Postill_Intro_Theorising

INTRODUCTION: THEORISING MEDIA AND PRACTICE

John Postill

Last changed 19 January 2009

NB - This is work in progress. For the final version, see Postill, J. (forthcoming) 'Introduction: Theorising Media and Practice'. In: B. Bräuchler and J. Postill (eds) Theorising Media and Practice. Oxford and New York: Berghahn.

This book rethinks the study of media from the perspective of practice theory, a branch of social theory centred on ‘practices’ rather than structures, systems, individuals or interactions. Practices are the embodied sets of activities that humans perform with varying degrees of commitment, competence and flair. Although practice theory has been a mainstay of social theory for nearly three decades, so far it has had very limited impact on media studies. By linking practice theory and media studies, Theorising Media and Practice offers media scholars and students – and indeed anyone with a professional or personal interest in what people actually do with media – a bridge to the often abstract practice theory literature. It also provides a bridge for practice theorists wishing to travel in the other direction, towards media research and theory, an area of scholarship largely overlooked by practice theorists. Drawing on case studies of media-related practices in Zambia, India, Hong Kong, the United States, Britain, Norway and Denmark, the contributors to this volume show some of the myriad ways in which humans make use of media technologies. Collectively, these chapters make a strong case for the importance of theorising the relationship between media and practice. Theorising Media and Practice contributes, therefore, to two bodies of literature: practice theory and media studies.

One main source of inspiration for this project has been Nick Couldry’s call for a new paradigm in media research that takes as its starting point the ‘practice turn’ in sociology (Couldry 2004, reprinted here as Chapter 1). The present book is also firmly aligned with Shaun Moores’ (2005) recent publication Media/Theory – discussed later in this Introduction – which builds on Giddens’ theory of practice. It further shares the concerns of David Hesmondalgh and Jason Toynbee (2008) who, in a recent collection on media theory, stress the need to strengthen the theoretical backbone of media studies, a field of research with an empiricist and positivist track record in which social theory is often used superficially. Like these authors, the contributors to the present book see theories as ‘useful abstractions’ (2008: 3) that should not be divorced from empirical research.

These sociological ties notwithstanding, the present study approaches media and practice primarily from the anthropology of media, a subfield that has expanded dramatically since the late 1980s^¹. Most contributors to Theorising Media and Practice, including its co-editors, are in fact media anthropologists (in addition, there are chapters by a media sociologist, a semiotician, a filmmaker, and two technologists). What marks this volume off from its precursors is that this is the first predominantly anthropological collection that focuses on a single media-theoretical problem, i.e. on how we may go about theorising media as practice. Additionally, there is an overlapping literature known as ‘the ethnography of media’ to which this volume is linked, albeit rather more tenuously. For instance, like Paterson and Domingo’s (2008) recent ethnographic collection on online news making, a number of contributors to the present book discuss media production (see especially Chapters 2, 4, 7, 12 and 13). The key difference is that they do so in both empirical and theoretical terms and not solely empirically, as is the case with most chapters in Paterson and Domingo.

In this Introduction I review the relevant media studies and practice theory literature to argue not for a new ‘practice paradigm’ in media studies (pace Couldry and Hobart, this volume) but rather for practice theory as a new strand to add to existing strands of media theory. Drawing from the practice theories of Giddens, Bourdieu and Warde as well as from my own research in Malaysia, I sketch out a field/practice theoretical approach to media around three main questions: media in everyday life, media and the body, and media production. I then note some of the limitations of any practice perspective on media, ending with an outline of the book.

Doing ethnography through ‘media practices’

The anthropology of media is an ideal place to start a review of the media studies literature on practice because its specialists have already studied and participated in a plethora of media-related practices around the world. This practical knowledge, though, is strewn across a dispersed ethnographic record where it has been put to a broad range of theoretical aims only implicitly related to theories of practice. Hence my use of the preposition ‘through’ in this section’s heading: media anthropologists have regarded ‘media practices’ not as objects of study in their own right but rather as conduits through which to reach other research objects.

Over the past twenty years or so, media anthropologists have used the notion of ‘practices’ and its countless variants (‘media practices’, ‘cultural practices’, ‘discursive practices’, etc) both profusely and to great effect, vastly expanding media studies beyond its traditional Euro-American heartland. The main topics studied by anthropologists via the notion of ‘(media) practices’ include indigenous media activism in white-settler countries; media and cultural politics in postcolonial states; mainstream media production; ethnic minority media; ritual, performance and media; and the ‘social life’ of media artefacts (Ginsburg et al 2002, Hughes-Freeland 1998, Rothenbuhler and Coman 2005).

But what do anthropologists actually mean by ‘media practices’? (Hobart, this volume). A survey of all instances in which the word ‘practices’ appears in four influential media anthropological collections^² is revealing. The term ‘practices’ is used in these reference books 190 times in 93 different ways, with a great variety of single qualifiers (e.g. ‘media practices’, ‘cultural practices’, ‘social practices’, ‘symbolic practices’) and double qualifiers (e.g. ‘minority media practices’ or ‘media consumption practices’) being employed. The most commonly used of these combinations is ‘media practices’ (N = 34^³), followed at a considerable distance by ‘cultural practices’ (N = 8) and ‘social practices’ (N = 6). Not only is ‘media practices’ the most frequently used variant, it is also given pride of place in the edited collections surveyed. Some examples include (italics added):

[W]e have attempted to use anthropology to push media studies into new environments and examine diverse media practices that are only beginning to be mapped (Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod and Larkin 2002: 1).

[T]he different kinds of media practices represented in this volume can be placed on a sociopolitical continuum reflected in the different sections of the book (Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod and Larkin 2002: 7).

Anthropologists categorically reject the common tendency to treat media as separate from social life and in ethnographic case after case highlight the interconnections between media practices and cultural frames of reference (Askew 2002: 10).

[M]edia practices have tended to be analysed with reference to consumption…

In this book, media practices are analysed in terms of agency, in some cases with reference to performance (Hughes-Freeland 1998: 4-5).

One fundamental problem with the term ‘media practices’ as it is used in the media anthropological literature is that it is nowhere defined or problematised. Rather this term and its cognates are used as lexical means towards ethnographic ends. To reiterate: it is through the study of (media) practices that anthropologists are taking media studies beyond the affluent North and into the ‘media worlds’ of subaltern people in the South. For instance, in my own ethnographic work among the Iban of Borneo (Postill 2006: 91) I use the phrase ‘media practices’ to track the spread of nationalist ideals across rural Sarawak, but in typical ethnographic fashion I do not define what I mean by ‘practices’, let alone problematise or theorise this notion.

Although numerous kinds of practices are mentioned in the media anthropological literature, these practices are seldom unpacked. One of the few exceptions to this rule is Hobart’s (2005: 26, 31) differentiation of (discursive) practices into ‘practices of knowing, explaining, justifying and so on’ and, at a different point in his exposition, into ‘practices of asserting, denying, questioning, deceiving and so forth’. A further problem is semantic slippage^⁴. For instance, Ginsburg et al (2002: 7) use the terms ‘practices’, ‘formations’ and ‘processes’ interchangeably, while Hamilton (2002: 162) conflates ‘activities’, ‘practices’ and ‘behavior’ in a passage about television viewers in Thailand:

[T]he different kinds of media practices represented in this volume can be placed on a sociopolitical continuum … On one end are the more classic formations of mass media produced through large governmental and commercial institutions… In the middle range are more reflexive processes [related to] a variety of subaltern social and cosmological worlds. … On the other end are more self-conscious practices, often linked to social movements, in which cultural material is … strategically deployed as part of a broader project of political empowerment by indigenous and other disenfranchised groups… (Ginsburg et al 2002: 7, italics added)

The demeanor of viewers changed during the Royal News; they stopped their other activities and fell silent. This behavior was consistent with other practices expected when ordinary people are brought in conjunction with Royalty (Hamilton 2002: 162, italics added)

More importantly, there is a general lack of explicit engagement with practice theory. In a survey of 85 media anthropological chapters I found only four references to practice theory (Coman 2005, Couldry 2005, Peterson 2005, Schieffelin 1998) – all four, interestingly, to Bourdieu’s (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice but only the first three in the context of media research.

To summarise, although the term ‘practices’ and its vast progeny have paid a sterling service to the anthropology of media^⁵ as research probes, the theoretical promise of this concept remains unrealised. If we are to begin to understand what people actually do with media we need to engage with practice theory.

What is practice theory?

