God and Morality

Derrick Farnell (see user page at Chains of Reason)


An earlier, and abridged, version of this article was published in the Summer 2005 issue of Think (issue 10).


What is the relationship between God and morality? For most believers the answer is simple: what is in accordance with God’s command is moral, and what is contrary to that command is immoral.

However, this seemingly straightforward answer in turn raises a famous question in the history of Western theology and moral philosophy. It was first asked by the ancient-Greek philosopher Plato. In his tale Euthyphro the character Socrates (who had also been a real-life philosopher and former tutor of Plato) asks: Is something moral because the gods command it, or do the gods command it because it is moral? This is referred to as the ‘Euthyphro dilemma’, because either interpretation apparently raises serious theological problems. This article considers these problems in the context of the Judaeo-Christo-Islamic God.

The problem with morality determining God’s command

The theory that God commands something because it is moral is problematic because it means that his command is dictated by morality, which is contrary to the theological doctrine of the supreme authority of God. Within this interpretation, something is moral because it has some defining quality. God first establishes what does, and does not, possess this moral quality, and then commands accordingly. Therefore, contrary to the theological conception of morality, what is moral and immoral is independent of God’s will. It may be the case that only God is intellectually capable of establishing what has this moral quality, but he has no more control over what is moral than we have over the correct answer to an arithmetical problem. While it is true that God’s commanding of what is moral is dependent on his will to command what is moral, it is simply the possession of some quality, and not God’s commanding, that determines what is moral.

The problems with God’s command determining morality

So it must be the case that something is moral simply because God commands it. Indeed, if, as described above, God instead first works-out what is moral, and then commands accordingly, then it might be expected that he would mention morality when making such commands, and yet there is no reference in the Bible to him doing so. However, if God’s command is simply used by us to define what is moral and immoral, then it wouldn’t be strange that God himself does not mention morality when commanding.

But this theory – called the Divine Command Theory – arouses concern, for it represents God’s command as arbitrary. God could have commanded, or failed to command, anything and it would have then been, or not been, of moral significance, respectively. That is, the process that determines what is moral and immoral does not actually involve moral considerations.

This means that God could have demanded, or at least not forbidden, something that we would have great difficulty accepting isn’t immoral, such as killing. And similarly for God forbidding, or at least not demanding, something that we would have great difficulty accepting isn’t moral, such as loving one’s neighbour. Also, God could issue new commands in the future. For example, even though he did forbid killing, he could revoke this command tomorrow.

So God could easily have commanded, or failed to command, in such a way that is contrary to our strong intuitions about what is intrinsically moral and immoral. And the same applies to what God could command, or commands he could revoke, in the future. But, according to the Divine Command Theory (DCT), nothing is intrinsically moral or immoral - it is only God’s forbidding of killing that makes killing immoral, for example.

Another problem with the DCT is that it means that we can never act morally as an end in itself, but only ever as a means to simply comply with God’s commands. We might say that we obey God’s commands in order to act morally. But within this theory the term ‘moral’ simply means ‘in accordance with God’s commands’. So we would simply be saying that we obey God’s commands in order to act in accordance with those commands, which is of course the same as saying that we obey God’s command as an end in itself. Therefore, within this theory, acting morally is ultimately about complying with the whims of an amoral dictator, which is a far cry from the noble view of moral action held by most people today.

However, both of these problems with the DCT may be resolved. In fact, the resolution of the second problem follows easily from the resolution of the first.

One response to concern over arbitrary divine command

It could be argued that such concern over the potential arbitrariness of God’s command misses the point of both the DCT and the theory that God commands something because it is moral. Both theories state that what is in accordance with God’s command is moral and what is contrary to that command is immoral, period. Therefore, within either theory, it must be concluded that any independent views people have on what is moral and immoral are both irrelevant and irreverent. Any concern over the nature of God’s command merely indicates that such people don’t have complete faith in God, and therefore in his commands. If they did, then they would be wholly unquestioning of, and obedient to, him. Perhaps they didn’t fully appreciate the gravity of what they were undertaking when they decided to accept that faith and to therefore always abide by his command. Such faith is meaningless if it is only followed as long as the ‘faithful’ find what God commands agreeable to them.

Therefore, the above concern over arbitrary divine command would simply not arise for people who have the genuine, and therefore complete, faith in God required to be a true believer – the only people to whom either theory has relevance. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, there is another reason why such concern is unjustified, and one which most people would probably prefer to rely upon.

