte¹) were defeated by Germany: Belgium and the Netherlands capitulated; France signed an armistice on June 25^th. She was brought down within 6 weeks (47 days). Britain escaped the same fate only by retreating to its island.

I will focus my essay on an analysis of different levels of explanation for the “collapse” of the French Army (the military doctrine, the equipment, the political and diplomatic background and the preparation of society without forgetting the German side) rather than on a description of the May-June campaign or a deterministic description of a decadent 3rd Republic. I will only be looking at the case of France but one can not dissociate its case from the other Allies and from the general context of the war.

The estimations of French casualties during the May-June campaign fluctuate between 50,000 and 120,000 killed and missing in action and around 1.5 million prisoners of war. As for the German losses, they were « remarkably light 27,074 killed, 111,034 wounded, 18,384 missing-in the first stage, from 10 May to June, the casualty rate was 200 per day »².

Despite these numbers, talking about "collapse" is too simplistic. We actually have two collapses, one at the beginning (approximately May 13^th to 20^th), the other at the end of the campaign. Between these two stampedes, the casualties of the French Army rose to 5,000 per day (i.e. as many as during the First World War, it is a clue that after the first shock, the average French soldier fought well and did not hesitate to sacrifice his life). So we have to limit the extent of the initial “collapse” to space: mainly around Sedan on the river Meuse, at the exit of the Ardennes forest; and to time: between the 13^th and 20^th May³. Put into perspective, this allowed the breakthrough of the “sickle-cut” manoeuvre which encircles the Allies Armies in Dunkirk.

The next engagement was the so called "Battle of France" to try to halt the Germans on the “Weygand Line”, the rivers Somme and Aisne.

The second collapse occurred after this unsuccessful attempt only from June 17^th to June 25^th mainly because the war was thought to be finished. It was confirmed by Pétain's own words: "It is with a heavy heart that I say we must end the fight"⁴ more than one week before the signature of the armistice and caused the capture of more than 700,000 prisoners.

More generally, to refer to the apocryphal title of Marc Bloch's book⁵, how can we explain this "strange defeat" by considering the campaign as a whole?

It is easy to find a lot of possible explanations for the defeat. Some could be partially true: the bad preparation of the French Army, a defensive strategy, a late rearmament, a staff one war late, a pacifism leading to defeatism⁶, a decadent diplomacy⁷, an ecomomy in crisis, a failing/ waning demography... Others were given in the 1940s but are now historically proven wrong: the inferiority of the French infantry, the 5^th column⁸, a plot against the French Republic…The historiography is complicated by the fact that the actors of the time have tried to vindicate themselves: the military by blaming the politicians and vice-versa.

The difficulty lies in the determination of the factors that directly cause the defeat, among the unfavourable conditions to France in 1940.

Firstly, a comparison of the material strength shows that, to simplify matters, that there was no significant superiority in favor of the Wehrmacht.

Secondly, the long-term strategy with economic and political considerations was modelled on the wrong type of war: roughly a remake of the First World War.

Thirdly, on the strategic and operational level the attitude was always defensive and the military plan contained mistakes that proven to be disastrous.

Fourthly, the tactical doctrine showed less adaptability than of the German one.

Fifthly, the weakness of the whole society was not so deep but the policy was not exemplary and the diplomacy inefficient.

I- MATERIAL STRENGTH COMPARISON

Comparing the armed forces before the Western campaign is not easy. France and Great Britain were formally allies since their declaration of war on Germany on the 3^rd September 1939. But Belgium and the Netherlands remained neutrals until May 10^th even if they eventually fought on the Allied side.

In terms of number of soldiers, the Allies had a numerical superiority by having 4 millions against 3 millions of German soldiers⁹.

In terms of number of divisions in the North East of France and in the Benelux, it means 104 French divisions, plus the 15 divisions of the British Expeditionary Forces plus 22 Belgians ones with the 10 Dutch. That is 151 divisions for the Allies as opposed to 135 Germans divisions on their Western border.

In terms of quality, the average strength of German and French units of the regular army was comparable. However, Germany had quite a large number of non-trained conscripts because of the interdiction of the military service by the Versailles treaty, respected until March 1935.

To summarize, the Wehrmacht was quite heterogeneous but very good for the offensive units (the 10 Panzer divisions, the 6 motorized and the 61 of the 1^st and 2^nd Wellen)¹⁰.

Considering the artillery, the Allies outnumbered the Germans with 14 000 guns against 7378¹¹ but they were lacking of anti-tank artillery and anti-aircraft defenses.

Once again, if we compare the number of tanks, the Allies are superior in number by 4204 armoured vehicles against 2439 Panzers I, II, III, IV, 35 and 38. They were concentrated in big armoured units (10 Panzer divisions and 6 motorized divisions) whereas the French were scattered along the Front (except for the 4 DCR, armoured divisions). One decisive advantage of the Panzer was that they could be refuelled very quickly by jerry can, not the French ones.