Social theorists agree that there is no such thing as a coherent, unified ‘practice theory’, only a body of highly diverse writings by thinkers who adopt a loosely defined ‘practice approach’. Theodor Schatzki (2001) distinguishes four main types of practice theorists: philosophers (such as Wittgenstein, Dreyfus, or Taylor), social theorists (Bourdieu, Giddens), cultural theorists (Foucault, Lyotard) and theorists of science and technology (Latour, Rouse, Pickering). It is also possible to distinguish two ‘waves’ or generations of practice theorists. Whilst the first generation, led by some of the foremost theorists of the twentieth century (e.g. Bourdieu 1977, de Certeau 1984, Foucault 1979, Giddens 1979, 1984) laid the foundations of what we now regard as practice theory, the second generation is currently testing those foundations and building new extensions to the theoretical edifice (Ortner 1984, 2006, Schatzki 1996, Schatzki et al 2001, Reckwitz 2002, Warde 2005). In this section I review the main questions addressed by the more influential members of each generation, concluding with some contemporary trends in practice theory.

The first generation of practice theorists sought a virtuous middle path between the excesses of methodological individualism (the idea that we can explain social phenomena on the basis of individual actions^⁶) and those of its logical opposite, methodological holism (the explanation of phenomena by means of structures or social wholes, Ryan 1970). Put differently, they wished to liberate agency – the human ability to act upon and change the world –from the constrictions of structuralist and systemic models while avoiding the trap of methodological individualism. These theorists regarded the human body as the nexus of people’s practical engagements with the world^⁷. Thus the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977) developed the notion of ‘habitus’ to capture ‘the permanent internalisation of the social order in the human body’ (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 130) whilst recognising ‘the agent’s practice, his or her capacity for invention and improvisation’ (Bourdieu 1990: 13). In Bourdieu’s theory of practice, the world’s structural constraints form ‘permanent dispositions’. These are

schemes of perception and thought, extremely general in their application, such as those which divide up the world in accordance with the oppositions between the male and the female, east and west, future and past, top and bottom, right and left, etc., and also, at a deeper level, if the form of bodily postures and stances, ways of standing, sitting, looking, speaking, or walking (Bourdieu 1977: 15, quoted in Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 130).

Bourdieu borrows the Greek word ‘hexis’ to refer to the way in which social agents ‘carry themselves’ in the world; their gait, gestures, postures, etc. (Jenkins 2002: 75). He exemplifies this idea with his early research in Kabylia (Algeria) where he observed that men and women carried themselves in markedly different ways. Where women’s bodies were oriented down in keeping with ‘[t]he female ideal of modesty and restraint’, men’s bodies were oriented towards other men (Jenkins 2002: 75). Bourdieu concluded that Kabyle bodies are ‘mnenomic devices’ that help to reproduce fundamental cultural oppositions and are integral to a cultural habitus learned more through observation than formal teaching (Jenkins 2002: 75-76). In Mark A. Peterson’s (this volume) summary of Bourdieu’s account of practice:

Social life is a constant struggle to construct a life out of the cultural resources one’s social experience offers, in the face of formidable social constraints. By living in a society structured by such constraints, and organised by the successful practices of [others, JP], one develops predispositions to act in certain ways.

Later in his career Bourdieu added the notion of ‘field’ to his practice-theoretical vocabulary (see Bourdieu 1992, 1993, 2005, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Reed-Danahay 2005, Swartz 1997). Fields are specialist domains of practice (e.g. art, photography, sociology) with their own ‘logic’ that are constituted by a unique combination of species of capital, e.g. financial capital, symbolic capital (prestige, renown) or social capital (‘connections’). An apt metaphor for a field is that of a game. Only players with sufficient ‘know-how’ and belief in the game (‘illusio’) will be willing to invest time and effort playing it^⁸. Skilled players acquire over time a ‘feel for the game’ or ‘practical sense’ that allows them to improvise in a structured but seemingly effortless manner. Field agents’ successful strategies may appear to the casual observer rational and conscious but in reality, says Bourdieu, they are only possible when there is a good fit between the habitus and the field. The habitus

…produces strategies which, even if they are not produced by consciously aiming at explicitly formulated goals…turn out to be objectively adjusted to the situation. Action guided by a ‘feel for the game’ has all the appearances of the rational action that an impartial observer…would deduce. And yet it is not based on reason. You need only think of the impulsive decision made by the tennis player who runs up to the net, to understand that it has nothing to do with the learned construction that the coach, after analysis, draws up…The conditions of rational calculation are practically never given in practice: time is limited, information is restricted, etc. (Bourdieu 1990: 11)

Another fundamental notion in Bourdieu’s practical apparatus is ‘doxa’^⁹, those deeply internalised societal or field-specific presuppositions that ‘go without saying’ and are not up for negotiation (Bourdieu 1998: 66-67, 2005: 37, Parkin 1997: 376). For Bourdieu, in sum, practice is ‘based on the dispositions inherent in habitus’ and unfolds as ‘strategic improvisations – goals and interests pursued as strategies – against a background of doxa that ultimately limits them’ (Parkin 1997: 376).

A closely related notion to Bourdieu’s habitus is Michel Foucault’s (1979) concept of ‘discipline’. Like habitus, discipline ‘is structure and power that have been impressed on the body forming permanent dispositions’ (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 130). In contrast to Bourdieu, though, Foucault laid particular emphasis on the violence through which modern regimes impress their power (or ‘biopower’) on bodies (2001: 130). In Europe, the introduction of mental asylums and prisons allowed the replacing of earlier hierarchical and centralised forms of control with more diffuse and insidious forms of ‘governmentality’ and ‘disciplinary power’. Disciplinary power works through the body; subjects learn to self-regulate their bodily practices, making it less necessary for states to intervene directly in their lives (Gledhill 2000: 149).

Like Bourdieu, the British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984) first developed an original version of practice theory in the 1970s, but he arrived there via a very different route. Where Bourdieu prided himself in grounding his theories in empirical research, Giddens is more concerned with the history of philosophy and social theory than with sociological data (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 129). In The Constitution of Society he sets out to unify structure and agency through the notion of the ‘duality of structure’, the idea that structure is both ‘the medium and outcome it recursively organizes’ (1984: 374). Social relations are structured across space and time thanks to the duality of structure – this is what Giddens calls ‘structuration’ (1984: 376). His ‘structuration theory’ demonstrated ‘how principles of order could both produce and be reproduced at the level of practice itself’ and not through some ‘ordering’ society impinging upon individual actors from above (Couldry, this volume). Critically building on Hägerstrand’s (1967) geographical work, Giddens argues that we cannot separate ‘individuals’ from the day-to-day contexts they help to constitute. Rejecting what he regards as Hägerstrand’s weak notion of power as ‘authority constraints’ to human action, he stresses instead the transformational power of human action which operates both with the limitations and possibilities afforded by societal constraints (1984: 116-117). For Giddens, the routinisation of day-to-day life is fundamental to humans who derive a sense of ‘ontological security’ from the familiar contours of the social worlds they have helped to (re)create (1984: 23, 50).

Turning now to the second generation of practice theorists, these thinkers have continued to stress the centrality of the human body to practice while paying closer attention to questions of culture and history as well as developing new concepts (e.g. ‘dispersed’ vs. ‘integrative’ practices, see below) and applying practice theory to new areas (e.g. consumption studies, organisational theory, material culture of the home, neuroscience).

In 1984, the American cultural anthropologist Sherry Ortner published a germinal essay titled ‘Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties’ that is often regarded by anthropologists as marking the discipline’s ‘turn to practice’ (see Bird this volume, Eriksen and Nielsen 2001, Ortner 2006). Ortner questioned the three ‘theories of constraint’ that dominated US cultural anthropology in the early 1980s, namely interpretive anthropology (Geertz), Marxist political economy and French structuralism (Lévi-Strauss). She found that these approaches remained silent about human agency and ‘the processes that produce and reproduce [societal, JP] constraints – social practices’ (2006: 2). Dissatisfied with this situation, Ortner sought inspiration in Bourdieu (1977), Giddens (1979) and Sahlins (1981) who she saw as putting actors back into social processes yet without neglecting the larger structures that enable and constrain their actions^¹⁰. On the other hand, Ortner was critical of practice theory for lacking ‘a recognisable concept of culture’ (2006: 11) and for its limited purchase on questions of power and history. In this regard, she found Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’ more useful than Foucault’s totalising account of disciplinary power (hegemony, for Gramsci, is ‘strongly controlling but never complete or total’^¹¹). Leaning on Sahlins’ work, Ortner concluded that ‘a theory of practice is a theory of history’ and that therefore social practices can only be understood in their articulations with historical events.