Why arbitrary divine commands would not be morally arbitrary

The philosopher James Rachels (1941-2003) wrote that if God’s commands aren’t determined by morality, then they are, ‘from a moral point of view, arbitrary’ (see source 1). It is true that, within the DCT, the process which produces conclusions about what is moral and immoral doesn’t involve moral considerations. However, this is not because God’s commands ignore morality, but because morality is defined by those commands. Therefore, God’s arbitrary commands cannot be arbitrary ‘from a moral point of view’ because, within this theory, there is simply no independent moral point of view from which those commands can be assessed.

Rachels presumably meant that God’s command, within this theory, is morally arbitrary in the sense of not involving the kind of moral reasoning performed by God within the alternative theory. But if so, then Rachels failed to fully appreciate that the DCT is not stating that God fails to take into account the existence of moral qualities, but simply that are no such qualities, that what is moral and immoral is purely about whether something is in accordance with God’s commands.

Of course, the conclusion that God’s arbitrary command wouldn’t be morally arbitrary will be of no consolation to those who find this theory unpalatable. The conclusion remains that God could have, for example, failed to have forbidden killing, and killing would then have not been immoral.

Another response to concern over arbitrary divine command

Some people may be tempted to reply to concern over the potential arbitrariness of God’s command with an appealingly simple argument. God, they point-out, is by nature all-good. He would therefore not have failed to, for example, forbid killing, or demand loving one’s neighbour. That is, while God’s command may not be explicitly determined by moral considerations, he nevertheless instinctively demands what is good and forbids what is bad. However, there are two serious problems with this argument.

First, within the DCT, if God hadn’t forbidden killing, then killing wouldn’t be bad. - therefore, God wouldn’t have failed to forbid something that is bad. Similarly, if God hadn’t demanded loving one’s neighbour, then loving one’s neighbour wouldn’t be good - therefore, God wouldn’t have failed to demand something that is good.

Second, God can’t actually be morally good or bad to any degree within this theory, never mind all-good. If acting morally simply means acting in accordance with God’s command, then only those who are the target of that command are suitable targets of moral assessment, which obviously excludes God. Within the alternative theory morality is above God; within this theory God is above morality.

It is often written that if God’s commands define goodness, then it is a mere tautology to say that God is good, like talking about a round circle or wet rain. That is, grand statements of God’s all-goodness become empty. In fact, such a statement isn’t even a tautology. Tautologies may be redundantly repetitive, but they at least make sense. However, for the above reason, no statements of God’s goodness make any sense within the DCT.

So God can’t be regarded as being good within this theory even though that term can still be applied to the behaviour which God commands. Of course, while God can’t be good, this isn’t because God is any way bad. Indeed, by the same reasoning, God can’t be bad either.

Why it can’t be said that God’s commands are good, but it can be said that what God commands is referred to as ‘good’

Rachels wrote:

:What could it mean to say that God’s commands are good [if God’s commands define morality]? If ‘X is good’ means ‘X is commanded by God,’ then ‘God’s commands are good’ would mean only ‘God’s commands are commanded by God,’ an empty truism. (see source 2)

What indeed could it mean to say that God’s commands are good within the DCT? Such a statement isn’t even an ‘empty truism’. Just as it makes no sense to say that God is good, so it is also the case for God's commands. First, ‘X is good’ does not mean ‘X is commanded by God’ within this theory - rather, either phrase is merely directly implied by the other. ‘X is good’ actually means ‘X is in accordance with God’s commands’. Whereas both 'X is good' and 'X is in accordance with God's commands' are an evaluation of behaviour with respect to a standard – God's command – 'X is commanded by God' simple refers to that command. For example, within this theory, if altruism is commanded by God, then altruism is in accordance with God's commands, is good.

Second, it isn’t a truism to say that God’s commands are in accordance with God’s commands, it’s simply nonsensical. Those commands are directed at us and our behaviour, not themselves, and so it only makes sense to refer to whether we are in accordance with those commands. For example, in the context of the command ‘Love thy neighbour’, the loving of one’s neighbour, and those who do, are described as being morally good; but if morality is defined by what God commands, then it wouldn’t make sense to describe the command itself as being morally good. Only if God’s command is determined by morality could it be the case that those commands themselves may possess the quality required for something to be good. Therefore, just as God cannot be, within this theory, the target of moral assessment, and therefore cannot be good, so it is also the case for God’s commands.

