Congressional history, H.R. Rep. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 27 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 579, 605, states:

Explanation of Provision – The Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does not have medical insurance.  The Committee is most concerned that medically unstable patients are not being treated appropriately.  There have been reports of situations where treatment was simply not provided.  In numerous other instances, patients in an unstable condition have been transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of the receiving hospital.

  Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1992).    
  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
  1395dd. Examination and treatment for emergency medical conditions and women in labor
(a) Medical screening requirement

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists.

  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (a)(emphasis added).
  Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir.  1995)(emphasis added).
  See e.g. Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 290 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  But see Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (One Circuit Court requiring an “improper motive” in EMTALA claims).
  Power v. Arlington Hospital Association, 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
 
  Hardy v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 164 F.3d 789 (2nd Cir. 1999).
  Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 95 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1996).
  Vickers v. Nash General Hospital, Inc., 78 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
  Summers v. Baptist Medical Center Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996).

  Baber, 977 F.2d at 881. 
  Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995). 
  Power, 800 F. Supp. at 1387.
  It now specifically defines an “appropriate medical screening examination” in 42 CFR § 489.24(a) as:
. . . the process required to reach, with reasonable clinical confidence, the point at which it can be determined whether the individual has an Emergency Medical Condition or not. . . . Depending on the individual’s presenting signs and symptoms, an appropriate Medical Screening Examination (MSE) can involve a wide spectrum of actions, ranging from a simple process involving only a brief history and physical examination to a complex process that also involves performing ancillary studies and procedures, such as (but not limited to) lumbar punctures, clinical laboratory tests, CT scans, and/or other diagnostic tests and procedures.
The Interpretive Guidelines go on to describe:
The MSE must be the same MSE that the hospital would perform on any individual coming to the hospital’s dedicated emergency department with those signs and symptoms, regardless of the individual’s ability to pay for medical care. If a hospital applies in a nondiscriminatory manner (i.e., a different level of care must not exist based on payment status, race, national origin, etc.) a screening process that is reasonably calculated to determine whether an EMC exists, it has met its obligations under EMTALA. If the MSE is appropriate and does not reveal an EMC, the hospital has no further obligation under 42 CFR §489.24.
  .  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a-b), (e)(2); see also Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Ass'n, 950 F.2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1991).
  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d).
  Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Negron Agosto, 299 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2002); Lebron v. Ashford Presbyterian Cmty. Hosp., 995 F.Supp. 241, 244 (D.P.R. 1998); Eberhardt v. City of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1995); King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1994); Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387 (10th Cir. 1993); Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
  Power v. Arlington Hospital Association, 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994)