If Ortner’s 1984 essay is still essential reading for anthropologists interested in practice theory, Theodor Schatzki (1996, 2001) is a more central figure among second-wave practice theorists. Schatzki is a Wittgensteinian social philosopher for whom the idea of a ‘total field of practices’ is fundamental (2001). By this term Schatzki appears to mean – but this is not entirely clear – the dense tangle of human practices that spans the globe. In order to be able to work with this massive web, says Schatzki, practice theorists have had to either (a) narrow down the inquiry to more manageable subfields of the ‘total field’ (e.g. science or photography; Bourdieu, Giddens) or (b) transform an existing subject-matter into a practice-theoretical question (e.g. Swidler’s 1986 notion of ‘culture as practice’; see also Couldry’s ‘media as practice’, this volume). For Schatzki (2001: 3), ‘the social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices centrally organized around shared practical understandings’. The maintenance of practices over time depends on ‘the successful inculcation of shared embodied know-how’ (2001: 3) as well as on their continued performance (1996). Because activities (or actions) and bodies are ‘constituted’ within practices, ‘the skilled body’ is where activity and mind as well as individual and society meet (2001: 3). It follows that we can only understand actions within their specific practical contexts.^¹²

Most practice theorists, according to Schatzki (2001: 2), minimally define practices as ‘arrays of activity’ in which the human body is the nexus. Although he subscribes to this curt definition, Schatzki (1996) also introduces an important distinction between what he calls ‘integrative’ and ‘dispersed’ practices. Integrative practices are ‘the more complex practices found in and constitutive of particular domains of social life’ (1996: 98), e.g. cooking, farming or business. By contrast, dispersed practices include ‘describing… explaining, questioning, reporting, examining and imagining’ (1996: 91) and they can take place within and across different domains or subfields (see Peterson, this volume).

Another contemporary author, Andreas Reckwitz (2002), synthesizes elements from Schatzki, Bourdieu, Giddens and other thinkers to build an ‘ideal type’ of practice theory. With Giddens, Reckwitz emphasizes the importance of routines – ‘social practices are bodily and mental routines’ (2002: 256) – whilst noting that we should not lose sight of ‘crises of practice’ that can bring about significant changes, i.e. new routines. Reckwitz also notes that practice theorists have, by and large, neglected the individual (cf. Helle-Valle’s ‘in/dividual’, this volume), even though there is

a very precise place for the ‘individual’ – as distinguished from the agent – in practice theory…: As there are diverse social practices, and as every agent carries out a multitude of different social practices, the individual is the unique crossing point of practices, of bodily-mental routines (2002: 256).

Where Reckwitz is often abstract and philosophical, Alan Warde (2005) – who inspired Nick Couldry’s turn to practice^¹³ – approaches practice theory with a far more concrete, empirical aim in mind: the sociology of consumption. He finds Schatzki’s notion of ‘integrative practices’ of more relevance to this research area than his ‘dispersed practices’ (explaining, reporting, questioning, etc.) and illustrates his argument with examples from the practice of motoring in Britain. For Warde, the rewards of practice can be of different kinds; they can be social (Bourdieu’s social recognition), psychological (e.g. Csíkszentmihályi’s [1990] notion of ‘flow’) or of other kinds. Complex practices offer practitioners more levels of self-development and a stronger sense of wellbeing than simple practices, which to Warde may explain why many people appear to be satisfied cultivating low-status practices. Practices are internally differentiated and distinctions among practitioners can matter a great deal, not least in the differing qualities and degrees of commitment to the practice (2005: 138). No practice is ‘hermetically sealed’ from other practices: innovations diffuse, copying and borrowing are common (2005: 141). Nor are practices understandable without regard to the broader political, infrastructural, and technological environments in which they are sustained (Randles and Warde 2006: 229).

In the wake of this second wave of thinkers, practice theory is currently being put to numerous new uses across a range of disciplines, such as the study of domestic and leisure practices (Shove 2003, Shove and Pantzar 2005, Shove et al 2007), social and political anthropology (Evens and Handelman 2005, Nuitjen 2003), strategy research (Jarzabkowski et al 2007, Whittington 2006) or neuroscience (Lizardo 2007), to mention but a few areas of research.

To summarise, practice theory is a body of work about the work of the body. With one or two exceptions, this loose network of approaches to social theory takes the human body to be the nexus of ‘arrays of activities’ (i.e. practices) that agents perform with greater or lesser commitment, dexterity and grace. Whilst some of these practices are widely diffused across social space and time, others are found clustered in configurations that change over time through the socially (re)productive agency of practitioners. Practice theory itself has diffused across epistemic space since its emergence in the 1970s and today we find practice theoretical approaches in subfields as diverse as strategy theory, political anthropology, material culture studies, the sociology of consumption and neuroscience.

Theorising media and practice: prospects and limitations

In this section I argue that practice theory can be greatly beneficial to media studies, albeit not as the field’s next paradigm (pace Couldry and Hobart, this volume). Rather I am suggesting that practice theory offers media studies new ways of addressing questions that are central to the field, such as media in everyday life, media and the body, and media production. At the same time, we cannot expect practice theory (or any other theory, for that matter) to be a theoretical panacea, and in the latter part of this section I discuss one set of media questions that practice theory is not better suited to answer than existing theoretical models, namely questions about processes such as global media events, media dramas or ‘digital epidemics’.

Let us first examine the question of media in everyday life. A helpful starting point is Shaun Moores’ Media/Theory (2005). Moores devotes the first part of this book to extending Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory to the study of media. Giddens contrasts the irreversibility of human biographical time with the reversibility (or cyclicity) of modern clock-and-calendar time. For Giddens, the predictability of modern time cycles contributes to people’s sense of ‘ontological security’, i.e. a ‘confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be’ (1984: 375). Any major disruption to these familiar cycles can lead to an acute sense of insecurity and disorientation. As they go about their rounds of activities, human agents ‘stop’ and interact with others in what Giddens calls, following Hägerstrand, ‘stations’ (e.g. workplaces, schools, homes, shops, etc.). Stations can be studied along three main dimensions: how encounters are distributed across space and time, how the station is internally ‘regionalised’, and how these regions are contextualised by agents (1984: 135). Thus time-space is ‘zoned’ in relation to the routinised practices of social agents:

[A] private house is a locale which is a ‘station’ for a large cluster of interactions in the course of a typical day. Houses in contemporary societies are regionalized into floors, halls and rooms. But the various rooms of the house are zoned differently in time as well as space. The rooms downstairs are characteristically used most in daylight hours, while bedrooms are where individuals ‘retire to’ at night (Giddens 1984: 119).

Building on Giddens’ ideas about modern time and space, Moores follows Ellis (1982), Scannell (1988, 1991), Silverstone (1993) and other media scholars to explain how broadcasting in Britain was built on clock-and-calendar cycles through devices such as seriality and scheduling. Thus fixed schedules made audiences expect an ‘ordered and predictable’ output (Moores 2005: 20). After a historical process of routinisation all but forgotten today, radio and television – in contrast to film – came to be regarded as ‘profoundly “ordinary” media’ (2005: 22). Although most programme production is studio-based, from the outset broadcasters “attempted to produce programmes that fitted into the domestic sphere and the daily round” (Scannell 1991: 3, in Moores 2005: 19).

These ideas, firmly embedded as they are in British sociology and media studies, may seem irrelevant to ‘media-poor’ countries in the South. Yet in my own late 1990s research among the Iban of Sarawak, in Malaysian Borneo (Postill 2002, 2006), I found the same close intertwining of broadcasting schedules with people’s ‘round-and-round movements in time-space’ (Moores 2005: 34). For instance, in the more urbanised longhouses – the ‘villages under one roof’ where most Iban live – watching television had its own regular evening slot (ca. 7-10 p.m.) and preferred ‘region’ within the geography of the longhouse: the semi-private family living room. Moreover, as in the British case, Malaysian broadcasting is built on modern clock-and-calendar time, and I found no evidence of an indigenous ‘Iban time’ running out of synch with the national broadcasting cycles. As Alfred Gell (1992) concludes in his comprehensive review of the cross-cultural literature on time:

There is no fairyland where people experience time in a way that is markedly unlike the way in which we do ourselves, where there is no past, present and future, where time stands still, or chases its own tail, or swings back and forth like a pendulum. All these possibilities have been seriously touted in the literature on the anthropology of time … but they are all travesties, engendered in the process of scholarly reflection (Gell 1992: 315).