A similar statement to ‘God’s commands are good’ that is an empty truism within this theory, and therefore does at least make sense, is ‘What God commands is good’. The subject of this statement is the content of God’s command, not the command itself. It is saying, ‘What God commands [for example, loving one’s neighbour, or not killing] is in accordance with what God commands.’

One more change is required to produce a statement that both makes sense and isn’t a tautology: ‘What God commands is referred to as “good”.’ Here, ‘good’ is used simply as a label for an assessment, not as an assessment itself. That is, the statement is simply a definition of the assessing term ‘good’.

So, contrary to what Rachels concluded above, it is still possible to make sensible statements relating God’s commands with the term ‘good’ within the DCT. And surely not many would be disturbed by the conclusion that it can neither be said God’s commands are good, nor that what God commands is good, if the above reasoning behind why this is the case is explained to them.

Another problem with God’s command determining morality – and its resolution

The impossibility, within the DCT, of the goodness of God is a third problem with this theory. It was mentioned at the beginning of this article that the alternative theory, with morality being independent of God’s will, was contrary to the theological doctrine of the supreme authority of God. Similarly, this theory is contrary to the theological doctrine of the all-goodness of God.

However, even if God can’t be described as all-good, he can still be all-loving, and therefore omnibenevolent (‘all-benevolent’), as God is currently also believed to be. The terms ‘omnibenevolent’ and ‘all-good’ are sometimes used interchangeably. But whereas ordinary morality concerns benevolence, benevolence does not concern morality: it simply concerns acting in the interests of others at the expense of one’s own, whether or not as a means to acting morality. One could still act benevolently if morality didn’t exist, or wasn't applicable, if it is in one’s character to do so – that is, if one is by nature a loving, or indeed all-loving, individual.

The conclusion that, within this theory, God can’t be described as all-good, but can still be all-loving and omnibenevolent, isn’t in conflict with the Bible. The Bible doesn’t actually explicitly describe God’s nature - the theological concept of the all-goodness of God was merely a creation of theologians. Similarly, the Earth-centred model of the universe was once considered to be an unquestionable and necessary part of Judaeo-Christian theology. But the then great concern over science’s challenge to that model can now be seen to have been misplaced. And so it could be with the concern over this challenge to the all-goodness of God, if it is realised that God could still be all-loving and therefore omnibenevolent.

Thus, the conflict between the theological doctrine of the all-goodness of God and the impossibility, within the DCT, of the goodness of God can be resolved.

It may be asked why we could not similarly drop the doctrine that God’s authority is supreme in all cases, and therefore allow morality to be independent of his will. However, the reason why it would be acceptable to drop the concept of the all-goodness of God is that doing so would still leave an all-loving and omnibenevolent God. But if we were to abandon the concept of God’s total authority there wouldn’t be anything left that could make-up for this great loss.

Why arbitrary divine commands can’t be based on whim

The conclusion that God could still be all-loving, and therefore omnibenevolent, if not all-good, actually resolves all of the above problems with the DCT. As just explained, it resolves the problem of the impossibility of the all-goodness of God. But it also means that if God’s command is not dictated by morality then it cannot be based on whim either.

The philosopher Emrys Westacott draws the following conclusion about the DCT: ‘God, it seems, just happens to have disapproved of adultery; had his whim been different then adultery would be permissible.' (see source 3) And according to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy:

:No normative term (such as ‘the pious’ or ‘the right’) can be defined satisfactorily as what some rational authority, such as God or the Gods, loves or commands, unless we suppose that the command or approval is without rational justification. (see source 4)

But the dictionary lists three definitions of ‘arbitrary’ that are relevant here:

1. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle: stopped at the first motel we passed, an arbitrary choice.
2. Not limited by law; despotic: the arbitrary rule of a dictator.
3. Based on or subject to individual judgment or preference: The diet imposes overall calorie limits, but daily menus are arbitrary. (see source 5)

It seems to have been assumed that, within this theory, God’s command must be arbitrary in the sense of both the first and second definitions. But if God is all-loving, and therefore omnibenevolent, his command must instead be arbitrary in, and only in, the second and third senses. That is, God must be a benevolent dictator who’s commands are based on a natural preference to act in the overall best interests of all of us - and so he commands the kind of behaviour that he judges to be in the overall best interests of all of us. God’s arbitrary commands therefore could, and must, define morality without that command being arbitrary in the sense of being based on whim.