Considering absolute numerical strength of the two belligerent Air Forces, the Allies were again superior (4469 against 3578) but, considering the relative number of bombers and fighters in the sky in May, the Germans were more numerous (2589 against 1453). In terms of quality; the German planes were in general better and had already been tested by pilots. That is why the Luftwaffe had the air supremacy in May and June.

Globally, the numerical superiority was on the Allies side. In some sectors, qualitative and quantitative superiority were for the German (because they had taken initiative, they could have chosen where to attack and concentrate their best units). It has to be remembered that the Allied forces did not constitute a coalition (so the value of the total is less than the sum of its parts)¹².

The huge French effort of rearmament between 1937 and 1940 was between one and five year behind Germany's one (by starting from nearly nothing, their equipment could have been more modern). The critical critical on the Front Populaire and the 40 hours law (responsible for the defeat according to Vichy in the Riom trial) is to be is to be moderate. The strikes have temporarily disrupted the production but the nationalisations have rationalised the production in the long-term (in particular in the aviation).

II- THE EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE WAR (level of long-term strategy with economic and political considerations)

Most of the French officers and politicians had lived the experience of the last war, the Great War (e.g. Pétain was War Minister between 1934 and 1936). They expected the next war to be long as well and to be a new war of attrition. That is why all the material was not engaged in the first blow (especially planes) and the skilled workers were specially affected in the rear for the war production. It was thought that the winner would be the one to engage its last forces on the battlefield.

The model for the French Army was the battle of Verdun, a battle of attrition. And from the first World War result the dogma of the continuous front

On the contrary, the battle of Cannae and Sedan 1870, and the Hindenburg offensive of 1918 (with the Sturmtruppen) were model of breakthrough, encircling manoeuvre and annihilation for the German Army.

If the French command did not expect a short war, it has to be mentioned that neither the German Generalitat apart few exception exceptions (e.g. Manstein) believed in a successful Blitzkrieg (it was not theorised at all on the strategic and economical level before 1940).

III- the MILITARY PLANS (strategic and operational level)

There was no unified command facing a lack of consultation (neither common French-English General Staff, nor joint French staff); therefore the Gamelin-Weygand counter-attack plan was not applied in May, for want of agreement between the English, Belgian, and French. Gamelin did not react after the breakthrough at Sedan (the tanks ventured towards Amiens and could be cut down in number by a counter-attack South-North North-South).

The Allied “Dyle-Breda” plan conceived by Gamelin was based on false assumptions: the Germans will attack through Belgium and maybe the Netherlands as during the Great War. The French General Staff mistakenly believed that Hitler was following the 1914 Schlieffen Plan again and that his right wing had to be blocked. In May 1940 Gamelin adopted the linear cordon, without masses of reserve manoeuvres, without deeply fortified points. Guderian tanks cross the Ardennes where they were not expected. This was the dogma (and wishful thinking) that « the Ardennes are impenetrable » according to Pétain and the second dogma was that even if they try to cross the Ardennes, the French will « catch the whole enemy force at its hinge ».

So from these premises and other diplomatic ones (France and the B.E.F. will have to go to rescue Belgium only when its neutrality would be violated (up to the Dyle river), ditto to assist the Netherlands and go to Breda therefore we have the Dyle (variant) Breda, politically logical but militarily quite risky.

Luckily for the Germans, especially the staff officer Erich von Manstein and the Bohemian corporal Adolf Hitler, expected this Allies behaviour. And the final draft of their Plan Yellow (Fall Gelb: a successful breakthrough followed by a Kesselschlacht, a battle of annihilation by encirclement) was based on, was made easier by the fall of the Allied Armies in the trap.

The Dyle-Breda Plan had other faults that would become disastrous:

- there was no strategic reserve (after the 7^th Army, the most motorised and probably the best of the French Armed Forces was sent into the Netherlands for the Breda manoeuvre)

- the pivot of the manoeuvre (where the wheeling left flank of the Allied forces was joining the static Mginot Line) was relatively emptied and occupied by bad quality units of series B (reservists) of the 9^th and the 2^nd Army (especially the 55^th and 71^st Infantry Division, Huntziger, Commander in chief of the 2nd Army, in charge of the sector of Sedan plays a great personal part in the defeat).

The Maginot Line is not the mistake so often disparage. After the massacre of the Great War, it was suppose to save lives. It did not confine itself the Allies in a defensive attitude. On the contrary, it has allowed the push in Belgium by protecting the right flank.

However, it could have “economize” more troops more useful elsewhere. But the French were not certain than the German would attack through the Saar or the Switzerland (it is here also an intelligence matter) and because the Maginot Line had cost so much, the military could not take the risk to lose it.

“On the other side of the hill”, and because the Wehrmacht has taken the initiative by attacking, they could have chosen where to concentrate their troops (in the Heeresgruppe A in front of the Ardennes). The global equality was offset by a local German numerical and qualitative superiority.

IV- the DOCTRINE (tactical level)

A main cause of the defeat was that the doctrine of engagement contradicted the strategic Plan¹³. In 1940 and because of the lessons of the Great War, the French (and Allied) convention was the usual methodical battle (with artillery preparation and fortified positions).