The Giddensian stress on day-to-day recursivity and modern forms of scheduling does not mean, however, that we can take for granted the creation and maintenance of routine media practices. Moores (2005: 23) regards the ‘ordinariness’ of broadcasting as the regular outcome of the ‘seemingly effortless practical accomplishments’ of both broadcasters and their audiences. But what of media practices outside the ‘typical’ routines of twentieth century television viewing? Do these ideas apply to today’s far more diverse, mobile and ubiquitous media technologies (see Hawk et al 2008)? Two recent case studies from Denmark suggest that they do^¹⁴. Toke Christensen and Inge Røpke (this volume) describe how families in urban Denmark use mobile phones to try to coordinate their activities – not always successfully – and ‘hold things together’ as individual family members make their rounds through what Giddens would call their day-to-day ‘stations’ (schools, workplaces, shops, car parks, etc). By contrast, the rural teleworkers studied by Kjaerulff (this volume) face the opposite challenge: how to ‘keep things apart’, as it were, when ‘work’ and ‘family life’ share the same locale – the home. Both cases demonstrate that under conditions of swift technological and economic change, domestic media-related practices are not always ‘seemingly effortless’. Yet regardless of the technologies employed, these practices are invariably tied to the relentless cycles of clock-and-calendar time. Like the Iban families I knew in Borneo, these Danish families have no timeless ‘fairyland’ to repair to, no magical world ‘where time stands still, or chases its own tail, or swings back and forth like a pendulum’ (Gell 1992: 315).

A second key media question that practice theory is well equipped to address is the relationship between media and the body. As discussed earlier, practice theorists have stressed the powerful imprint of the state (Foucault’s ‘discipline’) and the family or kin group (Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’) on the body. Whilst homes, schools, prisons and hospitals are no doubt important ‘stations’ in which to study the disciplined habitus and its technological mediations, we should not neglect other stations in which people seek to discipline their bodies on a regular basis, e.g. fitness centres, karate clubs, dance schools, weightwatchers’ groups or yoga sects.

Let us compare, for instance, the ‘subcultural’ worlds of BDSM (bondage and discipline, domination/submission, and sadomasochism) and BASE jumping (the illegal practice of parachute jumping from fixed structures such as bridges or skyscrapers). At first sight, these two ‘integrative practices’ may seem to have little in common. A closer inspection through a media practice lens, however, reveals striking commonalities as well as contrasts. In two separate ethnographies of such worlds (both in the United States) we find people who are tirelessly ‘working at play’ (Weiss 2006); investing time, money and effort in highly technical, often mediated embodied practices. Thus growing numbers of BASE jumpers now fit small video cameras onto their helmets and/or bodies to become ‘stars of their own in-flight movies’ which they later replay and share with others. This being a fiercely competitive milieu, becoming a skilled filmmaker as well as a skilled jumper can enhance a practitioner’s reputation. However, these relatively new ‘media practices’ (Ferrell et al 2001) have had some unintended effects as well: what in the BASE scene is customarily regarded as an ephemeral, private and ineffable practice – the jump – is transformed by means of new media technologies into an enduring, public and visible practice. In contrast, although we are told that BDSM practitioners in San Francisco are regular users of email, websites and print media, Weiss (2006) is silent about media uses during their sexual practices. It is fair to assume, nonetheless, that audiovisual technologies will have found their way into these practices as well, with consequences for the wider social field of BDSM that only empirical research can establish.

One interesting parallel is the reported ‘reality’ of the practice. Practitioners in both scenes reject any suggestion that they are indulging in escapism from the ‘reality’ of day-to-day life. If anything, it is everyday life that they regard as ‘less real’ (in Bourdieu’s terms, they are heavily invested in the ‘illusio’ of their field of practice). As Annalee, a self-defined ‘bisexual, genderqueer/pervert’ put it to the anthropologist:

And the fantasy world, that's the reality because that's where people come out, that's where you see who people are and people see who you are. And you live for that world; you live for those few hours that you play in the evening. That's what drives you if you're a player, if you're a part of the community, that's the serious part of it. Everything else is paying the rent, getting by, but that's where you live (in Weiss 2006: 238)

From a Giddensian viewpoint, this remark offers us a glimpse into Annalee’s routine practices. The two main stations in her rounds of activities appear to be the workplace (‘paying the rent’) and BDSM locales (‘those few hours that you play in the evening’). By articulating a sharp contrast between the practical worlds of waged labour and unwaged ‘play’ – a discourse with deep roots in the industrialised West, Annalee is doing her part to (re)produce the divide. At any rate, BASE jumping and BDSM furnish their more advanced practitioners with a sense of self-development and wellbeing, as Warde (2005) suggests for complex integrative practices in general. The grounded micro-study of embodied practices should not make us lose sight, however, of the wider infrastructural, legislative and political factors that both enable and constrain practice (Randles and Warde 2006). Just as the very British practice of trainspotting is unthinkable in Sarawak (where there are no trains), BASE jumping without America’s colossal man-made structures would lose much of its appeal. The evidence also suggests that both BASE and BDSM leading practitioners deploy the rhetoric of ‘community’^¹⁵ strategically across different public media as they strive to legitimise these ‘alternative’ practices vis-à-vis the authorities and the general public. By analogy to Ginsburg’s (1993) indigenous filmmakers’ ‘cultural activism’ we could call this a form of ‘subcultural activism’ that objectifies a set of practices partly for reasons of public relations (see Bob 2005).

Moving on now to the possible uses of practice theory in the study of media production, in recent years a number of researchers working on the media industries have turned to Bourdieu’s field theory for inspiration (e.g. Benson and Neveu 2005, de Nooy 2003, Moeran 2002, see also Peterson 2003). A field, as we said earlier, is a domain of practice in which differently positioned practitioners compete and cooperate over the same prizes and rewards (money, pleasure, recognition, etc.) (Martin 2003). In his own research on French journalists, Bourdieu (1998) argued that these media professionals constitute a highly influential field with tangible effects on other fields of cultural production such as science or literature. As Rao (this volume) aptly puts it, Bourdieu insisted that ‘only an internal analysis of the embodied practices of media professionals and their relationships to each other can open up an understanding of the way the social is constituted in the contemporary world’.

A major stumbling block in the development of a field/practice approach to media production is Bourdieu’s aversion to interactionism – the sociological approach centred on people’s social interactions that informs Giddens’ structuration theory. Whilst Giddens (1979, 1984) was influenced by early interactionist theorists such as Goffman and Barth^¹⁶ (Eriksen and Nielsen 2001: 129), Bourdieu was adamantly opposed to all forms of interactionism. He argued that interactionists fail to grasp the importance of the invisible objective relations binding social agents’ relative positions within fields of practice and the broader ‘social space’ in which these fields are embedded, e.g. the social space of France. Thus two professors of sociology living in different parts of France may have never ‘interacted’ but can still occupy neighbouring positions in the field of sociology and wider French social space (Knox et al 2006, Postill 2008).^¹⁷

In my own ongoing study of internet activists in a suburb of Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) I have ignored Bourdieu’s objections and used the notion of interaction as part of a field/practice theoretical framework, for I can see no logical incompatibility between this notion and Bourdieu’s invisible ‘network’ of objective relations binding all field practitioners (see also de Nooy 2003). Moreover, it is hard to envisage an internet without interactivity – think, for instance, of the ease with which listserv or blog users can reply to previous posts. Although the focus of my research is media and ‘the production of locality’ (Appadurai 1996) rather than media production, I believe my analysis also has implications for this latter area of research. In the study I concentrate on what I call the suburb’s ‘field of residential affairs’. This is an invisible ‘field of practices’ in which activists, politicians, councillors, journalists and other interested parties compete and collaborate over issues of concern to local residents, such as traffic congestion, street lighting or crime (Postill 2008). Here I use the plural form ‘practices’ not out of ethnographic habit (as I did in Postill 2006) but to signal that the field is internally differentiated into a plethora of practices, e.g. patrolling the streets, posting on Web forums, attending meetings or organising ‘community’ events. This plurality extends to field practitioners: different agents carry out different arrays of activities at different field stations with varying degrees of commitment, embodied skill and publicness (cf. Warde 2005). As a result each practice has evolved its unique blend of sociality, ‘mediated interaction’ (Thompson 1995) and articulations with the rest of the field. Additionally, cutting across these diverse practices there are fieldwide forces at work – e.g., the ‘fundamental law’ (Bourdieu 1993) of selfless volunteerism, i.e. the doxic expectation that leading residents will freely volunteer their time and labour for the good of ‘the community’ (Postill 2008).