It may be thought that this picture of God’s relationship with morality is open to the same criticism made of the alternative theory. Within that theory, it would be God’s calculations about what possesses the defining quality of morality that determines what is moral and immoral, and not God’s will. And according to the DCT, what kind of behaviour is in the overall best interests of all of us is similarly determined by calculations performed by God, and is therefore not dependent on God’s will.

But while the latter point is true, it cannot be concluded that, within the DCT, morality is independent of God’s will, because God’s will, in the form of his commands, is morality. Within the interpretation that morality determines God’s command, what is moral and immoral is not dependent on God actually having the will to command the outcome of his calculations; it is determined by that outcome alone. But if God’s commands determine morality, then what is moral and immoral is only partly dependent on the outcome of his calculations about what kind of behaviour is in the overall best interests of all of us. It is also dependent on God having the will, once the calculations have been completed, to then command this particular kind of behaviour, arising from God being all-loving and therefore omnibenevolent. It is those commands, and not the outcome of God’s calculations, that define morality. Therefore, if, once the calculations had been made, God’s will had changed, then he could have commanded contrary to the outcome of those calculations. Then, the nature of those commands, and therefore of morality, would have been different. So the nature of morality is not independent of God’s will if the DCT is correct.

As explained at the beginning of this article, people dislike the idea that God’s commands are arbitrary because this is contrary to their strong intuition that things are intrinsically moral and immoral. However, it seems fair to assume that, at least for the great majority, this intrinsic quality is that something is in the overall best interests of everyone involved. Therefore, if morality is defined by God’s command, people would presumably be just as happy knowing that God is all-loving, and therefore omnibenevolent, even if not all-good. God’s command would be arbitrary, but the morality or immorality of something would also be dependent on an intrinsic quality of that thing - that is, whether or not it is in the overall best interests of everyone involved.

Concern over the DCT would probably also be reduced if it was explained that the reason why God cannot be regarded as good is simply because only the targets of God’s commands can be targets of moral assessment. Indeed, if God walked among us, we would mistakenly regard this person as being good, because the actions of such an all-loving being would naturally coincide with his own commands.

Finally, it was also explained at the beginning of the article that another problem with the DCT is that, within it, acting morally is ultimately not about morality, but complying with the arbitrary commands of an amoral dictator. However, while God may be amoral within this theory, he is also all-loving and omnibenevolent. Therefore, acting morally would be about complying with the commands of a benevolent dictator who only has what is in all of our interests in mind. And because God is omniscient (‘all-knowing’) we can be sure that he knows best in this respect.


To recap: If God’s commands define morality, then those commands obviously can’t be guided by any moral considerations, and must instead be arbitrary; also, God can’t be regarded as good, and it can’t even be said that God’s commands are good; and acting morality is simply about complying with the arbitrary commands of an amoral dictator.

On the other hand, God’s commands would not be morally arbitrary; and the term ‘good’ can still be applied to what God commands, such as loving one’s neighbour, or refraining from killing; and God can still be all-loving and omnibenevolent, if not all-good.

And because of the last point, God’s arbitrary commands can’t be arbitrary in the sense of being based on whim, but must instead concern behaviour that is in the overall best interests of those involved. That is, those commands must be arbitrary simply in the sense of being determined not by morality, but by God’s own innate preference to command in a benevolent way; and those commands will therefore be in accordance with most people’s strong intuitions about what is intrinsically moral and immoral.

And although acting morally may be compliance with the commands of an amoral dictator, God is also a benevolent and omniscient dictator who therefore only has the overall best interests of all of us in mind.

Therefore, the concerns over the Divine Command Theory discussed in this article have no justification, because there does not seem to be any problems with the theory that morality is defined by the commands of an all-loving God. But it is hard to see how the theory that God’s command is determined by morality, with the implication that morality is independent of God’s will, could ever be accepted. If this analysis is correct, then Socrates’ question represents not a dilemma, but a simple choice: between the theologically acceptable and the theologically unacceptable.


Sources

1. Rachels, J., 2003, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, fourth edition, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, New York, U.S.A., p. 52

2. see note 1, p. 51

3. Westacott, E., 2003, ‘The contemporary relevance of Socrates’ Question to Euthyphro’, in Think, The Royal Institute of Philosophy, London, U.K., issue 5

4. Honderich, T. (editor), 1995, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., p. 253

5. from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=arbitrary (viewed 2/11/2004)