Even if the material and technology has evolved since 1918 (in particular planes and tanks) had nearly the same doctrine in 1940 (De Gaulle’s The Army of the Future was interested only in tanks and seen as heretical). The Germans had thought about weapons changes. But Guderian’s Achtung Panzer existing since 1936 was not an official manual among the Panzerwaffe. The Wehrmacht had not conceptualized and adopted the Blitzkrieg strategy yet. The better coordination between air forces and tanks trained to work together was due to propitious circumstances (Guderian and Manstein had friends in the Luftwaffe)¹⁴.

Similarly, the attitude toward orders was different among the two armies. The French commanders, even if they already knew what mission they had to accomplish, were usually waiting for written detailed orders. On the contrary, the Germans had the aufträgtaktik¹⁵, the mission by objectives. It was defined by von Seeckt (father of the Reichswehr) in these terms: « contrary to the restrictive order which enter in the details of execution here, it is about the designation of the objective to achieve by giving means but by letting a total liberty for the execution ». The myth of narrow-minded German generals in 1940 obeying suicidal orders is broken¹⁶.

To sum up, the French Army had more or less the same doctrine as at the end of WWI (infantry and tanks mutually support each other at the pace of a soldier) whereas the German Army had a very flexible doctrine and some ambitious generals (Guderian, Rommel) willing to test their conceptions.

The Germans bet on speed and surprise whereas the French counted on preparation and firepower.

To explain the breakthrough at Sedan and the initial collapse of the French Army, several explanations add up.

The surprise plays an important part: the Germans were not expected on the Meuse and at least not after 3 but 9 days of war.

Most of the French soldiers, especially the series B divisions were not prepared for their first contact facing tanks, aviation (the Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka" Dive Bomber had its "Trumpets of Jericho"), and storm troopers.

The poor training during the phoney war and rotation between units¹⁷, led to a « lack of preparation, lack of cohesion and isolation »¹⁸. The rotation between units in the front line was modelled on Petain’s tactic at Verdun.

Finally, the Germans were efficient and their tanks were on the south side of the Meuse by May 14^th. But a whole French unit deserted behind Sedan, by a spontaneous panic of tanks at Bulson (actually caused by French vehicles wrongly recognized as Germans). Without the denial and control of the French commandment on the field (partially caused by very unfavourable lack of radio communication in the French Army), the rumour and panic spread up.

The attitude of some 2^nd class divisions does not reflect posture of the whole French Army, but it is eventually lead to the defeat and what has often been remembered.

V- SOCIETY, POLICY AND DIPLOMACY (from high to low level of military hierarchy and civil structure)

It is often said that an Army reflects the society of its country. As underlying cause for the defeat one can invoke that France was in relative decline compared to Germany since 1815. The fall in the fall in the birth-rate, the stagnant economy may have bad effects on the preparation for war but one can’t say if they were decisive or not for a military defeat.

In the society, the pacifism was widespread, not the internationalist and socialist type, but pacifism of war veterans. We can mention also alcoholism, blight in the French Army (an average of 1 litter of wine per day was the ration) as a factor against the physique and moral of the soldiers.

The political regime of France, the 3^rd Republic was still strong and has resisted economic and political crisis (e.g. the 6^th February 1934). However, it was weaken by partisan or leadership conflicts (Reynaud against its successor Daladier).

The society¹⁹ had to fight a two front war: on the right against the Nazi sympathizers and on the left against the communists (since the Russo-Nazi pact of 23^rd August 1939 the Communist Party was forbidden).

The beginning of the war was not in favour of France. For a self-proclaimed defensive democracy, it was difficult to explain that she declared war on Germany (even if its aggression of Poland was obvious). The aim of war (the integrity of Poland) was brought into question after she has collapse. The war was neither an ideological war against fascism (neutral Italy was wooed) nor patriotic war (France had no claim and the French soil was not attacked until May 10^th 1940).

This reveal that the diplomacy was in contradiction with Army doctrine and military capacity (France has reverse alliance, the Petite-Entente with Czechoslovakia, Rumania Yugoslavia, but a defensive army)²⁰. The ultimate failure was the Munich agreement: Allies were scarified against a temporary peace.

For Pétain « too few children, too few weapons, too few allies, that is the reasons for our defeat ». Even if it could be use to vindicate the army, theses are not false (except for the inferiority in weapons).

As a conclusion, we also have to say that the collapse of the French Army was not inevitable. It was not God's willing, not a "divine surprise"²¹ but the friction of war was almost always on the German side. A new “miracle od the Marne” could have happen and France would have won.

The defeat is a dialectical process. Surprisingly, the defeat of the France is more explicable than the victory of Nazi Germany. Within the context of 1940, we can understand why France has lost the campaign of 1940. The historian is not here to judge anyone but some actors of the time have committed mistakes. Maybe the French people could have done more and therefore is responsible collectively. More certainly the military and political leadership is more guilty, with some distinctions.

If one factor had to be kept as decisive, the French military doctrine would be the one.