What is the relevance of this field/practice model to the study of media production? First, it allows for more nuanced accounts of field practices and their specific mediations than existing theoretical models. Contrast, for instance, my stress on the plurality of field practices with Wittel’s (2001) dichotomous sociality model in which this author posits ‘network sociality’ (as opposed to ‘community sociality’) as the predominant mode of sociality in London’s new media industries. The field/practice model I am proposing also enables us to theorise the kinds of skilled embodied practices of media professionals that ethnographers have documented in recent years, but lacking a firm grounding in practice theory (see Ginsburg et al 2002, Paterson and Domingo 2008, Peterson 2003). If we further add a spatio-temporal strand to the model, the result is a frame of analysis in which the agency of media practitioners can be tracked across Giddensian ‘stations’ and ‘regions’ within the workplace and beyond. Finally, as with all other field-theoretical models, the synthesis I am advocating here permits the historical analysis of fields of media production and their changing power relations vis-à-vis other fields (Bourdieu 1992, cf. Couldry 2003).

One neglected area in the study of fields of media production is the dispersal of practices (and elements of practice) to and from such fields (cf. Schatzki 1996, Warde 2005). A few ethnographic examples will clarify this point. In May 1997 I participated in the invention of a media-derived practice during my fieldwork among the Iban of Sarawak. As part of the annual Dayak Festival celebrations, a manner of longhouse ‘quiz show’ was introduced that year. The woman who dreamed up this innovation had seen many quiz shows on Malaysian television. Her aim was to test the ‘school knowledge’ of local children and publicly reward the more diligent among them (Postill 2006: 179-183). This new practice was scripted and staged ‘as seen on television’, with all the necessary props and impeccable time-keeping. Although this may be a rare case of direct appropriation of a media practice, there is ample ethnographic evidence to suggest that ritual and other performative practices around the world are being influenced by practices seen on television and other media (see Bird this volume, Eisenlohr 2006, Hobart 2002, Pype 2008, van de Port 2006). Thus, early 1990s Balinese theatrical audiences ‘increasingly expected plays to be as-seen-on-TV and actors to replicate favourite routines from television performances’ (Hobart 2002: 377). In some cases a single element of a media practice will be appropriated. For instance, in Zambia the English meta-pragmatic device ‘Over to you!’ diffused from a popular 1980s radio show by that name to a wide range of practices, including weddings, singing rehearsals and letter writing. Debra Spitulnik (1996) makes the intriguing point that discursive items such as ‘Over to you!’ may have an inherent ‘detachability’ and ‘reproducibility’ that allows them to spread widely across practices well beyond their original contexts. In other cases, the migration of practical elements will move in the opposite direction, from domains of amateur practice to the professional mass media. It is important, however, not to draw too sharp a divide between ‘the media’ and ‘the public’ given the recent proliferation of ‘user-generated content’ across multiple Web and mobile platforms that are often shared by media professionals and amateurs (Ardevol et al, this volume).

To recapitulate, a practice-theoretical approach to media suggests that people use a range of media partly to try to maintain – not always with success – a sense of ontological security in a modern world in which biological death and the predictable cycles of clock-and-calendar time are among the only certainties. In going about their embodied engagements with the world, people traverse and (re)produce a variety of internally regionalised, variously mediated ‘stations’ (homes, schools, gyms, bars, newsrooms, studios, etc.). This day-to-day and biographical work/play of cultural (re)production and change occurs within and across specialist fields (law, BDSM, journalism, filmmaking) whose practitioners differ greatly in the degree and quality of their embodied know-how, self-discipline and commitment to the ‘games’ played in the field. Media practitioners, practices and technologies migrate and circulate across field boundaries unevenly, with some practical elements exhibiting a greater in-built ‘detachability’ and ‘reproducibility’ than others.

This sketch of a theory of media practice brings us to the limitations of practice theory for media studies. To reiterate my earlier point, I am arguing that practice theory cannot be a theoretical cure-all. For example, it is unlikely that practice theory will help us to explain the events surrounding the publication in September 2005 of a set of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper (Hervik and Peterson forthcoming). Practice theory is certainly equipped to handle some of the multiple articulations of this global media event with (inter)local practices (posting on a blog, talking on TV, sharing a YouTube video, debating the issue in a coffee-shop, and so on). Where practice theory cannot help, though, is with the study of this world-historical moment in its own right, as what members of the Manchester School of anthropology (Evens and Handelman 2005) would call not a social practice but rather a ‘political process’, i.e. an unpredictable political conflict whose main arenas can shift at great speed across social fields and geographical space (Swartz et al 1966). These irregular episodes, some of which are known as ‘social dramas’ (Turner 1974, 1996) or ‘media dramas’ (Wagner-Pacifici 1986), possess their own dynamics and ‘processual forms’, not those of regular embodied practices (Bourdieu’s bodily ‘hexis’). Provided that the empirical data are sufficiently rich, such episodes are amenable to detailed stage-by-stage analysis, but practice theory can be of little assistance here.

Other types of media process that practice theory cannot help us with include ‘global media events’ around catastrophes such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 or the Chinese earthquakes of 2008; the instant formation of ‘smart mobs’ enabled by new mobile technologies (e.g. the 2001 People Power II demonstrations in the Philippines that led to a change of government, see Rafael 2003); or the ‘pandemic’ spread of urban legends, rumours, or hoaxes across internet and mobile networks. Again, I am not suggesting that practice theory has nothing to tell us about these complexly mediated processes, only that it does not equip us to study them as processes any better than existing theoretical models. What practice theory can do in all these instances is lend us tools with which to study (especially ethnographically) some of the practical ramifications of these processes – e.g. how they can disrupt the daily practical rounds of people affected by them (see Moores 2005: 31) or how certain media professionals and amateurs may use them to change existing media practices or invent new ones.

Outline of the book

Theorising Media and Practice opens with a debate between two media theorists who advocate different ‘turns to practice’ and regard their own proposals as being ‘instrumental’ (Couldry) and ‘radical’ (Hobart) respectively (Part 1). Then a group of contributors argue for the need to retain holistic notions such as ‘culture’ and/or ‘structure’ in practice-based approaches to media (Part 2). By contrast, the chapters in Part 3 reject any notion of an overarching social structure, placing media squarely in the situated contexts of their practical uses. The discussion then moves on (Part 4) to consider the implications for a practice approach of new digital technologies (and vice versa), and the volume ends with a chapter written from the perspective of a media practitioner (Part 5).

Part 1, ‘Media as Practice’, is an exchange about practice theory and its implications for media studies between two British media theorists: the media sociologist Nick Couldry and the media anthropologist Mark Hobart. These disciplinary identities frame some of their disagreements, particularly around the politics, possibilities and limits of a practice approach to media research in non-Western locales where anthropologists have long had a presence, such as Hobart’s own research base of Bali, in Indonesia. In Chapter 1, Nick Couldry proposes a new media studies paradigm based on practice theory that will bring media scholars closer to the practical actualities of social life in a ‘media-saturated world’. Couldry suggests that this turn to practice theory will help media scholars overcome old impasses around media effects, political economy and audience research, enabling them to take up instead the study of ‘the open-ended range of practices focussed directly or indirectly on media’. The chapter starts by situating the proposed paradigm in relation to the history of media research, after which it discusses the advantages of this approach with particular reference to the limitations of existing audience studies. Of special interest to Couldry is the study of ‘media-oriented practices’ and the question of whether certain media practices ‘anchor’ other practices across social space.

Mark Hobart (Chapter 2) responds to Couldry’s proposal with a call for a more ‘radical’ practice turn in media studies that does away with notions such as structure and system that are deeply rooted in Western thought. Hobart is critical of what he regards as Couldry’s privileging of media as an ‘anchor’ for other social practices (cf. Swidler 2001) and doubts that scholars enjoy a special insight into media power regardless of ordinary people’s own discursive practices. In the place of Couldry’s ‘media-oriented practices’ he proposes ‘media-related practices’ as an open-ended notion that does not confine us to the seemingly bounded worlds of media organisations (but see Ardevol et al, Chapter 12). The term media-related practice can refer, for Hobart, to anything from film- or news making to cooking in time for the family’s favourite soap opera to discussing the purchase of a domestic media artefact. Contending that Schatzki’s (1996) notion of practices as ‘organized nexuses of activities’ downplays human beings’ ability to articulate and order their own practices, Hobart defines practices as ‘those recognised, complex forms of social activity and articulation, through which agents set out to maintain or change themselves, others and the world around them under varying conditions’. The mass media are crucially important in this regard, says Hobart, because they are centrally implicated in such articulations.

