Tuesday, December 04, 2007 by Mickey Duniho

Ideas for improving election security and transparency in Pima County elections

(1) Develop stronger ballot tracking system for early ballots.

(2) Create a new database for each election.

(3) Copy every election database backup to a CD, seal CD cases with tamper-revealing

seals, have party reps initial the seals, and store backup CDs in a secure location. Do

not rely on hash codes for security.

(4) Never turn on the central computer or scan ballots without party observers present.

Develop an emergency plan for having party reps on call.

(5) Use Accuracy Certification Boards for early ballot scanning observers.

(6) Double or triple the number of scanners used simultaneously to shorten the overall

time required to scan early ballots. The 2006 early ballot scanning before the 2006

election lasted 40 hours. This could be reduced to 20 or even 13 hours by acquiring

more scanners. This would also provide better insurance against scanner problems

delaying the early ballot scanning process.

(7) Use a clerk to track paperwork while scanning early ballots so that the scanner

operator can concentrate on xanning ballots and so that the process can be better

documented.

(8) Package early ballots in batches of approximately 100 ballots, with a limit of 4

batches per box, using smaller boxes than the current system.

(9) Have early boards seal boxes of ballots and initial the seals.

(10) Seal early ballots after scanning and have party observers initial seals.

(11) When creating summary reports for early ballot audit batches, seal the reports in

envelopes and store in a separate sealed container separate from the ballot boxes.

(12) Use color coded Labels for ballot boxes to aid in ballot tracking.

(13) Never print summary reports before Election Day evening except for the early

ballot hand count audits.

(14) When ending a xanning day, turn off the computer before sealing the computer

case.

(15) Have party observers check directory lists and cards cast reports at the end of

each day and the beginning of the next day's scanning to confirm that no changes

occurred during the interim period.

(16) Have party observers check seals on doors and containers at the beginning and end

of each scanning session.

(17) Use multiple user account!; for GEMS so that every pair of people operating GEMS

has a unique identifying user account and split password - to ensure that Windows and

G Mac tivity logs can track actual users.

(18) Develop ballot inventory tracking so that all ballots, whether marked or not and

whether scanned or not, can be accounted for at all times during the course of an

election.

(19) Retain copies of all ballot tracking documentation in files that are not contained in

the ballot boxes, so that after the election they can be accessed after the ballots are

Locked in the Treasurer's vault.

(20) Irecommend against an additional testing computer in the counting room. There

are simpler approaches to ensuring security, and an additional computer creates new

security questions of its own.

(21) Reduce the delay between the end of Election Day and the beginning of the hand

count audit as much as possible. Arrange to begin the hand count audit immediately

after the selection of precincts and races to be counted, so that there can be no

question of anyone tampering with any ballots in the interim period. If a training

session is needed, arrange to conduct the training before the races and precincts are

selected.

(22) Invite party Accuracy Certification Board representatives to participate i n

developing and reviewing the Election Department security plan. Make this effort a

true partnership.

Mickey Duniho