Chapter 3 is a brief exchange^¹⁸ between Couldry and Hobart on some of the issues raised in their respective pieces and on the futures of media research, with special reference to the ‘media as practice’ paradigm proposed by Couldry. Both theorists agree that media scholars need to gain a greater understanding of the philosophical underpinnings and presuppositions that shape much media research, a field of research with a long history of empiricism and positivism. They also concur about the urgent need to internationalise media studies. They disagree, however, on a number of issues, including the question of whether certain (media) practices organise or hierarchise other practices.

When reviewing the history of practice theory earlier, I discussed the American anthropologist Sherry Ortner’s (1984, 2006) call for a practice theory that extends its remit to questions of power, culture and history. These questions are central to Part 2, ‘Media, Culture and Practice’, whose contributors (three of them American cultural anthropologists) concur about the need to retain the notion of ‘culture’ in spite of its troubled history. To argue their cases they draw on media examples from the United States, Zambia and India. Elizabeth Bird (Chapter 4) explores the potential uses of practice theory for an anthropology of media audiences not limited to the immediate contexts of media reception (Bird 2003). In contradistinction to Hobart, Bird does not favour a ‘radical’ turn to practice theory that would jettison the key notions of culture and structure. Instead she follows Ortner in arguing that a practice approach must hold together both ‘the constraints of structure and the power of audience agency’. Bird develops her argument with examples of three cultural practices in the United States: weddings, backyard wrestling and television reporting, suggesting that old media effects models cannot capture the manifold ways is which the media subtly alter existing practices. Distinguishing her approach from that of mainstream media scholars, Bird stresses the importance of practices that are not ostensibly centred on media.

In Chapter 5, Debra Spitulnik conducts a thought experiment based on her media anthropological research in Zambia. She invites us to imagine a group of young men ‘listening to the radio’ in a provincial Zambian marketplace. To analyse this practice one could either (a) follow standard ethnographic procedure by taking this to be a ‘core’ media practice and contextualising it through an ever-widening lens (youth culture, provincial marketplace, modern Zambia, etc.) or (b) adopt a more reflexive, unbounded and ‘rhizomatic’ approach (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Although Spitulnik favours the more experimental option (b) she also aligns herself with Brightman (1995), Hannerz (1992) and other social theorists – not least with Ortner – who argue for the retention of a non-essentialist notion of culture. This combination of practical rhizomes and cultural milieus, suggests Spitulnik, affords ‘more complex analyses of what is going on within so-called ‘sets of meanings and practices’’, such as radio listening in a Zambian marketplace.

Practice theorists have overlooked what practitioners themselves make of their own cultural practices, argues Mark A. Peterson in Chapter 6. In other words, we lack metacultural accounts of practice. Grounding the discussion in his anthropological fieldwork in New Delhi (India), Peterson sketches a vernacular theory of the practice of reading newspapers. One significant folk distinction is that between ‘taking’ and ‘reading’ a newspaper. Whilst taking a prestigious English-language paper is part of one’s ‘personalia’ (Gell 1986) as a modern educated Indian, privately reading a low-status paper is justified as merely a ‘habit’ or ‘addiction’ – one of the little ‘heterodoxies of practice’ (Bourdieu) through which social agents deviate from local regimes of value. The chapter concludes with a reflection on Peterson’s own effect on the practices he was studying, e.g. by introducing ‘dispersed practices’ (Schatzki 1996) such as asking informants to comment on their reading practices.

Ursula Rao’s discussion (Chapter 7) is, like Peterson’s, based on ethnographic research on the news media in North India, but here the focus is on media production rather than reception. Rao brings an interest in the performative nature of public life to her analysis of the controversy surrounding the making of a Hindi film in the holy city of Banaras (Benares). The analysis reveals how ambitious local men used the populist ‘open-door policy’ of the vernacular press to launch their political careers by capitalising on the Banaras drama. Finding the field/practice models of Bourdieu (1998) and Couldry (this volume) too orderly, Rao argues that in the ‘culture in flux’ of India’s ever more commercialised press, we must pay close attention not to regulated domains but to the contingent border-crossing ‘tactics’ (de Certeau 1984) of grassroots practitioners. She also contends that although folk versions of a Habermasian public sphere certainly inform widely shared democratic ideals about the Indian press, the actual news-making practices of local journalists differ quite markedly from the cherished ideals. In India, the ‘performative politics’ of making visible a political leader’s heroism, benevolence and effective networking is inextricable from the practices related to news making.

The chapters in Part 3, ‘Media Practices in Context’, follow what we might call ‘radical contextualism’ as their guiding principle. Their authors focus on the context-specific ways in which people make use of media. To these three contributors meanings do not travel well across social situations (but see Spitulnik’s [1996] earlier mentioned meta-pragmatic discourse), so that the meaning of a medium is always emergent and contingent on the micro-historical circumstances of its use, regardless of whether a given medium allows users to communicate with others across vast stretches of time and/or space (cf. Thompson 1995, Moores 2005). These contributors also warn against the cryptic structuralism of much media scholarship, and indeed of social theory generally. In this respect they come closer to Hobart’s than to Couldry’s position in the ‘turn to media practice’ debate. Thus the media semiotician Guido Ipsen builds on the ideas of the founder of American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) to propose a semiotic-pragmatist approach to theorising media as practice (Chapter 8). Distancing himself both from structuralist semiotics and from what he sees as media studies’ sociotechnocentrism (which he partly blames on McLuhan), Ipsen places instead sign-making (= semiosis) in the forefront of a practice-theoretical approach to media. For Ipsen, meaning cannot reside in media artefacts of technologies. Because media, like signs, bear ‘the fundamental quality of something in-between’ we can only know what a medium actually means ‘within the process and practice of its usage’.

Like Ipsen, Jo Helle-Valle (Chapter 9) has little time for structuralism. Helle-Valle argues that structuralist assumptions still shape (media) anthropological research, in particular the tacit idea that an invisible langue (system of meaning) orders our visible practices. To release himself from the grip of structuralism, Helle-Valle conjoins the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘language-games’ (‘the practically formed communicative contexts that provide statements with meaning’) with the anthropological concept of ‘in/dividual’ (the idea that our self is at times unitary and at other times divided, see LiPuma 1998), to develop an original practice-theoretical model for media research. Combined, he argues, the notions of language-game and in/dividual let us track people’s media uses and meaning-making as they move across social contexts. He illustrates this abstract model with examples from his research into the uses of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Norwegian households.

Following Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian social anthropologist whose name is not readily associated with practice theory, Jens Kjaerulff (Chapter 10) argues for a radically empirical take on the question of media as practice. The ethnographic examples are taken from Kjaerulff’s research among teleworkers in rural Denmark. His analytical starting point is a naturalistic definition of social practice as ‘what people actually do’. With this deliberately broad definition, Kjaerulff intends to capture the open-endedness of his research participants’ (internet-related) practices. Like Barth, he is more interested in how people attempt – but often fail – to order their lives than in classic social theoretical concerns with how social order is possible in the first place. He argues that ‘ordering’ is always an unending, partial and untidy process. For instance, rural teleworkers’ best efforts at separating ‘work’ from ‘family life’ were often undermined by events beyond their control. Regarding work as a ‘cultural stream’ (Barth) that shapes local practices, he illustrates this influence with the case of a weekly lunch that brought together all local teleworkers. Because this lunch was framed as ‘work’ this determined the timing of the event, the types of food and beverages consumed, the topics of conversations deemed appropriate, and so on^¹⁹

Both chapters in Part 4, ‘Digital Media Practices’, share a focus on the study of new digital technologies from a practice perspective. Their authors consider the implications of the rapid proliferation of digital technologies for practice-based analyses of social change within specific social domains – domestic digital technologies in one case, ‘new media’ cultural production in the other. Still in Denmark, Toke H. Christensen and Inge Røpke (Chapter 11) examine the daily uses of ICTs by Danish families through examples of practices such as shopping, ‘holding things together’, maintaining social networks, or ‘killing time’. Questioning Reckwitz’s (2002) depiction of individuals as the ‘carriers’ of practices, they stress the importance of social interaction. In most cases, they suggest, ‘the successful performance of a practice depends on the active participation of several persons’, for instance, when micro-coordinating a family meal over several mobile phones. Whilst concurring with Shove and her associates (e.g. Shove and Pantzar 2005) on the need to address the neglect of materiality by leading practice theorists, they also point out that Shove et al, like Reckwitz, downplay social interaction (see my earlier discussion of this term). The chapter closes with some remarks on the challenges of applying practice theory to the study of ICTs in day-to-day life, including the analytical difficulties of separating out one practice from another (e.g. shopping vs. ‘holding things together’) or of ascertaining whether a given mediated activity belongs with more than one practice simultaneously.

The aim of Elisenda Ardevol and colleagues’ piece (Chapter 12) is ‘to explore how peoples’ media practices mix with institutionalised media practices’ as a way of understanding media as practice. Ardevol et al entreat media theorists to regard ‘play’ (cf. Weiss 2006 and above) as a key aspect of the current global shift in media production towards ‘user-generated content’. Through the ludic appropriation of internet and mobile technologies, today’s ‘media consumers’ often are simultaneously producers, distributors and consumers of new media contents. Exemplifying their analysis with computer gaming and other audiovisual practices in France, Hong Kong and Spain they caution that Mark Hobart’s notion of ‘media-related practices’ assumes a separation between professional and amateur (or popular) media practices at odds with today’s media environments, e.g. when a mundane Hong Kong bus scene captured with a mobile phone camera ‘goes viral’, morphing at great speed across the porous boundaries separating the ‘traditional’ mass media from myriad new media platforms. They conclude that any practice-based approach to media should recognise that today virtually all of us are ‘the media’.

Part 5, ‘Media Practitioners’ consists of a single chapter by Cathy Greenhalgh who approaches practice theory as a filmmaking practitioner, ethnographer and teacher. Greenhalgh argues that film and media theorists have rarely acknowledged the collaborative character of filmmaking, as they have focused on forms, texts and authorship and not on how the crew shape the making of the final product. Her chapter describes in detail two cinematographic practices: ‘cheating’ (‘the constant coordination of bodies and sets with different lens views’) and ‘visualisation’ (‘the visual concept of a sequence or whole film’). Following de Certeau (1984), Greenhalgh distinguishes between the long-term ‘strategies’ of the film industry and the semi-autonomous ‘tactics’ of the crew. As she puts it: ‘The way a particular film resolves problems and the specific physical dexterity, psychological manoeuvres and affective mood of crew members are tactical’. She concludes by suggesting that theories of practice tend to be too general to capture the ground-up, contingent emergence of (media) practices.

To conclude, collectively these chapters further our understanding of media as practice by critically engaging with the work of a range of practice theorists (Peirce, Wittgenstein, Bourdieu, Foucault, de Certeau, Barth, Ortner, Schatzki, Warde and others) in order to address a set of closely interrelated questions, namely the epistemological implications for media studies of a prospective turn to practice theory; the power/knowledge asymmetries that define the mutually constitutive practices of media researchers and researched; the uses and abuses of key concepts such as ‘practices’, ‘media practices’, ‘structure’ and ‘culture’; the radically situated nature of people’s embodied, mediated practices; the study of media practices under conditions of swift technological change; the relationship between mainstream and marginal media practices; and the gulf between media theorists’ and media practitioners’ understandings of mediated practice.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Birgit Bräuchler and Sarah Pink for their thoughtful comments on previous drafts of this Introduction.

Notes

1. For a series of overviews of the anthropology of media, see Askew and Wilk (2002), Dickey (1997), Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod and Larkin (2002), Peterson (2003) and Rothenbuhler and Coman (2005).

2. This analysis is based on a Google Book search of the word ‘practices’ through online versions of four textbooks (Askew and Wilk 2002, Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod and Larkin 2002, Hughes-Freeland 1998 and Rothenbuhler and Coman 2005) followed by a direct inspection of the printed versions of these books. This method yielded a complete set of instances in which the word ‘practices’ appears along with the contexts of its numerous usages. A copy of this set is available at http://johnpostill.wordpress.com/2008/08/06/media-anthropological-uses-of-keyword-practices/ (retrieved 25 August 2008).

3. This figure includes double qualifiers.

4. See Amit (2002) on common anthropological slippages around key notions such as ‘community’, ‘group’, ‘network’, etc.

5. The same applies to the ethnography of media, see, e.g. Paterson and Domingo (2008).

6. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/ (retrieved 11 August 2008).

7. But see the ‘post-humanist challenge’ (Schatzki 2001) posed by Bruno Latour and his former Actor Network Theory associates (Couldry in press, Hinkelbein 2008).

8. This passage is based on a text from the now inaccessible carnalsociology.org website. The text is now available at http://johnpostill.wordpress.com/2008/05/14/fields-capital/ (retrieved 11 August 2008).

9. From the Greek for ‘belief or judgment’ (see Guthrie 1962: 155).

10. For media-anthropological versions of Ortner’s position, see Part 2 (this volume).

11. This preference for Gramsci is shared by political anthropologists (e.g. Gledhill 2000, Nuitjen 2003) and media anthropologists (e.g. Ginsburg et al 2002, Mankekar 2002).

12. However, see Christensen and Røpke (this volume) on the analytical difficulties of attempting to do so ‘in practice’.

13. Couldry acknowledges Warde’s inspiration in Couldry (2004: 130).

14. See also Christensen and Røpke (this volume) on the routinisation of computer and internet technologies (in affluent countries) and how today ‘most people feel comfortable using a computer’ (but cf. Hinkelbein 2008 on ethnic minorities and other groups in Germany and their ICT uses).

15. A rhetoric uncritically reproduced in both ethnographic accounts cited here.

16. On Fredrik Barth as a practice theorist of sorts, see Kjaerulff (this volume).

17. One interesting media instance of these two sociological principles at work is the music sharing site Last.fm (http://www.last.fm/) in which users are related to one another as ‘friends’ (i.e. anyone with whom they recognise a social tie) and/or ‘neighbours’ (users with whom, on the basis of their digital trail, they share a similar taste in music).

18. For reasons of space the original exchange had to be abridged. See the full version at http://www.criticalia.org/Debate_on_Media_Practices.htm (retrieved 27 August 2008)

19. See my discussion of a suburban Malaysian ‘field of practices’ above.

References

Amit,V. 2002 ‘Anthropology and Community: Some Opening Notes’, in V. Amit and N. Rapport, The Trouble with Community, pp. 13–25. London: Pluto Press.

Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Askew, K. and R.R. Wilk (eds). 2002. The Anthropology of Media: A Reader. New York: Blackwell.

Benson, R. and E. Neveu (eds) 2005. Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bird, S. E. 2003. The Audience in Everyday Life: Living in a Media World. London: Routledge.

Bob, C. 2005. The Marketing of Rebellion: insurgents, media, and international activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———1990. In Other Words. Cambridge: Polity

———1992. The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. Cambridge: Polity Press.

———1993. The Field of Cultural Production. Cambridge : Polity Press.

——— 1998 On Television and Journalism. London: Pluto.

———2005. ‘The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field’, In: R. Benson and E. Neveu (eds) Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 29-47.

Bourdieu, P. and L. Wacquant 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity.

Brightman, R. 1995. ‘Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification’. Cultural Anthropology 10(4), 509-546.

Couldry, N. 2003. Media meta-capital: Extending the range of Bourdieu's field theory, Theory and Society 32, 653-677

———2004. Theorising media as practice. Social Semiotics 14 (2):115-132

———2005. ‘Media Rituals: Beyond Functionalism’. In: Rothenbuhler, E.W. and M. Coman (eds), Media Anthropology, London: Sage. pp. 59-69.

——— in press. Actor Network Theory and media: do they connect and on what terms? In: A. Hepp et al. (eds) Cultures of Connectivity. Retrieved 25 August 2008 from

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/media@lse/pdf/Couldry_ActorNetworkTheoryMedia.pdf

Csíkszentmihályi, M. 1990. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: Harper and Row.

De Certeau, M. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, University of Minnesota Press.

De Nooy, W. 2003 ‘Fields and networks: correspondence analysis and social network analysis in the framework of field theory’, Poetics 31: 305-327.

Dickey, S. 1997. Anthropology and its contributions to studies of mass media. International Social Science Journal XLIX 3, 413-427.

Eisenlohr, P. 2006 ‘As Makkah is sweet and beloved, so is Madina: Islam, devotional genres, and electronic mediation in Mauritius’, American Ethnologist 33 (2): 230-245.

Ellis, J. 1982. Visible Fictions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

Eriksen, T.H. and Nielsen, F.S. 2001. A History of Anthropology, London: Pluto Press.

Evens, T.M.S and D. Handelman (eds) 2006. The Manchester School: Practice and Ethnographic Praxis in Anthropology, Oxford: Berghahn.

Ferrell, J., D. Milovanovic and S. Lyng (2001) Edgework, media practices, and the elongation of meaning: a theoretical ethnography of the Bridge Day event, Theoretical Criminology 5(2), 177-202

Foucault, M. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Harmondstworth: Peregrine Books.

Gell, A. 1986. ‘Newcomers to a World of Goods: Consumption among the Muria Gonds’. In: A. Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———1992. The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images, Oxford: Berg.

Giddens, A. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society. Cambridge: Polity.

Ginsburg, F. 1993. ‘Aboriginal Media and the Australian Imaginary’, Public Culture 5 (3): 557-578.

Ginsburg, F., L. Abu-Lughod, and B. Larkin 2002. Media Worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hägerstrand, T. (1967). Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hamilton, A. 2002. The national picture: Thai media and cultural identity. In: Ginsburg, F.D., Abu-Lughod, L. and Larkin, B. (eds) Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

Guthrie, W.K.C. 1962. A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hannerz, U. 1992. Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning, New York: Columbia University Press.

Hawk, B. D. Riedler and O. Oviedo (eds) 2008. Small Tech: The Culture of Digital Tools, Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press.

Hervik, P. and M.A. Peterson forthcoming. Cartoon Violence? Media, Muslims and the Making of a Global Controversy. Oxford: Berghahn

Hesmondhalgh, D. and Toynbee, J. (eds) (2008) The Media and Social Theory. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Hinkelbein, O. 2008. ‘Strategien zur Digitalen Integration von Migranten: Ethnographische Fallstudien in Esslingen und Hannover’, Ph.D. dissertation. Bremen: University of Bremen.

Hobart, M. 2002. 'Live or Dead? Televising Theater in Bali.' In: Ginsburg, F., L. Abu-Lughod, and B. Larkin (eds) Media Worlds. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———2005. The profanity of the media. In E. Rothenbuhler and M. Coman (eds) Media Anthropology. London: Sage, pp. 26-35.

Hughes-Freeland, F. (ed.) 1998. Ritual, Performance, Media. London: Routledge

Jarzabkowski, P., J. Balogun and D. Seidl 2007. ‘Strategizing: The challenges of a practice perspective’, Human Relations, Vol. 60, No. 1, 5-27

Jenkins, R. 2002. Pierre Bourdieu, London: Routledge.

Knox, H., M. Savage and P. Harvey 2006, ‘Social networks and spatial relations: networks as method, metaphor and form’ Economy and Society 35(1), 113-140.

LiPuma, E. 1998. ‘Modernity and Forms of Personhood in Melanesia’. In: M. Lambek and A. Strathern (eds), Bodies and Persons. Comparative Perspectives from Africa and Melanesia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 53-79.

Lizardo, O. 2007. ‘‘Mirror Neurons’, Collective Objects and the Problem of Transmission: Reconsidering Stephen Turner's Critique of Practice Theory’

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3), 319-350

Martin, J. L. 2003. ‘What Is Field Theory?’, American Journal of Sociology 109: 1-49.

Moeran, B. 2002 ‘Fields, networks and frames: advertising social organization in Japan’, Global Networks 16, 371-386.

Moores, S. 2005. Media/Theory. London: Routledge.

Nuitjen, M. 2003. Family Property and the Limits of Intervention: The Article 27 Reforms and the PROCEDE Programme in Mexico. Development and Change 34:475-497.

Ortner, S.B. 1984, ‘Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 26(1), 126-166.

_______2006. Anthropology and Social Theory. In: S.B. Ortner, Culture, Power and the Acting Subject, Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Parkin, R. 1997. ‘Practice Theory’, In: Barfield, T. (ed.) The Dictionary of Anthropology, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 375-377.

Paterson, C. and D. Domingo (2008) Making Online News: The Ethnography of New Media Production. New York: Peter Lang.

Peterson, M. A. 2003. Anthropology and Mass Communication: Media and Myth in the New Millennium, Oxford: Berghahn.

——— 2005 ‘Performing Media: Toward an Ethnography of Intertextuality. In: Rothenbuhler, E.W. and M. Coman (eds), Media Anthropology, London: Sage. pp. 129-138.

Postill, J. 2002. Clock and calendar time: a missing anthropological problem, Time & Society, 11, 251-270.

———. 2006. Media and Nation Building: How the Iban Became Malaysian. Oxford: Berghahn.

———2008 ‘Localizing the internet beyond communities and networks’, New Media and Society, 10(3), 413-431.

Pype, K. 2008. ‘The Making of the Pentecostal Melodrama: Mimesis, Power, and Agency in Kinshasa’s Media World’, Ph.D. dissertation. Leuven: Catholic University of Leuven.

Rafael, V. 2003 ‘The cell phone and the crowd: messianic politics in the contemporary Philippines’, Public Culture 15:3, 399-425.

Randles, S. and A. Warde. 2006. ‘Consumption: the view from theories of practice’, in K. Green and S. Randles (eds), Industrial Ecology and Spaces of Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 220-237.

Reckwitz, A. 2002. ‘Toward a theory of social practices. A development in culturalist theorizing’, European Journal of Social Theory 5: 243-63.

Reed-Danahay, D. 2005. Locating Bourdieu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ryan, A. 1970. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London: Macmillan.

Rothenbuhler, E. and M. Coman (eds). 2005. Media Anthropology, London: Sage.

Sahlins, M., 1981. Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, Ann Arbor (MI): University of Michigan Press.

Scannell, P. 1988. Radio times: the temporal arrangements of broadcasting in the modern world. In: Drummond, P. and Paterson, R. (eds), Television and its Audience, pp. 15-29, London: British Film Institute.

———1991. Introduction: The Relevance of Talk. In P. Scannell (ed) Broadcast Talk. London: Sage

Schatzki, T. 1996. Social Practices. A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— 2001. ‘Introduction: Practice Theory’, In: Schatzki, T., K. Knorr Cetina and E. von Savigny (eds) 2001. The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, London: Routledge, pp. 1-14.

Schatzki, T., K. Knorr Cetina and E. von Savigny (eds) 2001. The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory, London: Routledge

Schieffelin, E. 1998. ‘Problematizing Performance’. In: F. Hughes-Freeland (ed.): Ritual, Performance, Media, London: Routledge.

Shove, E. 2003. Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience. The Social Organization of Normality. Oxford / New York: Berg.

———, and M. Pantzar. 2005. ‘Consumers, producers and practices. Understanding the invention and reinvention of Nordic walking’, Journal of Consumer Culture 5: 43-64.

———, et al. 2007. The Design of Everyday Life. Oxford: Berg.

Silverstone, R. 1993 `Television, Ontological Security and the Transitional Object', Media, Culture and Society, 15 (4), 573-598.

Spitulnik, D. 1996. The social circulation of media discourse and the mediation of communities. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 62, 161 187.

Swartz, D. 1997. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Swartz, M., V. Turner and A. Tuden (eds) 1966 Political Anthropology, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.

Swidler, A. 1986. ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review 51, 273–286.

——— 2001. ‘What anchors cultural practices’, In The practice turn in contemporary theory. ed. T.R. Schatzki et al. London: Routledge.

Thompson, J.B. 1995. The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Turner, V.W. 1974. Dramas, fields and metaphors: Symbolic action in human society, Ithaca , New York : Cornell University Press.

———1996. Schism and Continuity in an African Society (originally published in 1957). Oxford : Berg.

Van de Port, M. 2006 ‘Visualizing the sacred: Video technology, “televisual” style, and the religious imagination in Bahian candomblé’ American Ethnologist 33 (3): 444-461.

Warde, A. 2005. ‘Consumption and theories of practice’, Journal of Consumer Culture 5: 131-53.

Weiss, M.D. 2006. ‘Working at Play: BDSM Sexuality in the San Francisco Bay Area’ Anthropologica 48, 229-245

Whittington, R. 2006. ‘Completing the Practice Turn in Strategy Research’, Organization Studies, Vol. 27, No. 5, 613-634

Wittel, A. 2001 ‘Toward a Network Sociality’, Theory, Culture & Society 18 (6): 51-76.